Political Law 2016 Case Digest

Political Law: Constitutional Law
NAPOLEON D. SENIT v PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES.

GR No. 192914 January 11, 2016, THIRD DIVISION (REYES, J.)
DOCTRINE: Constitutional Law; Trial in Absentia: Due Process is satisfied in

cases of trial in absentia if Section 14(2), Article III of the 1987 Constitution is
complied with, it provides that after arraignment, trial may proceed
notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he has been duly
notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable.
FACTS:
Mohinder Toor, Sr., private complainant, was driving on board his Toyota
pick-up with his wife, son and house helper. A speeding Super 5 bus driven by
Napoleon Senit, petitioner herein, tried to overtook a truck however did not
avoid a collision with the pick-up. All passengers of the pick-up were injured
and immediately brought to Bethel Baptist Hospital.
The City Prosecutor charged petitioner with Reckless Imprudence

Resulting to Multiple Serious Physical Injuries and Damage to Property. Upon
arraignment Petitioner Senit, with the assistance of his counsel, pleaded not
guilty to the Information in this case. However during the pendency of
proceedings Petitioner Senit resigned from his work and transferred residence.
Hence his whereabouts became unknown so he was not presented as a witness
by his new counsel.
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) rendered a decision in absentia convicting

Petitioner Senit of the crime charged. Upon issuance of the RTC of warrant of
arrest Petitioner Senit claimed that he was not able to present evidence during
trial because he was not notified of the schedule and he mistakenly believed
that the case against him has been dismissed as Private Complainant Toor, Sr.
left the country. An appeal was filed by Petitioner Senit before the Court of
Appeals but the decision of RTC was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Hence,
this final recourse to the Supreme Court was made.
ISSUE:
Was there a violation of due process when the RTC proceeded in trying
the case despite absence of accused?
RULING:
There was no violation of due process on the part of the RTC. Due
process is satisfied when the parties are afforded a fair and reasonable
opportunity to explain their respective sides of the controversy. The holding of
trial in absentia is authorized under Section 14(2), Article III of the 1987
Constitution which provides that after arraignment, trial may proceed
notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he has been duly
notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable.
In this case, it is established that notice for the presentation of evidence

by the defense was duly sent to the addresses on record of Petitioner Senit and
her counsel, respectively. It is also established that there is unjustifiable reason
why Petitioner Senit did not appear before the Regional Trial Court. Petitioner
Senit gave a wrong address, eventually jumped bail and evaded court processes.
Petitioner’s Senit counsel never notified the court of any change in her address.
Hence, they cannot claim that there is a violation of Petitioner Senit’s right to
due process since it was their own fault that that they lost the opportunity to
present evidence.
ERWIN LIBO-ON DELA CRUZ v PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

GR No. 209387 January 11, 2016, SECOND DIVISION (LEONEN, J.)
DOCTRINE: Constitutional Law; Rights Against Unreasonable Searches and

Seizure: In case of consented searches or waiver of the constitutional guarantee
against obtrusive searches, it is fundamental that to constitute a waiver, it
must first appear that (1) the right exists; (2) that the person involved had
knowledge, either actual or constructive, of the existence of such right; and (3)
the said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right.
FACTS:
Petitioner Erwin Libo-on Dela Cruz was an on-the-job trainee of an inter-

island vessel. When he was at pier of the Cebu Domestic Port to go home to
Iloilo and while buying a ticket, he allegedly left his bag on the floor with a
porter. According to him it took around 15 minutes to purchase a ticket.
Petitioner Dela Cruz then proceeded to the entrance of the terminal and placed
his bag on the x-ray scanning machine for inspection. The operator of the x-ray
machine saw firearms inside Dela Cruz's bag and upon seeing the firearms
inside the bag the operator called the attention of port personnel Archie Igot
who was the baggage inspector then. Upon questioning, Petitioner Dela Cruz
admitted that he was owner of the bag. Dela Cruz agreed that they can inspect
what is inside the bag thus the bag was then inspected, three (3) revolvers and
four (4) live ammunition placed inside the cylinder were found inside the bag.
When asked whether he had the proper documents for the firearms, Petitioner
Dela Cruz answered in the negative. Dela Cruz was then charged with violation
of Republic Act No. 8294 for illegal possession of firearms and violation of Gun
Ban under Commission on Elections Resolution No. 7764. Dela Cruz argued
that there is no was no voluntary waiver against warrantless search.
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) found Petitioner Dela Cruz guilty of
violating Gun Ban Order by the Commission on Election and dismissed the
charged of illegal possession of firearms. Petitioner Dela Cruz filed an appeal
before the Court of Appeals but the latter affirmed the decision of Regional Trial
Court.
ISSUE:
Was there a waiver of Petitioner Dela Cruz rights’ against unreasonable

searches and seizure?
RULING:
Yes there was a waiver of his right against unreasonable searches and
seizures. The Constitution safeguards a person’s right against unreasonable
searches and seizures. A warrantless search is presumed to be unreasonable.
However, this court lays down the exceptions where warrantless searches are
deemed legitimate: (1) warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest; (2)
seizure in "plain view"; (3) search of a moving vehicle; (4) consented warrantless
search; (5) customs search; (6) stop and frisk; and (7) exigent and emergency
circumstances.
In case of consented searches or waiver of the constitutional guarantee

against obtrusive searches, it is fundamental that to constitute a waiver, it
must first appear that (1) the right exists; (2) that the person involved had
knowledge, either actual or constructive, of the existence of such right; and (3)
the said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right.
In this case, Petitioner Dela Cruz presented his bag for scanning in the x-
ray machine. When his bag went through the x-ray machine and the firearms
were detected, he voluntarily submitted his bag for inspection to the port
authorities. Finding that the Petitioner Dela Cruz consented on the inspection
of his bag to the port authorities, the search conducted was reasonable and,
therefore, not violative of the accused’s constitutional rights. Thus, when the
search of the bag of the accused revealed the firearms and ammunitions,
accused is deemed to have been caught in flagrante delicto, justifying his arrest
even without a warrant. The firearms and ammunitions obtained in the course
of such valid search are thus admissible as evidence against the accused.
Political Law: Public Corporation
NATIVIDAD C. CRUZ and BENJAMIN DELA CRUZ v PANDACAN HIKER'S

CLUB, INC., Represented by its President, PRISCILA ILAO
GR No. 188213 January 11, 2016, Third Division (Peralta J.)
DOCTRINE: Public Corporation; Police Power: The general welfare clause

provides for the exercise of police power for the attainment or maintenance of
the general welfare of the community. The power, however, is exercised by the
government through its legislative branch by the enactment of laws regulating
those and other constitutional and civil rights. Jurisprudence defines police
power as the plenary power vested in the legislature to make statutes and
ordinances to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or
safety and general welfare of the people. Police power is vested primarily with
the national legislature, which may delegate the same to local governments
through the enactment of ordinances through their legislative bodies (the
sanggunians).
FACTS:
Petitioner Natividad C. Cruz was the Punong Barangay or Chairperson of

City of Manila. Petitioner Cruz allegedly confronted persons playing basketball
within the vicinity of her barangay. Petitioner Cruz allegedly gave an order to
the other Petitioner Benjamin Cruz, Barangay Tanod, to destroy the basketball
ring by cutting it up with a hacksaw which Dela Cruz promptly complied with.
From then on the basketball court was unusable. The acts of Cruz and Dela
Cruz prompted the filing of a complaint by the Pandacan Hiker’s Club Inc.
(PHC), as represented by their President Priscila Ilao. Ilao argued that
Respondent PHC had donated, administered, and operated the subject
basketball court for the Pandacan community until its alleged destruction by
Petitioners Cruz and Dela Cruz. Cruz on the other hand opposed said
allegations and argued that the basketball court affected the peace in the
barangay and was the subject of many complaints from residents asking for its
closure and that the said the basketball court was a public nuisance and it is
well within her power as barangay chief executive to perform.
ISSUE:
Was the destruction of the basketball court by the petitioners within the
powers under the general welfare clause of the Local Government Code?
RULING:
No, such act is not within the ambit of police power. The general welfare
clause provides for the exercise of police power for the attainment or
maintenance of the general welfare of the community. The power, however, is
exercised by the government through its legislative branch by the enactment of
laws regulating those and other constitutional and civil rights. Jurisprudence
defines police power as the plenary power vested in the legislature to make
statutes and ordinances to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good
order or safety and general welfare of the people. Police power is vested
primarily with the national legislature, which may delegate the same to local
governments through the enactment of ordinances through their legislative
bodies (the sanggunians).
In this case, the complete destruction of the basketball ring by the

Petitioner’s Cruz and Dela Cruz is not justified neither by law or ordinance nor
even by equity or necessity, which makes the act illegal. The Court stated that
even as an action to maintain public order, the same was done excessively and
unjustifiably. Where a less damaging action, such as the mere padlocking,
removal or confiscation of the ring would have sufficed, Petitioners Cruz and
Dela Cruz resorted to the drastic measure of completely destroying and
rendering as unusable the said ring, which was a private property, without due
process. Hence, by using their public office to commit such illegal act they are
held administratively liable.
ALMA G. PARAISO-ABAN v COMMISSION ON AUDIT

GR No. 217948 January 12, 2016, EN BANC (REYES, J.)
DOCTRINE: Constitutional Law; Commission on Audit (COA): Article IX-D,

Section 2(1) of the 1987 Constitution provides that the COA has "the power,
authority, and duty to examine, audit, and settle all accounts pertaining to the
revenue and receipts of, and expenditures or uses of funds and property, owned
or held in trust by, or pertaining to, the Government, or any of its subdivisions,
agencies, or instrumentalities, including government-owned or controlled
corporations with original charters."
FACTS:
The Senate's Committees on Accountability of Public Officers and

Investigations and on National Defense and Security held various hearings to
investigate the alleged anomalous acquisitions of land by the Armed Forces of
the Philippines Retirement and Separation Benefits System (AFP-RSBS). Deputy
Ombudsman for the Military and Other Law Enforcement Offices requested the
COA to conduct an audit of the past and present transactions of the AFP-RSBS.
The special audit team (SAT) was constituted, and later found out that
the AFP-RSBS purchased from the Concord Resources, Inc. (Concord) four (4)
parcels of land located in Calamba, Laguna and the purchase was covered by
two deeds of sale for different amounts.
The SAT team found that there is an excess in the price paid for the
above lots. Petitioner Alma Aban, then the Acting Head of the Office of Internal
Auditor of the AFP-RSBS was among the persons liable because she was the
one who verified the correctness of payment. Petitioner appealed to the COA en
banc and she requested to be removed as a person liable stating that she had
no knowledge of the above transactions prior to her department's conduct of the
post-audit. However, COA en banc denied the request of Petitioner Aban.
ISSUE:
Was the decision of COA En Banc to implead Petitioner Aban as one of

the officers liable proper?
RULING:
Yes, the act was within the powers of COA. It is well to be reminded that
the exercise by COA of its general audit power is among the mechanisms of
check and balance instituted under the 1987 Constitution on which our
democratic form of government is founded.
The Court ruled that Petitioner Aban neglected to exercise due care and
diligence in preventing such huge loss to AFP-RSBS. Considering that Petitioner
Aban was the head of the AFP-RSBS Internal Auditor Office, she should not
merely rely on the post-audit performed by her subordinates. Thus failure to do
the duty provided for by Article IX-D, Section 2(1) of the 1987 Constitution
constitutes neglect of duties on her part causing the Court to dismiss her
petition.
Political Law: Election Law
GOV. EXEQUIEL B. JAVIER v COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, CORNELIO P.

ALDON, AND RAYMUNDO T. ROQUERO
GR No. 215847 January 12, 2016, EN BANC (BRION, J.)
DOCTRINE: Election Law; Disqualification: The jurisdiction of the COMELEC

to disqualify candidates is limited to those enumerated in Section 68 of the
Omnibus Election Code. All other election offenses are beyond the ambit of
COMELEC jurisdiction. They are criminal and not administrative in nature.
Pursuant to sections 265 and 268 of the Omnibus Election Code, the power of
the COMELEC is confined to the conduct of preliminary investigation on the
alleged election offenses for the purpose of prosecuting the alleged offenders
before the regular courts of justice.
FACTS:
An administrative complaint for Gross Misconduct/Dereliction of Duty

and Abuse of Authority was filed against Mayor Mary Joyce U. Roquero. The
Sangguniang Panlalawigan (SP) issued Resolution No. 291-2012 recommending
to Antique Governor Exequiel Javier, petitioner herein, the preventive
suspension of Mayor Roquero.
COMELEC issued Resolution No. 9581 prohibiting any public official

from suspending any elective provincial, city, municipal, or barangay officer
during the election period for the May 13, 2013 elections. Despite such order
Petitioner Javier, issued an order preventively suspending Mayor Roquero for
thirty (30) days.
Mayor Roquero and Cornerlio Aldon sought to disqualify Gov. Javier and
the other incumbent officials from running in the 2013 elections on the ground
that Petitioner Gov. Javier committed election offenses including Coercion of
Subordinates and Threats, Intimidation, Terrorism or Other Forms of Coercion,
by suspending Mayor Roquero despite order from the COMELEC. Coercion
under Section 261 (d), Coercion of subordinates and Threats, intimidation,
terrorism, use of fraudulent device or other forms of coercion (e), of the
Omnibus Election Code is an election offense which can be a basis to disqualify
a candidate.
Mayor Roquero and Cornerlio Aldon (Aldon) alleged that the suspension
was political harassment calculated to intimidate the Roquero’s into backing
out of the 2013 elections. On May 13, 2013 Gov. Javier won the election.
However the COMELEC 2nd division disqualified Gov. Javier. It ruled that Gov.
Javier acted in bad faith when he suspended Mayor Roquero as a form of
punishment for opposing him. Lastly, Gov. Javier's act of preventively
suspending Mayor Roquero during the election period ban fell within the
contemplation of Section 261 (d) of the Election Code, which is a ground for
disqualification under Section 68. However, section 261 (d) was already
repealed by RA 7890.
ISSUE:
Should Petitioner Gov. Javier be disqualified due to his issuance of an

order of suspension against Mayor Roquero during the period of election ban?
RULING:
No, Gov. Javier should not be disqualified. No less than the Constitution
empowers the Commission to decide all questions affecting elections except
those involving the right to vote. It is the sole arbiter of all issues involving
elections. Hence, unless tainted with grave abuse of discretion, simple errors of
judgment committed by COMELEC cannot be reviewed even by this Court.
R.A. No. 7890 expressly repealed Section 261, paragraphs (d)(l) and (2) of
the Omnibus Election Code. The effect of the repeal is to remove Section 261(d)
from among those listed as ground for disqualification under Section 68 of the
Omnibus Election Code. With the express repeal of Section 261(d), the basis for
disqualifying Javier no longer existed. The jurisdiction of the COMELEC to
disqualify candidates is limited to those enumerated in Section 68 of the
Omnibus Election Code. All other election offenses are beyond the ambit of
COMELEC jurisdiction. They are criminal and not administrative in nature.
Pursuant to sections 265 and 268 of the Omnibus Election Code, the power of
the COMELEC is confined to the conduct of preliminary investigation on the
alleged election offenses for the purpose of prosecuting the alleged offenders
before the regular courts of justice.
In this case, COMELEC continued insistence in ruling that grave

coercion is still a ground for disqualification, is erroneous. There is grave abuse
of discretion on the part of COMELEC when it disqualified Gov. Javier based on
a provision of law that had already been expressly repealed.
LORD ALLAN JAY Q. VELASCO v HON. SPEAKER FELICIANO R.

BELMONTE, JR., SECRETARY GENERAL MARILYN1 B. BARUA-YAP AND
REGINA ONGSIAKO REYES
GR No. 211140 January 12, 2016, EN BANC (LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.)
DOCTRINE: Election Law; Petition for Mandamus: A petition for mandamus

will prosper if it is shown that the subject thereof is a ministerial act or duty,
and not purely discretionary on the part of the board, officer or person, and
that the petitioner has a well-defined, clear and certain right to warrant the
grant thereof.
FACTS:
Joseph Socorro Tan, a registered voter and resident of the Municipality of

Torrijos, Marinduque, filed with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) a
petition to deny due course or cancel the Certificate of Candidacy (COC) of Hon.
Regina Ongsiako Reyes, candidate for the position of Representative of the Lone
District of the Province of Marinduque. Tan alleged that Reyes made several
material misrepresentations in her COC. The COMELEC First Division granted
the petition and cancelled the COC of Reyes. Aggrieved of the decision, Reyes
filed a motion for reconsideration. Pending resolution, May 13, 2013 election
was held. Thereafter COMELEC En Banc, issued a resolution affirming the
decision cancelling the COC of Reyes. However, Reyes was already declared as
winner for the position of Representative and was proclaimed as winner by the
Board of Canvassers (BOC) despite the decision of COMELEC En Banc.
Lord Allan Jay Velasco (Velasco) contender of Reyes filed an election

protest before the HRET alleging that he was the rightful winner during the May
2013 election. Reyes belatedly filed a Petition for Certiorari on the order
cancelling her COC. Velasco filed a petition for mandamus demanding the
House Speaker Belmonte Jr. to administer his oath of office and for Reyes to
vacate the office and relinquish the same to him as the rightful winner.
ISSUE:
Can the House Speaker and other officials be compelled to administer

the oath in favor of Petitioner Velasco as duly elected Marinduque
Representative and allow him to assume and exercise said position?
RULING:
Yes, the petition for mandamus can compel these officers to undertake
their duties. A petition for mandamus will prosper if it is shown that the subject
thereof is a ministerial act or duty, and not purely discretionary on the part of
the board, officer or person, and that the petitioner has a well-defined, clear
and certain right to warrant the grant thereof.
What is prayed for herein is merely the enforcement of clear legal duties and not
to try disputed title. House Speaker Belmonte, Jr. and Sec. Gen. Barua-Yap
have no discretion whether or not to administer the oath of office to Velasco and
to register the latter's name in the Roll of Members of the House of
Representatives, respectively. There is already a final and executory decision of
the Supreme Court affirming the decision of COMELEC En Banc cancelling
Reyes's Certificate of Candidacy. Hence, without a valid COC, Reyes could not
be treated as a candidate in the election and much less as a duly proclaimed
winner.
In this case, the petition for mandamus can prosper because Petitioner
Velasco has a clear and certain right as Representative of the Lone District of
the Province of Marinduque. Since Petitioner Velasco was already the
proclaimed winner, the administration of oath and the registration of Velasco in
the Roll of Members of the House of Representatives are no longer a matter of
discretion or judgment on the part of Speaker Belmonte, Jr. and Sec. Gen.
Barua-Yap, rather these are considered ministerial acts or duties.
RENE SAGUISAG et. al. V EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO OCHOA al.

al.
G.R. No. 212426/ G.R. No. 212444, January 12, 2016 EN BANC (Sereno, J.)
DOCTINE: Constitutional Law; Executive Agreement: The President may

enter into an executive agreement on foreign military bases, troops, or facilities,
if (a) it is not the instrument that allows the presence of foreign military bases,
troops, or facilities; or (b) it merely aims to implement an existing law or treaty
FACTS:
Soon after the Philippines was granted independence, the Philippines

and the United States of America (U.S.) entered into their first military
arrangement pursuant to the Treaty of General Relations - the 1947 MBA.
However, a number of significant amendments to the 1947 MBA were
made. With respect to its duration, the parties entered into the Ramos-Rusk
Agreement of 1966, which reduced the term of the treaty from 99 years to a
total of 44 years or until 1991. To further strengthen their defense and security
relationship, the Philippines and the U.S. next entered into the MDT in 1951. In
view of the impending expiration of the 1947 MBA in 1991, the Philippines and
the U.S. negotiated for a possible renewal of their defense and security
relationship on 16 September 1991, but the Senate rejected the proposed
treaty. Subsequently, the military arrangements between them were revived in
1999 when they concluded the first Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA).
On June 6, 2014, the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA)

was ratified by the President of the Republic of the Philippines and said
agreement authorizes the U.S. military forces to have access to and conduct
activities within certain "Agreed Locations" in the country. It was not
transmitted to the Senate on the executive's understanding that to do so was no
longer necessary because the agreement was entered into by way of an
executive agreement.
Thus, Saguisag et. al. filed a petition before the Supreme Court assailing
the constitutionality of EDCA. They primarily argue that it should have been in
the form of a treaty concurred in by the Senate, not an executive agreement.
Hence, petitioners maintain that the Executive Department is not given the
choice to conclude agreements like EDCA in the form of an executive
agreement.
ISSUE:
Is the concurrence of the senate necessary before the EDCA be made

effective?
RULING:
No. The Constitution prohibits the entry of foreign military bases, troops
or facilities, except by way of a treaty concurred in by the Senate - a clear
limitation on the President's dual role as defender of the State and as sole
authority in foreign relations. The President, however, under Section 25 of the
transitory provision of the 1987 Constitution, may enter into an executive
agreement on foreign military bases, troops, or facilities, if (a) it is not the
instrument that allows the presence of foreign military bases, troops, or
facilities; or (b) it merely aims to implement an existing law or treaty. It is
evident, therefore, that the constitutional restriction refers solely to the initial
entry of the foreign military bases, troops, or facilities. Once entry is authorized,
the subsequent acts are thereafter subject only to the limitations provided by
the rest of the Constitution and Philippine law. The power of the President to
enter into binding executive agreements without Senate concurrence is already
well-established in this jurisdiction.
As such, executive agreements may dispense with the requirement of

Senate concurrence because of the legal mandate with which they are
concluded. As culled from the afore-quoted deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission, past Supreme Court Decisions, and works of noted
scholars, executive agreements merely involve arrangements on the
implementation of existing policies, rules, laws, or agreements. They are
concluded (1) to adjust the details of a treaty; (2) pursuant to or upon
confirmation by an act of the Legislature; or (3) in the exercise of the President's
independent powers under the Constitution. The raison d'etre of executive
agreements hinges on prior constitutional or legislative authorizations.
RENE SAGUISAG et. al. v EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO OCHOA et.

al.
G.R. No. 212426/ G.R. No. 212444 January 12, 2016 EN BANC (Sereno, J.)
Doctrine: Constitutional Law; Locus Standi: When those who challenge the
official act are able to craft an issue of transcendental significance to the
people, the Court may exercise its sound discretion and take cognizance of the
suit. It may do so in spite of the inability of the petitioners to show that they
have been personally injured by the operation of a law or any other government
act.
FACTS:
On June 6, 2014, the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA)

was ratified by the President of the Republic of the Philippines and said
agreement authorizes the U.S. military forces to have access to and conduct
activities within certain "Agreed Locations" in the country. It was not
transmitted to the Senate on the executive's understanding that to do so was no
longer necessary because the agreement was entered into by way of an
Thus, Saguisag et. al. filed a petition before the Supreme Court assailing
the constitutionality of EDCA. In response, the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG) maintains that there is no actual case or controversy that exists, since
the Senators have not been deprived of the opportunity to invoke the privileges
of the institution they are representing. It contends that the nonparticipation of
the Senators in the present petitions only confirms that even they believe that
EDCA is a binding executive agreement that does not require their concurrence.
Further, the OSG argued that Saguisag et. al does not possess the required
locus standi in filing the petition.
ISSUE:
Is the Saguisag et. al. have the personality in filing the petition?
RULING:
Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that while petitioners Saguisag et. al., do
not have legal standing; they nonetheless raise issues involving matters of
transcendental importance. In a number of cases, the court has indeed taken a
liberal stance towards the requirement of legal standing, especially when
paramount interest is involved. Indeed, when those who challenge the official
act are able to craft an issue of transcendental significance to the people, the
Court may exercise its sound discretion and take cognizance of the suit. It may
do so in spite of the inability of the petitioners to show that they have been
personally injured by the operation of a law or any other government act.
However, the Supreme Court ruled that while the Court has yet to
thoroughly delineate the outer limits of this doctrine, it emphasize that not
every other case, however strong public interest may be, can qualify as an issue
of transcendental importance. Before it can be impelled to brush aside the
essential requisites for exercising its power of judicial review, it must at the very
least consider a number of factors: (1) the character of the funds or other assets
involved in the case; (2) the presence of a clear case of disregard of a
constitutional or statutory prohibition by the public respondent agency or
instrumentality of the government; and (3) the lack of any other party that has
a more direct and specific interest in raising the present questions.
An exhaustive evaluation of the memoranda of the parties, together with

the oral arguments, shows that petitioners have presented serious
constitutional issues that provide ample justification for the Court to set aside
the rule on standing.
SERGIO R. OSMEÑA III v DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND

COMMUNICATIONS SECRETARY JOSEPH EMILIO A. ABAYA et.al
G.R. No. 211737/ G.R. No. 214756 January 13, 2016 THIRD DIVISION
(VILLARAMA, J.)
Doctrine: Constitutional Law; Locus Standi: Transcendental Importance;

Locus standi being a mere procedural technicality, the Court has, in the
exercise of its discretion, relaxed the rules on standing when the issues involved
as of "transcendental importance" to the public.
FACTS:
The Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC)

implemented a project for the construction of the Mactan-Cebu International
Airport (MCIA). On April 3, 2014, Pre-qualification, Bids and Awards Committee
(PBAC) issued a Resolution recommending GMR-Megawide Consortium (GMR)
as the winning bidder for the MCIA Project. On the same day, Senator Sergio R.
Osmeña III (Osmeña III) filed before the Supreme Court a petition for certiorari
and prohibition. He argues that PBAC should have disqualified GMR-Megawide
Consortium because it violated the conflict of interest rule when it failed to
disclose that Mr. Tan Shri Bashir Ahmad bin Abdul Majid was a director of two
subsidiaries of the GMR-Megawide Consortium, and is also the Managing
Director of Malaysia Airport Holdings Berhad (MAHB), which joined the bidding
for MCIA Project as member of the First Philippine Airports Consortium. Also,
Business for Progress Movement (BPM) claims that it stands to suffer great and
irreparable damage and injury because its members who are frequent travelers
to Cebu and Mactan will be burdened by the increased terminal fees imposed
by the private respondents upon taking over the operation and management of
MCIA.
GMR countered by alleging that Osmena has no locus standi to file the
petition, and neither has he shown any justification for this Court to disregard
his lack of personality to maintain this suit and the lack of requisite standing of
petitioner who has not raised any constitutional issue nor alleged any violation
of application of a law, but merely points to a supposed unequal enforcement of
PBAC's instructions to the bidders
ISSUE:
Did Osmena and BPM possess the required legal standing in filing the
petition?
RULING:
Yes. Legal standing or locus standi refers to a personal and substantial

interest in a case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury
because of the challenged governmental act. Locus standi being a mere
procedural technicality, the Court has, in the exercise of its discretion, relaxed
the rules on standing when the issues involved as of "transcendental
importance" to the public. The following instructive guides as determinants in
determining whether a matter is of transcendental importance: (1) the character
of the funds or other assets involved in the case; (2) the presence of a clear case
of disregard of a constitutional or statutory prohibition by the public
respondent agency or instrumentality of the government; and (3) the lack of any
other party with a more direct and specific interest in the questions being
raised.
Thus, the Supreme Court resolved to grant standing to the petitioners in

view of "the serious legal questions involved and their impact on public
interest."
VICE MAYOR MARCELINA S. ENGLE v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

(COMELEC) and WINSTON B. MENZON
G.R. No. 215995, January 19, 2016 EN BANC (DE CASTRO, J.)
DOCTRINE: Election Law; Disqualification: A petition to deny due course to,

or cancel a COC may be filed on the exclusive ground of false material
representation in said COC. The false representation which is a ground for a
denial of due course to and/or cancellation of a candidate’s COC refers to a
material fact relating to the candidate’s qualification for office such as one’s
citizenship or residence.
FACTS:
Engle and Menzon vied for the position of Vice-Mayor of the Municipality
of Babatngon, Province of Leyte in the May 13, 2013. Engle’s late husband,
James L. Engle, was originally a candidate for said contested position. However,
he died of cardiogenic shock on February 2, 2013. Due to this development,
petitioner filed her certificate of candidacy on February 22, 2013 as a substitute
candidate for her deceased spouse. It would appear that James L. Engle’s
Certificate of Nomination and Acceptance (CONA) was signed by Lakas
Christian Muslim Democrats (Lakas-CMD). However, Lakas-CMD failed to
submit to the COMELEC Law Department the authorization of Romualdez to
sign the CONAs of Lakas-CMD candidates in Babatngon. Thus, the COMELEC
Law Department considered all Lakas-CMD candidates whose CONAs were
signed by Romualdez as independent candidates.
For this reason, private respondent claimed that “the false representation
of Engle that she is qualified for public office consisted of a deliberate attempt
to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact that would otherwise render a candidate
ineligible.
ISSUE:
Did Marcelina Engle falsely misrepresent herself in filing her Certificate

of Candidacy (COC) when she substituted her spouse James Engle?
RULING:
Yes. Under Section 78 of the OEC, a petition to deny due course to, or
cancel a COC may be filed on the exclusive ground of false material
representation in said COC. The false representation which is a ground for a
denial of due course to and/or cancellation of a candidate’s COC refers to a
material fact relating to the candidate’s qualification for office such as one’s
citizenship or residence. Therefore, it may be concluded that the material
misrepresentation contemplated by Section 78 of the Code refers to
qualifications for elective office. This conclusion is strengthened by the fact that
the consequences imposed upon a candidate guilty of having made a false
representation in the certificate of candidacy are grave to prevent the candidate
from running or, if elected, from serving, or to prosecute him for violation of the
election laws. The records also show that when petitioner’s husband filed his
certificate of candidacy on October 4, 2012 with the Office of the Election
Officer in Babatngon, Leyte he clearly indicated therein that he was a nominee
of Lakas-CMD and attached thereto not only the CONA signed by Romualdez
but also the Authority to Sign Certificates of Nomination and Acceptance dated
September 12, 2012 in favor of Romualdez signed by Lakas-CMD President
Revilla and Lakas-CMD Secretary-General Aquino.
As far as the party and his wife were concerned, James L. Engle, as a
member of Lakas-CMD, may be substituted as a candidate upon his death.
There was no evidence on record that the party or petitioner had notice or
knowledge of the COMELEC’s classification of James L. Engle as an
independent candidate prior to February 22, 2013 when petitioner filed her
COC as a substitute for her deceased husband.
Under these premises, the COMELEC correctly did not cancel petitioner’s
COC on the ground of false material representation as there was none.
VICE MAYOR MARCELINA S. ENGLE v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

(COMELEC) and WINSTON B. MENZON
G.R. No. 215995, January 19, 2016 EN BANC (DE CASTRO, J.)
DOCTRINE: Election Law; COMELEC Powers to issue mandatory rules and

regulations: It is a long standing principle in jurisprudence that rules and
regulations for the conduct of elections are mandatory before the election, but
when they are sought to be enforced after the election they are held to be
directory only, if that is possible, especially where, if they are held to be
mandatory, innocent voters will be deprived of their votes without any fault on
their part.
FACTS:
Engle and Menzon vied for the position of Vice-Mayor of the Municipality
of Babatngon, Province of Leyte in the May 13, 2013. Engle’s late husband,
James L. Engle, was originally a candidate for said contested position. It would
appear that James L. Engle’s Certificate of Nomination and Acceptance (CONA)
was signed by Lakas Christian Muslim Democrats (Lakas-CMD).
However, Lakas-CMD failed to submit to the COMELEC Law Department

the authorization of Romualdez to sign the CONAs of Lakas-CMD candidates in
Babatngon. Thus, the COMELEC Law Department considered all Lakas-CMD
candidates whose CONAs were signed by Romualdez as independent
candidates. For this reason, Menzon charged Engle with violation of Section
15, COMELEC Resolution No. 9518 which disallows the substitution of an
independent candidate. The Commission stressed that the belated filing of
Romualdez’s authority to sign James L. Engle’s COC only in connection with
the proceedings for cancellation of petitioner’s own COC is fatal to petitioner’s
cause in view of the categorical directive of COMELEC Resolution 9518 which
says that said authority must be submitted to its Law Department on or before
October 1, 2012.
ISSUE:
Is James Engle (deceased) validly substituted by his wife despite the

belated filing before the COMELEC of Romualdez’s authority?
RULING:
Yes. It is true according to the Supreme Court that the COMELEC is

empowered by law to prescribe such rules so as to make efficacious and
successful the conduct of elections. However, it is a long standing principle in
jurisprudence that rules and regulations for the conduct of elections are
mandatory before the election, but when they are sought to be enforced after
the election they are held to be directory only, if that is possible, especially
where, if they are held to be mandatory, innocent voters will be deprived of their
votes without any fault on their part. Over time, Supreme Court has qualified
this doctrine to refer only to matters of form and cannot be applied to the
substantial qualifications of candidates.
The Supreme Court have applied in past cases the principle that the
manifest will of the people as expressed through the ballot must be given fullest
effect and in case of doubt, political laws must be interpreted to give life and
spirit to the popular mandate. Thus, Supreme Court have held that while
provisions relating to certificates of candidacy are in mandatory terms, it is an
established rule of interpretation as regards election laws, that mandatory
provisions, requiring certain steps before elections, will be construed as
directory after the elections, to give effect to the will of the people.
As such, since the people of Babatngon, Leyte could not have possibly
meant to waste their votes on a deceased candidate; the Supreme Court
conclude that Marcelina S. Engle was the undisputed choice of the electorate as
Vice-Mayor on the apparent belief that she may validly substitute her husband.
That belief was not contradicted by any official or formal ruling by the
COMELEC prior to the elections.
Hence, the Supreme Court ruled that the late submission of Romualdez’s
authority to sign the CONA of James L. Engle to the COMELEC was a mere
technicality that cannot be used to defeat the will of the electorate in a fair and
honest election.
MARY ELIZABETH TY-DELGADO v HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL AND PHILIP ARREZA PICHAY
G.R. No. 219603, January 16, 2016 EN BANC (CARPIO, J.)
DOCTRINE: Election Law; Disqualification by virtue of conviction of a

crime involving moral turpitude: Disqualification under Section 12 is a
material fact involving the eligibility of a candidate under Sections 74 and 78 of
the Omnibus Election Code. Hence, conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude under the law is a ground for disqualification and the votes cast
thereon is considered as stray votes.
FACTS:
On 16 September 2008, the Supreme Court in a case entitled "Tulfo v.

People of the Philippines," convicted Philip Pichay by final judgment of four
counts of libel. Subsequently, Pichay filed his certificate of candidacy for the
position of Member of the House of Representatives for the First Legislative
District of Surigao del Sur for the 13 May 2013 elections. This was opposed by
Ty- Delgado on the ground that Pichay was convicted of libel, a crime involving
moral turpitude. Hence, disqualified and committed false representation in
filing his Certificate of Candidacy (COC)
Pichay admitted his conviction by final judgment for four counts of libel,
but claimed that libel does not necessarily involve moral turpitude. He argued
that he did not personally perform the acts prohibited and his conviction for
libel was only because of his presumed responsibility as president of the
publishing company.
ISSUE:
Is Philip Pichay disqualified by running in an elective position on the

ground of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude?
RULING:
Yes. In the present case, Pichay admits his conviction for four counts of
libel. In Tulfo v People of the Philippines, the Court found Pichay liable for
publishing the four defamatory articles, which are libelous per se, with reckless
disregard of whether they were false or not. The fact that another libelous
article was published after the filing of the complaint can be considered as
further evidence of malice. Thus, Pichay clearly acted with actual malice, and
intention to do ulterior and unjustifiable harm.
Having been convicted of the crime of libel, Pichay is disqualified under

Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code for his conviction for a crime involving
moral turpitude. Under Section 12, the disqualification shall be removed after
the expiration of a period of five years from his service of sentence. In Teves v.
COMELEC, the Supreme Court held that the five-year period of disqualification
would end only after five years from conviction or the payment of fine. In this
case, since Pichay served his sentence when he paid the fine on 17 February
2011, the five-year period shall end only on 16 February 2016. Thus, Pichay is
disqualified to become a Member of the House of Representatives until then.
Considering his ineligibility due to his disqualification under Section 12,

which became final on 1 June 2009, Pichay made a false material
representation as to his eligibility when he filed his certificate of candidacy on 9
October 2012 for the 2013 elections. Pichay's disqualification under Section 12
is a material fact involving the eligibility of a candidate under Sections 74 and
78 of the Omnibus Election Code. In the present case, Pichay misrepresented
his eligibility in his certificate of candidacy because he knew that he had been
convicted by final judgment for a crime involving moral turpitude. Thus, his
representation that he was eligible for elective public office constitutes false
material representation as to his qualification or eligibility for the office.
NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION v ELIZABETH MANALASTAS AND BEA

CASTILLO
G.R. No. 196140, January 27, 2016 THIRD DIVISION (PERALTA, J.)
DOCTRINE: Constitutional Law; Just Compensation: The formula for

determination of just compensation to landowners does not include the factor
for inflation rate, as inflation is properly accounted for through payment of
interest on the amount due to the landowner, and through the award of
exemplary damages and attorney's fees in cases where there was irregularity in
the taking of property.
FACTS:
National Power Corporation (NPC) constructed a 230 KV transmission

line for the Naga-Tiwi line and a 69 KV transmission line for the Naga-Tinambac
line on Elizabeth Manalastas’ and Bea Castillo’s parcel of land. NPC entered
said land without the knowledge or consent of Manalastas and Castillo, without
properly initiating expropriation proceedings, and without any compensation to
Manalastas and Castillo. Because of said transmission lines, Manalastas and
Castillo alleged that they could no longer use their land as part of a subdivision
project as originally intended, which ultimately caused financial loss to their
family. Manalastas and Castillo filed a complaint against NPC and its officers
with the Regional Trial Court (RTC). RTC ordered NPC to pay Manalastas and
Castillo. On appeal to the CA, herein NPC argued that the RTC erred in
factoring the devaluation of the peso in the computation of the fair market value
of Manalastas’ and Castillo’s land. The CA affirmed the RTC judgment with
modification.
ISSUE:
How is just compensation computed?
RULING:
The constitutional limitation of "just compensation" is considered to be

the sum equivalent to the market value of the property, broadly described to be
the price fixed by the seller in open market in the usual and ordinary course of
legal action and competition or the fair value of the property as between one
who receives, and one who desires to sell, if fixed at the time of the actual
taking by the government.
Thus, if property is taken for public use before compensation is deposited

with the court having jurisdiction over the case, the final compensation must
include interest/s on its just value to be computed from the time the property is
taken to the time when compensation is actually paid or deposited with the
court. In fine, between the taking of the property and the actual payment, legal
interest/s accrue in order to place the owner in a position as good as (but not
better than) the position he was in before the taking occurred.
However, the valuation of the land for purposes of determining just

compensation should not include the inflation rate of the Philippine Peso
because the delay in payment of the price of expropriated land is sufficiently
recompensed through payment of interest on the market value of the land as of
the time of taking from the landowner.
Political Law: Administrative Law
JENNIFER A. AGUSTIN-SE and ROHERMIA J. JAMSANI-RODRIGUEZ v

OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, represented by Executive Secretary
PAQUITO N. OCHOA et. al.
G.R. No. 207355, February 3, 2016 SECOND DIVISION (CARPIO, J.)
DOCTRINE: Administrative Law; Administrative Due Process: The essence

of due process is an opportunity to be heard – as applied to administrative
proceedings, it is an opportunity to explain one’s side or an opportunity to seek
a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.
FACTS:
Jennifer A. Agustin-Se and Rohermia J. Jamsani-Rodriguez are Assistant

Special Prosecutors, who have been assigned to prosecute cases against Lt.
Gen. Leopoldo S. Acot, Bgen. Ildelfonso N. Dulinayan, and several others before
the Sandiganbayan. The case is for alleged ghost deliveries of assorted supplies
and materials to the Philippine Air Force.
In the Office of the President (OP), Agustin-Se and Jamsani-Rodriguez

complaint was dismissed. Thereafter, they filed a motion for reconsideration
which was denied by the OP. Agustin-Se and Jamsani-Rodriguez alleged that
OP did not consider the evidence they presented during the administrative
adjudication resulting in the denial of their right to due process. On appeal, the
Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the decision of the OP hence, this case.
ISSUE:
Did Agustin-Se and Jamsani-Rodriguez right to due process was violated

by respondent office of the president, when it did not consider the evidence
presented by the petitioners during the administrative adjudication?
RULING:
No. Agustin-Se and Jamsani-Rodriguez right to due process was not

violated.
The essence of due process is an opportunity to be heard – as applied to

administrative proceedings, it is an opportunity to explain one’s side or an
opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. In
this case, petitioners were given both opportunities – the opportunity to explain
their side by filing their pleadings which contained all their allegations and
evidence in support of their arguments, and the opportunity to seek a
reconsideration of the ruling complained of, as shown by their motions for
reconsideration and appeals. As long as parties are afforded these
opportunities, the requirement of due process in administrative proceedings is
sufficiently met. As evidenced by the pleadings filed during the administrative
proceeding, and their subsequent appeal to the CA and now to this Court, they
have been afforded the fullest opportunity to establish their claims and to seek
a reconsideration of the ruling complained of.
Moreover, a reading of the decisions of the CA and the OP shows that the
evidence Agustin-Se and Jamsani-Rodriguez presented had been duly
considered. Indeed, aside from their general allegation that the CA did not
consider their evidence, Agustin-Se and Jamsani-Rodriguez failed to identify
any conclusion arrived at by the CA or the OP that was not supported by the
evidence on record. Evidently, Agustin-Se and Jamsani-Rodriguez right to due
process was not violated.
NUEVA ECIJA I ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE INCORPORATED (NEECO I) v

ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION
G.R. No. 180642, February 03, 2016 THIRD DIVISION (REYES, J.)
DOCTRINE: Administrative Law; Administrative Due Process:

Administrative due process simply requires an opportunity to explain one's side
or to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. It means being
given the opportunity to be heard before judgment, and for this purpose, a
formal trial-type hearing is not even essential. It is enough that the parties are
given a fair and reasonable chance to demonstrate their respective positions
and to present evidence in support thereof.
FACTS:
Nueva Ecija Electric Cooperative Incorporated is among the various rural

electric cooperatives directed by the Energy Regulatory Commission (ERC) to
refund the over-recoveries arising from the implementation of the Purchased
Power Adjustment (PPA) Clause under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7832 or the Anti-
Electricity and Electric Transmission Lines/Materials Pilferage Act of 199. The
ERC evaluated documents and records submitted by NEECO I and discovered
that it had over-recoveries.
Accordingly, NEECO I was directed to refund its over-recoveries. NEECO

I thereafter filed a Manifestation and Motion for Reconsideration with Deferment
of Implementation Alleged Over-Recoveries. The ERC denied NEECO I's motion
on the ground that it "merely reiterates the same arguments earlier raised and
does not present any substantial reason not previously invoked." NEECO I was
accorded similar opportunities to present its side and objections. It attended the
conferences conducted by the ERC, allowed to file documentary submissions,
and seek a reconsideration of the ERC.
ISSUE:
Is NEECO I deprived of due process?
RULING:
No, NEECO I was not deprived of due process.
Administrative due process simply requires an opportunity to explain

one's side or to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. It
means being given the opportunity to be heard before judgment, and for this
purpose, a formal trial-type hearing is not even essential. It is enough that the
parties are given a fair and reasonable chance to demonstrate their respective
positions and to present evidence in support thereof.
The ERC observed administrative due process when it enjoined electric
cooperatives to refund their over-recoveries. They were duly informed of the
need for their monthly documentary submissions and were allowed to submit
them accordingly. Hearings and exit conferences with the representatives of
electric cooperatives were also conducted. These conferences entailed
discussions on preliminary figures and their further verification to determine
and correct any inaccuracies. The electric cooperatives were also allowed to file
motions for reconsideration of the ERC orders respectively directing them to
make the refunds.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v MOLDEX REALTY, INC.

G.R. No. 171041, February 10, 2016 SECOND DIVISION (LEONEN, J.)
DOCTRINE: Constitutional Law; Moot and Academic Cases: A case becomes

moot and academic when, by virtue of supervening events, the conflicting issue
that may be resolved by the court ceases to exist. There is no longer any
justiciable controversy that may be resolved by the court. This court refuses to
render advisory opinions and resolve issues that would provide no practical use
or value.
FACTS:
Luis Erce, Rosa Cinense, and Maria Clara Erce Landicho applied for the
registration of parcels of land before the Regional Trial Court (RTC). Eventually,
they sold Lot Nos. 9715-B and 9715-C, to Moldex Realty, Inc. They were later
substituted by Moldex Realty, Inc. in the application for registration pending
before the RTC. RTC rendered the Decision granting the application.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) appealed the RTC decision
before the Court of Appeals (CA). CA rendered the Decision affirming the
approval of Moldex Realty, Inc.'s application for registration. On March 14,
2012, Supreme Court received a Manifestation and Motion from Moldex Realty,
Inc. stating that although it had already been issued a favorable decision by the
RTC and the CA, it opted to withdraw its application for registration of the
properties in its name hence; the case had become moot and academic.
ISSUE:
Is Moldex Realty, Inc. withdrawal of its application for land registration

has rendered this case moot and academic?
RULING:
Yes. Moldex Realty withdrawal of its application for registration has

rendered this case moot and academic. A case becomes moot and academic
when, by virtue of supervening events, the conflicting issue that may be
resolved by the court ceases to exist. There is no longer any justiciable
controversy that may be resolved by the court. This court refuses to render
advisory opinions and resolve issues that would provide no practical use or
value. Thus, courts generally "decline jurisdiction over such case or dismiss it
on ground of mootness."
Moldex Reality Inc.’s Manifestation stating its withdrawal of its

application for registration has erased the conflicting interests that used to be
present in this case. Moldex Reality Inc.’s Manifestation was an expression of
its intent not to act on whatever claim or right it has to the property involved.
Thus, the controversy ended when Moldex Reality Inc. filed that Manifestation.
ERIC N. ESTRELLADO and JOSSIE M. BORJA v KARINA CONSTANTINO

DAVID, THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, HIPOLITO R. GABORNI and
ROBERTO S. SE
G.R. No. 184288, February 16, 2016 EN BANC (BERSAMIN, J.)
DOCTRINE: Administrative Law; The Next in Rank Status: The next-in-rank

status of a government employee is not a guarantee to one's fitness to the
position aspired for, and the applicant must go through the rigors of a
screening and selection process as determined and conducted by a department
or agency, subject only to the standards and guidelines set by the Civil Service
Commission (CSC). This is in keeping with the ideal of promoting through merit
rather than entitlement, and thus ensuring that government service is rewarded
with the best fit.
FACTS:
After screening the applicants, the LTO-COS-PB recommended to the

LTO the appointment of Hipolito R. Garboni and Roberto S. Se to the vacant
positions of TRO II and AO IV within the LTO Law Enforcement Service.
Eric N. Estrellado, TRO 1, and Jossie M. Borja, Records Officer III, who
were also applicants for the aforementioned positions and in their alleged
capacities as next-in-rank employees, filed with the CSC-NCR a petition to
declare the LTO-CO-SPB selection procedure null and void. They alleged,
among others, that Garboni and Se did not meet the requirements for the
positions.
ISSUE:
Is the next-in-rank status of a government employee, a guarantee to

one's fitness to the position aspired for?
RULING:
No. The next-in-rank status of a government employee is not a guarantee

to one's fitness to the position aspired for, and the applicant must go through
the rigors of a screening and selection process as determined and conducted by
a department or agency, subject only to the standards and guidelines set by the
Civil Service Commission (CSC). This is in keeping with the ideal of promoting
through merit rather than entitlement, and thus ensuring that government
service is rewarded with the best fit.
The screening process is that which each department or agency

formulates and administers in accordance with the law, rules, regulations, and
standards set by the CSC. If neither the law nor the implementing rules and
regulations define in specific terms or criteria the particulars of the screening
process, then each agency or department is empowered to formulate its own
screening processes subject to the standards and guidelines set by the CSC.
RE: VERIFIED COMPLAINT DATED JULY 13, 2015 OF ALFONSO v UMALI,

JR. v HON. JOSE R. HERNANDEZ, ASSOCIATE JUSTICE, SANDIGANBAYAN
IPI No. 15-35-SB-J, February 23, 2016 EN BANC (BRION, J.)
DOCTRINE: Administrative Law; Quantum of Evidence: In administrative

proceedings, complainants have the burden of proving the allegations in their
complaints by substantial evidence. Substantial evidence is such relevant
evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.
FACTS:
Complainant Alfonso V. Umali, then the Provincial Administrator of

Oriental Mindoro, was one of the accused in criminal case for violation of
Republic Act No. 3019 (the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) before the
Sandiganbayan. In its decision dated September 9, 2008, the Sandiganbayan
(Fourth Division) denied the motion to dismiss by way of a demurrer to
evidence filed by the accused Umali, Rodolfo Valencia, Pedrito Reyes, Jose
Enriquez and Jose Leynes, and convicted them of the crime charged. The
Sandiganbayan eventually reconsidered this decision, and allowed the accused
to present evidence; still the Sandiganbayan found Umali and two others guilty
beyond reasonable doubt.
Umali alleged that Justice Hernandez showed manifest partiality in

Criminal Case No. 26324 when he:
a. instructed the clerk of court not to allow the filing of a reply after the
prosecution submitted its comment to the motion for reconsideration;
b. asked numerous loaded questions to the witnesses and 'lawyered' for
the prosecution; and
c. declared, "You can always go to the Supreme Court" to Umali's counsels
when they were explaining the motions they filed with the Sandiganbayan.
Finally, Umali maintained that the Sandiganbayan's judgment of
conviction was an "unjust judgment motivated by ill will," and dictated by
Justice Hernandez's partiality.
ISSUE:
Does the complaint of Umali against the Sandiganbayan have merit?
RULING:
No. The Court stresses at the outset that in administrative proceedings,

complainants have the burden of proving the allegations in their complaints by
substantial evidence. While the Court will never tolerate or condone any
conduct, act, or omission that would violate the norm of public accountability
or diminish the people's faith in the judiciary, the quantum of proof necessary
for a finding of guilt in administrative cases is substantial evidence or such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.
Umali failed to support by substantial proof any of the allegations in his

complaint such that the hearsay allegations constituted the totality of Umali's
evidence.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v VICENTE LUGNASIN AND DEVINCIO

GUERRERO
G.R. No. 208404, February 24, 2016 FIRST DIVISION (LEONARDO-DE
CASTRO, J.)
DOCTRINE: Constitutional Law; Right to Custodial Investigation: Rights

during custodial investigation is relevant and material only to cases in which an
extrajudicial admission or confession is extracted from the accused which
becomes the basis of their conviction. The right is not applicable in in-court
identification since no extrajudicial confession is made but rather a judicial
confession or admission.
FACTS:
Niccasius Cordero was abducted while opening the garage door of his
residence in Mindanao Avenue. During court proceedings, Cordero identified
accused-appellants Devincio Guerrero as the man who pushed him inside the
car and Vicente Lugnasin as the Commander. Accused-appellants denied the
allegations.
DOJ filed information against accused-appellants of kidnapping for

ransom. Regional Trial Court found accused-appellants guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the same. On appeal, Devincio claimed, among others, that
he was not informed of his constitutional rights at the time of his arrest and his
rights under R.A. No. 7438 during investigation; however the Court of Appeals
pointed out that he neither offered any evidence nor executed an extrajudicial
confession or admission for such allegation.
ISSUE:
Is there a violation of Guerrero’s right to custodial investigation?
RULING:
No, there is no violation of Guerrero’s right to custodial investigation.

As stated in People v. Buluran and Valenzuela, any allegation of violation
of rights during custodial investigation is relevant and material only to cases in
which an extrajudicial admission or confession extracted from the accused
becomes the basis of their conviction.
In the present case, Cordero made an in-court identification to both

accused-appellants in court when he was asked to identify them inside the
court room. He did not execute an extrajudicial confession which would merit a
violation of accused-appellant’s constitutional right.
Therefore, Guerrero’s right to custodial investigation was not violated.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v C.C. UNSON COMPANY, INC.

G.R. No. 215107, February 24, 2016 SECOND DIVISION (MENDOZA, J.)
DOCTRINE: Constitutional Law; Just Compensation; Consequential

damages considered in just compensation: Just compensation, to which the
owner of the property to be expropriated is entitled, is equivalent to the market
value. “Market value is that sum of money which a person desirous but not
compelled to buy, and an owner willing but not compelled to sell, would agree
on as a price to be paid by the buyer and received by the seller. This rule is
modified only where a part of a certain property is expropriated. In such a case,
the owner is not restricted to compensation for the portion actually taken, he is
also entitled to recover the consequential damage, if any, to the remaining part
of the property.
FACTS:
Petitioner Republic filed a complaint for expropriation through the Toll

Regulatory Board (TRB). It sought the implementation of South Luzon Tollway
Extension Project (SLEPP) to extend the South Luzon Expressway for a more
convenient travel within the region. Respondent C.C. Unson Co., Inc. is the
owner of the affected properties.
Unson sought to expropriate two of its lots for ₱2,250.00 per sq. meter.
In contrast, Republic contends that one of the lots should have a lower zonal
value of ₱1,150.00 per sq. meter. But Unson argues that since both properties
were classified as residential, then a higher valuation is only proper. To settle
the dispute, a Board of Commission was instituted by the Regional Trial Court
for the assessment of just compensation of the affected lots. The Board
considered ₱3,000.00 per sq. meter as compromise amount in the end.
RTC arrived at the fixed amount of ₱3,500.00 as basis for just

compensation. It considered the potential use of the properties and expert
opinions which factored in consequential damages due to the dangling lots that
could no longer be used for any business purposes. The Court of Appeals
affirmed the RTC and held that the highest and best use of the land did not
equate to potential use.
ISSUE:
Is there just compensation on the affected properties?
RULING:
Yes, there is just compensation on the affected properties.

In Republic v. BPI, the Court categorically stated that if as a result of the
expropriation made by the petitioner, the remaining portion of the property of
the owner suffers from impairment or decrease in value, consequential damages
were to be awarded.
As a general rule, just compensation, to which the owner of the property

to be expropriated is entitled, is equivalent to the market value. “Market value is
that sum of money which a person desirous but not compelled to buy, and an
owner willing but not compelled to sell, would agree on as a price to be paid by
the buyer and received by the seller. This rule is modified only where a part of a
certain property is expropriated. In such a case, the owner is not restricted to
compensation for the portion actually taken, he is also entitled to recover the
consequential damage, if any, to the remaining part of the property."
In arriving at P3, 500.00 as the amount of just compensation, the RTC

already factored in the consequential damages suffered by Unson for the
unusable 750 square meter lots. In essence, petitioner was already ordered to
pay for the dangling lots when the just compensation was pegged at P3, 500.00.
In the case at hand, as it was determined by the Board that 750 sq. meters
would be left unused, it is only fit that Unson be entitled to consequential
damages as the remaining portion of the property suffers from impairment or
decrease in value.
REBECCA FULLIDO v GINO GRILLI

G.R. No. 215014, February 29, 2016 SECOND DIVISION (MENDOZA, J.)
DOCTRINE: Constitutional Law; Constitutional restraint against foreign

ownership of lands: Under Section 7 of Article XII of the 1987 Constitution,
natural resources shall not be alienated, except with respect to public
agricultural lands and in such cases, the alienation is limited to Filipino
citizens. The prohibition, however, is not limited to the sale of lands to
foreigners. It also covers leases of lands amounting to the transfer of all or
substantially all the rights of dominion.
FACTS:
In 1994, Gino Grilli, an Italian national, met Rebecca Fullido in Bohol where
he courted her. In 1995, Grilli decided to build a residential house where he
and Fullido would to stay whenever he would be vacationing in the country.
Grilli financially assisted Fullido in procuring a lot located in Biking I, Dauis,
Bohol, from her parents which was registered in her name. On the said
property, they constructed a house, which was funded by Grilli. Upon
completion, they maintained a common-law relationship and lived there
whenever Grilli was on vacation in the Philippines twice a year.
In 1998, Grilli and Fullido executed a contract of lease, a memorandum of

agreement (MOA) and a special power of attorney (SPA), to define their
respective rights over the house and lot. The lease contract stipulated, among
others, that Grilli as the lessee, would rent the lot, registered in the name of
Fullido, for a period of fifty years, to be automatically renewed for another fifty
years upon its expiration in the amount of P10, 000.00 for the whole term of the
lease contract; and that Fullido as the lessor, was prohibited from selling,
donating, or encumbering the said lot without the written consent of Grilli. SPA
allowed him to administer, manage and transfer the house and lot on behalf of
Fullido.
Initially, their relationship was harmonious, but it turned sour after 16

years of living together. Both charged each other with infidelity. They could not
agree who should leave the common property, and Grilli sent formal letters to
Fullido demanding that she vacate the property.
ISSUE:
Was the contract void for violating Art. XII of the Constitution?
RULING:
Yes. Under Section 1 of Article XIII of the 1935 Constitution, natural
resources shall not be alienated, except with respect to public agricultural
lands and in such cases, the alienation is limited to Filipino citizens.
Concomitantly, Section 5 thereof states that, save in cases of hereditary
succession, no private agricultural land shall be transferred or assigned except
to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of
the public domain in the Philippines.
The prohibition, however, is not limited to the sale of lands to foreigners.

It also covers leases of lands amounting to the transfer of all or substantially all
the rights of dominion.
Based on the above-cited constitutional limitation, the Court finds that

the lease contract and the MOA in the present case are null and void for
virtually transferring the reigns of the land to a foreigner. Evidently, the lease
contract and the MOA operated hand-in-hand to strip Fullido of any dignified
right over her own property.
The said contracts attempted to guise themselves as a lease, but a closer

scrutiny of the same revealed that they were intended to transfer the dominion
of a land to a foreigner in violation of Section 7, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution. Even if Fullido voluntary executed the same, no amount of
consent from the parties could legalize an unconstitutional agreement. The
lease contract and the MOA do not deserve an iota of validity and must be
rightfully struck down as null and void for being repugnant to the fundamental
law. These void documents cannot be the source of rights and must be treated
as mere scraps of paper.
WIGBERTO “TOBY” R. TANADA v HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL, ET AL.
G.R. No. 217012, March 1, 2016 EN BANC (CARPIO, J.)
DOCTRINE: Election Law; House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal

(HRET) Jurisdiction: Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution states that
the Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral
Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns, and qualifications of their respective Members; and Rule 15 of the
2011 HRET Rules to declare that its power to judge election contests is limited
to Members of the House of Representatives.
FACTS:
Petitioner Wigberto R. Tañada, Jr. and private respondents Angelina D.

Tan and Alvin John S. Tañada are candidates for member of the Fourth District
of Gumaca, Quezon.
Wigberto filed twin petitions before the COMELEC to cancel Alvin’s COC
and to declare Alvin as a nuisance candidate. COMELEC en Banc declared that
Alvin was not a nuisance candidate but nevertheless, it cancelled his COC.
However, in the elections, Alvin’s name remained in the ballots. The canvass of
votes indicated that Tan was the winning candidate with a margin of 84 votes to
second-placer, Wigberto. Despite his disqualification, Alvin still received 7,038
votes. Wigberto contends that fraud is extant through the malicious fielding of a
nuisance candidate in order to sabotage his chances. He prays that the votes
Alvin received be credited in his favor. He filed a petition challenging the
nuisance candidacy of Alvin before the HRET.
HRET declared that the election protest is insufficient in form and

substance. Further, it has no jurisdiction to declare that Alvin is a nuisance
candidate as its power to judge election contests is limited to members of the
House.
ISSUE:
Does HRET have jurisdiction to entertain petitions regarding candidates

for the House of Representatives?
RULING:
No, HRET have no jurisdiction to determine whether Alvin John was a

nuisance candidate since he did not emerge as a winner in the election.
The HRET relied on Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution

wherein the Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an
Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members; and Rule 15 of
the 2011 HRET Rules to declare that its power to judge election contests is
limited to Members of the House of Representatives. Alvin John, admittedly, is
not a Member of the House of Representatives.
HARLIN C. ABAYON v
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTOLRAL TRIBUNAL (HRET) and RAUL
A. DAZA,
G.R. No. 222236; G.R. No. 223032, May 3, 2016 SPECIAL EN BANC
(MENDOZA, J.)
DOCTRINE: Constitutional Law; HRET’s exclusive jurisdiction: The

Constitution no less, grants the HRET with exclusive jurisdiction to decide all
election contests involving the members of the House of Representatives, which
necessarily includes those which raise the issue of fraud, terrorism or other
irregularities committed before, during or after the elections. To deprive the
HRET the prerogative to annul elections would undermine its constitutional fiat
to decide election contests. The phrase "election, returns and qualifications"
should be interpreted in its totality as referring to all matters affecting the
validity of the contestee' s title.
FACTS:
Abayon and Daza were contenders for the position of Representative in

the First Legislative District of Northern Samar. Out of the votes cast in the 332
clustered precincts, Abayon emerged as the winner after obtaining the majority
vote of 72,857. Daza placed second with a total of 72,805 votes. The Provincial
Board of Canvassers of Northern Samar proclaimed Abayon as the duly elected
member of the House of Representatives for the said legislative district.
Daza filed his Election Protest challenging the elections results in 25

clustered precincts. In his protest, he bewailed that there was massive fraud,
vote-buying, intimidation; employment of illegal and fraudulent devices and
schemes before, during and after the elections benefitting Abayon and that
terrorism was committed by the latter and his unidentified cohorts, agents and
supporters.
The House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) decided the

election protest in Daza's favor and declared him as the winning candidate.
Moreover, the HRET annulled the election results in five clustered precincts
because of the commission of massive terrorism. As a result of nullifying the
election results in the said clustered precincts, the HRET deducted the votes
received by the parties in the concerned clustered precincts and concluded that
Daza obtained 72,436 votes and Abayon had 72,002 votes.
ISSUE:
Does the HRET have jurisdiction to annul the elections in the contested
precincts?
RULING:
Yes. Article VI, Section 17 of the Constitution clearly spells out HRET's
jurisdiction, to wit:
The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an

Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests
relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their
respective Members.
The Court agrees that the power of the HRET to annul elections differ
from the power granted to the COMELEC to declare failure of elections. The
Constitution no less, grants the HRET with exclusive jurisdiction to decide all
election contests involving the members of the House of Representatives, which
necessarily includes those which raise the issue of fraud, terrorism or other
irregularities committed before, during or after the elections. To deprive the
HRET the prerogative to annul elections would undermine its constitutional fiat
to decide election contests. The phrase "election, returns and qualifications"
should be interpreted in its totality as referring to all matters affecting the
validity of the contestee’s title.
The power granted to the HRET by the Constitution is intended to be as

complete and unimpaired as if it had remained originally in the legislature.
Thus, the HRET, as the sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns and qualifications of members of the House of Representatives, may
annul election results if in its determination, fraud, terrorism or other electoral
irregularities existed to warrant the annulment. Because in doing so, it is
merely exercising its constitutional duty to ascertain who among the candidates
received the majority of the valid votes cast.
Therefore, the HRET had jurisdiction to determine whether there was

terrorism in the contested precincts. In the event that the HRET would
conclude that terrorism indeed existed in the said precincts, then it could annul
the election results in the said precincts to the extent of deducting the votes
received by Daza and Abayon in order to remain faithful to its constitutional
mandate to determine who among the candidates received the majority of the
valid votes cast.
BAGUMBAYAN-VNP MOVEMENT, INC., et al v COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

G.R. No. 222731, March 08, 2016 EN BANC (LEONEN, J.)
DOCTRINE: Constitutional Law; COMELEC Power: The 1987 Constitution

empowers the Commission on Elections to enforce and administer all laws and
regulations relative to the conduct of an election. Pursuant to such, the State
recognizes the mandate and authority of the Commission to prescribe the
adoption and use of the most suitable technology of demonstrated capability
taking into account the situation prevailing in the area and the funds available
for the purpose.
FACTS:
Republic Act No. 8436 as amended by Republic Act 9369, authorized the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to use an automated election system for
electoral exercises.
In 2010 and 2013, the COMELEC enforced a nationwide automated

election system using the Precinct Count Optical Scan (PCOS) machines. For
the 2016 National and Local Elections, the COMELEC has opted to use the
Vote-Counting Machine. The vote-counting machine is reported to have more
memory and security features, and is "capable of producing the Voter
Verification Paper Audit Trail (VVPAT)."
Bagumbayan-VNP, Inc. is a non-stock and non-profit corporation. It

operates through Bagumbayan Volunteers for a New Philippines, a national
political party duly registered with the COMELEC. Former Senator Gordon is a
registered voter and taxpayer. He is the Chairperson of Bagumbayan-VNP, Inc.
Gordon authored Republic Act No. 9369, the law that amended Republic Act
No. 8436, otherwise known as the Automated Election System Law.
Bagumbayan et. al. now claim that the COMELEC refuses to implement
the VVPAT function based on fears that the security feature may aid in vote-
buying, and that the voting period may take longer. Petitioners further claim
that under Section 28 of Republic Act No. 9369, amending Section 35 of
Republic Act No. 8436, anyone "interfering with and impeding . . . the use of
computer counting devices and the processing, storage, generation and
transmission of election results, data or information" commits a felonious
act. The COMELEC allegedly did so when it refused to implement VVPAT.
ISSUE:
Did the COMELEC violate any of its constitutional mandates by failure to

implement the VVPAT?
RULING:
Yes. The inaction of the COMELEC in utilizing the VVPAT feature of the
vote-counting machines fails to fulfill the duty required under Section 2, Article
XI (C).
Article XI(C), Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution empowered the

COMELEC to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the
conduct of an election." One of the laws that the COMELEC must implement is
Republic Act No. 8436, as amended by Republic Act No. 9369, which requires
the automated election system to have the capability of providing a voter-
verified paper audit trail.
Based on the technical specifications during the bidding, the current

vote-counting machines should meet the minimum system capability of
generating a VVPAT. However, the COMELECS' act of rendering inoperative this
feature runs contrary to why the law required this feature in the first place.
Under Republic Act No. 8436, as amended, it is considered a policy of the state
that the votes reflect the genuine will of the People.
The State recognizes the mandate and authority of the Commission to

prescribe the adoption and use of the most suitable technology of demonstrated
capability taking into account the situation prevailing in the area and the funds
available for the purpose. The minimum functional capabilities enumerated
under Section 6 of Republic Act 8436, as amended, are mandatory. These
functions constitute the most basic safeguards to ensure the transparency,
credibility, fairness and accuracy of the upcoming elections.
MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD S. POE-LLAMANZARES v COMMISSION ON

ELECTIONS AND ESTRELLA ELAMPARO
G.R No. 221697 &221698-700, March 8, 2016 EN BANC (PEREZ, J.)
DOCTRINE: Constitutional Law: Citizenship and Domicile: Foundlings are

as a class, natural-born citizens. While the 1935 Constitution's enumeration is
silent as to foundlings, there is no restrictive language which would definitely
exclude foundlings either. Moreover, foundlings are deemed to be domiciled in
the place or country where they are found.
FACTS:
Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-Llamanzares was born in 1968, found as

newborn infant in Jaro, Iloilo and was legally adopted by Ronald Allan Kelly Poe
(FPJ) And Jesus Sonora Poe (Susan Roces) in 1974. She immigrated to the US
in 1991 after her marriage to Theodore Llamanzares who was then based at the
US. Grace Poe then became a naturalized American citizen in 2001.
On December 2004, she returned to the Philippines due to his father’s

deteriorating medical condition, who then eventually demise on February 3,
2005. She then quitted her job in the US to be with her grieving mother and
finally went home for good to the Philippines on May 24, 2005.
On July 18, 2006, the Bureau of Immigration granted her petition

declaring that she had reacquired her Filipino citizenship under RA 9225. She
registered as a voter and obtained a new Philippine Passport. In 2010, before
assuming her post as appointees Chairperson of the MTRCB, she renounced
her American citizenship to satisfy the RA 9225 requirements as to
Reacquisition of Filipino Citizenship. From then on, she stopped using her
American passport.
In her COC for Presidency on the May 2016 elections, Grace Poe declared
that she is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines and that her residence up to
day before May 9, 2016 would be 10 years and 11 months counted from May
24, 2005. Petitions were filed before the COMELEC to disqualify petitioner
under Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure. It was alleged that
petitioner lacks the requisite residency and citizenship to qualify her for the
Presidency.
ISSUES:
1. Is Mary Grace Poe-Llamanzares considered as a natural born citizen

of the Philippines?
2. Is Poe considered as a domicile of the Philippines?
RULING:
1. Yes, Grace Poe is considered as a natural born citizen of the Philippines.
The following are the reasons of the Court:
1) The official statistics of the Philippine Statistics Authority (PSA)

provides that from 1965 to 1975, the statistical probability that any
child born in the Philippines in that decade is natural born Filipino is
99. 83%;
2) Other circumstantial evidence of the nationality of petitioner’s parents

are the fact that she was abandoned as an infant in a Roman Catholic
Church in Iloilo City. She has typical Filipino features: height, flat
nasal bridge, straight black hair, almond shaped eyes, and an oval
face;
3) As a matter of law, foundlings are as a class, natural born citizens.

While the 1935 Constitution’s enumeration is silent as to foundlings,
there is no restrictive language which would definitely exclude
foundlings either;
4) The Constitution does not permit any discrimination but rather

guarantee the basic right to equal protection of the laws;
5) Domestic laws on adoption also support the principle that foundlings

are Filipinos. These laws do not provide that adoption confers
citizenship upon the adoptee. Rather, the adoptee must be a Filipino
in the first place to be adopted. RA 8043 or the Inter-Country
Adoption Act of 1995 defines Filipino children and include foundlings
as among the Filipino children who may be adopted; and
6) Under international law, it is a generally accepted principle of

international law to presume foundlings as having been born of
nationals of the country in which the foundling is found.
2. Yes, Grace Poe is a domicile of the Philippines. The foregoing evidence

shows that Poe and her family abandoned their US domicile and
relocated to the Philippines for good. To wit: petitioner’s former passport
showing her arrival and her return to the Philippines every time she
traveled abroad; shipment of their household items to the country;
school records of her children showing enrolment in Philippine schools;
tax identification issued to petitioner; titles of condominium and parking
slot issued to petitioner; affidavit of petitioner’s husband regarding
leaving US and subsequent employment in the Philippines; and her re-
acquisition of citizenship under RA 9225.
Political Law: Public International Law
MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD S. POE-LLAMANZARES v COMMISSION ON

ELECTIONS AND ESTRELLA ELAMPARO
G.R NO. 221697 &221698-700, MARCH 8, 2016 EN BANC (PEREZ, J.)
DOCTRINE: Public International Law: Generally accepted principles of

international law: A foundling is presumed to be a citizen of the country where
he is found. This is consistent with the generally accepted principles of
international law. The common thread of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights (UDHR), UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC), and
International Convention on the Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) are to obligate
its member nation to grant nationality from birth and ensure that no child is
stateless.
FACTS:
Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-Llamanzares was born in 1968, found as

newborn infant in Jaro, Iloilo and was legally adopted by Ronald Allan Kelly Poe
(FPJ) And Jesus Sonora Poe (Susan Roces) in 1974. She immigrated to the US
in 1991 after her marriage to Theodore Llamanzares who was then based at the
US. Grace Poe then became a naturalized American citizen in 2001.
On December 2004, he returned to the Philippines due to his father’s

deteriorating medical condition, who then eventually demise on February 3,
2005. She then quitted her job in the US to be with her grieving mother and
finally went home for good to the Philippines on May 24, 2005.
On July 18, 2006, the BI granted her petition declaring that she had
reacquired her Filipino citizenship under RA 9225. She registered as a voter
and obtained a new Philippine Passport.
In 2010, before assuming her post as appointees Chairperson of the

MTRCB, she renounced her American citizenship to satisfy the RA 9225
requirements as to Reacquisition of Filipino Citizenship. From then on, she
stopped using her American passport.
In her COC for Presidency on the May 2016 elections, Grace Poe declared
that she is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines
Petitions were filed before the COMELEC to deny or cancel her candidacy
on the ground particularly among others, that she cannot be considered a
natural born Filipino citizen and that neither can she seek refuge under
international conventions or treaties to support her claim that foundlings have
a nationality. According to Tatad, international conventions and treaties are
not self-executory and that local legislations are necessary in order to give effect
to treaty obligations assumed by the Philippines. He also stressed that there is
no standard state practice that automatically confers natural-born status to
foundlings.
ISSUE:
Is a foundling considered as natural born citizen?
RULING:
Yes. Foundlings are likewise natural born citizens under international

law. Under the 1987 Constitution, an international law can become part of the
sphere of domestic law either by transformation or incorporation. The
transformation method requires that an international law be transformed into a
domestic law through a constitutional mechanism such as local legislation. On
the other hand, generally accepted principles of international law, by virtue of
the incorporation clause of the Constitution, form part of the laws of the land
even if they do not derive from treaty obligations.
Universal Declaration of Human Rights ("UDHR") has been interpreted by

this Court as part of the generally accepted principles of international law and
binding on the State. The Philippines has also ratified the UN Convention on
the Rights of the Child (UNCRC).
The common thread of the UDHR, UNCRC and ICCPR is to obligate the
Philippines to grant nationality from birth and ensure that no child is stateless.
This grant of nationality must be at the time of birth, and it cannot be
accomplished by the application of our present naturalization laws.
The principles found in two conventions, while yet unratified by the

Philippines, are generally accepted principles of international law. The first is
Article 14 of the 1930 Hague Convention on Certain Questions Relating to the
Conflict of Nationality Laws under which a foundling is presumed to have the
"nationality of the country of birth. The second is the principle that a foundling
is presumed born of citizens of the country where he is found.
In sum, all of the international law conventions and instruments on the

matter of nationality of foundlings were designed to address the plight of a
defenseless class which suffers from a misfortune not of their own making. We
cannot be restrictive as to their application if we are a country which calls itself
civilized and a member of the community of nations.
JESSICA LUCILA G. REYES v THE HONORABLE OMBUDSMAN, & JESSICA

LUCILA G. REYES v. THE HON. SANDIGANBAYAN et. al.
G.R. Nos. 212593-94 & G.R.Nos. 213163-78, March 15, 2016 THIRD
DIVISION (PERLAS-BERNABE J.)
DOCTRINE: Constitutional Law; Jurisdiction of Ombudsman: Once the

public prosecutor (or the Ombudsman) determines probable cause and thus,
elevates the case to the trial court (or the Sandiganbayan), a judicial
determination of probable cause is made in order to determine if a warrant of
arrest should be issued ordering the detention of the accused.
FACTS:
Petitioners Jessica Lucila "Gigi" G. Reyes, Janet Lim Napoles, Jo

Christine L. Napoles and James Christopher L. Napoles are all charged as co-
conspirators for their respective participations in the anomalous Priority
Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) scam, involving the illegal utilization and
pillaging of public funds sourced from the PDAF of Senator Juan Ponce Enrile
(Senator Enrile) for the years 2004 to 2010.
The Ombudsman issued the assailed Joint finding probable cause

against, inter alia, Reyes, Janet Napoles, and De Asis of one (1) count of
Plunder, and against Reyes, Janet Napoles, De Asis, and the Napoles siblings
for fifteen (15) counts of violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019. Accordingly,
separate motions for reconsideration were timely filed by Reyes, Janet
Napoles, the Napoles siblings, and De Asis.
The Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution finding probable cause for the

issuance of warrants of arrest against "all the accused," opining therein that the
filing of a motion for judicial determination of probable cause was a mere
superfluity given that it was its bounden duty to personally evaluate the
resolution of the Ombudsman and the supporting evidence before it determines
the existence or non-existence of probable cause for the arrest of the accused.
ISSUE:
Did the Ombudsman and/or the Sandiganbayan committed any grave

abuse of discretion in rendering the assailed resolutions ultimately finding
probable cause against petitioners for the charges against them.
RULING:
No. Once the public prosecutor (or the Ombudsman) determines

probable cause and thus, elevates the case to the trial court (or the
Sandiganbayan), a judicial determination of probable cause is made in order to
determine if a warrant of arrest should be issued ordering the detention of the
accused.
In the case of People v. Castillo, the court held that:
“There are two kinds of determination of probable

case: executive and judicial. The executive
determination of probable cause is one made during
preliminary investigation. It is a function that
properly pertains to the public prosecutor who is
given a broad discretion to determine whether
probable cause exists and to charge those whom he
believes to have committed the crime as defined by
law and thus should be held for trial. Otherwise
stated, such official has the quasi-judicial authority
to determine whether or not a criminal case must be
filed in court. Whether or not that function has been
correctly discharged by the public prosecutor, i.e.,
whether or not he has made a correct ascertainment
of the existence of probable cause in a case, is a
matter that the trial court itself does not and may
not be compelled to pass upon.”
The judicial determination of probable cause, on the

other hand, is one made by the judge to ascertain
whether a warrant of arrest should be issued against
the accused. The judge must satisfy himself that
based on the evidence submitted; there is necessity
for placing the accused under custody in order not to
frustrate the ends of justice. If the judge finds no
probable cause, the judge cannot be forced to issue
the arrest warrant.
Verily, when a criminal Information is filed before the trial court, the
judge, motu proprio or upon motion of the accused, is entitled to make his own
assessment of the evidence on record to determine whether there is probable
cause to order the arrest of the accused and proceed with the trial; or in the
absence thereof, to order the immediate dismissal of the criminal case. This is
in line with the fundamental doctrine that "once a complaint or information is
filed in court, any disposition of the case, whether as to its dismissal or the
conviction or the acquittal of the accused, rests in the sound discretion of the
court." As such, the determination of probable cause was within the power of
the Ombudsman.
Political Law: Natural Resources and Environmental Laws
ERNIE IDANAN et al., v PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R No. 193313, March 16, 2016 (PEREZ, J.)
DOCTRINE: Natural Resources: Illegal Possession of Timber is Malum

Prohibitum: Illegal possession of timber is an offense covered by special law
and is malum prohibitum. Thus, criminal intent is not an essential element of
the offense. However, the prosecution must prove intent to possess or animus
possidendi.
FACTS:
The PNP headquarters of the Municipality of Panganiban, Province of

Catanduanes received information that a group of illegal loggers will be
transporting narra flitches. While patrolling on the said place, the policemen
saw a truck and found out plaintiffs, Idanan, Del Barrio and Plopenio. They
were not able to produce any document authorizing them to transport lumber
so they were placed under arrest.
The defense, on the other hand, denied the charge. Idanan, Del Barrio
and Plopemo testified that while they were traversing Kilometer 12, they were
flagged down by policemen. One of the policemen drove the truck for about 100
meters while petitioners trailed the truck by foot. They then saw the policemen
load narra flitches into the truck. Not one of them questioned the police out of
fear. To petitioners' surprise, they were then arrested and ordered to follow the
policemen to the police station.
Idanan et. al. were charged for possessing and in control of 29 pieces of
narra lumber without the legal requirements as required under existing forest
laws and regulations.
ISSUE:
Is intent necessary to be indicted under PD 705?
RULING:
No. Illegal possession of timber is an offense covered by special law and

is malum prohibitum. Thus, criminal intent is not an essential element of the
offense. However, the prosecution must prove intent to possess or animus
possidendi.
Mere possession of timber or other forest products without the proper

legal documents, even absent malice or criminal intent, is illegal. It would make
no difference at all whether the ownership of the lumber pertains to only one
accused. The possession of lumber was made without any license or permit
issued by any competent authority.
UNDERSECRETARY AUSTERE A. PANADERO v COMELEC

GR No. 215548, Apr 05, 2016 EN BANC (REYES, J.)
DOCTRINE: Constitutional Law; Contempt Power: The power to punish for

contempt is inherent in all courts and is essential to the preservation of order in
judicial proceedings and to the enforcement of judgments, orders, and
mandates of the court, and consequently, to the due administration of justice."
FACTS:
Limbona was among the persons found to be guilty of grave misconduct,

oppression and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, which he
committed while he was still the Chairman of Barangay Kalanganan Lower,
Pantar, Lanao del Norte, and in relation to the killing of Hadji Abdul Rasid
Onos, the former Municipal Vice Mayor of Pantar. Limbona was meted the
penalty of dismissal from public service, with the accessory penalties of
cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of retirement benefits and perpetual
disqualification from re-employment in the government service. The DILG,
petitioners, was directed to immediately implement the ruling against Limbona,
pursuant to Section 7, Rule III of Administrative Order No. 17 (Ombudsman
Rules of Procedure) in relation to Memorandum Circular No. 1, series of 2006.
On November 15, 2013, the Ombudsman issued Order forwarding to the

DILG Secretary a copy of its Decision against Limbona for implementation, as it
had become final and executory in 2011. The order indicated that Limbona had
been elected as Municipal Mayor of Pantar. Acting on the order, Usec. Panadero
issued, on April 3, 2014, a Memorandum directing RD Burdeos, as the RD of
the DILG Region X Office, to cause the immediate implementation of the
Ombudsman decision insofar as Limbona was concerned. On April 21, 2014,
however, RD Burdeos reported that he received from Limbona's counsel a copy
of the Resolution dated June 6, 2013 issued by the COMELEC First Division,
dismissing the petition for disqualification filed against Limbona.
On May 5, 2014, the DILG served the dismissal order of Limbona, which
led to his removal from office and the assumption to the mayoralty of then Vice
Mayor Tago. Displeased by the DILG's actions, Limbona filed with the
COMELEC a petition to cite the petitioners for indirect contempt.
ISSUE:
Are the petitioners guilty of indirect contempt?
RULING:
No. The Court finds that the actions of the petitioners do not constitute
indirect contempt. In serving the dismissal order of Limbona and allowing Tago
to assume the vacated mayoralty post, the petitioners could not be said to have
disobeyed the resolutions of the COMELEC in the disqualification case, much
less did so, in a manner that was characterized with contempt against the
COMELEC
.
Contrary to the COMELEC's finding, the DILG did not blatantly disregard
the resolutions of the COMELEC. Records indicate that it did not simply ignore
the COMELEC issuances, notwithstanding the fact that it only obtained notice
thereof through Limbona's counsel and not directly from the COMELEC.
Considering that the implementation of the order to dismiss Limbona was upon
the instance of the Ombudsman, the DILG still took recourse by seeking
clarification from the Ombudsman, which nonetheless later reiterated the
instruction to implement the decision in the administrative case. These
circumstances show good faith on the part of the petitioners, and negate a
supposed intent to plainly disobey the COMELEC.
A decision of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative cases shall

be executed as a matter of course. The Office of the Ombudsman shall ensure
that the decision shall be strictly enforced and properly implemented. The
refusal or failure by any officer without just cause to comply with an order of
the Office of the Ombudsman to remove, suspend, demote, fine, or censure
shall be a ground for disciplinary action against said officer.
RAPPLER INC. v ANDRES BAUTISTA

G.R No. 222702, April 5, 2016 EN BANC (CARPIO J.)
DOCTRINE: Constitutional Law; Freedom of the Press: The freedom of the

press to report and disseminate the live audio of the debates, subject to
compliance with the copyright law, can no longer be infringed or subject to prior
restraint. Such freedom of the press to report and disseminate the live audio of
the debates is now protected and guaranteed under Section 4, Article III of the
Constitution, which provides that "No law shall be passed abridging the
freedom x x x of the press."
FACTS:
Rappler, Inc. signed a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) to sponsor the

Presidential and Vice-Presidential debates. Under the MOA, Rappler is given the
right for live audio broadcast via online streaming provided that it complies with
the copyright law. Alleging that it is being discriminated, Rappler argues that
the MOA grants radio stations the right to simultaneously broadcast the audio
of the debates, even if the radio stations are not obliged to perform any
obligation under the MOA. Moreover, Rappler is also obliged to assure that the
live audio streaming must be with the approval of the other party networks and
the latter must be indicated as the source.
The compliance on the aforesaid rules allegedly infringes the right and
freedom of Rappler. It insisted that its right to live stream the debates is a
contractual right under the MOA and must not be burdened. As such, Rappler
filed a petition against COMELEC to nullify the MOA provisions on the ground
of violating the fundamental rights protected under the Constitution.
ISSUE:
Is the right of Rappler violated?
RULING:
No, the right of Rappler is not violated.
The debate is considered as a communication to the public by the mass

media for information purposes, hence, its dissemination is guaranteed under
the Constitution. Once the conditions imposed under the copyright law are
complied with, the information - in this case the live audio of the debates -now
forms part of the public domain. Indeed, the presidential and vice-presidential
debates are imbued with public interest since these are primarily held for the
benefit of the electorate to assist the electorate in making informed choices on
Election Day.
As such, the freedom of the press to report and disseminate the live
audio of the debates is now protected and guaranteed under Section 4, Article
III of the Constitution, which provides that "[N]o law shall be passed abridging
the freedom x x x of the press."
There is now freedom of the press to report or publicly disseminate the

live audio of the debates. In fact, the MOA recognizes the right of other mass
media entities, not parties to the MOA, to reproduce the debates subject only to
the same copyright conditions. Moreover under the agreement, the other party
networks have not "expressly reserved" or withheld the use of the debate audio
for online streaming, upon compliance with the copyright law.
Political Law: Laws on Public Officers
NEPTALI S. FRANCO et.al. v ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION et.al.

G.R. No. 194402, April 5, 2016, EN BANC (REYES, J.)
DOCTRINE: Laws on Public Officers; Double Compensation: Executive

departments cannot be compelled by mandamus to release public funds without
establishing a clear ministerial duty and legal entitlement thereto by any
petitioner. Moreover, the clear policy of the Constitution is that no elective or
appointive public officer or employee shall receive additional, double or indirect
compensation not specifically authorized by law.
FACTS:
Neptali Franco and Melinda Ocampo, former chairpersons, and Artemio

Magabo, Bernarda Lavisores, Nicomedes Deynata, Alberto Dosayla and Marietta
Larracas, former members of the Energy Regulatory Board (ERB), retired under
Executive Order (E.O.) No. 172 which created the said body. Under Section 1 of
E.O. No. 172, the Chairman and Members of ERB were entitled to retirement
benefits and privileges equal to those received by the Chairman and Members of
the Commission on Elections (COMELEC).
Subsequently, R.A. No. 9136 was passed to reform and restructure the
electric power industry and privatize the National Power Corporation (NPC). It
abolished the ERB and created the Energy Regulatory Commission (ERC) as an
independent regulatory body. Section 39 of R.A. No. 9136 thereof provides for
the retirement benefits of the Chairman and Members of the ERC, which would
be the same retirement benefits and privileges provided for the Presiding
Justice and Associate Justices of the Supreme Court.
Franco et. al. sought to compel the ERC and the Department of Budget
and Management (DBM) to adjust their monthly pensions as provided under RA
No. 9136. They argued that, as retired members of the ERB, they are entitled to
the retirement benefits provided in Section 39 of the law.
ISSUE:
Can the petitioners demand to have their retirement pensions equivalent

to the present salaries of the Chairman and Members of the ERC?
RULING:
No. The retired members of the abolished ERB, cannot demand the
retirement benefits granted to members of a new entity, the ERC. The Court has
seen that the DBM and the ERC cannot be compelled by mandamus to release
public funds to the petitioners since the latter failed to establish a clear
ministerial duty by the said agencies to recognize their legal entitlement thereto.
According to the DBM, the petitioners have been receiving retirement benefits
on a level with the salaries of the COMELEC Chairman and Members, pursuant
to Section 1 of E.O. No. 172 in relation to Section 2-A of R.A. No. 1568, as
amended. Clearly, nowhere does R.A. No. 9136 extend to the retired ERB
Chairman and Members the retirement benefits it grants to the ERC Chairman
and Members. Section 39 of R.A. No. 9136 specifically provides only for the
retirement benefits of the ERC Chairman and Members.
The clear policy of the Constitution under Section 8 of Article IX (B) is

that no elective or appointive public officer or employee shall receive additional,
double or indirect compensation not specifically authorized by law.
All pensions or gratuities must be paid only pursuant to an

appropriation made by law. Indeed, it had been held that in the absence of
express statutory provisions to the contrary, gratuity laws must be construed
against the grant of additional or double compensation, a rule which is a
constitutional curb on the spending power of the government.
ROBERTO G. ROSALES et.al. v ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION (ERC)

et.al
G.R. No. 201852, April 5, 2016, EN BANC (PERALTA, J.)
DOCTRINE: Constitutional Law; Legal Standing: It is a general rule that

every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party-in-
interest, who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or
the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Hence, "legal standing" or locus
standi calls for more than just a generalized grievance. The concept has been
defined as a personal and substantial interest in the case such that the party
has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act
that is being challenged.
FACTS:
The Members ' Contribution for Capital Expenditures (MCC), later

renamed as Reinvestment Fund for Sustainable Capital Expenditures (RFSC),
was imposed by on-grid Electric Cooperatives (ECs ). The MCC is envisioned to
fund the amortization of debt service of the ECs’ indebtedness associated with
the expansion, rehabilitation or upgrading of their existing electric power
system in accordance with their ERC-approved CAPEX Plan.
Petitioners Rosales, et al. claimed that as Board members/officers of the

National Alliance for Consumer Empowerment of Electric Cooperatives
(NACEELCO) they have the required legal standing to assail the validity of
MCC/RFSC imposed by the ECs under the RSEC-WR and Resolution No. 14
issued by the ERC. They also stand to be benefited or injured by the judgment
in this suit because they are member-consumers of the ECs who were required
to and did pay the MCC/RFSC, as shown by the electric bills appended to the
petition. They also alleged that, like party-list representatives Briones of AGAP,
Payuyo of Association of Philippine Electric Cooperatives (APEC), and Ping-ay of
Cooperative-National Confederation of Cooperatives (Coop-NATCO), they
represent their constituents who are paying EC member-consumers in good
standing.
ISSUE:
Do all petitioners in this case have locus standi?
RULING:
No. Only petitioners Ping-ay and Ramirez satisfy the requirement of locus
standi.
It is a general rule that every action must be prosecuted or defended in
the name of the real party-in-interest, who stands to be benefited or injured by
the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.
By real interest is meant a present substantial interest, as distinguished

from a mere expectancy or a future, contingent, subordinate, or consequential
interest." "To qualify a person to be a real party-in-interest in whose name an
action must be prosecuted, he must appear to be the present real owner of the
right sought to be enforced."
"Legal standing" or locus standi calls for more than just a generalized
grievance. The concept has been defined as a personal and substantial interest
in the case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a
result of the governmental act that is being challenged. The gist of the question
of standing is whether a party alleges such personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the
presentation of issues upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult
constitutional questions.
In this case, Ping-ay is a member-consumer of respondent Ilocos Sur

Electric Cooperative, Inc. (ISECO). On the other hand, Ramirez is undisputedly
the spouse of Mary Ramirez, who is the registered member-consumer of
respondent Eastern Samar Electric Cooperative, Inc. (ESAMELCO). Mary, who
is not one of the petitioners, only needs to be impleaded as a pro-forma party to
the suit based on Section 4, Rule 4 of the Rules. Therefore, they are the real
parties-in-interest and their cause of action to declare invalid the subject Rule
and Resolution is related to their right to seek a refund of the payments made
and to stop future imposition of the MCC/RFSC.
ARLENE LLENA EMPAYNADO CHUA v COMMISSIONS ON ELECTIONS et.al.

G.R. No. 216607 April 5, 2016, EN BANC (LEONEN, J.)
DOCTRINE: Election Law; Dual citizenship and Re-acquisition under RA

9225: As a general rule, dual citizens are disqualified from running for any
elective local position. Their certificates of candidacy are void ab initio, and
votes cast for them will be disregarded. However, those who have reacquired
their citizenship under Republic Act (RA) 9225, the Citizenship Retention and
Re-acquisition Act of 2003, are allowed to run for any elective position upon: 1)
making an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines; and 2) make a
personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any
public officer authorized to administer an oath.
FACTS:
Arlene Llena Empaynado Chua filed her Certificate of Candidacy (COC)

for Councilor for the Fourth District of Manila during the 2013 National and
Local Elections. Chua then garnered the sixth highest number of votes. She was
thereafter, proclaimed by the Board of Canvassers as a winner.
A petition was filed to disqualify her and annul her proclamation as a

Councilor. Chua is allegedly a dual citizen at time of filing her COC. She was
naturalized as an American citizen and was issued an American passport.
Although Chua re-acquired his Filipino citizenship under RA 9225 and took an
Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, she did not execute an
oath of renunciation of her American citizenship. In her defense, Chua alleged
that by taking the oath of allegiance in filing the COC, it is tantamount to
renouncing her foreign citizenship.
ISSUE:
Is Chua disqualified as a candidate and therefore, should not be

proclaimed as a Councilor?
RULING:
Yes, she is disqualified as a candidate and should not be proclaimed as a

winning Councilor.
Under Section 40 of the Local Government Code, a dual citizen is

disqualified to run for any elective local positions. Although, a dual citizen may
reacquire his Filipino citizenship pursuant to RA 9225, it is mandated the he
comply with the requisites provided by the law. Section 5 (2) provides that aside
from making an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, he must
make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship
before any public officer authorized to administer an oath.
Chua cannot claim that she has renounced her American citizenship by
taking the Oath of Allegiance. The oath of allegiance and the sworn and
personal renunciation of foreign citizenship are separate requirements, the
latter being an additional requirement for qualification to run for public office.
With Chua’s failure to execute a personal and sworn renunciation of her
American citizenship, she was a dual citizen at the time she filed her COC and
thus, disqualified as a candidate.
EDWARD THOMAS F. JOSON v THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN et.al.

G.R. No. 210220-21 April 6, 2016, SECOND DIVISION (MENDOZA, J.)
DOCTRINE: Law on Public Officers; Jurisdiction of the Ombudsman

An oath of office is a qualifying requirement for public office, a prerequisite to
the full investiture of the office.
FACTS:
Edward Thomas Jason filed a complaint before the Ombudsman

charging the respondents – Governor Aurelio Umali and among others, with the
criminal offenses of Violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019,
otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, and Unlawful
Appointment, defined and penalized under Article 244 of the Revised Penal
Code (RPC). The filing of the above charges stemmed from the alleged
appointment of Atty. Ferdinand Abesamis as a consultant.
Joson asserted that Governor Umali appointed Ferdinand despite his

knowledge of the latter’s disqualification for appointment or re-employment in
any government position. He claimed that Ferdinand was dismissed from the
service as Senior State Prosecutor of the Department of Justice for “conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service and that such penalty of dismissal
carried with it his perpetual disqualification for re-employment in the
government service. In his defense, Governor Umali averred that the
consultancy services rendered by Ferdinand could not be considered as
government service within the contemplation of law and, hence, not governed
by the Civil Service Law, Rules and Regulations.
ISSUE:
Is Ferdinand a public officer by appointment?
RULING:
No. Ferdinand was not appointed to a public office through the contracts
of consultancy because of the following factors:
1. The rights, authority and duties of Ferdinand arose from contract, not
law;
2. Ferdinand was not vested with a portion of the sovereign authority;
3. The consultancy contracts were for a limited duration, as the same
were valid for only six (6) months each and could be terminated by a
mere written notice given 5 days prior;
4. Ferdinand did not enjoy the benefits given to government employees
such as PERA, COLA and RATA, but only received honoraria for
consultancy services actually rendered; and
5. The Revised Omnibus Rules on Appointments and other Personnel
Actions recognize that service contracts like the subject twin contracts of
consultancy were not considered government service.
The Court notes that Ferdinand did not take an oath of office prior to his
rendition of consultancy services for the Provincial Government of Nueva Ecija.
All public officers and employees from the highest to the lowest rank are
required to take an oath of office which marks their assumption to duty. It is
well-settled that on oath of office is a qualifying requirement for public office, a
prerequisite to the full investiture of the office. Ferdinand was not required to
take an oath of office because he rendered consultancy services for the
provincial government not by virtue of an appointment or election to a specific
public office or position but by a contractual engagement. In fine, those who
have rendered services with the government, without occupying a public office
or without having been elected or appointed as a public officer evidenced by a
written appointment and recorded with the Civil Service Commission, did so
outside the concept of government service.
Political Law: Natural Resources and Environmental Law
LNL ARCHIPELAGO MINERALS, INC. v AGHAM PARTY LIST

G.R. No. 209165, April 12, 2016, EN BANC (CARPIO, J.)
DOCTRINE: Natural Resources and Environmental Law; Writ of Kalikasan

The Rules are clear that in a Writ of Kalikasan petitioner has the burden to
prove the (1) environmental law, rule or regulation violated or threatened to be
violated; (2) act or omission complained of; and (3) the environmental damage of
such magnitude as to prejudice the life, health or property of inhabitants in two
or more cities or provinces.
FACTS:
Petitioner LNL Archipelago Minerals, Inc. (LAMI) is the operator of a

mining claim located in Sta. Cruz, Zambales. LAMI embarked on a project to
build a private, non-commercial port in Brgy. Bolitoc, Sta. Cruz, Zambales. A
port is a vital infrastructure to the operations of a mining company to ship out
ores and other minerals extracted from the mines and make the venture
economically feasible.
Respondent Agham Party List (Agham), filed a Petition for the issuance of
a Writ of Kalikasan against LAMI, DENR, PPA, and the Zambales Police
Provincial Office (ZPPO). Agham alleged that LAMI violated: (1) Section 6823 of
PD No. 705, as amended by Executive Order No. 277,25 or the Revised Forestry
Code; and (2) Sections 5726 and 6927 of Republic Act No. 7942, or the
Philippine Mining Act of 1995 (Philippine Mining Act). Agham added that LAMI
cut mountain trees and flattened a mountain which serves as a natural
protective barrier from typhoons and floods not only of the residents of
Zambales but also the residents of some nearby towns located in Pangasinan.
ISSUE:
Can the writ of kalikasan be issued under the circumstances of the case?
RULING:
No, the application for the writ of kalikasan must be denied.
The Rules are clear that in a writ of kalikasan, petitioner has the burden
to prove the (1) environmental law, rule or regulation violated or threatened to
be violated; (2) act or omission complained of; and (3) the environmental
damage of such magnitude as to prejudice the life, health or property of
inhabitants in two or more cities or provinces.
Agham, in accusing that LAMI allegedly flattened a mountain, did not

cite any law allegedly violated by LAMI in relation to this claim; there was no
proof to demonstrate that the local residents in Zambales, and even the nearby
towns of Pangasinan complained of any great danger or harm on the alleged
leveling of the land formation which may affect their lives, health or properties;
and neither was there any evidence showing of a grave and real environmental
damage to the barangay and the surrounding vicinity.
Thus, the petition for the issuance of the privilege of the writ of kalikasan
must be denied.
SAMAHAN NG MAGSASAKA AT MANGINGISDA NG SITIO NASWE,

INC. [SAMMANA] v TOMAS TAN
G.R. No. 196028 April 18, 2016 SECOND DIVISION, (BRION, J.)
DOCTRINE: Constitutional law; Real Party in interest: A real party in

interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in
the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. .” To be properly
considered as such, the party must have a real, actual, material, or substantial
interest in the subject matter of the action, NOT a mere expectancy or a future,
contingent, subordinate, or consequential interest.
FACTS:
The petitioner Samahan ng Magsasaka at Mangingisda ng Sitio Naswe,

Inc. (SAMMANA) is an association of farmers and fishermen. SAMMANA claimed
that its members “have resided in the area for several years doing farming
activities” from which they “derive their income for their daily sustenance.” The
Presidential Commission on Good Governance (PCGG) published in the
newspaper an Invitation to Bid for the sale of its assets, which included 34
hectares of a 129.4227- hectare land. As such, Tomas Tan emerged as the
highest bidder in the bidding of the 34-hectare property.
SAMMANA assailed the lifting of Notice of Coverage under the

Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) of the said parcel of land.
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) rejected the petition averring that
SAMMANA is not the real party in interest to question the order.
ISSUE:
Is SAMMANA the real party in interest?
RULING:
No, SAMMANA is not the real party in interest.
Unless otherwise authorized by law or the Rules of Court, every action

must be prosecuted and defended in the name of the real party-in-interest. The
Rules of Court defines a real party in interest as “the party who stands to be
benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the
avails of the suit.” To be properly considered as such, the party must have a
real, actual, material, or substantial interest in the subject matter of the action,
NOT a mere expectancy or a future, contingent, subordinate, or consequential
interest.
Consequently, Republic Act (RA) No. 665727 in relation with Section 3 of

the Rules of Court expressly allows farmers, farmworkers, tillers, cultivators,
etc., organizations and associations, through their leaders, to represent their
members in any proceedings before the DAR. These members must have such
real, actual, material, or substantial interest in the subject matter of the action,
not merely expectancy, or a future contingent interest.
SAMMANA failed to allege and prove that its members are identified and
registered qualified beneficiaries of the subject land, or have already been
actually awarded portions of it, or have been issued Certificates of Land
Ownership Award (CLOAs) for which they could validly claim the status of the
land’s grantees having a real, actual, material interest to question the Order of
the DAR Secretary lifting the Notice of Coverage. Not being identified and duly
registered qualified beneficiaries, these members’ interest over the subject land
were at most an expectancy that, unfortunately for them, did not ripen to actual
award and ownership.
PHILIPPINE CHARITY SWEEPSTAKES OFFICE (PCSO) V CHAIRPERSON

MA. GRACIA M. PULIDO-TAN, COMMISSIONER HEIDI L. MENDOZA,
COMMISSIONER ROWENA v GUANZON, THE COMMISSIONERS,
COMMISSION ON AUDIT (COA).
G.R. No. 216776, APRIL 19, 2016 (J. PERALTA)
DOCTRINE: Administrative Law; Power of PCSO: The PCSO charter evidently

does not grant its Board the unbridled authority to set salaries and allowances
of officials and employees. On the contrary, as a government owned and/or
controlled corporation (GOCC), it was expressly covered by P.D. No. 985 or "The
Budgetary Reform Decree on Compensation and Position Classification of 1976,"
and its 1978 amendment, P.D. No. 1597 {Further Rationalizing the System of
Compensation and Position Classification in the National Government), and
mandated to comply with the rules of the Office of Compensation and Position
Classification (OCPC) under the DBM.
FACTS:
Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) is the principal government

agency for raising and providing funds for health programs, medical assistance
and services, and charities of national character. PCSO is created by Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 1169, as amended by Presidential Decree (P.O.) No. 1157 and
Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 42.
PCSO Board of Directors, through Resolution No. 135, approved the

payment of monthly cost of living allowance (COLA) to its officials and
employees for a period of three (3) years in accordance with the Collective
Negotiation Agreement. The PCSO released sum of money to all qualified
officials and employees of its Nueva Ecija Provincial District Office.
Executive Secretary Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr. confirmed the benefits and

incentives provided for in Resolution No. 135 but such should be in accordance
with Executive Order No. 07. Upon post auditing a notice of disallowance was
issued invalidating the COLA issued by PCSO on the ground that it is contrary
to the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) Circular No. 2001-03 and
it amounts to double compensation that is prohibited under the 1987
Constitution.
The PCSO appealed to the Commission on Audit (COA) Regional Director

but similarly denied the petition for review of PCSO. PCSO now alleged that it is
authorized under Sections 6 and 9 of R.A. No. 1169, as amended, to fix salaries
and to determine allowances, bonuses, and other incentives of its officers and
employees. The second contention of PCSO is that Executive Secretary Ochoa
approved the same and it is within the Constitution. PCSO also alleged that the
disallowance was in violation of principle of non-diminution of benefits because
the PCSO officials and employees already acquired vested rights over the same
for having been a part of their compensation for a considerable length of time.
ISSUE:
Can the PCSO grants cost of living allowance (COLA) by virtue of the
Section 6 and 9 of RA 1169?
RULING:
No. The PCSO charter evidently does not grant its Board the unbridled
authority to set salaries and allowances of officials and employees. On the
contrary, as a government owned and/or controlled corporation (GOCC), it was
expressly covered by P.D. No. 985 or "The Budgetary Reform Decree on
Compensation and Position Classification of 1976," and its 1978 amendment,
P.D. No. 1597 {Further Rationalizing the System of Compensation and Position
Classification in the National Government), and mandated to comply with the
rules of then Office of Compensation and Position Classification (OCPC) under
the DBM.
In this case there is nothing in the provision of RA 1169, the law creating
PCSO which grants to the latter an authority to release cost of living allowance.
Section 6 merely states, among others, that fifteen percent (15%) of the net
receipts from the sale of sweepstakes tickets (whether for sweepstakes races,
lotteries, or other similar activities) shall be set aside as contributions to the
operating expenses and capital expenditures of the PCSO and Section 9 only
provides that among the powers and functions of the PCSO Board of Directors
is to fix the salaries and allowances of its officers. PCSO the power of the Board
to fix the salaries and determine the reasonable allowances, bonuses and other
incentives was still subject to the DBM review.
BIBIANO RIVERA v COMELEC

GR No. 210273 AND G.R. No. 213069, APRIL 19, 2016 (REYES, J.)
DOCTRINE: Constitutional Law; COMELEC; The COMELEC's jurisdiction to

settle the struggle for leadership within the party is well established, emanating
from one of its constitutional functions, under Article IX-C, Section 2,
Paragraph 5, of the 1987 Constitution, which is to "register, after sufficient
publication, political parties, organizations, or coalitions which, in addition to
other requirements, must present their platform or program of government,"
and that this singular power of COMELEC to rule upon questions of party
identity and leadership is an incident to its enforcement powers.
Election Law; HRET; Section 17 of Article IV of the 1987 Constitution, the sole
judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the
Members of the House of Representatives is the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal (HRET).
FACTS:
CIBAC was registered as a multi-sectoral party with the COMELEC.

Emmanuel Joel J. Villanueva, CIBAC National Council's Chairman and
President, submitted to COMELEC a "Manifestation of Intent to Participate in
the Party-List System of Representation in the May 13, 2013 Elections" as well
as a "Certificate of Nomination" containing names of nominees to represent
CIBAC in the House of Representatives.
CIBAC Foundation, headed by Maria Blanca Kim Bernardo-Lokin , who

claimed to be CIBAC's President, also submitted a "Manifestation of Intent to
Participate in the Party-List System of Representation in the May 13, 2013
Elections" and a "Certificate of Nomination".
COMELEC conducted a summary hearing to find out who should

represent CIBAC in May 2013 elections. CIBAC National Councils contended
that Maria Blanca was neither CIBAC's President nor a member of its National
Council. On the other hand, a CIBAC Foundation claim that CIBAC National
Council has been superseded by the Board of Trustees (BOT) of the CIBAC
Foundation, following the latter’s registration with the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) as a non-stock foundation in 2003.
CIBAC was proclaimed as one of the winning party-list groups in the May
2013 elections and was given two seats in the House of Representatives. The
first two nominees of Villanueva Group were proclaimed as one who will
represent CIBAC in the House of Representatives.
COMELEC then issued a resolution recognizing the nominees of

Villanueva. Hence, Rivera and Luis filed a petition for certiorari G.R. No.
210273, seeking to nullify the assailed COMELEC resolutions. Also, CIBAC
Foundation filed a petition for quo warranto, it argued that the CIBAC National
Council lost its legal existence following the registration of CIBAC with the SEC
as CIBAC Foundation by reason of which it is now governed by a BOT.
ISSUE:
(1) Does COMELEC have the power to decide who will be the
nominees of a party-list representative?
(2) Was the filing of petition for quo warranto against the
COMELEC proper?
RULING:
(1) Yes. COMELEC's jurisdiction to settle the struggle for leadership within
the party is well established, emanating from one of its constitutional functions,
under Article IX-C, Section 2, Paragraph 5, of the 1987 Constitution, which is
to "register, after sufficient publication, political parties, organizations, or
coalitions which, in addition to other requirements, must present their platform
or program of government," and that this singular power of COMELEC to rule
upon questions of party identity and leadership is an incident to its
enforcement powers.
In this case it was CIBAC National Council who has subsisting registration
with the COMELEC as a multi-sectoral organization. It has not become defunct
or non-existent, nor replaced by the BOT of the SEC-registered entity, CIBAC
Foundation, whose registration with the SEC will not per se dispense with the
evidentiary requirement under R.A. No. 7941 that its nominees must be bona
fide members and nominees of the party.
(2) No. Section 17 of Article IV of the 1987 Constitution, the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the Members of
the House of Representatives is the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
(HRET).
In this case since the nominees of CIBAC National Council has already
assumed their seats the jurisdiction to resolve all election contests lies with the
HRET as it is the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of its Members. Hence, the petition was dismissed.
FELICIANO LEGASPI v COMELEC

GR No. 216572, APRIL 19, 2016 EN BANC (PEREZ, J.)
DOCTRINE: Election Law; COMELEC En Banc Votation: Under Sec. 3, Article

IX-C of the 1987 Constitution, the COMELEC Divisions are granted
adjudicatory powers to decide election cases, provided that the COMELEC en
banc shall resolve motions for reconsideration of the division rulings. Further,
under Sec. 7, Article IX-A of the Constitution, four (4) votes are necessary for
the COMELEC en banc to decide a case. Naturally, the party moving for
reconsideration, as the party seeking affirmative relief, carries the burden of
proving that the division committed reversible error. The movant then shoulders
the obligation of convincing four (4) Commissioners to grant his or her plea.
FACTS:
Petitioner Feliciano Legaspi and private respondent Alfredo D. Germar

both ran as mayoralty candidates in Norzagaray, Bulacan while private
respondent Rogelio Santos (Santos) was a candidate for councilor in the May
13, 2013 elections. Legaspi filed a Petition for Disqualification against Germar.
Petitioner Legaspi averred Germar engaged in massive vote-buying, using their
political leaders as conduits. As per witness accounts, said political leaders,
while camped inside the North Hills Village Homeowners Association Office in
Brgy. Bitungol, Norzagaray, Bulacan, were distributing to voters envelopes
containing Php 500.00 each and a sample ballot bearing the names of private
respondents. Through military efforts, the vote-buying was foiled and the office,
which served as the venue for distribution, padlocked. The newly-minted Chief
of Police, P/Supt. Dale Soliba, and his subordinates then attempted to force
open the office and retrieve from inside four (4) boxes containing the remaining
undistributed envelopes with an estimated aggregate amount of Php800,
000.00, but a group of concerned citizens were able to thwart their plan in
flagrante delicto and intercept the said evidence of vote-buying. In answer,
Germar denied the allegations and raised that they attended the Liberal Party's
meeting de avance.
The COMELEC disqualified Private Respondent Germar from the 2013

electoral race. The COMELEC en Banc denied Petitioner Legaspi’s motion for
reconsideration. The Resolution had a vote of 3 denials -2 dissented -1 took no
part -1 did not vote. Since the Resolution was not concurred in by four (4) votes
or a majority of all the members of the COMELEC, a re-deliberation of the
administrative aspect of the case was conducted pursuant to Sec. 6, Rule 18 of
the COMELEC Rules of Procedure. The re-deliberation resulted in the issuance
of the assailed Order 2015 with a 3 denial -2 took no part -2 abstained vote.
The COMELEC en banc dismissed the original Petition for Disqualification filed
by Legaspi.
Hence, the petition to the Court is made. But the Supreme Court voted to
dismiss the petition in a decision rendered in the year 2015.
However, petitioner Legaspi interposed the present motion for

reconsideration contending that Mendoza Doctrine (an action that is considered
"originally commenced with the Commission" and there is failure to muster the
required majority vote on reconsideration would lead to the election protest's
dismissal, not just of the motion for reconsideration.) should be abandoned.
ISSUE:
Should the motion for reconsideration be granted despite the lack of 4

concurring majority vote?
RULING:
Yes. The Court ruled that the voting threshold is easily rendered illusory
by the application of the Mendoza ruling, which virtually allows the grant of a
motion for reconsideration even though the movant fails to secure four votes in
his or her favor, in blatant violation of Sec. 7, Art. IX-A of the Constitution. In
this case, in spite of securing only two (2) votes to grant their motion for
reconsideration, private respondents were nevertheless declared the victors in
the January 28, 2015 COMELEC en banc Resolution.
Under the prevailing interpretation of Sec. 6, Rule 18 of the COMELEC

Rules of Procedure, a movant, in situations such as this, need not even rely on
the strength of his or her arguments and evidence to win a case, and may,
instead, choose to rest on inhibitions and abstentions of COMELEC members to
produce the same result.
The motion for reconsideration which was filed with the COMELEC en
banc in the first instance, cannot strictly be considered as an "action or
proceeding" originally commenced with the commission as contemplated by the
rules. The Court ruled that the phrase action or proceeding originally
commenced with the commission coverage of the phrase is limited to those
itemized in Part V of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure.
The case originated from Legaspi's filing of a Petition for Disqualification,

said petition has already been passed upon and decided by the COMELEC
Special First Division on October 3, 2013. Instead, what was under
consideration when Sec. 6, Rule 18 was invoked was no longer Legaspi's
petition for disqualification itself but his motion for reconsideration before the
COMELEC en banc. The pending issue at the time was not directly private
respondents' qualification or disqualification to run for or hold office, but, more
precisely, whether or not the COMELEC division committed reversible error in
its October 3, 2013 ruling.
GLENN CHONG AND ANG KAPATIRAN PARTY, REPRESENTED BY NORMAN

v CABRERA v SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 217725, May 31, 2016 (REYES, J)
DOCTRINE: Constitutional Law; Constitutionality of a Law: Settled is the

rule that every law is presumed valid. Courts are to adopt a liberal
interpretation in favor of the constitutionality of legislation, as Congress is
deemed to have enacted a valid, sensible, and just law. To strike down a law as
unconstitutional, the petitioners have the burden to prove a clear and
unequivocal breach of the Constitution. In case of doubt in the sufficiency of
proof establishing unconstitutionality, the Court must sustain legislation
because to invalidate a law based on baseless supposition is an affront to the
wisdom not only of the legislature that passed it but also of the executive which
approved it.
FACTS:
R.A. No. 8436 authorized the adoption of an automated election system

(AES). R.A. No. 9369 was signed into law, amending R.A. No. 8436 the former
Section’s 8, 9, 10 and 11 which calls for the creation of the Advisory Council
(AC) and the Technical Evaluation Committee (TEC). Glenn Chong and Ang
Kapatiran Party (petitioners) assail the constitutionality of the creation of the
AC and the TEC. Petitioner Chong alleged that AC and the TEC are so patently
incompatible with a functioning COMELEC. That AC dictates upon the
COMELEC in regard with the technology to be applied in the AES.
On the other hand, Respondents provide that the existence of the AC and
the TEC does not limit or prevent the exercise of the COMELEC s constitutional
mandate to enforce election laws. It also argued that the AC and the TEC
merely ensure that the COMELEC will put in place an effective AES that will
clearly and accurately reflect the will of the sovereign people. Lastly, the power
to provide these safeguards is within the authority of the Congress, whose
power includes the power to ensure the faithful execution of its policies. RA
9369 also enjoys the presumption of validity.
ISSUE:
Should the provision of RA 9369 creating the advisory council and

technical evaluation committee be declared unconstitutional for being violative
of Section 2(1), Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution?
RULING:
No. The AC and the TEC's functions are merely advisory and
recommendatory in nature. The functions of the AC are recommendatory, as
can be gleaned from the assailed provision itself in Section 9 of R.A. No. 8436
which provides that the functions of the AC are merely to recommend, to
provide advice and/or assistance, and to participate as nonvoting members
with respect to the COMELEC s fulfillment of its mandate and authority to use
the AES, and which in all instances, is subject to the approval and final
decision of the COMELEC. On the other hand, the TEC's exclusive function is to
certify, through an established international certification entity to be chosen by
the COMELEC from the recommendations of the AC that the AES, including its
hardware and software components, is operating properly, securely, and
accurately, in accordance with the provisions of law.
In this case the Court ruled that RA 9369 is considered valid because
Petitioner Chong failed to discharge the burden of overcoming the presumption
that the assailed provisions are valid and constitutional since they failed to
present substantial evidence to support their claim. Settled is the rule that
every law is presumed valid. Courts are to adopt a liberal interpretation in favor
of the constitutionality of legislation, as Congress is deemed to have enacted a
valid, sensible, and just law. To strike down a law as unconstitutional, the
petitioners have the burden to prove a clear and unequivocal breach of the
Constitution. In case of doubt in the sufficiency of proof establishing
unconstitutionality, the Court must sustain legislation because to invalidate a
law based on baseless supposition is an affront to the wisdom not only of the
legislature that passed it but also of the executive which approved it.
THE OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL (OSG) v THE HONORABLE

COURT OF APPEALS AND THE MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT OF SAGUIRAN,
LANAO DEL SUR
G.R. No. 199027, June 09, 2016 (REYES, J.)
DOCTRINE: Administrative Law; Office of the Solicitor General: The Office

of the Solicitor General shall represent the Government of the Philippines, its
agencies and instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any litigation,
proceeding, investigation or matter requiring the services of a lawyer. When
authorized by the President or head of the office concerned, it shall also
represent government-owned or controlled corporations. The Office of the
Solicitor General shall constitute the law office of the Government and, as such,
shall discharge duties requiring the services of a lawyer.
FACTS:
Former members of the Sangguniang Bayan of Saguiran filed before the

RTC a petition for mandamus to compel the Municipality of Saguiran to pay
them the aggregate amount of 726,000.00, representing their unpaid terminal
leave benefits under Section 5 of the Civil Service Commission Memorandum
Circular Nos. 41, Series of 1998 and 14, Series of 1999.
RTC issued an order dismissing the petition on the ground that the act
being sought by therein petitioners was not a ministerial duty. It, nonetheless,
directed the Municipality of Saguiran to include in its general or special budget
for the year 2009 the subject claims for terminal leave benefits. The
Municipality of Saguiran appealed the case to the appellate court.
The appellate court issued a notice requiring the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) to file a memorandum for the Municipality of Saguiran within a
non-extendible period of 30 days. The OSG moved for a suspension to file a
memorandum but the motion was denied by the appellate court. The OSG now
contends that it lacked legal authority to represent the Municipality of
Saguiran. It reasoned that the Municipality of Saguiran had to be represented
by its legal officer, pursuant to Article XI (3)(i) of Republic Act No. 7160,
otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991 (LGC). The CA ruled
that OSG is now estopped from claiming lack of authority as its defense since it
already filed a motion for extension of filing a memorandum.
ISSUE:
Can the OSG represent the Municipality of Saguiran?

RULING:
No. The Court ruled that CA committed grave abuse of discretion

amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed resolutions
which obligated the OSG to represent the Municipality of Saguiran. Such ruling
disregarded the provisions of the LGC that vested exclusive authority upon legal
officers to be counsels of local government units. Even the employment of a
special legal officer is expressly allowed by the law only upon a strict condition
that the action or proceeding which involves the component city or municipality
is adverse to the provincial government or to another component city or
municipality.
Although the Administrative Code provides that “The Office of the

Solicitor General shall represent the Government of the Philippines, its agencies
and instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any litigation, proceeding,
investigation or matter requiring the services of a lawyer. When authorized by
the President or head of the office concerned, it shall also represent
government-owned or controlled corporations. The Office of the Solicitor
General shall constitute the law office of the Government and, as such, shall
discharge duties requiring the services of a lawyer.” The Court said that
notwithstanding the broad language of the Administrative Code on the OSG's
functions, the LGC is not the only qualification to its scope. Jurisprudence also
provides limits to its authority.
The mere fact that the OSG initially filed before the CA a motion for
extension of time to file the required memorandum could not have estopped it
from later raising the issue of its lack of authority to represent the Municipality
of Saguiran. Its mandate was to be traced from existing laws. No action of the
OSG could have validated an act that was beyond the scope of its authority.
THE DIOCESE OF BACOLOD, REPRESENTED BY THE MOST REV. BISHOP

VICENTE M. NAVARRA and THE BISHOP HIMSELF IN HIS PERSONAL
CAPACITY
v COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND THE ELECTION OFFICER OF
BACOLOD CITY, ATTY. MAVIL V. MAJARUCON
G.R. No. 205728, July 5, 2016 EN BANC (LEONEN, J.)
DOCTRINE: Constitutional Law; Freedom of Expression; The preferred

freedom of expression calls all the more for the utmost respect when what may
be curtailed is the dissemination of information to make more meaningful the
equally vital right of suffrage. In the hierarchy of civil liberties, the rights of free
expression and of assembly occupy a preferred position as they are essential to
the preservation and vitality of our civil and political institutions; and such
priority "gives these liberties the sanctity and the sanction not permitting
dubious intrusions.”
FACTS:
Diocese of Bacolod posted two (2) tarpaulins within a private compound

housing the San Sebastian Cathedral of Bacolod. Each tarpaulin was
approximately six feet (6') by ten feet (10') in size. They were posted on the front
walls of the cathedral within public view. The first tarpaulin contains the
message "IBASURA RH Law" referring to the Reproductive Health Law of 2012
or Republic Act No. 10354. The second tarpaulin is the subject of the present
case. This tarpaulin contains the heading "Conscience Vote" and lists
candidates as either "(Anti-RH) Team Buhay" with a check mark, or "(Pro-RH)
Team Patay" with an "X" mark. The electoral candidates were classified
according to their vote on the adoption of Republic Act No. 10354, otherwise
known as the RH Law. Those who voted for the passing of the law were
classified by petitioners as comprising "Team Patay," while those who voted
against it form "Team Buhay".
Atty. Mavil V. Majarucon, in her capacity as Election Officer of Bacolod

City, issued a Notice to Remove Campaign materials addressed to petitioner
Most Rev. Bishop Vicente M. Navarra. The election officer ordered the
tarpaulin’s removal within three (3) days from receipt for being oversized and
invoked COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 provides for the size requirement of two
feet (2’) by three feet (3’). Thereafter, COMELEC Law Department issued a letter
ordering the immediate removal of the tarpaulin; otherwise, it will be
constrained to file an election offense against petitioners.
According to the Diocese of Bacolod the tarpaulin contains speech on a

matter of public concern, that is, a statement of either appreciation or criticism
on votes made in the passing of the RH law. Thus, the diocese invokes their
right to freedom of expression.
ISSUE:
Is the letter issued by the COMELEC violative of the right of the Diocese
to Freedom of Expression?
RULING:
Yes. The Supreme Court held that free speech and other intellectual
freedoms as "highly ranked in our scheme of constitutional values. These rights
enjoy precedence and primacy. In the hierarchy of civil liberties, the rights of
free expression and of assembly occupy a preferred position as they are
essential to the preservation and vitality of our civil and political institutions;
and such priority "gives these liberties the sanctity and the sanction not
permitting dubious intrusions." Most importantly, the Supreme Court ruled
that the preferred freedom of expression calls all the more for the utmost
respect when what may be curtailed is the dissemination of information to
make more meaningful the equally vital right of suffrage.
In this case, the size regulation is not unrelated to the suppression of

speech. Limiting the maximum size of the tarpaulin would render ineffective
petitioners’ message and violate their right to exercise freedom of expression.
The COMELEC’s act of requiring the removal of the tarpaulin has the effect of
dissuading expressions with political consequences. These should be
encouraged, more so when exercised to make more meaningful the equally
important right to suffrage. The action of the COMELEC in this case is a strong
deterrent to further speech by the electorate. Given the stature of petitioners
and their message, there are indicators that this will cause a "chilling effect" on
robust discussion during elections.
The guarantee of freedom of expression to individuals without any

relationship to any political candidate should not be held hostage by the
possibility of abuse by those seeking to be elected. It is true that there can be
underhanded, covert, or illicit dealings so as to hide the candidate’s real levels
of expenditures. However, labelling all expressions of private parties that tend
to have an effect on the debate in the elections as election paraphernalia would
be too broad a remedy that can stifle genuine speech like in this case. The
message of petitioners in this case will certainly not be what candidates and
political parties will carry in their election posters or media ads. The message of
petitioner, taken as a whole, is an advocacy of a social issue that it deeply
believes. Through rhetorical devices, it communicates the desire of Diocese that
the positions of those who run for a political position on this social issue be
determinative of how the public will vote. It primarily advocates a stand on a
social issue; only secondarily — even almost incidentally — will cause the
election or non-election of a candidate. In fact, the Supreme Court further ruled
that even though the tarpaulin is readily seen by the public, the tarpaulin
remains the private property of petitioners. Their right to use their property is
likewise protected by the Constitution.
There are several theories and schools of thought that strengthen the need
to protect the basic right to freedom of expression to wit:
a) The right relates to the right of the people to participate in public affairs,
including the right to criticize government actions;
b) Second, free speech should be encouraged under the concept of a market
place of ideas;
c) Free speech involves self-expression that enhances human dignity. This
right is "a means of assuring individual self-fulfillment," among others;
d) Expression is a marker for group identity. For one, "voluntary
associations perform an important democratic role in providing forums
for the development of civil skills, for deliberation, and for the formation
of identity and community spirit and are largely immune from any
governmental interference;
e) The Bill of Rights, free speech included, is supposed to "protect
individuals and minorities against majoritarian abuses perpetrated
through the framework of democratic governance;
f) Free speech must be protected under the safety valve theory.
Hence, what is involved in this case is the most sacred of speech forms:
expression by the electorate that tends to rouse the public to debate
contemporary issues. This is not speech by candidates or political parties to
entice votes. It is a portion of the electorate telling candidates the conditions for
their election. It is the substantive content of the right to suffrage.
THE DIOCESE OF BACOLOD, REPRESENTED BY THE MOST REV. BISHOP

VICENTE M. NAVARRA and THE BISHOP HIMSELF IN HIS PERSONAL
CAPACITY
v COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND THE ELECTION OFFICER OF
BACOLOD CITY, ATTY. MAVIL V. MAJARUCON
G.R. No. 205728, July 5, 2016 EN BANC (LEONEN, J.)
DOCTRINE: Administrative Law; Powers of the COMELEC; COMELEC does

not have the authority to regulate the enjoyment of the preferred right to
freedom of expression exercised by a non-candidate.
FACTS:
Diocese of Bacolod posted two (2) tarpaulins within a private compound

housing the San Sebastian Cathedral of Bacolod. Each tarpaulin was
approximately six feet (6') by ten feet (10') in size. They were posted on the front
walls of the cathedral within public view. The first tarpaulin contains the
message "IBASURA RH Law" referring to the Reproductive Health Law of 2012
or Republic Act No. 10354. The second tarpaulin is the subject of the present
case. This tarpaulin contains the heading "Conscience Vote" and lists
candidates as either "(Anti-RH) Team Buhay" with a check mark, or "(Pro-RH)
Team Patay" with an "X" mark. The electoral candidates were classified
according to their vote on the adoption of Republic Act No. 10354, otherwise
known as the RH Law. Those who voted for the passing of the law were
classified by petitioners as comprising "Team Patay," while those who voted
against it form "Team Buhay".
Atty. Mavil V. Majarucon, in her capacity as Election Officer of Bacolod

City, issued a Notice to Remove Campaign Materials addressed to petitioner
Most Rev. Bishop Vicente M. Navarra. The election officer ordered the
tarpaulin’s removal within three (3) days from receipt for being oversized and
invoked COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 provides for the size requirement of two
feet (2’) by three feet (3’). Thereafter, COMELEC Law Department issued a letter
ordering the immediate removal of the tarpaulin; otherwise, it will be
constrained to file an election offense against petitioners.
Concerned about the imminent threat of prosecution for their exercise of

free speech, Diocese of Bacolod initiated this case through a petition for
certiorari and prohibition with application for preliminary injunction and
temporary restraining order.
ISSUE:
Is the letter issued by the COMELEC valid?

RULING:
No. COMELEC had no legal basis to regulate expressions made by

private citizens. COMELEC cite the Constitution, laws, and jurisprudence to
support their position that they had the power to regulate the
tarpaulin. However, all of these provisions pertain to candidates and political
parties. Petitioners are not candidates. Neither do they belong to any political
party. COMELEC does not have the authority to regulate the enjoyment of the
preferred right to freedom of expression exercised by a non-candidate in this
case. The tarpaulin was not paid for by any candidate or political party. There
was no allegation that petitioners coordinated with any of the persons named in
the tarpaulin regarding its posting. On the other hand, petitioners posted the
tarpaulin as part of their advocacy against the RH Law.
As such, while the tarpaulin may influence the success or failure of the
named candidates and political parties, this does not necessarily mean it is
election propaganda. The tarpaulin was not paid for or posted "in return for
consideration" by any candidate, political party, or party-list group.
ACCREDITED LOCAL PUBLISHERS et. al. v SAMUEL L. DEL ROSARIO,

Clerk III, Regional Trial Court, Branch 33, Bauang, La Union
A.M No. P-14-3213 July 12, 2016 PER CURIAM
DOCTRINE: Constitutional Law; Public Office is a Public Trust; The

Constitution has enshrined the principle that a public office is a public
trust. The Court will not tolerate or condone any conduct, act, or omission that
falls short of the exacting norms of public office, especially on the part of those
expected to preserve the image of the judiciary.
FACTS:
The weekly Ilocandia Publishers and other complainants were Accredited

Local Publishers of judicial or legal notices. As such, they were authorized to
participate in the raffle draws scheduled before RTC Branch 67 of Bauang, La
Union. The accused Del Rosario and other publishers of conspired so that the
latter would be the publishers of judicial and legal notices in cases that had not
undergone the process of raffle, to the prejudice of complainants and in
violation of Presidential Decree 1079 (Regulating Publication Of Judicial
Notices, Advertisements For Public Biddings, Notices Of Auction Sales And
Other Similar Notices). In his Answer, respondent Del Rosario admitted
referring some cases for publication to certain newspaper publishers or their
representatives without the required raffle. He claimed that he had referred
litigants to those publishers because they charged lower rates, and not because
he was motivated by any monetary gain.
In her affidavit, certain Abarra alleged that in exchange for a certain

amount of money intended for the medicines of respondent Del Rosario, the
latter submitted a judicial notice to the Ilocos Herald for publication. Abarra
claimed that publisher Peralta did not know that the notice had not been
raffled. When Del Rosario gave her a second notice for publication, Abarra said
that Peralta already knew it had not been raffled. As a result, Peralta did not
publish the second judicial notice.
The Investigating Judge finds respondent Samuel del Rosario, to have

violated the law on raffle of judicial notices, as admitted by him, which is
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, and punishable with
dismissal.
ISSUE:
Is the act of Del Rosario considered as grave misconduct that will

warrant his dismissal in the public service?
RULING:
Yes, Del Rosario himself admittedly failed to refer the notices for
publication to the Office of the Clerk of Court for the conduct of raffle. His
failure to do so was in clear violation of A.M. No. 01-1-07-SC in relation to P.D.
1079. He claims that he directly gave notices for publication sans the required
raffle, because "other newspapers charge very high amounts and he [took] pity
[on] poor litigants." Yet he miserably failed to adduce evidence to support his
allegation that there were indigent litigants who had sought his help for
referrals to publishers that would charge lower rates than the others.
The Supreme Court reiterated that it shall not hesitate to impose the
ultimate penalty on those who have fallen short of their accountabilities. No
less than the Constitution has enshrined the principle that a public office is a
public trust. The Court will not tolerate or condone any conduct, act, or
omission that falls short of the exacting norms of public office, especially on the
part of those expected to preserve the image of the judiciary.
As such, since Del Rosario did not abide the provision of P.D 1079 as
regards the said raffle of cases, he is dismissed from the Public Service as Clerk
III of the Regional Trial Court 67 of Bauang La Union.
HAMBRE J. MOHAMMAD V GRACE BELGADO-SAQUETON, in her capacity

as Director IV, Civil Service Commission
G. R. No. 193584, July 12, 2016 EN BANC (SERENO, CJ.)
DOCTRINE: Administrative Law; Exhaustion of Administrative Remedy;

The Civil Service Commission as the sole arbiter of controversies relating to the
civil service
FACTS:
Mohammad was appointed as Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer II

(PARO II) of the Department of Agrarian Reform in the Autonomous Region in
Muslim Mindanao (DAR-ARMM). His appointment was temporary as he had no
Career Service Executive Eligibility (CSEE) or eligibility in the Career Executive
Service (CES). On 24 October 2005, Mohammad requested the regional
secretary of DAR-ARMM to change his appointment status from temporary to
permanent. Grace Belgado-Saqueton denied the request. Petitioner did not
elevate the case to the Civil Service Commission proper. Instead, he filed a
special civil action for mandamus before the Regional Trial Court. He invoked
an exception to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies: when the
question is purely legal. He argued that because the PARO II position did not
require CES eligibility and was not declared to be a CES position, Grace
Belgado-Saqueton can be compelled through mandamus to change his status
from temporary to permanent. Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss on the
ground of failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
ISSUE:
Is the remedy resorted by Mohammad in elevating the case to the

Regional Trial Court without first obtaining opinion from the Civil Service
Commission proper?
RULING:
No. The Supreme Court ruled that before parties are allowed to seek the
intervention of the court, it is a precondition that they must have availed
themselves of all the means of administrative processes afforded to them. The
Supreme Court has recognized the Civil Service Commission as the sole arbiter
of controversies relating to the civil service. The doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies, which is "a cornerstone of our judicial system," impels
the Supreme Court to allow administrative agencies to carry out their functions
and discharge their responsibilities within the specialized areas of their
respective competencies. Thus, it will refrain from the overarching use of
judicial power in matters of policy infused with administrative
character. Hence, the doctrine has been set aside only for exceptional
circumstances.
As such, since Mohammad did not ask first the opinion of the Civil
Service Commission, his Special Civil Action for Mandamus before the courts is
dismissible due to non-exhaustion of administrative remedies.
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES v. HON.

PAQUITO OCHOA, et. al.,
G.R. No. 204605, July 19, 2016 EN BANC (BERSAMIN, J.)
DOCTRINE: Public International Law; Treaty vis a vis Executive

Agreement: The primary consideration in the choice of the form of agreement is
the parties' intent and desire to craft their international agreement in the form
they so wish to further their respective interests. The matter of form takes a
back seat when it comes to effectiveness and binding effect of the enforcement
of a treaty or an executive agreement; inasmuch as all the parties; regardless of
the form, become obliged to comply conformably with the time-honored
principle of pacta sunt servanda. The principle binds the parties to perform in
good faith their parts in the agreements.
FACTS:
Intellectual Property Office of the Philippines (IPOPHL) began considering

the country's accession to the Madrid Protocol. The Madrid Protocol has two
objectives, namely: (1) to facilitate securing protection for marks; and (2) to
make the management of the registered marks easier in different countries. The
DFA endorsed to the President the country's accession to the Madrid Protocol.
President Benigno C. Aquino III ratified the Madrid Protocol through an
instrument of accession. The Madrid Protocol entered into force in the
Philippines on July 25, 2012.
Intellectual Property Association of the Philippines (IPAP) has

commenced a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition to challenge the
validity of the President's accession to the Madrid Protocol without the
concurrence of the Senate. According to the (IPAP) the Madrid Protocol is a
treaty, not an executive agreement; hence, DFA Secretary Albert Del Rosario
acted with grave abuse of discretion in determining the Madrid Protocol as an
ISSUE:
Is the President's ratification of the Madrid Protocol valid and

constitutional?
RULING:
Yes. The President’s ratification is valid and constitutional. In the

Philippines, the DFA, by virtue of Section 9, Executive Order No. 459, is initially
given the power to determine whether an agreement is to be treated as a treaty
or as an executive agreement.
The registration of trademarks and copyrights has been the subject of
executive agreements entered into without the concurrence of the Senate. Some
executive agreements have been concluded in conformity with the policies
declared in the acts of Congress with respect to the general subject matter.
Accordingly, DFA Secretary Del Rosario’s determination and treatment of

the Madrid Protocol as an executive agreement; being in apparent
contemplation of the express state policies on intellectual property as well as
within his power under Executive Order No. 459, are upheld. There are no hard
and fast rules on the propriety of entering into a treaty or an executive
agreement on a given subject as an instrument of international relations. The
primary consideration in the choice of the form of agreement is the parties'
intent and desire to craft their international agreement in the form they so wish
to further their respective interests. The matter of form takes a back seat when
it comes to effectiveness and binding effect of the enforcement of a treaty or an
executive agreement; inasmuch as all the parties; regardless of the form,
become obliged to comply conformably with the time-honored principle of pacta
sunt servanda. The principle binds the parties to perform in good faith their
parts in the agreements.
LEODEGARIO A. LABAO, JR, v COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND

LUDOVICO L, MARTELINO, JR.
G.R. No. 212615, July 19, 2016 EN BANC (LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.)
DOCTRINE: Election Law; Disqualification: The term "fugitive from

justice' includes not only those who flee after conviction to avoid punishment
but likewise those who, after being charged, flee to avoid prosecution.”
FACTS:
Ludovico L. Martelino, Jr. sought the disqualification of Leodegario

Labao, Jr. as candidate for Mayor before the Commission of Elections
(COMELEC), on the ground that Labao, Jr. was a fugitive from justice.
An Information for murder was filed before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC). The Information for murder stemmed from the assassination of Vice-
Mayor Abel P. Martinez (Martinez). Roger D. Loredo executed an extrajudicial
confession admitting his participation in the killing of Vice Mayor Martinez, and
implicating Labao, Jr. as the mastermind thereof. The Department of Justice
(DOJ) found probable cause to indict Labao, Jr. and four other persons for
murder. Acting on a tip, members of the Philippine National Police (PNP)
attempted but failed to apprehend Labao, Jr. at St. Paul's Hospital in Iloilo City
where he was supposedly confined. Hence, this present case.
ISSUE:
Is Labao Jr. disqualified as candidate for mayor?
RULING:
No. Labao Jr. was not a fugitive from justice at the time that he was a
candidate for Mayor. Based on settled jurisprudence, the term "fugitive from
justice' includes not only those who flee after conviction to avoid punishment
but likewise those who, after being charged, flee to avoid prosecution.” Labao,
Jr. relies much on the fact that, on May 21, 2014, one year after the conduct of
the elections, the RTC had already dismissed the murder charge against him.
But what matters in the resolution of the present cases is whether or not during
the period starting from the time the Information for murder filed on April 10,
2013 until the day of the election, on May 13, 2013, Labao, Jr. can be
considered a fugitive from justice, and, hence, disqualified to run for the
position of Mayor of Mambusao, Capiz.
Such intent has not been established by the evidence on record. No other
substantial evidence was presented to prove that Labao, Jr. tried to hide from
the authorities or that he left Mambusao, Capiz to avoid being arrested and
prosecuted. Moreover, there was no proof to show the efforts exerted by the
police to locate Labao, Jr. and that despite such efforts, the warrant of arrest
against him could not be served.
LEODEGARIO A. LABAO, JR, v COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND

LUDOVICO L, MARTELINO, JR.
G.R. No. 212615, July 19, 2016 EN BANC (LEONARDO-DE
CASTRO, J.)
DOCTRINE: Election Law; Pre-proclamation Controversy: Pre-proclamation

controversy refers to any question pertaining to or affecting the proceedings of
the board of canvassers which may be raised by any candidate or by any
registered political party or coalition of political parties before the board or
directly with the Commission, or any matter raised under Sections 233,234,235
and 236 in relation to the preparation, transmission, receipt, custody and
appreciation of the election returns.
FACTS:
Ludovico L. Martelino, Jr. sought the disqualification of Leodegario

Labao, Jr. as candidate for Mayor before the Commission of Elections
(COMELEC), on the ground that Labao, Jr. was a fugitive from justice. The
COMELEC Division resolved to disqualify Labao, Jr.
Labao, Jr. moved for the reconsideration before the COMELEC En Banc
that the petition for disqualification has ceased to be a pre-proclamation
controversy. Labao, Jr. insists that the COMELEC should have dismissed the
case against him on account of his proclamation as Mayor of Mambusao, Capiz.
COMELEC En Banc denied his motion for reconsideration.
ISSUE:
Is the case a pre-proclamation controversy even after Labao Jr. had

already been proclaimed as Mayor?
RULING:
No. The petition is not a pre-proclamation controversy. The Omnibus

Election Code (OEC) clearly defines the term "pre-proclamation controversy."
Section 241 thereof provides that a pre-proclamation controversy refers to any
question pertaining to or affecting the proceedings of the board of
canvassers which may be raised by any candidate or by any registered political
party or coalition of political parties before the board or directly with the
Commission, or any matter raised under Sections 233,234,235 and 236 in
relation to the preparation, transmission, receipt, custody and appreciation of
the election returns.
The grounds to file a petition for disqualification are provided for in

Section 12 or 68 of the OEC, or under Section 40 of the Local Government
Code. In the case at bar, the petition for disqualification against Labao, Jr. was
based on Section 40(e) of the Local Government Code, quoted above,
disqualifying "fugitives from justice in criminal or non-political cases here or
abroad" from running for any elective local position. Thus, in this case, the
petition filed against Labao, Jr. does not come within the scope of a pre-
proclamation controversy under the aforequoted OEC provision.
LUZ S. ALMEDA v OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN (MINDANAO) AND THE

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 204267, July 25, 2016 SECOND DIVISION (DEL CASTILLO, J.)
DOCTRINE: Constitutional Law; Right to Speedy Disposition of Cases:

Right to speedy disposition of cases applies to all cases pending before all
judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative bodies; it is "not limited to the accused
in criminal proceedings but extends to all parties in all cases, be it civil or
administrative in nature, as well as all proceedings, either judicial or quasi-
judicial. In this accord, any party to a case may demand expeditious action to
all officials who are tasked with the administration of justice." It "includes
within its contemplation the periods before, during and after trial," such as
preliminary investigations and fact-finding investigations conducted by the
Office of the Ombudsman.
FACTS:
Luz S. Almeda was charged administratively and criminally before the

Ombudsman with the alleged improper use and disbursement of the
Countrywide Development Fund (CDF). On March 19, 2003, a Resolution was
issued in said case by Graft Investigation and Prosecution Officer (GIPO) II
Hilde C. dela Cruz-Likit. Through a June 16, 2004 Indorsement of the
Ombudsman for Mindanao, Almeda's motion for reconsideration and all other
pleadings, orders, and communications were forwarded for appropriate action.
In another Indorsement dated October 11, 2004, then Deputy Ombudsman for
Mindanao Antonio E. Valenzuela forwarded a copy of an October 11, 2004
Order which ultimately closed and terminated OMB-MIN-01-0183 as far as the
Ombudsman for Mindanao is concerned. On May 25, 2010, Almeda sent a letter
of, even date to the Ombudsman, seeking the early resolution of her motions.
However, the letter was not acted upon.
On September 1, 2011, Almeda filed before the Ombudsman a

Manifestation, seeking resolution of her Motion for Reconsideration. On
November 18, 2011, she filed a second Manifestation with the Ombudsman
with a prayer for dismissal of OMB-MIN-01-0183 as against her. On August 8,
2012, Almeda filed a third Manifestation before the Ombudsman, instead of the
OSP, entitled "Manifestation Reiterating the Right of the Accused to Speedy
Trial with Prayer for Dismissal of the Case."
ISSUE:
Is the right to speedy trial of Almeda violated?
RULING:
Yes, her right to speedy trial was violated.

Section 16, Article III of the 1987 Constitution it guarantees that "all
persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all
judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies." This right applies to all cases
pending before all judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative bodies; it is "not
limited to the accused in criminal proceedings but extends to all parties in all
cases, be it civil or administrative in nature, as well as all proceedings, either
judicial or quasi-judicial. In this accord, any party to a case may demand
expeditious action to all officials who are tasked with the administration of
justice." It "includes within its contemplation the periods before, during and
after trial," such as preliminary investigations and fact-finding investigations
conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman.
First of all, the preliminary investigation proceedings in said case took

more than 11 long years to resolve, or from March 23, 2001 when the
proceedings were initiated and docketed, to September 6, 2012 when
petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration was denied. Secondly, the delay in the
proceedings was caused solely by the repeated indorsement of the Ombudsman
and the OSP, which may be attributed to the Ombudsman's failure to realize
that Almeda was not under the jurisdiction of the OSP or
the Sandiganbayan. Third, Almeda had no hand in the delay. As a matter of
fact, she sent a letter and filed written manifestations seeking the immediate
resolution of her case. While they were filed only in 2010 and 2011, petitioner's
letter and manifestations cannot be considered late, and no waiver or
acquiescence may be attached to the same, as she was not required as a rule to
follow up on her case; instead, it is the State's duty to expedite the same.
Fourth, the pendency of OMB-MIN-01-0183 undoubtedly prejudiced petitioner.
The case hung like a hangman's cord above her all these years, causing
distress, anxiety, and embarrassment. Finally, the Ombudsman's explanation
for the delay is not at all acceptable. Instead, it can be seen that it failed to
apply a basic rule that in the investigation and prosecution of public officers
and employees accused of graft, specific rules on jurisdiction based on rank
apply. What ensued was an administrative "ping-pong," as petitioner puts it.
INTERNATIONAL SERVICE FOR THE ACQUISITION OF AGRI-BIOTECH

APPLICATIONS, INC. et. al., v GREENPEACE SOUTHEAST ASIA
(PHILIPPINES) et. al.,
G.R. No. 209271, July 26, 2016 EN BANC (PERLAS-BERNABE, J.)
DOCTRINE: Constitutional Law; Moot and Academic Cases: An action is

considered "moot" when it no longer presents a justiciable controversy because
the issues involved have become academic or dead or when the matter in
dispute has already been resolved and hence, one is not entitled to judicial
intervention unless the issue is likely to be raised again between the parties.
There is nothing for the court to resolve as the determination thereof has been
overtaken by subsequent events.
FACTS:
The instant case arose from the conduct of field trials for "bioengineered
eggplants," known as Bacillus thuringiensis (Bt) eggplant (Bt
talong), administered pursuant to the Memorandum of Undertaking (MOU)
entered into by herein petitioners University of the Philippines Los Baños
Foundation, Inc. (UPLBFI) et.al. Thereafter, the Bureau of Plant Industries (BPI)
issued two (2)-year Biosafety Permits.
Greenpeace Southeast Asia (Philippines) (Greenpeace), Magsasaka at

Siyentipiko sa Pagpapaunlad ng Agrikultura (MASIPAG), and others filed before
the Court a Petition for Writ of Continuing Mandamus and Writ
of Kalikasan against the Environmental Management Bureau (EMB) et. al.,
alleging that the Bt talong field trials violated their constitutional right to health
and a balanced ecology. The Court issued a Writ of Kalikasan against said EMB
et. al. Court of Appels (CA) ruled in favor of Greenpeace et. al., and it did not
find merit in EMB’s contention that the case should be dismissed on the ground
of mootness, noting that the issues raised by the latter were "capable of
repetition yet evading review" since the Bt talong field trial was just one of the
phases or stages of an overall and bigger study that is being conducted in
relation to the said genetically-modified organism.
ISSUE:
Is the case moot and academic?
RULING:
Yes. The case is moot and academic. An action is considered "moot"

when it no longer presents a justiciable controversy because the issues involved
have become academic or dead or when the matter in dispute has already been
resolved and hence, one is not entitled to judicial intervention unless the issue
is likely to be raised again between the parties. There is nothing for the court to
resolve as the determination thereof has been overtaken by subsequent events.
The case does not present paramount public interest. It is clear that no
benefit would be derived by the public in assessing the merits of field trials
whose parameters are not only unique to the specific type of Bt talong tested,
but are now, in fact, rendered obsolete by the supervening change in the
regulatory framework applied to GMO field testing. Therefore, the paramount
public interest exception to the mootness rule should not have been applied.
The case is not also capable of repetition yet evading review. Here,
Greenpeace cannot claim that the duration of the subject field tests was too
short to be fully litigated. It must be emphasized that the Biosafety Permits
were valid for two (2) years. However, as aptly pointed out by Justice Leonen,
Greenpeace filed their petition for Writ of Kalikasan just a few months before
the Biosafety Permits expired and when the field testing activities were already
over. Obviously, therefore, the cessation of the subject field tests before the case
could be resolved was due to Greenpeace own inaction.
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN v RICO C. MANALASTAS

G.R. No. 208264, July 27, 2016 SECOND DIVISION (CARPIO, J.)
DOCTRINE: Laws on Public Officers; Presumption of Regularity: A public

officer enjoys the presumption of regularity in the performance of his official
duties and functions.
FACTS:
Dy Chiu Ha Tiu or Marian Dy Tiu applied for a loan with BPI Family
Savings Bank, Inc. (BPI Family), secured by Paquito Tiu’s property, Marian's
husband. BPI Family approved the loan. Marian and a certain person whom she
introduced as her husband Paquito, signed, executed, and delivered to BPI
Family several documents required for the loan. Reynold Cuasay, BPI Family's
bank personnel, brought the Real Estate Mortgage and the other documents to
the Office of the Register of Deeds. Rico C. Manalastas (Manalastas) examined
the documents and assessed the corresponding fees. Thereafter, BPI Family
released the net proceeds of the loan by crediting the Spouses Tiu's Joint
Current Account/Savings Account.
The real Paquito Tiu, accompanied by his lawyer, Atty. Deogracias C.

Eufemio, went to BPI Family's main office and informed BPI Family's officers
that the signatures of one Paquito Tiu appearing on the loan documents were
not his. After such discovery, BPI Family filed an administrative complaint for
Grave Misconduct with the Office of the Ombudsman against Manalastas.
ISSUE:
Does Malastas enjoy the presumption of regularity in the performance of

his official duty?
RULING:
Yes. Manalastas enjoys such presumption. As a public officer,

Manalastas enjoys the presumption of regularity in the performance of his
official duties and functions. Manalastas accepted the requirements presented
by BPI Family for annotation and registration of the real estate mortgage in the
ordinary course of transaction. His examination of the owner's duplicate copy of
title and his recommendation to his superiors for the approval of the annotation
and registration of the real estate mortgage were made in good faith and not
tainted with gross negligence.
The owner's duplicate copy of title attached to the real estate mortgage
was written in an official paper of the Land Registration Authority and
contained all the markings of a genuine title. The Office of the Register of Deeds
is not mandated to investigate further than necessary when documents
presented before it appear authentic.
Political Law: Local Government Code
J. TOBIAS M. JAVIER and VICENTE H. PICCIO III V RHODORA J. CADIAO

et. al
G.R. No. 185369, August 3, 2016 THIRD DIVISION (REYES, J.)
DOCTRINE: Local Government Code; Determining Quorum vs. Majority:

The vice Governor, as the Presiding Officer, shall be considered a part of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan (SP) for purposes of ascertaining if a quorum exists.
In determining the number which constitutes as the majority vote, the Vice
Governor is excluded. The Vice Governor's right to vote is merely contingent and
arises only when there is a tie to break.
FACTS:
For the years 2007 to 2010, one of the herein respondents, Vice
Governor Rhodora J. Cadiao (Vice Governor Cadiao), was the presiding officer of
the SP. Certain Combong proposed Resolution No. 42-2008 (Combong
Resolution), which sought to reorganize the standing committees of the SP. The
resolution was included as an "urgent matter" in the agenda of the SP's fifth
regular session. The Combong Resolution was approved with seven (7) voting in
its favor, and six (6) against it.
To challenge the legality of the passage of the Combong Resolution, the

Lakas-CMD block filed before the RTC a Complaint for Injunction with Urgent
Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary
Injunction. The Lakas-CMD block also cited Article 107 of the Implementing
Rules and Regulations (IRR) of the Local Government Code (LGC) and the legal
opinions of the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG) to argue
that at the least, eight (8) affirmative votes, corresponding to a simple majority,
were needed to validly pass the Combong Resolution. All fourteen (14) members
of the SP, including Vice Governor Cadiao, as the presiding officer, were present
during the session. That being the case, the simple majority was half of 14 plus
1.
The RTC, thus, opined that the presence of Vice Governor Cadiao should
not be considered in the determination of what number constitutes as the
majority. Hence, when the Combong Resolution was passed, 14 were present, to
wit, 13 SP members and Vice Governor Cadiao. The 13 SP members voted, with
seven (7) voting for and six (6) against the Combong Resolution. A majority was
already obtained; hence, there was no need for Vice Governor Cadiao's vote as
there was no tie to break. The proceedings took place in accordance with
Section 49 of the LGC, Article 102, IRR of the LGC, and Section 67, IRP of the
SP.
ISSUE:
Is the ruling of the Regional Trial Court in this case in accordance with
the provision of the Local Government Code?
RULING:
Yes. The Vice Governor, as the Presiding Officer, shall be considered a

part of the SP for purposes of ascertaining if a quorum exists. In determining
the number which constitutes as the majority vote, the Vice Governor is
excluded. The Vice Governor's right to vote is merely contingent and arises only
when there is a tie to break. The Supreme Court ruled that the Vice Governor
forms part of the composition of the SP as its Presiding Officer, and should be
counted in the determination of the existence of a quorum. However, the nature
of the position of the Presiding Officer as a component of the SP is distinct from
the other members comprising the said body.
In the instant petition, when the Combong Resolution was deliberated

upon, all the ten (10) regular and three (3) ex-officio members, plus the
Presiding Officer, were present. Seven members voted for, while six voted
against the Combong Resolution. There was no tie to break as the majority vote
had already been obtained.
To hold that the Presiding Officer should be counted in determining the

required number of votes necessary to uphold a matter before the SP shall be
counter-productive. It would admit deadlocks as ordinary incidents in the
conduct of business of the SP, which in effect incapacitates the said body from
addressing every issue laid before it. In the process, the SP's responsiveness,
effectivity and accountability towards the affairs of the body politic would be
diminished.
Verily, the Vice Governor, as the SP's Presiding Officer, should be

counted for purposes of ascertaining the existence of a quorum, but not in the
determination of the required number of votes necessary to uphold a matter
before the SP.
ATTY. RODOLFO D. MATEO v EXECUTIVE SECRETARY ALBERTO G.

ROMULO et al.
G.R. No. 177875, August 08, 2016 FIRST DIVISION (BERSAMIN, J.)
DOCTRINE: Administrative Law; Due Process;

Administrative due process simply means the opportunity to be heard or
to explain one's side, or to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling
complained of. For sure, the trial- type hearing was not indispensable
in administrative cases.
FACTS:
Mateo was first employed on May 28, 1990 by the National Water
Resources Board (NWRB) as Attorney IV. He was later on appointed as
Executive Director of NWRB, and took his oath of office as such on January 29,
2009. Subsequently NWRB employees (respondents herein) lodged a complaint
affidavit with the Presidential Anti-Graft Commission (PAGC) charging the
petitioner with dishonesty, usurpation of authority and conduct prejudicial to
the interest of the service. They alleged therein that he had not disclosed the
existence of a prior criminal conviction for homicide in his PDS on file with the
NWRB.
It was later found out by the PAGC that Mateo was convicted for the
crime of homicide and that the penalty of reclusion temporal imposed on him
included the accessory penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification from
holding public office or employment; and that such accessory penalty remained
even if the petitioner had been pardoned, unless the pardon expressly remitted
such accessory penalty. The PAGC went on to explain that although the
records showed that he had been granted a conditional pardon, the terms of the
pardon did not expressly restore his right to hold public office or to have public
employment; hence, he was not eligible to be appointed to his posts in the
NWPB.
Mateo countered the same alleging the right to due process in

administrative proceedings should include the right to confront his accusers;
that he invoked his right to confrontation and sought a formal hearing through
his motion for reconsideration in the OP; and that the violation of his rights
rendered any evidence presented against him inadmissible.
ISSUE:
Is the contention of Mateo that he should be afforded the right to

confront his accusers in relation to the right to due process tenable?
RULING:
Administrative due process simply means the opportunity to be

heard or to explain one's side, or to seek a reconsideration of the action or
ruling complained of. For him to insist on a formal trial-type hearing in which
he could confront his accusers was bereft of legal basis considering that he had
been duly notified of the complaint against him and of the formal hearings
conducted by the PAGC. He had also filed his answer to the complaint and
participated in the formal hearings. For sure, the trial- type hearing was
not indispensable in administrative cases. The requirements of administrative
due process were satisfied once the parties were afforded the fair and
reasonable opportunity to explain their respective sides. The administrative
agency could resolve the issues based solely on position
papers, affidavits or documentary evidence submitted by the parties.
Hence, Mateo was given his right to process despite the fact that he did
not confront his accusers on a formal trial-type hearing.
WILFREDO MOSQUEDA, et al. v. PILIPINO BANANA GROWERS &

EXPORTERS ASSOCIATION, INC. et al.
GR No. 189185, August 16, 2016 EN BANC (BERSAMIN, J.)
CITY GOVERNMENT OF DAVAO v. COURT OF APPEALS

Doctrine: Local Government Code; Ordinance power within the local

government’s corporate powers; The corporate powers of the local
government unit confer the basic authority to enact legislation that may
interfere with personal liberty, property, lawful businesses and occupations in
order to promote the general welfare.
FACTS:
After several committee hearings and consultations with various

stakeholders, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Davao City enacted Ordinance
No. 0309, Series of 2007, entitled “AN ORDINANCE BANNING AERIAL
SPRAYING AS AN AGRICULTURAL PRACTICE IN ALL AGRICULTURAL
ACTIVITIES BY ALL AGRICULTURAL ENTITIES IN DAVAO CITY”, to impose a
ban against aerial spraying as an agricultural practice by all agricultural
entities within Davao City.
The Pilipino Banana Growers and Exporters Association, Inc. and two of
its members, namely: Davao Fruits Corporation and Lapanday Agricultural and
Development Corporation, filed their petition in the RTC to challenge the
constitutionality of the ordinance. They assailed that the ordinance is invalid for
the city acted beyond its corporate powers granted by the Local Government
Code because it has disregarded the health of the plantation workers,
contending that by imposing the ban against aerial spraying the ordinance
would place the plantation workers at a higher health risk because the
alternatives of either manual or truck-boom spraying method would be adopted;
and that exposing the workers to the same risk sought to be prevented by the
ordinance would defeat its purported purpose.
ISSUE:
Did the Sangguniang Bayan of Davao City, by enacting Ordinance No.

0309-07, exceed its corporate powers?
RULING:
Yes. The corporate powers of the local government unit confer the basic
authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty, property,
lawful businesses and occupations in order to promote the general
welfare. Such legislative powers spring from the delegation thereof by Congress
through either the Local Government Code or a special law. The General Welfare
Clause in Section 16 of the Local Government Code embodies the legislative
grant that enables the local government unit to effectively accomplish and carry
out the declared objects of its creation, and to promote and maintain local
autonomy. Moreover, in terms of the right of the citizens to health and to a
balanced and healthful ecology, the local government unit takes its cue from
Section 15 and Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution that the State
shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill health
consciousness among them and the State shall protect and advance the right of
the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and
harmony of nature.
Following the provisions of the Local Government Code and the

Constitution, the acts of the local government unit designed to ensure the
health and lives of its constituents and to promote a balanced and healthful
ecology are well within the corporate powers vested in the local government
unit. Accordingly, the Sangguniang Bayan of Davao City is vested with the
requisite authority to enact an ordinance that seeks to protect the health and
well-being of its constituents. Thus, advancing the interests of the residents
who are vulnerable to the alleged health risks due to their exposure to pesticide
drift justifies the motivation behind the enactment of the ordinance. The City of
Davao has the authority to enact pieces of legislation that will promote the
general welfare, specifically the health of its constituents. Such authority
should not be construed, however, as a valid license for the City of Davao to
enact any ordinance it deems fit to discharge its mandate. A thin but well-
defined line separates authority to enact legislations from the method of
accomplishing the same.
GOVERNMENT OF HONGKONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION v.

JUAN ANTONIO MUNOZ
DOCTRINE: Public International Law; Double Criminality Rule; Under the

double criminality rule, the extraditable offense must be criminal under the
laws of both the requesting and the requested states.
FACTS:
This case is the third in the trilogy of cases that started with the 2000
case of Cuevas v. Muñoz, which dealt with respondent Juan Antonio Munoz's
provisional arrest as an extraditee, and the 2007 case of Government of Hong
Kong Special Administrative Region v. Olalia, Jr., which resolved the question of
Muñoz's right to bail as a potential extraditee. Both rulings dealt with and
resolved incidents arising during the process of having Munoz extradited to
Hong Kong under and pursuant to the Agreement between the Government of
the Republic of the Philippines and the Government of Hong Kong for the
Surrender of Accused and Convicted Persons (RP-HK Agreement).
A perusal of the decision of the RTC and the original decision of the CA
show that said courts determined that the crime of accepting an advantage as
an agent was analogous to the crime of corrupt practices of public officers as
defined under Section 3 of Republic Act No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act). In its assailed amended decision, however, the CA reversed itself,
and agreed with Muñoz to the effect that Section 9(1)(a) of the Prevention of
Bribery Ordinance (POBO) of Hongkong referred only to private individuals, not
to persons belonging to the public sector.
The CA ultimately concluded that the crime of accepting an advantage as

an agent did not have an equivalent in this jurisdiction considering that when
the unauthorized giving and receiving of benefits happened in the private
sector, the same was not a crime because there was no law that defined and'
punished such act as criminal in this jurisdiction.
ISSUE:
Did the crime of accepting an advantage as an agent comply with the

double criminality rule?
RULING:
No. Under the double criminality rule, the extraditable offense must be
criminal under the laws of both the requesting and the requested states. This
simply means that the requested state comes under no obligation to surrender
the person if its laws do not regard the conduct covered by the request for
extradition as criminal.
Although the crime of conspiracy to defraud was included among the offenses
covered by the RP-Hong Kong Agreement, and the RTC and the CA have agreed
that the crime was analogous to the felony of estafa through false pretense as
defined and penalized under Article 315(2) of the Revised Penal Code, it was
disputed whether or not the other crime of accepting an advantage as an
agent was also punished as a crime in the Philippines.
Therefore, the court agrees with the CA. Considering that the
transactions were entered into by and in behalf of the Central Bank of the
Philippines, an instrumentality of the Philippine Government, Munoz should be
charged for the offenses not as a regular agent or one representing a private
entity but as a public servant or employee of the Philippine Government. Yet,
because the offense of accepting an advantage as an agent charged against him
in the HKSAR is one that deals with private sector bribery, the conditions for
the application of the double criminality rule are obviously not met.
Accordingly, the crime of accepting an advantage as an agent must be dropped
from the request for extradition.
BARANGAY MAYAMOT, et. al. v SANGGUNIANG PANGLUNGSOD OF

ANTIPOLO, et. al.
GR No. 187349, August 7, 2016 THIRD DIVISION (JADELEZA, J.)
DOCTRINE: Local Government Code; Jurisdictional responsibility for

settlement of boundary disputes; By virtue of the Local Government Code of
1991, the RTC lost its power to try, at the first instance, cases of boundary
disputes, and it is only when the intermediary steps have failed that resort to
the RTC will follow as provided in the laws.
FACTS:
In 1984, Batas Pambansa Bilang 787 to 794 were passed creating eight
new barangays in the then Municipality of Antipolo. Each law creating the new
barangay contained provisions regarding the sitios comprising it, its
boundaries, and mechanism for ratification of the law wherein Antipolo became
composed of sixteen barangays.
In order to integrate the territorial jurisdiction of the sixteen barangays

into the map of Antipolo, the Sangguniang Bayan of Antipolo passed Resolution
No. 97-80, commissioning the City Assessor to plot and delineate the territorial
boundaries of the sixteen barangays pursuant to the Bureau of Lands
Cadastral Survey No. 29-047 and the provisions of BP Blg. 787 to794. It
approved the barangay boundaries specified and delineated in the plans/maps
prepared by the City Assessor. After due deliberation and on motion it is
resolved to approve the barangay boundaries specified and delineated in the
plans/maps prepared by the Assessor's Office, Antipolo, Rizal based on
Cadastral Survey No. 29-047 and Batas Pambansa Nos. 787 to 794.
On September 21, 1999, Barangay Mayamot filed a Petition for

Declaration of Nullity and/or Annulment of Resolution No. 97-89 and
Injunction against Antipolo City, Sangguniang Panglungsod of Antipolo,
Barangays Sta. Cruz, Bagong Nayon, Cupang, and Mambugan, the City
Assessor and the City Treasurer before the RTC of Antipolo City. In its petition,
Barangay Mayamot claimed that while BP Blg. 787 to 794 did not require
Barangay Mayamot to part with any of its territory, the adoption of Resolution
No. 97-89 reduced its territory to one-half of its original area and was
apportioned to Barangays Sta. Cruz, Bagong Nayon, Cupang, and Mambugan.
Both the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals decided against
the claims of Barangay Mayamot.
ISSUE:
Does the RTC have jurisdiction to settle the boundary dispute between
Barangay Mayamot and some barangays in Antipolo?
RULING:
None, the RTC has no jurisdiction regarding the boundary dispute. At the
time Barangay Mayamot filed its petition before the RTC of Antipolo City, RA
No. 7160 was already in effect. Sections 118 and 119 of RA No. 7160 provide:
Section 118. Jurisdictional Responsibility for Settlement of Boundary

Dispute. - Boundary disputes between and among local government units shall,
as much as possible, be settled amicably. To this end:
( Boundary disputes involving two (2) or more barangays in the same
a) city or municipality shall be referred for settlement to the sangguniang
panlungsod or sangguniang bayan concerned.
xxx
( In the event the sanggunian fails to effect an amicable settlement

e) within sixty (60) days from the date the dispute was referred thereto, it
shall issue a certification to that effect. Thereafter, the dispute shall be
formally tried by the sanggunian concerned which shall decide the issue
within sixty (60) days from the date of the certification referred to above.
Section 119. Appeal. - Within the time and manner prescribed by the
Rules of Court, any party may elevate the decision of the sanggunian concerned
to the proper Regional Trial Court having jurisdiction over the area in dispute.
The Regional Trial Court shall decide the appeal within one year from the filing
thereof.
Based on the foregoing, it is clear that the RTC is without jurisdiction to

settle a boundary dispute involving barangays in the same city or municipality.
Said dispute shall be referred for settlement to the sangguniang
panglungsod or sangguniang bayan concerned. If there is failure of amicable
settlement, the dispute shall be formally tried by the sanggunian concerned and
shall decide the same within sixty days from the date of the certification
referred to. Further, the decision of the sanggunian may be appealed to the RTC
having jurisdiction over the area in dispute, within the time and manner
prescribed by the Rules of Court.
Thus, the Court of Appeals correctly held that the RTC was correct in
dismissing the petition due to lack of jurisdiction.
ALLIANCE FOR THE FAMILY FOUNDATION, PHILIPPINES INC. (ALFI), et al.

v HON. JANETTE L. GARIN, et al.
GR No. 217872, AUGUST 24, 2016 SECOND DIVISION (MENDOZA, J.)
MARIA CONCEPCION S. NOCHE, et al v HON. JANETTE L. GARIN, et al

DOCTRINE: Constitutional Law; Locus standi: The issues of contraception

and reproductive health in relation to the right to life of the unborn child were
indeed of transcendental importance. Hence, any individual has the locus
standing to file a suit regarding the same under a tax payer’s suit.
FACTS:
The subject of the petitioners sprouted from Imbong v. Ochoa and other
cases where the court declared Republic Act No. 10354 (RH Law) and its
Implementing Rules and Regulations as not unconstitutional, save for several
provisions which were declared as violative of the Constitution.
The controversy began in September 2014, when petitioner Rosie B.

Luistro chanced upon the FDA’s Notice inviting Marketing Authorization
Holders of fifty contraceptive products and directed “all concerned to give their
written comments to said application on or before October 8, 2014”.
Petitioner ALFI believed that the contraceptives enumerated in the Notice

fell within the definition of “abortifacient” under Section 4(a) of the RH Law
because of their “secondary mechanism of action which induces abortion or
destruction of the fetus inside the mother’s womb or the prevention of the
fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother’s womb”.
On November 24, 2014, ALFI filed its main opposition to all seventy-
seven contraceptive drugs. The respondents, through the OSG, argued that
petitioners failed to establish not only the direct injury that they had suffered,
or would suffer, but also the transcendental importance of the issues raised as
a result of the issuance of certificates of registration and the recertification of
contraceptive drugs and devices; and the purchase of Implanon and Implanon
NXT.
ISSUE:
Do the petitioners have locus standi to file the subject petitions?

RULING:
Yes. In Imbong vs. Ochoa, it was already stated that "(from) the declared
policy of the RH Law, it is clear that Congress intended that the public be given
only those medicines that are proven medically safe, legal, non-abortifacient,
and effective in accordance with scientific and evidence-based medical research
standards." Thus, the public, including the petitioners in these cases, have the
right to question any approval or disapproval by the FDA of any drugs or
devices which they suspect to be abortifacient on the ground that they were not
properly tested or were done in haste or secrecy.
As early as David v. Arroyo, the Court has already ruled that "taxpayers,
voters, concerned citizens, may be accorded standing to sue, provided that for
taxpayers, there must be a claim of illegal disbursement of public funds or that
the tax measure is unconstitutional for concerned citizens, there must be a
showing that the issues raised are of transcendental importance which must be
settled early."
Considering that the Court in Imbong already declared that the issues of
contraception and reproductive health in relation to the right to life of the
unborn child were indeed of transcendental importance, and considering also
that the petitioners averred that the respondents unjustly caused the allocation
of public funds for the purchase of alleged abortifacients which would deprive
the unborn of its the right to life, the Court finds that the petitioners have locus
standi to file these petitions.
ALLIANCE FOR THE FAMILY FOUNDATION, PHILIPPINES INC. (ALFI), et al.

v HON. JANETTE L. GARIN, et al.
MARIA CONCEPCION S. NOCHE, et al. v HON. JANETTE L. GARIN, et al.

DOCTRINE: Constitutional Law; Due process; Administrative proceedings are

not exempt from basic and fundamental procedural principles, such as the
right to due process in investigations and hearings.
FACTS:
It is on record that sometime in September 2014, the FDA issued a

Notice inviting MAH of fifty contraceptive drugs to apply for reevaluation/re-
certification of their contraceptive products and directed "all concerned to give
their written comments to said applications on or before October 8, 2014.
ALFI, in the belief that the contraceptives enumerated in the Notice fell
within the definition of "abortifacient," filed its preliminary opposition, dated
October 8, 2014, to all 50 applications with the FDA. The same opposition also
questioned twenty-seven other contraceptive drugs and devices that had
existing FDA registrations which were not subjects of any application for re-
evaluation/re-certification.
On November 24, 2014, ALFI formally filed its opposition to all the
seventy-seven contraceptive drugs, but despite the pending opposition to the re-
evaluation/re-certification of these contraceptive products, the FDA issued two
certificates of product registration for the hormonal contraceptives, "Implanon"
and "Implanon NXT."
On March 19, 2015, ALFI wrote another letter to the DOH and the FDA,
reiterating its opposition to the applications for re-evaluation/recertification
and requesting, among others, that the agencies shed light on the status of
their earlier opposition and schedule hearings and consultations regarding the
applications for re-evaluation/re-certification. The petitioners' oppositions were
all ignored.
ISSUE:
Was there a violation of due process when the FDA certified, procured
and administered such contraceptive drugs and devices?
RULING:
Yes. Due process of law has two aspects: substantive and procedural due
process. In order that a particular act may not be impugned as violative of the
due process clause, there must be compliance with both the substantive and
the procedural requirements thereof.
Substantive due process refers to the intrinsic validity of a law that

interferes with the rights of a person to its property. Procedural due process, on
the other hand, means compliance with the procedures or steps, even periods,
prescribed by the statute, in conformity with the standard of fair play and
without arbitrariness on the part of those who are called upon to administer it.
Although administrative procedural rules are less stringent and often

applied more liberally, administrative proceedings are not exempt from basic
and fundamental procedural principles, such as the right to due process in
investigations and hearings.
Rather than provide concrete evidence to meet the petitioners'

opposition, the respondents simply relied on their challenge questioning the
propriety of the subject petition on technical and procedural grounds. Even the
letters submitted by the petitioners to the FDA and the DOH seeking
information on the actions taken by· the agencies regarding their opposition
were left unanswered as if they did not exist at all. The mere fact that the RH
Law was declared as not unconstitutional does not permit the respondents to
run roughshod over the constitutional rights, substantive and procedural, of
the petitioners.
Indeed, although the law tasks the FDA as the primary agency to
determine whether a contraceptive drug or certain device has no abortifacient
effects, its findings and conclusion should be allowed to be questioned and
those who oppose the same must be given a genuine opportunity to be heard in
their stance. Due to the failure of the respondents to observe and comply with
the basic requirements of due process, the certifications/re-certifications and
the distribution of the questioned contraceptive drugs by the respondents
should be struck down as violative of the constitutional right to due process.
THE CHAIRMAN AND EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, et al. v. EJERCITO LIM,

DOING BUSINESS AS BONANZA AIR SERVICES
GR No. 183173, AUGUST 24, 2016 FIRST DIVISION (BERSAMIN, J.)
DOCTRINE: Administrative Law; Administrative Power; Quasi-legislative

powers are the agency’s power to make rules and regulations that results in
delegated legislation that is within the confines of the granting statute and the
doctrine of non-delegability and separability of powers.
FACTS:
The Palawan Council for Sustainable Development, the government

agency responsible for the governance, implementation, and policy direction of
the Strategic Environment Plan for Palawan, issued A.O. No. 00-05 on February
25, 2002 to ordain that the transport of live fish from Palawan. It allows traders
and carriers who had sought and secured accreditation from it to transport
such live fish. On September 4, 2002, the Air Transportation Office sent to the
PCSD its communication to the effect that ATO-authorized carriers were
considered common carriers, and, as such, should be exempt from the PCSD
accreditation requirement. It attached to the communication a list of its
authorized carriers, which included the Bonanza Air Services which has
authority to engage in nonscheduled air taxi transportation of passengers and
cargo for the public and business operation was primarily that of transporting
live fish from Palawan to fish traders.
In disregard of the prohibition, Lim continued his business operation in

Palawan until a customer showed him the Notice of Violation and Show Cause
Order issued by the PCSD to the effect that he had still made 19 flights in
October 2002 despite his failure to secure accreditation from the PCSD; and
that he should explain his actuations within 15 days, otherwise, he would be
sanctioned with a fine of ₱50,000.00.
The respondent filed a petition for prohibition in the CA, which issued a
temporary restraining order upon his application after finding that there were
sufficient grounds to issue the TR0.
The petitioners averred that the petition for prohibition should have been
dismissed because A.O. No. 00-05 was in accord with the mandate of the
Constitution and of Republic Act No. 7611 (Strategic Environmental Plan for
Palawan Act); that Resolution No. 03-211 had meanwhile amended or repealed
portions of A.O. No. 00-05, thereby rendering the issues raised by the petition
for prohibition moot and academic; that by virtue of such developments, the
PCSD accreditation was now required for all carriers, except those belonging to
the Government.
ISSUE:
Did the PCSD exceed its authority when it issued AO No. 00-05,
Resolution No. 03-211, and the Notice of Violation and Show Cause Order?
RULING:
No. Administrative agencies possess two kinds of powers, the quasi-

legislative or rule-making power, and the quasi-judicial or administrative
adjudicatory power.
The first is the power to make rules and regulations that result in
delegated legislation that is within the confines of the granting statute and the
doctrine of non-delegability and separability of powers. The issuance of the
assailed A.O. No. 00-05, Resolution No. 03-211 and the other issuances by the
PCSD was in the exercise of the agency’s quasi-legislative powers.
The second is the power to hear and determine questions of fact to which
the legislative policy is to apply and to decide in accordance with the standards
laid down by the law itself in enforcing and administering the same law. The
administrative body exercises its quasi-judicial power when it performs in a
judicial manner an act that is essentially of an executive or administrative
nature, where the power to act in such manner is incidental to or reasonably
necessary for the performance of the executive or administrative duty entrusted
to it.
JULIET B. DANO v COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND MARIE KAREN

JOY B. DIGAL
GR No. 210200, SEPTEMBER 13, 2016 EN BANC (SERENO, CJ.)
DOCTRINE: Administrative Law; One-year residency requirement for local

elective officials: Physical presence, along with animus manendi et revertendi,
is an essential requirement for the acquisition of a domicile of choice. However,
the law does not require that physical presence be unbroken.
FACTS:
Juliet Dano was a natural-born Filipino who hailed from the Municipality
of Sevilla, Province of Bohol. She worked as a nurse in the US and thereafter
acquired American citizenship. On 2 February 2012, she obtained a Community
Tax Certificate from the municipal treasurer of Sevilla. On 30 March 2012, she
took her Oath of Allegiance before the Vice Consul of the Philippine Consulate
in Los Angeles, California. On 2 May 2012, petitioner went to Sevilla to apply for
voter's registration. Eight days later, she went back to the US and stayed there
until 28 September 2012. She claims that she went there to wind up her affairs,
particularly to sell her house in Stockton, California, as well as her shares of
stock in various companies.
Upon returning to the Philippines, petitioner executed a Sworn

Renunciation of Any and All Foreign Citizenship on 30 September 2012. On 4
October 2012, she filed her Certificate of Candidacy for mayor of Sevilla. She
represented herself therein as one who had been a resident of Sevilla for 1 year
and 11 days prior to the elections of 13 May 2013, or from 2 May 2012.
On 10 October 2012, private respondent Marie Karen Joy Digal filed a

petition with the COMELEC for the cancellation of petitioner's COC. COMELEC
abruptly concluded that she had failed to reestablish her domicile in Sevilla,
simply because she was admittedly absent from the municipality for four
months.
ISSUE:
Was Dano able to comply with the one-year residency requirement for
local elective officials?
RULING:
Yes. Physical presence, along with animus manendi et revertendi, is an

essential requirement for the acquisition of a domicile of choice. However, the
law does not require that physical presence be unbroken. In Japzon v.
COMELEC, this Court ruled that to be considered a resident of a municipality;
the candidate is not required to stay and never leave the place for a full one-
year period prior to the date of the election. In Sabili v. COMELEC, this Court
reiterated that the law does not require a candidate to be at home 24 hours a
day 7 days a week to fulfill the residency requirement.
Therefore, Dano have complied with the residency requirement for local
elective officials. The COMELEC should not have disregarded the following
evidence showing specific acts performed by petitioner one year before the
elections, or by 13 May 2012, which clearly demonstrated her animus manendi
et revertendi:
1. She made public her intention to run for the mayoralty position. In
preparation for this aspiration, and in order to qualify for the position,
she went through the reacquisition process under Republic Act No. 9225;
2. She started to reside in her ancestral home, and even obtained a CTC,
during the first quarter of 2012;
3. She applied for voter's registration in Sevilla; and
4. She went back to the US to dispose of her properties located there.
Political Law: Natural Resources and Environmental Laws
SANGGUNIANG PANLALAWIGAN OF BATAAN v CONGRESSMAN ENRIQUE T.

GARCIA, JR., et al.
G.R. No. 174964, October 05, 2016, THIRD DIVISION, (REYES, J.)
DOCTRINE: Natural Resources and Environmental Laws; Regalian

Doctrine: Under the well-entrenched and time-honored Regalian Doctrine, all
lands of the public domain are under the absolute control and ownership of the
State.
FACTS:
Lot Nos. 2193 and 2194 of the Bataan Cadastre, were registered in the
name of the Province of Bataan. Both lots were occupied by the Bataan
Community Colleges (BCC) and the Medina Lacson de Leon School of Arts and
Trades (MLLSAT), both State-run schools. The Congress of the Philippines
passed Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8562, converting the MLLSAT into a polytechnic
college, to be known as the Bataan Polytechnic State College (BPSC), and
integrating thereto the BCC. Section 24 of R.A. No. 8562 provides that, all
parcels of land belonging to the government occupied by MLLSAT and BCC are
declared to be the property of the BPSC. It further stated that if these lands are
no longer needed by the State College, it shall revert to the Province of Bataan.
Cong. Garcia, along with the faculty members and some concerned
students of BPSC (collectively, the respondents) filed a Special Civil Action for
Mandamus against the Governor and the petitioner Sanggunian for the transfer
of title of the lots to BPSC.
The Governor and the petitioner alleged that the subject lots were the
patrimonial properties of the Province of Bataan, and as such they cannot be
taken by the National Government without due process of law and without just
compensation.
ISSUE:
Are the subject parcels of land patrimonial properties of the Province of

Bataan which cannot be taken without due process of law and without just
compensation?
RULING:
No. The subject lots were not patrimonial properties of the Province of
Bataan; thus, must be presumed to belong to the State.
Under the well-entrenched and time-honored Regalian Doctrine, all lands

of the public domain are under the absolute control and ownership of the State.
Local government property devoted to governmental purposes, such as local
administration, public education, and public health, as may be provided under
special laws, is classified as public. In The Province of Zamboanga del Norte v.
City of Zamboanga, et al. the Court classified properties of local governments as
either (a) properties for public use, or (b) patrimonial properties, and held that
the capacity in which the property is held by a local government is dependent
on the use to which it is intended and for which it is devoted. If the property is
owned by the municipal corporation in its public and governmental capacity, it
is public and Congress has absolute control over it; but if the property is owned
in its private or proprietary capacity, then it is patrimonial and Congress has no
absolute control, in which case, the municipality cannot be deprived of it
without due process and payment of just compensation. In upholding the
validity of R.A. No. 3039, the Court noted that it affected "lots used as capitol
site, school sites and its grounds, hospital and leprosarium sites and the high
school playground sites - a total of 24 lots - since these were held by the former
Zamboanga province in its governmental capacity and therefore are subject to the
absolute control of Congress."
Moreover, in the 2009 case of Heirs of Mario Malabanan v. Republic of the

Philippines, the Court reiterated that Article 420(2) of the Civil Code makes clear
that properties "which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are
intended for some public service or for the development of the national wealth,"
are public dominion property. For as long as the property belongs to the State,
although already classified as alienable or disposable, it remains property of the
public dominion when it is "intended for some public service or for the
development of the national wealth."
Furthermore, property registered in the name of the municipal

corporation but without proof that it was acquired with its corporate funds is
deemed held by it in trust for the State. As a general rule, regardless of the
source or classification of land in the possession of a municipality, excepting
those acquired with its own funds in its private or corporate capacity, such
property is held in trust for the State for the benefit of its inhabitants, whether
it be for governmental or proprietary purposes.
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF ELECTRICITY CONSUMERS FOR REFORMS

(NASECORE) et al. v MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY (MERALCO),
G.R. No. 191150, October 10, 2016, FIRST DIVISION (PERLAS-
BERNABE, J.)
DOCTRINE: Administrative Law; Rate-fixing: Rate-fixing calls for a technical

examination and a specialized review of specific details which the courts are ill-
equipped to enter, such matters are primarily entrusted to the administrative or
regulating authority.
FACTS:
MERALCO filed an application with the Energy Regulatory Commission

for the approval of its unbundled rates and the appraisal of its
properties. During this time, the ERC adopted the Rate on Return Base (RORB)
methodology in its rate-setting function. Under the RORB methodology, rates
are set to recover the cost of service incurred by the distribution utility plus a
reasonable rate of return, whereby historical costs are used to determine the
revenue requirement.
Meanwhile, the ERC shifted from the RORB methodology to the PBR
methodology in fixing the wheeling rates of regulated entities. Under the PBR
methodology, the price of the utility concerned, i.e., electricity is controlled
through an average price cap mechanism under which a limit is placed upon
the average revenue per kWh at a particular period which the utility is allowed
to earn.
ERC approved MERALCO's application albeit with substantial

disallowances and reductions. It appearing that no more appeals were filed, the
ERC ruling became final and executory.
ISSUE:
Is ERC’s shift to PBR methodology in providing rates reasonable and

justified?
RULING:
Yes. The rule is settled that "administrative regulations enacted by

administrative agencies to implement and interpret the law which they are
entrusted to enforce have the force of law x x x and enjoy the presumption of
constitutionality and legality until they are set aside with finality in an
appropriate case by a competent court." As such, they "cannot be attacked
collaterally. Unless [such] rule is annulled in a direct proceeding, the legal
presumption of its validity stands."
Moreover, it should be highlighted that no discernible objection was
raised by petitioners during the public consultations conducted by the ERC
relative to its shift to the PBR methodology. Petitioners were given an ample
opportunity to question the ERC's shift to the PBR methodology, including its
application relative to MERALCO's rate propositions, but to no avail.
Consequently, they can no longer question the judgment rendered in said case
which had long become final and executory and hence, immutable.
It must be stressed that since rate-fixing calls for a technical

examination and a specialized review of specific details which the courts are ill-
equipped to enter, such matters are primarily entrusted to the administrative or
regulating authority. Hence, the factual findings of administrative officials and
agencies that have acquired expertise in the performance of their official duties
and the exercise of their primary jurisdiction are generally accorded not only
respect but, at times, even finality if such findings are supported by substantial
evidence. Absent any of the exceptions laid down by jurisprudence, such factual
findings of quasi judicial agencies, especially when affirmed by the CA, are
binding to the Court.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES AND HOUSING AND URBAN

DEVELOPMENT COORDINATING COUNCIL (HUDCC) v GONZALO ROQUE,
JR., et al.
G.R. No. 203610, October 10, 2016, SECOND DIVISION (BRION, J.)
DOCTRINE: Constitutional Law; Immunity from Suit: The Constitution

provides that "the State may not be sued without its consent." One instance
when a suit is against the State is when the Republic is sued by name, as in
this case. A suit against the State is allowed when the State gives its consent,
either expressly or impliedly. Express consent is given through a statute while
implied consent is given when the State enters into a contract or commences
litigation.
FACTS:
Respondents Gonzalo Roque, Jr. et al. owned several parcels of land with
a total area of about 9,811 square meters, located in Constitution Hills, Quezon
City. In 1978, the Republic, asked them to sell a portion of the land at
government-dictated prices lower than the market value. The Republic was
supposed to use the land for President Marcos' National Government Center
(NGC) Project — his plan to bring together the various national government
offices in one venue for greater efficiency and to create additional areas for the
expanding needs of the central government and the people. The lots were sold
and 6 new titles were issued in the Republic's name. The Republic did not
immediately take possession of all of the land it had bought from the
respondents; thus, the respondents continued to occupy portions of the sold
properties.
De Castro then undersecretary of the Housing and Urban Development

Coordinating Council (HUDCC), wrote a letter to the respondents, requesting
them to vacate all portions of the sold land that they were still occupying,
because the government would use the properties for socialized housing
pursuant to Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9207.
Gonzalo wrote a letter to then HUDCC Secretary Michael Defensor,

offering to buy back the properties. He argued that they have the right to
repurchase the properties after the Republic abandoned the NGC Project and
diverted the use of the properties to socialized housing. The respondents filed
a complaint for the annulment of the sale of the properties on the grounds of
fraud, force, intimidation, or undue influence. One of the arguments of the
Republic and the HUDCC (defendants) is that they are immune from suit as
government instrumentalities.
ISSUE:
Is the Republic immuned from suit?

RULING:
No. The Republic is not immune from suit in the present case.
The Constitution provides that "the State may not be sued without its
consent." One instance when a suit is against the State is when the Republic is
sued by name, as in this case. A suit against the State is allowed when the
State gives its consent, either expressly or impliedly. Express consent is given
through a statute while implied consent is given when the State enters into a
contract or commences litigation. Although not all contracts entered into by the
government operates as a waiver of its non-suability, the Court held in the two
cases below that the State effectively gave its consent when it entered into
contracts and committed breach.
In Santiago v. The Government of the Republic of the Philippines, the

Court reasoned that the State's consent to be sued is presumed when the State
fails to comply with the alleged terms of a deed of donation. It essentially held
that the Republic impliedly waived its immunity.
In Republic v. Sandiganbayan, the Court ruled that when the Republic

entered into a compromise agreement with a private person, it stripped itself of
its immunity from suit and placed itself on the same level as its adversary.
When the State enters into a contract which creates mutual or reciprocal rights
and obligations, the State may be sued even without express consent. Its
consent to be sued is implied from its entry into the contract and the Republic's
breach grants the other party the right to enforce or repudiate the contract.
In the present case, the Republic entered into deeds of sale with the
respondents to construct the NGC Project on the lots sold. To facilitate the sale,
the Republic created a negotiating team to discuss the terms of the sale with
the respondents. The latter agreed to the negotiated sale on these alleged
conditions: (a) that they will have the right to repurchase the properties if the
NGC Project does not push through; and (b) that the NGC Project will increase
the market value of their remaining properties.
PHILIPPINE ECONOMIC ZONE AUTHORITY (PEZA) v COMMISSION ON

AUDIT (COA) et al.
G.R. No. 210903, October 11, 2016, EN BANC (PERALTA, J.)
DOCTRINE: Constitutional Law; Power of Control: All executive departments,

bureaus and offices are under the control of the President of the Philippines.
This precept is embodied in Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution which
provides as follows:
Sec. 17. The President shall have control of all the executive departments,
bureaus and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.
The nature of presidential power of control, is self-executing and does not
require statutory implementation, nor may its exercise be limited, much less
withdrawn, by the legislature.
FACTS:
The PEZA Board in Resolution No. M-99-266 adjusted PEZA's

compensation plan and included in the said compensation plan is the grant of
Christmas bonus in such amount as may be fixed by the Board and such other
emoluments.
Petitioner PEZA had been granting Christmas bonus in the amount of

P50, 000.00 to each of its officers and employees for CY 2000 to 2004, however,
for the years 2005 to 2008, the Christmas bonus was gradually increased per
PEZA Board Resolution Nos. 05-450 and 06-462. For 2005, the Christmas
bonus was increased to P60, 000.00 and was again increased to P70, 000.00 in
2006 and 2007. In 2008, the Christmas bonus was increased to P75, 000.00
per PEZA officer/employee.
State Auditor V Aurora Liveta-Funa, issued Notice of Disallowance

stating that the payment of additional Christmas bonus to PEZA officers and
employees for calendar years 2005-2008 violated Section 3 of Memorandum
Order (M.O.) No. 20 dated June 25, 2001 which provides that any increase in
salary or compensation of government-owned and controlled corporations
(GOCCs) and government financial institutions (GFIs) that is not in accordance
with the Salary Standardization Law shall be subject to the approval of the
President. Thus, COA disallowed the increase in the Christmas bonus.
ISSUE:
Does the President exercises power of control over PEZA?
RULING:
Yes. The President exercises the power of control over PEZA.

It is not disputed that after the enactment of the Salary Standardization
Law (Republic Act No. 6758), laws have been passed exempting some
government entities from its coverage. The said government entities were
allowed to create their own compensation and position classification systems
that apply to their respective offices, usually through their Board of Directors.
However, petitioner is still bound to observe the guidelines and policies

issued by the Office of the President citing the Court's ruling in Intia, Jr. v. COA
where it was ruled that the power of the board of directors to fix the
compensation of the employees is not absolute. In addition, Section 6 of P.D.
No. 1597 provides the requisite Presidential review, through the DBM, of the
position classification and compensation plan of an agency exempt from the
Office of Compensation and Position Classification (OCPC) coverage. This Court
ruled that the corporation should report the details of its salary and
compensation system to the DBM.
The ruling in Intia, Jr. v. COA and the provisions of Section 6 of P.D. No.
1597 can thus be reconciled as both emphasized that these exempted
government entities are required to report to the President, through the DBM,
the details of its salary and compensation system. Reporting, however, is
different from approval. Thus, the charters of those government entities exempt
from the Salary Standardization Law are not without any form of restriction.
Such restriction is the most apparent indication that the legislature did not
divest the President, as Chief Executive of his power of control over the said
government entities.
H. SOHRIA PASAGI DIAMBRANG v COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

AND H. HAMIM SARIP PATAD
G.R. No. 201809, October 11, 2016, EN BANC (CARPIO, ACTING C.J.)
DOCTRINE: Election Law; Disqualification of a candidate and its effect on

the second-placer in an election: If the certificate of candidacy is void ab
initio, the candidate is not considered a candidate from the very beginning even
if his certificate of candidacy was cancelled after the elections. All votes for such
non-candidate are stray votes and should not be counted. Thus, such non-
candidate can never be a first-placer in the elections.
FACTS:
Petitioner H. Sohria Pasagi Diambrang and respondent H. Hamim Sarip

Patad were candidates for Punong Barangay of Barangay Kaludan, Nunungan,
Lanao del Norte in the 25 October 2010 Barangay Elections. Patad obtained
183 votes while Diambrang obtained 78 votes. However, the Barangay Board of
Canvassers (BBOC) proclaimed Diambrang as the duly elected Punong
Barangay based on the assumption that Patad was disqualified for being a
fugitive from justice. The BBOC’s assumption was, in turn, based on the
recommendation of the Provincial Election Supervisor that was not yet final and
executory because the COMELEC had not issued any ruling on the matter.
Patad filed a petition to annul Diambrang’s proclamation. The COMELEC

En Banc annulled the proclamation of Diambrang and ordered the first ranked
Barangay Kagawad of Barangay Kaludan to succeed as the new Punong
Barangay. The COMELEC En Banc ruled that despite Patad’s disqualification,
Diambrang, who garnered the next highest number of votes, could not be
proclaimed as the elected Punong Barangay. Having lost the elections,
Diambrang is not entitled to be declared elected. Instead, the COMELEC En
Banc ruled that the vacant position should be filled by the first ranked
Kagawad pursuant to Section 44(b) of the Local Government Code.
ISSUE:
Can Diambrang be proclaimed as the elected Punong Barangay in view of

Patad’s disqualification?
RULING:
No. This case has been rendered moot by the election of a new Punong
Barangay of Barangay Kaludan, Nunungan, Lanao del Norte during the 28
October 2013 Barangay Elections. The case had been overtaken by events due
to Patad’s failure to file his comment on the petition as well as the repeated
failure of the Postmaster of Lanao del Norte to respond to the Court’s query
whether Patad received the Resolution requiring him to file his comment.
However, the Court reiterated its prevailing rulings on the matter of
disqualification of a candidate and its effect on the second-placer in an election.
The prevailing ruling is that if the certificate of candidacy is void ab initio, the
candidate is not considered a candidate from the very beginning even if his
certificate of candidacy was cancelled after the elections.
Patad's disqualification arose from his being a fugitive from justice. It

does not matter that the disqualification case against him was finally decided
by the COMELEC En Banc only on 14 November 2011. Patad's certificate of
candidacy was void ab initio. As such, Diambrang, being the first-placer among
the qualified candidates, should have been proclaimed as the duly-elected
Punong Barangay of Barangay Kaludan, Nunungan, Lanao del Norte. However,
due to supervening events as we previously discussed, Diambrang can no
longer hold office.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v CAPITAL RESOURCES

CORPORATION, et. al.
G.R. No. 217210, November 07, 2016, FIRST DIVISION (CAGUIOA, J.)
DOCTRINE: Constitutional Law; Private Corporations’ acquisition of

private lands: The provision of the 1973 Constitution proscribing corporations
from acquiring "alienable lands" of the public domain provides that the
prohibition will not apply if the property acquired by the corporation is private
property and not alienable lands of the public domain. The rule is that once a
patent is registered and the corresponding certificate of title is issued, the land
covered by it ceases to be part of the public domain and becomes private
property.
FACTS:
A Homestead Patent was granted to Vitaliano Dumuk which resulted in

the issuance of Original Certificate of Title (OCT). The OCT was cancelled and
superseded by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) in the name of spouses Cecilio
and Laura Milo. Capital Resources Corporation and Romeo Roxas [jointly
referred to as defendants-appellants] acquired the subject property from
spouses Milo.
Defendants-appellants then caused the subdivision of the subject

property, among which are Block 35 and Block 36. The plan indicated that
Block 35 is a "salvage zone" while a portion of Block 36 appeared to overlap a
portion of the China Sea. Sometime in 1987, the town of Bauang, La Union was
cadastrally surveyed and based on the Cadastral Survey Map, Block 35 and
Block 36 were projected therein as part of the identified foreshore land and
seabed, respectively.
The Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor

General (OSG), filed a Complaint for Cancellation of Title and Reversion against
defendants-appellants. The Republic alleged that Capital Resources Corporation
is proscribed by the Constitution to acquire lands of the public domain.
ISSUE:
Can private corporations, like Capital Resources Corporation, acquire

alienable lands of the public domain?
RULING:
Yes. It should be noted that under Section 121 of CA 141 (which

superseded Section 119 of Act No. 2874) a corporation may acquire land
granted under the free patent or homestead only if it was with the consent of
the grantee and the approval of the Secretary of Natural Resources and the land
will be used solely for commercial, industrial, educational, religious or
charitable purposes or for a right of way. Nevertheless, as clarified in the case of
Villaflor vs. Court of Appeals, Section 121 pertains to acquisitions of public land
by a corporation from a grantee. In this particular case, the original grantee was
Vitaliano Dumuk and he subsequently transferred the subject property to
spouses Cecilio and Laura Milo. In turn, the spouses were the ones who sold
the subject property to Capital Resources and Romeo Roxas. Evidently, Capital
Resources did not acquire the subject property from the original grantee. Even
if assuming that Capital Resources is ineligible to be a transferee, the fact
remains that the subject property was purchased by Capital Resources and
Romeo Roxas and the latter is an individual who is not barred from acquiring
the subject property.
As to the provision of the 1973 Constitution proscribing corporations

from acquiring "alienable lands" of the public domain, the consistent ruling of
the Supreme Court is that the prohibition will not apply if the property acquired
by the corporation is private property and not alienable lands of the public
domain. The rule is that once a patent is registered and the corresponding
certificate of title is issued, the land covered by it ceases to be part of the public
domain and becomes private property. In the present case, the subject property
became private property upon the issuance of OCT to Vitaliano Dumuk.
Necessarily, when the defendants-appellants acquired the subject property in
1982, the same was no longer a part of the alienable lands of the public domain
but a private property. Hence the prohibition will not apply.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE v DE LA SALLE UNIVERSITY,

INC.
G.R. No. 196596, NOVEMBER 9, 2016, EN BANC (BRION, J.:)
DOCTRINE: Constitutional Law; Tax exemption of non-stock non-profit

educational institutions: The revenues and assets of non-stock, non-profit
educational institutions proved to have been used actually, directly, and
exclusively for educational purposes are exempt from duties and taxes
FACTS:
The Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) issued to DLSU Letter of Authority

(LOA) No. 2794 authorizing its revenue officers to examine the latter's books of
accounts and other accounting records for all internal revenue taxes for the
period Fiscal Year Ending 2003 and Unverified Prior Years.
The BIR through a Formal Letter of Demand assessed DLSU the following
deficiency taxes: (1) income tax on rental earnings from restaurants/canteens
and bookstores operating within the campus; (2) value-added tax (VAI) on
business income; and (3) documentary stamp tax (DSI) on loans and lease
contracts. The BIR demanded the payment of ₱17,303,001.12, inclusive of
surcharge, interest and penalty for taxable years 2001, 2002 and 2003. DLSU
protested the assessment. The Commissioner failed to act on the protest; DLSU,
a non-stock, non-profit educational institution, principally anchored its petition
on Article XIV, Section 4 (3) of the Constitution, which reads:
(3) All revenues and assets of non-stock, non-profit educational

institutions used actually, directly, and exclusively for educational
purposes shall be exempt from taxes and duties. xxx.
ISSUE:
Is DLSU's income and revenues proved to have been used actually,

directly and exclusively for educational purposes exempt from duties and taxes?
RULING:
YES. The revenues and assets of non-stock, non-profit educational

institutions proved to have been used actually, directly, and exclusively for
educational purposes are exempt from duties and taxes. DLSU rests it case on
Article XIV, Section 4 (3) of the 1987 Constitution, which reads:
(3) All revenues and assets of non-stock, non-profit educational

institutions used actually, directly, and exclusively for educational
purposes shall be exempt from taxes and duties. Upon the dissolution or
cessation of the corporate existence of such institutions, their assets
shall be disposed of in the manner provided by law.
Proprietary educational institutions, including those cooperatively
owned, may likewise be entitled to such exemptions subject to
the limitations provided by law including restrictions on dividends and
provisions for reinvestment.
The court observes that:
First, the constitutional provision refers to two kinds of educational institutions:

(1) non-stock, non-profit educational institutions and (2) proprietary
educational institutions;
Second, DLSU falls under the first category. Even the Commissioner admits the
status of DLSU as a non-stock, non-profit educational institution;
Third, while DLSU's claim for tax exemption arises from and is based on the
Constitution, the Constitution, in the same provision, also imposes certain
conditions to avail of the exemption;
Fourth, there is a marked distinction between the treatment of non-stock, non-

profit educational institutions and proprietary educational institutions. The tax
exemption granted to non-stock, non-profit educational institutions is
conditioned only on the actual, direct and exclusive use of their revenues and
assets for educational purposes. While tax exemptions may also be granted to
proprietary educational institutions, these exemptions may be subject to
limitations imposed by Congress; and
For all these reasons, the court held that the income and revenues of
DLSU proven to have been used actually, directly and exclusively for
educational purposes are exempt from duties and taxes.
PHILIPPINE TELEGRAPH TELEPHONE CORP., v SMART

COMMUNICATIONS, INC., G.R. No. 189026, November 09, 2016, THIRD
DIVISION (JARDELEZA, J.)
DOCTRINE: Administrative Law: Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction The

doctrine of primary jurisdiction has been increasingly called into play on
matters demanding the special competence of administrative agencies even if
such matters are at the same time within the jurisdiction of the courts. A case
that requires for its determination the expertise, specialized skills, and
knowledge of some administrative board or commission because it involves
technical matters or intricate questions of fact, relief must first be obtained in
an appropriate administrative proceeding before a remedy will be supplied by
the courts although the matter comes within the jurisdiction of the courts. The
application of the doctrine does not call for the dismissal of the case in the
court but only for its suspension until after the matters within the competence
of the administrative body are threshed out and determined.
FACTS:
Petitioner Philippine Telegraph & Telephone Corporation (PT&T) and

respondent Smart Communications, Inc. (Smart) entered into an Agreement for
the interconnection of their telecommunication facilities. The Agreement
provided for the interconnection of Smart's Cellular Mobile Telephone System
(CMTS), Local Exchange Carrier (LEC) and Paging services with PT&T's LEC
service. The parties amended the Agreement, which extended the payment
period and allowed PT&T to settle its obligations on instalment basis..
Thereafter, Smart filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court of

Makati City (RTC) against PT&T. Smart alleged that PT&T was in breach of its
contractual obligation when it failed to pay its outstanding debt and denied its
liability to Smart.
PT&T sought for the dismissal of the civil case on the grounds of lack of
jurisdiction, non-observance of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction and
exhaustion of administrative remedies. The RTC denied PT&T's motion to
dismiss, finding that the nature of the civil case was incapable of pecuniary
estimation which squarely falls within its jurisdiction. It added that the NTC has
no jurisdiction to adjudicate breaches of contract and award damages.
ISSUE:
Does the NTC have jurisdiction over the case?

RULING:
Yes. Section 18 of RA 7925 authorizes the NTC to determine the equity,

reciprocity and fairness of the access charges stipulated in Smart and PT&T's
Agreement. This does not, however, completely deprive the RTC of its
jurisdiction over the complaint filed by Smart. The Agreement has other
stipulations which do not require the NTC's expertise. But insofar as Smart's
complaint involved the enforcement of, as well as the collection of sums based
on the rates subject of the NTC proceedings, the RTC cannot precede with the
civil case until the NTC has finally determined if the access charges are fair and
reasonable. Hence, the more prudent course of action for the RTC would have
been to hold the civil action in abeyance until after a determination of the NTC
case. Indeed, logic and the doctrine of primary jurisdiction dictate such move.
It would be more proper for the RTC to yield its jurisdiction in favor of
the NTC since the determination of a central issue, i.e., the matter of access
charges, requires the special competence and expertise of the latter. "In this era
of clogged court dockets, administrative boards or commissions with special
knowledge, experience and capability to promptly hear and determine disputes
on technical matters or intricate questions of facts, subject to judicial review in
case of grave abuse of discretion, are well-nigh indispensable. Between the
power lodged in an administrative body and a court, therefore, the
unmistakable trend is to refer it to the former."
JULIUS B. CAMPOL v MAYOR RONALD S. BALAO-AS AND VICE-MAYOR

DOMINADOR I. SIANEN, G.R. No. 197634, November 28, 2016, EN
BANC (JARDELEZA, J.)
DOCTRINE: Administrative Law; Security of Tenure: Section 2, paragraph 3

of Article IX-B of the Constitution states that no officer or employee of the civil
service shall be removed or suspended except for cause provided by law. This
constitutional provision captures the essence of security of tenure. An employee
of the civil service has the right to be protected in the possession and exercise of
his or her office. He or she cannot be removed from his or her employment
saves for causes allowed by law. A necessary consequence of the importance
given to security of tenure is the rule that an employee invalidly dismissed from
service is entitled to reinstatement.
FACTS:
Campol served the Municipality of Boliney, Abra since 1999 as Secretary

to the Sangguniang Bayan (SB). He held the position in a permanent capacity.
During the 2004 elections, Ronald S. Balao-as (Balao-as) and Dominador J.
Sianen (Sianen), respondents in this case, won as mayor and vice-mayor,
respectively (collectively, Respondents). They assumed office in July 2004.
Shortly after this, the SB passed a resolution terminating Campolas as SB

Secretary on the ground that he was absent without approved leave from
August 1, 2004 to September 30, 2004. However, when the resolution was
transmitted to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan (SP), it referred the matter to
CSC-Abra. CSC-Abra then wrote Sianen informing him that Campol cannot be
removed from his position because he is protected by the Administrative Code.
The SP followed this advice. The Department of Interior and Local Government
(DILG)-Abra also took the same position. Despite the unanimous position of
these three agencies, Sianen issued Memorandum Order No. 001, Series of
2004, which dropped Campol from the rolls.
Campol challenged this memorandum before the CSC-CAR, which ruled in his
favor. Sianen, in tum, elevated the matter before the CSC. The CSC granted his
appeal and ruled that Campol was properly dropped from the rolls.
Issue:
Is Campol entitled to reinstatement?
Ruling:
Yes, Campol should be reinstated.
Section 2, paragraph 3 of Article IX-B of the Constitution states –

No officer or employee of the civil service shall be removed or suspended
except for cause provided by law.
This constitutional provision captures the essence of security of tenure.

An employee of the civil service has the right to be protected in the possession
and exercise of his or her office. He or she cannot be removed from his or her
employment save for causes allowed by law. A necessary consequence of the
importance given to security of tenure is the rule that an employee invalidly
dismissed from service is entitled to reinstatement.
This was also the pronouncement in Tañala v. Legaspi. In the latter case,
it was held that the reinstatement of an illegally dismissed employee is proper
even when another person is already occupying the position. This is not a legal
impediment to reinstatement. Thus, in accordance with the doctrine in the
aforementioned case, Campol should be reinstated to his position as SB
Secretary. In the event that another person has already been appointed to his
post, the ruling in Tañala should apply. In the eyes of the law, the position
never became vacant since Campol was illegally dropped from the rolls. Hence,
the incumbency of the person who assumed the position is only temporary and
must give way to Campol whose right to the office has been recognized by the
proper authorities.
HON. PHILIP A. AGUINALDO et. al. v HIS EXCELLENCY PRESIDENT

BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III, et al.,
G.R. No. 224302, November 29, 2016, EN BANC (LEONARDO-DE
CASTRO, J.)
DOCTRINE: Constitutional Law; Appointment in the Judicial and Bar

Council (JBR): The power to recommend of the JBC cannot be used to restrict
or limit the President's power to appoint as the latter's prerogative to choose
someone whom he/she considers worth appointing to the vacancy in the
Judiciary is still paramount. As long as in the end, the President appoints
someone nominated by the JBC, the appointment is valid.
FACTS:
On June 11, 1978, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos (Marcos) issued

Presidential Decree No. 1486, creating a special court called the
Sandiganbayan, composed of a Presiding Judge and eight Associate Judges to
be appointed by the President, which shall have jurisdiction over criminal and
civil cases involving graft and corrupt practices and such other offenses
committed by public officers and employees, including those in government
owned or controlled corporations.
On July 20, 2015, the JBC published in the Philippine Star and
Philippine Daily Inquirer and posted on the JBC website an announcement
calling for applications or recommendations for the six newly created positions
of Associate Justice of the Sandiganbayan. After screening and selection of
applicants, the JBC submitted to President Aquino six shortlists contained in
six separate letters. President Aquino issued on January 20, 2015 the
appointment papers for the six new Sandiganbayan Associate Justices.
Petitioners Aguinaldo, Alhambra, D. Cruz, Pozon, and Timbang

(Aguinaldo, et al.), were all nominees in the shortlist for the 16th Sandiganbayan
Associate Justice. They insist that President Aquino could only choose one
nominee from each of the six separate shortlists submitted by the JBC for each
specific vacancy, and no other; and any appointment made in deviation of this
procedure is a violation of the Constitution. Hence, petitioners pray, among
other reliefs, that the appointments of respondents Musngi and Econg, who
belonged to the same shortlist for the position of 21st Associate Justice, be
declared null and void for these were made in violation of Article VIII, Section 9
of the 1987 Constitution.
ISSUE:
Did President Aquino err in disregarding the clustering of nominees into

six separate shortlist for the six vacancies for Sandiganbayan Associate
Justice?
RULING:
No. Article VIII, Section 9 of the 1987 Constitution provides that "[t]he
Members of the Supreme Court and judges of lower courts shall be appointed
by the President from a list of at least three nominees prepared by the Judicial
and Bar Council for every vacancy."
It should be stressed that the power to recommend of the JBC cannot be

used to restrict or limit the President's power to appoint as the latter's
prerogative to choose someone whom he/she considers worth appointing to the
vacancy in the Judiciary is still paramount. As long as in the end, the President
appoints someone nominated by the JBC, the appointment is valid. On this
score, the Court finds herein that President Aquino was not obliged to appoint
one new Sandiganbayan Associate Justice from each of the six shortlists
submitted by the JBC, especially when the clustering of nominees into the six
shortlists encroached on President Aquino's power to appoint members of the
Judiciary from all those whom the JBC had considered to be qualified for the
same positions of Sandiganbayan Associate Justice.
President Aquino validly exercised his discretionary power to appoint

members of the Judiciary when he disregarded the clustering of nominees into
six separate shortlists for the vacancies for the 16th, 17th, 18th, 19th, 20th and
21st Sandiganbayan Associate Justices. President Aquino merely maintained
the well-established practice, consistent with the paramount Presidential
constitutional prerogative, to appoint the six new Sandiganbayan Associate
Justices from the 37 qualified nominees, as if embodied in one JBC list. This
does not violate Article VIII, Section 9 of the 1987 Constitution which requires
the President to appoint from a list of at least three nominees submitted by the
JBC for every vacancy. To meet the minimum requirement under said
constitutional provision of three nominees per vacancy, there should at least be
18 nominees from the JBC for the six vacancies for Sandiganbayan Associate
Justice; but the minimum requirement was even exceeded herein because the
JBC submitted for the President's consideration a total of 37 qualified
nominees. All the six newly appointed Sandiganbayan Associate Justices met
the requirement of nomination by the JBC under Article VIII, Section 9 of the
1987 Constitution. Hence, the appointments of respondents Musngi and Econg,
as well as the other four new Sandiganbayan Associate Justices, are valid and
do not suffer from any constitutional infirmity.

Political Law 2016 Case Digest

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Description:

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Political Law 2016 Case Digest

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Political Law: Constitutional Law

NAPOLEON D. SENIT v PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES.

DOCTRINE: Constitutional Law; Trial in Absentia: Due Process is satisfied in

The City Prosecutor charged petitioner with Reckless Imprudence

The Regional Trial Court (RTC) rendered a decision in absentia convicting

In this case, it is established that notice for the presentation of evidence

ERWIN LIBO-ON DELA CRUZ v PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

DOCTRINE: Constitutional Law; Rights Against Unreasonable Searches and

Petitioner Erwin Libo-on Dela Cruz was an on-the-job trainee of an inter-

Was there a waiver of Petitioner Dela Cruz rights’ against unreasonable

In case of consented searches or waiver of the constitutional guarantee

NATIVIDAD C. CRUZ and BENJAMIN DELA CRUZ v PANDACAN HIKER'S

DOCTRINE: Public Corporation; Police Power: The general welfare clause

Petitioner Natividad C. Cruz was the Punong Barangay or Chairperson of

In this case, the complete destruction of the basketball ring by the

ALMA G. PARAISO-ABAN v COMMISSION ON AUDIT

DOCTRINE: Constitutional Law; Commission on Audit (COA): Article IX-D,

The Senate's Committees on Accountability of Public Officers and

Was the decision of COA En Banc to implead Petitioner Aban as one of

GOV. EXEQUIEL B. JAVIER v COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, CORNELIO P.

DOCTRINE: Election Law; Disqualification: The jurisdiction of the COMELEC

An administrative complaint for Gross Misconduct/Dereliction of Duty

COMELEC issued Resolution No. 9581 prohibiting any public official

Should Petitioner Gov. Javier be disqualified due to his issuance of an

In this case, COMELEC continued insistence in ruling that grave

LORD ALLAN JAY Q. VELASCO v HON. SPEAKER FELICIANO R.

DOCTRINE: Election Law; Petition for Mandamus: A petition for mandamus

Joseph Socorro Tan, a registered voter and resident of the Municipality of

Lord Allan Jay Velasco (Velasco) contender of Reyes filed an election

Can the House Speaker and other officials be compelled to administer

RENE SAGUISAG et. al. V EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO OCHOA al.

DOCTINE: Constitutional Law; Executive Agreement: The President may

Soon after the Philippines was granted independence, the Philippines

On June 6, 2014, the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA)

Is the concurrence of the senate necessary before the EDCA be made

As such, executive agreements may dispense with the requirement of

RENE SAGUISAG et. al. v EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO OCHOA et.

On June 6, 2014, the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA)

An exhaustive evaluation of the memoranda of the parties, together with

SERGIO R. OSMEÑA III v DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND

Doctrine: Constitutional Law; Locus Standi: Transcendental Importance;

The Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC)

Yes. Legal standing or locus standi refers to a personal and substantial

Thus, the Supreme Court resolved to grant standing to the petitioners in

VICE MAYOR MARCELINA S. ENGLE v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

DOCTRINE: Election Law; Disqualification: A petition to deny due course to,

Did Marcelina Engle falsely misrepresent herself in filing her Certificate

VICE MAYOR MARCELINA S. ENGLE v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

DOCTRINE: Election Law; COMELEC Powers to issue mandatory rules and

However, Lakas-CMD failed to submit to the COMELEC Law Department

Is James Engle (deceased) validly substituted by his wife despite the

Yes. It is true according to the Supreme Court that the COMELEC is

MARY ELIZABETH TY-DELGADO v HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

DOCTRINE: Election Law; Disqualification by virtue of conviction of a

On 16 September 2008, the Supreme Court in a case entitled "Tulfo v.

Is Philip Pichay disqualified by running in an elective position on the

Having been convicted of the crime of libel, Pichay is disqualified under

Considering his ineligibility due to his disqualification under Section 12,

NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION v ELIZABETH MANALASTAS AND BEA

DOCTRINE: Constitutional Law; Just Compensation: The formula for

National Power Corporation (NPC) constructed a 230 KV transmission

How is just compensation computed?

The constitutional limitation of "just compensation" is considered to be