Section 171B of Indian Penal Code, 1860 – Explained!

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Legal Provisions of Section 171B of Indian Penal Code, 1860.

Bribery

This section defines the offence of bribery at an election the punishment of which has been provided
under section 170-E. Since this offence has to be with respect to the electoral right, it has been so
defined. The section vide clause (1) (i) says that whoever gives a gratification to any person with the
object of inducing him or any other person to exercise any electoral right or of rewarding any person
for having exercised any such right, commits the offence of bribery. According to this sub-clause one
way of committing bribery is by giving gratification. The object of the giver must be either to induce
a person to exercise an electoral right or of rewarding him for having already exercised such right.
Bribery has also been defined under clause (1) (ii) wherein it has been said that whoever accepts any
gratification, either for himself or for any other person, as a reward for exercising any such right or
for inducing or attempting to induce any other person to exercise any such right, commits the
offence of bribery.

Thus the second way of committing bribery is by accepting gratification. So bribery under this
section is possible either by giving gratification as stated under the first part of the first clause or by
accepting gratification as stated by the second part of the first clause. There is a proviso clause as
well which clarifies that a declaration of public policy or a promise of public action shall not be an
offence under this section.

According to the second clause of this section, a person who offers, or agrees to give, or offers or
attempts to procure, a gratification shall be deemed to give a gratification. In other words, a
gratification is deemed to have been given in any of the four cases, viz., where a person offers
gratification, or where he agrees to give gratification, or where he offers to procure gratification, or
where he attempts to procure gratification. The second clause, therefore, further explains ‘bribery
by giving gratification’ which has been explained in clause (1) (i) of this section.

The third clause of this section further explains ‘bribery by accepting gratification’ which has been
explained in clause (1) (ii) of this section. According to the third clause, a person who obtains, or
agrees to accept, or attempts to obtain a gratification shall be deemed to accept a gratification, and
a person who accepts a gratification as a motive for doing something which he has no intention to
do, or as a reward for doing something which he has not done, shall be deemed to have accepted
the gratification as a reward.

In Deepuk Ganpatrao Salunke v. Government of Maharashtra,’ the Bombay High Court held that
statements made by a member of ruling political alliance to a political party that if it supported the
alliance in the parliamentary elections one member of that party would be made the Deputy Chief
Minister, does not amount to giving offer to any individual with respect to exercising his electoral
right in a particular manner and cannot be called as giving gratification under section 171-B of the
Code.

Home ››Section 171C of Indian Penal Code, 1860 – Explained!

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Legal Provisions of Section 171C of Indian Penal Code, 1860.

Undue influence at elections:

This section defines the offence of undue influence at election. The offence is punishable under
section 171 -F of the Code. Sub-section (1) of the section states that whoever interferes voluntarily,
or attempts to interfere voluntarily, with the free exercise of any electoral right commits the offence
of undue influence at an election. Actual interference and attempt to interfere have been treated at
par.

The interference or its attempt must be with respect to free exercise of any electoral right. ‘Electoral
right’ has the same meaning as given under section 171-A of the Code. Sub-section (2) explains the
meaning of the expression ‘free exercise of the electoral right’ by including within it certain things
while at the same time not prejudicing the generality of the provisions of sub-section (1). It says vide
clause (a) that without prejudice to the generality of the provisions of sub-section (1), whoever
either threatens any candidate or voter, or threatens any person in whom a candidate or voter is
interested, with any kind of injury, it shall be deemed to be an interference with the free exercise of
the electoral right of such candidate or voter, as the case may be, within the meaning of sub-section
(1). It says vide clause (b) that without prejudice to the generality of the provisions of sub-section
(1), whoever either induces a candidate or a voter or attempts to induce a candidate or a voter to
believe that he or any person in whom he is interested will become or will be rendered an object of
divine displeasure or of spiritual censure, shall be deemed to be an interference with the free
exercise of the electoral right of such candidate or voter, within the meaning of sub-section (1). Sub-
section (3), while excluding certain things from being considered as interference, says that a
declaration of public policy or a promise of public action, or the mere exercise of a legal right
without any intention to interfere with an electoral right, shall not be deemed to be interference
within the meaning of this section.

In Raj Raj Deb v. Gangadhar Mahapatra, a candidate at an election represented himself as ‘Chalanti
Vishnu’, a representative of Lord Vishnu, before the voters and impressed upon them that anyone
not voting for him would commit a sin against the Hindu religion and sacrilege against the deity. He
was held guilty under section 171-F for committing the offence defined under this section. In
Baburao Patel v. Zakir Hussain, the Supreme Court held that a letter addressed by the Prime Minister
to the members of Parliament asking them to vote for the candidate belonging to her party for the
office of President did not constitute undue influence.

In Shiva Kripal Singh v. V.V. Giri, the evidence could not establish that a pamphlet was distributed to
the voters by the connivance of a returned candidate which made serious allegations against a rival
candidate. The Supreme Court held that this section did not app

The Madras High Court held in M. Anbalagam v. State, that a message to boycott an election could
not be held to be undue influence because the voters were free to vote or not to vote despite the
message.

In Charan Lai Saliu v. Giani Zail Singh, the Supreme Court has observed that in clauses (a) and (b) of
sub-section (1) of section 171-C something more than mere canvassing for vote is required.
Consequently, an appeal by the Chairman, Minorities Commission, who had been a judge of the
Supreme Court earlier, to vote for a particular candidate, did not amount to undue influence.

Section 191 of Indian Penal Code, 1860 – Explained!

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Legal Provisions of Section 191 of Indian Penal Code, 1860.

Giving false evidence:

This section defines the offence of giving false evidence which in popular parlance is known as
perjury, a word not used by the Indian Penal Code’ The section says that whoever is legally bound to
state the truth, either by an oath or by any express provision of law, or is bound by law to make a
declaration upon any subject, makes any false statement, and about which he has either knowledge
that it is false or believe that it is false, or he does not believe the statement to be true, is guilty of
giving false evidence.

There are two explanations given in the section the first of which states that a statement under this
section may be verbal or any other kind of statement. According to the second explanation, a false
statement as to the belief of the person attesting is covered by this section, and, therefore, a person
is guilty of giving false evidence where he states that he believes something which he actually does
not believe, or where he states that he knows something which actually he does not know.

The section requires that the person against whom a charge of giving false evidence is made must be
legally bound to state the truth either by an oath or by an express provision of law, or he must be
bound by law to make a declaration upon any subject. The statement made must be a false
statement, and the maker of the statement must either know it to be false, or must believe it to be
false, or does not believe it to be true. It is not necessary that the false statement made must have
any bearing upon the matter in issue.

Oath

According to section 51 of the Code, the word ‘oath’ includes a solemn affirmation substituted by
law for an oath, and any declaration required or authorised by law to be made before a public
servant or to be used for the purpose of proof, whether in .a court of justice or not.

As is clear, the definition is not an exhaustive one but is an inclusive definition. Section 8, Oaths Act,
1969 requires that every person giving evidence on any subject before any court is bound to state
the truth. The Calcutta High Court is of the opinion that the offence of giving false evidence may be
committed even though the person giving evidence has neither been sworn nor affirmed. But the
Allahabad High Court does not subscribe to this view.

In Advocate General, High Court of Karnataka v. Chidambara, there was an application to dismiss the
order on a compromise petition allegedly signed by the impersonating respondents instead of the
real respondents in a writ appeal. There was an admission by the accused on oath that some persons
had impersonated the real contesting respondents in the writ appeal.

Subsequently, however, in suo motu proceedings for contempt of court, the accused stated that he
had given a false statement in the course of those proceedings when his sworn statement was being
recorded. The Karnataka High Court held that the act of the accused amounted to commission of the
offence of giving false evidence.

Jurisdiction
If a matter is being heard by a court which has no jurisdiction to hear the same, false statement
made during the course of such proceedings does not attract section 191 of the Code.

Express provision of law

Where one is bound by an express provision of law to state the truth, even though he is not bound
by an oath, making a false statement makes him liable. Express provision of law may be any law
which specifically binds a person to state the truth. The Supreme Court has held in Ranjit Singh v.
State, that a person who is bound by an express statement through a false affidavit in the court, is
guilty of giving false evidence.

Declaration upon any subject

This section is applicable when one is bound by law to make a declaration upon any subject and
makes a false statement as stated in the section. The expression ‘any subject’ has been used in the
sense of that subject on which one is bound by law to make a declaration. It does not mean any
subject which has absolutely no connection with the case concerned. The law sometimes requires a
declaration to be made with respect to a matter and in such a case a false declaration will make one
liable if other requirements of the section are met.

Knows or believes to be false or does not believe to be true

The accused must know the statement to be false or he must believe it to be false or he must not
believe it to be true. Swearing at a fact without knowing at the time whether it is true or false will
make him liable when the statement in fact is false.

Two contradictory statements

When a person makes two contradictory statements one of these is bound to be false. But that in
itself does not make him liable. The prosecution has the responsibility to establish positively as to
which of them is false before he can be held guilty of the same. This seems to be the view in
England. But in India, illustration (c) of section 221, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 says—’A states
on oath before the magistrate that he saw В hit С with a club. Before the sessions court A states on
oath that В never hit C. A may be charged in the alternative and convicted of intentionally giving
false evidence, although it cannot be proved which of these contradictory statement was false’.

Thus, where a person makes on statement under section 164, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 and
another diametrically opposite one in court during inquiry or trial, he could be charged for giving
false evidence. But the Supreme Court has held in Ramchandran v. State, and Balak Ram v. State,
and the Andhra Pradesh High Court in the case of In re B. Arjunappa that such evidence must be
approached with caution in view of the fact that the accused feels tied to his previous statement
under section 164.

Illegality of a trial
The Calcutta and Madras High Courts have held that where false evidence has been given in course
of a trial, but a retrial has been ordered in view of an irregularity in that trial, the accused is liable for
the same as obligation to state the truth exists always. But the Bombay High Court disagreed with
this point of view where the proceedings had been annulled as no sanction for the prosecution had
been given, and thus the previous proceedings could not be called judicial proceedings before which
the earlier evidence was give

The Supreme Court has observed in S.P. Kohli v. High Court of Punjab and Haryana that it is now
almost settled that court must sanction prosecution for the offence of giving false evidence only
when false evidence has been given deliberately on a matter of substance and that there is every
probability of an order of conviction by the court in the matter.

Section 192 of Indian Penal Code, 1860 – Explained!

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Legal Provisions of Section 192 of Indian Penal Code, 1860.

Fabricating false evidence:

This section defines the offence of fabricating false evidence. It states that whoever causes any
circumstance to exist or makes any false entry in any book or record, or makes any document
containing a false statement, with the intention that such circumstance, false entry or false
statement may appear either in a judicial proceeding, or in a proceeding before a public servant as
such taken by law, or before an arbitrator, and that such circumstance, false entry or false
statement, so appearing in evidence, may cause any person who is to form an opinion upon the
evidence in such proceeding, to entertain an erroneous opinion with respect to any point which is
material to the result of such proceeding, is said to fabricate false evidence.

According to the section, there are only three ways by which a false evidence can be fabricated—(1)
by causing any circumstance to exist, as illustrated by illustration (a) under the section, (2) by making
any false entry in any book or record, as illustrated by illustration (b), and (3) by making any
document containing a false statement, as illustrated by illustration (c). The intention of the
fabricator must be that such a thing may appear before such a proceeding as stated in the section,
and may cause a person to entertain an erroneous opinion in the course of such proceeding
touching any material point.

Forgery and fabricating false evidence

The Supreme Court has observed in Babulal v. State, that even though the offences of forgery and
fabricating false evidence sometimes may have some common elements, the offences are distinct.
Making false documents, or false entries in a book or record, may amount to forgery if other
elements of that offence are present.

But when these false documents, or entries, are intended to be used in a judicial proceeding, or in a
proceeding before a public servant or an arbitrator, leading to entertaining an erroneous opinion
touching any point material to the result of the proceeding, the offence of fabricating false evidence
is committed.

Home ››Section 231 of Indian Penal Code, 1860 – Explained!

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Legal Provisions of Section 231 of Indian Penal Code, 1860.

Counterfeiting coin:

This section makes counterfeiting of coins a punishable offence. It says that whoever either
counterfeits coin or performs any part of the process of counterfeiting coin knowingly, shall be
punished with simple or rigorous imprisonment for a term extending up to seven years, and shall
also be liable to fine.

According to the explanation attached to the section, a person who causes a genuine coin to appear
like a different coin, with the intention of practising deception, or with the knowledge that it is likely
that deception will thereby be practised, is guilty of the offence under this section.

According to the section, not only counterfeiting coin but also performing any part of the process of
counterfeiting coin is an offence. The expression ‘performs any part of the process’ has been used to
indicate that it is not necessary that the whole process should be completed. The end product may
not be finished or perfected.

The section is applicable whether the act of counterfeiting is complete or is left unfinished. The
explanation clarifies that even causing a genuine coin to look like another coin is an offence under
this section provided the same is done with the intention of practising deception or with the
knowledge that deception is likely to be practised thereby.

Therefore, causing a genuine coin to look different does not give any defence to the doer if the
requisite mens rea as stated in the section is present. It is not necessary that the resemblance must
be exact. However, if no one would be deceived because of the very poor imitation, there is no
liability under this section. The word ‘counterfeit’, as has been defined under section 28 of Code,
means causing one thing to resemble another, intending by means of that resemblance to practise
deception, or knowing it to be likely that deception will thereby be practised.

The offence under this section is cognizable, non-bailable and non-compoundable, and is triable by
magistrate of the first class.

Section 232 of Indian Penal Code, 1860 – Explained!

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Legal Provisions of Section 232 of Indian Penal Code, 1860.

Counterfeiting Indian coin:

This section penalises counterfeiting of Indian coin. It says that whoever either counterfeits Indian
coin, or performs any part of the process of counterfeiting Indian coin knowingly, shall be punished
with imprisonment for life, or with simple or rigorous imprisonment for a term extending up to ten
years, and shall also be liable to fine.
The section not only punishes counterfeiting Indian coin but also performing any part of the process
of counterfeiting Indian coin knowingly. Even if the work remains partly in completed or unfinished,
the section is applicable. This is clear from the use of the words ‘performs any part of the process’.

The word ‘counterfeit’ has the same meaning as given in section 28 of the Code. Counterfeiting
Indian coin has been thought to be more serious than counterfeiting other coin and has thus been
punished more severely under this section. Making counterfeit Indian coin with the object of
secretly transmitting the same into the house of another person so that the other person would get
into trouble is punishable under section 195 and not under section 232 or 235 of the Code.

The offence under this section is cognizable, non-bailable and non-compoundable, and is triable by
court of session

Section 264 of Indian Penal Code, 1860 – Explained!

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Legal Provisions of Section 264 of Indian Penal Code, 1860.

Fraudulent use of false instrument for weighing:

This section makes fraudulent use of false instrument for weighing, an offence. It says that whoever
uses any instrument for weighing with intention to defraud with the knowledge that the instrument
is false, shall be punished with simple or rigorous imprisonment for a term extending up to one year,
or with fine, or with both.

The section requires that an instrument for weighing is used with the knowledge that it is a false
instrument and with the intention to defraud. The section does not mention any standard weight.
Fraudulent use of a weight which is less than the customary weight will entail liability under this
section if other ingredients of the section are also present. The expression ‘false’ in this whole
chapter means one which is different from the instrument, weight or measure fixed by the parties,
expressly or impliedly, in their dealing with each other.

The offence under this section is non-cognizable, bailable and non-compoundable, and is triable by
any magistrate.

Section 268 of Indian Penal Code, 1860 – Explained!

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Legal Provisions of Section 268 of Indian Penal Code, 1860.

Public nuisance:

This section defines public nuisance. According to the section, a person commits public nuisance
who either does any act or is guilty of an illegal omission, which causes either any common injury or
danger or annoyance to the public or to the people in general who stay or occupy property near that
place, or which must necessarily cause either injury or obstruction or danger or annoyance to such
persons who may have occasion to use any public right. It is not a defence to say that the common
nuisance is convenient or advantageous.

The section requires that there must be a positive act or an illegal omission on the part of the
accused. This act or omission must cause a common injury, danger or annoyance to the public or to
the people in general who live nearby or who occupy property in the neighbourhood.

If such is not the case then the act or omission must definitely cause injury, obstruction, danger or
annoyance to those persons who may have opportunity to use any public right. Liability for public
nuisance does not cease to exist even if it causes some convenience or advantage.

Parking one’s car in front of the house of a person every night and remaining in that house till late in
the night might have brought bad name to that family and might have put to shame the people of
that locality, but it could not be public nuisance within the meaning of this section as it could not be
held to be an annoyance to the public or to the people in general.

But overhanging of trees dangerously over the neighbour’s premises was held to be a public
nuisance.

Prostitution carried on in a clandestine manner in a house cannot be held to be a public nuisance

even though persons come to know about the same and they feel their moral values outraged by the
same. A witness who utters words against another witness during cross-examination does not
commit public nuisance. Playing of a radio at a high pitch during a particular time does not amount
to public nuisance, and this act is also a trifle act.

Violating another’s trademark and thereby increasing the sale of his own brand of cigarettes does
not amount to public nuisance, and though smoking is injurious to health it is not banned by law and
is thus not eligible for a public remedy under section 91, Code of Criminal Procedure. Offending the
sentiments of certain people by keeping meat exposed to view does not amount to public nuisance.

An absent owner of the premises in which public nuisance is being caused is generally not liable as
the liability generally is that of the occupier of the premises. It is not necessary that annoyance must
be caused to each person within the range of the public nuisance; it is enough if some of them are
injuriously affected. Lawful cremation of dead bodies at the appointed place does not amount to
public nuisance even though it may cause annoyance to persons living nearby. Gambling at a public
place may be a public nuisance if essentials of the section are met. But gambling at a private place in
a clandestine manner may not be public nuisance as it does not cause annoyance to the public or to
the persons generally living in the area. Liability under the Gambling Act may, however, exist.
Prescriptive right cannot be claimed with respect to a public nuisa

A nuisance may, however, be legalised by statutory authority. Public nuisances are punishable under
the respective sections under this chapter depending upon the kind of public nuisance committed.
There is a general provision, section 290, as well which is applicable when no specific provision
applies.

Section 295 of Indian Penal Code, 1860 – Explained!

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Legal Provisions of Section 295 of Indian Penal Code, 1860.

Injuring or defiling place of worship with intent to insult the religion of any class:

This section penalises injuring or defiling any place of worship with the intention of insulting the
religion of any class. The section says that whoever either destroys, or damages, or defiles any place
of worship, or any object which any class of persons holds scared, either with the intention of
thereby insulting the religion of any class of persons or with the knowledge that any class of persons
is likely to consider such act as an insult to their religion, shall be punished with simple or rigorous
imprisonment for a term extending up to two years, or with fine, or with both

The section requires the proof of destroying, damaging or defiling either any place of worship, or any
object which is held sacred by any class of persons. The intention of the doer of such act must be to
insult the religion of any class of persons, or there must be knowledge on his part that such act is
likely to be considered as an insult to their religion by any class of persons.Whoever

The word ‘whoever’ has a wide connotation and means not only a person who worships in the place,
but also one who does not do so.

Defiles

The word ‘defiles’ means not only such acts as would make a place of worship unclean as a material
object, but also extends to such acts as would turn such an object ritually impure. It refers to
inanimate objects only like temples, churches etc. and has no concern with animate objects.

Any class of persons

The expression ‘any class of persons’ shows the existence of more persons than one, and this
existence must be in the form of a class. A class must be discernible to a classification, and even two
persons would be enough to form a class. A complainant and his family, in this view, cannot be
termed a class of persons.

Decided cases

In S. Veerabadram v. E. V. Ramaswami Naicker, the accused was the leader of a sect professing to be
religious reformers who were against idol worshipping. They propagated their views through
published articles and speeches etc. During the course of one such public speech, the accused broke
an idol of Lord Ganesh in full public view.

While holding the accused guilty under this section the Supreme Court observed that triviality of
actual monetary value of the object in such matters is of no consequence, and also it is not always
necessary that the object must actually have been worshipped. The object of the section is to make
people respect the religious susceptibilities of persons of different religious beliefs, and the courts
must very carefully weigh all circumstances before arriving at a judgment.

In Joseph v. State, some Hindus had been using a place as a place of worship even though the lessor
had not leased the same to be used as temple or a place of worship. The Kerala High Court held that
it was not a place of worship within the meaning of this section even though the lessees had been
using the same as such and had been allowing others to do likewise because property rights of the
lessor could not be prejudiced in any way.

Similarly, in Bechan Jha v. Emp, a hut on an agricultural land was being used as a mosque without
the permission of the landlord. The Patna High Court decried any attempt by which a place was
being sought to be converted into a place of worship under section 295 of the Code.

Performing sexual intercourse within the enclosure of the tomb of a Mohammadan fakir by a Hindu
with a woman secretly at night is not an offence under this section but under section 297 of the
Code.

Running a nursery school and a charitable dispensary within the church premises by a Christian who
was thought fit to be a Pastor of a church in a Bishop Conference cannot be punished under this
section because neither was there an intention to insult a religion on the part of the accused nor
could he be said to know that his act was likely to cause insult to religion.

Demolishing a wall and throwing away an idol being worshipped by the complainant and his family
was not punishable under this section as the complainant and his family could not be held to be any
class of persons under section 297 of the Code.

Tearing of the sacred thread worn by a person, ‘Ahir’ by caste, who was not supposed to wear it, was
held not to be an offence either under this section or under section 295-A of the Code.

The offence under section 295 of the Code is cognizable, non-bailable and non- compoundable, and
is triable by any magistrate.

Description

Whoever, to the annoyance of others:

does any obscene act in any public place, or

sings, recites or utters any obscene song, ballad or words, in or near any public place, shall be
punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three months, or
with fine, or with both.

Applicable Offences

Obscene Songs

Punishment - 3 Months or Fine or Both

This is a Bailable, Cognizable offence and triable by Any Magistrate

This offence in NOT compoundable.

1. If an offence is cognizable, police has the authority to arrest the accused without a warrant and to
start an investigation with or without the permission of a court. Otherwise police does not have the
authority to arrest the accused without a warrant and an investigation cannot be initiated without a
court order.

2. If an offience is bailable, police has the authority to release the accused on bail on getting the
defined surety amount along with a duly filled bail bond at the concerned police station. Otherwise
arrested person has to apply for bail before a magistrate or court
3. If an offence is compoundable, a compromise can be done between the accused and the victim,
and a trial can be avoided. Otherwise, No compromise is allowed between the accused and the
victim except under certain situations, where the High Court or the Supreme Court have the
authority for quashing a matter.

Section 297 of Indian Penal Code, 1860 – Explained!

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Legal Provisions of Section 297 of Indian Penal Code, 1860.

Trespassing on burial places etc:

Committing trespass on burial places etc. with a certain guilty mind has been made punishable
under this section. The section states that whoever commits trespass either in any place of worship
or any place of sepulture, or any such place which has been set apart for the performance of funeral
rights or for depositing the remains of dead persons, or offers any indignity to any human dead
body, or causes disturbance to any persons who have assembled for performing funeral ceremonies,
either with the intention of wounding the feelings of any person, or with the intention of causing
insult to the religion of any person, or with the knowledge that the feelings of any person are likely
to be wounded, or that the religion of any person is likely to be insulted, shall be punished with
simple or rigorous imprisonment for a term extending up to one year, or with fine, or with both.

The section requires that trespass must have been committed at any of the places mentioned in the
section itself, or indignity to human dead body must have been offered, or disturbance must have
been caused to persons assembled for performing religious ceremonies. This must be done with the
requisite ‘mens rea’ in the form or either intention or knowledge as specifically stated.

Entering a burial place and ploughing up the graves existing therein is punishable under this section
even if the entry into the place was with the consent of the owner of the place. Where some co-
owners of a plot of land used to bury their dead there, and two of them opened a saw-pit close to
the graves of another co-owner’s relatives, no offence under this section was committed.

But doing one’s duty of collecting money as per rules for erecting wall around a cemetery and
withholding the burial proceedings till the fee was not paid, but later on allowing the grave to be dug
without charging the fee as aforesaid, does not amount to an offence under this section. Having
sexual intercourse within the premises of a mosque, or the tomb of a Mohammadan ‘fakir’ is
punishable under this section. A ‘moharram’ procession cannot be held to be a funeral ceremony
within the meaning of this section.

The word ‘trespass’ used in the section is not limited to ‘criminal trespass’ which has been defined
by section 441 of the Code, but also includes any trespass which means entering into the property of
another without authority, and if done with the requisite intention or knowledge as described in the
section would be punishable under the section. A land owned by two bhumidhars had a family
graveyard and a mango grove without a proper demarcating line between the two.
The accused who ploughed a part of the land could not be held guilty under this section because in
the absence of a demarcating line between the burial place and the mango grove it could not be said
that any part of that piece of land had been set apart for funeral rights or as a depository for the
remains of the dead.

The offence under this section is cognizable, bailable and non-compoundable, and is triable by any
magistrate.

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