CASE 1: PILAR CAÑEDA BRAGA, PETER TIU LAVIÑA, ANTONIO H. VERGARA, BENJIE T.

BADAL,
DIOSDADO ANGELO A. MAHIPUS, and SAMAL CITY RESORT OWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC. (SCROA),
petitioners, vs.HON. JOSEPH EMILIO A. ABAYA, in his capacity as SECRETARY of the DEPARTMENT
OF TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND
COMMUNICATIONS (DOTC), PRE-QUALIFICATION, BIDS AND AWARDS COMMITTEE (PBAC) and
PHILIPPINE PORTS AUTHORITY (PPA), respondents.

G.R. No. 223076. September 13, 2016.

DOCTRINE: The bidding process is not equivalent to the implementation of the project. The
bidding process itself cannot conceivably cause any environmental damage.

Facts

The Port of Davao is a seaport located in Mindanao. It is compose of several ports, all within the
gulf of Davao, but its base port is the Sasa Wharf located at Barangay Sasa, Davao City. In 2011,
the Sasa Wharf was pegged for privatization under the PPP scheme. The DOTC study served as
one of the primary considerations for current Sasa Wharf expansion project.

On December 21, 2014, the Regional Development Council for Region XI (the Council) endorsed
the project through Resolution No. 118 subject to conditions. On April 10, 2015, the DOTC
published an invitation to pre-qualify and bid for the Project.1

On March 15, 2016, the petitioners - all stakeholders from Davao City and Samal, Davao del
Norte - filed this Urgent Petition for a Writ of Continuing Mandamus and/or Writ of Kalikasan. The
petitioners seek to restrain the implementation of the Project - including its bidding and award -
until the respondents secure an ECC and comply with the LGC. The respondents, through the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) argue that the allegations do not warrant the issuance of a
writ of kalikasan because the petitioners failed to prove the threat of environmental damage of
such magnitude as to prejudice the life, health, or property of inhabitants in two or more cities or
provinces.2

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petition warrant a Writ of Kalikasan.

RULING

No. The Court cannot issue a writ of kalikasan based on the petition. The writ is a remedy to
anyone whose constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology is violated or
threatened with violation by an lawful act or omission. However, the violation must
involve environmental damage of such magnitude as to prejudice the life, health, or property of
inhabitants in two or
The petitioners allege that the respondents have begun the process of transgressing their right to
health and a balanced ecology through the bidding process.3 They cite The Competitiveness of
Global Port-Cities: Synthesis Report4 to identify the four major negative impacts related to port
operations: 1) environmental impacts, 2) land use impacts, 3) traffic impacts, and 4) other

1
Id. at 263.
2
Id
3
Rollo, p. 12.
4
Id.
impacts. The synthesis report claims that most of these impacts affect the surrounding localities.

However, these allegations are insufficient to warrant a writ of kalikasan.

First, the petition failed to identify the particular threats from the Project itself. All it does is cite the
negative impacts of operating a port inside a city based on the Synthesis Report. However,
these impacts already exist because the Port of Davao has been operating since 1900. The
Project is not for the creation of a new port but the modernization of an existing one. At best, the
allegations in support of the application for the writ of kalikasan are hazy and speculative.

Second, the joint publication is titled Managing Impacts of Development in the Coastal Zone for
a reason; it identifies the potential environmental impacts and proposes mitigation measures to
protest the environment. The petition is misleading because it only identified the risks but
neglected to mention the existence and availability of mitigating measures. 5

Further, we fail to see an environmental risk that threatens to prejudice the inhabitants of two or
more cities or municipalities if we do not estrain the conduct of the bidding process. The bidding
process is not equivalent to the implementation of the project. The bidding process itself cannot
conceivably cause any environmental damage.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition for its prematurity and lack of merit.

5
Managing Impacts of Development in the Coastal Zone, p. 45, available
at http://faspselib.dens.gov.ph/sites/default/files/publication%20files/crmgubook7.pdf
WRITS:

Continuing Mandamus; The purpose of a writ of continuing mandamus is to compel the

respondent to perform his duties under the law. This remedy is available when any government
agency, instrumentality, or officer unlawfully neglects a specific legal duty in connection with
the enforcement or violation of an environmental law, rule, or regulation, or a right therein, or
unlawfully excludes another from the use or enjoyment of such right and there is no other plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.—The purpose of a writ of
continuing mandamus is to compel the respondent to perform his duties under the law. This
remedy is available when any government agency, instrumentality, or officer unlawfully neglects
a Specific legal duty in connection with the enforcement or violation of an environmental law,
rule, or regulation, or a right therein, unlawfully excludes another from the use or enjoyment of
such right and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law. The writ cannot be resorted to when the respondent is not the person obliged to perform
the duty under the law (as is the case under the EIS System) or when the period for the
respondent to perform its legal duty has not yet expired (as is the case with the consultation
requirements of the LGC). Accordingly, we cannot issue a writ of continuing mandamus.

Writ of Kalikasan; The writ of kalikasan is a remedy to anyone whose constitutional right to a
balanced and healthful ecology is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or
omission.—The Court cannot issue a writ of kalikasan based on the petition. The writ is a remedy
to anyone whose constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology is violated or
threatened with violation by an lawful act or omission. However, the violation must
involve environmental damage of such magnitude as to prejudice the life, health, or property of
inhabitants in two or more cities or provinces in order to arrant the issuance of the writ.

Other topics:

Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) is the process of evaluating and predicting the likely
impacts — including cumulative impacts — of an undertaking on the environment.—Environ-
mental Impact Assessment (EIA) is the process of evaluating and predicting the likely impacts —
including cumulative impacts — of an undertaking on the environment. Its goal is to prevent or
mitigate potential harm to the environment and to protect the welfare of the affected
community. To this end, the process requires proponents to truthfully and responsibly disclose all
relevant information on the project through the EIS. This facilitates meaningful and informed
public participation that ensures the project’s social acceptability to the community.

Environmental Impact Statement; The Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) contains a detailed
project description of the nature, configuration, the raw materials/natural resources to be used,
production system, waste generation and control, timelines, and all other related activities of the
proposed project.—The EIS contains a detailed project description of the nature, configuration,
the raw materials/natural resources to be used, production system, waste generation and
control, timelines, and all other related activities of the proposed project. It also includes an
Environmental Management Plan (EMP) detailing the proponent’s preventive, mitigating,
compensatory, and contingent measures to enhance the project’s positive impacts and
minimize ecological risks. Projects with potentially significant negative environmental impacts are
further required to conduct public consultations so that the environmental concerns of
stakeholders are addressed in formulating the EMP. The impact assessment concludes with
EMB’s approval (in the form of an ECC) or rejection (in the form of a denial letter). The ECC
signifies that the proposed project will not cause significant negative impact on the environment
based on the proponent’s representation. It also certifies that the proponent has complied with
the EIS System and has committed to implement its approved EMP. Accordingly, the ECC
contains the specific measures and conditions that the proponent must undertake to mitigate
the identified environmental impacts.

Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1151 and PD No. 1586 requires all agencies and instrumentalities of
the national government, including government-owned or -controlled corporations (GOCCs),
and private corporations, firms, and entities to file the Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) for
every proposed project or undertaking that significantly affects the quality of the environment.
Continuing Mandamus; Considering that the Project is still in the bidding stage, the petition
for continuing mandamus to compel the respondents to submit an Environmental Impact
Statement (EIS) and secure an environmental compliance certificate is premature.—Republic Act
No. 6957 as amended by R.A. 7718, commonly known as the Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) Law,
identifies the proponent in a PPP project as “the private sector entity which shall
have contractual responsibility for the project.” Accordingly, there is yet no project proponent
responsible for the EIS and the ECC until the bidding process has concluded and the contract has
been awarded. Considering that the Project is still in the bidding stage, the petition or
continuing mandamusto compel the respondents to submit an EIS and secure an ECC
is premature. It is also misplaced because the public respondents DO NOT have the duty to submit
the EIS or secure an ECC.

Environmental Compliance Certificate; The issuance of the Environmental Compliance

Certificate (ECC) does not exempt the project from compliance with other relevant laws.—The
issuance of the ECC does not exempt the project from compliance with other relevant laws. The
LGC, in particular, requires the government agency authorizing the project to conduct local
consultation and secure prior consent for ecologically impactful projects. x x x The duty to
consult the concerned local government units and the stakeholders belongs to the national
government agency or GOCC authorizing or involved in the planning and implementation of
the project — not the private sector proponent. In this case, this refers to the DOTC.

The Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) Law defines the proponent as the private sector entity with the
contractual responsibility over the project.—The BOT Law defines the proponent as the private
sector entity with the contractual responsibility over the project. The contract to a project is
executed between the concerned agency and the winning bidder within seven (7) days from
the latter’s receipt of the notice from the agency that all conditions stated in the Notice of
Award have been complied with. Upon the signing of the contract, the winning bidder
becomes the project proponent. Within another 7 days from the date of approval or signing of
the contract by the head of the Agency, the agency will issue a “Notice to Commence
Implementation” to the proponent. Interestingly enough, even this does not signal the start of
the implementation stage. Upon receipt of the Notice, the proponent is required to prepare
detailed engineering designs and plans based on the prescribed minimum design and
performance standards and specifications in the bid/tender documents. The agency shall
review the detailed engineering designs in terms of its compliance with the prescribed standards
and specification. If the designs are found acceptable, the agency shall approve them
incorporation in the contract to be signed by the proponent and the agency. The proponent
shall construct the project based on the design and performance standards and specifications
in the detailed engineering design. The signing of the finalized contract incorporating the
detailed engineering design is the reckoning point when implementation can begin. This is the
start of the Construction Stage.
CASE 2: G.R. No. 207257 February 3, 2015

HON. RAMON JESUS P. PAJE, in his capacity as SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT
AND NATURAL RESOURCES (DENR), Petitioner,
vs.
HON. TEODORO A. CASIÑO, HON. RAYMOND V. PALATINO, HON. RAFAEL V. MARIANO, HON.
EMERENCIANA A. DE JESUS, CLEMENTE G. BAUTISTA, JR., HON. ROLEN C. PAULINO, HON. EDUARDO
PIANO, HON. JAMES DE LOS REYES, HON. AQUILINO Y. CORTEZ, JR., HON. SARAH LUGERNA
LIPUMANO-GARCIA, NORAIDA VELARMINO, BIANCA CHRISTINE GAMBOA ESPINOS, CHARO
SIMONS, GREGORIO LLORCA MAGDARAOG, RUBELH PERALTA, ALEX CORPUS HERMOSO,
RODOLFO SAMBAJON, REV. FR. GERARDO GREGORIO P. JORGE, CARLITO A. BALOY, OFELIA D.
PABLO, MARIO ESQUILLO, ELLE LATINAZO, EVANGELINE Q. RODRIGUEZ, JOHN CARLO DELOS
REYES, Respondents.

Facts:

The Department of Environment and Natural Resources, issued an Environmental Compliance

Certificate for a proposed coal-fired power plant at Subic, Zambales to be implemented by RP
Energy.
Hon. Teodoro Casino and a number of legislators filed a Petition for Writ of Kalikasan against RP
energy, SBMA, and Hon. Ramon Paje as the DENR secretary on the ground that actual
environmental damage will occur if the power plant project is implemented and that the
respondents failed to comply with certain laws and rules governing or relating to the issuance of
an ECC and amendments thereto.
The Court of Appeals denied the petition for the Writ of Kalikasan and invalidated the ECC. Both
the DENR and Casino filed an appeal, the former imputing error in invalidating the ECC and its
amendments, arguing that the determination of the validity of the ECC as well as its
amendments is beyond the scope of a Petition for a Writ of kalikasan; while the latter claim that
it is entitled to a Writ of Kalikasan.

Issues:
1. Whether the parties may raise questions of fact on appeal on the issuance of a writ of
Kalikasan; and
2. Whether the validity of an ECC can be challenged via a writ of Kalikasan

Ruling:

1. Yes, the parties may raise questions of fact on appeal on the issuance of a writ of
Kalikasan because the Rules on the Writ of kalikasan (Rule 7, Section 16 of the Rules of
Procedure for Environmental Cases)allow the parties to raise, on appeal, questions of
fact— and, thus, constitutes an exception to Rule 45 of the Rules of Court— because of
the extraordinary nature of the circumstances surrounding the issuance of a writ
of kalikasan.

2. Yes, the validity of an ECC can be challenged via a writ of Kalikasan because such writ is
principally predicated on an actual or threatened violation of the constitutional right to a
balanced and healthful ecology, which involves environmental damage of a magnitude
that transcends political and territorial boundaries.

A party, therefore, who invokes the writ based on alleged defects or irregularities in the issuance
of an ECC must not only allege and prove such defects or irregularities, but must also provide a
causal link or, at least, a reasonable connection between the defects or irregularities in the
issuance of an ECC and the actual or threatened violation of the constitutional right to a
balanced and healthful ecology of the magnitude contemplated under the Rules. Otherwise,
the petition should be dismissed outright and the action re-filed before the proper forum with
due regard to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies.

In the case at bar, no such causal link or reasonable connection was shown or even attempted
relative to the aforesaid second set of allegations. It is a mere listing of the perceived defects or
irregularities in the issuance of the ECC.
CASE 3: LNL ARCHIPELAGO MINERALS v. AGHAM PARTY LIST

[ GR No. 209165, Apr 12, 2016 ]

Facts:

Petitioner LNL Archipelago Minerals, Inc. (LAMI) is the operator of a mining claim located in Sta.
Cruz, Zambales. LAMI's mining area is covered by Mineral Production Sharing Agreement[3] No.
268-2008-III dated 26 August 2008 by virtue of an Operating Agreement[4] dated 5 June 2007
with Filipinas Mining Corporation.

LAMI embarked on a project to build a private, non-commercial port in Brgy. Bolitoc, Sta. Cruz,
Zambales.

A port is a vital infrastructure to the operations of a mining company to ship out ores and other
minerals extracted from the mines and make the venture economically feasible.

LAMI secured the following permits and compliance certificates for the port project:

The Zambales Alliance, a group of other mining companies operating in Sta. Cruz, Zambales
which do not have their own port, namely Eramen Minerals, Inc.; Zambales Diversified Metals
Corporation; Zambales Chromite Mining Corporation, Inc.; BenguetCorp Nickel Mines, Inc.,
supported the port project of LAMI and issued Letters[11] of Intent to use the port facilities of
LAMI upon completion.

The Bolitoc community - the barangay, its officials and residents -gave several endorsements[12]
supporting the project. Even the Sangguniang Bayan of Sta. Cruz gave its consent to the
construction of the port.

LAMI stated that Mayor Marty unduly favored some mining companies in the municipality and
allegedly refused to issue business and mayor's permits and to receive payment of occupation
fees from other mining companies despite the necessary national permits and licenses secured
by the other mining companies.

On 24 April 2012, Mayor Marty issued an order[14] directing LAMI to refrain from continuing with
its clearing works and directed the Sta. Cruz Municipal Police Chief Generico Binan to
implement his order.

Thereafter, Rep. Dan Fernandez, a member of the Committee on Ecology of the House of
Representatives, passed House Resolution No. 117 (HR 117) entitled "Resolution Directing the
Committee on Ecology to Conduct an Inquiry, in Aid of Legislation, on the Implementation of
Republic Act No. 7942, Otherwise Known as the Philippine Mining Act of 1995, Particularly on the
Adverse Effects of Mining on the Environment."

The DENR PENRO team found that LAMI violated some of its conditions under the ECC.
Accordingly, a Notice of Violation (NOV) dated 1 June 2012 was issued against LAMI for violation
of certain conditions of the ECC with a cease and desist order from further constructing and
developing until such time that the ECC conditions were fully complied.

On 8 June 2012, a technical conference was held where LAMI presented its reply to the NOV.
The DENR-EMB R3 ascertained that LAMI's violations of the four conditions of its ECC constitute
minor violations since they only pertain to non-submission of documents.

However, the leveling of the elevated portion of the area was a major violation.
On 11 June 2012, LAMI wrote a letter[17] to the DENR-EMB R3 regarding the commitments
agreed upon during the technical conference. LAMI signified compliance with the conditions of
DENR-EMB R3.

The composite team found that LAMI's activities in its property would not result to any
environmental damage to its surrounding communities.

Thereafter, the DENR-EMB R3 lifted the cease and desist order after LAMI was found to have
complied with the requirements.

Meanwhile, earlier, or on 6 June 2012, respondent Agham Party List (Agham), through its
President, former Representative Angelo B. Palmones (Rep. Palmones), filed a Petition[21] for the
issuance of a Writ[22] of Kalikasan against LAMI, DENR, PPA, and the Zambales Police Provincial
Office (ZPPO).

In a Decision[37] dated 23 November 2012, the Court of Appeals decided the case in favor of
petitioner. The appellate court found that the government, through the CENRO, authorized LAMI
to cut trees and LAMI strictly followed the proper guidelines stated in the permit.

Agham filed a Motion for Reconsideration with the Court of Appeals.

In an Amended Decision dated 13 September 2013, the Court of Appeals reversed and set
aside its original Decision dated 23 November 2012.

Issues

1. Whether LAMI violated the environmental laws: the Revised Forestry Code, and Philippine
Mining Act;
2. Whether LAMI flattened any mountain and cause environmental damage of such
magnitured as to prejudice the life, health, property of inhabitants in two or more cities or
provinces

Ruling

1. No. LAMI strictly followed the permit issued by CENRO and passed the evaluation
conducted after the issuance of the permit so it clearly had the authority to cut trees
and did not violate Sec. 68 of the Revised Forestry Code. The Philippine Mining Act is not
applicable to the case since LAMI is not conducting anything on the port site and it
secured all the necessary permits and licenses for the construction of a port and LAMI’s
activity was limited to preparatory works for the port’s construction. The Philippine Mining
Act deals with mining operations and other mining activities.

2. No. The Respondent, in accusing that LAMI allegedly flattened a mountain, did not cite any
law allegedly violated by LAMI in relation to this claim. It did not present any proof to
demonstrate that the local residents in Zambales and those of the towns of Pangaisnan
complained of any great danger or harm on the alleged leveling of the land formation which
may affect their lives, health, or properties. Neither was there any evidence showing of a grave
and real environmental damage to the barangay and the surrounding vicinity.

The records of expert testimonies and government entities and offiicials also show that there is in
fact no mountain in Brgy. Bolitoc, Sta. Cruz, Zambales.

The Supreme Court agreed with the CA in denying the petition for a Writ of Kalikasan.
 WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We REVERSE and SET ASIDE the Amended Decision dated
13 September 2013 of the Court of Appeals and REINSTATE AND AFFIRM the original Decision
dated 23 November 2012 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 00012 which DENIED the
petition for the issuance of the privilege of the Writ of Kalikasan.

Principles:

Writ of Kalikasan which is under the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases.[42] Section 1,
Rule 7, Part III of the said Rules provides:Section 1. Nature of the writ. - The writ is a remedy
available to a natural or juridical person, entity authorized by law, people's organization, non-
governmental organization, or any public interest group accredited by or registered with any
government agency, on behalf of persons whose constitutional right to a balanced and
healthful ecology is violated, or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a
public official or employee, or private individual or entity, involving environmental damage of
such magnitude as to prejudice the life, health or property of inhabitants in two or more cities or
provinces.

The following requisites must be present to avail of this remedy: (1) there is an actual or
threatened violation of the constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology; (2) the
actual or threatened violation arises from an unlawful act or omission of a public official or
employee, or private individual or entity; and (3) the actual or threatened violation involves or
will lead to an environmental damage of such magnitude as to prejudice the life, health or
property of inhabitants in two or more cities or provinces.

Section 68 of the Revised Forestry Code, as amended, states:Sec. 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or
collecting Timber, or Other Forest Products Without License. Any person who shall cut, gather,
collect, remove timber or other forest products from any forest land, or timber from alienable or
disposable public land, or from private land, without any authority, or possess timber or other
forest products without the legal documents as required under existing forest laws and
regulations, shall be punished with the penalties imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of the
Revised Penal Code: Provided, That in the case of partnerships, associations, or corporations, the
officers who ordered the cutting, gathering, collection or possession shall be liable, and if such
officers are aliens, they shall, in addition to the penalty, be deported without further proceedings
on the part of the Commission on Immigration and Deportation.

There are two distinct and separate offenses punished under Section 68 of PD 705:

(1) Cutting, gathering, collecting and removing timber or other forest products from any forest
land, or timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from private land without any
authorization; and

(2) Possession of timber or other forest products without the legal documents required under
existing forest laws and regulations.
CASE 4: Victoria Segovia, et al. Vs. The Climate Change Commission, represented by its
Chairman, His Excellency Benigno S. Aquino, et al.
G.R. No. 211010
March 7, 2017

FACTS:

To address the clamor for a more tangible response to climate change, Former President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo issued AO 171 which created the Presidential Task Force on Climate Change
(PTFCC) on February 20, 2007. This body was reorganized through EO 774, which designated the
President as Chairperson, and cabinet secretaries as members of the Task Force. EO 774 expressed
what is now referred to by the petitioners as the "Road Sharing Principle." Its Section 9(a) reads:

Section 9. Task Group on Fossil Fuels. - (a) To reduce the consumption of fossil fuels, the Department
of Transportation and Communications (DOTC) shall lead a Task Group to reform the
transportation sector. The new paradigm in the movement of men and things must follow a simple
principle: "Those who have less in wheels must have more in road." For this purpose, the system
shall favor non-motorized locomotion and collective transportation system (walking, bicycling,
and the man-powered mini-train). In 2009, AO 254 was issued, mandating the DOTC (as lead
agency for the Task Group on Fossil Fuels or TGFF) to formulate a national Environmentally
Sustainable Transport Strategy (EST) for the Philippines. The Road Sharing Principle is similarly
mentioned, thus:

SECTION 4. Functions of the TGFF - In addition to the functions provided in EO 774, the TGFF shall
initiate and pursue the formulation of the National EST Strategy for the Philippines. Specifically, the
TGFF shall perform the following functions:

(a) Reform the transport sector to reduce the consumption of fossil fuels. The new paradigm in the
movement of men and things must follow a simple principle: "Those who have less in wheels must
have more in road." For this purpose, the system shall favor non-motorized locomotion and
collective transportation system (walking, bicycling, and the man--powered mini-train).

Later that same year, Congress passed the Climate Change Act. It created the Climate Change
Commission which absorbed the functions of the PTFCC and became the lead policy-making
body of the government which shall be tasked to coordinate, monitor and evaluate the programs
and action plans of the government relating to climate change.[7] Herein petitioners wrote
respondents regarding their pleas for implementation of the Road Sharing Principle, demanding
the reform of the road and transportation system in the whole country within thirty (30) days from
receipt of the said letter-foremost, through the bifurcation of roads and the reduction of official
and government fuel consumption by fifty percent (50%).Claiming to have not received a
response, they filed this petition. The Petitioners are Carless People of the Philippines, parents,
representing their children, who in tum represent "Children of the Future, and Car-owners who
would rather not have cars if good public transportation were safe, convenient, accessible,
available, and reliable". They claim that they are entitled to the issuance of the extraordinary writs
due to the alleged failure and refusal of respondents to perform an act mandated by
environmental laws, and violation of environmental laws resulting in environmental damage of
such magnitude as to prejudice the life, health and property of all Filipinos.

[9] These identified violations include: (a) The government's violation of "atmospheric trust" as
provided under Article XI, Section 1 of the Constitution, and thoughtless extravagance in the midst
of acute public want under Article 25 of the Civil Code for failure to reduce personal and official
consumption of fossil fuels by at least fifty percent (50%); (b) DOTC and DPWH's failure to
implement the Road Sharing Principle under EO 774; (c) DA's failure to devote public open spaces
along sidewalks, roads and parking lots to sustainable urban farming as mandated by Section
12(b)[11] of EO 774; (d) DILG's failure to coordinate with local government units (LGUs) to guide
them on the Road Sharing Principle under Section 9(g)[12] of EO 774; (e) DENR's failure to reduce
air pollutant emissions; and lastly, (f) DBM's failure to make available Road Users' Tax for purposes
stated in Section 9(e)[13] of EO 774.

In gist, petitioners contend that respondents' failure to implement the foregoing laws and
executive issuances resulted in the continued degradation of air quality, particularly in Metro
Manila, in violation of the petitioners' constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology,
and may even be tantamount to deprivation of life, and of life sources or "land, water, and air" by
the government without due process of law.[15] They also decry the "unequal" protection of laws
in the prevailing scheme, claiming that ninety--eight percent (98%) of Filipinos are discriminated
against by the law when the car-owning two percent (2%) is given almost all of the road space
and while large budgets are allocated for construction and maintenance of roads, hardly any
budget is given for sidewalks, bike lanes and non-motorized transportation systems.

[16] Respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor General, filed their Comment seeking the
outright dismissal of the petition for lack of standing and failure to adhere to the doctrine of
hierarchy of courts. The respondents denied the specific violations alleged in the petition, stating
that they have taken and continue to take measures to improve the traffic situation in Philippine
roads and to improve the environment condition - through projects and programs such as: priority
tagging of expenditures for climate change adaptation and mitigation, the Integrated Transport
System which is aimed to decongest major thoroughfares, Truck Ban, Anti-Smoke Belching
Campaign, Anti-Colorum, Mobile Bike Service Programs, and Urban Re-Greening Programs. These
projects are individually and jointly implemented by the public respondents to improve the traffic
condition and mitigate the effects of motorized vehicles on the environment.Contrary to
petitioners' claims, public respondents assert that they consider the impact of the transport sector
on the environment, as shown in the Philippine National Implementation Plan on Environment
Improvement in the Transport Sector which targets air pollution improvement actions, greenhouse
gases emission mitigation, and updating of noise pollution standards for the transport sector. In
response, petitioner filed their Reply, substantially reiterating the arguments they raised in the
Petition.

ISSUES

1. Whether or not the petitioners have standing to file the petition; NO.
2. Whether or not the petition should be dismissed for failing to adhere to the doctrine of hierarchy
of courts; YES. DISMISSED
3. Whether or not a writ of Kalikasan and/or Continuing Mandamus should issue. NO.

HELD:

The petition is DISMISSED

1. NO. The petitioners failed to prove direct or personal injury arising from acts attributable
to the respondents to be entitled to the writ.—The petitioners failed to prove direct or
personal injury arising from acts attributable to the respondents to be entitled to the writ.
While the requirements of standing had been liberalized in environmental cases, the
general rule of real party-in-interest applies to a petition for continuing mandamus.
 2. YES. View that petitions for the issuance of a writ of kalikasan involve factual matters
cannot, without more, justify the claim that the petition must first be filed with the Court
of Appeals (CA) on the ground that the Supreme Court (SC) is not a trier of facts.—
Indeed, that petitions for the issuance of a writ of kalikasan involve factual matters
cannot, without more, justify the claim that the petition must first be filed with the CA on
the ground that this Court is not a trier of facts. The RPEC deviates from the other rules on
this matter. After all, even if the petition has been initially lodged with the appellate
court, the appellant may still raise questions of fact on appeal. Section 16, Rule 7, Part III
of the RPEC explicitly says so: SECTION 16. Appeal.—Within fifteen (15) days from the date
of notice of the adverse judgment or denial of motion for reconsideration, any party may
appeal to the Supreme Court under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The appeal may raise
questions of fact.

3. NO. In this case, apart from repeated invocation of the constitutional right to health and
to a balanced and healthful ecology and bare allegations that their right was violated,
the petitioners failed to show that public respondents are guilty of any unlawful act or
omission that constitutes a violation of the petitioners’ right to a balanced and healthful
ecology.

Requisites for a Writ of Kalikasan to Issue.—For a writ of kalikasan to issue, the following
requisites must concur:
1. there is an actual or threatened violation of the constitutional right to a balanced and
healthful ecology;
2. the actual or threatened violation arises from an unlawful act or omission of a public official
or employee, or private individual or entity;
3. the actual or threatened violation involves or will lead to an environmental damage of
such magnitude as to prejudice the life, health or property of inhabitants in two or more cities or
provinces. It is well-settled that a party claiming the privilege for the issuance of a writ
of kalikasan has to show that a law, rule or regulation was violated or would be violated.

Other info:

There is a difference between a petition for the issuance of a writ of kalikasan, wherein it is
sufficient that the person filing represents the inhabitants prejudiced by the environmental
damage subject of the writ; and a petition for the issuance of a writ of continuing mandamus,
which is only available to one who is personally aggrieved by the unlawful act or omission.—The
RPEC did liberalize the requirements on standing, allowing the filing of citizen’s suit for the
enforcement of rights and obligations under environmental laws. This has been confirmed by this
Court’s rulings in Arigo v. Swift, 735 SCRA 102 (2014), and International Service for the Acquisition
of Agri-BioTech Applications, Inc. v. Greenpeace Southeast Asia (Philippines), 776 SCRA 434
(2015). However, it bears noting that there is a difference between a petition for the issuance of
a writ of kalikasan, wherein it is sufficient that the person filing represents the inhabitants
prejudiced by the environmental damage subject of the writ; and a petition for the issuance of
a writ of continuing mandamus, which is only available to one who is personally aggrieved by
the unlawful act or omission.

Mandamus lies to compel the performance of duties that are purely ministerial in nature, not
those that are discretionary, and the official can only be directed by mandamus to act but not
to act one way or the other.—The Road Sharing Principle is precisely as it is denominated — a
principle. It cannot be considered an absolute imposition to encroach upon the province of
public respondents to determine the manner by which this principle is applied or considered in
their policy decisions. Mandamus lies to compel the performance of duties that are purely
ministerial in nature, not those that are discretionary, and the official can only be directed
by mandamus to act but not to act one way or the other. The duty being enjoined
in mandamus must be one according to the terms provided in the law itself. Thus, the
recognized rule is that, in the performance of an official duty or act involving discretion, the
corresponding official can only be directed by mandamus to act, but not to act one way or the
other.

View that the absence of any mention of the first level courts — the municipal trial courts,
metropolitan trial courts, and the regional trial courts — is indicative of the exceptional nature of
a writ of kalikasan and the non-application of the principle to petitions for its issuance; The
limitation of the venues to the Supreme Court (SC) and the Court of Appeals (CA), whose
jurisdiction is national in scope, is the intended solution to controversies involving environmental
damage of such magnitude as to affect the “inhabitants in [at least] two (2) or more cities or
provinces.”—The absence of any mention of the first level courts — the municipal trial courts,
metropolitan trial courts, and the regional trial courts — is indicative of the exceptional nature of
a writ of kalikasan and the non-application of the principle to petitions for its issuance. This
palpable absence marks the difference from the other special civil actions available under the
other rules where this Court is given concurrent jurisdiction not only with the Court of Appeals
(CA) but also with the trial courts. For instance, Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
specifically identifies the RTC as one of the courts where the petitions for certiorari, prohibition,
and mandamus may be filed. Section 2 of Rule 102 on Habeas Corpuslikewise names the trial
court as a venue where the petition therefor may be filed. In a similar manner, Section 3 of The
Rule on Habeas Data lays down at the outset that the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction over
petitions for Habeas Data and states that this Court only has jurisdiction over petitions
concerning public data files of government offices. Notable too is Section 3 of the Rule on the
Writ of Amparo, which includes the Regional Trial Court, the Sandiganbayan, and the Court of
Appeals in the list of fora with jurisdiction over petitions for the writ of amparo. The omission of the
trial courts with limited jurisdiction in Section 3, Rule 7, Part III of the RPEC was not by mere
oversight. Rather, the limitation of the venues to this Court and the CA, whose jurisdiction is
national in scope, is the intended solution to controversies involving environmental damage of
such magnitude as to affect the “inhabitants in [at least] two or more cities or provinces.”
 CASE 5: MOST REV. PEDRO D. ARIGO, D.D., vs SCOTT H. SWIFT
G.R. No. 206510. September 16, 2014

FACTS: The USS Guardian is an Avenger-class mine countermeasures ship of the US Navy. In
December 2012, the US Embassy in the Philippines requested diplomatic clearance for the said
vessel “to enter and exit the territorial waters of the Philippines and to arrive at the port of Subic
Bay for the purpose of routine ship replenishment, maintenance, and crew liberty.” On January 6,
2013, the ship left Sasebo, Japan for Subic Bay, arriving on January 13, 2013 after a brief stop for
fuel in Okinawa, Japan.

On January 15, 2013, the USS Guardian departed Subic Bay for its next port of call in Makassar,
Indonesia. On January 17, 2013 at 2:20 a.m. while transiting the Sulu Sea, the ship ran aground on
the northwest side of South Shoal of the Tubbataha Reefs, about 80 miles east-southeast of
Palawan. No one was injured in the incident, and there have been no reports of leaking fuel or
oil.

Petitioners claim that the grounding, salvaging and post-salvaging operations of the USS Guardian
cause and continue to cause environmental damage of such magnitude as to affect the
provinces of Palawan, Antique, Aklan, Guimaras, Iloilo, Negros Occidental, Negros Oriental,
Zamboanga del Norte, Basilan, Sulu, and Tawi-Tawi, which events violate their constitutional rights
to a balanced and healthful ecology.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not petitioners have legal standing.

2. Whether or not US respondents may be held liable for damages caused by USS Guardian.
3. Whether or not the waiver of immunity from suit under VFA applies in this case.

HELD:

First issue: YES.

Petitioners have legal standing

Locus standi is “a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question.”

Specifically, it is “a party’s personal and substantial interest in a case where he has sustained or
will sustain direct injury as a result” of the act being challenged, and “calls for more than just a
generalized grievance.” However, the rule on standing is a procedural matter which this Court
has relaxed for non-traditional plaintiffs like ordinary citizens, taxpayers and legislators when the
public interest so requires, such as when the subject matter of the controversy is of transcendental
importance, of overreaching significance to society, or of paramount public interest.

In the landmark case of Oposa v. Factoran, Jr., we recognized the “public right” of
citizens to “a balanced and healthful ecology which, for the first time in our constitutional history,
is solemnly incorporated in the fundamental law.” We declared that the right to a balanced and
healthful ecology need not be written in the Constitution for it is assumed, like other civil and
polittcal rights guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, to exist from the inception of mankind and it is an
issue of transcendental importance with intergenerational implications. Such right carries with it
the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment.

On the novel element in the class suit filed by the petitioners minors in Oposa, this Court
ruled that not only do ordinary citizens have legal standing to sue for the enforcement of
environmental rights, they can do so in representation of their own and future generations.

Second issue: YES.

The US respondents were sued in their official capacity as commanding officers of the
US Navy who had control and supervision over the USS Guardian and its crew. The alleged act or
omission resulting in the unfortunate grounding of the USS Guardian on the TRNP was committed
while they were performing official military duties. Considering that the satisfaction of a judgment
against said officials will require remedial actions and appropriation of funds by the US
government, the suit is deemed to be one against the US itself. The principle of State immunity
therefore bars the exercise of jurisdiction by this Court over the persons of respondents Swift, Rice
and Robling.

During the deliberations, Senior Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio took the position that
the conduct of the US in this case, when its warship entered a restricted area in violation of R.A.
No. 10067 and caused damage to the TRNP reef system, brings the matter within the ambit of
Article 31 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). He explained that
while historically, warships enjoy sovereign immunity from suit as extensions of their flag State, Art.
31 of the UNCLOS creates an exception to this rule in cases where they fail to comply with the rules
and regulations of the coastal State regarding passage through the latter’s internal waters and the
territorial sea.

In the case of warships, as pointed out by Justice Carpio, they continue to enjoy
sovereign immunity subject to the following exceptions:

Article 30: Non-compliance by warships with the laws and regulations of the coastal State

If any warship does not comply with the laws and regulations of the coastal State concerning
passage through the territorial sea and disregards any request for compliance therewith which is
made to it, the coastal State may require it to leave the territorial sea immediately.

Article 31: Responsibility of the flag State for damage caused by a warship or other government
ship operated for non-commercial purposes

The flag State shall bear international responsibility for any loss or damage to the coastalState
resulting from the non-compliance by a warship or other government ship operated for non-
commercial purposes with the laws and regulations of the coastal State concerning passage
through the territorial sea or with the provisions of this Convention or other rules of international
law.

Article 32: Immunities of warships and other government ships operated for non-commercial
purposes

With such exceptions as are contained in subsection A and in articles 30 and 31, nothing
in this Convention affects the immunities of warships and other government ships operated for
non-commercial purposes. A foreign warship’s unauthorized entry into our internal waters with
resulting damage to marine resources is one situation in which the above provisions may apply.

But what if the offending warship is a non-party to the UNCLOS, as in this case, the US?

According to Justice Carpio, although the US to date has not ratified the UNCLOS, as a matter of
long-standing policy the US considers itself bound by customary international rules on the
“traditional uses of the oceans” as codified in UNCLOS.

Moreover, Justice Carpio emphasizes that “the US refusal to join the UNCLOS was centered on its
disagreement with UNCLOS” regime of deep seabed mining (Part XI) which considers the oceans
and deep seabed commonly owned by mankind,” pointing out that such “has nothing to do with
its the US’ acceptance of customary international rules on navigation.”

The Court also fully concurred with Justice Carpio’s view that non-membership in the UNCLOS
does not mean that the US will disregard the rights of the Philippines as a Coastal State over its
internal waters and territorial sea. We thus expect the US to bear “international responsibility”
under Art. 31 in connection with the USS Guardian grounding which adversely affected the
Tubbataha reefs. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine that our long-time ally and trading partner, which
has been actively supporting the country’s efforts to preserve our vital marine resources, would
shirk from its obligation to compensate the damage caused by its warship while transiting our
internal waters. Much less can we comprehend a Government exercising leadership in
international affairs, unwilling to comply with the UNCLOS directive for all nations to cooperate in
the global task to protect and preserve the marine environment as provided in Article 197 of
UNCLOS

Article 197: Cooperation on a global or regional basis

States shall cooperate on a global basis and, as appropriate, on a regional basis, directly or
through competent international organizations, in formulating and elaborating international rules,
standards and recommended practices and procedures consistent with this Convention, for the
protection and preservation of the marine environment, taking into account characteristic
regional features.

In fine, the relevance of UNCLOS provisions to the present controversy is beyond dispute. Although
the said treaty upholds the immunity of warships from the jurisdiction of Coastal States while
navigating the latter’s territorial sea, the flag States shall be required to leave the territorial sea
immediately if they flout the laws and regulations of the Coastal State, and they will be liable for
damages caused by their warships or any other government vessel operated for non-commercial
purposes under Article 31.

Third issue: NO.

The waiver of State immunity under the VF A pertains only to criminal jurisdiction and not
to special civil actions such as the present petition for issuance of a writ of Kalikasan. In fact, it can
be inferred from Section 17, Rule 7 of the Rules that a criminal case against a person charged with
a violation of an environmental law is to be filed separately.

The Court considered a view that a ruling on the application or non-application of

criminal jurisdiction provisions of the VFA to US personnel who may be found responsible for the
grounding of the USS Guardian, would be premature and beyond the province of a petition for a
writ of Kalikasan.

The Court also found unnecessary at this point to determine whether such waiver of
State immunity is indeed absolute. In the same vein, we cannot grant damages which have
resulted from the violation of environmental laws. The Rules allows the recovery of damages,
including the collection of administrative fines under R.A. No. 10067, in a separate civil suit or that
deemed instituted with the criminal action charging the same violation of an environmental law.
CASE 6 : Resident Marine Mammals of the Protected Seascape Tañon Strait v. Secretary Angelo
Reyes in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Energy, et.al. (G.R. No. 180771 and 181527)
21 April 2015
J. Leonardo-De Castro

FACTS

On 13 June 2002, the Government of the Philippines, acting through the Department of Energy
(DOE) entered into a Geophysical Survey and Exploration Contract-102 (GSEC-102) with
Japan Petroleum Exploration Co., Ltd. (JAPEX). The studies included surface geology, sample
analysis, and reprocessing of seismic and magnetic data. Geophysical and satellite surveys as
well as oil and gas sampling in Tañon Strait was conducted.

On 12 December 2004, DOE and JAPEX converted GSEC-102 to Service Contract No. 46 (SC-
46) for the exploration, development, and production of petroleum resources in a block
covering approximately 2,850 sqm. offshore the Tañon Strait.

From 9-18 May 2005, JAPEX conducted seismic surveys in and around Tañon Strait, including a
multi-channel sub-bottom profiling covering approximately 751 kms. to determine the area’s
underwater composition. During the 2nd sub-phase of the project, JAPEX committed to drill
one exploration well. Since the same was to be drilled in the marine waters of Aloguisan and
Pinamungajan where the Tañon Strait was declared a protected seascape in 1988, JAPEX
agreed to comply with the Environmental Impact Assessment requirements under Presidential
Decree No. 1586 (PD 1586), entitled “Establishing an Environmental Impact Statement System,
Including Other Environmental Management Related Measures and For Other Purposes.”

On 31 January 2007, the Protected Area Management Board (PAMB) of the Tañon Strait issued
Resolution No. 2007-01 where it adopted the Initial Environmental Examination commissioned
by JAPEX, and favourably recommended the approval of the latter’s application for an
Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC).

On 6 March 2007, DENR-EMB Region VII granted an ECC to DOE and JAPEX for the offshore oil
and gas exploration project in Tañon Strait.
From 16 November 2007 to 8 February 2008, JAPEX drilled an exploratory well with a depth of
3,150 meters near Pinamungajan town.

On 17 December 2007, two separate original petitions were filed commonly seeking that the
implementation of SC-46 be enjoined for violation of the 1987 Constitution.

The petitioners in G.R. No. 180771 are the “Resident Marine Mammals” which inhibit the waters
in and around the Tañon Strait, joined by “Stewards” Gloria Estenzo Ramos and Rose-Liza
Eisma-Osorio as their legal guardians and friends seeking their protection. Also impleaded as
unwilling co-petitioner is former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. In G.R. No. 181527, the
petitioners are the Central Visayas Fisherfolk Development Center (FIDEC), a non-stock, non-
profit, non-governmental organization established for the welfare of the marginal fisherfolk in
Region VII and representatives of the subsistence fisherfolk of the municipalities of Aloguinsan
and Pinamungajan, Cebu. Their contentions are:
- A study made after the seismic survey showed that there is a drastic reduce in fish
catch by 50-70% attributable to the destruction of the “payao” or the artificial reef.
- The ECC obtained by the respondents is invalid because there is no public
consultations and discussions prior to its issuance.
 - SC-46 is null and void for having violated Section 2, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution, considering that there is no general law prescribing the standard or
uniform terms, conditions, and requirements for service contracts involving oil
exploration and extraction
- FIDEC alleges that it was barred from entering and fishing within a 7-kilometer radius
from the point where the oilrig was located, an area grated than the 1.5-kilometer
radius exclusion zone stated in the Initial Environmental Examination
 The respondents in both petitions are: the late Angelo T. Reyes, DOE Secretary; Jose L.
Atienza, DENR Secretary; Leonardo Sibbaluca, DENR-Region VII Director and Chairman of
Tañon Strait PAMB; JAPEX, a Japanese company; and Supply Oilfield Services, Inc. (SOS)
as the alleged Philippine agent of JAPEX. Their counter-allegations are:
- The “Resident Marine Mammals” and “Stewards” have no legal standing to file the
petition.
- SC-46 is constitutional.
- The ECC was legally issued.
- The case is moot and academic since SC-46 is mutually terminated on 21 June
2008.

ISSUES

1. WON the case is moot and academic

2. WON Petitioners have a legal standing
3. WON SC-46 is unconstitutional

RULING

1. No. The Court makes clear that the “moot and academic” principle is not a magic formula
that can automatically dissuade the courts in resolving a case. Despite the termination of
SC-46, the Court deems it necessary to resolve the consolidated petitions as it falls within
the exceptions. Both petitioners allege that SC-46 is violative of the Constitution, the
environmental and livelihood issues raised undoubtedly affect the public’s interest, and
the respondents’ contested actions are capable of repetition.

2. Yes. In our jurisdiction, locus standi in environmental cases has been given a more
liberalized approach. The Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases allow for a “citizen
suit,” and permit any Filipino citizen to file an action before our courts for violation of our
environmental laws on the principle that humans are stewards of nature:

“Section 5. Citizen suit. – Any Filipino citizen in representation of others,

including minors or generations yet unborn, may file an action to enforce
rights or obligations under environmental laws. Upon the filing of a citizen
suit, the court shall issue an order which shall contain a brief description of
the cause of action and the reliefs prayed for, requiring all interested parties
to manifest their interest to intervene in the case within fifteen (15) days from
notice thereof. The plaintiff may publish the order once in a newspaper of
general circulation in the Philippines or furnish all affected baragngays
copies of said order.

Citizen suits filed under R.A. No. 8749 and R.A. No. 9003 shall be governed
by their respective provisions. (Emphasis supplied)”
 Although the petition was filed in 2007, years before the effectivity of the Rules of
Procedure for Environmental Cases, it has been consistently held that rules of procedure
may be retroactively applied to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their
passage and will not violate any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely
affected, inasmuch as there is no vested rights in rules of procedure.

Moreover, even before the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases became
effective, the SC had already taken a permissive position on the issue of locus standi in
environmental cases. In Oposa, the SC allowed the suit to be brought in the name of
generations yet unborn “based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar
as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned.”

It is also worth noting that the Stewards in the present case are joined as real parties
in the Petition and not just in representation of the named cetacean species.

3. Yes. Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution provides in part:

“The President may enter into agreement with foreign-owned corporations

involving either technical or financial assistance for large-scale
exploration, development, and utilization of minerals, petroleum, and other
mineral oils according to the general terms and conditions provided by law,
based on real contributions to the economic growth and general welfare of
the country. In such agreements, the State shall promote the development
and use of local scientific and technical resources.

The President shall notify the Congress of every contract entered into in
accordance with this provision, within thirty days from its execution.”
(Emphases supplied)

The disposition, exploration, development, exploitation, and utilization of

indigenous petroleum in the Philippines are governed by Presidential Decree No. 87 (PD
87) or the Oil Exploration and Development Act of 1972. Although the Court finds that PD
87 is sufficient to satisfy the requirement of a general law, the absence of the two other
conditions, that the President be a signatory to SC-46, and that the Congress be notified
of such contract, renders it null and void.

SC-46 appears to have been entered into and signed by the DOE through its then
Secretary Vicente S. Perez, Jr. Moreover, public respondents have neither shown nor
alleged that Congress was subsequently notified of the execution of such contract.

Service contracts involving the exploitation, development, and utilization of our

natural resources are of paramount interest to the present and future generations. Hence,
safeguards were out in place to insure that the guidelines set by law are meticulously
observed and likewise eradicate the corruption that may easily penetrate departments
and agencies by ensuring that the President has authorized or approved of the service
contracts herself.

Even under the provisions of PD 87, it is required that the Petroleum Board, now the
DOE, obtain the President’s approval for the execution of any contract under said statute.

The SC likewise ruled on the legality of SC-46 vis-à-vis other pertinent laws to serve
as a guide for the Government when executing service contracts.
 Under Proclamation No. 2146, the Tañon Strait is an environmentally critical area,
having been declared as a protected area in 1998; therefore, any activity outside the
scope of its management plan may only be implemented pursuant to an ECC secured
after undergoing an Environment Impact Assessment (EIA) to determine the effects of such
activity on its ecological system.

Public respondents admitted that JAPEX only started to secure an ECC prior to the
2nd sub-phase of SC-46, which required the drilling of the exploration well. This means that
no environmental impact evaluation was done when the seismic surveys were conducted.
Unless the seismic surveys are part of the management plan of the Tañon Strait, such
surveys were done in violation of Section 12 of NIPAS Act and Section 4 of Presidential
Decree No. 1586.

While PD 87 may serve as the general law upon which a service contract for
petroleum exploration and extraction may be authorized, the exploitation and utilization
of this energy resource in the present case may be allowed only through a law passed by
Congress, since the Tañon Strait is a NIPAS area. Since there is no such law specifically
allowing oil exploration and/or extraction in the Tañon Strait, no energy resource
exploitation and utilization may be done in said protected seascape.