Petition to reacquire the privilege to practice law in the PH, Muneses

On June 8, 2009, a petition was filed by Epifanio B. Muneses (petitioner) with the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) praying that he be granted the
privilege to practice law in the Philippines.

The petitioner alleged that he became a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) on March 21, 1966; that he lost his privilege to practice
law when he became a citizen of the United States of America (USA) on August 28, 1981; that on September 15, 2006, he re-acquired his Philippine
citizenship pursuant to Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225 or the "Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003" by taking his oath of allegiance as a
Filipino citizen before the Philippine Consulate General in Washington, D.C., USA; that he intends to retire in the Philippines and if granted, to resume
the practice of law. Attached to the petition were several documents in support of his petition, albeit mere photocopies thereof, to wit:

1. Oath of Allegiance dated September 15, 2006 before Consul General Domingo P. Nolasco;

2. Petition for Re-Acquisition of Philippine Citizenship of same date;

3. Order for Re-Acquisition of Philippine Citizenship also of same date;

4. Letter dated March 13, 2008 evidencing payment of membership dues with the IBP;

5. Attendance Forms from the Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE).

In Bar Matter No. 1678, dated December 17, 2007, the Court was confronted with a similar petition filed by Benjamin M. Dacanay (Dacanay) who
requested leave to resume his practice of law after availing the benefits of R.A. No. 9225. Dacanay was admitted to the Philippine Bar in March 1960. In
December 1998, he migrated to Canada to seek medical attention for his ailments and eventually became a Canadian citizen in May 2004. On July 14,
2006, Dacanay re-acquired his Philippine citizenship pursuant to R.A. No. 9225 after taking his oath of allegiance before the Philippine Consulate
General in Toronto, Canada. He returned to the Philippines and intended to resume his practice of law.

The Court reiterates that Filipino citizenship is a requirement for admission to the bar and is, in fact, a continuing requirement for the practice of law. The
loss thereof means termination of the petitioner’s membership in the bar;ipso jure the privilege to engage in the practice of law. Under R.A. No. 9225,
natural-born citizens who have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country are deemed to have re-
acquired their Philippine citizenship upon taking the oath of allegiance to the Republic. 1 Thus, a Filipino lawyer who becomes a citizen of another country
and later re-acquires his Philippine citizenship under R.A. No. 9225, remains to be a member of the Philippine Bar. However, as stated in Dacanay, the
right to resume the practice of law is not automatic. 2 R.A. No. 9225 provides that a person who intends to practice his profession in the Philippines must
apply with the proper authority for a license or permit to engage in such practice. 3

It can not be overstressed that:

The practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions.1âwphi1 It is so delicately affected with public interest that it is both the power and duty of the
State (through this Court) to control and regulate it in order to protect and promote the public welfare.

Adherence to rigid standards of mental fitness, maintenance of the highest degree of morality, faithful observance of the legal profession, compliance
with the mandatory continuing legal education requirement and payment of membership fees to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) are the
conditions required for membership in good standing in the bar and for enjoying the privilege to practice law. Any breach by a lawyer of any of these
conditions makes him unworthy of the trust and confidence which the courts and clients repose in him for the continued exercise of his professional
privilege.4

Thus, in pursuance to the qualifications laid down by the Court for the practice of law, the OBC required the herein petitioner to submit the original or
certified true copies of the following documents in relation to his petition:

1. Petition for Re-Acquisition of Philippine Citizenship;

2. Order (for Re-Acquisition of Philippine citizenship);

3. Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines;

4. Identification Certificate (IC) issued by the Bureau of Immigration;

5. Certificate of Good Standing issued by the IBP;

6. Certification from the IBP indicating updated payments of annual membership dues;

7. Proof of payment of professional tax; and

8. Certificate of compliance issued by the MCLE Office.

In compliance thereof, the petitioner submitted the following:

 1. Petition for Re-Acquisition of Philippine Citizenship;

2. Order (for Re-Acquisition of Philippine citizenship);

3. Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines;

4. Certificate of Re-Acquisition/Retention of Philippine Citizenship issued by the Bureau of Immigration, in lieu of the IC;

5. Certification dated May 19, 2010 of the IBP-Surigao City Chapter attesting to his good moral character as well as his updated payment of
annual membership dues;

6. Professional Tax Receipt (PTR) for the year 2010;

7. Certificate of Compliance with the MCLE for the 2nd compliance period; and

8. Certification dated December 5, 2008 of Atty. Gloria Estenzo-Ramos, Coordinator, UC-MCLE Program, University of Cebu, College of Law
attesting to his compliance with the MCLE.

The OBC further required the petitioner to update his compliance, particularly with the MCLE. After all the requirements were satisfactorily complied with
and finding that the petitioner has met all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications for membership in the bar, the OBC recommended that the
petitioner be allowed to resume his practice of law.

Upon this favorable recommendation of the OBC, the Court adopts the same and sees no bar to the petitioner's resumption to the practice of law in the
Philippines.

WHEREFORE, the petition of Attorney Epifanio B. Muneses is hereby GRANTED, subject to the condition that he shall re-take the Lawyer's Oath on a
date to be set by the Court and subject to the payment of appropriate fees.

PP v. De Luna, et al., GR No. L-10236, Jan. 31, 1958

The defendants, who took and failed the Bar exams, were accused of contemptuously disobeying the Supreme Court Resolution, obstructing or degrading the
administration of justice, and disrespecting the Court by taking their oath as lawyers before a notary public and making manifestations before the High Court.

The case was filed before the Court of First Instance of Manila (CFI Manila). However, the lower court ruled that it had no jurisdiction to try the case as the
contempt was not committed against it but against the Supreme Court. The CFI’s decision was anchored on Rule 64 Section 4 of the Rules of Court and Corpus Juris
Secundum.1

The Supreme Court however, varied in opinion. It stated that the provisions cited are merely permissive in nature, and that it was merely declaratory of the
inherent power of the courts to punish those guilty of contempt against it. It continued by saying that the jurisdiction of the court to punish contempt is not exclusive. The
Supreme Court has no authority to exercise such denial.

Moreover, the allegations claimed that the defendants performed acts in contempt of the Supreme Court, as well as all other court of the Philippines, including
the CFI Manila.

Appellees knew that they did not pass the bar examination. They were notified of the resolution of the Supreme Court denying their petition. The resolution
denying the petition of appellees necessarily implied a denial of the right to said oath. It also served as a prohibition of against the taking thereof. Nevertheless, appellees
took the oath before a notary public, and formally advised the Supreme Court that they will practice in all the courts of the Philippines, in clear violation of the Resolution
of the Surpreme Court.

By their act of taking 'the oath of office and notifying the Supreme Court of the same and that they would "practice law in all courts of the
Philippines", the appellees had presented themselves as such attorneys-at-law, in clear contempt of the order issued by the Court. The appellees overtly challenged and
defied the authority of the Supreme Court to decide upon the issue of admission. Moreover, they embarrased, hindered and obstructed the administration of justice and
disrespected the courts of justice, especially the Supreme Court., qualified as contemptuous acts under section 3(b) Rule 64 of the Rules of Court.

LBP VS. PAMINTUAN

This petition for review on certiorari assails the April 15, 2005 Decision [1] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 85843, which dismissed Land Bank of the
Philippines (LANDBANKs) petition and sustained the August 2, 2004 Order [2] of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) which denied due
course to the notice of appeal and notice of entry of appearance filed by LANDBANKs counsels.

The antecedent facts show that in DARAB Case No. 1204-0545-2003 for Preliminary Determination of Just Compensation, DARAB rendered a Decision[3] dated April
27, 2004, fixing the just compensation of respondent Pamintuan Development Companys 274.9037 hectare lot covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-4972 and
located at San Vicente, Makilala, Cotabato, at P58,237,301.68. The dispositive portion thereof, reads:

1“Where the contempt . . . has been committed against a superior court or judge, or against an officer appointed by it, the charge may be filed with such
superior court.”
 WHEREFORE, foregoing considered, the just compensation of TCT No. T-4972 registered in the name of Pamintuan Development
Company (PAMDEVCO) containing an area of 274.9037 hectares located at San Vicente, Makilala, Cotabato is preliminary determined at FIFTY
EIGHT MILLION TWO HUNDRED THIRTY SEVEN THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED ONE AND 68/100 (P58,237,301.68) PESOS.

SO ORDERED.[4]

Petitioner moved for reconsideration but was denied. The order denying the motion for reconsideration was received by petitioner on June 11, 2004. At the
proceedings before the trial court, petitioner was represented by Piczon, Beramo & Associates.

On June 4, 2004, Attys. Engilberto F. Montarde and Felix F. Mesa, filed a Notice of Entry of Appearance[5] in behalf of petitioner. Within the period to appeal, or on June
15, 2004, said counsels also filed a Notice of Appeal[6] via registered mail. The Certification[7] attached to the Notice of Appeal was signed by Loreto B. Corotan, Head
of petitioners Agrarian Operations Center.

Respondent filed an Opposition contending that the notice of appeal and notice of entry of appearance should be denied due course because Attys. Montarde and Mesa
failed to show that their appearance was authorized by petitioner. Said new counsels, on the other hand, asserted that they were duly authorized, attaching to their Comment
the Special Power of Attorney (SPA) executed by Gilda E. Pico, Executive Vice President of petitioner, authorizing Loreto B. Corotan to represent,[8] and
designating[9] Attys. Montarde and Mesa as counsels for LANDBANK.

On August 2, 2004, DARAB issued an order holding that Attys. Montarde and Mesa are without authority to represent petitioner because the latter failed to effect a valid
substitution of their former counsel of record. It added that the April 27, 2004 decision had become final and executory because the notice of appeal filed by its purported
new counsels is a mere scrap of paper which did not toll the running of the reglementary period to appeal. Thus

WHEREFORE, foregoing considered, the instant Notice of Entry of Appearance and the Notice of Appeal are hereby not given DUE COURSE for
LACK OF LEGAL BASIS. The decision dated April 27, 2004 has become FINAL and EXECUTORY.

SO ORDERED.[10]

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration appending two memoranda [11] signed by Atty. Danilo B. Beramo, petitioners Department Manager and Head,
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) Legal Services Department, confirming the authority of Atty. Montarde to file a notice of appeal.

The DARAB, however, denied petitioners motion for reconsideration. Hence, a petition for certiorari was filed by petitioner with the Court of Appeals, but
the latter dismissed the petition. It sustained the DARABs finding that Attys. Montarde and Mesa were not clothed with authority to file the notice of appeal.[12]

Petitioner filed the instant petition with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order.

In a resolution dated June 6, 2005, the Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the execution of the April 27, 2004 decision of the DARAB.

We find that the DARAB gravely abused its discretion in holding that Attys. Montarde and Mesa lacked the authority to file a notice of appeal in behalf of
petitioner. Section 21, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides:

SEC. 21. Authority of attorney to appear. An attorney is presumed to be properly authorized to represent any cause in which he appears,
and no written power of attorney is required to authorize him to appear in court for his client, but the presiding judge may, on motion of either party
and on reasonable grounds therefor being shown, require any attorney who assumes the right to appear in a case to produce or prove the authority
under which he appears, and to disclose, whenever pertinent to any issue, the name of the person who employed him, and may thereupon make
such order as justice requires. An attorney wilfully appearing in court for a person without being employed, unless by leave of the court, may be
punished for contempt as an officer of the court who has misbehaved in his official transactions.

The presumption in favor of the counsels authority to appear in behalf of a client is a strong one. [13] A lawyer is not even required to present a written
authorization from the client. In fact, the absence of a formal notice of entry of appearance will not invalidate the acts performed by the counsel in his clients
name.[14] However, the court, on its own initiative or on motion of the other party require a lawyer to adduce authorization from the client.

In the case at bar, the filing of a notice of entry of appearance by Attys. Montarde and Mesa, gave rise to the presumption that they have the authority to file
the notice of appeal in behalf of petitioner. When their authority was challenged, they presented the SPA executed by Gilda E. Pico, Executive Vice President of
LANDBANK authorizing them to represent petitioner; and the two memoranda of Atty. Danilo B. Beramo, Department Manager and Head, CARP Legal Services
Department, requesting Atty. Montarde to file a notice of appeal. These documents are sufficient proof of their authority to represent petitioners cause. The doubt
entertained by the DARAB as to when the SPA and memoranda were executed is of no consequence in view of petitioners vigorous assertion that it authorized said
lawyers to file a notice of appeal. Indeed, even an unauthorized appearance of an attorney may be ratified by the client either expressly[15] or impliedly.[16]Ratification
retroacts to the date of the lawyers first appearance and validates the action taken by him. [17]

The DARABs assertion that Attys. Montarde and Mesa cannot validly represent petitioner because there was no proper substitution of counsels, lacks merit.
Petitioner never intended to replace its counsel of record, the law firm Piczon, Beramo & Associates. Though not specified in the notice, Attys. Montarde and Mesa
entered their appearance as collaborating counsels.

Likewise, the Court of Appeals erroneously applied the doctrine laid down in Sublay v. National Labor Relations Commission,[18] in dismissing the petition.
In Sublay, it was held that a substitution cannot be presumed from the mere filing of a notice of appearance of a new lawyer and that the representation of the first counsel
of record continuous until a formal notice to change counsel is filed with the court. [19] Thus, absent a formal notice of substitution, all lawyers who appeared before the
court or filed pleadings in behalf of the client are considered counsels of the latter. All acts performed by them are deemed to be with the clients consent.

The case of Ong Ching v. Ramolete,[20] is on all fours with the instant controversy. The trial court therein held that the period to appeal had already lapsed
rendering the assailed decision final and executory because petitioners motion for reconsideration, though presented within the reglementary period, is without legal effect
having been filed by a lawyer other than petitioners counsel of record. It disregarded petitioners written authorization belatedly filed by said new lawyer as the same was
not appended to the motion for reconsideration previously filed. In debunking the ruling of the trial court, we stressed that the new counsel who filed the motion for
reconsideration in behalf of the client is presumed to be authorized even if he filed no formal notice of entry of appearance. Hence, said motion effectively tolled the
running of the period to appeal. As explained by the Court:

The present case, however, does not involve a substitution of attorneys, but merely the employment by petitioner of an additional
counsel. True it is, as claimed by respondents, that the motion for reconsideration filed by Atty. Hermosisima gives no indication that he was
presenting his motion in collaboration with Atty. Vasquez; but neither would it indicate that by his filing of the pleading in the case, Atty.
 Hermosisima was replacing Atty. Vasquez as counsel for petitioner. In law it is assumed prima faciethat every attorney who appears in court does
so with sufficient authority. The fact that a second attorney enters an appearance on behalf of a litigant does not authorize a presumption that the
authority of the first attorney has been withdrawn. There is no question that a party may have two or more lawyers working in collaboration as his
counsel in a given litigation. Thus in the case at bar the certificate dated May 16, 1972, executed by Atty. Vasquez, is to the effect that he, with the
consent and authority of petitioner (who signified his conformity in writing) was authorizing Atty. Hermosisima to collaborate with him in the case
due to his ill health. While the said certificate was not attached to the motion for reconsideration on May 17, 1972, but was presented in court rather
belatedly on June 16, 1972 as an annex to petitioners Rejoinder to Opposition to Motion for Reconsideration, respondents have not shown that the
recitals of fact contained therein did not reflect the truth. At any rate, this case is different from U.S. v. Borromeo, Fojas, et al. v. Navarro, Ramos
v. Potenciano, Baquiran v. Court of Appeals. Here petitioner's counsel, Atty. Vasquez, not only affirmed his continued connection with the case,
but also explained Atty. Hermosisimas appearance as collaborating counsel. While it may be desirable in the interest of an orderly conduct of
judicial proceedings, that a counsel for a party should file with the court his formal written appearance in the case, before filing a pleading therein,
or mention in said pleading that he is submitting the same in collaboration with the counsel of record, the mere circumstance that such acts were
not done does not warrant the conclusion that the pleading filed by such counsel has no legal effect whatsoever.

It is evident therefore that the DARAB gravely abused its discretion in denying due course to the notice of appeal seasonably filed by Attys. Montarde and
Mesa, the duly authorized counsel of petitioner. In the same vein, the affirmance by the Court of Appeals of the assailed order of the DARAB is a clear disregard of the
oft repeated principle that courts should not resort to a rigid application of the rules where the end result would frustrate the just, speedy and inexpensive determination
of the controversy.[21]

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the April 15, 2005 Decision of the Court of Appeals dismissing the petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 85843,
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board is DIRECTED to give due course to petitioners Notice of Entry of
Appearance and the Notice of Appeal.

ALAWI VS. ALAUYA

Facts:
Ashary Alauya transacted with Sophia Alawi to avail of a contract for the purchase of one housing unit from EB Villarosa & Partner Co. Ltd., a real estate and housing
company. Shortly thereafter Alauya wrote to the company expressing his intent to render the contract void ab initio.

Several correspondences ensued, all of which were signed by Alauya as ATTY. ASHARY M. ALAUYA. Alauya is a member of the Sharia Bar and for that matter he is a
counselor-at-law. Alauya claims that he does not use the title of counselor-at-law for fear of being mistaken as a local legislator, i.e. councilor. Hence, he affixed the
title of attorney before his name.

Alawi filed a verified complaint against Alauya, alleging, among others, that Alawi usurped the title of an attorney which is reserved only for the members of the
Philippine Bar.

Issue:
Whether or not Alauya's membership in the Sharia Bar endows him the title of an attorney

Held:
No. Alauya is hereby reprimanded for usurping the title of an attorney reserved for those who, having obtained the necessary degree in the study of law and had
successfully passed the bar examinations, have been admitted ti the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and remain members thereof in good standing.
Persons who passed the Sharia Bar are not full-fledged members of the Bar and may only practice law before a Sharia Court, Alauya's disinclination to use the title
of counselor-at-law does not warrant his use of the title of an attorney.

In Re: Purisima

FACTS
1) Petitioner was conditionally admitted to take the 1999 Bar Examinations. Like many others he was directed to submit the required certification
of completion of the pre-bar review course within sixty (60) days from the last day of the examinations.
2) Petitioner passed the 1999 Examinations. But in a Resolution dated 13 April 2000 the Court disqualified him from becoming a member of the
Philippine Bar and declared his examinations null and void on two (2) grounds:
(a) Petitioner failed to submit the required certificate of completion of the pre-bar review course under oath for his conditional
admission to the 1999 Bar Examinations; and
(b) He committed a serious act of dishonesty which rendered him unfit to become a member of the Philippine Bar when he made
it appear in his Petition to Take the 1999 Bar Examinations that he took his pre-bar review course at the Philippine Law School
(PLS) when, as certified by Acting Registrar Rasalie G. Kapauan, PLS had not offered such course since 1967
3) On 2 July 2002 petitioner filed a Motion for Due Process stating, among others, his reasons why in his Petition to Take the 1999 Bar Examinations
it was stated that he was enrolled in and regularly attending the pre-bar review course at the PLS and not at the University of Santo Tomas
(UST) where he in fact took the said course as evidenced by the Certification dated 22 July 1999 of Dean Amado L. Damayuga of the UST Faculty
of Civil Law
4) Petitioner claimed that the statement in paragraph 8 of his Petition that he x x x enrolled in and passed the regular fourth year (law) review
classes at the Phil. Law School x x x x was a self-evident clerical error and a mere result of an oversight which is not tantamount to a deliberate
and willful declaration of a falsehood.
5) Petitioner explained that upon obtaining a ready-made form of the Petition and affixing his signature on the space provided therefor, he
requested his schoolmate/friend Ms. Lilian A. Felipe to fill up the form, have it notarized and then to file it for him with the Office of the Bar
Confidant (OBC). Being consumed with his preparations for the upcoming bar examinations, petitioner admitted that he did not have the
opportunity to check the veracity of the information supplied by Ms. Felipe. Had he done this he could have readily seen that Ms. Felipe had
 erroneously typed Philippine Law School, instead of UST, on the space provided for the school where petitioner attended his pre-bar review
course.
6) Petitioner further averred that on 26 July 1999, a week after the filing of the Petition to take the bar, he (thru Ms. Felipe) submitted the
Certification of Completion of the Pre-Bar Review as Annex D of his Petition to prove that he actually enrolled and attended the pre-bar review
course in UST.
7) Petitioner also explained that he did not submit the required certification of completion of the pre-bar review course within sixty (60) days from
the last day of the examinations because he thought that it was already unnecessary in view of the Certification of Completion (Annex D of his
Petition) issued by Dean Dimayuga which not only attested to his enrollment in UST but also his completion of the pre-bar review course.

ISSUE
WON Petitioner can take his oath.

DECISION
YES
- The recommendation is well taken.
- The foremost question to be resolved is whether petitioner did enrol in and complete his pre-bar review course in UST as he herein avows.
- The testimony of petitioner and Ms. Felipe during the 30 October 2002 hearing that the subject Certification of Dean Dimayuga was duly
submitted to the OBC a week after the filing of the Petition to take the bar appears to be credible. It is supported by documentary evidence
showing that petitioner actually enrolled and completed the required course in UST.
- Granting that the Certification of Dean Dimayuga was defective as it certified completion of the pre-bar review course which was still on-going,
this defect should not be attributed to petitioner considering that he had no participation in the preparation thereof. Whatever it is, the fact
remains that there is such a certification issued by the UST which appears to be genuine. This finding is backed by the affidavit of Ms. Parena,
office clerk at the UST Faculty of Civil Law, that she was the one who released the Certification to petitioner on 26 July 1999.
- Indeed, it must be stressed that there is nothing on record which impugns the authenticity of the subject Certification as well as that of the other
documentary evidence proferred by petitioner to establish that he was duly enrolled and took the pre-bar review course in UST, not in PLS. As
to the argument that the Certification of Dean Dimayuga did not include the taking and completion of the pre-bar review course, the realities
of our bar reviews render it difficult to record the attendance religiously of the reviewees every single day for several months.
- Considering petitioners explanation, fortified by undisputedly genuine documents, at the very least, petitioner should be given the benefit of
the doubt and be allowed to take his oath.
- The Court is well aware of instances in the past when ,as a measure of compassion and kindness, it has acted favorably on similar petitions. In
his letter petitioners father pleaded that the denial of permission for Mark to take his oath for about three (3) years now should be enough
penalty. It is time to move on.

Paguia v. Office of the President, GR No. 176278

FACTS:

Petitioner Alan F. Paguia (petitioner), as citizen and taxpayer, filed this original action for the writ of certiorari to invalidate President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo’s
nomination of respondent former Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. (respondent Davide) as Permanent Representative to the United Nations (UN) for violation of
Section 23 of Republic Act No. 7157 (RA 7157), the Philippine Foreign Service Act of 1991. Petitioner argues that respondent Davide’s age at that time of his
nomination in March 2006, 70, disqualifies him from holding his post. Petitioner grounds his argument on Section 23 of RA 7157 pegging the mandatory retirement
age of all officers and employees of the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) at 65. Petitioner theorizes that Section 23 imposes an absolute rule for all DFA
employees, career or non-career; thus, respondent Davide’s entry into the DFA ranks discriminates against the rest of the DFA officials and employees.

ISSUE:

Petitioner’s lack of capacity to sue and mootness.

Ruling:

An incapacity to bring legal actions peculiar to petitioner also obtains. Petitioner’s suspension from the practice of law bars him from performing "any activity, in or
out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience."Certainly, preparing a petition raising carefully crafted
arguments on equal protection grounds and employing highly legalistic rules of statutory construction to parse Section 23 of RA 7157 falls within the proscribed
conduct.

A supervening event has rendered this case academic and the relief prayed for moot. Respondent Davide resigned his post at the UN on 1 April 2010.

WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition.

Bulacan v. Torcino, GR. No. L-4438, Jan. 30, 1985

FACTS:

A complaint for forcible entry and damages with preliminary mandatory injunction was filed with the Municipal Court of Baybay, Leyte by Victoriano Bulacan against
Faustino Torcino and Felipa Torcino. The complaint was signed by Nicolas Nuñes, Jr., "Friend counsel for the Plaintiff" but was verified by the plaintiff-appellee
himself.

The verification reads:

"I, VICTORIANO BULACAN, of legal age, Filipino, married and a resident of Baybay, Leyte, after having been duly sworn to in accordance with law hereby depose
and say:

"That I am the plaintiff in the above-entitled case; that I have caused the above complaint to be prepared by Nicolas P. Nuñes, Jr. and that I have voluntarily asked,
sought and requested his aid to file, claim, prosecute, and defend in court my civil case against the defendants Faustino Torcino et al or others in connection with this
case at the Municipal Court of Baybay, Leyte; that I have read and known the contents thereon and the allegations therein are true and correct to my own knowledge.

"IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this 4th day of August, 1972 at Baybay, Leyte.
Plaintiff

"SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 4th day of August, 1972 at Baybay, Leyte by Victoriano Bulacan with his Res. Cert. No. A-930280 dated Aug. 4,
1972 issued at Baybay, Leyte.
.
t/NICOLAS P. NUÑES, JR.
Notary Public
Until December 31st, 1972

When the defendants-appellants filed their answer, they did not question the fact that the complaint was signed by Nicolas Nuñes, Jr.

On February 10, 1973, the municipal court issued the following order:
"The contending parties are given one week time to submit the proposed compromise agreement in connection with his case. "Failure to do so will constrain this court
to render judgment on the basis of the ocular inspection conducted sometime on December, 1972."
Due to the failure of the parties to settle their case amicably, the court rendered a decision ordering the Torcinos to demolish and remove the portion of their house
which was illegally constructed on the land of the plaintiff. The municipal court stated that there is no doubt that Victoriano Bulacan is the owner and has been in
possession of Lot No. 5998 and that the lot of the defendants-appellants is on the eastern portion of said lot.

The Torcinos appealed the decision to the Court of First Instance of Leyte. The appellants Torcinos filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the
complaint was not signed by the plaintiff or by an admitted attorney, and therefore must be considered as sham and false.

On September 24, 1973, appellee Bulacan opposed the motion and alleged that the motion to dismiss was not filed on time and the defenses therein were not pleaded in
the answer in the municipal court and therefore, are deemed waived and may not be raised for the first time on appeal in the Court of First Instance. The opposition also
stated that the complaint substantially conforms to the Rule.

On September 24, 1973, the Court of First Instance of Leyte denied the motion to dismiss. A motion for reconsideration was denied for lack of merit.

On December 7, 1973, when the case was called for continuance, the parties presented to the court a stipulation of facts which states and which we quote verbatim:
"COME NOW, the plaintiff and the defendants duly assisted by their respective counsel and unto this Honorable Court most respectfully submits the following
stipulation of facts, to wit:
“1. That the plaintiff and the defendants hereby agree to relocate the defendants' land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title Number T-8133 which is hereto attached.

xxx
"WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed that the Honorable Court renders judgment on the basis of the above stipulation of facts."
The stipulation of facts was signed by plaintiff Victoriano Bulacan, his new counsel Atty. Diego A. Cala, defendants Faustino and Felipa Torcino, and their counsel
Gerardo A. Pabello.

On December 17, 1973, Kudera submitted his report and on the basis of his findings, the Court of First Instance of Leyte affirmed the decision of the municipal court.

ISSUE:
WON a complaint for forcible entry and detainer should be dismissed by a municipal court on the ground that the plaintiff knowingly asked a non-member of the bar to
sign and file it for him.

HELD:
NO.

The Torcinos allege that the complaint is irregular as it was signed not by the plaintiff but by one who was not a member of the bar and who designated himself merely
as "Friend counsel for the Plaintiff." The appellants argue that the municipal court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case. They invoke Section 5, Rule 7 which states:
SEC. 5. Signature and address.- Every pleading of a party represented by an attorney shall be signed by at least one attorney of record in his individual name, whose
address shall be stated. A party who is not represented by an attorney shall sign his pleading and state his address. Except when otherwise specifically provided by rule
or statute, pleadings need not be verified or accompanied by affidavit. The signature of an attorney constitutes a certificate by him that he has read the pleading; that to
the best of his knowledge, information, and belief there is good ground to support it; and that it is not interposed for delay. If a pleading is not signed or is signed with
Intent to defeat the purpose of this rule, it may be stricken out as sham and false and the action may proceed as though the pleading had not been served. For a willful
violation of this rule an attorney may be subjected to appropriate disciplinary action. Similar action may be taken if scandalous or indecent matter is inserted.
(Underlining supplied)
Under the facts of this case, however, the applicable provision is Section 34, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court which states:
SEC. 34. By whom litigation is conducted.- In the Court of a municipality a party may conduct his litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by
him for that purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. In any other court, a party may conduct his litigation personally or by aid of an attorney and his appearance must be
either personal or by a duly authorized member of the bar." (Underlining supplied)
The Rules are clear. In municipal courts, the litigant may be assisted by a friend, agent, or an attorney. However, in cases before the regional trial court, the litigant must
be aided by a duly authorized member of the bar. The rule invoked by the Torcinos applies only to cases filed with the regional trial court and not to cases before a
municipal court.
In the case of Cantimbuhan v. Cruz, Jr. (126 SCRA 190) we decided a similar issue and allowed the appearance of two senior law students as friends of the
complainant-petitioner Cantimbuhan to prosecute the case before the sala of Judge Nicanor J. Cruz, Jr., of the Municipal Court of Parañaque.

Similarly, in the case of Laput v. Bernabe (55 Phil. 621) a law student was allowed to represent the accused in a case pending before the City Court of Manila.

Court procedures are often technical and may prove like snares to the ignorant or the unwary. In the past, our law has allowed non-lawyers to appear for party litigants
in places where duly authorized members of the bar are not available. (U.S. v. Bacansas, 6 Phil. 539). For relatively simple litigation before municipal courts, the Rules
still allow a more educated or capable person to appear in behalf of a litigant who cannot get a lawyer. But for the protection of the parties and in the interest of justice,
the requirement for appearances in regional trial courts and higher courts is more stringent.

In the case before us, the complaint was verified by the party litigant himself. In the verification, the plaintiff specifically stated that he had caused Mr. Nuñes to
conduct the litigation and to sign the complaint in his behalf, indicating his awareness that Nuñes is not a registered lawyer. There is, therefore, added justification for
the pleading to be admitted rather than dismissed. As the lower court has cited:
"So it has been held that, where a pleading is not signed by the attorney as required, but is verified by the party, substantial rights have not been affected and the defect
may be disregarded as against a motion to strike." (71 C.J.S. 954-955)
Rules of pleading, practise, and procedure must be liberally construed so as to protect the rights and interests of the parties. As we stated in Paulino v. Court of Appeals
(80 SCRA 257):
xxx xxx xxx

"x x x pleadings, as well as remedial laws, should be construed liberally, in order that litigants may have ample opportunity to prove their respective claims, and that a
possible denial of substantial justice, due to legal technicalities, may be avoided. x x x"
The Torcinos try to impugn the results of the relocation survey. We agree with the appellee that the appellants are now estopped on this issue because they themselves
prayed in the stipulation of facts that the findings of the geodetic engineer would be bases for the decision of the court of first instance. We see no error, much less any
grave abuse of discretion, in the lower courts' findings that the house of the Torcinos encroached on the lot of Victoriano Bulacan.