Heirs of Basbas (GR 188773)

Petitioners filed an Action for Annulment of Title, Reconveyance with Damages against
Crispiniano and respondent Ricardo seeking to: (1) annul TCTs issued in the names of
Crispiniano and Ricardo covering the contested lot, and (2) recover possession of the subject
property before the Municipal Trial Court, Santa Rosa, Laguna. The MTC ruled in favor of the
Petitioners. Based on the evidence on hand, defendants [including herein respondent Ricardo]
acquired the property in question through fraud and, therefore, an implied trust was created in
favor of [petitioners] under Article 1456 of the New Civil Code. Since a constructive trust was
created, petitioners have the right to recover the property subject of this action.
Upon appeal, the CA reversed the ruling of the lower courts for the reason that the MTC had
ruled on filiation and heirship, matters which fall within the jurisdiction of a probate court, which
the lower courts were not designated to be. It isalso proper that these particular matters be
threshed out in a special proceeding.

Question: Is there a need for a separate proceeding for a declaration of the heirs of Severo in
order to resolve petitioners’ Action for Annulment of Title and Reconveyance of the subject
property.

Answer: No. There is no need for a separate proceeding for a declaration of the heirs of Severo
in order to resolve petitioners’ Action for Annulment of Title and Reconveyance of the subject
property.

The Petitioners have fully established their filiation with the decedent Severo. There is found
wanting, lacking documentary evidence on the different claims of heirship by Respondents. No
evidence was ever adduced by the Respondents. Thus, the only conclusion is that the Defendants
are not the legal heirs of the late Severo.

A claim of status as heir of a decedent must always be substantially supported by evidence as

required under ourlaw. The resolution of a case, in this instance, an action for annulment of title
and reconveyance of real property, cannot be further stalled and waylaid by a mere assertion of a
party of an ostensible conflicting claims of heirship of the common decedent. Not all rights to
property and incidents thereof, such as titling, ought to be preceded by a declaration of heirship,
albeit supposedly traced to a single decedent and original titleholder.

When a person obtains a certificate of title to a land belonging to another and he has full
knowledge of the rights of a true owner, he is considered guilty of fraud, and he may be
compelled to transfer the land to the defrauded owner so long as the property has not passed to
the hands of an innocent purchaser for value x x x. Also it has been held "that an original owner
of registered land may seek annulment of the transfer thereof on the ground of fraud and the
proper remedy is reconveyance.

We add that Valentin’s rights to the succession vested from the moment of death of the decedent
Severo.19 In turn, petitioners’, as Heirs of Valentin, who is an uncontested heirof decedent
Severo, rights to the succession vested from the moment of Valentin’s death. As such, they own
Lot No. 39, undisputedly titled in Severo’s name and forming part of Severo’s estate, and are
entitled to the titling thereof in their names.

Intestate Estate of Ismael Reyes (GR 139587)

Petitioner Oscar Reyes was able to acquire the Arayat Property of deceased Reyes Sr. through a
redemption or purchase from levy made by the BIR. Another heir of the decedent named Cesar
Reyes filed a Petition for Letters of Administration. Cesar included in the inventory the Arayat
Property notwithstanding the opposition of Oscar. The Probate Court issued its assailed decision
which affirmed the probate courts order. It ruled that the probate courts order categorically stated
that the inclusion of the subject properties in the inventory of the estate of the deceased Ismael
Reyes is provisional in character and shall be without prejudice to the outcome of any action to
be brought hereafter in the proper court on the issue of ownership of the properties.

Question: Whether the Probate Court erred in including the Arayat Property in the inventory

Answer: The jurisdiction of the probate court merely relates to matters having to do with the
settlement of the estate and the probate of wills of deceased persons, and the appointment and
removal of administrators, executors, guardians and trustees.[18] The question of ownership is as
a rule, an extraneous matter which the Probate Court cannot resolve with finality.[19] Thus, for
the purpose of determining whether a certain property should or should not be included in the
inventory of estate proceeding, the probate court may pass upon the title thereto, but such
determination is provisional, not conclusive, and is subject to the final decision in a separate
action to resolve title.

We find that the respondent Court did not err in affirming the provisional inclusion of the subject
properties to the estate of the deceased Ismael Reyes without prejudice to the outcome of any
action to be brought thereafter in the proper court on the issue of ownership considering that the
subject properties are still titled under the torrens system in the names of spouses Ismael and
Felisa Revita Reyes which under the law is endowed with incontestability until after it has been
set aside in the manner indicated in the law.[21] The declaration of the provisional character of the
inclusion of the subject properties in the inventory as stressed in the order is within the
jurisdiction of the Probate Court.

Notably, the Probate Court stated, from the start of the hearing, that the hearing was for the
merits of accounting and inventory, thus it had jurisdiction to hear the opposition of Oscar Reyes
to the inventory as well as the respective evidence of the parties to determine for purposes of
inventory alone if they should be included therein or excluded therefrom. In fact, the probate
court in its Order stated that for resolution is the matter of the inventory of the estate, mainly to
consider what properties should be included in the inventory and what should not be included.
There was nothing on record that both parties submitted the issue of ownership for its final
resolution. Thus the respondent Court did not err in ruling that the trial court has no jurisdiction
to pass upon the issue of ownership conclusively.

In fact, the probate court, aware of its limited jurisdiction declared that its determination of the
ownership was merely provisional and suggested that either the administrator or the widow
Felisa Reyes may commence the proper action in the Regional Trial Court. Moreover, the court
admitted that it was not competent to pass upon the ownership of the subject properties.

Munsayac de Villa vs CA (2003)

In Special Proceedings No. 704-R, Judge Reyes disallowed the Extrajudicial Partition executed
by the heirs of the Munsayac spouses which therefore led to the filing of request for inhibition
against the Judge. While the said case was pending before the CA, Judge Reyes issued his Orders
commanding the bank manager of the China Bank branch in Baguio City to freeze the safety
deposit box of petitioners[22] and to deposit certain amounts in custodia legis,[23] he did so as the
presiding judge in the probate court that was hearing Special Proceedings No. 704-R. Meanwhile
the CA terminated Special Proceedings No. 704-R, ruled for the approval of the Extrajudicial
Partition between the heirs of Sps Munsayac and saw no more reason why the inhibition of Judge
Reyes should still be an issue.

Question: Whether or not Judge Reyes still has authority to to look into the ownership of the
properties deposited with or ordered frozen despite the said Order of the Court of Appeals.

Answer: In a train of decisions, this Court has consistently enunciated this settled, corollary
principle: generally, a probate court may not decide a question of title or ownership, but it may
do so if the interested parties are all heirs; or the question is one of collation or advancement; or
the parties consent to its assumption of jurisdiction and the rights of third parties are not
impaired.[27] These principles, however, have no more application in this case, since the main
proceedings for the settlement of the intestate estate of the deceased couple have already been
decided and terminated. Indeed, every litigation must come to an end.

To be sure, this Court is not tasked to look into the ownership of the properties deposited with or
ordered frozen by the lower court during the progress of the special proceedings. Neither can
Judge Reyes do so now. Whether those properties should have been adjudicated by the legal
heirs of the Munsayac spouses is beside the point at this time. The former have already entered
into an Extrajudicial Partition representing the final, complete and absolute settlement of their
shares as heirs of the latter. What is left to be done is simply the lifting of any freeze order and
the release of any property originally deposited by petitioners in custodia legis.

In view of the above ruling, we deem it necessary to direct Judge Reyes to immediately lift any
freeze order still pending and to order the release of any property deposited in custodia legis. It is
already an accepted rule of procedure for this Court to strive to settle the entire controversy in a
single proceeding, leaving no root or branch to bear the seeds of future litigation.[29] To achieve
that end and to expedite the case in the interest of substantial justice, a directive to the trial judge
to lift the freeze order and release the property deposited with the court becomes
indispensable.[30]

De Borja vs Tan (97 Phil 872)

 Petitioner Francisco de Borja filed a petition in the lower court for the probate of the Last Will
and Testament of his deceased wife Josefa Tangco. The will was probated and named Francisco
as executor thereof. Due to the physical inability of Francisco de Borja to fully administer the
estate he being quite weak and unable to see, the lower court appointed Crisanto de Borja,
another heir, as co-administrator. Later,the trial court according to petitioner, without petition of
or notice to anyone appointed respondent Jose de Borja as co-administrator, this, after holding in
abeyance consideration of Francisco de Borja's amended account. The lower court Judge, acting
upon an alleged ex-parte petition of the heirs Jose, Crisanto, Cayetano and Matilde, all surnamed
De Borja, revoked the appointment of Crisanto as co-administrator and directed administrator
Jose de Borja to comment on the amended account filed by Francisco de Borja. Francisco,
Matilde and Crisanto moved for reconsideration of the appointment of Jose de Borja. Denied,
Francisco, Matilde and Crisanto filed a notice of appeal from the order appointing Jose de Borja
as co-administrator and the order denying the motion for reconsideration and later they filed the
corresponding record on appeal. On the other hand, Respondents contend that a co-administrator
is not a regular or general administrator, and his duties and functions rather partake those of a
special administrator; consequently, his appointment is not subject to appeal.

Question: Whether or not an Order appointing a co-administrator is appealable.

Answer: Yes.

An order appointing a regular administrator is appealable (See Sy Hong Eng vs. Sy Liac Suy, 8
Phil., 594). On the other hand, according to Rule 105, section 1 (e) an order appointing a special
administrator is not appealable.

The powers and functions of a special administrator are quite limited. Under Rule 81, section 1, a
special administrator is appointed only when there is a delay in granting letters testamentary or
of administration occasioned by an appeal from allowance or disallowance of a will or from any
other cause, and such special administrator is authorized to collect and take charge of the estate
until the questions causing the delay are decided and an executor or administrator thereon
appointed. Under Rule 87 section 8, a special administrator is also appointed when the regular
executor or administrator has a claim against the estate he represents and said special
administrator shall have the same power and subject to the same liability as a regular executor or
administrator. In other words, a special administrator is appointed only for a limited time and for
a specific purpose. Naturally, because of the temporary and special character of his appointment,
it was deemed by the law not advisable for any party to appeal from said temporary appointment.
On the other hand, a co-administrator performs all the functions and duties and exercises all the
powers of a regular administrator, only that he is not alone in the administration. Further taking
into consideration the circumstances obtaining in this case, that petitioner Francisco de Borja
though originally designated administrator, is and has for several years been one only in name
due to his physical and mental disability, as a result of which respondent Jose de Borja is now
practically the sole administrator there is no question that for all practical and legal purposes the
appointment of Jose de Borja as co-administrator is equivalent to and has the same effect as a
sole regular or general administrator.
 Reillo et al vs. Galicano San Jose (GR 166393)
Quiterio San Jose and Antonina Espiritu Santo are husband and wife. Both died intestate in 1970
and 1976 respectively. They have five children, to wit: Virginia, Virgilio, Galicano, Victoria, and
Catalina. In 1998, Virginia with the help of her husband (Zosimo Fernando, Sr.) and her children
(Cristina Reillo et al) executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate where they made it
appear that Virginia was the only heir of the spouses Quiterio and Antonina. They adjudicated
among themselves the estate and then later sold it to Ma. Teresa Piñon. Later, the other siblings
found out about what Virginia did and so in October 1999, they filed a complaint in RTC Rizal
for the annulment of the deed of extrajudicial settlement as well as the subsequent deed of sale.

The RTC ruled that the admission of Reillo et al that there are 4 other heirs is proof that the
extrajudicial settlement is void because the other heirs were excluded.

Question: WON the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate executed by Virginia is valid.

Answer: The Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement is void.

A deed of extrajudicial partition executed without including some of the heirs, who had no
knowledge of and consent to the same, is fraudulent and vicious. The deed of settlement made by
petitioners was invalid because it excluded respondents who were entitled to equal shares in the
subject property. Under the rule, no extrajudicial settlement shall be binding upon any person
who has not participated therein or had no notice thereof. Thus, the RTC correctly annulled the
Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate Among Heirs with Waiver of Rights dated January
23, 1998 and TCT No. M-94400 in the name of Ma. Teresa S.J. Fernando issued pursuant to
such deed.

Mendoza vs Teh

Petitioner for herself and as administratrix of the intestate estate of her deceased husband
Norberto Mendoza filed before the RTC of Batangas a complaint for reconveyance of title
(involving parcels of lot in Batangas) and damages with petition for preliminary injunction. The
complaint also alleged that petitioner should be appointed administratrix of the estate.

In their motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, private respondents argued that since
petitioners husband resided in Quezon City at the time of his death, the appointment of the estate
administratrix should be filed in the RTC of that place in accordance with Section 1 Rule 73 of
the Rules of Court. Accordingly, it is their argument that the RTC of Batangas has no jurisdiction
over the case.

RTC of Batangas thru respondent Judge Teh dismissed without prejudice the complaint for lack
of jurisdiction on the ground that the rules governing an ordinary civil action and a special
proceeding are different.

Question: Whether or not in an action for reconveyance, an allegation seeking appointment as

administratrix of an estate, would oust the RTC of its jurisdiction over the whole case?
Answer: An action for reconveyance, which involves title title to property worth millions of
pesos, such as the lots subject of this case, is cognizable by the RTC. Likewise falling within its
jurisdiction are actions incapable of pecuniary estimation, such as the appointment of an
administratrix for an estate. Even the Rules on venue of estate proceedings (Section 1 of Rule
73) impliedly recognizes the jurisdiction of the RTC over petitions for granting of letters of
administration.

On the other hand, probate proceedings for the settlement of estate are within the ambit of either
the RTC or MTC depending on the net worth of the estate. By arguing that the allegation seeking
such appointment as administratrix ousted the RTC of its jurisdiction, both public and private
respondents confuses jurisdiction with venue. Section 2 of Rule 4 as revised by Circular 13-95
provides that actions involving title to property shall be tried in the province where the property
is located, in this case, - Batangas. The mere fact that petitioners deceased husband resides in
Quezon City at the time of his death affects only the venue but not the jurisdiction of the Court.
Second, the cases cited by private respondents are not at point as they involve settlement of
estate where the probate court was asked to resolve questions of ownership of certain properties.

In the present suit, no settlement of estate is involved, but merely an allegation seeking
appointment as estate administratrix which does not necessarily involve settlement of estate that
would have invited the exercise of the limited jurisdiction of a probate court. The above
allegation is not even a jurisdictional fact which must be stated in an action for reconveyance.
The Court therefore, should have at least, proceeded with the reconveyance suit rather than
dismiss the entire case.

Third, jurisprudential rulings that a probate court cannot generally decide questions of ownership
or title to property is not applicable in this case, because: there is no settlement of estate involved
and the RTC of Batangas was not acting as a probate court. It should be clarified that whether a
particular matter should be resolved by the RTC in the exercise of its general jurisdiction or its
limited probate jurisdiction, is not a jurisdictional issue but a mere question of procedure.
Moreover, the instant action for reconveyance does not even invoke the limited jurisdiction of a
probate court. Considering that the RTC has jurisdiction, whether it be on the reconveyance suit
or as to the appointment of an administratrix, it was improper for respondent judge to dismiss the
whole complaint for alleged lack of jurisdiction.

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