In re Saturnino Bermudez

Saturnino Bermudez, as a lawyer, questioned the validity of the first paragraph of Section
5 of Article XVIII of the proposed 1986 Constitution, which provides in full as follows:
Sec. 5. The six-year term of the incumbent President and Vice-President elected in the February
7, 1986 election is, for purposes of synchronization of elections, hereby extended to noon of
June 30, 1992.

The first regular elections for the President and Vice-President under this Constitution shall be
held on the second Monday of May, 1992.

Bermudez claims that the said provision “is not clear” as to whom it refers, he then asks the
Court “to declare and answer the question of the construction and definiteness as to who,
among the present incumbent President Corazon Aquino and Vice President Salvador
Laurel and the elected President Ferdinand E. Marcos and Vice President Arturo M.
Tolentino being referred to as the “incumbent president”.
ISSUE: Whether or not said provision is ambiguous.
HELD: No. Bermudez’s allegation of ambiguity or vagueness of the aforequoted provision is
manifestly gratuitous, it being a matter of public record and common public knowledge that
the Constitutional Commission refers therein to incumbent President Aquino and Vice-
President Laurel, and to no other persons, and provides for the extension of their term to
noon of June 30, 1992 for purposes of synchronization of elections. Hence, the second
paragraph of the cited section provides for the holding on the second Monday of May, 1992
of the first regular elections for the President and Vice-President under said 1986
Constitution. In previous cases, the legitimacy of the government of President Aquino was
likewise sought to be questioned with the claim that it was not established pursuant to the
1973 Constitution. The said cases were dismissed outright by the Supreme Court which
held that: “Petitioners have no personality to sue and their petitions state no cause of action.
For the legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a justiciable matter. It belongs to the
realm of politics where only the people of the Philippines are the judge. And the people
have made the judgment; they have accepted the government of President Corazon C.
Aquino which is in effective control of the entire country so that it is not merely a de facto
government but in fact and in law a de jure government. Moreover, the community of
nations has recognized the legitimacy of the present government.
In re Saturnino Bermudez

Facts:
This is a petition for declaratory relief filed by the petitioner Bermudez seeking for the
clarification of Sec. 5, Art. 18 of the proposed 1986 Constitution, as quoted:
Sec. 5. The six-year term of the incumbent President and Vice-President elected in the
February 7, 1986 election is, for purposes of synchronization of elections, hereby extended
to noon of June 30, 1992.
The first regular elections for the President and Vice-President under this Constitution shall
be held on the second Monday of May, 1992.
Petitioner sought the aid of the Court to determine as to whom between the incumbent
Pres. Aquino and VP Laurel and elected Pres. Marcos and VP Tolentino the said provision
refers to.
Issue: Whether the Court should entertain the petition for declaratory relief?
Held:
It is elementary that this Court assumes no jurisdiction over petitions for declaratory
relief.(Note: ROC provides that the jurisdiction for petitions for declaratory relief is with the
RTC )
More importantly, the petition amounts in effect to a suit against the incumbent President of
the Republic, President Corazon C. Aquino, and it is equally elementary that incumbent
Presidents are immune from suit or from being brought to court during the period of their
incumbency and tenure.
It being a matter of public record and common public knowledge that the
Constitutional Commission refers therein to incumbent President Corazon C. Aquino and
Vice-President Salvador H. Laurel, and to no other persons, and provides for the extension
of their term to noon of June 30, 1992 for purposes of synchronization of election
ACCFA v CUGCO G.R. No. L-21484. November 29,
1969.
J. Makalintal
Certiorari
Facts:

(ACCFA) was a government agency created under Republic Act No. 821, as amended. Its
administrative machinery was reorganized and its name changed to Agricultural Credit
Administration (ACA) under the Land Reform Code (Republic Act No. 3844). On the other hand, the
ACCFA Supervisors' Association (ASA) and the ACCFA Workers' Association (AWA), referred to as
the Unions, are labor organizations composed of the supervisors and the rank-and-file employees,
respectively, in the ACCFA (now ACA).

On October 30, 1962 the Unions, together with its mother union, the Confederation of Unions in
Government Corporationsand Offices (CUGCO), filed a complaint with the Court of Industrial
Relations against the ACCFA for having allegedly committed acts of unfair labor practice, namely:
violation of the collective bargaining agreement in order to discourage the members of the Unions in
the exercise of their right to self-organization, discrimination against said members in the matter of
promotions, and refusal to bargain.

The ACCFA moved to reconsider but was turned down in a resolution dated April 25, 1963 of the
CIR en banc. Hence this appeal.

During the pendency of the case, the union filed a petition for certification election with the Court of
Industrial Relations praying that they be certified as the exclusive bargaining agents for the
supervisors and rank-and-file employees, respectively, in the ACA.Trial court agreed with this move.

However, the ACA filed for a stay of execution which the trial court granted.

Issue: WON the CIR has jurisdiction to entertain the petition of the Unions for certification election
given that the mother company (ACA) is engaged in governmental functions

Held: The Unions are not entitled. Decision modified

Ratio:
Under Section 3 of the Agricultural Land Reform Code the ACA was established, among other
governmental agencies, to extend credit and similar assistance to agriculture.
According to the Land Reform Code, the administrative machinery of the ACCFA shall be
reorganized to enable it to align its activities with the requirements and objective of this Code and
shall be known as the Agricultural Credit Administration. These include powers non really accorded
to non-government entities such as tax exemptions, registration of deeds, notarial services, and
prosecution of officials.

The power to audit the operations of farmers' cooperatives and otherwise inquire into their affairs, as
given by Section 113, is in the nature of the visitorial power of the sovereign, which only a
government agency specially delegated to do so by the Congress may legally exercise.

Moreover, the ACA was delegated under the Land Reform Project Administration , a government
agency tasked t implement land reform.

Moreover, the appointing authority for officials was the President himself.
The considerations set forth above militate quite strongly against the recognition of collective
bargaining powers in the respondent Unions within the context of Republic Act No. 875, and hence
against the grant of their basic petition for certification election as proper bargaining units. The ACA
is a government office or agency engaged in governmental, not proprietary functions.

These functions may not be strictly what President Wilson described as "constituent" (as
distinguished from "ministrant"), such as those relating to the maintenance of peace and the
prevention of crime, those regulating property and property rights, those relating to the
administration of justice and the determination of political duties of citizens, and those relating to
national defense and foreign relations. Under this traditional classification, such constituent functions
are exercised by the State as attributes of sovereignty, and not merely to promote the welfare,
progress and prosperity of the people — these letter functions being ministrant, he exercise of which
is optional on the part of the government.

The growing complexities of modern society, however, have rendered this traditional classification of
the functions of government quite unrealistic, not to say obsolete. The areas which used to be left to
private enterprise and initiative and which the government was called upon to enter optionally, and
only "because it was better equipped to administer for the public welfare than is any
private individual or group of individuals." continue to lose their well-defined boundaries and to be
absorbed within activities that the government must undertake in its sovereign capacity if it is to meet
the increasing social challenges of the times.

It was in furtherance of such policy that the Land Reform Code was enacted and the various
agencies, the ACA among them, established to carry out its purposes. There can be no dispute as to
the fact that the land reform program contemplated in the said Code is beyond the capabilities of any
private enterprise to translate into reality. It is a purely governmental function, no less than, say, the
establishment and maintenance of public schools and public hospitals.

Given these, the respondent Unions are not entitled to the certification election sought in the Court
below. Such certification is admittedly for purposes of bargaining in behalf of the employees with
respect to terms and conditions of employment, including the right to strike as a coercive economic
weapon, as in fact the said unions did strike in 1962 against the ACCFA.

This is contrary to Section 11 of Republic Act No. 875, which provides:

"SEC. 11. Prohibition Against Strike in the Government. — The terms and conditions of
employment in the Government, including any political subdivision or instrumentality thereof, are
governed by law and it is declared to be the policy of this Act that employees therein shall not strike
for the purposes of securing changes or modification in their terms and conditions of employment.
Such employees may belong to any labor organization which does not impose the obligation to strike
or to join in strike: Provided, However, that this section shall apply only to employees employed in
governmental functions of the Government including but not limited to
governmental corporations."
ACCFA v CUGCO

Facts:
1. ACCFA, a government agency created under RA 821, as amended was
reorganized and its name changed to Agricultural Credit Administration (ACA)
under the RA 3844 or Land Reform Code. While ACCFA Supervisors'
Association (ASA) and the ACCFA Workers' Association (AWA), are labor
organizations (the Unions) composed of the supervisors and the rank-and-file
employees in the ACCFA.
2. A CBA was agreed upon by labor unions (ASA and AWA) and ACCFA.
The said CBA was supposed to be effective on 1 July 1962. Due to non-
implementation of the CBA the unions held a strike. And 5 days later, the Unions,
with its mother union, the Confederation of Unions in Government Corporations
and Offices (CUGCO), filed a complaint against ACCFA before the CIR on
ground of alleged acts of unfair labor practices; violation of the collective
bargaining agreement in order to discourage the members of the Unions in the
exercise of their right to self-organization, discrimination against said members in
the matter of promotions and refusal to bargain.
3. ACCFA moved for a reconsideration but while the appeal was pending, RA
3844 was passed which effectively turned ACCFA to ACA. Then, ASA and AWA
petitioned that they obtain sole bargaining rights with ACA. While this petition
was not yet decided upon, EO 75 was also passed which placed ACA under the
Land Reform Project Administration. Notwithstanding the latest legislation
passed, the trial court and the appellate court ruled in favor of ASA and AWA.
ISSUE: W/N ACA is a government entity

YES.

It was in furtherance of such policy that the Land Reform Code was enacted and the
various agencies, the ACA among them, established to carry out its purposes. There can
be no dispute as to the fact that the land reform program contemplated in the said Code is
beyond the capabilities of any private enterprise to translate into reality. It is a purely
governmental function, no less than, the establishment and maintenance of public schools
and public hospitals. And when, aside from the governmental objectives of the ACA,
geared as they are to the implementation of the land reform program of the State, the law
itself declares that the ACA is a government office, with the formulation of policies,
plans and programs vested no longer in a Board of Governors, as in the case of the
ACCFA, but in the National Land Reform Council, itself a government instrumentality;
and that its personnel are subject to Civil Service laws and to rules of standardization
with respect to positions and salaries, any vestige of doubt as to the governmental
character of its functions disappears.
The growing complexities of modern society, however, have rendered this traditional
classification of the functions of government quite unrealistic, not to say obsolete. The
areas which used to be left to private enterprise and initiative and which the government
was called upon to enter optionally, and only "because it was better equipped to
administer for the public welfare than is any private individual or group of
individuals,"5continue to lose their well-defined boundaries and to be absorbed within
activities that the government must undertake in its sovereign capacity if it is to meet the
increasing social challenges of the times. Here as almost everywhere else the tendency is
undoubtedly towards a greater socialization of economic forces. Here of course this
development was envisioned, indeed adopted as a national policy, by the Constitution
itself in its declaration of principle concerning the promotion of social justice.

The Unions have no bargaining rights with ACA. EO 75 placed ACA under the LRPA
and by virtue of RA 3844 the implementation of the Land Reform Program of the
government is a governmental function NOT a proprietary function. Being such, ACA
can no longer step down to deal privately with said unions as it may have been doing
when it was still ACCFA. However, the growing complexities of modern society have
rendered the classification of the governmental functions as unrealistic, if not obsolete.
Ministerial and governmental functions continue to lose their well-defined boundaries
and are absorbed within the activities that the government must undertake in its sovereign
capacity if it to meet the increasing social challenges of the times and move towards a
greater socialization of economic forces.
Dimaporo v Mitra

FACTS:

Petitioner Mohamad Ali Dimaporo was elected Representative for the Second Legislative District of
Lanao del Sur during the 1987 congressional elections. On 15 January 1990, petitioner filed with the
COMELEC a Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Regional Governor of the Autonomous Region
in Muslim Mindanao in the immediately following elections. Upon being informed of this development
by the COMELEC, respondents Speaker and Secretary of the House of Representatives excluded
petitioner's name from the Roll of Members of the House of Representatives pursuant to Section 67,
Article IX of the Omnibus Election Code which states:
Any elective official whether national or local running for any office other than the one which he is
holding in a permanent capacity except for President and Vice-President shall be considered ipso facto
resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy.

Having lost in the autonomous region elections, petitioner, in a letter addressed to respondent Speaker,
expressed his intention "to resume performing my duties and functions as elected Member of Congress.
He maintains that he did not thereby lose his seat as congressman because Section 67, Article IX of B.P.
Blg. 881 is not operative under the present Constitution, being contrary thereto, and therefore not
applicable to the present members of Congress.

In support of his contention, petitioner points out that the term of office of members of the House of
Representatives, as well as the grounds by which the incumbency of said members may be shortened, are
provided for in the Constitution. Section 2, Article XVIII thereof provides that "the Senators, Members of
the House of Representatives and the local officials first elected under this Constitution shall serve until
noon of June 30, 1992," while Section 7, Article VI states: "The Members of the House of
Representatives shall be elected for a term of three years which shall begin, unless otherwise provided by
law, at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following their election. He asserts that under the rule
expressio unius est exclusio alterius, Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881 is repugnant to these
constitutional provisions in that it provides for the shortening of a congressman's term of office on a
ground not provided for in the Constitution.
Moreover, he claims that he cannot be said to have forfeited his seat as it is only when a congressman
holds another office or employment that forfeiture is decreed. Filing a certificate of candidacy is not
equivalent to holding another office or employment.

ISSUE:

1. IS SECTION 67, ARTICLE IX, OF B.P. BLG. 881 OPERATIVE UNDER THE PRESENT
CONSTITUTION?

2. COULD THE RESPONDENT SPEAKER AND/OR THE RESPONDENT SECRETARY, 'BY

ADMINISTRATIVE ACT', EXCLUDE THE PETITIONER FROM THE ROLLS OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, THEREBY PREVENTING HIM FROM EXERCISING HIS FUNCTIONS AS
CONGRESSMAN, AND DEPRIVING HIM OF HIS RIGHTS AND PRIVILEGES AS SUCH?

HELD:

The petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

1. The officials running for office other than the ones they are holding will be considered resigned not
because of abuse of facilities of power or the use of office facilities but primarily because under our
Constitution, we have this …chapter on accountability of public officers (both in the 1973 and 1987
constitution). Section 1 of Article XI (1987) on "Accountability of Public Officers" states that:

Sec. 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to
the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism
and justice, and lead modest lives.

Under this commentary on accountability of public officers, the elective public officers must serve their
principal, the people, not their own personal ambition. Petitioner failed to discern that rather than cut
short the term of office of elective public officials, this statutory provision (Section 67, Article IX of B.P.
Blg. 881) seeks to ensure that such officials serve out their entire term of office by discouraging them
from running for another public office and thereby cutting short their tenure by making it clear that should
they fail in their candidacy, they cannot go back to their former position. This is consonant with the
constitutional edict that all public officials must serve the people with utmost loyalty and not trifle with
the mandate which they have received from their constituents.

Under the questioned provision, when an elective official covered thereby files a certificate of candidacy
for another office, an overt, concrete act of voluntary renunciation of the elective office presently being
held, he is deemed to have voluntarily cut short his tenure, not his term. Forfeiture (is) automatic and
permanently effective upon the filing of the certificate of candidacy for another office. Only the moment
and act of filing are considered. Once the certificate is filed, the seat is forever forfeited and nothing save
a new election or appointment can restore the ousted official. The law does not make the forfeiture
dependent upon future contingencies, unforeseen and unforeseeable.

That the ground cited in Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881 is not mentioned in the Constitution itself
as a mode of shortening the tenure of office of members of Congress, does not preclude its application to
present members of Congress. Section 2 of Article XI provides that "(t)he President, the Vice-President,
the Members of the Supreme Court, the Members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the
Ombudsman may be removed from office, on impeachment … All other public officers and employees
may be removed from office as provided by law, but not by impeachment. Such constitutional expression
clearly recognizes that the four (4) grounds found in Article VI of the Constitution by which the tenure of
a Congressman may be shortened are not exclusive. The expression in the constitution of the
circumstances which shall bring about a vacancy does not preclude the legislature from prescribing other
grounds

Additionally, this Court has enunciated the presumption in favor of constitutionality of legislative
enactment. To justify the nullification of a law, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the
Constitution, not a doubtful and argumentative implication. A doubt, even if well-founded, does not
suffice.
2. As administrative officers, both the Speaker and House Secretary-General perform ministerial
functions; It was their duty to remove petitioner's name from the Roll considering the unequivocal tenor
of Section 67, Article IX, B.P. Blg. 881. When the COMELEC communicated to the House of
Representatives that petitioner had filed his certificate of candidacy for regional governor of Muslim
Mindanao, respondents had no choice but to abide by the clear and unmistakable legal effect of Section
67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881. These officers cannot refuse to perform their duty on the ground of an
alleged invalidity of the statute imposing the duty. The reason for this is obvious. It might seriously
hinder the transaction of public business if these officers were to be permitted in all cases to question the
constitutionality of statutes and ordinances imposing duties upon them and which have not judicially been
declared unconstitutional. Officers of the government from the highest to the lowest are creatures of the
law and are bound to obey it.
In conclusion, We reiterate the basic concept that a public office is a public trust. It is created for the
interest and benefit of the people. As such, the holder thereof is subject to such regulations and conditions
as the law may impose and he cannot complain of any restrictions which public policy may dictate on his
office.

NOTES:

- In theorizing that the provision under consideration cuts short the term of office of a Member of
Congress, petitioner seems to confuse "term" with "tenure" of office: The term of office prescribed by the
Constitution may not be extended or shortened by the legislature (22 R.C.L.), but the period during which
an officer actually holds the office (tenure) may be affected by circumstances within or beyond the power
of said officer. Tenure may be shorter than the term or it may not exist at all. These situations will not
change the duration of the term of office (see Topacio Nueno vs. Angeles, 76 Phil 12).

- 4 grounds found in Article VI of the Constitution by which the tenure of a Congressman may be
shortened:

a) Section 13, Article VI: Forfeiture of his seat by holding any other office or employment in the
government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or
controlled corporations or subsidiaries;
b) Section 16 (3): Expulsion as a disciplinary action for disorderly behavior;
c) Section 17: Disqualification as determined by resolution of the Electoral Tribunal in an election
contest; and,
d) Section 7, par. 2: Voluntary renunciation of office.

FACTS:
Dimaporo was elected as a representative for the second legislative district of Lanao del Sur during
the1987 congressional elections.Dimaporo filed a certificate of candidacy for the position of governor of
ARMM. Secretary and Speaker of the House excluded the name of Dimaporo from the Roll of Members
of HR Under Art IX of Sec 67 of theOmnibus Election Code. Dimaporo lost the election wrote a letter
intending to resume performing his duties andfunctions as an elected member of the Congress.
Unfortunately, he was not able to regain his seat in theCongress.Dimaporo contended that he did not lose
his seat as a Congressman because Art. IX Sec. 67 of BP 881 isnot operative in the present constitution,
and therefore not applicable to the members of Congress.Grounds may be termed to be
shortened:1.Holding any officer or employment in the government or ant subdivision, agency, orinstrume
ntality thereof.2.Expulsion as a disciplinary action for a disorderly behavior3.Disqualification
as determined by a resolution of the electoral tribunal in an election contest4.Voluntary renunciation
of office
ISSUE:W/N Dimaporo can still be considered as a member of Congress even after he has filed for
anothergovernment position
HELD:No.In the constitution there is a newchapter on the accountability of public officers.In the 1935Co
nstitution, it was provided that public office is a public trust. Public officers should serve with the
highestdegree of responsibility and integrity.If you allow a Batasan or a governor or a mayor who has
mandated to serve for 6 years to file for anoffice other than the one he was elected to, then that clearly
shows that he did not intend to serve the mandateof the people which was placed upon him and therefore
he should be considered ipso facto resigned. The filling of a certificate shall be considered as an overt act
or abandoning or relinquishing his mandateto the people and he should therefore resign if he want to seek
another position which he feels he could be of better service.
Bagabuyo v COMELEC

Cagayan de Oro used to have only one legislative district. But in 2006, CdO Congressman Constantino Jaraula
sponsored a bill to have two legislative districts in CdO instead. The law was passed (RA 9371) hence two
legislative districts were created. Rogelio Bagabuyo assailed the validity of the said law and he went immediately to
the Supreme Court to enjoin the COMELEC from enforcing the law in the upcoming elections. Bagabuyo
was contending that the 2nd district was created without a plebiscite which he averred was required by the
Constitution.

ISSUE: Whether or not a plebiscite was required in the case at bar.

HELD: No, a plebiscite is not required in the case at bar. RA 9371 merely increased the representation of Cagayan
de Oro City in the House of Representatives and Sangguniang Panglungsod pursuant to Section 5, Article VI of the
1987 Constitution; the criteria established under Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution only apply when
there is a creation, division, merger, abolition or substantial alteration of boundaries of a province, city,
municipality, or barangay; in this case, no such creation, division, merger, abolition or alteration of boundaries of a
local government unit took place; and R.A. No. 9371 did not bring about any change in Cagayan de Oro’s territory,
population and income classification; hence, no plebiscite is required. What happened here was a reapportionment of
a single legislative district into two legislative districts. Reapportionment is the realignment or change in
legislative districts brought about by changes in population and mandated by the constitutional requirement of
equality of representation.
Before, Cagayan de Oro had only one congressman and 12 city council members citywide for its population of
approximately 500,000. By having two legislative districts, each of them with one congressman, Cagayan de Oro
now effectively has two congressmen, each one representing 250,000 of the city’s population. This easily means
better access to their congressman since each one now services only 250,000 constituents as against the 500,000.

Bagabuyo vs. COMELEC, 573 SCRA 290 (2008)

ISSUE:WoN RA. No. 9371 merely provide for the legislative reapportionment of Cagayan de Oro City, or does it
involve the divisionand conversion of a local government unit?
HELD:RA. No. 9371 is, on its face, purely and simply a reapportionment legislation passed in accordance with the
authority granted to Congressunder Article VI, Section 5(4) of the Constitution.Its core provision –Section 1 –
provides: SECTION 1.Legislative Districts. — The lone legislative district of the Cityof Cagayan de Oro is hereby
apportioned to commence in the next nationalelections after the effectivity of this Act. Henceforth, barangays
Bonbon,Bayabas, Kauswagan, Carmen, Patag, Bulua, Iponan, Baikingon, San Simon,Pagatpat, Canitoan, Balulang,
Lumbia, Pagalungan, Tagpangi, Taglimao,Tuburan, Pigsag-an, Tumpagon, Bayanga, Mambuaya,
Dansulihon,Tignapoloan and Bisigan shall comprise the first district while barangaysMacabalan, Puntod,
Consolacion, Camaman-an, Nazareth, Macansandig,Indahag, Lapasan, Gusa, Cugman, FS Catanico, Tablon,
Agusan, Puerto,Bugo and Balubal and all urban barangays from Barangay 1 to Barangay40 shall comprise the
second district.Under these wordings, no division of Cagayan de Oro City as a political andcorporate entity takes
place or is mandated. Cagayan de Oro Citypolitically remains a single unit and its administration is not divided
alongterritorial lines. Its territory remains completely whole and intact; there isonly the addition of another
legislative district and the delineation of thecity into two districts for purposes of representation in the House
ofRepresentatives.

ISSUE:Whether or not a plebiscite was required in the case at bar.

HELD:No, a plebiscite is not required in the case at bar. RA 9371 merelyincreased the representation of Cagayan de
Oro City in the House ofRepresentatives and Sangguniang Panglungsod pursuant to Section 5,Article VI of the 1987
Constitution; the criteria established under Section10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution only apply when there is a
creation,division, merger, abolition or substantial alteration of boundaries of aprovince, city, municipality, or
barangay; in this case, no such creation,division, merger, abolition or alteration of boundaries of a localgovernment
unit took place; and R.A. No. 9371 did not bring about anychange in Cagayan de Oro’s territory, population and
income classification;hence, no plebiscite is required.
Aquino III V. Comelec
Apr. 7, 2010

Issue:
This is a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Petitioners
Senator Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III and Mayor Jesse Robredo seek the nullification as
unconstitutional of Republic Act No. 9716, entitled “An Act Reapportioning the Composition of the
First (1st) and Second (2nd) Legislative Districts in the Province of Camarines Sur and Thereby
Creating a New Legislative District From Such Reapportionment.”

Republic Act No. 9716 originated from House Bill No. 4264, and was signed into law by President
Gloria Macapagal Arroyo on 12 October 2009. It took effect on 31 October 2009 creating an
additional legislative district for the Province of Camarines Sur by reconfiguring the existing first and
second legislative districts of the province.

The Province of Camarines Sur was estimated to have a population of 1,693,821,2 distributed among
four (4) legislative districts. Following the enactment of Republic Act No. 9716, the first and second
districts of Camarines Sur were reconfigured in order to create an additional legislative district for
the province. Hence, the first district municipalities of Libmanan, Minalabac, Pamplona, Pasacao,
and San Fernando were combined with the second district municipalities of Milaor and Gainza to
form a new second legislative district.

Petitioners contend that the reapportionment introduced by Republic Act No. 9716, runs afoul of the
explicit constitutional standard that requires a minimum population of two hundred fifty thousand
(250,000) for the creation of a legislative district. Petitioners rely on Section 5(3), Article VI of the
1987 Constitution as basis for the cited 250,000 minimum population standard. The provision reads:
(3) Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact, and adjacent
territory. Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall
have at least one representative.

The petitioners claim that the reconfiguration by Republic Act No. 9716 of the first and second
districts of Camarines Sur is unconstitutional, because the proposed first district will end up with a
population of less than 250,000 or only 176,383.

Issue:
w/n a population of 250,000 is an indispensable constitutional requirement for the creation of a new
legislative district in a province?

Held:
We deny the petition.

Ruling:
There is no specific provision in the Constitution that fixes a 250,000 minimum population that
must compose a legislative district.
The use by the subject provision of a comma to separate the phrase “each city with a population of at
least two hundred fifty thousand” from the phrase “or each province” point to no other conclusion
than that the 250,000 minimum population is only required for a city, but not for a province.26
Apropos for discussion is the provision of the Local Government Code on the creation of a province
which, by virtue of and upon creation, is entitled to at least a legislative district. Thus, Section 461 of
the Local Government Code states:

Requisites for Creation. –

(a) A province may be created if it has an average annual income, as certified by the Department of
Finance, of not less than Twenty million pesos (P20,000,000.00) based on 1991 constant prices and
either of the following requisites:

(i) a contiguous territory of at least two thousand (2,000) square kilometers, as certified by the
Lands Management Bureau; or
(ii) a population of not less than two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) inhabitants as certified by the
National Statistics Office.

Notably, the requirement of population is not an indispensable requirement, but is merely an

alternative addition to the indispensable income requirement.

FACTS:

Republic Act No. 9176 created an additional legislative district for the province of Camarines Sur by reconfiguring
the existing first and second legislative districts of the province. The said law originated from House Bill No. 4264
and was signed into law by President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo on 12 October 2009.

To that effect, the first and second districts of Camarines Sur were reconfigured in order to create an additional
legislative district for the province. Hence, the first district municipalities of Libmanan, Minalabac, Pamplona,
Pasacao, and San Fernando were combined with the second district Municipalities of Milaor and Gainza to form a
new second legislative district.

Petitioners claim that the reapportionment introduced by Republic Act No. 9716 violates the constitutional standards
that requires a minimum population of two hundred fifty thousand ( 250,000) for the creation of a legislative district.
Thus, the proposed first district will end up with a population of less than 250,000 or only 176,383.

ISSUE:

Whether a population of 250,000 is an indispensable constitutional requirement for the creation of a new legislative
district in a province.

HELD:

NO. The second sentence of Section 5 (3), Article VI of the constitution states that: “ Each city with a population of
at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one representative.”

There is a plain and clear distinction between the entitlement of a city to a district on one hand, and the entitlement
of a province to a district on the other. For a province is entitled to at least a representative, there is nothing
mentioned about the population. Meanwhile, a city must first meet a population minimum of 250,000 in order to be
similarly entitled.

It should be clearly read that Section 5(3) of the constitution requires a 250,000 minimum population only for a city
to be entitled to a representative, but not so for a province.
Mariano v COMELEC

Facts: Two petitions are filed assailing certain provisions of RA 7854, An Act Converting The
Municipality of Makati Into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Makati, as
unconstitutional.

Section 52 of RA 7854 is said to be unconstitutional for it increased the legislative district of Makati only
by special law in violation of Art. VI, Sec. 5(4) requiring a general reapportionment law to be passed by
Congress within 3 years following the return of every census. Also, the addition of another legislative
district in Makati is not in accord with Sec. 5(3), Art. VI of the Constitution for as of the 1990 census, the
population of Makati stands at only 450,000.
Issue: Whether or not the addition of another legislative district in Makati is unconstitutional
Held: Reapportionment of legislative districts may be made through a special law, such as in the charter
of a new city. The Constitution clearly provides that Congress shall be composed of not more than 250
members, unless otherwise fixed by law. As thus worded, the Constitution did not preclude Congress
from increasing its membership by passing a law, other than a general reapportionment law. This is
exactly what was done by Congress in enacting RA 7854 and providing for an increase in Makati’s
legislative district. Moreover, to hold that reapportionment can only be made through a general
apportionment law, with a review of all the legislative districts allotted to each local government unit
nationwide, would create an inequitable situation where a new city or province created by Congress will
be denied legislative representation for an indeterminate period of time. The intolerable situations will
deprive the people of a new city or province a particle of their sovereignty.

Petitioner cannot insist that the addition of another legislative district in Makati is not in accord with Sec.
5(3), Art. VI of the Constitution for as of the 1990 census, the population of Makati stands at only
450,000. Said section provides that a city with a population of at least 250,000 shall have at least one
representative. Even granting that the population of Makati as of the 1990 census stood at 450,000, its
legislative district may still be increased since it has met the minimum population requirement of
250,000.

FACTS:
This is a petition for prohibition and declaratory relief filed by petitioners Juanito Mariano, Jr., Ligaya S.
Bautista, Teresita Tibay, Camilo Santos, Frankie Cruz, Ricardo Pascual, Teresita Abang, Valentina
Pitalvero, Rufino Caldoza, Florante Alba, and Perfecto Alba. Of the petitioners, only Mariano, Jr., is a
resident of Makati. The others are residents of Ibayo Ususan, Taguig, Metro Manila. Suing as taxpayers,
they assail sections 2, 51, and 52 of Republic Act No. 7854 as unconstitutional.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there is an actual case or controversy to challenge the constitutionality of one of the
questioned sections of R.A. No. 7854.
HELD:
The requirements before a litigant can challenge the constitutionality of a law are well delineated. They
are: 1) there must be an actual case or controversy; (2) the question of constitutionality must be raised by
the proper party; (3) the constitutional question must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and (4)
the decision on the constitutional question must be necessary to the determination of the case itself.
Petitioners have far from complied with these requirements. The petition is premised on the occurrence of
many contingent events, i.e., that Mayor Binay will run again in this coming mayoralty elections; that he
would be re-elected in said elections; and that he would seek re-election for the same position in the 1998
elections. Considering that these contingencies may or may not happen, petitioners merely pose a
hypothetical issue which has yet to ripen to an actual case or controversy. Petitioners who are residents of
Taguig (except Mariano) are not also the proper partiesto raise this abstract issue. Worse, they hoist this
futuristic issue in a petition for declaratory relief over which this Court has no jurisdiction.
Aquino vs. Comelec

Relevant Provisions:
Section 6, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution
No person shall be a Member of the House of Representatives unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines
and, on the day of the election, is at least twenty-five years of age, able to read and write, and, except the party-list
representatives, a registered voter in the district in which he shall be elected, and a resident thereof for a period of
not less than one year immediately preceding the day of the election.
Facts:
On 20 March 1995, Agapito A. Aquino, the petitioner, filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the position of
Representative for the new (remember: newly created) Second Legislative District of Makati City. In his certificate
of candidacy, Aquino stated that he was a resident of the aforementioned district (284 Amapola Cor. Adalla Sts.,
Palm Village, Makati) for 10 months.
Move Makati, a registered political party, and Mateo Bedon, Chairman of LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP of Barangay
Cembo, Makati City, filed a petition to disqualify Aquino on the ground that the latter lacked the residence
qualification as a candidate for congressman which under Section 6, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, should be
for a period not less than one yearpreceding the (May 8, 1995) day of the election.
Faced with a petition for disqualification, Aquino amended the entry on his residency in his certificate of candidacy
to 1 yearand 13 days. The Commission on Elections passed a resolution that dismissed the petition on May 6 and
allowed Aquino to run in the election of 8 May. Aquino, with 38,547 votes, won against Augusto Syjuco with
35,910 votes.
Move Makati filed a motion of reconsideration with the Comelec, to which, on May 15, the latter acted with an
order suspending the proclamation of Aquino until the Commission resolved the issue. On 2 June, the Commission
on Elections found Aquino ineligible and disqualified for the elective office for lack of constitutional qualification
of residence.
Aquino then filed a Petition of Certiorari assailing the May 15 and June 2 orders.
Issue:
1. Whether “residency” in the certificate of candidacy actually connotes “domicile” to warrant the disqualification of
Aquino from the position in the electoral district.
2. WON it is proven that Aquino has established domicile of choice and not just residence (not in the sense of the
COC)in the district he was running in.
Held:
1. Yes, The term “residence” has always been understood as synonymous with “domicile” not only under the
previous constitutions but also under the 1987 Constitution. The Court cited the deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission wherein this principle was applied.
Mr. Nolledo:
I remember that in the 1971 Constitutional Convention, there was an attempt to require residence in the place not
less than one year immediately preceding the day of elections.
…
What is the Committee’s concept of residence for the legislature? Is it actual residence or is it the concept of
domicile or constructive residence?
Mr. Davide:
This is in the district, for a period of not less than one year preceding the day of election. This was in effect lifted
from the 1973 constituition, the interpretation given to it was domicile.
Mrs. Braid:
On section 7, page2, Noledo has raised the same point that resident has been interpreted at times as a matter of
intention rather than actual residence.
…
Mr. De los Reyes
So we have to stick to the original concept that it should be by domicile and not physical and actual residence.
Therefore, the framers intended the word “residence” to have the same meaning of domicile.
The place “where a party actually or constructively has his permanent home,” where he, no matter where he may be
found at any given time, eventually intends to return and remain, i.e., his domicile, is that to which
the Constitution refers when it speaks of residence for the purposes of election law.
The purpose is to exclude strangers or newcomers unfamiliar with the conditions and needs of the community from
taking advantage of favorable circumstances existing in that community for electoral gain.
While there is nothing wrong with the purpose of establishing residence in a given area for meeting election
law requirements, this defeats the essence of representation, which is to place through assent of voters those
most cognizantand sensitive to the needs of a particular district, if a candidate falls short of the period of residency
mandated by law for him to qualify.
Which brings us to the second issue.

2. No, Aquino has not established domicile of choice in the district he was running in.
The SC agreed with the Comelec’s contention that Aquino should prove that he established a domicile of choice and
not just residence.
The Constitution requires a person running for a post in the HR one year of residency prior to the elections in the
district in which he seeks election to .
Aquino’s certificate of candidacy in a previous (May 11, 1992) election indicates that he was a resident and
a registered voter of San Jose, Concepcion, Tarlac for more than 52 years prior to that election. His birth
certificate indicated that Conception as his birthplace and his COC also showed him to be a registered voter of the
same district. Thus his domicile of origin (obviously, choice as well) up to the filing of his COC was in Conception,
Tarlac.
Aquino’s connection to the new Second District of Makati City is an alleged lease agreement of a condominium unit
in the area. The intention not to establish a permanent home in Makati City is evident in his leasing a condominium
unit instead of buying one. The short length of time he claims to be a resident of Makati (and the fact of his stated
domicile in Tarlac and his claims of other residences in Metro Manila) indicate that his sole purpose in transferring
his physical residence is not to acquire a new, residence or domicile but only to qualify as a candidate for
Representative of the Second District of Makati City.
Aquino’s assertion that he has transferred his domicile from Tarlac to Makati is a bare assertion which is hardly
supported by the facts in the case at bench. To successfully effect a change of domicile, petitioner must prove an
actual removal or an actual change of domicile, a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence
and establishing a new one and definite acts which correspond with the purpose.
Aquino was thus rightfully disqualified by the Commission on Elections due to his lack of one year residence in the
district.
Decision: Instant petition dismissed. Order restraining respondent Comelec from proclaiming
the candidate garnering the next highest number of votes in the congressional elections of Second district of Makati
City made permanent.
Dicta:
I. Aquino’s petition of certiorari contents were:
A. The Comelec’s lack of jurisdiction to determine the disqualification issue involving congressional candidates
after the May 8, 1995 elections, such determination reserved with the house of representatives electional tribunal
B. Even if the Comelec has jurisdiction, the jurisdiction ceased in the instant case after the elections and the remedy
to the adverse parties lies in another forum which is the HR Electoral Tribunal consistent with Section 17, Article VI
of the 1987 Constitution.
C. The COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion when it proceeded to promulagate its questioned decision
despite its own recognition that a threshold issue of jurisdiction has to be judiciously reviewed again, assuming
arguendo that the Comelec has jurisdiction
D. The Comelec’s finding of non-compliance with the residency requirement of one year against the petitioner is
contrary to evidence and to applicable laws and jurisprudence.
E. The Comelec erred in failing to appreciate the legal impossibility of enforcing the one year residency requirement
of Congressional candidates in newly created political districts which were only existing for less than a year at the
time of the election and barely four months in the case of petitioner’s district in Makati.
F. The Comelec committed serious error amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it ordered the board of canvassers to
determine and proclaim the winner out of the remaining qualified candidates after the erroneous disqualification of
the petitioner in disregard of the doctrine that a second place candidate or a person who was repudiated by the
electorate is a loser and cannot be proclaimed as substitute winner.
II. Modern day carpetbaggers can’t be allowed to take advantage of the creation of new political districts by
suddenly transplanting themselves in such new districts, prejudicing their genuine residents in the process of taking
advantage of existing conditions in these areas.
III. according to COMELEC: The lease agreement was executed mainly to support the one year residence
requirement as a qualification for a candidate of the HR, by establishing a commencement date of his residence. If a
oerfectly valid lease agreement cannot, by itself establish a domicile of choice, this particular lease agreement
cannot be better.

Facts: Agapito Aquino filed his certificate of candidacy for the new 2nd district of Makati stating that he has been
residing there for ten months. When his candidacy was opposed he filed another certificate of candidacy stating that
he has been residing in Makati for more than a year by virtue of a contract of lease. COMELEC dismissed petition
for Aquino’s disqualification and garnered majority vote on 1995 election. Mateo Bedon filed for suspension of his
proclamation. COMELEC decided in favour of Bedon hence the petition for certiorari.

Issue: Whether or not Aquino failed the constitutional residency requirement?

Decision: Petition dismissed, COMELEC decision affirmed. In order for Aquino to qualify he must prove that he
has established not just residence but domicile of choice. Clearly, the place “where a party actually or constructively
has his permanent home” where he eventually intends to return and remain – his domicile – is what the Constitution
speaks of residence for purposes of election law. Property ownership is not an indicia of the right to vote or to be
voted upon.
Atong Paglaum v COMELEC

This case partially abandoned the rulings in Ang Bagong Bayani vs COMELEC and BANAT
vs COMELEC.
Atong Paglaum, Inc. and 51 other parties were disqualified by the Commission on Elections
in the May 2013 party-list elections for various reasons but primarily for not being qualified
as representatives for marginalized or underrepresented sectors.
Atong Paglaum et al then filed a petition for certiorari against COMELEC alleging grave
abuse of discretion on the part of COMELEC in disqualifying them.
ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in disqualifying
the said party-lists.
HELD: No. The COMELEC merely followed the guidelines set in the cases of Ang Bagong
Bayani and BANAT. However, the Supreme Court remanded the cases back to the
COMELEC as the Supreme Court now provides for new guidelines which abandoned some
principles established in the two aforestated cases. The new guidelines are as follows:
I. Parameters. In qualifying party-lists, the COMELEC must use the following parameters:
1. Three different groups may participate in the party-list system: (1) national parties or
organizations, (2) regional parties or organizations, and (3) sectoral parties or
organizations.
2. National parties or organizations and regional parties or organizations do not need to
organize along sectoral lines and do not need to represent any “marginalized and
underrepresented” sector.
3. Political parties can participate in party-list elections provided they register under the
party-list system and do not field candidates in legislative district elections. A political party,
whether major or not, that fields candidates in legislative district elections can participate in
party-list elections only through its sectoral wing that can separately register under the
party-list system. The sectoral wing is by itself an independent sectoral party, and is linked
to a political party through a coalition.
4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be “marginalized and underrepresented” or
lacking in “well-defined political constituencies.” It is enough that their principal advocacy
pertains to the special interest and concerns of their sector. The sectors that are
“marginalized and underrepresented” include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, and overseas workers. The
sectors that lack “well-defined political constituencies” include professionals, the elderly,
women, and the youth.
5. A majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the
“marginalized and underrepresented” must belong to the “marginalized and
underrepresented” sector they represent. Similarly, a majority of the members of sectoral
parties or organizations that lack “well-defined political constituencies” must belong to the
sector they represent. The nominees of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the
“marginalized and underrepresented,” or that represent those who lack “well-defined
political constituencies,” either must belong to their respective sectors, or must have a track
record of advocacy for their respective sectors. The nominees of national and regional
parties or organizations must be bona-fide members of such parties or organizations.
6. National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall not be disqualified if some
of their nominees are disqualified, provided that they have at least one nominee who
remains qualified.
II. In the BANAT case, major political parties are disallowed, as has always been the
practice, from participating in the party-list elections. But, since there’s really no
constitutional prohibition nor a statutory prohibition, major political parties can now
participate in the party-list system provided that they do so through their bona fide sectoral
wing (see parameter 3 above).
Allowing major political parties to participate, albeit indirectly, in the party-list elections will
encourage them to work assiduously in extending their constituencies to the “marginalized
and underrepresented” and to those who “lack well-defined political constituencies.”
Ultimately, the Supreme Court gave weight to the deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission when they were drafting the party-list system provision of the Constitution. The
Commissioners deliberated that it was their intention to include all parties into the party-list
elections in order to develop a political system which is pluralistic and multiparty. (In
the BANAT case, Justice Puno emphasized that the will of the people should defeat the
intent of the framers; and that the intent of the people, in ratifying the 1987 Constitution, is
that the party-list system should be reserved for the marginalized sectors.)
III. The Supreme Court also emphasized that the party-list system is NOT RESERVED for
the “marginalized and underrepresented” or for parties who lack “well-defined political
constituencies”. It is also for national or regional parties. It is also for small ideology-based
and cause-oriented parties who lack “well-defined political constituencies”. The common
denominator however is that all of them cannot, they do not have the machinery – unlike
major political parties, to field or sponsor candidates in the legislative districts but they can
acquire the needed votes in a national election system like the party-list system of elections.
If the party-list system is only reserved for marginalized representation, then the system
itself unduly excludes other cause-oriented groups from running for a seat in the lower
house.
As explained by the Supreme Court, party-list representation should not be understood to
include only labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities,
handicapped, veterans, overseas workers, and other sectors that by their nature
are economically at the margins of society. It should be noted that Section 5 of Republic Act
7941 includes, among others, in its provision for sectoral representation groups of
professionals, which are not per se economically marginalized but are still qualified as
“marginalized, underrepresented, and do not have well-defined political constituencies” as
they are ideologically marginalized.
Atong Paglaum v COMELEC

52 party-list groups and organizations filed separate petitions totaling 54 with the Supreme Court (SC) in
an effort to reverse various resolutions by the Commission on Elections (Comelec) disqualifying them
from the May 2013 party-list race. The Comelec, in its assailed resolutions issued in October, November
and December of 2012, ruled, among others, that these party-list groups and organizations failed to
represent a marginalized and underrepresented sector, their nominees do not come from a marginalized
and underrepresented sector, and/or some of the organizations or groups are not truly representative of
the sector they intend to represent in Congress.

Petitioners argued that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction in disqualifying petitioners from participating in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections, either
by denial of their new petitions for registration under the party-list system, or by cancellation of their
existing registration and accreditation as party-list organizations; andsecond, whether the criteria for
participating in the party-list system laid down inAng Bagong Bayani and Barangay Association for
National Advancement and Transparency v. Commission on Elections(BANAT) should be applied by the
COMELEC in the coming 13 May 2013 party-list elections.

ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion

HELD: No. The COMELEC merely followed the guidelines set in the cases of Ang Bagong Bayani and
BANAT. However, the Supreme Court remanded the cases back to the COMELEC as the Supreme Court
now provides for new guidelines which abandoned some principles established in the two aforestated
cases.

Political Law- Party-list system

Commissioner Christian S. Monsod, the main sponsor of the party-list system, stressed that "the party-list
system is not synonymous with that of the sectoral representation." Indisputably, the framers of the 1987
Constitution intended the party-list system to include not only sectoral parties but also non-sectoral
parties. The framers intended the sectoral parties to constitute a part, but not the entirety, of the party-list
system.As explained by Commissioner Wilfredo Villacorta, political parties can participate in the party-list
system "For as long as they field candidates who come from the different marginalized sectors that we
shall designate in this Constitution."

Republic Act No. 7941 or the Party-List System Act is the law that implements the party-list system
prescribed in the Constitution.

Section 3(a) of R.A. No. 7941 defines a "party" as"either a political party or a sectoral partyor a coalition
of parties." Clearly, a political party is different from a sectoral party. Section 3(c) of R.A. No. 7941 further
provides that a"political partyrefers to anorganized group of citizens advocating an ideology or platform,
principles and policies for the general conduct of government."On the other hand, Section 3(d) of R.A. No.
7941 provides that a "sectoral partyrefers to an organized group of citizens belonging to any of the
sectors enumerated in Section 5 hereofwhose principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and
concerns of their sector."R.A. No. 7941 provides different definitions for a political and a sectoral party.
Obviously, they are separate and distinct from each other.

Under the party-list system, an ideology-based or cause-oriented political party is clearly different from a
sectoral party. A political party need not be organized as a sectoral party and need not represent any
particular sector. There is no requirement in R.A. No. 7941 that a national or regional political party must
represent a "marginalized and underrepresented" sector. It is sufficient that the political party consists of
citizens who advocate the same ideology or platform, or the same governance principles and
policies,regardless of their economic status as citizens.

Political Law- parameters in qualifying party- lists

The COMELEC excluded from participating in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections those that did not
satisfy these two criteria: (1) all national, regional, and sectoral groups or organizations must represent
the "marginalized and underrepresented" sectors, and (2) all nominees must belong to the "marginalized
and underrepresented" sector they represent. Petitioners may have been disqualified by the COMELEC
because as political or regional parties they are not organized along sectoral lines and do not represent
the "marginalized and underrepresented."

Also, petitioners' nominees who do not belong to the sectors they represent may have been disqualified,
although they may have a track record of advocacy for their sectors. Likewise, nominees of non-sectoral
parties may have been disqualified because they do not belong to any sector. Moreover, a party may
have been disqualified because one or more of its nominees failed to qualify, even if the party has at least
one remaining qualified nominee.

In determining who may participate in the coming 13 May 2013 and subsequent party-list elections, the
COMELEC shall adhere to the following parameters:

1. Three different groups may participate in the party-list system: (1) national parties or organizations, (2)
regional parties or organizations, and (3) sectoral parties or organizations.

2. National parties or organizations and regional parties or organizations do not need to organize along
sectoral lines and do not need to represent any "marginalized and underrepresented" sector.

3. Political parties can participate in party-list elections provided they register under the party-list system
and do not field candidates in legislative district elections. A political party, whether major or not, that
fields candidates in legislative district elections can participate in party-list elections only through its
sectoral wing that can separately register under the party-list system. The sectoral wing is by itself an
independent sectoral party, and is linked to a political party through a coalition.

4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be "marginalized and underrepresented" or lacking in

"well-defined political constituencies." It is enough that their principal advocacy pertains to the special
interest and concerns of their sector. The sectors that are "marginalized and underrepresented" include
labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, and
overseas workers. The sectors that lack "well-defined political constituencies" include professionals, the
elderly, women, and the youth.

5. A majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the "marginalized and
underrepresented" must belong to the "marginalized and underrepresented" sector they represent.
Similarly, a majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that lack "well-defined political
constituencies" must belong to the sector they represent. The nominees of sectoral parties or
organizations that represent the "marginalized and underrepresented," or that represent those who lack
"well-defined political constituencies," either must belong to their respective sectors, or must have a track
record of advocacy for their respective sectors. The nominees of national and regional parties or
organizations must be bona-fide members of such parties or organizations.

6. National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall not be disqualified if some of their
nominees are disqualified, provided that they have at least one nominee who remains qualified.

This Court is sworn to uphold the 1987 Constitution, apply its provisions faithfully, and desist from
engaging in socio-economic or political experimentations contrary to what the Constitution has ordained.
Judicial power does not include the power to re-write the Constitution. Thus, the present petitions should
be remanded to the COMELEC not because the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in
disqualifying petitioners, but because petitioners may now possibly qualify to participate in the coming 13
May 2013 party-list elections under the new parameters prescribed by this Court.

Petitions Granted
 586 SCRA 210 – Political Law – Constitutional Law – Legislative Department – Party
List System; Proportional Representation; Proper Computation
Statutory Construction – Rule in Interpreting the Constitution – Intent of the Framers vs
Intent of the People
NOTE: This case is consolidated with BAYAN Muna vs COMELEC (G.R. No. 179295).
In July and August 2007, the COMELEC, sitting as the National Board of Canvassers, made
a partial proclamation of the winners in the party-list elections which was held in May 2007.
In proclaiming the winners and apportioning their seats, the COMELEC considered the
following rules:
1. In the lower house, 80% shall comprise the seats for legislative districts, while the
remaining 20% shall come from party-list representatives (Sec. 5, Article VI, 1987
Constitution);
2. Pursuant to Sec. 11b of R.A. 7941 or the Party-List System Act, a party-list which garners
at least 2% of the total votes cast in the party-list elections shall be entitled to one seat;
3. If a party-list garners at least 4%, then it is entitled to 2 seats; if it garners at least 6%,
then it is entitled to 3 seats – this is pursuant to the 2-4-6 rule or the Panganiban
Formula from the case of Veterans Federation Party vs COMELEC.
4. In no way shall a party be given more than three seats even if if garners more than 6% of
the votes cast for the party-list election (3 seat cap rule, same case).
The Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT), a party-
list candidate, questioned the proclamation as well as the formula being used. BANAT
averred that the 2% threshold is invalid; Sec. 11 of RA 7941 is void because its provision
that a party-list, to qualify for a congressional seat, must garner at least 2% of the votes cast
in the party-list election, is not supported by the Constitution. Further, the 2% rule creates a
mathematical impossibility to meet the 20% party-list seat prescribed by the Constitution.
BANAT also questions if the 20% rule is a mere ceiling or is it mandatory. If it is mandatory,
then with the 2% qualifying vote, there would be instances when it would be impossible to
fill the prescribed 20% share of party-lists in the lower house. BANAT also proposes a new
computation (which shall be discussed in the “HELD” portion of this digest).
On the other hand, BAYAN MUNA, another party-list candidate, questions the validity of the
3 seat rule (Section 11a of RA 7941). It also raised the issue of whether or not major
political parties are allowed to participate in the party-list elections or is the said elections
limited to sectoral parties.
ISSUES:
I. How is the 80-20 rule observed in apportioning the seats in the lower house?
II. Whether or not the 20% allocation for party-list representatives mandatory or a mere
ceiling.
III. Whether or not the 2% threshold to qualify for a seat valid.
IV. How are party-list seats allocated?
V. Whether or not major political parties are allowed to participate in the party-list elections.
VI. Whether or not the 3 seat cap rule (3 Seat Limit Rule) is valid.
HELD:
I. The 80-20 rule is observed in the following manner: for every 5 seats allotted for
legislative districts, there shall be one seat allotted for a party-list representative. Originally,
the 1987 Constitution provides that there shall be not more than 250 members of the lower
house. Using the 80-20 rule, 200 of that will be from legislative districts, and 50 would be
from party-list representatives. However, the Constitution also allowed Congress to fix the
number of the membership of the lower house as in fact, it can create additional legislative
districts as it may deem appropriate. As can be seen in the May 2007 elections, there were
220 district representatives, hence applying the 80-20 rule or the 5:1 ratio, there should be
55 seats allotted for party-list representatives.
How did the Supreme Court arrive at 55? This is the formula:
(Current Number of Legislative DistrictRepresentatives ÷ 0.80) x (0.20) = Number of Seats
Available to Party-List Representatives
Hence,
(220 ÷ 0.80) x (0.20) = 55
II. The 20% allocation for party-list representatives is merely a ceiling – meaning, the
number of party-list representatives shall not exceed 20% of the total number of the
members of the lower house. However, it is not mandatory that the 20% shall be filled.
III. No. Section 11b of RA 7941 is unconstitutional. There is no constitutional basis to allow
that only party-lists which garnered 2% of the votes cast are qualified for a seat and those
which garnered less than 2% are disqualified. Further, the 2% threshold creates a
mathematical impossibility to attain the ideal 80-20 apportionment. The Supreme Court
explained:
To illustrate: There are 55 available party-list seats. Suppose there are 50 million votes cast for the 100
participants in the party list elections. A party that has two percent of the votes cast, or one million votes,
gets a guaranteed seat. Let us further assume that the first 50 parties all get one million votes. Only 50
parties get a seat despite the availability of 55 seats. Because of the operation of the two percent
threshold, this situation will repeat itself even if we increase the available party-list seats to 60 seats and
even if we increase the votes cast to 100 million. Thus, even if the maximum number of parties get two
percent of the votes for every party, it is always impossible for the number of occupied party-list seats to
exceed 50 seats as long as the two percent threshold is present.
It is therefore clear that the two percent threshold presents an unwarranted obstacle to the
full implementation of Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution and prevents the attainment
of “the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of
Representatives.”
IV. Instead, the 2% rule should mean that if a party-list garners 2% of the votes cast, then it
is guaranteed a seat, and not “qualified”. This allows those party-lists garnering less than
2% to also get a seat.
But how? The Supreme Court laid down the following rules:
1. The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the lowest
based on the number of votes they garnered during the elections.
2. The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total
votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one guaranteed seat each.
3. Those garnering sufficient number of votes, according to the ranking in paragraph 1, shall
be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes until all the
additional seats are allocated.
4. Each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats.
In computing the additional seats, the guaranteed seats shall no longer be included
because they have already been allocated, at one seat each, to every two-percenter. Thus,
the remaining available seats for allocation as “additional seats” are the maximum seats
reserved under the Party List System less the guaranteed seats. Fractional seats are
disregarded in the absence of a provision in R.A. No. 7941 allowing for a rounding off of
fractional seats.
In short, there shall be two rounds in determining the allocation of the seats. In the first
round, all party-lists which garnered at least 2% of the votes cast (called the two-percenters)
are given their one seat each. The total number of seats given to these two-percenters are
then deducted from the total available seats for party-lists. In this case, 17 party-lists were
able to garner 2% each. There are a total 55 seats available for party-lists hence, 55 minus
17 = 38 remaining seats. (Please refer to the full text of the case for the tabulation).
The number of remaining seats, in this case 38, shall be used in the second round,
particularly, in determining, first, the additional seats for the two-percenters, and second, in
determining seats for the party-lists that did not garner at least 2% of the votes cast, and in
the process filling up the 20% allocation for party-list representatives.
How is this done?
Get the total percentage of votes garnered by the party and multiply it against the remaining
number of seats. The product, which shall not be rounded off, will be the additional number
of seats allotted for the party list – but the 3 seat limit rule shall still be observed.
Example:
In this case, the BUHAY party-list garnered the highest total vote of 1,169,234 which is
7.33% of the total votes cast for the party-list elections (15,950,900).
Applying the formula above: (Percentage of vote garnered) x (remaining seats) = number of
additional seat
Hence, 7.33% x 38 = 2.79
Rounding off to the next higher number is not allowed so 2.79 remains 2. BUHAY is a two-
percenter which means it has a guaranteed one seat PLUS additional 2 seats or a total of 3
seats. Now if it so happens that BUHAY got 20% of the votes cast, it will still get 3 seats
because the 3 seat limit rule prohibits it from having more than 3 seats.
Now after all the tw0-percenters were given their guaranteed and additional seats, and
there are still unoccupied seats, those seats shall be distributed to the remaining party-lists
and those higher in rank in the voting shall be prioritized until all the seats are occupied.
V. No. By a vote of 8-7, the Supreme Court continued to disallow major political parties (the
likes of UNIDO, LABAN, etc) from participating in the party-list elections.
Although the ponencia (Justice Carpio) did point out that there is no prohibition either from
the Constitution or from RA 7941 against major political parties from participating in the
party-list elections as the word “party” was not qualified and that even the framers of the
Constitution in their deliberations deliberately allowed major political parties to participate in
the party-list elections provided that they establish a sectoral wing which represents the
marginalized (indirect participation), Justice Puno, in his separate opinion, concurred by 7
other justices, explained that the will of the people defeats the will of the framers of the
Constitution precisely because it is the people who ultimately ratified the Constitution – and
the will of the people is that only the marginalized sections of the country shall participate in
the party-list elections. Hence, major political parties cannot participate in the party-list
elections, directly or indirectly.
VI. Yes, the 3 seat limit rule is valid. This is one way to ensure that no one party shall
dominate the party-list system.

(April 21, 2009) Facts: The 14 May 2007 elections included the elections for the party-list
representatives. The COMELEC counted 15,950,900 votes cast for 93 parties under the
Party-List System. BANAT filed petition as quoting the COMELEC of using the Panganiban
formula used in Veterans case in allocating party-list seats. BANAT contend that Article 6
Section 5 should be followed and that 20%of party-list representatives shall be proclaimed.
COMELEC denied said petition. BANAT filed mandamus for certiorari.
Issue: Whether or not the 20% allocation for party-list representatives provided in Article 6
Section 5 (2) of the Constitution mandatory?
Decision: Petition has partial merit. The party-list election has four inviolable parameters
stated in Veterans. First, the twenty percent allocation the combined number of all party-list
congressmen shall not exceed twenty percent of the total membership of the House of
Representatives, including those elected under the party list; Second, the two percent
threshold only those parties garnering a minimum of two percent of the total valid votes
cast for the party-list system are qualified to have a seat in the House of Representatives;
Third, the three-seat limit each qualified party, regardless of the number of votes it actually
obtained, is entitled to a maximum of three seats; that is, one qualifying and two additional
seats; Fourth, proportional representation the additional seats which a qualified party is
entitled to shall be computed in proportion to their total number of votes.
ANG LADLAD VS. COMELEC
Facts:
Petitioner is a national organization which represents the lesbians, gays,
bisexuals, and trans-genders. It filed a petition for accreditation as a party-list
organization to public respondent. However, due to moral grounds, the latter
denied the said petition. To buttress their denial, COMELEC cited certain
biblical and quranic passages in their decision. It also stated that since their
ways are immoral and contrary to public policy, they are considered
nuissance. In fact, their acts are even punishable under the Revised Penal
Code in its Article 201.

A motion for reconsideration being denied, Petitioner filed this instant

Petition on Certiorari under Rule 65 of the ROC.
Ang Ladlad argued that the denial of accreditation, insofar as it justified the
exclusion by using religious dogma, violated the constitutional guarantees
against the establishment of religion. Petitioner also claimed that the Assailed
Resolutions contravened its constitutional rights to privacy, freedom of speech
and assembly, and equal protection of laws, as well as constituted violations of
the Philippines’ international obligations against discrimination based on
sexual orientation.

In its Comment, the COMELEC reiterated that petitioner does not have a
concrete and genuine national political agenda to benefit the nation and that
the petition was validly dismissed on moral grounds. It also argued for the
first time that the LGBT sector is not among the sectors enumerated by the
Constitution and RA 7941, and that petitioner made untruthful statements in
its petition when it alleged its national existence contrary to actual verification
reports by COMELEC’s field personnel.

Issue:
WON Respondent violated the Non-establishment clause of the Constitution;
WON Respondent erred in denying Petitioners application on moral and legal
grounds.
Held:
Respondent mistakenly opines that our ruling in Ang Bagong Bayani stands
for the proposition that only those sectors specifically enumerated in the law
or related to said sectors (labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous
cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas
workers, and professionals) may be registered under the party-list system. As
we explicitly ruled in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. Commission on
Elections, “the enumeration of marginalized and under-represented sectors is
not exclusive”. The crucial element is not whether a sector is specifically
enumerated, but whether a particular organization complies with the
requirements of the Constitution and RA 7941.

Our Constitution provides in Article III, Section 5 that “[n]o law shall be made
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof.” At bottom, what our non-establishment clause calls for is
“government neutrality in religious matters.” Clearly, “governmental reliance
on religious justification is inconsistent with this policy of neutrality.” We thus
find that it was grave violation of the non-establishment clause for the
COMELEC to utilize the Bible and the Koran to justify the exclusion of Ang
Ladlad. Be it noted that government action must have a secular purpose.

Respondent has failed to explain what societal ills are sought to be prevented,
or why special protection is required for the youth. Neither has the COMELEC
condescended to justify its position that petitioner’s admission into the party-
list system would be so harmful as to irreparably damage the moral fabric of
society.

We also find the COMELEC’s reference to purported violations of our penal

and civil laws flimsy, at best; disingenuous, at worst. Article 694 of the Civil
Code defines a nuisance as “any act, omission, establishment, condition of
property, or anything else which shocks, defies, or disregards decency or
morality,” the remedies for which are a prosecution under the Revised Penal
Code or any local ordinance, a civil action, or abatement without judicial
proceedings. A violation of Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code, on the other
hand, requires proof beyond reasonable doubt to support a criminal
conviction. It hardly needs to be emphasized that mere allegation of violation
of laws is not proof, and a mere blanket invocation of public morals cannot
replace the institution of civil or criminal proceedings and a judicial
determination of liability or culpability.

As such, we hold that moral disapproval, without more, is not a sufficient

governmental interest to justify exclusion of homosexuals from participation
in the party-list system. The denial of Ang Ladlad’s registration on purely
moral grounds amounts more to a statement of dislike and disapproval of
homosexuals, rather than a tool to further any substantial public interest.