VICARIOUS LIABILITY / QUASI-DELICT

PROFESSIONAL SERVICES, INC., petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and

NATIVIDAD and ENRIQUE AGANA, respondents.

Medical Negligence; Corporate Negligence; Ostensible Agency; Court holds

that Professional Services, Inc. (PSI) is liable to the Aganas not under the principle
of respondent superior for lack of evidence of an employment relationship with
Dr. Ampil but under the principle of ostensible agency for the negligence of Dr.
Ampil and pro hac vice under the principle of corporate negligence for its failure
to perform its duties as a hospital.— After gathering its thoughts on the issues, this
Court holds that PSI is liable to the Aganas, not under the principle of respondeat
superior for lack of evidence of an employment relationship with Dr. Ampil but
under the principle of ostensible agency for the negligence of Dr. Ampil and, pro
hac vice, under the principle of corporate negligence for its failure to perform its
duties as a hospital.

Same; Same; Same; While in theory a hospital as a juridical entity cannot

practice medicine, in reality it utilizes doctors, surgeons and medical practitioners
in the conduct of its business of facilitating medical and surgical treatment; Three
legal relationships crisscross within that reality.—While in theory a hospital as a
juridical entity cannot practice medicine, in reality it utilizes doctors, surgeons
and medical practitioners in the conduct of its business of facilitating medical
and surgical treatment. Within that reality, three legal relationships crisscross: (1)
between the hospital and the doctor practicing within its premises; (2) between
the hospital and the patient being treated or examined within its premises and
(3) between the patient and the doctor. The exact nature of each relationship
determines the basis and extent of the liability of the hospital for the negligence
of the doctor.

Same; Same; Same; Regardless of its relationship with the doctor, the hospital
may be held directly liable to the patient for its own negligence or failure to
follow established standard of conduct to which it should conform as a
corporation.—Where an employment relationship exists, the hospital may be
held vicariously liable under Article 2176 in relation to Article 2180 of the Civil
Code or the principle of respondeat superior. Even when no employment
relationship exists but it is shown that the hospital holds out to the patient that the
doctor is its agent, the hospital may still be vicariously liable under Article 2176 in
relation to Article 1431 and Article 1869 of the Civil Code or the principle of
apparent authority. Moreover, regardless of its relationship with the doctor, the
hospital may be held directly liable to the patient for its own negligence or
failure to follow established standard of conduct to which it should conform as a
corporation.

Same; Same; Same; Employer-Employee Relationship; Court still employs the

“control test” to determine the existence of an employer-employee relationship
between hospital and doctor.—This Court still employs the “control test” to
determine the existence of an employer-employee relationship between
hospital and doctor. In Calamba Medical Center, Inc. v. National Labor
Relations Commission, et al., 571 SCRA 585 (2008), it held: Under the “control
test,” an employment relationship exists between a physician and a hospital if

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the hospital controls both the means and the details of the process by which the
physician is to accomplish his task.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Control as a determinative factor in testing the
employer-employee relationship between doctor and hospital under which the
hospital could be held vicariously liable to a patient in medical negligence cases
is a requisite fact to be established by preponderance of evidence.—To allay
the anxiety of the intervenors, the Court holds that, in this particular instance, the
concurrent finding of the RTC and the CA that PSI was not the employer of Dr.
Ampil is correct. Control as a determinative factor in testing the employer-
employee relationship between doctor and hospital under which the hospital
could be held vicariously liable to a patient in medical negligence cases is a
requisite fact to be established by preponderance of evidence. Here, there was
insufficient evidence that PSI exercised the power of control or wielded such
power over the means and the details of the specific process by which Dr. Ampil
applied his skills in the treatment of Natividad. Consequently, PSI cannot be held
vicariously liable for the negligence of Dr. Ampil under the principle of
respondeat superior.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Factors that Determine Apparent Authority. —There
is, however, ample evidence that the hospital (PSI) held out to the patient
(Natividad) that the doctor (Dr. Ampil) was its agent. Present are the two factors
that determine apparent authority: first, the hospital’s implied manifestation to
the patient which led the latter to conclude that the doctor was the hospital’s
agent; and second, the patient’s reliance upon the conduct of the hospital and
the doctor, consistent with ordinary care and prudence.

PROFESSIONAL SERVICES, INC., petitioner, vs. NATIVIDAD

and ENRIQUE AGANA, respondents. G.R. No. 126297. January 31, 2007

Civil Law; Damages; Negligence; The leaving of sponges or other foreign

substances in the wound after the incision has been closed is at least prima facie
negligence by the operating surgeon.— An operation requiring the placing of
sponges in the incision is not complete until the sponges are properly removed,
and it is settled that the leaving of sponges or other foreign substances in the
wound after the incision has been closed is at least prima facie negligence by
the operating surgeon. To put it simply, such act is considered so inconsistent
with due care as to raise an inference of negligence. There are even legions of
authorities to the effect that such act is negligence per se.

Same; Same; Same; To the mind of the Court, what was initially an act of
negligence by Dr. Ampil has ripened into a deliberate wrongful act of deceiving
his patient.—Here, Dr. Ampil did not inform Natividad about the missing two
pieces of gauze. Worse, he even misled her that the pain she was experiencing
was the ordinary consequence of her operation. Had he been more candid,
Natividad could have taken the immediate and appropriate medical remedy to
remove the gauzes from her body. To our mind, what was initially an act of
negligence by Dr. Ampil has ripened into a deliberate wrongful act of deceiving
his patient.

Same; Same; Same; Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur; Requisites for the Applicability
of the Doctrine.—Literally, res ipsa loquitur means “the thing speaks for itself.” It is
the rule that the fact of the occurrence of an injury, taken with the surrounding

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circumstances, may permit an inference or raise a presumption of negligence, or
make out a plaintiff’s prima facie case, and present a question of fact for
defendant to meet with an explanation. Stated differently, where the thing
which caused the injury, without the fault of the injured, is under the exclusive
control of the defendant and the injury is such that it should not have occurred if
he, having such control used proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the
absence of explanation that the injury arose from the defendant’s want of care,
and the burden of proof is shifted to him to establish that he has observed due
care and diligence. From the foregoing statements of the rule, the requisites for
the applicability of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur are: (1) the occurrence of an
injury; (2) the thing which caused the injury was under the control and
management of the defendant; (3) the occurrence was such that in the
ordinary course of things, would not have happened if those who had control or
management used proper care; and (4) the absence of explanation by the
defendant. Of the foregoing requisites, the most instrumental is the “control and
management of the thing which caused the injury.”

Same; Same; Same; Same; Res ipsa loquitur is not a rule of substantive law,
hence, does not per se create or constitute an independent or separate ground
of liability, being a mere evidentiary rule.—In this jurisdiction, res ipsa loquitur is
not a rule of substantive law, hence, does not per se create or constitute an
independent or separate ground of liability, being a mere evidentiary rule. In
other words, mere invocation and application of the doctrine does not dispense
with the requirement of proof of negligence. Here, the negligence was proven
to have been committed by Dr. Ampil and not by Dr. Fuentes.

Same; Same; Same; Professionals are considered personally liable for the fault or
negligence they commit in the discharge of their duties and their employer
cannot be held liable for such fault or negligence.—A prominent civilist
commented that professionals engaged by an employer, such as physicians,
dentists, and pharmacists, are not “employees” under this article because the
manner in which they perform their work is not within the control of the latter
(employer). In other words, professionals are considered personally liable for the
fault or negligence they commit in the discharge of their duties, and their
employer cannot be held liable for such fault or negligence. In the context of
the present case, “a hospital cannot be held liable for the fault or negligence of
a physician or surgeon in the treatment or operation of patients.”

Same; Same; Same; In this jurisdiction, the nature of the relationship between the
hospital and the physicians is rendered inconsequential in view of the
pronouncement in Ramos vs. Court of Appeals, 321 SCRA 584 (1999), that for
purposes of apportioning responsibility in medical negligence cases, an
employer-employee relationship in effect exists between hospitals and their
attending and visiting physicians.—In our shores, the nature of the relationship
between the hospital and the physicians is rendered inconsequential in view of
our categorical pronouncement in Ramos v. Court of Appeals, 321 SCRA 584
(1999), that for purposes of apportioning responsibility in medical negligence
cases, an employer-employee relationship in effect exists between hospitals and
their attending and visiting physicians.

Same;Same; Same; PSI’s liability is also anchored upon the agency principle of
apparent authority or agency by estoppel and the doctrine of corporate
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negligence.—But the Ramos pronouncement is not our only basis in sustaining
PSI’s liability. Its liability is also anchored upon the agency principle of apparent
authority or agency by estoppel and the doctrine of corporate negligence
which have gained acceptance in the determination of a hospital’s liability for
negligent acts of health professionals. The present case serves as a perfect
platform to test the applicability of these doctrines, thus, enriching our
jurisprudence. Apparent authority, or what is sometimes referred to as the
“holding out” theory, or doctrine of ostensible agency or agency by estoppel,
has its origin from the law of agency. It imposes liability, not as the result of the
reality of a contractual relationship, but rather because of the actions of a
principal or an employer in somehow misleading the public into believing that
the relationship or the authority exists. The concept is essentially one of estoppel
and has been explained in this manner: “The principal is bound by the acts of his
agent with the apparent authority which he knowingly permits the agent to
assume, or which he holds the agent out to the public as possessing. The
question in every case is whether the principal has by his voluntary act placed
the agent in such a situation that a person of ordinary prudence, conversant
with business usages and the nature of the particular business, is justified in
presuming that such agent has authority to perform the particular act in
question.

Same; Same; Same; In cases where it can be shown that a hospital, by its
actions, has held out a particular physician as its agent and/or employee and
that a patient has accepted treatment from that physician in the reasonable
belief that it is being rendered in behalf of the hospital, then the hospital will be
liable for the physician’s negligence.—The applicability of apparent authority in
the field of hospital liability was upheld long time ago in Irving v. Doctor Hospital
of Lake Worth, Inc., 415 So. 2d 55 (1982). There, it was explicitly stated that “there
does not appear to be any rational basis for excluding the concept of apparent
authority from the field of hospital liability.” Thus, in cases where it can be shown
that a hospital, by its actions, has held out a particular physician as its agent
and/or employee and that a patient has accepted treatment from that
physician in the reasonable belief that it is being rendered in behalf of the
hospital, then the hospital will be liable for the physician’s negligence.

Same; Same; Same; By accrediting Dr. Ampil and Dr. Fuentes and publicly
advertising their qualifications, the hospital created the impression that they
were its agents, authorized to perform medical or surgical services for its
patients.—In this case, PSI publicly displays in the lobby of the Medical City
Hospital the names and specializations of the physicians associated or
accredited by it, including those of Dr. Ampil and Dr. Fuentes. We concur with
the Court of Appeals’ conclusion that it “is now estopped from passing all the
blame to the physicians whose names it proudly paraded in the public directory
leading the public to believe that it vouched for their skill and competence.”
Indeed, PSI’s act is tantamount to holding out to the public that Medical City
Hospital, through its accredited physicians, offers quality health care services. By
accrediting Dr. Ampil and Dr. Fuentes and publicly advertising their
qualifications, the hospital created the impression that they were its agents,
authorized to perform medical or surgical services for its patients. As expected,
these patients, Natividad being one of them, accepted the services on the
reasonable belief that such were being rendered by the hospital or its
employees, agents, or servants.
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 AIR FRANCE, petitioner, vs.. RAFAEL CARRASCOSO and the HONORABLE COURT
OF APPEALS, respondents. No. L-21438. September 28, 1966
Common carriers; Contracts; First class tickets.—A written document speaks a
uniform language; the spoken word could be notoriously unreliable. If only to
achieve stability in the relations between passenger and air carrier, adherence
to the terms of a ticket is desirable.

Same; Damages; Moral damages; Trial; Bad faith in breach of contract of

carriage.—Where at the start of the trial, respondent's counsel placed petitioner
on guard that he intended to prove that, while sitting in the plane in Bangkok,
the respondent was ousted .by petitioner's manager, who gave his seat to a
white man, and evidence of bad faith in the fulfillment of the contract was
presented without objection on the part of the petitioner, it is therefore
unnecessary to inquire as to whether or not there is sufficient averment in the
complaint to justify an award for moral damages. Deficiency in the complaint, if
any, was cured by the evidence.

OSCAR DEL CARMEN, JR., petitioner, vs. GERONIMO BACOY, Guardian and
representing the children, namely: MARY MARJORIE B. MONSALUD, ERIC B.
MONSALUD, METZIE ANN B. MONSALUD, KAREEN B. MONSALUD, LEONARDO
B. MONSALUD, JR., and CRISTINA B. MONSALUD, respondents. G.R. No. 173870.
April 25, 2012

Civil Law; Quasi-Delicts; Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur; Under the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur, where the thing that caused the injury complained of is shown to
be under the management of the defendant or his servants; and the accident,
in the ordinary course of things, would not happen if those who had
management or control used proper care, it affords reasonable evidence—in
the absence of a sufficient, reasonable and logical explanation by defendant—
that the accident arose from or was caused by the defendant’s want of care;
The doctrine is based partly on the theory that the defendant in charge of the
instrumentality which causes the injury either knows the cause of the accident or
has the best opportunity of ascertaining it while the plaintiff has no such
knowledge, and is therefore compelled to allege negligence in general terms.—
Under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, “[w]here the thing that caused the injury
complained of is shown to be under the management of the defendant or his
servants; and the accident, in the ordinary course of things, would not happen if
those who had management or control used proper care, it affords reasonable
evidence—in the absence of a sufficient, reasonable and logical explanation by
defendant —that the accident arose from or was caused by the defendant’s
want of care.” Res ipsa loquitur is “merely evidentiary, a mode of proof, or a
mere procedural convenience, since it furnishes a substitute for, and relieves a
plaintiff of, the burden of producing a specific proof of negligence.”
It“recognizes that parties may establish prima facie negligence without direct
proof, thus, it allows the principle to substitute for specific proof of negligence. It
permits the plaintiff to present along with proof of the accident, enough of the
attending circumstances to invoke the doctrine, create an inference or
presumption of negligence and thereby place on the defendant the burden of
proving that there was no negligence on his part.” The doctrine is based partly
on “the theory that the defendant in charge of the instrumentality which causes
the injury either knows the cause of the accident or has the best opportunity of
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ascertaining it while the plaintiff has no such knowledge, and is therefore
compelled to allege negligence in general terms.”

Same; Same; Same; Requisites of the Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur.— The
requisites of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur as established by jurisprudence are
as follows: 1) the accident is of a kind which does not ordinarily occur unless
someone is negligent; 2) the cause of the injury was under the exclusive control
of the person in charge and 3) the injury suffered must not have been due to
any voluntary action or contribution on the part of the person injured.

Same; Same; Motor Vehicles; The registered owner of any vehicle, even if not
used for public service, would primarily be responsible to the public or to third
persons for injuries caused the latter while the vehicle was being driven on the
highways or streets.—In Aguilar, Sr. v. Commercial Savings Bank, 360 SCRA 395
(2001), the car of therein respondent bank caused the death of Conrado
Aguilar, Jr. while being driven by its assistant vice president. Despite Article 2180,
we still held the bank liable for damages for the accident as said provision should
defer to the settled doctrine concerning accidents involving registered motor
vehicles, i.e., that the registered owner of any vehicle, even if not used for public
service, would primarily be responsible to the public or to third persons for injuries
caused the latter while the vehicle was being driven on the highways or streets.

FILCAR TRANSPORT SERVICES, petitioner, vs. JOSE A. ESPINAS, respondent.

Civil Law; Quasi-Delicts; A person will generally be held liable only for the torts
committed by himself and not by another.—As a general rule, one is only
responsible for his own act or omission. Thus, a person will generally be held liable
only for the torts committed by himself and not by another. This general rule is
laid down in Article 2176 of the Civil Code, which provides to wit: Article 2176.
Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if
there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a
quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter. Based on the
above-cited article, the obligation to indemnify another for damage caused by
one’s act or omission is imposed upon the tortfeasor himself, i.e., the person who
committed the negligent act or omission. The law, however, provides for
exceptions when it makes certain persons liable for the act or omission of
another.

Same; Same; Vicarious Liability; Under Article 2176, in relation with Article 2180, of
the Civil Code, an action predicated on an employee’s act or omission may be
instituted against the employer who is held liable for the negligent act or
omission committed by his employee.—Under Article 2176, in relation with Article
2180, of the Civil Code, an action predicated on an employee’s act or omission
may be instituted against the employer who is held liable for the negligent act or
omission committed by his employee. Although the employer is not the actual
tortfeasor, the law makes him vicariously liable on the basis of the civil law
principle of pater familias for failure to exercise due care and vigilance over the
acts of one’s subordinates to prevent damage to another. In the last paragraph
of Article 2180 of the Civil Code, the employer may invoke the defense that he
observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.

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Same; Same; Same; Motor Vehicles; In case of motor vehicle mishaps, the
registered owner of the motor vehicle is considered as the employer of the
tortfeasor-driver, and is made primarily liable for the tort committed by the latter
under Article 2176, in relation with Article 2180, of the Civil Code.—It is well settled
that in case of motor vehicle mishaps, the registered owner of the motor vehicle
is considered as the employer of the tortfeasor-driver, and is made primarily
liable for the tort committed by the latter under Article 2176, in relation with
Article 2180, of the Civil Code. In Equitable Leasing Corporation v. Suyom, 388
SCRA 445 (2002), we ruled that in so far as third persons are concerned, the
registered owner of the motor vehicle is the employer of the negligent driver, and
the actual employer is considered merely as an agent of such owner.

Same; Same; Same; Same; In contemplation of law, the owner/ operator of

record is the employer of the driver, the actual opera tor and employer being
considered as merely its agent.—In upholding the liability of Equitable, as
registered owner of the tractor, this Court said that “regardless of sales made of
a motor vehicle, the registered owner is the lawful operator insofar as the public
and third persons are concerned; consequently, it is directly and primarily
responsible for the consequences of its operation.” The Court further stated that
“[i]n contemplation of law, the owner/operator of record is the employer of the
driver, the actual operator and employer being considered as merely its agent.”
Thus, Equitable, as the registered owner of the tractor, was considered under the
law on quasi delict to be the employer of the driver, Raul Tutor; Ecatine, Tutor’s
actual employer, was deemed merely as an agent of Equitable. Thus, it is clear
that for the purpose of holding the registered owner of the motor vehicle
primarily and directly liable for damages under Article 2176, in relation with
Article 2180, of the Civil Code, the existence of an employer-employee
relationship, as it is understood in labor relations law, is not
required. It is sufficient to establish that Filcar is the registered owner of the motor
vehicle causing damage in order that it may be held vicariously liable under
Article 2180 of the Civil Code.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Whether there is an employer-employee relationship

between the registered owner and the driver is irrelevant in determining the
liability of the registered owner who the law holds primarily and directly
responsible for any accident, injury or death caused by the operation of the
vehicle in the streets and highways.—The rationale for the rule that a registered
owner is vicariously liable for damages caused by the operation of his motor
vehicle is explained by the principle behind motor vehicle registration, which has
been discussed by this Court in Erezo, and cited by the CA in its decision: The
main aim of motor vehicle registration is to identify the owner so that if any
accident happens, or that any damage or injury is caused by the vehicle on the
public highways, responsibility therefor can be fixed on a definite individual, the
registered owner. Instances are numerous where vehicles running on public
highways caused accidents or injuries to pedestrians or other vehicles without
positive identification of the owner or drivers, or with very scant means of
identification. It is to forestall these circumstances, so inconvenient or prejudicial
to the public, that the motor vehicle registration is primarily ordained, in the
interest of the determination of persons responsible for damages or injuries
caused on public highways. [emphasis ours] Thus, whether there is an employer-
employee relationship between the registered owner and the driver is irrelevant
in determining the liability of the registered owner who the law holds primarily
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and directly responsible for any accident, injury or death caused by the
operation of the vehicle in the streets and highways.

Same; Same; Same; Same; The general public policy involved in motor vehicle
registration is the protection of innocent third persons who may have no means
of identifying public road malefactors.—As explained by this Court in Erezo, the
general public policy involved in motor vehicle registration is the protection of
innocent third persons who may have no means of identifying public road
malefactors and, therefore, would find it difficult—if not impossible—to seek
redress for damages they may sustain in accidents resulting in deaths, injuries
and other damages; by fixing the person held primarily and directly liable for the
damages sustained by victims of road mishaps, the law ensures that relief will
always be available to them.

Same; Same; Same; Same; To identify the person primarily and directly
responsible for the damages would also prevent a situation where a registered
owner of a motor vehicle can easily escape liability by passing on the blame to
another who may have no means to answer for the damages caused, thereby
defeating the claims of victims of road accidents.—To identify the person
primarily and directly responsible for the damages would also prevent a situation
where a registered owner of a motor vehicle can easily escape liability by
passing on the blame to another who may have no means to answer for the
damages caused, thereby defeating the claims of victims of road accidents. We
take note that some motor vehicles running on our roads are driven not by their
registered owners, but by employed drivers who, in most instances, do not have
the financial means to pay for the damages caused in case of accidents.

Same; Same; Same; Same; The motor vehicle registration law, to a certain
extent, modified Article 2180 of the Civil Code by making these defenses (that
the employee acts beyond the scope of his assigned task or that it exercised the
due diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage) unavailable to
the registered owner of the motor vehicle. —Filcar should not be permitted to
evade its liability for damages by conveniently passing on the blame to another
party; in this case, its Corporate Secretary, Atty. Flor and his alleged driver,
Floresca. Following our reasoning in Equitable, the agreement between Filcar
and Atty. Flor to assign the motor vehicle to the latter does not bind Espinas who
was not a party to and has no knowledge of the agreement, and whose only
recourse is to the motor vehicle registration. Neither can Filcar use the defenses
available under Article 2180 of the Civil Code—that the employee acts beyond
the scope of his assigned task or that it exercised the due diligence of a good
father of a family to prevent damage—because the motor vehicle registration
law, to a certain extent, modified Article 2180 of the Civil Code by making these
defenses unavailable to the registered owner of the motor vehicle. Thus, for as
long as Filcar is the registered owner of the car involved in the vehicular
accident, it could not escape primary liability for the damages caused to
Espinas.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Road safety is one of the most common problems
that must be addressed in this country.—The public interest involved in this case
must not be underestimated. Road safety is one of the most common problems
that must be addressed in this country. We are not unaware of news of road
accidents involving reckless drivers victimizing our citizens. Just recently, such
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pervasive recklessness among most drivers took the life of a professor of our state
university. What is most disturbing is that our existing laws do not seem to deter
these road malefactors from committing acts of recklessness.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Whether the driver of the motor vehicle, Floresca, is
an employee of Filcar is irrelevant in arriving at the conclusion that Filcar is
primarily and directly liable for the damages sustained by Espinas.—Whether the
driver of the motor vehicle, Floresca, is an employee of Filcar is irrelevant in
arriving at the conclusion that Filcar is primarily and directly liable for the
damages sustained by Espinas. While Republic Act No. 4136 or the Land
Transportation and Traffic Code does not contain any provision on the liability of
registered owners in case of motor vehicle mishaps, Article 2176, in relation with
Article 2180, of the Civil Code imposes an obligation upon Filcar, as registered
owner, to answer for the damages caused to Espinas’ car. This interpretation is
consistent with the strong public policy of maintaining road safety, thereby
reinforcing the aim of the State to promote the responsible operation of motor
vehicles by its citizens.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Unjust Enrichment; Under the civil law principle of
unjust enrichment, the registered owner of the motor vehicle has a right to be
indemnified by the actual employer of the driver of the amount that he may be
required to pay as damages for the injury caused to another. —Under the civil
law principle of unjust enrichment, the registered owner of the motor vehicle has
a right to be indemnified by the actual employer of the driver of the amount that
he may be required to pay as damages for the injury caused to another.

WESTMONT BANK, formerly ASSOCIATED BANK now UNITED OVERSEAS BANK

PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. MYRNA DELA ROSA-RAMOS, DOMINGO TAN and
WILLIAM CO, respondents. G.R. No. 160260. October 24, 2012

Mercantile Law; Banks and Banking; The fiduciary nature of every bank’s
relationship with its clients/depositors impels it to exercise the highest degree of
care, definitely more than that of a reasonable man or a good father of a
family.―It must be remembered that public interest is intimately carved into the
banking industry because the primordial concern here is the trust and
confidence of the public. This fiduciary nature of every bank’s relationship with its
clients/depositors impels it to exercise the highest degree of care, definitely more
than that of a reasonable man or a good father of a family. It is, therefore,
required to treat the accounts and deposits of these individuals with meticulous
care.

Same; Same; A bank’s liability as an obligor is not merely vicarious, but primary
since they are expected to observe an equally high degree of diligence, not
only in the selection, but also in the supervision of its employees.―Considering
that banks can only act through their officers and employees, the fiduciary
obligation laid down for these institutions necessarily extends to their employees.
Thus, banks must ensure that their employees observe the same high level of
integrity and performance for it is only through this that banks may meet and
comply with their own fiduciary duty. It has been repeatedly held that “a bank’s
liability as an obligor is not merely vicarious, but primary” since they are
expected to observe an equally high degree of diligence, not only in the
selection, but also in the supervision of its employees. Thus, even if it is their
9
employees who are negligent, the bank’s responsibility to its client remains
paramount making its liability to the same to be a direct one.

MARIANO C. MENDOZA and ELVIRA LIM, petitioners, vs. SPOUSES LEONORA J.

GOMEZ and GABRIEL V. GOMEZ, respondents. G.R. No. 160110. June 18, 2014

Civil Law; Quasi-Delicts; Proximate Cause; Words and Phrases; Proximate cause is
defined as that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by
any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result
would not have occurred.—Proximate cause is defined as that cause, which, in
natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause,
produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred. And
more comprehensively, the proximate legal cause is that acting first and
producing the injury, either immediately or by setting other events in motion, all
constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each having a close
causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain
immediately effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause
which first acted, under such circumstances that the person responsible for the
first event should, as an ordinary prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable
ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury to some
person might probably result therefrom.

Same; Same; According to Manresa, liability for personal acts and omissions is
founded on that indisputable principle of justice recognized by all legislations
that when a person by his act or omission causes damage or prejudice to
another, a juridical relation is created by virtue of which the injured person
acquires a right to be indemnified and the person causing the damage is
charged with the corresponding duty of repairing the damage.— Having settled
the fact of Mendoza’s negligence, then, the next question that confronts us is
who may be held liable. According to Manresa, liability for personal acts and
omissions is founded on that indisputable principle of justice recognized by all
legislations that when a person by his act or omission causes damage or
prejudice to another, a juridical relation is created by virtue of which the injured
person acquires a right to be indemnified and the person causing the damage is
charged with the corresponding duty of repairing the damage. The reason for
this is found in the obvious truth that man should subordinate his acts to the
precepts of prudence and if he fails to observe them and causes damage to
another, he must repair the damage. His negligence having caused the
damage, Mendoza is certainly liable to repair said damage.

Same; Same; Vicarious Liability; In our jurisdiction, vicarious liability or imputed

negligence is embodied in Article 2180 of the Civil Code and the basis for
damages in the action under said article is the direct and primary negligence of
the employer in the selection or supervision, or both, of his employee.—
Mendoza’s employer may also be held liable under the doctrine of vicarious
liability or imputed negligence. Under such doctrine, a person who has not
committed the act or omission which caused damage or injury to another may
nevertheless be held civilly liable to the latter either directly or subsidiarily under
certain circumstances. In our jurisdiction, vicarious liability or imputed negligence
is embodied in Article 2180 of the Civil Code and the basis for damages in the
action under said article is the direct and primary negligence of the employer in
the selection or supervision, or both, of his employee.
10
Same; Same; Same; In Filcar Transport Services v. Espinas, 674 SCRA 117 (2012),
the Supreme Court (SC) held that the registered owner is deemed the employer
of the negligent driver, and is thus vicariously liable under Article 2176, in relation
to Article 2180, of the Civil Code.—In Filcar Transport Services v. Espinas, 674
SCRA 117 (2012), we held that the registered owner is deemed the employer of
the negligent driver, and is thus vicariously liable under Article 2176, in relation to
Article 2180, of the Civil Code. Citing Equitable Leasing Corporation v. Suyom,
388 SCRA 445 (2002), the Court ruled that insofar as third persons are concerned,
the registered owner of the motor vehicle is the employer of the negligent driver,
and the actual employer is considered merely as an agent of such owner. Thus,
whether there is an employer-employee relationship between the registered
owner and the driver is irrelevant in determining the liability of the registered
owner who the law holds primarily and directly responsible for any accident,
injury or death caused by the operation of the vehicle in the streets and
highways.

Same; Same; Same; With the enactment of the motor vehicle registration law,
the defenses available under Article 2180 of the Civil Code — that the employee
acts beyond the scope of his assigned task or that it exercised the due diligence
of a good father of a family to prevent damage — are no longer available to
the registered owner of the motor vehicle, because the motor vehicle
registration law, to a certain extent, modified Article 2180.—Generally, when an
injury is caused by the negligence of a servant or employee, there instantly arises
a presumption of law that there was negligence on the part of the master or
employer either in the selection of the servant or employee (culpa in eligiendo)
or in the supervision over him after the selection (culpa vigilando), or both. The
presumption is juris tantum and not juris et de jure; consequently, it may be
rebutted. Accordingly, the general rule is that if the employer shows to the
satisfaction of the court that in the selection and supervision of his employee he
has exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a family, the
presumption is overcome and he is relieved of liability. However, with the
enactment of the motor vehicle registration law, the defenses available under
Article 2180 of the Civil Code — that the employee acts beyond the scope of his
assigned task or that it exercised the due diligence of a good father of a family
to prevent damage — are no longer available to the registered owner of the
motor vehicle, because the motor vehicle registration law, to a certain extent,
modified Article 2180.

Same; Same; Unjust Enrichment; Under the civil law principle of unjust
enrichment, the registered owner of the motor vehicle has a right to be
indemnified by the actual employer of the driver; and under Article 2181 of the
Civil Code, whoever pays for the damage caused by his dependents or
employees may recover from the latter what he has paid or delivered in
satisfaction of the claim.—As such, there can be no other conclusion but to hold
Lim vicariously liable with Mendoza. This does not mean, however, that Lim is left
without any recourse against Enriquez and Mendoza. Under the civil law
principle of unjust enrichment, the registered owner of the motor vehicle has a
right to be indemnified by the actual employer of the driver; and under Article
2181 of the Civil Code, whoever pays for the damage caused by his dependents
or employees may recover from the latter what he has paid or delivered in
satisfaction of the claim.
11
Same; Same; Damages; Article 2202 of the Civil Code provides that in crimes
and quasi-delicts, the defendant shall be liable for all damages which are the
natural and probable consequences of the act or omission complained of.—
Article 2202 of the Civil Code provides that in crimes and quasi -delicts, the
defendant shall be liable for all damages which are the natural and probable
consequences of the act or omission complained of. It is not necessary that such
damages have been foreseen or could have reasonably been foreseen by the
defendant. Article 2199 of the same Code, however, sets the limitation that,
except as provided by law or by stipulation, one is entitled to an adequate
compensation only for such pecuniary loss suffered by him as he has duly
proved. As such, to warrant an award of actual or compensatory damages, the
claimant must prove that the damage sustained is the natural and probable
consequences of the negligent act and, moreover, the claimant must
adequately prove the amount of such damage.

R TRANSPORT CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. LUISITO G. YU, respondent. G.R. No.

174161. February 18, 2015

Civil Law; Quasi-Delicts; Negligence; Words and Phrases; Negligence has been
defined as “the failure to observe for the protection of the interests of another
person that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which the circumstances
justly demand, whereby such other person suffers injury.”— Both the trial and
appellate courts found driver Gimena negligent in hitting and running over the
victim and ruled that his negligence was the proximate cause of her death.
Negligence has been defined as “the failure to observe for the protection of the
interests of another person that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which
the circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person suffers injury.”
Verily, foreseeability is the fundamental test of negligence. It is the omission to do
something which a reasonable man, guided by those considerations which
ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or the doing of
something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do.

Same; Same; Same; Vicarious Liability; Once negligence on the part of the
employee is established, a presumption instantly arises that the employer was
remiss in the selection and/or supervision of the negligent employee.—Under
Article 2180 of the New Civil Code, employers are liable for the damages caused
by their employees acting within the scope of their assigned tasks. Once
negligence on the part of the employee is established, a presumption instantly
arises that the employer was remiss in the selection and/or supervision of the
negligent employee. To avoid liability for the quasi-delict committed by its
employee, it is incumbent upon the employer to rebut this presumption by
presenting adequate and convincing proof that it exercised the care and
diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of its
employees.

Same; Same; Same; Same; The liability of the employer for the negligent
conduct of its subordinate is direct and primary, subject only to the defense of
due diligence in the selection and supervision of the employee.—It must be
noted that the case at hand does not involve a breach of contract of carriage,
as in Tamayo v. Aquino, 105 Phil. 949 (1959), but a tort or quasi-delict under
Article 2176, in relation to Article 2180 of the New Civil Code. As such, the liability
12
for which petitioner is being made responsible actually arises not from a
preexisting contractual relation between petitioner and the deceased, but from
a damage caused by the negligence of its employee. Petitioner cannot,
therefore, rely on our ruling in Tamayo and escape its solidary liability for the
liability of the employer for the negligent conduct of its subordinate is direct and
primary, subject only to the defense of due diligence in the selection and
supervision of the employee.

Same; Same; Solidary Liability; The Supreme Court (SC) has consistently been of
the view that it is for the better protection of the public for both the owner of
record and the actual operator to be adjudged jointly and severally liable with
the driver.—Indeed, this Court has consistently been of the view that it is for the
better protection of the public for both the owner of record and the actual
operator to be adjudged jointly and severally liable with the driver. As aptly
stated by the appellate court, “the principle of holding the registered owner
liable for damages notwithstanding that ownership of the offending vehicle has
already been transferred to another is designed to protect the public and not as
a shield on the part of unscrupulous transferees of the vehicle to take refuge in,
in order to free itself from liability arising from its own negligent act.”

NOEL CASUMPANG, RUBY SANGA-MIRANDA and SAN JUAN DE DIOS HOSPITAL,

petitioners, vs. NELSON CORTEJO, respondent. G.R. No. 171127. March 11, 2015

Civil Law; Quasi-Delicts; Medical Malpractice; Negligence; To successfully pursue

a medical malpractice suit, the plaintiff (in this case, the deceased patient’s
heir) must prove that the doctor either failed to do what a reasonably prudent
doctor would have done, or did what a reasonably prudent doctor would not
have done; and the act or omission had caused injury to the patient.—The claim
for damages is based on the petitioning doctors’ negligence in diagnosing and
treating the deceased Edmer, the child of the respondent. It is a medical
malpractice suit, an action available to victims to redress a wrong committed by
medical professionals who caused bodily harm to, or the death of, a patient. As
the term is used, the suit is brought whenever a medical practitioner or health
care provider fails to meet the standards demanded by his profession, or
deviates from this standard, and causes injury to the patient. To successfully
pursue a medical malpractice suit, the plaintiff (in this case, the deceased
patient’s heir) must prove that the doctor either failed to do what a reasonably
prudent doctor would have done, or did what a reasonably prudent doctor
would not have done; and the act or omission had caused injury to the patient.
The patient’s heir/s bears the burden of proving his/her cause of action.

Same; Same; Same; Physician-Patient Relationship; A physician-patient

relationship is created when a patient engages the services of a physician, and
the latter accepts or agrees to provide care to the patient; The mere fact that
an individual approaches a physician and seeks diagnosis, advice or treatment
does not create the duty of care unless the physician agrees.—The elements of
medical negligence are: (1) duty; (2) breach; (3) injury; and (4) proximate
causation. Duty refers to the standard of behavior that imposes restrictions on
one’s conduct. It requires proof of professional relationship between the
physician and the patient. Without the professional relationship, a physician
owes no duty to the patient, and cannot therefore incur any liability. A
physician-patient relationship is created when a patient engages the services of
13
a physician, and the latter accepts or agrees to provide care to the patient. The
establishment of this relationship is consensual, and the acceptance by the
physician essential. The mere fact that an individual approaches a physician
and seeks diagnosis, advice or treatment does not create the duty of care unless
the physician agrees.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Once a physician-patient relationship is established,

the legal duty of care follows. The doctor accordingly becomes duty-bound to
use at least the same standard of care that a reasonably competent doctor
would use to treat a medical condition under similar circumstances.—Once a
physician-patient relationship is established, the legal duty of care follows. The
doctor accordingly becomes duty-bound to use at least the same standard of
care that a reasonably competent doctor would use to treat a medical
condition under similar circumstances. Breach of duty occurs when the doctor
fails to comply with, or improperly performs his duties under professional
standards. This determination is both factual and legal, and is specific to each
individual case. If the patient, as a result of the breach of duty, is injured in body
or in health, actionable malpractice is committed, entitling the patient to
damages. To successfully claim damages, the patient must lastly prove the
causal relation between the negligence and the injury. This connection must be
direct, natural, and should be unbroken by any intervening efficient causes. In
other words, the negligence must be the proximate cause of the injury. The injury
or damage is proximately caused by the physician’s negligence when it
appears, based on the evidence and the expert testimony, that the negligence
played an integral part in causing the injury or damage, and that the injury or
damage was either a direct result, or a reasonably probable consequence of
the physician’s negligence.

Same; Same; Same; As a rule, hospitals are not liable for the negligence of its
independent contractors.—Despite the absence of employer-employee
relationship between SJDH and the petitioning doctors, SJDH is not free from
liability. As a rule, hospitals are not liable for the negligence of its independent
contractors. However, it may be found liable if the physician or independent
contractor acts as an ostensible agent of the hospital. This exception is also
known as the “doctrine of apparent authority.”

Civil Law; Hospitals; Vicarious Liability; A hospital can be held vicariously liable for
the negligent acts of a physician (or an independent contractor) providing care
at the hospital if the plaintiff can prove these two (2) factors: first, the hospital’s
manifestations; and second, the patient’s reliance.—A hospital can be held
vicariously liable for the negligent acts of a physician (or an independent
contractor) providing care at the hospital if the plaintiff can prove these two
factors: first, the hospital’s manifestations; and second, the patient’s reliance.

Same; Quasi-Delicts; Medical Malpractice; Health Care Plans; The only effect of
the availment of her Fortune Care card benefits is that her choice of physician is
limited only to physicians who are accredited with Fortune Care. Thus, her use of
health care plan in this case only limited the choice of doctors (or coverage of
services, amount etc.) and not the liability of doctors or the hospital.—We also
stress that Mrs. Cortejo’s use of health care plan (Fortune Care) did not affect
SJDH’s liability. The only effect of the availment of her Fortune Care card benefits
is that her choice of physician is limited only to physicians who are accredited
14
with Fortune Care. Thus, her use of health care plan in this case only limited the
choice of doctors (or coverage of services, amount etc.) and not the liability of
doctors or the hospital.

CARAVAN TRAVEL AND TOURS INTERNATIONAL, INC., petitioner, vs. ERMILINDA R.

ABEJAR, respondent. G.R. No. 170631. February 10, 2016.

Civil Law; Persons and Family Relations; Substitute Parental Authority; Article 233
of the Family Code provides for the extent of authority of persons exercising
substitute parental authority, that is, the same as those of actual parents.—Article
233 of the Family Code provides for the extent of authority of persons exercising
substitute parental authority, that is, the same as those of actual parents: Art.
233. The person exercising substitute parental authority shall have the same
authority over the person of the child as the parents. (Emphasis supplied) Both of
Reyes’ parents are already deceased. Reyes’paternal grandparents are also
both deceased. The whereabouts of Reyes’ maternal grandparents are
unknown. There is also no record that Reyes has brothers or sisters. It was under
these circumstances that respondent took custody of Reyes when she was a
child, assumed the role of Reyes’ parents, and thus, exercised substitute parental
authority over her. As Reyes’ custodian, respondent exercised the full extent of
the statutorily recognized rights and duties of a parent. Consistent with Article
220 of the Family Code, respondent supported Reyes’ education and provided
for her personal needs. To echo respondent’s words in her Complaint, she
treated Reyes as if she were her own daughter.

Same; Quasi-Delicts; Damages; In interpreting Article 1902 of the old Civil Code,
which is substantially similar to the first sentence of Article 2176 of the Civil Code,
the Supreme Court (SC) in The Receiver For North Negros Sugar Company, Inc. v.
Ybañez, et al., 24 SCRA 979 (1968), ruled that brothers and sisters may recover
damages, except moral damages, for the death of their sibling.—We note that
Reyes was already 18 years old when she died. Having reached the age of
majority, she was already emancipated upon her death. While parental
authority is terminated upon emancipation, respondent continued to support
and care for Reyes even after she turned 18. Except for the legal technicality of
Reyes’ emancipation, her relationship with respondent remained the same. The
anguish and damage caused to respondent by Reyes’ death was no different
because of Reyes’ emancipation. In any case, the termination of respondent’s
parental authority
is not an insurmountable legal bar that precludes the filing of her Complaint. In
interpreting Article 1902 of the old Civil Code, which is substantially similar to the
first sentence of Article 2176 of the Civil Code, this court in The Receiver For North
Negros Sugar Company, Inc. v. Ybañez, et al., 24 SCRA 979 (1968), ruled that
brothers and sisters may recover damages, except moral damages, for the
death of their sibling. This court declared that Article 1902 of the old Civil Code
(now Article 2176) is broad enough to accommodate even plaintiffs who are not
relatives of the deceased.

Same; Same; Vicarious Liability; Article 2180 requires proof of two (2) things: first,
an employment relationship between the driver and the owner; and second,
that the driver acted within the scope of his or her assigned tasks.—The resolution
of this case must considertwo (2) rules. First, Article 2180’s specification that
“[e]mployers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees . . .
15
acting within the scope of their assigned tasks[.]” Second, the operation of the
registeredowner rule that registered owners are liable for death or injuries caused
by the operation of their vehicles. These rules appear to be in conflict when it
comes to cases in which the employer is also the registered owner of a vehicle.
Article 2180 requires proof of two things: first, an employment relationship
between the driver and the owner; and second, that the driver acted within the
scope of his or her assigned tasks. On the other hand, applying the registered-
owner rule only requires the plaintiff to prove that the defendant-employer is the
registered owner of the vehicle. The registered-owner rule was articulated as
early as 1957 in Erezo, et al. v. Jepte, 102 Phil. 103, where this court explained that
the registration of motor vehicles, as required by Section 5(a) of Republic Act No.
4136, the Land Transportation and Traffic Code, was necessary “not to make said
registration the operative act by which ownership in vehicles is transferred, . . .
but to permit the use and operation of the vehicle upon any public highway[.]”
Its “main aim . . . is to identify the owner so that if any accident happens, or that
any damage or injury is caused by the vehicle on the public highways,
responsibility therefor can be fixed on a definite individual, the registered owner.”

Same; Same; Same; The source of a registered owner’s liability is not a distinct
statutory provision, but remains to be Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code.—
Aguilar, Sr. v. Commercial Savings Bank, 360 SCRA 395 (2001), Del Carmen, Jr. v.
Bacoy, 671 SCRA 91 (2012), Filcar Transport Services v. Espinas, 674 SCRA 117
(2012), and Mendoza v. Spouses Gomez, 726 SCRA 505 (2014), should not be
taken to mean that Article 2180 of the Civil Code should be completely
discarded in cases where the registered owner rule finds application. As
acknowledged in Filcar, there is no categorical statutory pronouncement in the
Land Transportation and Traffic Code stipulating the liability of a registered
owner. The source of a registered owner’s liability is not a distinct statutory
provision, but remains to be Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code: While
Republic Act No. 4136 or the Land Transportation and Traffic Code does not
contain any provision on the liability of registered owners in case of motor
vehicle mishaps, Article 2176, in relation with Article 2180, of the Civil Code
imposes an obligation upon Filcar, as registered owner, to answer for the
damages caused to Espinas’ car. Thus, it isimperative to apply the registered-
owner rule in a manner that harmonizes it with Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil
Code. Rules must be construed in a manner that will harmonize them with other
rules so as to form a uniform and consistent system of jurisprudence. In light of
this, the words used in Del Carmen are particularly notable. There, this court
stated that Article 2180 “should defer to” the registered-owner rule. It never
stated that Article 2180 should be totally abandoned.

Same; Same; Same; The appropriate approach is that in cases where both the
registered-owner rule and Article 2180 apply, the plaintiff must first establish that
the employer is the registered owner of the vehicle in question.—The appropriate
approach is that in cases where both the registered-owner rule and Article 2180
apply, the plaintiff must first establish that the employer is the registered owner of
the vehicle in question. Once the plaintiff successfully proves ownership, there
arises a disputable presumption that the requirements of Article 2180 have been
proven. As a consequence, the burden of proof shifts to the defendant to show
that no liability under Article 2180 has arisen. This disputable presumption, insofar
as the registered owner of the vehicle in relation to the actual driver is
concerned, recognizes that between the owner and the victim, it is the former
16
that should carry the costs of moving forward with the evidence. The victim is, in
many cases, a hapless pedestrian or motorist with hardly any means to uncover
the employment relationship of the owner and the driver, or any act that the
owner may have done in relation to that employment.

Same; Same; Same; Employing a person holding a nonprofessional driver’s

license to operate another’s motor vehicle violates Section 24 of the Land
Transportation and Traffic Code.—Employing a person holding a nonprofessional
driver’s license to operate another’s motor vehicle violates Section 24 of the
Land Transportation and Traffic Code, which provides: SEC. 24. Use of driver’s
license and badge.—. . . . . . . No owner of a motor vehicle shall engage,
employ, or hire any person to operate such motor vehicle, unless the person
sought to be employed is a duly licensed professional driver. Evidently, petitioner
did not only fail to exercise due diligence when it selected Bautista as service
driver; it also committed an actual violation of law.

Same; Same; Same; The liability imposed on the registered owner is direct and
primary.—Petitioner’s argument that it should be excused from liability because
Bautista was already dropped as a party is equally unmeritorious. The liability
imposed on the registered owner is direct and primary. It does not depend on
the inclusion of the negligent driver in the action. Agreeing to petitioner’s
assertion would render impotent the rationale of the motor registration law in
fixing liability on a definite person. Bautista, the driver, was not an indispensable
party under Rule 3, Section 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Rather, he was
a necessary party under Rule 3, Section 8. Instead of insisting that Bautista — who
was nothing more than a necessary party — should not have been dropped as
a defendant, or that petitioner, along with Bautista, should have been dropped,
petitioner (as a codefendant insisting that the action must proceed with Bautista
as party) could have opted to file a cross-claim against Bautista as its remedy.
The 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure spell out the rules on joinder of indispensable
and necessary parties. These are intended to afford “a complete determination
of all possible issues, not only between the parties themselves but also as regards
to other persons who may be affected by the judgment.”

Same; Same; Same; Like natural parents, persons exercising substitute parental
authority are required to, among others, keep their wards in their company,
provide for their upbringing, show them love and affection, give them advice
and counsel, and provide them with companionship and understanding.—For
deaths caused by quasi-delict, the recovery of moral damages is limited to the
spouse, legitimate and illegitimate descendants, and ascendants of the
deceased. Persons exercising substitute parental authority are to be considered
ascendants for the purpose of awarding moral damages. Persons exercising
substitute parental authority are intended to stand in place of a child’s parents in
order to ensure the well-being and welfare of a child. Like natural parents,
persons exercising substitute parental authority are required to, among others,
keep their wards in their company, provide for their upbringing, show them love
and affection, give them advice and counsel, and provide them with
companionship and understanding. For their part, wards shall always observe
respect and obedience towards the person exercising parental authority. The
law forges a relationship between the ward and the person exercising substitute
parental authority such that the death or injury of one results in the damage or
prejudice of the other.
17
Same; Same; Substitute Parental Authority; Moral Damages; Given the policy
underlying Articles 216 and 220 of the Family Code as well as the purposes for
awarding moral damages, a person exercising substitute parental authority is
rightly considered an ascendant of the deceased, within the meaning of Article
2206(3) of the Civil Code.—Moral damages are awarded to compensate the
claimant for his or her actual injury, and not to penalize the wrongdoer. Moral
damages enable the injured party to alleviate the moral suffering resulting from
the defendant’s actions. It aims to restore — to the extent possible — “the
spiritual status quo ante[.]” Given the policy underlying Articles 216 and 220 of
the Family Code as well as the purposes for awarding moral damages, a person
exercising substitute parental authority is rightly considered an ascendant of the
deceased, within the meaning of Article 2206(3) of the Civil Code. Hence,
respondent is entitled to moral damages.

Revised Motor Vehicle Law; Motor Vehicles; View that the Revised Motor Vehicle
Law requires vehicles to be registered before they may be used in any public
highway.—As early as 1957, this Court held in Erezo v. Jepte, 102 Phil. 103, that a
vehicle’s registered owner is primarily responsible for the damage caused to
another person. The Revised Motor Vehicle Law requires vehicles to be registered
before they may be used in any public highway. The Court stressed that the
main purpose of the registration is to identify the owner so that if any accident
happens or damage is caused on the public highways, responsibility can be
fixed on a definite individual — the registered owner.

Same; Vicarious Liability; View that the vicarious liability remains with the
registered owner even when the vehicle had been sold to another person
before the accident but the registration has not yet been transferred. —In Filcar
Transport Services v. Espinas, 674 SCRA 117 (2012), the Court had the opportunity
to discuss the interplay between Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code and the
registered owner rule. The Court ruled that the registered owner of a vehicle is
deemed the employer of the vehicle’s driver. Thus, the vehicle’s registered
owner is vicariously liable for the driver’s negligent acts pursuant to Articles 2176
and Article 2180 of the Civil Code. The vicarious liability remains with the
registered owner even when the vehicle had been sold to another person
before the accident but the registration has not yet been transferred. The Court
emphasized in R Transport Corporation v. Yu, 750 SCRA 696 (2015), thatthe
employer’s liability for the negligent acts of its subordinate is direct and primary.

DRA. MERCEDES OLIVER, petitioner, vs. PHILIPPINE SAVINGS BANK and LILIA
CASTRO, respondents. G.R. No. 214567. April 4, 2016

Civil Law; Vicarious Liability; Solidary Liability; The bank should be solidarily liable
with its employee for the damages committed to its depositor. Under Article 2180
of the Civil Code, employers shall be held primarily and solidarily liable for
damages caused by their employees acting within the scope of their assigned
tasks.—Indeed, the bank should be solidarily liable with its employee for the
damages committed to its depositor. Under Article 2180 of the Civil Code,
employers shall be held primarily and solidarily liable for damages caused by
their employees acting within the scope of their assigned tasks. Castro, as acting
branch manager of PSBank was able to facilitate the questionable transaction
as she was also entrusted with Oliver’s passbook. In other words, Castro was the
18
representative of PSBank, and, at the same time, the agent of Oliver, earning
commissions from their transactions. Oddly, PSBank, either consciously or through
sheer negligence, allowed the double dealings of its employee with its client.
Such carelessness and lack of protection of the depositors from its own
employees led to the unlawful withdrawal of the P7 million from Oliver’s account.
Although Castro was eventually terminated by PSBank because of certain
problems regarding client accommodation and loss of confidence, the damage
to Oliver had already been done. Thus, both Castro and PSBank must be held
solidarily liable.

Same; Culpa Contractual; Damages; Moral Damages; In culpa contractual or

breach of contract, like in the present case, moral damages are recoverable
only if the defendant has acted fraudulently or in bad faith, or is found guilty of
gross negligence amounting to bad faith, or in wanton disregard of his
contractual obligations.—The award of moral damages must also be upheld.
Specifically, in culpa contractual or breach of contract, like in the present case,
moral damages are recoverable only if the defendant has acted fraudulently or
in bad faith, or is found guilty of gross negligence amounting to bad faith, or in
wanton disregard of his contractual obligations. Verily, the breach must be
wanton, reckless, malicious, or in bad faith, oppressive or abusive. Here, Castro
and PSBank were utterly reckless in allowing the withdrawal of a huge amount
from Oliver’s account without her consent. The bank’s negligence is a result of
lack of due care and caution required of managers and employees of a firm
engaged in a business so sensitive and demanding. Hence, the award of
P100,000.00 as moral damages is warranted.

OUR LADY OF LOURDES HOSPITAL, petitioner, vs. SPOUSES ROMEO and REGINA
CAPANZANA, respondents. G.R. No. 189218. March 22, 2017

Quasi-delicts; Medical Negligence; In order to successfully pursue a claim in a

medical negligence case, the plaintiff must prove that a health professional
either failed to do something which a reasonably prudent health professional
would have or have not done; and that the action or omission caused injury to
the patient.—In order to successfully pursue a claim in a medical negligence
case, the plaintiff must prove that a health professional either failed to do
something which a reasonably prudent health professional would have or have
not done; and that the action or omission caused injury to the patient.
Proceeding from this guideline, the plaintiff must show the following elements by
a preponderance of evidence: duty of the health professional, breach of that
duty, injury of the patient, and proximate causation between the breach and
the injury. Meanwhile, in fixing a standard by which a court may determine
whether the physician properly performed the requisite duty toward the patient,
expert medical testimonies from both plaintiff and defense are resorted to. In this
case, the expert testimony of witness for the respondent Dr. Godfrey Robeniol, a
neurosurgeon, provided that the best time to treat hypoxic encephalopathy is at
the time of its occurrence; i.e., when the patient is experiencing difficulty in
breathing and showing signs of cardiac arrest.

Same; Same; The Supreme Court (SC) has emphasized that a higher degree of
caution and an exacting standard of diligence in patient management and
health care are required of a hospital’s staff, as they deal with the lives of
patients who seek urgent medical assistance.—We agree with the courts below
19
in their finding that when she was gasping for breath and turning cyanotic, it was
the duty of the nurses to intervene immediately by informing the resident doctor.
Had they done so, proper oxygenation could have been restored and other
interventions performed without wasting valuable time. That such high degree of
care and responsiveness was needed cannot be overemphasized —
considering that according to expert medical evidence in the records, it takes
only five minutes of oxygen deprivation for irreversible brain damage to set in.
Indeed, the Court has emphasized that a higher degree of caution and an
exacting standard of diligence in patient management and health care are
required of a hospital’s staff, as they deal with the lives of patients who seek
urgent medical assistance. It is incumbent upon nurses to take precautions or
undertake steps to safeguard patients under their care from any possible injury
that may arise in the course of the latter’s treatment and care.

Same; Same; There was a delay in the administration of oxygen to the patient,
caused by the delayed response of the nurses of petitioner hospital. —The Court
further notes that the immediate response of the nurses was especially
imperative, since Regina herself had asked for oxygen. They should have been
prompted to respond immediately when Regina herself expressed her needs,
especially in that emergency situation when it was not easy to determine with
certainty the cause of her breathing difficulty. Indeed, even if the patient had
not asked for oxygen, the mere fact that her breathing was labored to an
abnormal degree should have impelled the nurses to immediately call the
doctor and to administer oxygen. In this regard, both courts found that there was
a delay in the administration of oxygen to the patient, caused by the delayed
response of the nurses of petitioner hospital. They committed a breach of their
duty to respond immediately to the needs of Regina, considering her precarious
situation and her physical manifestations of oxygen deprivation.

Same; Same; The records also show another instance of negligence, such as the
delay in the removal of Regina’s consumed dextrose, a condition that was
already causing her discomfort.—The records also show another instance of
negligence, such as the delay in the removal of Regina’s consumed dextrose, a
condition that was already causing her discomfort. In fact, Balad had to inform
the nurses and the patient had to instruct one of them, on what to do.

Same; Same; Proximate Cause; A failure to act may be the proximate cause if it
plays a substantial part in bringing about an injury.—We affirm the findings of the
courts below that the negligent delay on the part of the nurses was the
proximate cause of the brain damage suffered by Regina. In Ramos v. Court of
Appeals, 321 SCRA 584 (1999), the Court defines proximate cause as follows:
Proximate cause has been defined as that which, in natural and continuous
sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces injury, and
without which the result would not have occurred. An injury or damage is
proximately caused by an act or a failure to act, whenever it appears from the
evidence in the case, that the act or omission played a substantial part in
bringing aboutor actually causing the injury or damage; and that the injury or
damage was either a direct result or a reasonably probable consequence of the
act or omission. It is the dominant, moving or producing cause. (Underscoring
supplied; citations omitted) Thus, a failure to act may be the proximate cause if it
plays a substantial part in bringing about an injury. Note also that the omission to
perform a duty may also constitute the proximate cause of an injury, but only
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where the omission would have prevented the injury. The Court also emphasizes
that the injury need only be a reasonably probable consequence of the failure
to act. In other words, there is no need for absolute certainty that the injury is a
consequence of the omission. Applying the above definition to the facts in the
present case, the omission of the nurses — their failure to check on Regina and
to refer her to the resident doctor and, thereafter, to immediately provide
oxygen — was clearly the proximate cause that led to the brain damage
suffered by the patient. As the trial court and the CA both held, had the nurses
promptly responded, oxygen would have been immediately administered to her
and the risk of brain damage lessened, if not avoided.

Same; Same; Vicarious Liability; For the negligence of its nurses, petitioner is thus
liable under Article 2180 in relation to Article 2176 of the Civil Code. Under Article
2180, an employer like petitioner hospital may be held liable for the negligence
of its employees based on its responsibility under a relationship of patria
potestas.—For the negligence of its nurses, petitioner is thus liable under Article
2180 in relation to Article 2176 of the Civil Code. Under Article 2180, an employer
like petitioner hospital may be held liable for the negligence of its employees
based on its responsibility under a relationship of patria potestas. The liability of
the employer under this provision is “direct and immediate; it is not conditioned
upon a prior recourse against the negligent employee or a prior showing of the
insolvency of that employee.” The employer may only be relieved of
responsibility upon a showing that it exercised the diligence of a good father of
a family in the selection and supervision of its employees. The rule is that once
negligence of the employee is shown, the burden is on the employer to
overcome the presumption of negligence on the latter’s part by proving
observance of the required diligence.

Same; Same; Same; While the question of diligent supervision depends on the
circumstances of employment, the Supreme Court(SC) finds that by the very
nature of a hospital, the proper supervision of the attendance of its nurses, who
are its frontline health professionals, is crucial considering that patients’
conditions can change drastically in a matter of minutes.—There is no proof of
actual supervision of the employees’ work or actual implementation and
monitoring of consistent compliance with the rules. The testimony of petitioner’s
Assistant Nursing Service Director, Lourdes H. Nicolas is belied by the actual
records of petitioner. These show that Nurses David and Padolina had been
observed to be latecomers and absentees; yet they were never sanctioned by
those supposedly supervising them. While the question of diligent supervision
depends on the circumstances of employment, we find that by the very nature
of a hospital, the proper supervision of the attendance of its nurses, who are its
frontline health professionals, is crucial considering that
patients’ conditions can change drastically in a matter of minutes. Petitioner’s
Employee Handbook recognized exactly this as it decreed the proper
procedure in availing of unavoidable absences and the commensurate
penalties of verbal reprimand, written warning, suspension from work, and
dismissal in instances of unexcused absence or tardiness. Petitioner’s failure to
sanction the tardiness of the defendant nurses shows an utter lack of actual
implementation and monitoring of compliance with the rules and ultimately of
supervision over its nurses.

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JOHN E.R. REYES and MERWIN JOSEPH REYES, petitioners, vs. ORICO DOCTOLERO,
ROMEO AVILA, GRANDEUR SECURITY AND SERVICES CORPORATION, and MAKATI
CINEMA SQUARE, respondents. G.R. No. 185597. August 2, 2017

Civil Law; Quasi-Delicts; Vicarious Liability; As a general rule, one is only

responsible for his own act or omission; One exception is an employer who is
made vicariously liable for the tort committed by his employee under paragraph
5 of Article 2180.—As a general rule, one is only responsible for his own act or
omission. This general rule is laid down in Article 2176 of the Civil Code, which
provides: Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another,
there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such
fault or negligence, if there is no preexisting contractual relation between the
parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
The law, however, provides for exceptions when it makes certain persons liable
for the act or omission of another. One exception is an employer who is made
vicariously liable for the tort committed by his employee under paragraph 5 of
Article 2180. Here, although the employer is not the actual tortfeasor, the law
makes him vicariously liable on the basis of the civil law principle of pater familias
for failure to exercise due care and vigilance over the acts of one’s subordinates
to prevent damage to another. It must be stressed, however, that the above rule
is applicable only if there is an employer-employee relationship. This employer-
employee relationship cannot be presumed but must be sufficiently proven by
the plaintiff. The plaintiff must also show that the employee was acting within the
scope of his assigned task when the tort complained of was committed. It is only
then that the defendant, as employer, may find it necessary to interpose the
defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision of employees.

Same; Same; Same; Employer-Employee Relationship; In the absence of

employer-employee relationship, vicarious liability under Article 2180 of the Civil
Code cannot apply.—In Mamaril v. The Boy Scout of the Philippines, 688 SCRA
437 (2013), we found that there was no employer-employee relationship
between Boy Scout of the Philippines (BSP) and the security guards assigned to it
by an agency pursuant to a Guard Service Contract. In the absence of such
relationship, vicarious liability under Article 2180 of the Civil Code cannot apply
as against BSP. Similarly, we find no employer-employee relationship between
MCS and respondent guards. The guards were merely assigned by Grandeur to
secure MCS’ premises pursuant to their Contract of Guard Services. Thus, MCS
cannot be held vicariously liable for damages caused by these guards’ acts or
omissions.

Same; Same; Same; When the employee causes damage due to his own
negligence while performing his own duties, there arises the juris tantum
presumption that the employer is negligent, rebuttable only by proof of
observance of the diligence of a good father of a family. The “diligence of a
good father” referred to in the last paragraph of Article 2180 means diligence in
the selection and supervision of employees.—Paragraph 5 of Article 2180 of the
Civil Code may be applicable to Grandeur, it being undisputed that respondent
guards were its employees. When the employee causes damage due to his own
negligence while performing his own duties, there arises the juris tantum
presumption that the employer is negligent, rebuttable only by proof of
observance of the diligence of a good father of a family. The “diligence of a
good father” referred to in the last paragraph of Article 2180 means diligence in
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the selection and supervision of employees. To rebut the presumption of
negligence, Grandeur must prove two things: first, that it had exercised due
diligence in the selection of respondents Doctolero and Avila, and second, that
after hiring Doctolero and Avila, Grandeur had exercised due diligence in
supervising them.

Same; Same; Same; In Metro Manila Transit Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 223
SCRA 521 (1993), the Supreme Court (SC) found that “[p]etitioner’s attempt to
prove its diligentissimi patris familias in the selection and supervision of employees
through oral evidence must fail as it was unable to buttress the same with any
other evidence, object or documentary, which might obviate the apparent
biased nature of the testimony.”—In Metro Manila Transit Corporation v. Court of
Appeals, 223 SCRA 521 (1993), the Court found that “[p]etitioner’s attempt to
prove its diligentissimi patris familias in the selection and supervision of employees
through oral evidence must fail as it was unable to buttress the same with any
other evidence, object or documentary, which might obviate the apparent
biased nature of the testimony.” There, the supposed clearances, results of
seminars and tests which Leonardo allegedly submitted and complied with were
never presented in court despite the fact that, if true, then they were obviously in
the possession and control of Metro Manila Transit Corporation (MMTC).
Subsequently, in a different case also involving MMTC, the Court held that “in a
trial involving the issue of vicarious liability, employers must submit concrete proof,
including documentary evidence.”

Same; Same; Same; Ordinarily, evidence demonstrating that the employer has
exercised diligent supervision of its employee during the performance of the
latter’s assigned tasks would be enough to relieve him of the liability imposed by
Article 2180, in relation to Article 2176 of the Civil Code.—The question of diligent
supervision, however, depends on the circumstances of employment. Ordinarily,
evidence demonstrating that the employer has exercised diligent supervision of
its employee during the performance of the latter’s assigned tasks would be
enough to relieve him of the liability imposed by Article 2180, in relation to Article
2176 of the Civil Code. Here, Grandeur’s HRD head, Ungui, likewise testified on
Grandeur’s standard operational procedures, showing the means by which
Grandeur conducts close and regular supervision over the security guards
assigned to their various clients. Grandeur also submitted as evidence
certificates of attendance to various seminars and the memoranda both those
commending respondents for their good works and reprimanding them for
violations of various company policies. We agree with the CA that these may be
considered, as they are related to the documents and testimonies adduced
during trial to show Grandeur’s diligence in the supervision of the actual work
performance of its employees. Considering all the evidence borne by the
records, we find that Grandeur has sufficiently exercised the diligence of a good
father of a family in the selection and supervision of its employees. Hence,
having successfully overcome the legal presumption of negligence, it is relieved
of liability from the negligent acts of its employees, respondents Doctolero and
Avila.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. PORFERIO CULAS y RAGA,

accused-appellant. G.R. No. 211166. June 5, 2017

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Criminal Law; Extinction of Criminal Liability; Death of the Accused; Under
prevailing law and jurisprudence, accused-appellant’s death prior to his final
conviction by the Supreme Court (SC) renders dismissible the criminal case
against him.—Under prevailing law and jurisprudence, accused-appellant’s
death prior to his final conviction by the Court renders dismissible the criminal
case against him. Article 89(1) of the Revised Penal Code provides that criminal
liability is totally extinguished by the death of the accused, to wit: Article 89. How
criminal liability is totally extinguished. —Criminal liability is totally extinguished: 1.
By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to pecuniary
penalties, liability therefor is extinguished only when the death of the offender
occurs before final judgment.

Same; Same; Same; Civil Liability Arising from Crime; Upon accused-appellant’s
death pending appeal of his conviction, the criminal action is extinguished
inasmuch as there is no longer a defendant to stand as the accused; the civil
action instituted therein for the recovery of the civil liability ex delicto is ipso facto
extinguished, grounded as it is on the criminal action.—Upon accused-
appellant’s death pending appeal of his conviction, the criminal action is
extinguished inasmuch as there is no longer a defendant to stand as the
accused; the civil action instituted therein for the recovery of the civil liability ex
delicto is ipso facto extinguished, grounded as it is on the criminal action.
However, it is well to clarify that accused-appellant’s civil liability in connection
with his acts against the victim, AAA, may be based on sources other than
delicts; in which case, AAA may file a separate civil action against the estate of
accused-appellant, as may be warranted by law and procedural rules.

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