G.R. No.

L-12426 February 16, 1959 accordance with which the United States Patent Office has also prescribed a similar
PHILIPPINE LAWYER'S ASSOCIATION, petitioner,
vs.
CELEDONIO AGRAVA, in his capacity as Director of the Philippines Patent
Office, respondent.
Arturo A. Alafriz for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General Ambrosio Padilla and Solicitor Pacifico P. de Castro for
respondent.
MONTEMAYOR, J.:
This is the petition filed by the Philippine Lawyer's Association for prohibition and injunction
against Celedonio Agrava, in his capacity as Director of the Philippines Patent Office.
On may 27, 1957, respondent Director issued a circular announcing that he had scheduled for
June 27, 1957 an examination for the purpose of determining who are qualified to practice as
patent attorneys before the Philippines Patent Office, the said examination to cover patent
law and jurisprudence and the rules of practice before said office. According to the circular,
members of the Philippine Bar, engineers and other persons with sufficient scientific and
technical training are qualified to take the said examination. It would appear that heretofore,
respondent Director has been holding similar examinations.
It is the contention of the petitioner Philippine Lawyer's Association that one who has passed
the bar examinations and is licensed by the Supreme Court to practice law in the Philippines
and who is in good standing, is duly qualified to practice before the Philippines Patent Office,
and that consequently, the cat of the respondent Director requiring members of the
Philippine Bar in good standing to take and pass an examination given by the Patent Office as
a condition precedent to their being allowed to practice before said office, such as
representing applicants in the preparation and prosecution of applications for patent, is in
excess of his jurisdiction and is in violation of the law.
examination as that prescribed by respondent. . . .
Respondent further contends that just as the Patent law of the United States of America
authorizes the Commissioner of Patents to prescribe examinations to determine as to who
practice before the United States Patent Office, the respondent, is similarly authorized to do
so by our Patent Law, Republic Act No. 165.
Although as already stated, the Director of Patents, in the past, would appear to have been
holding tests or examinations the passing of which was imposed as a required qualification to
practice before the Patent Office, to our knowledge, this is the first time that the right of the
Director of Patents to do so, specially as regards members of the bar, has been questioned
formally, or otherwise put in issue. And we have given it careful thought and consideration.
The Supreme Court has the exclusive and constitutional power with respect to admission to
the practice of law in the Philippines 1 and to any member of the Philippine Bar in good
standing may practice law anywhere and before any entity, whether judicial or quasi-judicial
or administrative, in the Philippines. Naturally, the question arises as to whether or not
appearance before the patent Office and the preparation and the prosecution of patent
applications, etc., constitutes or is included in the practice of law.
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it
embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and
social proceedings, the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of
clients before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying. In general, all advice to
clients, and all action taken for them in matters connected with the law corporation
services, assessment and condemnation services contemplating an appearance
before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of a creditor's
claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in
attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have been held to constitute
law practice as do the preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where the
work done involves the determination by the trained legal mind of the legal effect
of facts and conditions. (5 Am. Jur. p. 262, 263). (Emphasis supplied).

In his answer, respondent Director, through the Solicitor General, maintains that the
Practice of law under modern conditions consists in no small part of work
prosecution of patent cases "does not involve entirely or purely the practice of law but
performed outside of any court and having no immediate relation to proceedings in
includes the application of scientific and technical knowledge and training, so much so that,
court. It embraces conveyancing, the giving of legal advice on a large variety of
as a matter of actual practice, the prosecution of patent cases may be handled not only by
subjects, and the preparation and execution of legal instruments covering an
lawyers, but also engineers and other persons with sufficient scientific and technical training
extensive field of business and trust relations and other affairs. Although these
who pass the prescribed examinations as given by the Patent Office; . . . that the Rules of
transactions may have no direct connection with court proceedings, they are
Court do not prohibit the Patent Office, or any other quasi-judicial body from requiring
always subject to become involved in litigation. They require in many aspects a high
further condition or qualification from those who would wish to handle cases before the
degree of legal skill, a wide experience with men and affairs, and great capacity for
Patent Office which, as stated in the preceding paragraph, requires more of an application of
adaptation to difficult and complex situations. These customary functions of an
scientific and technical knowledge than the mere application of provisions of law; . . . that the
attorney or counselor at law bear an intimate relation to the administration of
action taken by the respondent is in accordance with Republic Act No. 165, otherwise known
justice by the courts. No valid distinction, so far as concerns the question set forth
as the Patent Law of the Philippines, which similar to the United States Patent Law, in
in the order, can be drawn between that part which involves advice and drafting of
 instruments in his office. It is of importance to the welfare of the public that these
manifold customary functions be performed by persons possessed of adequate
learning and skill, of sound moral character, and acting at all times under the heavy
trust obligations to clients which rests upon all attorneys. (Moran, Comments on
the Rules of Court, Vol. 3 (1953 ed.), p. 665-666, citing In re Opinion of the Justices
(Mass.), 194 N.E. 313, quoted in Rhode Is. Bar Assoc. vs. Automobile Service Assoc.
(R. I. ) 179 A. 139, 144). (Emphasis ours).
In our opinion, the practice of law includes such appearance before the Patent Office, the
representation of applicants, oppositors, and other persons, and the prosecution of their
applications for patent, their oppositions thereto, or the enforcement of their rights in patent
cases. In the first place, although the transaction of business in the Patent Office involves the
use and application of technical and scientific knowledge and training, still, all such business
has to be rendered in accordance with the Patent Law, as well as other laws, including the
Rules and Regulations promulgated by the Patent Office in accordance with law. Not only this,
but practice before the Patent Office involves the interpretation and application of other laws
and legal principles, as well as the existence of facts to be established in accordance with the
law of evidence and procedure. For instance: Section 8 of our Patent Law provides that an
invention shall not be patentable if it is contrary to public order or morals, or to public health
or welfare. Section 9 says that an invention shall not be considered new or patentable if it
was known or used by others in the Philippines before the invention thereof by the inventor
named in any printed publication in the Philippines or any foreign country more than one
year before the application for a patent therefor, or if it had been in public use or on sale in
the Philippines for more than one year before the application for the patent therefor. Section
10 provides that the right to patent belongs to the true and actual inventor, his heirs, legal
representatives or assigns. Section 25 and 26 refer to connection of any mistake in a patent.
Section 28 enumerates the grounds for cancellation of a patent; that although any person
may apply for such cancellation, under Section 29, the Solicitor General is authorized to
petition for the cancellation of a patent. Section 30 mentions the requirements of a petition
for cancellation. Section 31 and 32 provide for a notice of hearing of the petition for
cancellation of the patent by the Director of Patents in case the said cancellation is
warranted. Under Section 34, at any time after the expiration of three years from the day the
patent was granted, any person patent on several grounds, such as, if the patented invention
is not being worked in the Philippines on a commercial scale, or if the demand for the
patented article in the Philippines on a commercial scale, or if the demand for the patented
article in the Philippines is not being met to an adequate extent and reasonable terms, or if
by reason of the patentee's refusal to grant a license on reasonable terms or by reason of the
condition attached by him to the license, purchase or use of the patented article or working
of the patented process or machine of production, the establishment of a new trade or
industry in the Philippines is prevented; or if the patent or invention relates to food or
medicine or is necessary to public health or public safety. All these things involve the
applications of laws, legal principles, practice and procedure. They call for legal knowledge,
training and experience for which a member of the bar has been prepared.
In support of the proposition that much of the business and many of the act, orders and
decisions of the Patent Director involve questions of law or a reasonable and correct
evaluation of facts, the very Patent Law, Republic Act No. 165, Section 61, provides that:
. . . . The applicant for a patent or for the registration of a design, any party to a
proceeding to cancel a patent or to obtain a compulsory license, and any party to
any other proceeding in the Office may appeal to the Supreme Court from any final
order or decision of the director.
In other words, the appeal is taken to this Tribunal. If the transaction of business in the Patent
Office and the acts, orders and decisions of the Patent Director involved exclusively or mostly
technical and scientific knowledge and training, then logically, the appeal should be taken not
to a court or judicial body, but rather to a board of scientists, engineers or technical men,
which is not the case.
Another aspect of the question involves the consideration of the nature of the functions and
acts of the Head of the Patent Office.
. . . . The Commissioner, in issuing or withholding patents, in reissues, interferences,
and extensions, exercises quasi-judicial functions. Patents are public records, and it
is the duty of the Commissioner to give authenticated copies to any person, on
payment of the legal fees. (40 Am. Jur. 537). (Emphasis supplied).
. . . . The Commissioner has the only original initiatory jurisdiction that exists up to
the granting and delivering of a patent, and it is his duty to decide whether the
patent is new and whether it is the proper subject of a patent; and his action in
awarding or refusing a patent is a judicial function. In passing on an application the
commissioner should decide not only questions of law, but also questions of fact, as
whether there has been a prior public use or sale of the article invented. . . . (60
C.J.S. 460). (Emphasis supplied).
The Director of Patents, exercising as he does judicial or quasi-judicial functions, it is
reasonable to hold that a member of the bar, because of his legal knowledge and training,
should be allowed to practice before the Patent Office, without further examination or other
qualification. Of course, the Director of Patents, if he deems it advisable or necessary, may
require that members of the bar practising before him enlist the assistance of technical men
and scientist in the preparation of papers and documents, such as, the drawing or technical
description of an invention or machine sought to be patented, in the same way that a lawyer
filing an application for the registration of a parcel of land on behalf of his clients, is required
to submit a plan and technical description of said land, prepared by a licensed surveyor.
But respondent Director claims that he is expressly authorized by the law to require persons
desiring to practice or to do business before him to submit an examination, even if they are
already members of the bar. He contends that our Patent Law, Republic Act No. 165, is
patterned after the United States Patent Law; and of the United States Patent Office in Patent
Cases prescribes an examination similar to that which he (respondent) has prescribed and
scheduled. He invites our attention to the following provisions of said Rules of Practice:
Registration of attorneys and agents. — A register of an attorneys and a register
agents are kept in the Patent Office on which are entered the names of all persons
recognized as entitled to represent applicants before the Patent Office in the
 preparation and prosecution of applicants for patent. Registration in the Patent
Office under the provisions of these rules shall only entitle the person registered to
practice before the Patent Office.
(a) Attorney at law. — Any attorney at law in good standing admitted to practice
before any United States Court or the highest court of any State or Territory of the
United States who fulfills the requirements and complied with the provisions of
these rules may be admitted to practice before the Patent Office and have his name
entered on the register of attorneys.
xxx xxx xxx
(c) Requirement for registration. — No person will be admitted to practice and
register unless he shall apply to the Commissioner of Patents in writing on a
prescribed form supplied by the Commissioner and furnish all requested
information and material; and shall establish to the satisfaction of the
Commissioner that he is of good moral character and of good repute and possessed
of the legal and scientific and technical qualifications necessary to enable him to
render applicants for patent valuable service, and is otherwise competent to advise
and assist him in the presentation and prosecution of their application before the
Patent Office. In order that the Commissioner may determine whether a person
seeking to have his name placed upon either of the registers has the qualifications
specified, satisfactory proof of good moral character and repute, and of sufficient
basic training in scientific and technical matters must be submitted and an
examination which is held from time to time must be taken and passed. The taking
of an examination may be waived in the case of any person who has served for
three years in the examining corps of the Patent Office.
Respondent states that the promulgation of the Rules of Practice of the United States Patent
Office in Patent Cases is authorized by the United States Patent Law itself, which reads as
follows:
The Commissioner of Patents, subject to the approval of the Secretary of
Commerce may prescribe rules and regulations governing the recognition of
agents, attorneys, or other persons representing applicants or other parties before
his office, and may require of such persons, agents, or attorneys, before being
recognized as representatives of applicants or other persons, that they shall show
they are of good moral character and in good repute, are possessed of the
necessary qualifications to enable them to render to applicants or other persons
valuable service, and are likewise to competent to advise and assist applicants or
other persons in the presentation or prosecution of their applications or other
business before the Office. The Commissioner of Patents may, after notice and
opportunity for a hearing, suspend or exclude, either generally or in any particular
case from further practice before his office any person, agent or attorney shown to
be incompetent or disreputable, or guilty of gross misconduct, or who refuses to
comply with the said rules and regulations, or who shall, with intent to defraud in
any matter, deceive, mislead, or threaten any applicant or prospective applicant, or
other person having immediate or prospective applicant, or other person having
immediate or prospective business before the office, by word, circular, letter, or by
advertising. The reasons for any such suspension or exclusion shall be duly
recorded. The action of the Commissioner may be reviewed upon the petition of
the person so refused recognition or so suspended by the district court of the
United States for the District of Columbia under such conditions and upon such
proceedings as the said court may by its rules determine. (Emphasis supplied)
Respondent Director concludes that Section 78 of Republic Act No. 165 being similar to the
provisions of law just reproduced, then he is authorized to prescribe the rules and regulations
requiring that persons desiring to practice before him should submit to and pass an
examination. We reproduce said Section 78, Republic Act No. 165, for purposes of
comparison:
SEC. 78. Rules and regulations. — The Director subject to the approval of the
Secretary of Justice, shall promulgate the necessary rules and regulations, not
inconsistent with law, for the conduct of all business in the Patent Office.
The above provisions of Section 78 certainly and by far, are different from the provisions of
the United States Patent Law as regards authority to hold examinations to determine the
qualifications of those allowed to practice before the Patent Office. While the U.S. Patent Law
authorizes the Commissioner of Patents to require attorneys to show that they possess the
necessary qualifications and competence to render valuable service to and advise and assist
their clients in patent cases, which showing may take the form of a test or examination to be
held by the Commissioner, our Patent Law, Section 78, is silent on this important point. Our
attention has not been called to any express provision of our Patent Law, giving such
authority to determine the qualifications of persons allowed to practice before the Patent
Office.
Section 551 of the Revised Administrative Code authorizes every chief of bureau to prescribe
forms and make regulations or general orders not inconsistent with law, to secure the
harmonious and efficient administration of his branch of the service and to carry into full
effect the laws relating to matters within the jurisdiction of his bureau. Section 608 of
Republic Act 1937, known as the Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines, provides that the
Commissioner of Customs shall, subject to the approval of the Department Head, makes all
rules and regulations necessary to enforce the provisions of said code. Section 338 of the
National Internal Revenue Code, Commonwealth Act No. 466 as amended, states that the
Secretary of Finance, upon recommendation of the Collector of Internal Revenue, shall
promulgate all needful rules and regulations for the effective enforcement of the provisions
of the code. We understand that rules and regulations have been promulgated not only for
the Bureau of Customs and Internal Revenue, but also for other bureaus of the Government,
to govern the transaction of business in and to enforce the law for said bureaus.
Were we to allow the Patent Office, in the absence of an express and clear provision of law
giving the necessary sanction, to require lawyers to submit to and pass on examination
prescribed by it before they are allowed to practice before said Patent Office, then there
would be no reason why other bureaus specially the Bureau of Internal Revenue and
Customs, where the business in the same area are more or less complicated, such as the
presentation of books of accounts, balance sheets, etc., assessments exemptions,
depreciation, these as regards the Bureau of Internal Revenue, and the classification of
goods, imposition of customs duties, seizures, confiscation, etc., as regards the Bureau of
Customs, may not also require that any lawyer practising before them or otherwise
transacting business with them on behalf of clients, shall first pass an examination to qualify.

In conclusion, we hold that under the present law, members of the Philippine Bar authorized
by this Tribunal to practice law, and in good standing, may practice their profession before the
Patent Office, for the reason that much of the business in said office involves the
interpretation and determination of the scope and application of the Patent Law and other
laws applicable, as well as the presentation of evidence to establish facts involved; that part
of the functions of the Patent director are judicial or quasi-judicial, so much so that appeals
from his orders and decisions are, under the law, taken to the Supreme Court.

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for prohibition is granted and the respondent Director
is hereby prohibited from requiring members of the Philippine Bar to submit to an
examination or tests and pass the same before being permitted to appear and practice before
the Patent Office. No costs.
G.R. No. 100113 September 3, 1991
RENATO CAYETANO, petitioner,
vs.
CHRISTIAN MONSOD, HON. JOVITO R. SALONGA, COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENT, and
HON. GUILLERMO CARAGUE, in his capacity as Secretary of Budget and
Management, respondents.
Renato L. Cayetano for and in his own behalf.
Sabina E. Acut, Jr. and Mylene Garcia-Albano co-counsel for petitioner.
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. (Land Title Abstract and
Trust Co. v. Dworken, 129 Ohio St. 23, 193 N.E. 650) A person is also considered to be in the
practice of law when he:
PARAS, J.:
We are faced here with a controversy of far-reaching proportions. While ostensibly only legal
issues are involved, the Court's decision in this case would indubitably have a profound effect
on the political aspect of our national existence.
The 1987 Constitution provides in Section 1 (1), Article IX-C:
There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and six
Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the
time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, holders of a college
degree, and must not have been candidates for any elective position in the
immediately preceding -elections. However, a majority thereof, including the
This Court in the case of Philippine Lawyers Association v.Agrava, (105 Phil. 173,176-177)
Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the
stated:
practice of law for at least ten years. (Emphasis supplied)
The aforequoted provision is patterned after Section l(l), Article XII-C of the 1973 Constitution
which similarly provides:
There shall be an independent Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and eight
Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their
appointment, at least thirty-five years of age and holders of a college degree. However, a
majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have
been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.' (Emphasis supplied)
Regrettably, however, there seems to be no jurisprudence as to what constitutes practice of
law as a legal qualification to an appointive office.
Black defines "practice of law" as:
The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the application of legal
principles and technique to serve the interest of another with his consent. It is not
limited to appearing in court, or advising and assisting in the conduct of litigation,
but embraces the preparation of pleadings, and other papers incident to actions
and special proceedings, conveyancing, the preparation of legal instruments of all
kinds, and the giving of all legal advice to clients. It embraces all advice to clients
and all actions taken for them in matters connected with the law. An attorney
engages in the practice of law by maintaining an office where he is held out to be-
an attorney, using a letterhead describing himself as an attorney, counseling clients
in legal matters, negotiating with opposing counsel about pending litigation, and
fixing and collecting fees for services rendered by his associate. (Black's Law
Dictionary, 3rd ed.)
... for valuable consideration engages in the business of advising person, firms,
associations or corporations as to their rights under the law, or appears in a
representative capacity as an advocate in proceedings pending or prospective,
before any court, commissioner, referee, board, body, committee, or commission
constituted by law or authorized to settle controversies and there, in such
representative capacity performs any act or acts for the purpose of obtaining or
defending the rights of their clients under the law. Otherwise stated, one who, in a
representative capacity, engages in the business of advising clients as to their rights
under the law, or while so engaged performs any act or acts either in court or
outside of court for that purpose, is engaged in the practice of law. ( State ex. rel.
Mckittrick v..C.S. Dudley and Co., 102 S.W. 2d 895, 340 Mo. 852)
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it
embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and
special proceedings, the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of
clients before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying. In general, all advice to
clients, and all action taken for them in matters connected with the
law incorporation services, assessment and condemnation services contemplating
an appearance before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement
of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting
proceedings in attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have been
held to constitute law practice, as do the preparation and drafting of legal
instruments, where the work done involves the determination by the trained legal
mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions. (5 Am. Jr. p. 262, 263). (Emphasis
supplied)
 Practice of law under modem conditions consists in no small part of work
performed outside of any court and having no immediate relation to proceedings in
court. It embraces conveyancing, the giving of legal advice on a large variety of
subjects, and the preparation and execution of legal instruments covering an
extensive field of business and trust relations and other affairs. Although these
transactions may have no direct connection with court proceedings, they are
always subject to become involved in litigation. They require in many aspects a high
degree of legal skill, a wide experience with men and affairs, and great capacity for
adaptation to difficult and complex situations. These customary functions of an
attorney or counselor at law bear an intimate relation to the administration of
justice by the courts. No valid distinction, so far as concerns the question set forth
in the order, can be drawn between that part of the work of the lawyer which
involves appearance in court and that part which involves advice and drafting of
instruments in his office. It is of importance to the welfare of the public that these
manifold customary functions be performed by persons possessed of adequate
learning and skill, of sound moral character, and acting at all times under the heavy
trust obligations to clients which rests upon all attorneys. (Moran, Comments on
the Rules of Court, Vol. 3 [1953 ed.] , p. 665-666, citing In re Opinion of the
Justices [Mass.], 194 N.E. 313, quoted in Rhode Is. Bar Assoc. v. Automobile Service
Assoc. [R.I.] 179 A. 139,144). (Emphasis ours)
The University of the Philippines Law Center in conducting orientation briefing for new
lawyers (1974-1975) listed the dimensions of the practice of law in even broader terms as
advocacy, counselling and public service.
One may be a practicing attorney in following any line of employment in the
profession. If what he does exacts knowledge of the law and is of a kind usual for
attorneys engaging in the active practice of their profession, and he follows some
one or more lines of employment such as this he is a practicing attorney at law
within the meaning of the statute. (Barr v. Cardell, 155 NW 312)
Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law,
legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. "To engage in the practice of law is to
perform those acts which are characteristics of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to
give notice or render any kind of service, which device or service requires the use in any
degree of legal knowledge or skill." (111 ALR 23)
The following records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission show that it has adopted a
liberal interpretation of the term "practice of law."
MR. FOZ. Before we suspend the session, may I make a manifestation which I forgot
to do during our review of the provisions on the Commission on Audit. May I be
allowed to make a very brief statement?
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir).
The Commissioner will please proceed.
MR. FOZ. This has to do with the qualifications of the members of the Commission
on Audit. Among others, the qualifications provided for by Section I is that "They
must be Members of the Philippine Bar" — I am quoting from the provision — "who
have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years".
To avoid any misunderstanding which would result in excluding members of the Bar who are
now employed in the COA or Commission on Audit, we would like to make the clarification
that this provision on qualifications regarding members of the Bar does not necessarily refer
or involve actual practice of law outside the COA We have to interpret this to mean that as
long as the lawyers who are employed in the COA are using their legal knowledge or legal
talent in their respective work within COA, then they are qualified to be considered for
appointment as members or commissioners, even chairman, of the Commission on Audit.
This has been discussed by the Committee on Constitutional Commissions and Agencies and
we deem it important to take it up on the floor so that this interpretation may be made
available whenever this provision on the qualifications as regards members of the Philippine
Bar engaging in the practice of law for at least ten years is taken up.
MR. OPLE. Will Commissioner Foz yield to just one question.
MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.
MR. OPLE. Is he, in effect, saying that service in the COA by a lawyer is equivalent to
the requirement of a law practice that is set forth in the Article on the Commission
on Audit?
MR. FOZ. We must consider the fact that the work of COA, although it is auditing,
will necessarily involve legal work; it will involve legal work. And, therefore, lawyers
who are employed in COA now would have the necessary qualifications in
accordance with the Provision on qualifications under our provisions on the
Commission on Audit. And, therefore, the answer is yes.
MR. OPLE. Yes. So that the construction given to this is that this is equivalent to the
practice of law.
MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.
MR. OPLE. Thank you.
... ( Emphasis supplied)
Section 1(1), Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution, provides, among others, that the Chairman
and two Commissioners of the Commission on Audit (COA) should either be certified public
accountants with not less than ten years of auditing practice, or members of the Philippine
Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. (emphasis supplied)
Corollary to this is the term "private practitioner" and which is in many ways synonymous
with the word "lawyer." Today, although many lawyers do not engage in private practice, it is
still a fact that the majority of lawyers are private practitioners. (Gary
Munneke, Opportunities in Law Careers [VGM Career Horizons: Illinois], [1986], p. 15).
At this point, it might be helpful to define private practice. The term, as commonly
understood, means "an individual or organization engaged in the business of delivering legal
services." (Ibid.). Lawyers who practice alone are often called "sole practitioners." Groups of
lawyers are called "firms." The firm is usually a partnership and members of the firm are the
partners. Some firms may be organized as professional corporations and the members called
shareholders. In either case, the members of the firm are the experienced attorneys. In most
firms, there are younger or more inexperienced salaried attorneyscalled "associates." (Ibid.).
The test that defines law practice by looking to traditional areas of law practice is essentially
tautologous, unhelpful defining the practice of law as that which lawyers do. (Charles W.
Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics [West Publishing Co.: Minnesota, 1986], p. 593). The practice
of law is defined as the performance of any acts . . . in or out of court, commonly understood
to be the practice of law. (State Bar Ass'n v. Connecticut Bank & Trust Co., 145 Conn. 222, 140
A.2d 863, 870 [1958] [quoting Grievance Comm. v. Payne, 128 Conn. 325, 22 A.2d 623, 626
[1941]). Because lawyers perform almost every function known in the commercial and
governmental realm, such a definition would obviously be too global to be workable.
(Wolfram, op. cit.).
The appearance of a lawyer in litigation in behalf of a client is at once the most publicly
familiar role for lawyers as well as an uncommon role for the average lawyer. Most lawyers
spend little time in courtrooms, and a large percentage spend their entire practice without
litigating a case. (Ibid., p. 593). Nonetheless, many lawyers do continue to litigate and the
litigating lawyer's role colors much of both the public image and the self perception of the
legal profession. (Ibid.).
In this regard thus, the dominance of litigation in the public mind reflects history, not reality.
(Ibid.). Why is this so? Recall that the late Alexander SyCip, a corporate lawyer, once
articulated on the importance of a lawyer as a business counselor in this wise: "Even today,
there are still uninformed laymen whose concept of an attorney is one who principally tries
cases before the courts. The members of the bench and bar and the informed laymen such as
businessmen, know that in most developed societies today, substantially more legal work is
transacted in law offices than in the courtrooms. General practitioners of law who do both
litigation and non-litigation work also know that in most cases they find themselves spending
more time doing what [is] loosely desccribe[d] as business counseling than in trying cases.
The business lawyer has been described as the planner, the diagnostician and the trial lawyer,
the surgeon. I[t] need not [be] stress[ed] that in law, as in medicine, surgery should be
avoided where internal medicine can be effective." (Business Star, "Corporate Finance Law,"
Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).
In the course of a working day the average general practitioner wig engage in a number of
legal tasks, each involving different legal doctrines, legal skills, legal processes, legal
institutions, clients, and other interested parties. Even the increasing numbers of lawyers in
specialized practice wig usually perform at least some legal services outside their specialty.
And even within a narrow specialty such as tax practice, a lawyer will shift from one legal task
or role such as advice-giving to an importantly different one such as representing a client
before an administrative agency. (Wolfram, supra, p. 687).
By no means will most of this work involve litigation, unless the lawyer is one of the relatively
rare types — a litigator who specializes in this work to the exclusion of much else. Instead,
the work will require the lawyer to have mastered the full range of traditional lawyer skills of
client counselling, advice-giving, document drafting, and negotiation. And increasingly
lawyers find that the new skills of evaluation and mediation are both effective for many
clients and a source of employment. (Ibid.).
Most lawyers will engage in non-litigation legal work or in litigation work that is constrained
in very important ways, at least theoretically, so as to remove from it some of the salient
features of adversarial litigation. Of these special roles, the most prominent is that of
prosecutor. In some lawyers' work the constraints are imposed both by the nature of the
client and by the way in which the lawyer is organized into a social unit to perform that work.
The most common of these roles are those of corporate practice and government legal
service. (Ibid.).
In several issues of the Business Star, a business daily, herein below quoted are emerging
trends in corporate law practice, a departure from the traditional concept of practice of law.
We are experiencing today what truly may be called a revolutionary transformation
in corporate law practice. Lawyers and other professional groups, in particular
those members participating in various legal-policy decisional contexts, are finding
that understanding the major emerging trends in corporation law is indispensable
to intelligent decision-making.
Constructive adjustment to major corporate problems of today requires an accurate
understanding of the nature and implications of the corporate law research
function accompanied by an accelerating rate of information accumulation. The
recognition of the need for such improved corporate legal policy formulation,
particularly "model-making" and "contingency planning," has impressed upon us
the inadequacy of traditional procedures in many decisional contexts.
In a complex legal problem the mass of information to be processed, the sorting
and weighing of significant conditional factors, the appraisal of major trends, the
necessity of estimating the consequences of given courses of action, and the need
for fast decision and response in situations of acute danger have prompted the use
of sophisticated concepts of information flow theory, operational analysis,
automatic data processing, and electronic computing equipment. Understandably,
an improved decisional structure must stress the predictive component of the
policy-making process, wherein a "model", of the decisional context or a segment
thereof is developed to test projected alternative courses of action in terms of
futuristic effects flowing therefrom.
Although members of the legal profession are regularly engaged in predicting and
projecting the trends of the law, the subject of corporate finance law has received
relatively little organized and formalized attention in the philosophy of advancing
corporate legal education. Nonetheless, a cross-disciplinary approach to legal
research has become a vital necessity.
Certainly, the general orientation for productive contributions by those trained
primarily in the law can be improved through an early introduction to multi-variable
decisional context and the various approaches for handling such problems.
Lawyers, particularly with either a master's or doctorate degree in business
administration or management, functioning at the legal policy level of decision-
making now have some appreciation for the concepts and analytical techniques of
other professions which are currently engaged in similar types of complex decision-
making.
Truth to tell, many situations involving corporate finance problems would require
the services of an astute attorney because of the complex legal implications that
arise from each and every necessary step in securing and maintaining the business
issue raised. (Business Star, "Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).
In our litigation-prone country, a corporate lawyer is assiduously referred to as the
"abogado de campanilla." He is the "big-time" lawyer, earning big money and with a
clientele composed of the tycoons and magnates of business and industry.
Despite the growing number of corporate lawyers, many people could not explain
what it is that a corporate lawyer does. For one, the number of attorneys employed
by a single corporation will vary with the size and type of the corporation. Many
smaller and some large corporations farm out all their legal problems to private law
firms. Many others have in-house counsel only for certain matters. Other
corporation have a staff large enough to handle most legal problems in-house.
A corporate lawyer, for all intents and purposes, is a lawyer who handles the legal
affairs of a corporation. His areas of concern or jurisdiction may include, inter alia:
corporate legal research, tax laws research, acting out as corporate secretary (in
board meetings), appearances in both courts and other adjudicatory agencies
(including the Securities and Exchange Commission), and in other capacities which
require an ability to deal with the law.
At any rate, a corporate lawyer may assume responsibilities other than the legal
affairs of the business of the corporation he is representing. These include such
matters as determining policy and becoming involved in management. ( Emphasis
supplied.)
In a big company, for example, one may have a feeling of being isolated from the
action, or not understanding how one's work actually fits into the work of the
orgarnization. This can be frustrating to someone who needs to see the results of
his work first hand. In short, a corporate lawyer is sometimes offered this fortune to
be more closely involved in the running of the business.
Moreover, a corporate lawyer's services may sometimes be engaged by a
multinational corporation (MNC). Some large MNCs provide one of the few
opportunities available to corporate lawyers to enter the international law field.
After all, international law is practiced in a relatively small number of companies
and law firms. Because working in a foreign country is perceived by many as
glamorous, tills is an area coveted by corporate lawyers. In most cases, however,
the overseas jobs go to experienced attorneys while the younger attorneys do their
"international practice" in law libraries. (Business Star, "Corporate Law Practice,"
May 25,1990, p. 4).
This brings us to the inevitable, i.e., the role of the lawyer in the realm of finance.
To borrow the lines of Harvard-educated lawyer Bruce Wassertein, to wit: "A bad
lawyer is one who fails to spot problems, a good lawyer is one who perceives the
difficulties, and the excellent lawyer is one who surmounts them." (Business Star,
"Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).
Today, the study of corporate law practice direly needs a "shot in the arm," so to
speak. No longer are we talking of the traditional law teaching method of confining
the subject study to the Corporation Code and the Securities Code but an incursion
as well into the intertwining modern management issues.
Such corporate legal management issues deal primarily with three (3) types of
learning: (1) acquisition of insights into current advances which are of particular
significance to the corporate counsel; (2) an introduction to usable disciplinary skins
applicable to a corporate counsel's management responsibilities; and (3) a devotion
to the organization and management of the legal function itself.
These three subject areas may be thought of as intersecting circles, with a shared
area linking them. Otherwise known as "intersecting managerial jurisprudence," it
forms a unifying theme for the corporate counsel's total learning.
Some current advances in behavior and policy sciences affect the counsel's role. For
that matter, the corporate lawyer reviews the globalization process, including the
resulting strategic repositioning that the firms he provides counsel for are required
to make, and the need to think about a corporation's; strategy at multiple levels.
The salience of the nation-state is being reduced as firms deal both with global
multinational entities and simultaneously with sub-national governmental units.
Firms increasingly collaborate not only with public entities but with each other —
often with those who are competitors in other arenas.
Also, the nature of the lawyer's participation in decision-making within the
corporation is rapidly changing. The modem corporate lawyer has gained a new
role as a stakeholder — in some cases participating in the organization and
operations of governance through participation on boards and other decision-
making roles. Often these new patterns develop alongside existing legal institutions
and laws are perceived as barriers. These trends are complicated as corporations
organize for global operations. ( Emphasis supplied)
The practising lawyer of today is familiar as well with governmental policies toward
the promotion and management of technology. New collaborative arrangements
for promoting specific technologies or competitiveness more generally require
approaches from industry that differ from older, more adversarial relationships and
traditional forms of seeking to influence governmental policies. And there are
lessons to be learned from other countries. In Europe, Esprit, Eureka and Race are
examples of collaborative efforts between governmental and business
Japan's MITI is world famous. (Emphasis supplied)
Following the concept of boundary spanning, the office of the Corporate Counsel
comprises a distinct group within the managerial structure of all kinds of
organizations. Effectiveness of both long-term and temporary groups within
organizations has been found to be related to indentifiable factors in the group-
context interaction such as the groups actively revising their knowledge of the
environment coordinating work with outsiders, promoting team achievements
within the organization. In general, such external activities are better predictors of
team performance than internal group processes.
In a crisis situation, the legal managerial capabilities of the corporate lawyer vis-a-
vis the managerial mettle of corporations are challenged. Current research is
seeking ways both to anticipate effective managerial procedures and to understand
relationships of financial liability and insurance considerations. (Emphasis supplied)
Regarding the skills to apply by the corporate counsel, three factors are apropos:
First System Dynamics. The field of systems dynamics has been found an effective
tool for new managerial thinking regarding both planning and pressing immediate
problems. An understanding of the role of feedback loops, inventory levels, and
rates of flow, enable users to simulate all sorts of systematic problems — physical,
economic, managerial, social, and psychological. New programming techniques
now make the system dynamics principles more accessible to managers — including
corporate counsels. (Emphasis supplied)
Second Decision Analysis. This enables users to make better decisions involving
complexity and uncertainty. In the context of a law department, it can be used to
appraise the settlement value of litigation, aid in negotiation settlement, and
minimize the cost and risk involved in managing a portfolio of cases . (Emphasis
supplied)
Third Modeling for Negotiation Management. Computer-based models can be used
directly by parties and mediators in all lands of negotiations. All integrated set of
such tools provide coherent and effective negotiation support, including hands-on
on instruction in these techniques. A simulation case of an international joint
venture may be used to illustrate the point.
[Be this as it may,] the organization and management of the legal function, concern
three pointed areas of consideration, thus:
Preventive Lawyering. Planning by lawyers requires special skills that comprise a
major part of the general counsel's responsibilities. They differ from those of
remedial law. Preventive lawyering is concerned with minimizing the risks of legal
trouble and maximizing legal rights for such legal entities at that time when
transactional or similar facts are being considered and made.
Managerial Jurisprudence. This is the framework within which are undertaken
those activities of the firm to which legal consequences attach. It needs to be
directly supportive of this nation's evolving economic and organizational fabric as
firms change to stay competitive in a global, interdependent environment. The
practice and theory of "law" is not adequate today to facilitate the relationships
needed in trying to make a global economy work.
Organization and Functioning of the Corporate Counsel's Office. The general counsel
has emerged in the last decade as one of the most vibrant subsets of the legal
profession. The corporate counsel hear responsibility for key aspects of the firm's
strategic issues, including structuring its global operations, managing improved
relationships with an increasingly diversified body of employees, managing
expanded liability exposure, creating new and varied interactions with public
decision-makers, coping internally with more complex make or by decisions.
This whole exercise drives home the thesis that knowing corporate law is not
enough to make one a good general corporate counsel nor to give him a full sense
of how the legal system shapes corporate activities. And even if the corporate
lawyer's aim is not the understand all of the law's effects on corporate activities, he
must, at the very least, also gain a working knowledge of the management issues if
only to be able to grasp not only the basic legal "constitution' or makeup of the
modem corporation. "Business Star", "The Corporate Counsel," April 10, 1991, p. 4).
The challenge for lawyers (both of the bar and the bench) is to have more than a
passing knowledge of financial law affecting each aspect of their work. Yet, many
would admit to ignorance of vast tracts of the financial law territory. What
transpires next is a dilemma of professional security: Will the lawyer admit
ignorance and risk opprobrium?; or will he feign understanding and risk exposure?
(Business Star, "Corporate Finance law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).
Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino to the position
of Chairman of the COMELEC in a letter received by the Secretariat of the Commission on
Appointments on April 25, 1991. Petitioner opposed the nomination because allegedly
Monsod does not possess the required qualification of having been engaged in the practice of
law for at least ten years.
On June 5, 1991, the Commission on Appointments confirmed the nomination of Monsod as
Chairman of the COMELEC. On June 18, 1991, he took his oath of office. On the same day, he
assumed office as Chairman of the COMELEC.
Challenging the validity of the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of
Monsod's nomination, petitioner as a citizen and taxpayer, filed the instant petition for
certiorari and Prohibition praying that said confirmation and the consequent appointment of
Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on Elections be declared null and void.
Atty. Christian Monsod is a member of the Philippine Bar, having passed the bar examinations
of 1960 with a grade of 86-55%. He has been a dues paying member of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines since its inception in 1972-73. He has also been paying his professional license
fees as lawyer for more than ten years. (p. 124, Rollo)
After graduating from the College of Law (U.P.) and having hurdled the bar, Atty. Monsod
worked in the law office of his father. During his stint in the World Bank Group (1963-
1970), Monsod worked as an operations officer for about two years in Costa Rica and
Panama, which involved getting acquainted with the laws of member-countries negotiating
loans and coordinating legal, economic, and project work of the Bank. Upon returning to the
Philippines in 1970, he worked with the Meralco Group, served as chief executive officer of an
investment bank and subsequently of a business conglomerate, and since 1986, has rendered
services to various companies as a legal and economic consultant or chief executive officer. As
former Secretary-General (1986) and National Chairman (1987) of NAMFREL. Monsod's work
involved being knowledgeable in election law. He appeared for NAMFREL in its accreditation
hearings before the Comelec. In the field of advocacy, Monsod, in his personal capacity and as
former Co-Chairman of the Bishops Businessmen's Conference for Human Development, has
worked with the under privileged sectors, such as the farmer and urban poor groups, in
initiating, lobbying for and engaging in affirmative action for the agrarian reform law and
lately the urban land reform bill. Monsod also made use of his legal knowledge as a member
of the Davide Commission, a quast judicial body, which conducted numerous hearings (1990)
and as a member of the Constitutional Commission (1986-1987), and Chairman of its
Committee on Accountability of Public Officers, for which he was cited by the President of the
Commission, Justice Cecilia Muñoz-Palma for "innumerable amendments to reconcile
government functions with individual freedoms and public accountability and the party-list
system for the House of Representative. (pp. 128-129 Rollo) ( Emphasis supplied)
Just a word about the work of a negotiating team of which Atty. Monsod used to be a
member.
In a loan agreement, for instance, a negotiating panel acts as a team, and which is
adequately constituted to meet the various contingencies that arise during a
negotiation. Besides top officials of the Borrower concerned, there are the legal
officer (such as the legal counsel), the finance manager, and an operations
officer (such as an official involved in negotiating the contracts) who comprise the
members of the team. (Guillermo V. Soliven, "Loan Negotiating Strategies for
Developing Country Borrowers," Staff Paper No. 2, Central Bank of the Philippines,
Manila, 1982, p. 11). (Emphasis supplied)
After a fashion, the loan agreement is like a country's Constitution; it lays down the
law as far as the loan transaction is concerned. Thus, the meat of any Loan
Agreement can be compartmentalized into five (5) fundamental parts: (1) business
terms; (2) borrower's representation; (3) conditions of closing; (4) covenants; and
(5) events of default. (Ibid., p. 13).
In the same vein, lawyers play an important role in any debt restructuring program.
For aside from performing the tasks of legislative drafting and legal advising, they
score national development policies as key factors in maintaining their countries'
sovereignty. (Condensed from the work paper, entitled "Wanted: Development
Lawyers for Developing Nations," submitted by L. Michael Hager, regional legal
adviser of the United States Agency for International Development, during the
Session on Law for the Development of Nations at the Abidjan World Conference in
Ivory Coast, sponsored by the World Peace Through Law Center on August 26-31,
1973). ( Emphasis supplied)
Loan concessions and compromises, perhaps even more so than purely
renegotiation policies, demand expertise in the law of contracts, in legislation and
agreement drafting and in renegotiation. Necessarily, a sovereign lawyer may work
with an international business specialist or an economist in the formulation of a
model loan agreement. Debt restructuring contract agreements contain such a
mixture of technical language that they should be carefully drafted and signed only
with the advise of competent counsel in conjunction with the guidance of adequate
technical support personnel. (See International Law Aspects of the Philippine
External Debts, an unpublished dissertation, U.S.T. Graduate School of Law, 1987, p.
321). ( Emphasis supplied)
A critical aspect of sovereign debt restructuring/contract construction is the set of
terms and conditions which determines the contractual remedies for a failure to
perform one or more elements of the contract. A good agreement must not only
define the responsibilities of both parties, but must also state the recourse open to
either party when the other fails to discharge an obligation. For a compleat debt
restructuring represents a devotion to that principle which in the ultimate analysis
is sine qua non for foreign loan agreements-an adherence to the rule of law in
domestic and international affairs of whose kind U.S. Supreme Court Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes, Jr. once said: "They carry no banners, they beat no drums; but
where they are, men learn that bustle and bush are not the equal of quiet genius
and serene mastery." (See Ricardo J. Romulo, "The Role of Lawyers in Foreign
Investments," Integrated Bar of the Philippine Journal, Vol. 15, Nos. 3 and 4, Third
and Fourth Quarters, 1977, p. 265).
Interpreted in the light of the various definitions of the term Practice of law". particularly the
modern concept of law practice, and taking into consideration the liberal construction
intended by the framers of the Constitution, Atty. Monsod's past work experiences as a
lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator
of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both the rich and the poor — verily more than satisfy
the constitutional requirement — that he has been engaged in the practice of law for at least
ten years.
Besides in the leading case of Luego v. Civil Service Commission, 143 SCRA 327, the Court
said:
Appointment is an essentially discretionary power and must be performed by the
officer in which it is vested according to his best lights, the only condition being that
the appointee should possess the qualifications required by law. If he does, then
the appointment cannot be faulted on the ground that there are others better
qualified who should have been preferred. This is a political question involving
considerations of wisdom which only the appointing authority can decide.
(emphasis supplied)
No less emphatic was the Court in the case of (Central Bank v. Civil Service Commission, 171
SCRA 744) where it stated:
It is well-settled that when the appointee is qualified, as in this case, and all the
other legal requirements are satisfied, the Commission has no alternative but to
attest to the appointment in accordance with the Civil Service Law. The Commission
has no authority to revoke an appointment on the ground that another person is
more qualified for a particular position. It also has no authority to direct the
appointment of a substitute of its choice. To do so would be an encroachment on
the discretion vested upon the appointing authority. An appointment is essentially
within the discretionary power of whomsoever it is vested, subject to the only
condition that the appointee should possess the qualifications required by law.
( Emphasis supplied)
The appointing process in a regular appointment as in the case at bar, consists of four (4)
stages: (1) nomination; (2) confirmation by the Commission on Appointments; (3) issuance of
a commission (in the Philippines, upon submission by the Commission on Appointments of its
certificate of confirmation, the President issues the permanent appointment; and (4)
acceptance e.g., oath-taking, posting of bond, etc. . . . (Lacson v. Romero, No. L-3081, October
14, 1949; Gonzales, Law on Public Officers, p. 200)
The power of the Commission on Appointments to give its consent to the nomination of
Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on Elections is mandated by Section 1(2) Sub-Article
C, Article IX of the Constitution which provides:
The Chairman and the Commisioners shall be appointed by the President with the
consent of the Commission on Appointments for a term of seven years without
reappointment. Of those first appointed, three Members shall hold office for seven
years, two Members for five years, and the last Members for three years, without
reappointment. Appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired term of
the predecessor. In no case shall any Member be appointed or designated in a
temporary or acting capacity.
Anent Justice Teodoro Padilla's separate opinion, suffice it to say that his definition
of the practice of law is the traditional or stereotyped notion of law practice, as
distinguished from the modern concept of the practice of law, which modern
connotation is exactly what was intended by the eminent framers of the 1987
Constitution. Moreover, Justice Padilla's definition would require generally a
habitual law practice, perhaps practised two or three times a week and would
outlaw say, law practice once or twice a year for ten consecutive years. Clearly, this
is far from the constitutional intent.
Upon the other hand, the separate opinion of Justice Isagani Cruz states that in my written
opinion, I made use of a definition of law practice which really means nothing because the
definition says that law practice " . . . is what people ordinarily mean by the practice of law."
True I cited the definition but only by way of sarcasm as evident from my statement that the
definition of law practice by "traditional areas of law practice is essentially tautologous" or
defining a phrase by means of the phrase itself that is being defined.
Justice Cruz goes on to say in substance that since the law covers almost all situations, most
individuals, in making use of the law, or in advising others on what the law means, are
actually practicing law. In that sense, perhaps, but we should not lose sight of the fact that
Mr. Monsod is a lawyer, a member of the Philippine Bar, who has been practising law for over
ten years. This is different from the acts of persons practising law, without first becoming
lawyers.
Justice Cruz also says that the Supreme Court can even disqualify an elected President of the
Philippines, say, on the ground that he lacks one or more qualifications. This matter, I greatly
doubt. For one thing, how can an action or petition be brought against the President? And
even assuming that he is indeed disqualified, how can the action be entertained since he is
the incumbent President?
We now proceed:
The Commission on the basis of evidence submitted doling the public hearings on Monsod's
confirmation, implicitly determined that he possessed the necessary qualifications as
required by law. The judgment rendered by the Commission in the exercise of such an
acknowledged power is beyond judicial interference except only upon a clear showing of a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. (Art. VIII, Sec. 1
Constitution). Thus, only where such grave abuse of discretion is clearly shown shall the Court
interfere with the Commission's judgment. In the instant case, there is no occasion for the
exercise of the Court's corrective power, since no abuse, much less a grave abuse of
discretion, that would amount to lack or excess of jurisdiction and would warrant the
issuance of the writs prayed, for has been clearly shown.
Additionally, consider the following:
(1) If the Commission on Appointments rejects a nominee by the President, may the
Supreme Court reverse the Commission, and thus in effect confirm the
appointment? Clearly, the answer is in the negative.
 (2) In the same vein, may the Court reject the nominee, whom the Commission
has confirmed? The answer is likewise clear.
(3) If the United States Senate (which is the confirming body in the U.S. Congress)
decides to confirm a Presidential nominee, it would be incredible that the U.S.
Supreme Court would still reverse the U.S. Senate.
Finally, one significant legal maxim is:
We must interpret not by the letter that killeth, but by the spirit that giveth life.
Take this hypothetical case of Samson and Delilah. Once, the procurator of Judea asked
Delilah (who was Samson's beloved) for help in capturing Samson. Delilah agreed on
condition that —
No blade shall touch his skin;
No blood shall flow from his veins.
When Samson (his long hair cut by Delilah) was captured, the procurator placed an iron rod
burning white-hot two or three inches away from in front of Samson's eyes. This blinded the
man. Upon hearing of what had happened to her beloved, Delilah was beside herself with
anger, and fuming with righteous fury, accused the procurator of reneging on his word. The
procurator calmly replied: "Did any blade touch his skin? Did any blood flow from his veins?"
The procurator was clearly relying on the letter, not the spirit of the agreement.
In view of the foregoing, this petition is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Griño-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.
Feliciano, J., I certify that he voted to dismiss the petition. (Fernan, C.J.)
Sarmiento, J., is on leave.
Regalado, and Davide, Jr., J., took no part.
Separate Opinions
NARVASA, J., concurring:
I concur with the decision of the majority written by Mr. Justice Paras, albeit only in the
result; it does not appear to me that there has been an adequate showing that the
challenged determination by the Commission on Appointments-that the appointment of
respondent Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on Elections should, on the basis of his
stated qualifications and after due assessment thereof, be confirmed-was attended by error
so gross as to amount to grave abuse of discretion and consequently merits nullification by
this Court in accordance with the second paragraph of Section 1, Article VIII of the
Constitution. I therefore vote to DENY the petition.
PADILLA, J., dissenting:
The records of this case will show that when the Court first deliberated on the Petition at bar,
I voted not only to require the respondents to comment on the Petition, but I was the sole
vote for the issuance of a temporary restraining order to enjoin respondent Monsod from
assuming the position of COMELEC Chairman, while the Court deliberated on his
constitutional qualification for the office. My purpose in voting for a TRO was to prevent the
inconvenience and even embarrassment to all parties concerned were the Court to finally
decide for respondent Monsod's disqualification. Moreover, a reading of the Petition then in
relation to established jurisprudence already showed prima facie that respondent Monsod
did not possess the needed qualification, that is, he had not engaged in the practice of law for
at least ten (10) years prior to his appointment as COMELEC Chairman.
After considering carefully respondent Monsod's comment, I am even more convinced that
the constitutional requirement of "practice of law for at least ten (10) years" has not been
met.
The procedural barriers interposed by respondents deserve scant consideration because,
ultimately, the core issue to be resolved in this petition is the proper construal of the
constitutional provision requiring a majority of the membership of COMELEC, including the
Chairman thereof to "have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10) years."
(Art. IX(C), Section 1(1), 1987 Constitution). Questions involving the construction of
constitutional provisions are best left to judicial resolution. As declared in Angara v. Electoral
Commission, (63 Phil. 139) "upon the judicial department is thrown the solemn and
inescapable obligation of interpreting the Constitution and defining constitutional
boundaries."
The Constitution has imposed clear and specific standards for a COMELEC Chairman. Among
these are that he must have been "engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10) years."
It is the bounden duty of this Court to ensure that such standard is met and complied with.
What constitutes practice of law? As commonly understood, "practice" refers to the actual
performance or application of knowledge as distinguished from mere possession of
knowledge; it connotes an active, habitual, repeated or customary action.1 To "practice" law,
or any profession for that matter, means, to exercise or pursue an employment or
profession actively, habitually, repeatedly or customarily.
Therefore, a doctor of medicine who is employed and is habitually performing the tasks of a
nursing aide, cannot be said to be in the "practice of medicine." A certified public accountant
who works as a clerk, cannot be said to practice his profession as an accountant. In the same
way, a lawyer who is employed as a business executive or a corporate manager, other than as
head or attorney of a Legal Department of a corporation or a governmental agency, cannot be
said to be in the practice of law.
As aptly held by this Court in the case of People vs. Villanueva:2
Practice is more than an isolated appearance for it consists in frequent or
customary actions, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is
frequent habitual exercise (State vs- Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan. 864, 42 LRA, M.S.
768). Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of statute has been interpreted as
customarily or habitually holding one's self out to the public as a lawyer and
demanding payment for such services (State vs. Bryan, 4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C.
644,647.) ... (emphasis supplied).
It is worth mentioning that the respondent Commission on Appointments in a Memorandum
it prepared, enumerated several factors determinative of whether a particular activity
constitutes "practice of law." It states:
1. Habituality. The term "practice of law" implies customarily or habitually holding
one's self out to the public as a lawyer (People vs. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109 citing
State v. Boyen, 4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644) such as when one sends a circular
announcing the establishment of a law office for the general practice of law (U.S. v.
Ney Bosque, 8 Phil. 146), or when one takes the oath of office as a lawyer before a
notary public, and files a manifestation with the Supreme Court informing it of his
intention to practice law in all courts in the country (People v. De Luna, 102 Phil.
968).
Practice is more than an isolated appearance for it consists in frequent or
customary action, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is a
habitual exercise (People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109 citing State v. Cotner, 127, p. 1,
87 Kan, 864).
2. Compensation. Practice of law implies that one must have presented himself to
be in the active and continued practice of the legal profession and that his
professional services are available to the public for compensation, as a service of
his livelihood or in consideration of his said services. (People v. Villanueva, supra).
Hence, charging for services such as preparation of documents involving the use of
legal knowledge and skill is within the term "practice of law" (Ernani Paño, Bar
Reviewer in Legal and Judicial Ethics, 1988 ed., p. 8 citing People v. People's
Stockyards State Bank, 176 N.B. 901) and, one who renders an opinion as to the
proper interpretation of a statute, and receives pay for it, is to that extent,
practicing law (Martin, supra, p. 806 citing Mendelaun v. Gilbert and Barket Mfg.
Co., 290 N.Y.S. 462) If compensation is expected, all advice to clients and all action
taken for them in matters connected with the law; are practicing law. (Elwood
Fitchette et al., v. Arthur C. Taylor, 94A-L.R. 356-359)
3. Application of law legal principle practice or procedure which calls for legal
knowledge, training and experience is within the term "practice of law".
(Martin supra)
4. Attorney-client relationship. Engaging in the practice of law presupposes the
existence of lawyer-client relationship. Hence, where a lawyer undertakes an
activity which requires knowledge of law but involves no attorney-client
relationship, such as teaching law or writing law books or articles, he cannot be said
to be engaged in the practice of his profession or a lawyer (Agpalo, Legal Ethics,
1989 ed., p. 30).3
The above-enumerated factors would, I believe, be useful aids in determining whether or not
respondent Monsod meets the constitutional qualification of practice of law for at least ten
(10) years at the time of his appointment as COMELEC Chairman.
The following relevant questions may be asked:
1. Did respondent Monsod perform any of the tasks which are peculiar to the practice of law?
2. Did respondent perform such tasks customarily or habitually?
3. Assuming that he performed any of such tasks habitually, did he do so HABITUALLY FOR AT
LEAST TEN (10) YEARS prior to his appointment as COMELEC Chairman?
Given the employment or job history of respondent Monsod as appears from the records, I
am persuaded that if ever he did perform any of the tasks which constitute the practice of
law, he did not do so HABITUALLY for at least ten (10) years prior to his appointment as
COMELEC Chairman.
While it may be granted that he performed tasks and activities which could be latitudinarianly
considered activities peculiar to the practice of law, like the drafting of legal documents and
the rendering of legal opinion or advice, such were isolated transactions or activities which do
not qualify his past endeavors as "practice of law." To become engaged in the practice of law,
there must be a continuity, or a succession of acts. As observed by the Solicitor General
in People vs. Villanueva:4
Essentially, the word private practice of law implies that one must have presented
himself to be in the activeand continued practice of the legal profession and that his
 professional services are available to the public for a compensation, as a source of
his livelihood or in consideration of his said services.
ACCORDINGLY, my vote is to GRANT the petition and to declare respondent Monsod as not
qualified for the position of COMELEC Chairman for not having engaged in the practice of law
for at least ten (10) years prior to his appointment to such position.
CRUZ, J., dissenting:
I am sincerely impressed by the ponencia of my brother Paras but find I must dissent just the
same. There are certain points on which I must differ with him while of course respecting
hisviewpoint.
To begin with, I do not think we are inhibited from examining the qualifications of the
respondent simply because his nomination has been confirmed by the Commission on
Appointments. In my view, this is not a political question that we are barred from resolving.
Determination of the appointee's credentials is made on the basis of the established facts,
not the discretion of that body. Even if it were, the exercise of that discretion would still be
subject to our review.
In Luego, which is cited in the ponencia, what was involved was the discretion of the
appointing authority to choosebetween two claimants to the same office who both possessed
the required qualifications. It was that kind of discretion that we said could not be reviewed.
If a person elected by no less than the sovereign people may be ousted by this Court for lack
of the required qualifications, I see no reason why we cannot disqualified an appointee
simply because he has passed the Commission on Appointments.
Even the President of the Philippines may be declared ineligible by this Court in an
appropriate proceeding notwithstanding that he has been found acceptable by no less than
the enfranchised citizenry. The reason is that what we would be examining is not
the wisdom of his election but whether or not he was qualified to be elected in the first place.
Coming now to the qualifications of the private respondent, I fear that the ponencia may
have been too sweeping in its definition of the phrase "practice of law" as to render the
qualification practically toothless. From the numerous activities accepted as embraced in the
term, I have the uncomfortable feeling that one does not even have to be a lawyer to be
engaged in the practice of law as long as his activities involve the application of some law,
however peripherally. The stock broker and the insurance adjuster and the realtor could
come under the definition as they deal with or give advice on matters that are likely "to
become involved in litigation."
The lawyer is considered engaged in the practice of law even if his main occupation is another
business and he interprets and applies some law only as an incident of such business. That
covers every company organized under the Corporation Code and regulated by the SEC under
P.D. 902-A. Considering the ramifications of the modern society, there is hardly any activity
that is not affected by some law or government regulation the businessman must know about
and observe. In fact, again going by the definition, a lawyer does not even have to be part of a
business concern to be considered a practitioner. He can be so deemed when, on his own, he
rents a house or buys a car or consults a doctor as these acts involve his knowledge and
application of the laws regulating such transactions. If he operates a public utility vehicle as
his main source of livelihood, he would still be deemed engaged in the practice of law
because he must obey the Public Service Act and the rules and regulations of the Energy
Regulatory Board.
The ponencia quotes an American decision defining the practice of law as the "performance
of any acts ... in or out of court, commonly understood to be the practice of law," which tells
us absolutely nothing. The decision goes on to say that "because lawyers perform almost
every function known in the commercial and governmental realm, such a definition would
obviously be too global to be workable."
The effect of the definition given in the ponencia is to consider virtually every lawyer to be
engaged in the practice of law even if he does not earn his living, or at least part of it, as a
lawyer. It is enough that his activities are incidentally (even if only remotely) connected with
some law, ordinance, or regulation. The possible exception is the lawyer whose income is
derived from teaching ballroom dancing or escorting wrinkled ladies with pubescent
pretensions.
The respondent's credentials are impressive, to be sure, but they do not persuade me that he
has been engaged in the practice of law for ten years as required by the Constitution. It is
conceded that he has been engaged in business and finance, in which areas he has
distinguished himself, but as an executive and economist and not as a practicing lawyer. The
plain fact is that he has occupied the various positions listed in his resume by virtue of his
experience and prestige as a businessman and not as an attorney-at-law whose principal
attention is focused on the law. Even if it be argued that he was acting as a lawyer when he
lobbied in Congress for agrarian and urban reform, served in the NAMFREL and the
Constitutional Commission (together with non-lawyers like farmers and priests) and was a
member of the Davide Commission, he has not proved that his activities in these capacities
extended over the prescribed 10-year period of actual practice of the law. He is doubtless
eminently qualified for many other positions worthy of his abundant talents but not as
Chairman of the Commission on Elections.
I have much admiration for respondent Monsod, no less than for Mr. Justice Paras, but I must
regretfully vote to grant the petition.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., dissenting:
When this petition was filed, there was hope that engaging in the practice of law as a
qualification for public office would be settled one way or another in fairly definitive terms.
Unfortunately, this was not the result.
Of the fourteen (14) member Court, 5 are of the view that Mr. Christian Monsod engaged in
the practice of law (with one of these 5 leaving his vote behind while on official leave but not
expressing his clear stand on the matter); 4 categorically stating that he did not practice law; The professional life of the respondent follows:
2 voting in the result because there was no error so gross as to amount to grave abuse of
discretion; one of official leave with no instructions left behind on how he viewed the issue; 1.15.1. Respondent Monsod's activities since his passing the Bar examinations in
and 2 not taking part in the deliberations and the decision. 1961 consist of the following:

There are two key factors that make our task difficult. First is our reviewing the work of a 1. 1961-1963: M.A. in Economics (Ph. D. candidate), University of Pennsylvania
constitutional Commission on Appointments whose duty is precisely to look into the
qualifications of persons appointed to high office. Even if the Commission errs, we have no
2. 1963-1970: World Bank Group — Economist, Industry Department; Operations,
power to set aside error. We can look only into grave abuse of discretion or whimsically and
Latin American Department; Division Chief, South Asia and Middle East,
arbitrariness. Second is our belief that Mr. Monsod possesses superior qualifications in terms
International Finance Corporation
of executive ability, proficiency in management, educational background, experience in
international banking and finance, and instant recognition by the public. His integrity and
competence are not questioned by the petitioner. What is before us is compliance with a 3. 1970-1973: Meralco Group — Executive of various companies, i.e., Meralco
specific requirement written into the Constitution. Securities Corporation, Philippine Petroleum Corporation, Philippine Electric
Corporation
Inspite of my high regard for Mr. Monsod, I cannot shirk my constitutional duty. He has never
engaged in the practice of law for even one year. He is a member of the bar but to say that he 4. 1973-1976: Yujuico Group — President, Fil-Capital Development Corporation and
has practiced law is stretching the term beyond rational limits. affiliated companies

A person may have passed the bar examinations. But if he has not dedicated his life to the 5. 1976-1978: Finaciera Manila — Chief Executive Officer
law, if he has not engaged in an activity where membership in the bar is a requirement I fail to
see how he can claim to have been engaged in the practice of law. 6. 1978-1986: Guevent Group of Companies — Chief Executive Officer

Engaging in the practice of law is a qualification not only for COMELEC chairman but also for 7. 1986-1987: Philippine Constitutional Commission — Member
appointment to the Supreme Court and all lower courts. What kind of Judges or Justices will
we have if there main occupation is selling real estate, managing a business corporation, 8. 1989-1991: The Fact-Finding Commission on the December 1989 Coup Attempt
serving in fact-finding committee, working in media, or operating a farm with no active — Member
involvement in the law, whether in Government or private practice, except that in one joyful
moment in the distant past, they happened to pass the bar examinations?
9. Presently: Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer of the following
companies:
The Constitution uses the phrase "engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years." The
deliberate choice of words shows that the practice envisioned is active and regular, not
isolated, occasional, accidental, intermittent, incidental, seasonal, or extemporaneous. To be a. ACE Container Philippines, Inc.
"engaged" in an activity for ten years requires committed participation in something which is
the result of one's decisive choice. It means that one is occupied and involved in the b. Dataprep, Philippines
enterprise; one is obliged or pledged to carry it out with intent and attention during the ten-
year period. c. Philippine SUNsystems Products, Inc.

I agree with the petitioner that based on the bio-data submitted by respondent Monsod to d. Semirara Coal Corporation
the Commission on Appointments, the latter has not been engaged in the practice of law for
at least ten years. In fact, if appears that Mr. Monsod has never practiced law except for an
e. CBL Timber Corporation
alleged one year period after passing the bar examinations when he worked in his father's
law firm. Even then his law practice must have been extremely limited because he was also
working for M.A. and Ph. D. degrees in Economics at the University of Pennsylvania during Member of the Board of the Following:
that period. How could he practice law in the United States while not a member of the Bar
there? a. Engineering Construction Corporation of the Philippines
 b. First Philippine Energy Corporation
c. First Philippine Holdings Corporation
d. First Philippine Industrial Corporation
e. Graphic Atelier
f. Manila Electric Company
g. Philippine Commercial Capital, Inc.
h. Philippine Electric Corporation
i. Tarlac Reforestation and Environment Enterprises
j. Tolong Aquaculture Corporation
k. Visayan Aquaculture Corporation
l. Guimaras Aquaculture Corporation (Rollo, pp. 21-22)
There is nothing in the above bio-data which even remotely indicates that respondent
Monsod has given the lawenough attention or a certain degree of commitment and
participation as would support in all sincerity and candor the claim of having engaged in its
practice for at least ten years. Instead of working as a lawyer, he has lawyers working for him.
Instead of giving receiving that legal advice of legal services, he was the oneadvice and those
services as an executive but not as a lawyer.
The deliberations before the Commission on Appointments show an effort to equate
"engaged in the practice of law" with the use of legal knowledge in various fields of endeavor
such as commerce, industry, civic work, blue ribbon investigations, agrarian reform, etc.
where such knowledge would be helpful.
I regret that I cannot join in playing fast and loose with a term, which even an ordinary
layman accepts as having a familiar and customary well-defined meaning. Every resident of
this country who has reached the age of discernment has to know, follow, or apply the law at
various times in his life. Legal knowledge is useful if not necessary for the business executive,
legislator, mayor, barangay captain, teacher, policeman, farmer, fisherman, market vendor,
and student to name only a few. And yet, can these people honestly assert that as such, they
are engaged in the practice of law?
The Constitution requires having been "engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years."
It is not satisfied with having been "a member of the Philippine bar for at least ten years."
Some American courts have defined the practice of law, as follows:
The practice of law involves not only appearance in court in connection with
litigation but also services rendered out of court, and it includes the giving of advice
or the rendering of any services requiring the use of legal skill or knowledge, such
as preparing a will, contract or other instrument, the legal effect of which, under
the facts and conditions involved, must be carefully determined. People ex rel.
Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Tinkoff, 399 Ill. 282, 77 N.E.2d 693; People ex rel. Illinois State
Bar Ass'n v. People's Stock Yards State Bank, 344 Ill. 462,176 N.E. 901, and cases
cited.
It would be difficult, if not impossible to lay down a formula or definition of what
constitutes the practice of law. "Practicing law" has been defined as "Practicing as
an attorney or counselor at law according to the laws and customs of our courts, is
the giving of advice or rendition of any sort of service by any person, firm or
corporation when the giving of such advice or rendition of such service requires the
use of any degree of legal knowledge or skill." Without adopting that definition, we
referred to it as being substantially correct in People ex rel. Illinois State Bar Ass'n v.
People's Stock Yards State Bank, 344 Ill. 462,176 N.E. 901. (People v. Schafer, 87 N.E.
2d 773, 776)
For one's actions to come within the purview of practice of law they should not only be
activities peculiar to the work of a lawyer, they should also be performed, habitually,
frequently or customarily, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
Respondent's answers to questions propounded to him were rather evasive. He was
asked whether or not he ever prepared contracts for the parties in real-estate
transactions where he was not the procuring agent. He answered: "Very seldom." In
answer to the question as to how many times he had prepared contracts for the
parties during the twenty-one years of his business, he said: "I have no Idea." When
asked if it would be more than half a dozen times his answer was I suppose. Asked
if he did not recall making the statement to several parties that he had prepared
contracts in a large number of instances, he answered: "I don't recall exactly what
was said." When asked if he did not remember saying that he had made a practice
of preparing deeds, mortgages and contracts and charging a fee to the parties
therefor in instances where he was not the broker in the deal, he answered: "Well, I
don't believe so, that is not a practice." Pressed further for an answer as to his
practice in preparing contracts and deeds for parties where he was not the broker,
he finally answered: "I have done about everything that is on the books as far as
real estate is concerned."
xxx xxx xxx
Respondent takes the position that because he is a real-estate broker he has a
lawful right to do any legal work in connection with real-estate transactions,
 especially in drawing of real-estate contracts, deeds, mortgages, notes and the like.
There is no doubt but that he has engaged in these practices over the years and has
charged for his services in that connection. ... (People v. Schafer, 87 N.E. 2d 773)
xxx xxx xxx
... An attorney, in the most general sense, is a person designated or employed by
another to act in his stead; an agent; more especially, one of a class of persons
authorized to appear and act for suitors or defendants in legal proceedings. Strictly,
these professional persons are attorneys at law, and non-professional agents are
properly styled "attorney's in fact;" but the single word is much used as meaning an
attorney at law. A person may be an attorney in facto for another, without being an
attorney at law. Abb. Law Dict. "Attorney." A public attorney, or attorney at law, says
Webster, is an officer of a court of law, legally qualified to prosecute and defend
actions in such court on the retainer of clients. "The principal duties of an attorney
are (1) to be true to the court and to his client; (2) to manage the business of his
client with care, skill, and integrity; (3) to keep his client informed as to the state of
his business; (4) to keep his secrets confided to him as such. ... His rights are to be
justly compensated for his services." Bouv. Law Dict. tit. "Attorney." The transitive
verb "practice," as defined by Webster, means 'to do or perform frequently,
customarily, or habitually; to perform by a succession of acts, as, to practice
gaming, ... to carry on in practice, or repeated action; to apply, as a theory, to real
life; to exercise, as a profession, trade, art. etc.; as, to practice law or medicine,'
etc...." (State v. Bryan, S.E. 522, 523; Emphasis supplied)
In this jurisdiction, we have ruled that the practice of law denotes frequency or a succession
of acts. Thus, we stated in the case of People v. Villanueva (14 SCRA 109 [1965]):
xxx xxx xxx
... Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary
actions, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual exercise
(State v. Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan. 864, 42 LRA, M.S. 768). Practice of law to fall within the
prohibition of statute has been interpreted as customarily or habitually holding one's self out
to the public, as a lawyer and demanding payment for such services. ... . (at p. 112)
It is to be noted that the Commission on Appointment itself recognizes habituality as a
required component of the meaning of practice of law in a Memorandum prepared and
issued by it, to wit:
l. Habituality. The term 'practice of law' implies customarilyor habitually holding
one's self out to the public as a lawyer (People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109 citing
State v. Bryan, 4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644) such as when one sends a circular
announcing the establishment of a law office for the general practice of law (U.S. v.
Noy Bosque, 8 Phil. 146), or when one takes the oath of office as a lawyer before a
notary public, and files a manifestation with the Supreme Court informing it of his
intention to practice law in all courts in the country (People v. De Luna, 102 Phil.
968).
Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or
customary action, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is a
habitual exercise (People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 1 09 citing State v. Cotner, 1 27, p.
1, 87 Kan, 864)." (Rollo, p. 115)
xxx xxx xxx
While the career as a businessman of respondent Monsod may have profited from his legal
knowledge, the use of such legal knowledge is incidental and consists of isolated activities
which do not fall under the denomination of practice of law. Admission to the practice of law
was not required for membership in the Constitutional Commission or in the Fact-Finding
Commission on the 1989 Coup Attempt. Any specific legal activities which may have been
assigned to Mr. Monsod while a member may be likened to isolated transactions of foreign
corporations in the Philippines which do not categorize the foreign corporations as doing
business in the Philippines. As in the practice of law, doing business also should be active and
continuous. Isolated business transactions or occasional, incidental and casual transactions
are not within the context of doing business. This was our ruling in the case of Antam
Consolidated, Inc. v. Court of appeals, 143 SCRA 288 [1986]).
Respondent Monsod, corporate executive, civic leader, and member of the Constitutional
Commission may possess the background, competence, integrity, and dedication, to qualify
for such high offices as President, Vice-President, Senator, Congressman or Governor but the
Constitution in prescribing the specific qualification of having engaged in the practice of law
for at least ten (10) years for the position of COMELEC Chairman has ordered that he may not
be confirmed for that office. The Constitution charges the public respondents no less than
this Court to obey its mandate.
I, therefore, believe that the Commission on Appointments committed grave abuse of
discretion in confirming the nomination of respondent Monsod as Chairman of the COMELEC.
I vote to GRANT the petition.
Bidin, J., dissent
Separate Opinions
NARVASA, J., concurring:
I concur with the decision of the majority written by Mr. Justice Paras, albeit only in the
result; it does not appear to me that there has been an adequate showing that the
challenged determination by the Commission on Appointments-that the appointment of
respondent Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on Elections should, on the basis of his
stated qualifications and after due assessment thereof, be confirmed-was attended by error
so gross as to amount to grave abuse of discretion and consequently merits nullification by
this Court in accordance with the second paragraph of Section 1, Article VIII of the
Constitution. I therefore vote to DENY the petition.
Melencio-Herrera, J., concur.
PADILLA, J., dissenting:
The records of this case will show that when the Court first deliberated on the Petition at bar,
I voted not only to require the respondents to comment on the Petition, but I was the sole
vote for the issuance of a temporary restraining order to enjoin respondent Monsod from
assuming the position of COMELEC Chairman, while the Court deliberated on his
constitutional qualification for the office. My purpose in voting for a TRO was to prevent the
inconvenience and even embarrassment to all parties concerned were the Court to finally
decide for respondent Monsod's disqualification. Moreover, a reading of the Petition then in
relation to established jurisprudence already showed prima facie that respondent Monsod
did not possess the needed qualification, that is, he had not engaged in the practice of law for
at least ten (10) years prior to his appointment as COMELEC Chairman.
After considering carefully respondent Monsod's comment, I am even more convinced that
the constitutional requirement of "practice of law for at least ten (10) years" has not been
met.
The procedural barriers interposed by respondents deserve scant consideration because,
ultimately, the core issue to be resolved in this petition is the proper construal of the
constitutional provision requiring a majority of the membership of COMELEC, including the
Chairman thereof to "have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10) years."
(Art. IX(C), Section 1(1), 1987 Constitution). Questions involving the construction of
constitutional provisions are best left to judicial resolution. As declared in Angara v. Electoral
Commission, (63 Phil. 139) "upon the judicial department is thrown the solemn and
inescapable obligation of interpreting the Constitution and defining constitutional
boundaries."
The Constitution has imposed clear and specific standards for a COMELEC Chairman. Among
these are that he must have been "engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10) years."
It is the bounden duty of this Court to ensure that such standard is met and complied with.
What constitutes practice of law? As commonly understood, "practice" refers to the actual
performance or application of knowledge as distinguished from mere possession of
knowledge; it connotes an active, habitual, repeated or customary action.1 To "practice" law,
or any profession for that matter, means, to exercise or pursue an employment or
profession actively, habitually, repeatedly or customarily.
Therefore, a doctor of medicine who is employed and is habitually performing the tasks of a
nursing aide, cannot be said to be in the "practice of medicine." A certified public accountant
who works as a clerk, cannot be said to practice his profession as an accountant. In the same
way, a lawyer who is employed as a business executive or a corporate manager, other than as
head or attorney of a Legal Department of a corporation or a governmental agency, cannot be
said to be in the practice of law.
As aptly held by this Court in the case of People vs. Villanueva:2
Practice is more than an isolated appearance for it consists in frequent or
customary actions, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is
frequent habitual exercise (State vs- Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan. 864, 42 LRA, M.S.
768). Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of statute has been interpreted as
customarily or habitually holding one's self out to the public as a lawyer and
demanding payment for such services (State vs. Bryan, 4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C.
644,647.) ... (emphasis supplied).
It is worth mentioning that the respondent Commission on Appointments in a Memorandum
it prepared, enumerated several factors determinative of whether a particular activity
constitutes "practice of law." It states:
1. Habituality. The term "practice of law" implies customarily or habitually holding
one's self out to the public as a lawyer (People vs. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109 citing
State v. Boyen, 4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644) such as when one sends a circular
announcing the establishment of a law office for the general practice of law (U.S. v.
Ney Bosque, 8 Phil. 146), or when one takes the oath of office as a lawyer before a
notary public, and files a manifestation with the Supreme Court informing it of his
intention to practice law in all courts in the country (People v. De Luna, 102 Phil.
968).
Practice is more than an isolated appearance for it consists in frequent or
customary action, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is a
habitual exercise (People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109 citing State v. Cotner, 127, p. 1,
87 Kan, 864).
2. Compensation. Practice of law implies that one must have presented himself to
be in the active and continued practice of the legal profession and that his
professional services are available to the public for compensation, as a service of
his livelihood or in consideration of his said services. (People v. Villanueva, supra).
Hence, charging for services such as preparation of documents involving the use of
legal knowledge and skill is within the term "practice of law" (Ernani Paño, Bar
Reviewer in Legal and Judicial Ethics, 1988 ed., p. 8 citing People v. People's
Stockyards State Bank, 176 N.B. 901) and, one who renders an opinion as to the
proper interpretation of a statute, and receives pay for it, is to that extent,
practicing law (Martin, supra, p. 806 citing Mendelaun v. Gilbert and Barket Mfg.
Co., 290 N.Y.S. 462) If compensation is expected, all advice to clients and all action
 taken for them in matters connected with the law; are practicing law. (Elwood
Fitchette et al., v. Arthur C. Taylor, 94A-L.R. 356-359)
3. Application of law legal principle practice or procedure which calls for legal
knowledge, training and experience is within the term "practice of law".
(Martin supra)
4. Attorney-client relationship. Engaging in the practice of law presupposes the
existence of lawyer-client relationship. Hence, where a lawyer undertakes an
activity which requires knowledge of law but involves no attorney-client
relationship, such as teaching law or writing law books or articles, he cannot be said
to be engaged in the practice of his profession or a lawyer (Agpalo, Legal Ethics,
1989 ed., p. 30).3
The above-enumerated factors would, I believe, be useful aids in determining whether or not
respondent Monsod meets the constitutional qualification of practice of law for at least ten
(10) years at the time of his appointment as COMELEC Chairman.
The following relevant questions may be asked:
1. Did respondent Monsod perform any of the tasks which are peculiar to the practice of law?
2. Did respondent perform such tasks customarily or habitually?
3. Assuming that he performed any of such tasks habitually, did he do so HABITUALLY FOR AT
LEAST TEN (10) YEARS prior to his appointment as COMELEC Chairman?
Given the employment or job history of respondent Monsod as appears from the records, I
am persuaded that if ever he did perform any of the tasks which constitute the practice of
law, he did not do so HABITUALLY for at least ten (10) years prior to his appointment as
COMELEC Chairman.
While it may be granted that he performed tasks and activities which could be latitudinarianly
considered activities peculiar to the practice of law, like the drafting of legal documents and
the rendering of legal opinion or advice, such were isolated transactions or activities which do
not qualify his past endeavors as "practice of law." To become engaged in the practice of law,
there must be a continuity, or a succession of acts. As observed by the Solicitor General
in People vs. Villanueva:4
Essentially, the word private practice of law implies that one must have presented
himself to be in the activeand continued practice of the legal profession and that his
professional services are available to the public for a compensation, as a source of
his livelihood or in consideration of his said services.
ACCORDINGLY, my vote is to GRANT the petition and to declare respondent Monsod as not
qualified for the position of COMELEC Chairman for not having engaged in the practice of law
for at least ten (10) years prior to his appointment to such position.
CRUZ, J., dissenting:
I am sincerely impressed by the ponencia of my brother Paras but find I must dissent just the
same. There are certain points on which I must differ with him while of course respecting
hisviewpoint.
To begin with, I do not think we are inhibited from examining the qualifications of the
respondent simply because his nomination has been confirmed by the Commission on
Appointments. In my view, this is not a political question that we are barred from resolving.
Determination of the appointee's credentials is made on the basis of the established facts,
not the discretion of that body. Even if it were, the exercise of that discretion would still be
subject to our review.
In Luego, which is cited in the ponencia, what was involved was the discretion of the
appointing authority to choosebetween two claimants to the same office who both possessed
the required qualifications. It was that kind of discretion that we said could not be reviewed.
If a person elected by no less than the sovereign people may be ousted by this Court for lack
of the required qualifications, I see no reason why we cannot disqualified an appointee
simply because he has passed the Commission on Appointments.
Even the President of the Philippines may be declared ineligible by this Court in an
appropriate proceeding notwithstanding that he has been found acceptable by no less than
the enfranchised citizenry. The reason is that what we would be examining is not
the wisdom of his election but whether or not he was qualified to be elected in the first place.
Coming now to the qualifications of the private respondent, I fear that the ponencia may
have been too sweeping in its definition of the phrase "practice of law" as to render the
qualification practically toothless. From the numerous activities accepted as embraced in the
term, I have the uncomfortable feeling that one does not even have to be a lawyer to be
engaged in the practice of law as long as his activities involve the application of some law,
however peripherally. The stock broker and the insurance adjuster and the realtor could
come under the definition as they deal with or give advice on matters that are likely "to
become involved in litigation."
The lawyer is considered engaged in the practice of law even if his main occupation is another
business and he interprets and applies some law only as an incident of such business. That
covers every company organized under the Corporation Code and regulated by the SEC under
P.D. 902-A. Considering the ramifications of the modern society, there is hardly any activity
that is not affected by some law or government regulation the businessman must know about
and observe. In fact, again going by the definition, a lawyer does not even have to be part of a
business concern to be considered a practitioner. He can be so deemed when, on his own, he
rents a house or buys a car or consults a doctor as these acts involve his knowledge and
application of the laws regulating such transactions. If he operates a public utility vehicle as
his main source of livelihood, he would still be deemed engaged in the practice of law
because he must obey the Public Service Act and the rules and regulations of the Energy
Regulatory Board.
The ponencia quotes an American decision defining the practice of law as the "performance
of any acts . . . in or out of court, commonly understood to be the practice of law," which tells
us absolutely nothing. The decision goes on to say that "because lawyers perform almost
every function known in the commercial and governmental realm, such a definition would
obviously be too global to be workable."
The effect of the definition given in the ponencia is to consider virtually every lawyer to be
engaged in the practice of law even if he does not earn his living, or at least part of it, as a
lawyer. It is enough that his activities are incidentally (even if only remotely) connected with
some law, ordinance, or regulation. The possible exception is the lawyer whose income is
derived from teaching ballroom dancing or escorting wrinkled ladies with pubescent
pretensions.
The respondent's credentials are impressive, to be sure, but they do not persuade me that he
has been engaged in the practice of law for ten years as required by the Constitution. It is
conceded that he has been engaged in business and finance, in which areas he has
distinguished himself, but as an executive and economist and not as a practicing lawyer. The
plain fact is that he has occupied the various positions listed in his resume by virtue of his
experience and prestige as a businessman and not as an attorney-at-law whose principal
attention is focused on the law. Even if it be argued that he was acting as a lawyer when he
lobbied in Congress for agrarian and urban reform, served in the NAMFREL and the
Constitutional Commission (together with non-lawyers like farmers and priests) and was a
member of the Davide Commission, he has not proved that his activities in these capacities
extended over the prescribed 10-year period of actual practice of the law. He is doubtless
eminently qualified for many other positions worthy of his abundant talents but not as
Chairman of the Commission on Elections.
I have much admiration for respondent Monsod, no less than for Mr. Justice Paras, but I must
regretfully vote to grant the petition.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., dissenting:
When this petition was filed, there was hope that engaging in the practice of law as a
qualification for public office would be settled one way or another in fairly definitive terms.
Unfortunately, this was not the result.
Of the fourteen (14) member Court, 5 are of the view that Mr. Christian Monsod engaged in
the practice of law (with one of these 5 leaving his vote behind while on official leave but not
expressing his clear stand on the matter); 4 categorically stating that he did not practice law;
2 voting in the result because there was no error so gross as to amount to grave abuse of
discretion; one of official leave with no instructions left behind on how he viewed the issue;
and 2 not taking part in the deliberations and the decision.
There are two key factors that make our task difficult. First is our reviewing the work of a
constitutional Commission on Appointments whose duty is precisely to look into the
qualifications of persons appointed to high office. Even if the Commission errs, we have no
power to set aside error. We can look only into grave abuse of discretion or whimsically and
arbitrariness. Second is our belief that Mr. Monsod possesses superior qualifications in terms
of executive ability, proficiency in management, educational background, experience in
international banking and finance, and instant recognition by the public. His integrity and
competence are not questioned by the petitioner. What is before us is compliance with a
specific requirement written into the Constitution.
Inspite of my high regard for Mr. Monsod, I cannot shirk my constitutional duty. He has never
engaged in the practice of law for even one year. He is a member of the bar but to say that he
has practiced law is stretching the term beyond rational limits.
A person may have passed the bar examinations. But if he has not dedicated his life to the
law, if he has not engaged in an activity where membership in the bar is a requirement I fail to
see how he can claim to have been engaged in the practice of law.
Engaging in the practice of law is a qualification not only for COMELEC chairman but also for
appointment to the Supreme Court and all lower courts. What kind of Judges or Justices will
we have if there main occupation is selling real estate, managing a business corporation,
serving in fact-finding committee, working in media, or operating a farm with no active
involvement in the law, whether in Government or private practice, except that in one joyful
moment in the distant past, they happened to pass the bar examinations?
The Constitution uses the phrase "engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years." The
deliberate choice of words shows that the practice envisioned is active and regular, not
isolated, occasional, accidental, intermittent, incidental, seasonal, or extemporaneous. To be
"engaged" in an activity for ten years requires committed participation in something which is
the result of one's decisive choice. It means that one is occupied and involved in the
enterprise; one is obliged or pledged to carry it out with intent and attention during the ten-
year period.
I agree with the petitioner that based on the bio-data submitted by respondent Monsod to
the Commission on Appointments, the latter has not been engaged in the practice of law for
at least ten years. In fact, if appears that Mr. Monsod has never practiced law except for an
alleged one year period after passing the bar examinations when he worked in his father's
law firm. Even then his law practice must have been extremely limited because he was also
working for M.A. and Ph. D. degrees in Economics at the University of Pennsylvania during
that period. How could he practice law in the United States while not a member of the Bar
there?
The professional life of the respondent follows:
1.15.1. Respondent Monsod's activities since his passing the Bar examinations in
1961 consist of the following:
1. 1961-1963: M.A. in Economics (Ph. D. candidate), University of Pennsylvania
2. 1963-1970: World Bank Group — Economist, Industry Department; Operations,
Latin American Department; Division Chief, South Asia and Middle East,
International Finance Corporation
3. 1970-1973: Meralco Group — Executive of various companies, i.e., Meralco
Securities Corporation, Philippine Petroleum Corporation, Philippine Electric
Corporation
4. 1973-1976: Yujuico Group — President, Fil-Capital Development Corporation and
affiliated companies
5. 1976-1978: Finaciera Manila — Chief Executive Officer
6. 1978-1986: Guevent Group of Companies — Chief Executive Officer
7. 1986-1987: Philippine Constitutional Commission — Member
8. 1989-1991: The Fact-Finding Commission on the December 1989 Coup Attempt
— Member
9. Presently: Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer of the following
companies:
a. ACE Container Philippines, Inc.
b. Dataprep, Philippines
c. Philippine SUNsystems Products, Inc.
d. Semirara Coal Corporation
e. CBL Timber Corporation
Member of the Board of the Following:
a. Engineering Construction Corporation of the Philippines
b. First Philippine Energy Corporation
c. First Philippine Holdings Corporation
d. First Philippine Industrial Corporation
e. Graphic Atelier
f. Manila Electric Company
g. Philippine Commercial Capital, Inc.
h. Philippine Electric Corporation
i. Tarlac Reforestation and Environment Enterprises
j. Tolong Aquaculture Corporation
k. Visayan Aquaculture Corporation
l. Guimaras Aquaculture Corporation (Rollo, pp. 21-22)
There is nothing in the above bio-data which even remotely indicates that respondent
Monsod has given the lawenough attention or a certain degree of commitment and
participation as would support in all sincerity and candor the claim of having engaged in its
practice for at least ten years. Instead of working as a lawyer, he has lawyers working for him.
Instead of giving receiving that legal advice of legal services, he was the oneadvice and those
services as an executive but not as a lawyer.
The deliberations before the Commission on Appointments show an effort to equate
"engaged in the practice of law" with the use of legal knowledge in various fields of endeavor
such as commerce, industry, civic work, blue ribbon investigations, agrarian reform, etc.
where such knowledge would be helpful.
I regret that I cannot join in playing fast and loose with a term, which even an ordinary
layman accepts as having a familiar and customary well-defined meaning. Every resident of
this country who has reached the age of discernment has to know, follow, or apply the law at
various times in his life. Legal knowledge is useful if not necessary for the business executive,
legislator, mayor, barangay captain, teacher, policeman, farmer, fisherman, market vendor,
and student to name only a few. And yet, can these people honestly assert that as such, they
are engaged in the practice of law?
The Constitution requires having been "engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years."
It is not satisfied with having been "a member of the Philippine bar for at least ten years."
Some American courts have defined the practice of law, as follows:
 The practice of law involves not only appearance in court in connection with
litigation but also services rendered out of court, and it includes the giving of advice
or the rendering of any services requiring the use of legal skill or knowledge, such
as preparing a will, contract or other instrument, the legal effect of which, under
the facts and conditions involved, must be carefully determined. People ex rel.
Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Tinkoff, 399 Ill. 282, 77 N.E.2d 693; People ex rel. Illinois State
Bar Ass'n v. People's Stock Yards State Bank, 344 Ill. 462,176 N.E. 901, and cases
cited.
It would be difficult, if not impossible to lay down a formula or definition of what
constitutes the practice of law. "Practicing law" has been defined as "Practicing as
an attorney or counselor at law according to the laws and customs of our courts, is
the giving of advice or rendition of any sort of service by any person, firm or
corporation when the giving of such advice or rendition of such service requires the
use of any degree of legal knowledge or skill." Without adopting that definition, we
referred to it as being substantially correct in People ex rel. Illinois State Bar Ass'n v.
People's Stock Yards State Bank, 344 Ill. 462,176 N.E. 901. (People v. Schafer, 87 N.E.
2d 773, 776)
For one's actions to come within the purview of practice of law they should not only be
activities peculiar to the work of a lawyer, they should also be performed, habitually,
frequently or customarily, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
Respondent's answers to questions propounded to him were rather evasive. He was
asked whether or not he ever prepared contracts for the parties in real-estate
transactions where he was not the procuring agent. He answered: "Very seldom." In
answer to the question as to how many times he had prepared contracts for the
parties during the twenty-one years of his business, he said: "I have no Idea." When
asked if it would be more than half a dozen times his answer was I suppose. Asked
if he did not recall making the statement to several parties that he had prepared
contracts in a large number of instances, he answered: "I don't recall exactly what
was said." When asked if he did not remember saying that he had made a practice
of preparing deeds, mortgages and contracts and charging a fee to the parties
therefor in instances where he was not the broker in the deal, he answered: "Well, I
don't believe so, that is not a practice." Pressed further for an answer as to his
practice in preparing contracts and deeds for parties where he was not the broker,
he finally answered: "I have done about everything that is on the books as far as
real estate is concerned."
xxx xxx xxx
Respondent takes the position that because he is a real-estate broker he has a
lawful right to do any legal work in connection with real-estate transactions,
especially in drawing of real-estate contracts, deeds, mortgages, notes and the like.
There is no doubt but that he has engaged in these practices over the years and has
charged for his services in that connection. ... (People v. Schafer, 87 N.E. 2d 773)
xxx xxx xxx
... An attorney, in the most general sense, is a person designated or employed by
another to act in his stead; an agent; more especially, one of a class of persons
authorized to appear and act for suitors or defendants in legal proceedings. Strictly,
these professional persons are attorneys at law, and non-professional agents are
properly styled "attorney's in fact;" but the single word is much used as meaning an
attorney at law. A person may be an attorney in facto for another, without being an
attorney at law. Abb. Law Dict. "Attorney." A public attorney, or attorney at law, says
Webster, is an officer of a court of law, legally qualified to prosecute and defend
actions in such court on the retainer of clients. "The principal duties of an attorney
are (1) to be true to the court and to his client; (2) to manage the business of his
client with care, skill, and integrity; (3) to keep his client informed as to the state of
his business; (4) to keep his secrets confided to him as such. ... His rights are to be
justly compensated for his services." Bouv. Law Dict. tit. "Attorney." The transitive
verb "practice," as defined by Webster, means 'to do or perform frequently,
customarily, or habitually; to perform by a succession of acts, as, to practice
gaming, ... to carry on in practice, or repeated action; to apply, as a theory, to real
life; to exercise, as a profession, trade, art. etc.; as, to practice law or medicine,'
etc...." (State v. Bryan, S.E. 522, 523; Emphasis supplied)
In this jurisdiction, we have ruled that the practice of law denotes frequency or a succession
of acts. Thus, we stated in the case of People v. Villanueva (14 SCRA 109 [1965]):
xxx xxx xxx
... Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary
actions, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual exercise
(State v. Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan. 864, 42 LRA, M.S. 768). Practice of law to fall within the
prohibition of statute has been interpreted as customarily or habitually holding one's self out
to the public, as a lawyer and demanding payment for such services. ... . (at p. 112)
It is to be noted that the Commission on Appointment itself recognizes habituality as a
required component of the meaning of practice of law in a Memorandum prepared and
issued by it, to wit:
l. Habituality. The term 'practice of law' implies customarilyor habitually holding
one's self out to the public as a lawyer (People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109 citing
State v. Bryan, 4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644) such as when one sends a circular
announcing the establishment of a law office for the general practice of law (U.S. v.
Noy Bosque, 8 Phil. 146), or when one takes the oath of office as a lawyer before a
notary public, and files a manifestation with the Supreme Court informing it of his
intention to practice law in all courts in the country (People v. De Luna, 102 Phil.
968).
 Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or
customary action, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is a
habitual exercise (People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 1 09 citing State v. Cotner, 1 27, p.
1, 87 Kan, 864)." (Rollo, p. 115)
xxx xxx xxx
While the career as a businessman of respondent Monsod may have profited from his legal
knowledge, the use of such legal knowledge is incidental and consists of isolated activities
which do not fall under the denomination of practice of law. Admission to the practice of law
was not required for membership in the Constitutional Commission or in the Fact-Finding
Commission on the 1989 Coup Attempt. Any specific legal activities which may have been
assigned to Mr. Monsod while a member may be likened to isolated transactions of foreign
corporations in the Philippines which do not categorize the foreign corporations as doing
business in the Philippines. As in the practice of law, doing business also should be active and
continuous. Isolated business transactions or occasional, incidental and casual transactions
are not within the context of doing business. This was our ruling in the case of Antam
Consolidated, Inc. v. Court of appeals, 143 SCRA 288 [1986]).
Respondent Monsod, corporate executive, civic leader, and member of the Constitutional
Commission may possess the background, competence, integrity, and dedication, to qualify
for such high offices as President, Vice-President, Senator, Congressman or Governor but the
Constitution in prescribing the specific qualification of having engaged in the practice of law
for at least ten (10) years for the position of COMELEC Chairman has ordered that he may not
be confirmed for that office. The Constitution charges the public respondents no less than
this Court to obey its mandate.
I, therefore, believe that the Commission on Appointments committed grave abuse of
discretion in confirming the nomination of respondent Monsod as Chairman of the COMELEC.
I vote to GRANT the petition.
Bidin, J., dissent
A.C. No. 9018, April 20, 2016
TERESITA P. FAJARDO, Complainant, v. ATTY. NICANOR C. ALVAREZ, Respondent.
DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
This administrative case involves the determination of whether a lawyer working in the Legal
Section of the National Center for Mental Health under the Department of Health is
authorized to privately practice law, and consequently, whether the amount charged by
respondent for attorney's fees is reasonable under the principle of quantum meruit.
Complainant Teresita P. Fajardo (Teresita) was the Municipal Treasurer of San Leonardo,
Nueva Ecija. She hired respondent Atty. Nicanor C. Alvarez (Atty. Alvarez) to defend her in
criminal and administrative cases before the Office of the Ombudsman.
The parties have differing versions of the facts as summarized by the Investigating
Commissioner of the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
Teresita's version of the facts is as follows:
Around 2009, Teresita hired Atty. Alvarez to handle several cases filed against her before the
Office of the Ombudsman.1 Atty. Alvarez was then working in the Legal Section of the
National Center for Mental Health.2 He asked for P1,400,000.00 as acceptance fee. 3 However,
Atty. Alvarez did not enter his appearance before the Office of the Ombudsman nor sign any
pleadings.4Ch
Atty. Alvarez assured Teresita that he had friends connected with the Office of the
Ombudsman who could help with dismissing her case for a certain fee. 5 Atty. Alvarez said that
he needed to pay the amount of P500,000.00 to his friends and acquaintances working at the
Office of the Ombudsman to have the cases against Teresita dismissed. 6C
However, just two (2) weeks after Teresita and Atty. Alvarez talked, the Office of the
Ombudsman issued a resolution and decision recommending the filing of a criminal
complaint against Teresita, and her dismissal from service,
respectively.7ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Teresita then demanded that Atty. Alvarez return at least a portion of the amount she
gave.8 Atty. Alvarez promised to return the amount to Teresita; however, he failed to fulfill this
promise.9 Teresita sent a demand letter to Atty. Alvarez, which he failed to
heed.10ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
On the other hand, Atty. Alvarez claims the following:
 Atty. Alvarez is Legal Officer III of the National Center for Mental Health under the
Department of Health.11 He has authority to engage in private practice of the profession. 12 He
represented Teresita in several cases before the Office of the
Ombudsman.13ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Atty. Alvarez and Teresita had an arrangement that Teresita would consult Atty. Alvarez
whenever a case was filed against her. 14 Atty. Alvarez would then advise Teresita to send him a
copy of the complaint and its attachments through courier. 15 Afterwards, Atty. Alvarez would
evaluate the case and call Teresita to discuss his fees in accepting and handling the case. 16 A
50% downpayment would be deposited to Atty. Alvarez's or his secretary's bank
account.17 The balance would then be paid in installments. 18 The success fee was voluntary on
Teresita's part.19ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
On July 10, 2009, Atty. Alvarez received a call from Teresita regarding a meeting at Shangri-La
Mall to discuss the decision and resolution she received from the Office of the Ombudsman
dismissing her from service for dishonesty and indicting her for violation of Section 3 of
Republic Act No. 3019, respectively. 20Atty. Alvarez accepted the case and asked for
P500,000.00 as acceptance fee.21 According to Atty. Alvarez, he arrived at the amount after
considering the difficulty of the case and the workload that would be involved, which would
include appeals before the Court of Appeals and this Court. 22 However, the fee is exclusive of
filing fees, appearance fees, and other miscellaneous fees such as costs for photocopying and
mailing.23ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Atty. Alvarez claimed that he prepared several pleadings in connection with Teresita's case:
(1) motion for reconsideration filed on July 23, 2009 in connection with the administrative
case;
(2) motion for reconsideration filed on July 23, 2009 in connection with the criminal case;
(3) petition for injunction filed on October 15, 2009 before the Regional Trial Court of Gapan
City; and
(4) petition for preliminary injunction with prayer for a temporary restraining order filed
before the Court of Appeals on November 18, 2009, and the amended petition on
November 26, 2009.24
Atty. Alvarez also said that he prepared several letters to different government officials and
agencies.25ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Atty. Alvarez alleged that Teresita made staggered payments for the amounts they agreed
on.26 Teresita only paid the balance of the agreed acceptance fee equivalent to P450,000.00
on February 11, 2010. 27While Teresita paid P60,000.00 for the miscellaneous expenses, she
did not pay the expenses for other legal work performed and advanced by Atty.
Alvarez.28ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
On the last day for filing of the petition for review of the Office of the Ombudsman's Decision,
Teresita informed Atty. Alvarez that she was no longer interested in retaining Atty. Alvarez's
services as she had hired Atty. Tyrone Contado from Nueva Ecija, who was Atty. Alvarez's co-
counsel in the cases against Teresita. 29ChanRoble
On June 1, 2011, Teresita filed before the Office of the Bar Confidant a Verified Complaint
praying for the disbarment of Atty. Alvarez. 30 This Court required Atty. Alvarez to file his
comment on the complaint within 10 days from notice. 31Chan
On December 7, 2011, the case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for
investigation, report, and recommendation.32Cha
In his Report and Recommendation33 dated November 12, 2012, Investigating Commissioner
Honesto A. Villamayor found Atty. Alvarez guilty of violating the Code of Professional
Responsibility and recommended Atty. Alvarez's suspension from the practice of law for one
(1) year.34 Atty. Alvarez was also ordered to return the amount of P700,000.00 to Teresita with
legal interest from the time of demand until its full payment. 35 The dispositive portion of the
Investigating Commissioner's Report and Recommendation reads:
WHEREFORE, finding Respondent guilty of committing unlawful, immoral and deceitful acts of
the Canon of Professional Responsibility, [it] is recommended that he be suspended for one
(1) year in the practice of law and he be ordered to return the amount of P700,000.00 to the
Complainant within two (2) months from receipt of this order with legal interest from the
time of demand, until fully paid, with a warning that repetition of [a] similar offense in the
future will be dealt with more severely.36cralawre
d
On the unauthorized practice of law, the Investigating Commissioner found that while Atty.
Alvarez claimed that he was authorized by his superior to privately practice law, the pleadings
he allegedly prepared and filed did not bear his name and signature. 37 Hence, the
Investigating Commissioner stated that:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The time that Respondent spent in following up the case of Complainant in the Office of the
Ombudsman is a time lost to the government which could have been used in the service of
many taxpayers[.]38cralawred
In any case, granting that Atty. Alvarez was authorized by his superior to practice his
profession, the Investigating Commissioner stated that Atty. Alvarez was prohibited to handle
cases involving malversation of funds by government officials such as a municipal
treasurer.39ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Moreover, the Investigating Commissioner found that the attorney's fees Atty. Alvarez asked
for were unreasonable:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
From all indication, Complainant was forced to give to the Respondent the amount of
P1,400,000.00 because of the words of Respondent that he has friends in the Office of the
Ombudsman who can help with a fee. That because of that guarantee, Complainant was
obligated to shell out every now and then money for the satisfaction of the allege[d] friend of
the Respondent[.]
Complainant is an ordinary Municipal Treasurer of a 4 th or 5th class municipality and the
amount of attorney's fees demanded by the Respondent is very much excessive. . . . The
exorbitant amount that he demanded from complainant is too much for a lowly local
government employee. What the Respondent did is not only illegal, immoral and dishonest
but also taking advantage of a defenseless victim.
. .
While a lawyer should charge only fair and reasonable fees, no hard and fast rule may be set
in the determination of what a reasonable fee is, or what is not. That must be established
from the facts of each case[.]
. .
The fees claimed and received by the Respondent for the alleged cases he handled despite
the fact that the records and evidence does not show that he ever signed pleadings filed, the
amount of P700,000.00 is reasonable, thus, fairness and equity dictate, he has to return the
excess amount of P700,000.00 to the complainant[.] 40cralaw
red
In Notice of Resolution No. XX-2013-77841 dated June 21, 2013, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines Board of Governors adopted the findings and recommendations of the
Investigating Commissioner:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
RESOLVED to ADOPT AND APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED AND APPROVED,
the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled
case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A", and finding the recommendation fully
supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules and considering that
complaint [sic] is guilty of unlawful, immoral and deceitful acts, Atty. Nicanor C. Alvarez is
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) year with [a] Warning that
repetition of the same acts shall be dealt with more sever[ejly. Further, he is Ordered to
Return the amount of P700,000.00 to complainant with legal interest from the time of
demand.42 (Emphasis in the original)cralawred
Atty. Alvarez moved for reconsideration of the Resolution,43 but the Motion was denied by the
Board of Governors in Notice of Resolution No. XXI-2014-286 44 dated May 3, 2014. The
Resolution reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
RESOLVED to DENY Respondent's Motion for Reconsideration, there being no cogent reason to
reverse the findings of the Commission and the resolution subject of the motion, it being a
mere reiteration of the matters which had already been threshed out and taken into
consideration. Thus, Resolution No. XX-2013-778 dated June 21, 2013 is hereby
AFFIRMED.45 (Emphasis in the original)cralawred
We resolve the following issues:
First, whether respondent Atty. Nicanor C. Alvarez, as a lawyer working in the Legal Section of
the National Center for Mental Health under the Department of Health, is authorized to
engage in the private practice of law; and
Second, whether the amount charged by respondent for attorney's fees is reasonable under
the principle of quantum meruit.
The Investigating Commissioner did not make a categorical declaration that respondent is
guilty of unauthorized practice of his profession. The Investigating Commissioner merely
alluded to respondent's unauthorized practice of law.
We find that respondent committed unauthorized practice of his profession.
Respondent claims that he is authorized to practice his profession 46 as shown in the letter
dated August 1, 2001 of National Center for Mental Health Chief Bernardino A. Vicente. 47 The
letter reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
TO : ATTY. NICANOR C. ALVAREZ
Legal Officer III
This Center
Subject : Authority to engage in private practice of profession
This refers to your request for permission to engage in private practice of your profession.
In accordance with Administrative Order No. 21, s. 1999 of the Department of Health, which
vested in the undersigned the authority to grant permission for the exercise of profession or
engage in the practice of profession, you are hereby authorized to teach or engage in the
practice of your profession provided it will not run in conflict with the interest of the Center
and the Philippine government as a whole. In the exigency of the service however, or when
public interest so requires, this authority may be revoked anytime.
Please be guided accordingly.
[sgd.]
BERNARDINO A. VICENTE, MD, FFPPA, MHA, CESO IV
Medical Center Chief II48 (Emphasis supplied)cralawred
Respondent practiced law even if he did not sign any pleading. In the context of this case, his
surreptitious actuations reveal illicit intent. Not only did he do unauthorized practice, his acts
also show badges of offering to peddle influence in the Office of the Ombudsman.
In Cayetano v. Monsod,49 the modern concept of the term "practice of law" includes the more
traditional concept of litigation or appearance before courts:
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. A person is also considered
to be in the practice of law when he:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
"x x x for valuable consideration engages in the business of advising person, firms,
associations or corporations as to their rights under the law, or appears in a representative
capacity as an advocate in proceedings pending or prospective, before any court,
commissioner, referee, board, body, committee, or commission constituted by law or
authorized to settle controversies and there, in such representative capacity performs any act
or acts for the purpose of obtaining or defending the rights of their clients under the law.
Otherwise stated, one who, in a representative capacity, engages in the business of advising
clients as to their rights under the law, or while so engaged performs any act or acts either in
court or outside of court for that purpose, is engaged in the practice of law."cralawred
. . . .
The University of the Philippines Law Center in conducting orientation briefing for new
lawyers (1974-1975) listed the dimensions of the practice of law in even broader terms as
advocacy, counseling and public service.
"One may be a practicing attorney in following any line of employment in the profession. If
what he does exacts knowledge of the law and is of a kind usual for attorneys engaging in the
active practice of their profession, and he follows some one or more lines of employment
such as this he is a practicing attorney at law within the meaning of the statute."cralawred
Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law,
legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. "To engage in the practice of law is to
perform those acts which are characteristics of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to
give notice or render any kind of service, which device or service requires the use in any
degree of legal knowledge or skill."
. . . The authority to grant permission to any official or employee shall be granted by the head of
Interpreted in the light of the various definitions of the term "practice of law," particularly the
modern concept of law practice, and taking into consideration the liberal construction
intended by the framers of the Constitution, Arty. Monsod's past work experiences as a
lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator
of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both the rich and the poor—verily more than satisfy
the constitutional requirement—that he has been engaged in the practice of law for at least
ten years.50 (Emphasis supplied)cralawred
Cayetano was reiterated in Lingan v. Calubaquib:51
Practice of law is "any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal
procedure, knowledge, training and experience." It includes "[performing] acts which are
characteristics of the [legal] profession" or "[rendering any kind of] service [which] requires
the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill."
Work in government that requires the use of legal knowledge is considered practice of law.
In Cayetano v. Monsod, this court cited the deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission and agreed that work rendered by lawyers in the Commission on Audit requiring
"[the use of] legal knowledge or legal talent" is practice of law. 52 (Citations omitted)cralawred
By preparing the pleadings of and giving legal advice to complainant, respondent practiced
law.
Under Section 7(b)(2) of Republic Act No. 6713, otherwise known as the Code of Conduct and
Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees, and Memorandum Circular No. 17, series
of 1986,53government officials or employees are prohibited from engaging in private practice
of their profession unless authorized by their department heads. More importantly, if
authorized, the practice of profession must not conflict nor tend to conflict with the official
functions of the government official or employee:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Republic Act No. 6713:
Section 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. - In addition to acts and omissions of public
officials and employees now prescribed in the Constitution and existing laws, the following
shall constitute prohibited acts and transactions of any public official and employee and are
hereby declared to be unlawful:
(b) Outside employment and other activities related thereto. - Public officials and employees
during their incumbency shall not:
(2) Engage in the private practice of their profession unless authorized by the Constitution or
law, provided, that such practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with their official
functions[.]
. . .
Memorandum Circular No. 17:
the ministry or agency in accordance with Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Revised Civil Service
Rules, which provides:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
"Sec. 12. No officer or employee shall engage directly in any private business, vocation, or
profession or be connected with any commercial, credit, agricultural, or industrial
undertaking without a written permission from the head of Department; Provided, That this
prohibition will be absolute in the case of those officers and employees whose duties and
responsibilities require that their entire time be at the disposal of the Government: Provided,
further, That if an employee is granted permission to engage in outside activities, the time so
devoted outside of office hours should be fixed by the chief of the agency to the end that it
will not impair in any way the efficiency of the other officer or employee: And provided,
finally, That no permission is necessary in the case of investments, made by an officer or
employee, which do not involve any real or apparent conflict between his private interests
and public duties, or in any way influence him in the discharge of his duties, and he shall not
take part in the management of the enterprise or become an officer or member of the board
of directors", subject to any additional conditions which the head of the office deems
necessary in each particular case in the interest of the service, as expressed in the various
issuances of the Civil Service Commission.cralawred
In Abella v. Cruzabra,54 the respondent was a Deputy Register of Deeds of General Santos City.
While serving as an incumbent government employee, the respondent "filed a petition for
commission as a notary public and was commissioned . . . without obtaining prior authority
from the Secretary of the Department of Justice." 55 According to the complainant, the
respondent had notarized around 3,000 documents. 56 This Court found the respondent guilty
of engaging in notarial practice without written authority from the Secretary of Justice. Thus:
It is clear that when respondent filed her petition for commission as a notary public, she did
not obtain a written permission from the Secretary of the D[epartment] [of] J[ustice].
Respondent's superior, the Register of Deeds, cannot issue any authorization because he is
not the head of the Department. And even assuming that the Register of Deeds authorized
her, respondent failed to present any proof of that written permission. Respondent cannot
feign ignorance or good faith because respondent filed her petition for commission as a
notary public after Memorandum Circular No. 17 was issued in 1986.esVirtualawlibrary
In this case, respondent was given written permission by the Head of the National Center for
Mental Health, whose authority was designated under Department of Health Administrative
Order No. 21, series of 1999.58Chan
However, by assisting and representing complainant in a suit against the Ombudsman and
against government in general, respondent put himself in a situation of conflict of interest.
Respondent's practice of profession was expressly and impliedly conditioned on the
requirement that his practice will not be "in conflict with the interest of the Center and the
Philippine government as a whole."59ChanRob
In Javellana v. Department of Interior and Local Government,60 the petitioner was an
incumbent City Councilor or member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Bago City. He was a
lawyer by profession and had continuously engaged in the practice of law without securing
authority from the Regional Director of the Department of Local Government. 61 In 1989, the
petitioner acted as counsel for Antonio Javiero and Rolando Catapang and filed a case for
Illegal Dismissal and Reinstatement with Damages against Engr. Ernesto C. Divinagracia, City
Engineer of Bago City.62ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrar
Engr. Ernesto C. Divinagracia filed an administrative case before the Department of Local
Government for violation of Section 7(b)(2) of Republic Act No. 6713 and relevant
Department of Local Government memorandum circulars on unauthorized practice of
profession, as well as for oppression, misconduct, and abuse of authority. 63 While the case
was pending before Department of Local Government, the petitioner was able to secure a
written authority to practice his profession from the Secretary of Interior and Local
Government, "provided that such practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with his official
functions."64ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
This Court in Javellana observed that the petitioner practiced his profession in conflict with
his functions as City Councilor and against the interests of government:
In the first place, complaints against public officers and employees relating or incidental to
the performance of their duties are necessarily impressed with public interest for by express
constitutional mandate, a public office is a public trust. The complaint for illegal dismissal
filed by Javiero and Catapang against City Engineer Divinagracia is in effect a complaint
against the City Government of Bago City, their real employer, of which petitioner Javellana is
a councilman. Hence, judgment against City Engineer Divinagracia would actually be a
judgment against the City Government. By serving as counsel for the complaining employees
and assisting them to prosecute their claims against City Engineer Divinagracia, the petitioner
violated Memorandum Circular No. 74-58 (in relation to Section 7[b-2] of R[epublic] A[ct]
[No.] 6713) prohibiting a government official from engaging in the private practice of his
profession, if such practice would represent interests adverse to the government.
Petitioner's contention that Section 90 of the Local Government Code of 1991 and DLG
Memorandum Circular No. 90-81 violate Article VIII, Section 5 of the Constitution is
completely off tangent. Neither the statute nor the circular trenches upon the Supreme
Court's power and authority to prescribe rules on the practice of law. The Local Government
Code and DLG Memorandum Circular No. 90-81 simply prescribe rules of conduct for public
officials to avoid conflicts of interest between the discharge of their public duties and the
private practice of their profession, in those instances where the law allows it. 65cralawre
d
There is basic conflict of interest here. Respondent is a public officer, an employee of
government. The Office of the Ombudsman is part of government. By appearing against the
Office of the Ombudsman, respondent is going against the same employer he swore to serve.
In addition, the government has a serious interest in the prosecution of erring employees and
their corrupt acts. Under the Constitution, "[p]ublic office is a public trust." 66 The Office of the
Ombudsman, as "protectors of the [P]eople," 67 is mandated to "investigate and prosecute . . .
any act or omission of any public officer or employee, office or agency, when such act or
omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient."
Thus, a conflict of interest exists when an incumbent government employee represents
another government employee or public officer in a case pending before the Office of the
Ombudsman. The incumbent officer ultimately goes against government's mandate under
the Constitution to prosecute public officers or employees who have committed acts or
omissions that appear to be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient. 69 Furthermore, this is
consistent with the constitutional directive that "[p]ublic officers and employees must, at all
times, be accountable to the [P]eople, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity,
loyalty, and efficiency; act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives." 70ary
The objective in disciplinary cases is not to punish the erring officer or employee but to
continue to uplift the People's trust in government and to ensure excellent public
service:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
[W]hen an officer or employee is disciplined, the object sought is not the punishment of that
officer or employee, but the improvement of the public service and the preservation of the
public's faith and confidence in the government. . . . These constitutionally-enshrined
principles, oft-repeated in our case law, are not mere rhetorical flourishes or idealistic
sentiments. They should be taken as working standards by all in the public service. 71
Having determined that respondent illicitly practiced law, we find that there is now no need
to determine whether the fees he charged were reasonable.
In disbarment or disciplinary cases pending before this Court, the complainant must prove his
or her allegations through substantial evidence. 72 In Advincula v. Macabata,73 this Court
dismissed a complaint for disbarment due to the lack of evidence in proving the
complainant's allegations:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
As a basic rule in evidence, the burden of proof lies on the party who makes the allegations—
ei incumbit probation, qui decit, non qui negat; cum per rerum naturam factum negantis
probation nulla sit. In the case at bar, complainant miserably failed to comply with the burden
of proof required of her. A mere charge or allegation of wrongdoing does not suffice.
Accusation is not synonymous with guilt. 74 (Emphasis in the original, citations
omitted)cralawred
Moreover, lawyers should not be hastily disciplined or penalized unless it is shown that they
committed a transgression of their oath or their duties, which reflects on their fitness to
enjoy continued status as a member of the bar:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The power to disbar or suspend ought always to be exercised on the preservative and not on
the vindictive principle, with great caution and only for the most weighty reasons and only on
clear cases of misconduct which seriously affect the standing and character of the lawyer as
an officer of the court and member of the Bar. Only those acts which cause loss of moral
character should merit disbarment or suspension, while those acts which neither affect nor
erode the moral character of the lawyer should only justify a lesser sanction unless they are
of such nature and to such extent as to clearly show the lawyer's unfltness to continue in the
practice of law. The dubious character of the act charged as well as the motivation which
induced the lawyer to commit it must be clearly demonstrated before suspension or
disbarment is meted out. The mitigating or aggravating circumstances that attended the
commission of the offense should also be considered. 75cralawred
Likewise, we find that respondent violated the Lawyer's Oath and the Code of Professional
Responsibility when he communicated to or, at the very least, made it appear to complainant
that he knew people from the Office of the Ombudsman who could help them get a favorable
decision in complainant's case.
Lawyers are mandated to uphold, at all times, integrity and dignity in the practice of their
profession.76Respondent violated the oath he took when he proposed to gain a favorable
outcome for complainant's case by resorting to his influence among staff in the Office where
the case was pending.77ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Thus, respondent violated the Code of Professional Responsibility. Canon 1, Rules 1.01, and
1.0278prohibit lawyers from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral, or deceitful
conduct.79 Respondent's act of ensuring that the case will be dismissed because of his
personal relationships with officers or employees in the Office of the Ombudsman is unlawful
and dishonest. Canon 780 of the Code of Professional Responsibility requires lawyers to always
"uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession."
In relation, Canon 13 81 mandates that lawyers "shall rely upon the merits of his [or her] cause
and refrain from any impropriety which tends to influence, or gives the appearance of
influencing the court."
A lawyer that approaches a judge to try to gain influence and receive a favorable outcome for
his or her client violates Canon 13 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. 82 This act of
influence peddling is highly immoral and has no place in the legal profession:
The highly immoral implication of a lawyer approaching a judge—or a judge evincing a
willingness—to discuss, in private, a matter related to a case pending in that judge's sala
cannot be over-emphasized. The fact that Atty. Singson did talk on different occasions to
Judge Reyes, initially through a mutual friend, Atty. Sevilla, leads us to conclude that Atty.
Singson was indeed trying to influence the judge to rule in his client's favor. This conduct is
not acceptable in the legal profession.83cralawred
In Jimenez v. Verano, Jr.,84 we disciplined the respondent for preparing a release order for his
clients using the letterhead of the Department of Justice and the stationery of the Secretary:
The way respondent conducted himself manifested a clear intent to gain special treatment
and consideration from a government agency. This is precisely the type of improper behavior
sought to be regulated by the codified norms for the bar. Respondent is duty-bound to
actively avoid any act that tends to influence, or may be seen to influence, the outcome of an
ongoing case, lest the people's faith in the judicial process is diluted.
The primary duty of lawyers is not to their clients but to the administration of justice. To that
end, their clients' success is wholly subordinate. The conduct of a member of the bar ought to
and must always be scrupulously observant of the law and ethics. Any means, not honorable,
fair and honest which is resorted to by the lawyer, even in the pursuit of his devotion to his
client's cause, is condemnable and unethical.
Zeal and persistence in advancing a client's cause must always be within the bounds of the
law. A self-respecting independence in the exercise of the profession is expected if an
attorney is to remain a member of the bar. In the present case, we find that respondent fell
short of these exacting standards. Given the import of the case, a warning is a mere slap on
the wrist that would not serve as commensurate penalty for the offense. 85cralawred
Similar to the present case, in Bueno v. Rañeses,86 we disbarred a lawyer who solicited bribe
money from his client in violation of Canon 13 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Rather than merely suspend Atty. Rañeses as had been done in Bildner, the Court believes
that Atty. Rañeses merits the ultimate administrative penalty of disbarment because of the
multi-layered impact and implications of what he did; by his acts he proved himself to be
what a lawyer should not be, in a lawyer's relations to the client, to the court and to the
Integrated Bar.
First, he extracted money from his client for a purpose that is both false and fraudulent. It is
false because no bribery apparently took place as Atty. Rañeses in fact lost the case. It is
fraudulent because the professed purpose of the exaction was the crime of bribery. Beyond
these, he maligned the judge and the Judiciary by giving the impression that court cases are
won, not on the merits, but through deceitful means—a decidedly black mark against the
Judiciary. Last but not the least, Atty. Rañeses grossly disrespected the IBP by his cavalier
attitude towards its disciplinary proceedings.
From these perspectives, Atty. Rañeses wronged his client, the judge allegedly on the "take,"
the Judiciary as an institution, and the IBP of which he is a member. The Court cannot and
should not allow offenses such as these to pass unredressed. Let this be a signal to one and
all—to all lawyers, their clients and the general public—that the Court will not hesitate to act
decisively and with no quarters given to defend the interest of the public, of our judicial
system and the institutions composing it, and to ensure that these are not compromised by
unscrupulous or misguided members of the Bar. 87 (Emphasis supplied)cralawred
In the interest of ridding itself of corrupt personnel who encourage influence peddling, and in
the interest of maintaining the high ethical standards of employees in the judiciary, this Court
did not hesitate in dismissing its own employee from government service when she peddled
influence in the Court of Appeals:88
What brings our judicial system into disrepute are often the actuations of a few erring court
personnel peddling influence to party-litigants, creating the impression that decisions can be Pnro sbi ng Dep Omb la png cnabi sa knya ng Omb. Ang CA Reso pnaiwan n Orly @ studyohn
bought and sold, ultimately resulting in the disillusionment of the public. This Court has never nya (txt kontal)
wavered in its vigilance in eradicating the so-called "bad eggs" in the judiciary. And whenever
warranted by the gravity of the offense, the supreme penalty of dismissal in an administrative DATE: 15-04-2010
case is meted to erring personnel.89crala
wred TIME: 6:07 pm
The Investigating Commissioner found that complainant was "forced to give . . . Respondent
the amount of P1,400,000.00 because of the words of Respondent that he ha[d] friends in TYPE: Text Message
the Office of the Ombudsman who c[ould] help with a fee." 90 It is because of respondent's
assurances to complainant that she sent him money over the course of several ....
months.91 These assurances are seen from the text messages that respondent sent
complainant:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary FROM: Atty. Alvarez <+639063630224>

FROM: Atty. Alvarez <+639063630224> SUBJECT:

SUBJECT:
Cnbi ko dun sa kontak dati na magbibigay tayo na pera sa allowance lang muna later na ang
bayad pag labas ng reso at kaliwaan pero sbi nya mas maganda kung isasabay na ang pera
pagbgay ng letter mo sa omb.. Parang dun tayo nagkamali pero ang solusyon ay sana ibalik
nila ang pera . . in d meantime hindi dapat apektado ang kaso at kailangan an Appeal sa CA at
may deadline yun
Yung blessing pala ni gutierez ang hnhntay ng overall dep omb si orly at dun din siya subok
kuha letter pero nasbhan na si gutierez ng dep omb for Luzon sbi ko pwwde b nila gawin total
alam na ni gutierez. . . Maya tawag ko sayo update
DATE: 15-04-2010
TIME: 12:44 pm

DATE: 31-05-2010 TYPE: Text Message

TIME: 5:24 pm ....

TYPE: Text Message FROM: Atty. Alvarez <+639063630224>

.... SUBJECT:

FROM: Atty. Alvarez <+639063630224> Gud mrng Tess hindi na svmagot kahapon tnxt ko pero minsan hndi tlga sumasagot yun nag
ttxt lang pagkatapos kaya lang d mo pala naiintindihan ang txt nya bisaya "istudyahun" ibig
SUBJECT: sabihn kausapin pa so nasbi na nya sa omb yung letter at istudzahan pa

Gud pm pnro, naLBC n b ang Reso? Kung Jan un pnrmahn ... DATE: 31-03-2010

DATE: 21-05-2010 TIME: 8:25 am

TIME: 5:13 pm TYPE: Text Message

TYPE: Text Message ....

.... FROM: Atty. Alvarez <+639063630224>

FROM: Atty. Alvarez <+639063630224> SUBJECT:

SUBJECT: Ok panero update ko na lang client pero nag txt tlga kailangan daw nya letter habang wala pa
omb reso., Txt mo lang ko panero, have a nice holidays., (sagot ko yan tess) TIME: 12:32 pm

DATE: 03-03-2010 TYPE: Text Message

TIME: 5:03 pm ....

TYPE: Text Message FROM: Atty. Alvarez <+639063630224>

.... SUBJECT:

FROM: Atty. Alvarez <+639063630224> Tess ndpst mo na? Kakausapin ko kasi na qc na lang kami kita at malapit ako dun maya at
hindi na sa crsng. Tnx
SUBJECT:
DATE: 14-04-2010
Sa dep omb for Luzon na nya follow up ang MR at saka overall dep omb si orly dun nya
kukunin letter TIME: 1:29 pm

DATE: 30-03-2010 TYPE: Text Message

TIME: 5:00 pm ....

TYPE: Text Message FROM: Atty. Alvarez <+639063630224>

.... SUBJECT:

FROM: Atty. Alvarez <+639063630224> Gud pm pnro. Ok ba ang 15k rep maya 6pm? Thnx (txt ng kontak tess kausapin ko mbuti sa
letter)
SUBJECT:
DATE: 14-04-2010
Gud pm pnro. Ang Dep. Omb. My closd dor mtng pro pnkta s knya ang note q at sabi rw
bumalik aq aftr Holy wk. C Orly nman ay ngsabi n es2dyuhn p rw nya. TIME: 10:25 am

DATE: 30-03-2010 TYPE: Text Message

TIME: 4:52 pm ....

TYPE: Text Message FROM: Atty. Alvarez <+639063630224>

.... SUBJECT:

FROM: Atty. Alvarez <+639063630224> Pnro ung rep alo n bngay mo 1st Mar 24 ay ok Ing pra s 2 falo-ups q Mar 25 @ Mar 30. As
usual, magkita tau Apr 14 @ kunin q 20th para sa falo-up Apr 15 thnx
SUBJECT:
DATE: 08-04-2010
Binigay ko na pera kahapon at kinausap ko para sa letter magkikita pa kami marnaya las 2 at
kukunin nya copy letter natin kay sales at CA reso TIME: 10:58 am

DATE: 15-04-2010 TYPE: Text Message

....
FROM: Atty. Alvarez <+639063630224>
SUBJECT:
Ok panero kailangan malinaw din ang presentation lp sa client panero at ang impression nya
yun na ang hningi natin... so april 15 panero an balik mo sa MR at yung letter form omb to dof
bhala ka na sa diskarte panero pag nakakuha tayo nakahanda na 150k dun
FROM: Atty. Alvarez <+639063630224>
SUBJECT:
Gud pm uli pnro. Kung subukan q n lkrn ky Orly ung cnabi mong letr adrsd 2 DOF Sec @ synd
n Orly ang letr, pktanong s rspndnt kung ok b s knya nab yarn nya aq ng Atty's fee n 75thou
upfront @ another 75thou upon receipt of a DOF ordr holdng n abyans implmntation of hr
dsmsal due 2 Orly's letr? thnx

DATE: 08-04-2010 DATE: 11-03-2010

TIME: 10:56 am TIME: 7:03 pm

TYPE: Text Message TYPE: Text Message92cralawred

....
FROM: Atty. Alvarez <+639063630224>
SUBJECT:
Pnero dapat maalala mo n ung purpose ng 400th hindi directly delivery ng Reso granting d MR
pro ung delivery by the Dep Omb ng letr of appeal 2 d Omb at pgpaliwang nya sa Omb. Re sa
hnhngi ng rspondnt n modfcation ng Dcsion. Nung 1st mtng ntn Mar 24, ngin4m q sau n
ngawa n i2 ng Dep Omb pro kausapn p ng Omb c Orly. Itong huli ang nabtn p, pro yon ay
dscrtion n ng Omb@ wing control d2 and Dep. Omb.
In response to his alleged text messages, respondent claims that complainant must have
confused him with her other contacts. 93 Respondent found it "mesmerizing" that complainant
was able to save all those alleged text messages from two (2) years ago. 94 Moreover,
assuming these messages were "true, still they [were] not legally admissible as they [were]
covered by the lawyer-client privileged communication as those supposed texts '[had been]
made for the purpose and in the course of employment, [were] regarded as privileged and
the rule of exclusion [was] strictly enforced.'" 95ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
In cases involving influence peddling or bribery, "[t]he transaction is always done in secret
and often only between the two parties concerned." 96 Nevertheless, as found by the
Investigating Commissioner and as shown by the records, we rule that there is enough proof
to hold respondent guilty of influence peddling.

DATE: 08-04-2010 We agree with the penalty recommended by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of
Governors. We find respondent's acts of influence peddling, coupled with unauthorized
TIME: 10:55 am practice of law, merit the penalty of suspension of one (1) year from the practice of law. To be
so bold as to peddle influence before the very institution that is tasked to prosecute
TYPE: Text Message corruption speaks much about respondent's character and his attitude towards the courts
and the bar.
....
Lawyers who offer no skill other than their acquaintances or relationships with regulators,
FROM: Atty. Alvarez <+639063630224> investigators, judges, or Justices pervert the system, weaken the rule of law, and debase
themselves even as they claim to be members of a noble profession. Practicing law should
SUBJECT: not degenerate to one's ability to have illicit access. Rather, it should be about making an
honest appraisal of the client's situation as seen through the evidence fairly and fully
Tess gud mrng, wag mo kalimutan mgdpst 25k today 6pm mtng naming omb tnx. gathered. It should be about making a discerning and diligent reading of the applicable law. It
is foremost about attaining justice in a fair manner. Law exists to temper, with its own power,
DATE: 24-03-2010 illicit power and unfair advantage. It should not be conceded as a tool only for those who
cheat by unduly influencing people or public officials.
TIME: 10:23 am
It is time that we unequivocally underscore that to even imply to a client that a lawyer knows
TYPE: Text Message who will make a decision is an act worthy of the utmost condemnation. If we are to preserve
the nobility of this profession, its members must live within its ethical parameters. There is
.... never an excuse for influence peddling.
While this Court is not a collection agency for faltering debtors, 97 this Court has ordered B.M. No. 2540 September 24, 2013
restitution of amounts to complainants due to the erroneous actions of
lawyers.98 Respondent is, therefore, required to return to complainant the amount of
IN RE: PETITION TO SIGN IN THE ROLL OF ATTORNEYS
P500,000.00—the amount that respondent allegedly gave his friends connected with the
Office of the Ombudsman.
MICHAEL A. MEDADO, Petitioner.
WHEREFORE, Respondent Arty. Nicanor C. Alvarez is guilty of violating the Code of Conduct
and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees, the Lawyer's Oath, and the Code of RESOLUTION
Professional Responsibility. He is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) year with
a WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with more severely. SERENO, CJ.:
Respondent is ORDERED to return the amount of P500,000.00 with legal interest to
complainant Teresita P. Fajardo.
We resolve the instant Petition to Sign in the Roll of Attorneys filed by petitioner Michael A.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to Medado (Medado).
respondent's personal record as attorney. Likewise, copies shall be furnished to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and all courts in the country for their information and Medado graduated from the University of the Philippines with the degree of Bachelor of Laws
guidance. in 19791 and passed the same year's bar examinations with a general weighted average of
82.7.2

On 7 May 1980, he took the Attorney’s Oath at the Philippine International Convention
Center (PICC) together with the successful bar examinees. 3 He was scheduled to sign in the
Roll of Attorneys on 13 May 1980, 4 but he failed to do so on his scheduled date, allegedly
because he had misplaced the Notice to Sign the Roll of Attorneys 5 given by the Bar Office
when he went home to his province for a vacation. 6

Several years later, while rummaging through his old college files, Medado found the Notice
to Sign the Roll of Attorneys. It was then that he realized that he had not signed in the roll,
and that what he had signed at the entrance of the PICC was probably just an attendance
record.7

By the time Medado found the notice, he was already working. He stated that he was mainly
doing corporate and taxation work, and that he was not actively involved in litigation practice.
Thus, he operated "under the mistaken belief that since he had already taken the oath, the
signing of the Roll of Attorneys was not as urgent, nor as crucial to his status as a
lawyer";8 and "the matter of signing in the Roll of Attorneys lost its urgency and compulsion,
and was subsequently forgotten."9

In 2005, when Medado attended Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) seminars, he
was required to provide his roll number in order for his MCLE compliances to be credited. 10

Not having signed in the Roll of Attorneys, he was unable to provide his roll number.

About seven years later, or on 6 February 2012, Medado filed the instant Petition, praying
that he be allowed to sign in the Roll of Attorneys.11
The Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) conducted a clarificatory conference on the matter on
21 September 201212and submitted a Report and Recommendation to this Court on 4
February 2013.13 The OBC recommended that the instant petition be denied for petitioner’s
gross negligence, gross misconduct and utter lack of merit. 14 It explained that, based on his
answers during the clarificatory conference, petitioner could offer no valid justification for his
negligence in signing in the Roll of Attorneys.15
After a judicious review of the records, we grant Medado’s prayer in the instant petition,
subject to the payment of a fine and the imposition of a penalty equivalent to suspension
from the practice of law.
At the outset, we note that not allowing Medado to sign in the Roll of Attorneys would be
akin to imposing upon him the ultimate penalty of disbarment, a penalty that we have
reserved for the most serious ethical transgressions of members of the Bar.
In this case, the records do not show that this action is warranted.
For one, petitioner demonstrated good faith and good moral character when he finally filed
the instant Petition to Sign in the Roll of Attorneys. We note that it was not a third party who
called this Court’s attention to petitioner’s omission; rather, it was Medado himself who
acknowledged his own lapse, albeit after the passage of more than 30 years. When asked by
the Bar Confidant why it took him this long to file the instant petition, Medado very candidly
replied:
Mahirap hong i-explain yan pero, yun bang at the time, what can you say? Takot ka kung
anong mangyayari sa ‘yo, you don’t know what’s gonna happen. At the same time, it’s a
combination of apprehension and anxiety of what’s gonna happen. And, finally it’s the right
thing to do. I have to come here … sign the roll and take the oath as necessary. 16
For another, petitioner has not been subject to any action for disqualification from the
practice of law,17 which is more than what we can say of other individuals who were
successfully admitted as members of the Philippine Bar. For this Court, this fact demonstrates
that petitioner strove to adhere to the strict requirements of the ethics of the profession, and
that he has prima facie shown that he possesses the character required to be a member of
the Philippine Bar.
Finally, Medado appears to have been a competent and able legal practitioner, having held
various positions at the Laurel Law Office, 18 Petron, Petrophil Corporation, the Philippine
National Oil Company, and the Energy Development Corporation. 19
All these demonstrate Medado’s worth to become a full-fledged member of the Philippine
Bar.1âwphi1 While the practice of law is not a right but a privilege, 20 this Court will not
unwarrantedly withhold this privilege from individuals who have shown mental fitness and
moral fiber to withstand the rigors of the profession.
That said, however, we cannot fully exculpate petitioner Medado from all liability for his years
of inaction.
Petitioner has been engaged in the practice of law since 1980, a period spanning more than
30 years, without having signed in the Roll of Attorneys. 21 He justifies this behavior by
characterizing his acts as "neither willful nor intentional but based on a mistaken belief and
an honest error of judgment."22
We disagree.
While an honest mistake of fact could be used to excuse a person from the legal
consequences of his acts23 as it negates malice or evil motive, 24 a mistake of law cannot be
utilized as a lawful justification, because everyone is presumed to know the law and its
consequences.25 Ignorantia factiexcusat; ignorantia legis neminem excusat.
Applying these principles to the case at bar, Medado may have at first operated under an
honest mistake of fact when he thought that what he had signed at the PICC entrance before
the oath-taking was already the Roll of Attorneys. However, the moment he realized that
what he had signed was merely an attendance record, he could no longer claim an honest
mistake of fact as a valid justification. At that point, Medado should have known that he was
not a full-fledged member of the Philippine Bar because of his failure to sign in the Roll of
Attorneys, as it was the act of signing therein that would have made him so. 26 When, in spite
of this knowledge, he chose to continue practicing law without taking the necessary steps to
complete all the requirements for admission to the Bar, he willfully engaged in the
unauthorized practice of law.
Under the Rules of Court, the unauthorized practice of law by one’s assuming to be an
attorney or officer of the court, and acting as such without authority, may constitute indirect
contempt of court,27 which is punishable by fine or imprisonment or both. 28 Such a finding,
however, is in the nature of criminal contempt 29 and must be reached after the filing of
charges and the conduct of hearings. 30 In this case, while it appears quite clearly that
petitioner committed indirect contempt of court by knowingly engaging in unauthorized
practice of law, we refrain from making any finding of liability for indirect contempt, as no
formal charge pertaining thereto has been filed against him.
Knowingly engaging in unauthorized practice of law likewise transgresses Canon 9 of 'the
Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides:
CANON 9 -A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, assist in the unauthorized practice of law.
While a reading of Canon 9 appears to merely prohibit lawyers from assisting in the
unauthorized practice of law, the unauthorized practice of law by the lawyer himself is
subsumed under this provision, because at the heart of Canon 9 is the lawyer's duty to
prevent the unauthorized practice of law. This duty likewise applies to law students and Bar
candidates. As aspiring members of the Bar, they are bound to comport themselves in
accordance with the ethical standards of the legal profession.
Turning now to the applicable penalty, previous violations of Canon 9have warranted the
penalty of suspension from the practice of law. 31 As Medado is not yet a full-fledged lawyer,
we cannot suspend him from the practice of law. However, we see it fit to impose upon him a
penalty akin to suspension by allowing him to sign in the Roll of Attorneys one (1) year after
receipt of this Resolution. For his transgression of the prohibition against the unauthorized
practice of law, we likewise see it fit to fine him in the amount of ₱32,000. During the one
year period, petitioner is warned that he is not allowed to engage in the practice of law, and
is sternly warned that doing any act that constitutes practice of law before he has signed in
the Roll of Attorneys will be dealt with severely by this Court.
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition to Sign in the Roll of Attorneys is hereby GRANTED.
Petitioner Michael A. Medado is ALLOWED to sign in the Roll of Attorneys ONE (1) YEAR after
receipt of this Resolution. Petitioner is likewise ORDERED to pay a FINE of ₱32,000 for his
unauthorized practice of law. During the one year period, petitioner is NOT ALLOWED to
practice law, and is STERNLY WARNED that doing any act that constitutes practice of law
before he has signed in the Roll of Attorneys will be dealt will be severely by this Court.
Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines, and the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the
country.
A.M. No. P-11-2980 June 10, 2013
(Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 08-3016-P)
LETICIA A. ARIENDA, Complainant,
vs.
EVELYN A. MONILLA, COURT STENOGRAPHER III, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 4,
LEGAZPI CITY,Respondent.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
This is an administrative complaint for conduct unbecoming a court employee and abuse of
authority filed by complainant Leticia A. Arienda against respondent Evelyn A. Monilla, Court
Stenographer Ill of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 4 of Legazpi City.
In her letter-complaint1 dated October 8, 2008, complainant alleged that respondent and
Atty. Zaldy Monilla (Atty. Monilla), respondent's husband (together referred to as the spouses
Monilla), went to complainant’s house on January 13, 2002 and offered their services in
settling the estate of complainant’s deceased mother. According to the spouses Monilla, they
would prepare an extrajudicial settlement for complainant and the latter’s siblings, while
respondent’s brother, Engineer Matias A. Arquero (Engr. Arquero), would conduct the survey
of the estate. Everytime the spouses Monilla went to complainant’s house, they would ask for
partial payment. Six Temporary Receipts show that complainant had paid the spouses Monilla
a total of ₱49,800.00. Complainant repeatedly requested from the spouses Monilla the
approved survey plan prepared by Engr. Arquero, but the spouses Monilla demanded that
complainant first pay the ₱20,000.00 she still owed them before they give her the approved
survey plan and extrajudicial settlement of estate. Complainant subsequently learned that
the spouses Monilla had no authority to settle her deceased mother’s estate as Atty. Monilla
was currently employed at the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) and respondent was
not even a lawyer but an ordinary court employee.
In her comment2 dated May 23, 2009, respondent denied that it was she and her husband
who offered complainant their services in settling the estate of complainant’s deceased
mother. Respondent averred that it was complainant and her sister, Ester, who came to
respondent’s house sometime in December 2000 and requested respondent to convince her
brother Engr. Arquero, a geodetic engineer, to partition the four lots left by complainant’s
parents situated in Bigaa, Legazpi City. Respondent was initially hesitant to accede to
complainant’s request because of complainant’s reputation in their locality as a troublemaker.
However, respondent’s husband, upon learning that complainant was a relative, urged
respondent to assist the complainant.
Respondent alleged that she was not privy to the agreement between Engr. Arquero and
complainant. Complainant scheduled the survey of one of the lots, Lot No. 5489, on January
13, 2001. After Engr. Arquero conducted the survey, complainant was nowhere to be found
and respondent had to shoulder the expenses for the same.
Respondent further narrated that without her knowledge, complainant and her siblings filed
a case for partition of estate before the RTC, Branch 7 of Legazpi City, on May 24, 2001. When
their case was dismissed by the RTC, complainant and her siblings argued at the Hall of
Justice, thus, disrupting court proceedings. Knowing that respondent was a court employee,
complainant approached and asked respondent to intervene. Respondent, during her lunch
break, met with complainant and the latter’s siblings at respondent’s residence located near
the Hall of Justice. Complainant and her siblings, already wishing to partition their deceased
parents’ estate out of court, pleaded that respondent prepare an extrajudicial settlement.
Respondent declined to get involved at first because complainant and her siblings were
represented by a lawyer in the partition case before the RTC, but complainant and her
siblings said that they had no more money to pay for the continued services of their lawyer.
Respondent understood the predicament of complainant and her siblings, so respondent
agreed to help them. Respondent called her brother, Engr. Arquero, and requested him to
bring the sketch plan of Lot No. 5489 he had previously prepared. In the presence of Engr.
Arquero, complainant and her siblings chose their respective shares in the property.
Respondent prepared and finalized the extrajudicial settlement and handed the said
document to complainant and her siblings. After a year, complainant, her sister Ester, and a
buyer of their shares in Lot No. 5489, Marlyn Dominguez (Dominguez), again approached
respondent. Complainant asked that Engr. Arquero continue with the partition of Lot No.
5489 as Dominguez advanced the money to pay for the expenses, including the preparation
of the lot plan. Engr. Arquero, despite his misgivings and persuaded by respondent,
conducted the survey, but complainant did not show up and respondent had to shoulder the
expenses once more.
Respondent went on to recount that on January 20, 2003, complainant, Ester, and a sales
agent came to respondent’s house, asking respondent to again convince her brother Engr.
Arquero to re-survey Lot No. 5489 because the boundaries were no longer visible. According
to complainant, the new buyer, Galahad O. Rubio (Rubio), wanted to see the exact location
and the boundaries of the lot. Respondent refused and told complainant to directly negotiate
with Engr. Arquero. When complainant and her companions returned in the afternoon,
complainant tendered ₱9,000.00 to respondent’s husband, Atty. Monilla, as partial payment
for the latter’s services. The following day, complainant and her companions came back and
complainant handed over another ₱9,000.00 as partial payment for the services of
respondent’s brother, Engr. Arquero.
Respondent admitted receiving from complainant payments amounting to ₱49,800.00, all
made at respondent’s residence in Rawis, not at complainant’s house in Bigaa. The
₱25,000.00 was for the preparation by Atty. Monilla of the following documents: (a) four
deeds of sale to different buyers; (b) two copies of extrajudicial settlement; (c) two contracts
to sell; (d) two authorities to sell; and (e) one demand letter. The remaining ₱24,800.00 was
for Engr. Arquero’s services in subdividing Lot No. 5489 into 13 lots.
Respondent asserted that she had already turned over to complainant on March 30, 2003 the
notarized extrajudicial settlement for Lot No. 5489, the blueprint of the subdivision plan for
the said lot, and the deed of sale between complainant and Rubio. The subdivision plan was
not approved by the Bureau of Lands because of complainant’s failure to submit other
requirements. Because of complainant’s broken promises, respondent and her husband, Atty.
Monilla, no longer prepared the other documents complainant was requesting for, and
respondent’s brother, Engr. Arquero, discontinued his services as a surveyor.
Lastly, respondent maintained that complainant knew that Atty. Monilla was a DAR employee.
Complainant and her siblings had often consulted Atty. Monilla regarding the properties left
by their parents, as well as their ongoing family feud. Complainant was likewise aware that
respondent was not a lawyer and was a mere court stenographer since complainant and
respondent are neighbors and they are related to one another. Respondent had already filed
for early retirement effective April 23, 2007, and she claimed that her former co-employees
at the RTC, Branch 4 of Legazpi City conspired and confederated with one another to induce
complainant to file the instant complaint against her.
In a Resolution3 dated June 23, 2010, the Court referred the instant administrative matter to
Vice Executive Judge Pedro R. Soriao (Investigating Judge Soriao) of RTC, Branch 5 of Legazpi
City, for investigation, report, and recommendation.
In his report4 dated September 22, 2010, Investigating Judge Soriao made the following
findings and recommendations:
Substantial evidence appearing of record demonstrates that Evelyn A. Monilla committed a
simple misconduct unbecoming of court personnel while she was a court stenographer. The
imposition upon her of an administrative penalty of fine equivalent to two months of the
salary that she was receiving when she resigned to be deducted from her retirement benefits
is hereby recommended.
Finally, it is submitted that Evelyn A. Monilla’s liability over the amount of 49,800 pesos that
she received from Leticia Arienda is a legal matter that can be properly ventilated in a
separate appropriate judicial proceeding.5
After evaluation of Investigating Judge Sariao’s report, the Office of the Court Administrator
(OCA) submitted to the Court its Memorandum 6 dated July 14, 2011, likewise recommending
that respondent be found guilty of simple misconduct but that the amount of fine imposed
against her be increased to four months salary, to be deducted from her retirement benefits.
In her Manifestation7 dated May 2, 2012, respondent informed the Court that Dominguez
filed a case against complainant for a sum of money and damages, docketed as Civil Case No.
5287, before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Branch 2 of Legazpi City. Dominguez
wanted to recover the partial payments she had made on Lot No. 5489, plus other damages,
after complainant sold the very same property to someone else. In a Decision dated July 7,
2006, the MTCC ruled in Dominguez’s favor. Respondent wanted this Court to note that
neither complainant nor Dominguez mentioned in Civil Case No. 5287 the participation of
respondent or her brother in the transaction involving Lot No. 5489.
It bears to note that respondent admitted in her comment that she prepared and finalized upon said respondent a FINE equivalent to four months salary to be deducted from her
the extrajudicial settlement of the estate of complainant’s deceased mother. The preparation retirement benefits.
of an extrajudicial settlement of estate constitutes practice of law as defined in Cayetano v.
Monsod,8 to wit:

Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law,
legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. "To engage in the practice of law is to
perform those acts which are characteristics of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to
give notice or render any kind of service, which device or service requires the use in any
degree of legal knowledge or skill." x x x.

Not being a lawyer, respondent had no authority to prepare and finalize an extrajudicial
settlement of estate. Worse, respondent also admitted receiving money from complainant for
her services. Being a court employee, respondent ought to have known that it was improper
for her to prepare and finalize the extrajudicial settlement of estate, a service only a lawyer is
authorized to perform, and to receive money therefor.

It is true that respondent prepared and finalized the extrajudicial settlement of estate
pursuant to a private agreement between her and complainant. However, respondent is an
employee of the court whose conduct must always be beyond reproach and circumscribed
with the heavy burden of responsibility as to let her be free from any suspicion that may taint
the judiciary. She is expected to exhibit the highest sense of honesty and integrity not only in
the performance of her official duties but also in her personal and private dealings with other
people to preserve the court’s good name and standing. 9

Respondent’s behavior and conduct, which led other people to believe that she had the
authority and capability to prepare and finalize an extrajudicial settlement of estate even
when she is not a lawyer, clearly fall short of the exacting standards of ethics and morality
imposed upon court employees.

Respondent’s mention of Civil Case No. 5287 before the MTCC does not help her
defense.1âwphi1 That case is irrelevant herein for it is between complainant and Dominguez.

Misconduct generally means wrongful, unlawful conduct, motivated by a premeditated,

obstinate or intentional purpose. Thus, any transgression or deviation from the established
norm, whether it be work-related or not, amounts to misconduct. 10 In preparing and finalizing
the extrajudicial settlement of estate and receiving compensation for the same even when
she is not a lawyer, respondent is guilty of simple misconduct, punishable under Section 52(B)
(2) of the Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service with suspension
for one month and one day to six months. Considering that this is respondent's first offense
and that she had served the judiciary for almost 16 years, a suspension of four months would
have been proper. Since respondent had already retired, the Court instead imposes the
penalty of a fine equivalent to her salary for four months, to be deducted from her
retirement benefits.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court finds respondent Evelyn Monilia, retired
Stenographer III of RTC, Branch 4 of Legazpi City, GUILTY of simple misconduct and imposes
BAR MATTER No. 914 October 1, 1999
RE: APPLICATION FOR ADMISSION TO THE PHILIPPINE BAR,
vs.
VICENTE D. CHING, applicant.
RESOLUTION
KAPUNAN, J.:
Can a legitimate child born under the 1935 Constitution of a Filipino mother and an alien
father validly elect Philippine citizenship fourteen (14) years after he has reached the age of
majority? This is the question sought to be resolved in the present case involving the
application for admission to the Philippine Bar of Vicente D. Ching.
The facts of this case are as follows:
Vicente D. Ching, the legitimate son of the spouses Tat Ching, a Chinese citizen, and Prescila
A. Dulay, a Filipino, was born in Francia West, Tubao, La Union on 11 April 1964. Since his
birth, Ching has resided in the Philippines.
On 17 July 1998, Ching, after having completed a Bachelor of Laws course at the St. Louis
University in Baguio City, filed an application to take the 1998 Bar Examinations. In a
Resolution of this Court, dated 1 September 1998, he was allowed to take the Bar
Examinations, subject to the condition that he must submit to the Court proof of his
Philippine citizenship.
In compliance with the above resolution, Ching submitted on 18 November 1998, the
following documents:
1. Certification, dated 9 June 1986, issued by the Board of Accountancy of
the Professional Regulations Commission showing that Ching is a certified
public accountant;
2. Voter Certification, dated 14 June 1997, issued by Elizabeth B. Cerezo,
Election Officer of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) in Tubao La
Union showing that Ching is a registered voter of the said place; and
3. Certification, dated 12 October 1998, also issued by Elizabeth B.
Cerezo, showing that Ching was elected as a member of the Sangguniang
Bayan of Tubao, La Union during the 12 May 1992 synchronized elections.
On 5 April 1999, the results of the 1998 Bar Examinations were released and Ching was one
of the successful Bar examinees. The oath-taking of the successful Bar examinees was
scheduled on 5 May 1999. However, because of the questionable status of Ching's citizenship,
he was not allowed to take his oath. Pursuant to the resolution of this Court, dated 20 April
1999, he was required to submit further proof of his citizenship. In the same resolution, the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) was required to file a comment on Ching's petition for
admission to the bar and on the documents evidencing his Philippine citizenship.
The OSG filed its comment on 8 July 1999, stating that Ching, being the "legitimate child of a
Chinese father and a Filipino mother born under the 1935 Constitution was a Chinese citizen
and continued to be so, unless upon reaching the age of majority he elected Philippine
citizenship" 1 in strict compliance with the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 625 entitled
"An Act Providing for the Manner in which the Option to Elect Philippine Citizenship shall be
Declared by a Person Whose Mother is a Filipino Citizen." The OSG adds that "(w)hat he
acquired at best was only an inchoate Philippine citizenship which he could perfect by
election upon reaching the age of majority." 2 In this regard, the OSG clarifies that "two (2)
conditions must concur in order that the election of Philippine citizenship may be effective,
namely: (a) the mother of the person making the election must be a citizen of the Philippines;
and (b) said election must be made upon reaching the age of majority." 3 The OSG then
explains the meaning of the phrase "upon reaching the age of majority:"
The clause "upon reaching the age of majority" has been construed to
mean a reasonable time after reaching the age of majority which had
been interpreted by the Secretary of Justice to be three (3) years
(VELAYO, supra at p. 51 citing Op., Sec. of Justice No. 70, s. 1940, Feb. 27,
1940). Said period may be extended under certain circumstances, as
when a (sic) person concerned has always considered himself a Filipino
(ibid., citing Op. Nos. 355 and 422, s. 1955; 3, 12, 46, 86 and 97, s. 1953).
But in Cuenco, it was held that an election done after over seven (7) years
was not made within a reasonable time.
In conclusion, the OSG points out that Ching has not formally elected Philippine citizenship
and, if ever he does, it would already be beyond the "reasonable time" allowed by present
jurisprudence. However, due to the peculiar circumstances surrounding Ching's case, the OSG
recommends the relaxation of the standing rule on the construction of the phrase
"reasonable period" and the allowance of Ching to elect Philippine citizenship in accordance
with C.A. No. 625 prior to taking his oath as a member of the Philippine Bar.
On 27 July 1999, Ching filed a Manifestation, attaching therewith his Affidavit of Election of
Philippine Citizenship and his Oath of Allegiance, both dated 15 July 1999. In his
Manifestation, Ching states:
1. I have always considered myself as a Filipino;
2. I was registered as a Filipino and consistently declared myself as one in
my school records and other official documents;
 3. I am practicing a profession (Certified Public Accountant) reserved for
Filipino citizens;
4. I participated in electoral process[es] since the time I was eligible to
vote;
5. I had served the people of Tubao, La Union as a member of the
Sangguniang Bayan from 1992 to 1995;
6. I elected Philippine citizenship on July 15, 1999 in accordance with
Commonwealth Act No. 625;
7. My election was expressed in a statement signed and sworn to by me
before a notary public;
8. I accompanied my election of Philippine citizenship with the oath of
allegiance to the Constitution and the Government of the Philippines;
9. I filed my election of Philippine citizenship and my oath of allegiance to
(sic) the Civil Registrar of Tubao La Union, and
10. I paid the amount of TEN PESOS (Ps. 10.00) as filing fees.
Since Ching has already elected Philippine citizenship on 15 July 1999, the question raised is
whether he has elected Philippine citizenship within a "reasonable time." In the affirmative,
whether his citizenship by election retroacted to the time he took the bar examination.
When Ching was born in 1964, the governing charter was the 1935 Constitution. Under
Article IV, Section 1(3) of the 1935 Constitution, the citizenship of a legitimate child born of a
Filipino mother and an alien father followed the citizenship of the father, unless, upon
reaching the age of majority, the child elected Philippine citizenship. 4 This right to elect
Philippine citizenship was recognized in the 1973 Constitution when it provided that "(t)hose
who elect Philippine citizenship pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution of nineteen
hundred and thirty-five" are citizens of the Philippines. 5 Likewise, this recognition by the
1973 Constitution was carried over to the 1987 Constitution which states that "(t)hose born
before January 17, 1973 of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching
the age of majority" are Philippine citizens. 6 It should be noted, however, that the 1973 and
1987 Constitutional provisions on the election of Philippine citizenship should not be
understood as having a curative effect on any irregularity in the acquisition of citizenship for
those covered by the 1935 Constitution. 7 If the citizenship of a person was subject to
challenge under the old charter, it remains subject to challenge under the new charter even if
the judicial challenge had not been commenced before the effectivity of the new
Constitution. 8
C.A. No. 625 which was enacted pursuant to Section 1(3), Article IV of the 1935 Constitution,
prescribes the procedure that should be followed in order to make a valid election of
Philippine citizenship. Under Section 1 thereof, legitimate children born of Filipino mothers
may elect Philippine citizenship by expressing such intention "in a statement to be signed and
sworn to by the party concerned before any officer authorized to administer oaths, and shall
be filed with the nearest civil registry. The said party shall accompany the aforesaid statement
with the oath of allegiance to the Constitution and the Government of the Philippines."
However, the 1935 Constitution and C.A. No. 625 did not prescribe a time period within
which the election of Philippine citizenship should be made. The 1935 Charter only provides
that the election should be made "upon reaching the age of majority." The age of majority
then commenced upon reaching twenty-one (21) years. 9 In the opinions of the Secretary of
Justice on cases involving the validity of election of Philippine citizenship, this dilemma was
resolved by basing the time period on the decisions of this Court prior to the effectivity of the
1935 Constitution. In these decisions, the proper period for electing Philippine citizenship
was, in turn, based on the pronouncements of the Department of State of the United States
Government to the effect that the election should be made within a "reasonable time" after
attaining the age of majority. 10 The phrase "reasonable time" has been interpreted to mean
that the election should be made within three (3) years from reaching the age of
majority. 11 However, we held in Cuenco vs. Secretary of Justice, 12 that the three (3) year
period is not an inflexible rule. We said:
It is true that this clause has been construed to mean a reasonable period
after reaching the age of majority, and that the Secretary of Justice has
ruled that three (3) years is the reasonable time to elect Philippine
citizenship under the constitutional provision adverted to above, which
period may be extended under certain circumstances, as when the person
concerned has always considered himself a Filipino. 13
However, we cautioned in Cuenco that the extension of the option to elect Philippine
citizenship is not indefinite:
Regardless of the foregoing, petitioner was born on February 16, 1923. He
became of age on February 16, 1944. His election of citizenship was made
on May 15, 1951, when he was over twenty-eight (28) years of age, or
over seven (7) years after he had reached the age of majority. It is clear
that said election has not been made "upon reaching the age of
majority." 14
In the present case, Ching, having been born on 11 April 1964, was already thirty-five (35)
years old when he complied with the requirements of C.A. No. 625 on 15 June 1999, or over
fourteen (14) years after he had reached the age of majority. Based on the interpretation of
the phrase "upon reaching the age of majority," Ching's election was clearly beyond, by any
reasonable yardstick, the allowable period within which to exercise the privilege. It should be
stated, in this connection, that the special circumstances invoked by Ching, i.e., his
continuous and uninterrupted stay in the Philippines and his being a certified public
accountant, a registered voter and a former elected public official, cannot vest in him
Philippine citizenship as the law specifically lays down the requirements for acquisition of
Philippine citizenship by election.
Definitely, the so-called special circumstances cannot constitute what Ching erroneously
labels as informal election of citizenship. Ching cannot find a refuge in the case of In
re: Florencio Mallare, 15 the pertinent portion of which reads:
And even assuming arguendo that Ana Mallare were (sic) legally married
to an alien, Esteban's exercise of the right of suffrage when he came of
age, constitutes a positive act of election of Philippine citizenship. It has
been established that Esteban Mallare was a registered voter as of April
14, 1928, and that as early as 1925 (when he was about 22 years old),
Esteban was already participating in the elections and campaigning for
certain candidate[s]. These acts are sufficient to show his preference for
Philippine citizenship. 16
Ching's reliance on Mallare is misplaced. The facts and circumstances obtaining therein are
very different from those in the present case, thus, negating its applicability. First,
Esteban Mallare was born before the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution and the enactment
of C.A. No. 625. Hence, the requirements and procedures prescribed under the 1935
Constitution and C.A. No. 625 for electing Philippine citizenship would not be applicable to
him. Second, the ruling in Mallare was an obiter since, as correctly pointed out by the OSG, it
was not necessary for Esteban Mallare to elect Philippine citizenship because he was already
a Filipino, he being a natural child of a Filipino mother. In this regard, the Court stated:
Esteban Mallare, natural child of Ana Mallare, a Filipina, is therefore
himself a Filipino, and no other act would be necessary to confer on him
all the rights and privileges attached to Philippine citizenship (U.S. vs. Ong
Tianse, 29 Phil. 332; Santos Co vs. Government of the Philippine Islands,
42 Phil. 543, Serra vs. Republic, L-4223, May 12, 1952, Sy Quimsuan vs.
Republic, L-4693, Feb. 16, 1953; Pitallano vs. Republic, L-5111, June 28,
1954). Neither could any act be taken on the erroneous belief that he is a
non-filipino divest him of the citizenship privileges to which he is rightfully
entitled. 17
The ruling in Mallare was reiterated and further elaborated in Co vs. Electoral Tribunal of the
House of Representatives, 18 where we held:
We have jurisprudence that defines "election" as both a formal and an
informal process.
In the case of In re: Florencio Mallare (59 SCRA 45 [1974]), the Court held
that the exercise of the right of suffrage and the participation in election
exercises constitute a positive act of election of Philippine citizenship. In
the exact pronouncement of the Court, we held:
Esteban's exercise of the right of suffrage when he
came of age constitutes a positive act of Philippine
citizenship. (p. 52: emphasis supplied)
The private respondent did more than merely exercise his right of suffrage. He has
established his life here in the Philippines.
For those in the peculiar situation of the respondent who cannot be
excepted to have elected Philippine citizenship as they were already
citizens, we apply the In Re Mallare rule.
xxx xxx xxx
The filing of sworn statement or formal declaration is a requirement for
those who still have to elect citizenship. For those already Filipinos when
the time to elect came up, there are acts of deliberate choice which
cannot be less binding. Entering a profession open only to Filipinos,
serving in public office where citizenship is a qualification, voting during
election time, running for public office, and other categorical acts of
similar nature are themselves formal manifestations for these persons.
An election of Philippine citizenship presupposes that the person electing
is an alien. Or his status is doubtful because he is a national of two
countries. There is no doubt in this case about Mr. Ong's being a Filipino
when he turned twenty-one (21).
We repeat that any election of Philippine citizenship on the part of the
private respondent would not only have been superfluous but it would
also have resulted in an absurdity. How can a Filipino citizen elect
Philippine citizenship? 19
The Court, like the OSG, is sympathetic with the plight of Ching. However, even if we consider
the special circumstances in the life of Ching like his having lived in the Philippines all his life
and his consistent belief that he is a Filipino, controlling statutes and jurisprudence constrain
us to disagree with the recommendation of the OSG. Consequently, we hold that Ching failed
to validly elect Philippine citizenship. The span of fourteen (14) years that lapsed from the
time he reached the age of majority until he finally expressed his intention to elect Philippine
citizenship is clearly way beyond the contemplation of the requirement of electing "upon
reaching the age of majority." Moreover, Ching has offered no reason why he delayed his
election of Philippine citizenship. The prescribed procedure in electing Philippine citizenship
is certainly not a tedious and painstaking process. All that is required of the elector is to
execute an affidavit of election of Philippine citizenship and, thereafter, file the same with the
nearest civil registry. Ching's unreasonable and unexplained delay in making his election
cannot be simply glossed over.
Philippine citizenship can never be treated like a commodity that can be claimed when
needed and suppressed when convenient. 20 One who is privileged to elect Philippine
citizenship has only an inchoate right to such citizenship. As such, he should avail of the right
with fervor, enthusiasm and promptitude. Sadly, in this case, Ching slept on his opportunity to
elect Philippine citizenship and, as a result. this golden privilege slipped away from his grasp.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court Resolves to DENY Vicente D. Ching's application for
admission to the Philippine Bar.
B. M. No. 1154 June 8, 2004 single incident and involving the same parties as "closed and terminated." Moreover, Meling
denies the charges and adds that the acts complained of do not involve moral turpitude.
IN THE MATTER OF THE DISQUALIFICATION OF BAR EXAMINEE HARON S. MELING IN THE
2002 BAR EXAMINATIONS AND FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTION AS MEMBER OF THE PHILIPPINE As regards the use of the title "Attorney," Meling admits that some of his communications
SHARI’A BAR, ATTY. FROILAN R. MELENDREZ, petitioner. really contained the word "Attorney" as they were, according to him, typed by the office
clerk.
RESOLUTION
In its Report and Recommendation4 dated December 8, 2003, the OBC disposed of the charge
TINGA, J.: of non-disclosure against Meling in this wise:

The Court is here confronted with a Petition that seeks twin reliefs, one of which is ripe while The reasons of Meling in not disclosing the criminal cases filed against him in his
the other has been rendered moot by a supervening event. petition to take the Bar Examinations are ludicrous. He should have known that
only the court of competent jurisdiction can dismiss cases, not a retired judge nor a
law professor. In fact, the cases filed against Meling are still pending. Furthermore,
The antecedents follow.
granting arguendo that these cases were already dismissed, he is still required to
disclose the same for the Court to ascertain his good moral character. Petitions to
On October 14, 2002, Atty. Froilan R. Melendrez (Melendrez) filed with the Office of the Bar take the Bar Examinations are made under oath, and should not be taken lightly by
Confidant (OBC) a Petition1 to disqualify Haron S. Meling (Meling) from taking the 2002 Bar an applicant.
Examinations and to impose on him the appropriate disciplinary penalty as a member of the
Philippine Shari’a Bar.
The merit of the cases against Meling is not material in this case. What matters is his act of
concealing them which constitutes dishonesty.
In the Petition, Melendrez alleges that Meling did not disclose in his Petition to take the 2002
Bar Examinations that he has three (3) pending criminal cases before the Municipal Trial
In Bar Matter 1209, the Court stated, thus:
Court in Cities (MTCC), Cotabato City, namely: Criminal Cases Noa. 15685 and 15686, both for
Grave Oral Defamation, and Criminal Case No. 15687 for Less Serious Physical Injuries.
It has been held that good moral character is what a person really is, as
distinguished from good reputation or from the opinion generally entertained of
The above-mentioned cases arose from an incident which occurred on May 21, 2001, when
him, the estimate in which he is held by the public in the place where he is known.
Meling allegedly uttered defamatory words against Melendrez and his wife in front of media
Moral character is not a subjective term but one which corresponds to objective
practitioners and other people. Meling also purportedly attacked and hit the face of
reality. The standard of personal and professional integrity is not satisfied by such
Melendrez’ wife causing the injuries to the latter.
conduct as it merely enables a person to escape the penalty of criminal law. Good
moral character includes at least common honesty.
Furthermore, Melendrez alleges that Meling has been using the title "Attorney" in his
communications, as Secretary to the Mayor of Cotabato City, despite the fact that he is not a
The non-disclosure of Meling of the criminal cases filed against him makes him also
member of the Bar. Attached to the Petition is an indorsement letter which shows that Meling
answerable under Rule 7.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which states
used the appellation and appears on its face to have been received by the Sangguniang
that "a lawyer shall be answerable for knowingly making a false statement or
Panglungsod of Cotabato City on November 27, 2001.
suppressing a material fact in connection with his application for admission to the
bar."5
Pursuant to this Court’s R E S O L U T I O N 2 dated December 3, 2002, Meling filed
his Answer with the OBC.
As regards Meling’s use of the title "Attorney", the OBC had this to say:

In his Answer,3 Meling explains that he did not disclose the criminal cases filed against him by
Anent the issue of the use of the appellation "Attorney" in his letters, the
Melendrez because retired Judge Corocoy Moson, their former professor, advised him to
explanation of Meling is not acceptable. Aware that he is not a member of the Bar,
settle his misunderstanding with Melendrez. Believing in good faith that the case would be
there was no valid reason why he signed as "attorney" whoever may have typed the
settled because the said Judge has moral ascendancy over them, he being their former
letters.
professor in the College of Law, Meling considered the three cases that actually arose from a
 Although there is no showing that Meling is engaged in the practice of law, the fact
is, he is signing his communications as "Atty. Haron S. Meling" knowing fully well
that he is not entitled thereto. As held by the Court in Bar Matter 1209, the
unauthorized use of the appellation "attorney" may render a person liable for
indirect contempt of court.6
Consequently, the OBC recommended that Meling not be allowed to take the Lawyer’s Oath
and sign the Roll of Attorneys in the event that he passes the Bar Examinations. Further, it
recommended that Meling’s membership in the Shari’a Bar be suspended until further orders
from the Court.7
We fully concur with the findings and recommendation of the OBC. Meling, however, did not
pass the 2003 Bar Examinations. This renders the Petition, insofar as it seeks to prevent
Meling from taking the Lawyer’s Oath and signing the Roll of Attorneys, moot and academic.
On the other hand, the prayer in the same Petition for the Court to impose the appropriate
sanctions upon him as a member of the Shari’a Bar is ripe for resolution and has to be acted
upon.
Practice of law, whether under the regular or the Shari’a Court, is not a matter of right but
merely a privilege bestowed upon individuals who are not only learned in the law but who
are also known to possess good moral character. 8 The requirement of good moral character is
not only a condition precedent to admission to the practice of law, its continued possession is
also essential for remaining in the practice of law.9
The standard form issued in connection with the application to take the 2002 Bar
Examinations requires the applicant to aver that he or she "has not been charged with any act
or omission punishable by law, rule or regulation before a fiscal, judge, officer or
administrative body, or indicted for, or accused or convicted by any court or tribunal of, any
offense or crime involving moral turpitude; nor is there any pending case or charge against
him/her." Despite the declaration required by the form, Meling did not reveal that he has
three pending criminal cases. His deliberate silence constitutes concealment, done under
oath at that.
The disclosure requirement is imposed by the Court to determine whether there is
satisfactory evidence of good moral character of the applicant. 10 The nature of whatever
cases are pending against the applicant would aid the Court in determining whether he is
endowed with the moral fitness demanded of a lawyer. By concealing the existence of such
cases, the applicant then flunks the test of fitness even if the cases are ultimately proven to
be unwarranted or insufficient to impugn or affect the good moral character of the applicant.
Meling’s concealment of the fact that there are three (3) pending criminal cases against him
speaks of his lack of the requisite good moral character and results in the forfeiture of the
privilege bestowed upon him as a member of the Shari’a Bar.
Moreover, his use of the appellation "Attorney", knowing fully well that he is not entitled to
its use, cannot go unchecked. In Alawi v. Alauya,11 the Court had the occasion to discuss the
impropriety of the use of the title "Attorney" by members of the Shari’a Bar who are not
likewise members of the Philippine Bar. The respondent therein, an executive clerk of court of
the 4th Judicial Shari’a District in Marawi City, used the title "Attorney" in several
correspondence in connection with the rescission of a contract entered into by him in his
private capacity. The Court declared that:
…persons who pass the Shari’a Bar are not full-fledged members of the Philippine
Bar, hence, may only practice law before Shari’a courts. While one who has been
admitted to the Shari’a Bar, and one who has been admitted to the Philippine Bar,
may both be considered "counselors," in the sense that they give counsel or advice
in a professional capacity, only the latter is an "attorney." The title "attorney" is
reserved to those who, having obtained the necessary degree in the study of law
and successfully taken the Bar Examinations, have been admitted to the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines and remain members thereof in good standing; and it is they
only who are authorized to practice law in this jurisdiction. 12
The judiciary has no place for dishonest officers of the court, such as Meling in this case. The
solemn task of administering justice demands that those who are privileged to be part of
service therein, from the highest official to the lowliest employee, must not only be
competent and dedicated, but likewise live and practice the virtues of honesty and integrity.
Anything short of this standard would diminish the public's faith in the Judiciary and
constitutes infidelity to the constitutional tenet that a public office is a public trust.
In Leda v. Tabang, supra, the respondent concealed the fact of his marriage in his application
to take the Bar examinations and made conflicting submissions before the Court. As a result,
we found the respondent grossly unfit and unworthy to continue in the practice of law and
suspended him therefrom until further orders from the Court.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is granted insofar as it seeks the imposition of appropriate
sanctions upon Haron S. Meling as a member of the Philippine Shari’a Bar. Accordingly, the
membership of Haron S. Meling in the Philippine Shari’a Bar is hereby SUSPENDED until
further orders from the Court, the suspension to take effect immediately. Insofar as
the Petition seeks to prevent Haron S. Meling from taking the Lawyer’s Oath and signing the
Roll of Attorneys as a member of the Philippine Bar, the same is DISMISSED for having
become moot and academic.
Copies of this Decision shall be circulated to all the Shari’a Courts in the country for their
information and guidance.
A.M. No. SDC-97-2-P February 24, 1997
SOPHIA ALAWI, complainant,
vs.
ASHARY M. ALAUYA, Clerk of Court VI, Shari'a District Court, Marawi City, respondent.
NARVASA, C.J.:
Sophia Alawi was (and presumably still is) a sales representative (or coordinator) of E.B.
Villarosa & Partners Co., Ltd. of Davao City, a real estate and housing company. Ashari M.
Alauya is the incumbent executive clerk of court of the 4th Judicial Shari'a District in Marawi
City, They were classmates, and used to be friends.
It appears that through Alawi's agency, a contract was executed for the purchase on
installments by Alauya of one of the housing units belonging to the above mentioned firm
(hereafter, simply Villarosa & Co.); and in connection therewith, a housing loan was also
granted to Alauya by the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC).
Not long afterwards, or more precisely on December 15, 1995, Alauya addressed a letter to
the President of Villarosa & Co. advising of the termination of his contract with the company.
He wrote:
. . I am formally and officially withdrawing from and notifying you of my
intent to terminate the Contract/Agreement entered into between me
and your company, as represented by your Sales Agent/Coordinator,
SOPHIA ALAWI, of your company's branch office here in Cagayan de Oro
City, on the grounds that my consent was vitiated by gross
misrepresentation, deceit, fraud, dishonesty and abuse of confidence by
the aforesaid sales agent which made said contract void ab initio. Said
sales agent acting in bad faith perpetrated such illegal and unauthorized
acts which made said contract an Onerous Contract prejudicial to my
rights and interests. He then proceeded to expound in considerable detail
and quite acerbic language on the "grounds which could evidence the bad
faith. deceit, fraud, misrepresentation, dishonesty and abuse of
confidence by the unscrupulous sales agent . . .;" and closed with the plea
that Villarosa & Co. "agree for the mutual rescission of our contract, even
as I inform you that I categorically state on record that I am terminating
the contract . . . I hope I do not have to resort to any legal action before
said onerous and manipulated contract against my interest be annulled. I
was actually fooled by your sales agent, hence the need to annul the
controversial contract."
Alauya sent a copy of the letter to the Vice-President of Villarosa & Co. at
San Pedro, Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City. The envelope containing it, and
which actually went through the post, bore no stamps. Instead at the
right hand corner above the description of the addressee, the words,
"Free Postage - PD 26," had been typed.
On the same date, December 15, 1995, Alauya also wrote to Mr. Fermin T.
Arzaga, Vice-President, Credit & Collection Group of the National Home
Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC) at Salcedo Village, Makati City,
repudiating as fraudulent and void his contract with Villarosa & Co.; and
asking for cancellation of his housing loan in connection therewith, which
was payable from salary deductions at the rate of P4,338.00 a month.
Among other things, he said:
. . . (T)hrough this written notice, I am terminating, as
I hereby annul, cancel, rescind and voided, the
"manipulated contract" entered into between me and
the E.B. Villarosa & Partner Co., Ltd., as represented
by its sales agent/coordinator, SOPHIA ALAWI, who
maliciously and fraudulently manipulated said
contract and unlawfully secured and pursued the
housing loan without my authority and against my
will. Thus, the contract itself is deemed to be void ab
initio in view of the attending circumstances, that my
consent was vitiated by misrepresentation, fraud,
deceit, dishonesty, and abuse of confidence; and that
there was no meeting of the minds between me and
the swindling sales agent who concealed the real facts
from me.
And, as in his letter to Villarosa & Co., he narrated in some detail what he took to
be the anomalous actuations of Sophia Alawi.
Alauya wrote three other letters to Mr. Arzaga of the NHMFC, dated February 21, 1996, April
15, 1996, and May 3, 1996, in all of which, for the same reasons already cited, he insisted on
the cancellation of his housing loan and discontinuance of deductions from his salary on
account thereof. a He also wrote on January 18, 1996 to Ms. Corazon M. Ordoñez, Head of
the Fiscal Management & Budget Office, and to the Chief, Finance Division, both of this Court,
to stop deductions from his salary in relation to the loan in question, again asserting the
anomalous manner by which he was allegedly duped into entering into the contracts by "the
scheming sales agent." b
The upshot was that in May, 1996, the NHMFC wrote to the Supreme Court requesting it to
stop deductions on Alauya's UHLP loan "effective May 1996." and began negotiating with
Villarosa & Co. " for the buy-back of . . . (Alauya's) mortgage. and . . the refund of . . (his)
payments." c
On learning of Alauya's letter to Villarosa & Co. of December 15, 1995, Sophia Alawi filed with
this Court a verified complaint dated January 25, 1996 — to which she appended a copy of
the letter, and of the above mentioned envelope bearing the typewritten words, "Free
Postage - PD 26."1 In that complaint, she accused Alauya of:
1. "Imputation of malicious and libelous charges with no solid grounds
through manifest ignorance and evident bad faith;"
2. "Causing undue injury to, and blemishing her honor and established
reputation;"
3. "Unauthorized enjoyment of the privilege of free postage . . .;" and
4. Usurpation of the title of "attorney," which only regular members of
the Philippine Bar may properly use.
She deplored Alauya's references to her as "unscrupulous swindler, forger, manipulator, etc."
without "even a bit of evidence to cloth (sic) his allegations with the essence of truth,"
denouncing his imputations as irresponsible, "all concoctions, lies, baseless and coupled with
manifest ignorance and evident bad faith," and asserting that all her dealings with Alauya had
been regular and completely transparent. She closed with the plea that Alauya "be dismissed
from the senice, or be appropriately desciplined (sic) . . ."
The Court resolved to order Alauya to comment on the complaint, Conformably with
established usage that notices of resolutions emanate from the corresponding Office of the
Clerk of Court, the notice of resolution in this case was signed by Atty. Alfredo P. Marasigan,
Assistant Division Clerk of Court.2
Alauya first submitted a "Preliminary Comment" 3 in which he questioned the authority of
Atty. Marasigan to require an explanation of him, this power pertaining, according to him, not
to "a mere Asst. Div. Clerk of Court investigating an Executive Clerk of Court." but only to the
District Judge, the Court Administrator or the Chief Justice, and voiced the suspicion that the
Resolution was the result of a "strong link" between Ms. Alawi and Atty. Marasigan's office.
He also averred that the complaint had no factual basis; Alawi was envious of him for being
not only "the Executive Clerk of Court and ex-officio Provincial Sheriff and District Registrar."
but also "a scion of a Royal Family . . ."4
In a subsequent letter to Atty. Marasigan, but this time in much less aggressive, even
obsequious tones,5 Alauya requested the former to give him a copy of the complaint in order
that he might comment thereon.6 He stated that his acts as clerk of court were done in good
faith and within the confines of the law; and that Sophia Alawi, as sales agent of Villarosa &
Co. had, by falsifying his signature, fraudulently bound him to a housing loan contract
entailing monthly deductions of P4,333.10 from his salary.
And in his comment thereafter submitted under date of June 5, 1996, Alauya contended that
it was he who had suffered "undue injury, mental anguish, sleepless nights, wounded feelings
and untold financial suffering," considering that in six months, a total of P26,028.60 had been
deducted from his salary.7 He declared that there was no basis for the complaint; in
communicating with Villarosa & Co. he had merely acted in defense of his rights. He denied
any abuse of the franking privilege, saying that he gave P20.00 plus transportation fare to a
subordinate whom he entrusted with the mailing of certain letters; that the words: "Free
Postage - PD 26," were typewritten on the envelope by some other person, an averment
corroborated by the affidavit of Absamen C. Domocao, Clerk IV (subscribed and sworn to
before respondent himself, and attached to the comment as Annex J); 8 and as far as he knew,
his subordinate mailed the letters with the use of the money he had given for postage, and if
those letters were indeed mixed with the official mail of the court, this had occurred
inadvertently and because of an honest mistake.9
Alauya justified his use of the title, "attorney," by the assertion that it is "lexically
synonymous" with "Counsellors-at-law." a title to which Shari'a lawyers have a rightful claim,
adding that he prefers the title of "attorney" because "counsellor" is often mistaken for
"councilor," "konsehal" or the Maranao term "consial," connoting a local legislator beholden
to the mayor. Withal, he does not consider himself a lawyer.
He pleads for the Court's compassion, alleging that what he did "is expected of any man
unduly prejudiced and injured." 10 He claims he was manipulated into reposing his trust in
Alawi, a classmate and friend. 11 He was induced to sign a blank contract on Alawi's assurance
that she would show the completed document to him later for correction, but she had since
avoided him; despite "numerous letters and follow-ups" he still does not know where the
property — subject of his supposed agreement with Alawi's principal, Villarosa & Co. — is
situated; 12 He says Alawi somehow got his GSIS policy from his wife, and although she
promised to return it the next day, she did not do so until after several months. He also claims
that in connection with his contract with Villarosa & Co., Alawi forged his signature on such
pertinent documents as those regarding the down payment, clearance, lay-out, receipt of the
key of the house, salary deduction, none of which he ever saw. 13
Averring in fine that his acts in question were done without malice, Alauya prays for the
dismissal of the complaint for lack of merit, it consisting of "fallacious, malicious and baseless
allegations." and complainant Alawi having come to the Court with unclean hands, her
complicity in the fraudulent housing loan being apparent and demonstrable.
It may be mentioned that in contrast to his two (2) letters to Assistant Clerk of Court
Marasigan (dated April 19, 1996 and April 22, 1996), and his two (2) earlier letters both dated
December 15, 1996 — all of which he signed as "Atty. Ashary M. Alauya" — in his Comment
of June 5, 1996, he does not use the title but refers to himself as "DATU ASHARY M. ALAUYA."
The Court referred the case to the Office of the Court Administrator for evaluation, report
and recommendation. 14
The first accusation against Alauya is that in his aforesaid letters, he made "malicious and
libelous charges (against Alawi) with no solid grounds through manifest ignorance and
evident bad faith, resulting in "undue injury to (her) and blemishing her honor and
established reputation." In those letters, Alauya had written inter alia that:
1) Alawi obtained his consent to the contracts in question "by gross misrepresentation,
deceit, fraud, dishonesty and abuse of confidence;"
2) Alawi acted in bad faith and perpetrated . . . illegal and unauthorized acts . . . prejudicial
to . . (his) rights and interests;"
3) Alawi was an "unscrupulous (and "swindling") sales agent" who had fooled him by "deceit,
fraud, misrepresentation, dishonesty and abuse of confidence;" and
4) Alawi had maliciously and fraudulently manipulated the contract with Villarosa & Co., and
unlawfully secured and pursued the housing loan without . . (his) authority and against . .
(his) will," and "concealed the real facts . . ."
Alauya's defense essentially is that in making these statements, he was merely acting in
defense of his rights, and doing only what "is expected of any man unduly prejudiced and
injured," who had suffered "mental anguish, sleepless nights, wounded feelings and untold
financial suffering, considering that in six months, a total of P26,028.60 had been deducted
from his salary. 15
As regards Alauya's use of the title of "Attorney," this Court has already had occasion to
declare that persons who pass the Shari'a Bar are not full-fledged members of the Philippine
Bar, hence may only practice law before Shari'a courts. 21 While one who has been admitted
to the Shari'a Bar, and one who has been admitted to the Philippine Bar, may both be
considered "counsellors," in the sense that they give counsel or advice in a professional
capacity, only the latter is an "attorney." The title of "attorney" is reserved to those who,
having obtained the necessary degree in the study of law and successfully taken the Bar
Examinations, have been admitted to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and remain
members thereof in good standing; and it is they only who are authorized to practice law in
this jurisdiction.
Alauya says he does not wish to use the title, "counsellor" or "counsellor-at-law, " because in
his region, there are pejorative connotations to the term, or it is confusingly similar to that
given to local legislators. The ratiocination, valid or not, is of no moment. His disinclination to
use the title of "counsellor" does not warrant his use of the title of attorney.
Finally, respecting Alauya's alleged unauthorized use of the franking privilege, 22 the record
contains no evidence adequately establishing the accusation.

WHEREFORE, respondent Ashari M. Alauya is hereby REPRIMANDED for the use of excessively
The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees (RA 6713) inter
intemperate, insulting or virulent language, i.e., language unbecoming a judicial officer, and
alia enunciates the State policy of promoting a high standard of ethics and utmost
for usurping the title of attorney; and he is warned that any similar or other impropriety or
responsibility in the public service. 16 Section 4 of the Code commands that "(p)ublic officials
misconduct in the future will be dealt with more severely.
and employees . . at all times respect the rights of others, and . . refrain from doing acts
contrary to law, good morals, good customs, public policy, public order, public safety and
public interest." 17 More than once has this Court emphasized that "the conduct and behavior
of every official and employee of an agency involved in the administration of justice, from the
presiding judge to the most junior clerk, should be circumscribed with the heavy burden of
responsibility. Their conduct must at all times be characterized by, among others, strict
propriety and decorum so as to earn and keep the respect of the public for the judiciary." 18

Now, it does not appear to the Court consistent with good morals, good customs or public
policy, or respect for the rights of others, to couch denunciations of acts believed — however
sincerely — to be deceitful, fraudulent or malicious, in excessively intemperate, insulting or
virulent language. Alauya is evidently convinced that he has a right of action against Sophia
Alawi. The law requires that he exercise that right with propriety, without malice or
vindictiveness, or undue harm to anyone; in a manner consistent with good morals, good
customs, public policy, public order, supra; or otherwise stated, that he "act with justice, give
everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith." 19 Righteous indignation, or
vindication of right cannot justify resort to vituperative language, or downright name-calling.
As a member of the Shari'a Bar and an officer of a Court, Alawi is subject to a standard of
conduct more stringent than for most other government workers. As a man of the law, he
may not use language which is abusive, offensive, scandalous, menacing, or otherwise
improper. 20 As a judicial employee, it is expected that he accord respect for the person and
the rights of others at all times, and that his every act and word should be characterized by
prudence, restraint, courtesy, dignity. His radical deviation from these salutary norms might
perhaps be mitigated, but cannot be excused, by his strongly held conviction that he had
been grievously wronged.
B.M. No. 712 March 19, 1997
RE: PETITION OF AL ARGOSINO TO TAKE THE LAWYERS OATH
RESOLUTION
PADILLA, J.:
Petitioner Al Caparros Argosino passed the bar examinations held in 1993. The Court however
deferred his oath-taking due to his previous conviction for Reckless Imprudence Resulting In
Homicide.
The criminal case which resulted in petitioner's conviction, arose from the death of a
neophyte during fraternity initiation rites sometime in September 1991. Petitioner and seven
(7) other accused initially entered pleas of not guilty to homicide charges. The eight (8)
accused later withdrew their initial pleas and upon re-arraignment all pleaded guilty to
reckless imprudence resulting in homicide.
On the basis of such pleas, the trial court rendered judgment dated 11 February 1993
imposing on each of the accused a sentence of imprisonment of from two (2) years four (4)
months :and one (1) day to four (4) years.
On 18 June 1993, the trial court granted herein petitioner's application for probation.
On 11 April 1994, the trial court issued an order approving a report dated 6 April 1994
submitted by the Probation Officer recommending petitioner's discharge from probation.
On 14 April 1994, petitioner filed before this Court a petition to be allowed to take the
lawyer's oath based on the order of his discharge from probation.
On 13 July 1995, the Court through then Senior Associate Justice Florentino P. Feliciano issued
a resolution requiring petitioner Al C. Argosino to submit to the Court evidence that he may
now be regarded as complying with the requirement of good moral character imposed upon
those seeking admission to the bar.
In compliance with the above resolution, petitioner submitted no less than fifteen (15)
certifications/letters executed by among others two (2) senators, five (5) trial court judges,
and six (6) members of religious orders. Petitioner likewise submitted evidence that a
scholarship foundation had been established in honor of Raul Camaligan, the hazing victim,
through joint efforts of the latter's family and the eight (8) accused in the criminal case.
On 26 September 1995, the Court required Atty. Gilbert Camaligan, father of Raul, to
comment on petitioner's prayer to be allowed to take the lawyer's oath.
In his comment dated 4 December 1995, Atty. Camaligan states that:
a. He still believes that the infliction of severe physical injuries which led to the death of his
son was deliberate rather than accidental. The offense therefore was not only homicide but
murder since the accused took advantage of the neophyte's helplessness implying abuse of
confidence, taking advantage of superior strength and treachery.
b. He consented to the accused's plea of guilt to the lesser offense of reckless imprudence
resulting in homicide only out of pity for the mothers of the accused and a pregnant wife of
one of the accused who went to their house on Christmas day 1991 and Maundy Thursday
1992, literally on their knees, crying and begging for forgiveness and compassion. They also
told him that the father of one of the accused had died of a heart attack upon learning of his
son's involvement in the incident.
c. As a Christian, he has forgiven petitioner and his co-accused for the death of his son.
However, as a loving father who had lost a son whom he had hoped would succeed him in his
law practice, he still feels the pain of an untimely demise and the stigma of the gruesome
manner of his death.
d. He is not in a position to say whether petitioner is now morally fit for admission to the bar.
He therefore submits the matter to the sound discretion of the Court.
The practice of law is a privilege granted only to those who possess the strict intellectual and
moral qualifications required of lawyers who are instruments in the effective and efficient
administration of justice. It is the sworn duty of this Court not only to "weed out" lawyers
who have become a disgrace to the noble profession of the law but, also of equal
importance, to prevent "misfits" from taking the lawyer's oath, thereby further tarnishing the
public image of lawyers which in recent years has undoubtedly become less than
irreproachable.
The resolution of the issue before us required weighing and reweighing of the reasons for
allowing or disallowing petitioner's admission to the practice of law. The senseless beatings
inflicted upon Raul Camaligan constituted evident absence of that moral fitness required for
admission to the bar since they were totally irresponsible, irrelevant and uncalled for.
In the 13 July 1995 resolution in this case we stated:
. . . participation in the prolonged and mindless physical behavior, [which]
makes impossible a finding that the participant [herein petitioner] was
then possessed of good moral character. 1
In the same resolution, however, we stated that the Court is prepared to consider de novo the
question of whether petitioner has purged himself of the obvious deficiency in moral
character referred to above.
Before anything else, the Court understands and shares the sentiment of Atty. Gilbert
Camaligan. The death of one's child is, for a parent, a most traumatic experience. The
suffering becomes even more pronounced and profound in cases where the death is due to
causes other than natural or accidental but due to the reckless imprudence of third parties.
The feeling then becomes a struggle between grief and anger directed at the cause of death.

Atty. Camaligan's statement before the Court- manifesting his having forgiven the accused is
no less than praiseworthy and commendable. It is exceptional for a parent, given the
circumstances in this case, to find room for forgiveness.

However, Atty. Camaligan admits that he is still not in a position to state if petitioner is now
morally fit to be a lawyer.

After a very careful evaluation of this case, we resolve to allow petitioner Al Caparros
Argosino to take the lawyer's oath, sign the Roll of Attorneys and practice the legal profession
with the following admonition:

In allowing Mr. Argosino to take the lawyer's oath, the Court recognizes that Mr. Argosino is
not inherently of bad moral fiber. On the contrary, the various certifications show that he is a
devout Catholic with a genuine concern for civic duties and public service.

The Court is persuaded that Mr. Argosino has exerted all efforts to atone for the death of Raul
Camaligan. We are prepared to give him the benefit of the doubt, taking judicial notice of the
general tendency of youth to be rash, temerarious and uncalculating.

We stress to Mr. Argosino that the lawyer's oath is NOT a mere ceremony or formality for
practicing law. Every lawyer should at ALL TIMES weigh his actions according to the sworn
promises he makes when taking the lawyer's oath. If all lawyers conducted themselves strictly
according to the lawyer's oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility, the administration
of justice will undoubtedly be faster, fairer and easier for everyone concerned.

The Court sincerely hopes that Mr. Argosino will continue with the assistance he has been
giving to his community. As a lawyer he will now be in a better position to render legal and
other services to the more unfortunate members of society.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, petitioner Al Caparros Argosino is hereby ALLOWED to take the

lawyer's oath on a date to be set by the Court, to sign the Roll of Attorneys and, thereafter, to
practice the legal profession.
A.C. No. 4148 July 30, 1998
REMEDIOS RAMIREZ TAPUCAR, complainant,
vs.
Atty. LAURO L. TAPUCAR, respondent.
PER CURIAM:
In a letter-complaint dated November 22, 1993, complainant Remedios Ramirez Tapucar
sought the disbarment of her husband, Atty. Lauro L. Tapucar, on the ground of continuing
grossly immoral conduct for cohabiting with a certain Elena (Helen) Peña under scandalous
circumstances. 1
Prior to this complaint, respondent was already administratively charged four times for
conduct unbecoming an officer of the court. In Administrative Matter No. 1740, resolved on
April 11, 1980, respondent, at that time the Judge of Butuan City, was meted the penalty of
six months suspension without pay, 2 while in Administrative Matters Nos. 1720, 1911 and
2300-CFI, which were consolidated, 3 this Court on January 31, 1981 ordered the separation
from the service of respondent. 4
Now he faces disbarment.
The records reveal the following facts:
From the Report and Recommendation of the Commission on Bar Discipline, it appears that
complainant and respondent married on October 29, 1953 at the Sacred Heart Roman
Catholic Church in Quezon City. They established their residence in Antipolo, Rizal, where
eight of their eleven children were born. In 1962 respondent relocated his family to
Dadiangas, Cotabato (now Gen. Santos City), where his last three children were born and
where he practiced his profession until his appointment as a CFI Judge in Butuan City on
January 30, 1976.
In August, 1976, shortly after being appointed as CFI Judge, respondent began cohabiting
with a certain Elena (Helen) Peña, in Nasipit, Agusan del Norte. On December 28, 1977, Elena
gave birth to their first child, named Ofelia Sembrano Peña.
In view of this cohabitation, a certain Atty. Tranquilino Calo filed an administrative complaint
against respondent for immorality. After investigation, the penalty of suspension from office
for a period of six months without pay was meted by this Court upon respondent. 5
Despite this penalty, respondent still continued to cohabit with Elena, giving rise to another
charge of immorality and other administrative cases, such as: conduct unbecoming an officer
of the court, and grossly immoral conduct. These cases were consolidated and after
investigation, this Court ordered his dismissal and separation from the service. 6
But his dismissal as a judge did not impel respondent to mend his ways. He continued living
with Elena, which resulted in the birth on September 20, 1989, of their second child named
Laella Peña Tapucar. Moreover, he completely abandoned complainant and his children by
her.
Respondent later moved from Nasipit, Agusan del Norte back to Antipolo, Rizal, bringing
along Elena and their two children. And on March 5, 1992, respondent contracted marriage
with Elena in a ceremony solemnized by MTC Judge Isagani A. Geronimo of Antipolo, Rizal.
This was done while the respondent's marriage to complainant subsists, as nothing on record
shows the dissolution thereof.
Complainant, in the meanwhile, had migrated to United States of America upon her
retirement from the government service in 1990. However, her children, who remained in
Antipolo, kept her posted of the misery they allegedly suffered because of their father's acts,
including deception and intrigues against them. Thus, despite having previously withdrawn a
similar case which she filed in 1976, complainant was forced to file the present petition for
disbarment under the compulsion of the maternal impulse to shield and protect her children
from the despotic and cruel acts of their own father. Complainant secured the assistance of
her eldest daughter, Atty. Ma. Susana Tapucar-Baua, to represent her in this case.
Consistent with Section 20, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, the matter was referred to the
Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for investigation, report
and recommendation. After conducting a thorough investigation, the Commission through
Commissioner Victor C. Fernandez recommended that respondent be disbarred, and his
name be stricken off the roll of attorneys. Mainly, this was premised on the ground that,
notwithstanding sanctions previously imposed upon him by the Honorable Supreme Court,
respondent continued the illicit liaison with Elena. 7
In his report Commissioner Fernandez noted that, instead of contradicting the charges
against him, respondent displayed arrogance, and even made a mockery of the law and the
Court, as when he said:
I have been ordered suspended by Supreme Court for two months
without pay in 1980 for having a mistress, the same girl Ms. Elena (Helen)
Peña, now my wife. Being ordered separated in later administrative case
constitute double jeopardy. If now disbarred for marrying Ms. Elena Peña
will constitute triple jeopardy. If that's the law so be it. 8
Based on said report, the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, passed
on May 17, 1997, a Resolution adopting the Commissioner's recommendation, as follows:
RESOLUTION NO. XII-97-97
Adm. Case No. 4148
 Remedios Ramirez Tapucar vs.
Atty. Lauro L. Tapucar
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and
APPROVED, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made part of the
Resolution/Decision as Annex "A"; and, finding the recommendation
therein to be fully supported by the evidence on record and the
applicable laws and rules, Respondent Atty. Lauro L. Tapucar is hereby
DISBARRED and that his name be stricken off the roll of attorneys.
We find the Report and Recommendation of Commissioner Fernandez, as approved and
adopted by the Board of Governors of IBP, more than sufficient to justify and support the
foregoing Resolution, herein considered as the recommendation to this Court by said Board
pursuant to Rule 139-B, Sec. 12 (b), of the Rules of Court. * We are in agreement that
respondent's actuations merit the penalty of disbarment.
Well settled is the rule that good moral character is not only a condition precedent for
admission to the legal profession, but it must also remain intact in order to maintain one's
good standing in that exclusive and honored fraternity. 9 There is perhaps no profession after
that of the sacred ministry in which a high-toned morality is more imperative than that of
law. 10 The Code of Professional Responsibility mandates that:
Rule 1.01. A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct.
Rule 7.03. A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on
his fitness to practice law, nor should he, whether in public or private life,
behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
(Emphasis supplied.)
As this Court often reminds members of the Bar, they must live up to the standards and
norms expected of the legal profession, by upholding the ideals and tenets embodied in the
Code of Professional Responsibility always. Lawyers must maintain a high standard of legal
proficiency, as well as morality including honesty, integrity and fair dealing. For they are at all
times subject to the scrutinizing eye of public opinion and community approbation. Needless
to state, those whose conduct — both public and private — fails this scrutiny would have to
be disciplined and, after appropriate proceedings, penalized accordingly.
Moreover, it should be recalled that respondent here was once a member of the judiciary, a
fact that aggravates his professional infractions. For having occupied that place of honor in
the Bench, he knew a judge's actuations ought to be free from any appearance of
impropriety. 11 For a judge is the visible representation of the law and, more importantly, of
justice. Ordinary citizens consider him as a source of strength that fortifies their will to obey
the law. 12 Indeed, a judge should avoid the slightest infraction of the law in all of his
actuations, lest it be a demoralizing example to others. 13 Surely, respondent could not have
forgotten the Code of Judicial Conduct entirely as to lose its moral imperatives. 14
Like a judge who is held to a high standard of integrity and ethical conduct, 15 an attorney-at-
law is also invested with public trust. Judges and lawyers serve in the administration of
justice. Admittedly, as officers of the court, lawyers must ensure the faith and confidence of
the public that justice is administered with dignity and civility. A high degree of moral
integrity is expected of a lawyer in the community where he resides. He must maintain due
regard for public decency in an orderly society.
A lawyer is expected at all times to uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession by
faithfully performing his duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and to his
clients. 16 Exacted from him, as a member of the profession charged with the responsibility to
stand as a shield in the defense of what is right, are such positive qualities of decency,
truthfulness and responsibility that have been compendiously described as "moral character."
To achieve such end, every lawyer needs to strive at all times to honor and maintain the
dignity of his profession, and thus improve not only the public regard for the Bar but also the
administration of justice.
On these considerations, the Court may disbar or suspend a lawyer for misconduct, whether
in his professional or private capacity, which shows him to be wanting in moral character, in
honesty, probity, and good demeanor, thus proving unworthy to continue as an officer of the
court. 17
The power to disbar, however, is one to be exercised with great caution, and only in a clear
case of misconduct which seriously affects the standing and character of the lawyer as an
officer of the Court and member of the bar. 18 For disbarment proceedings are intended to
afford the parties thereto full opportunity to vindicate their cause before disciplinary action is
taken, to assure the general public that those who are tasked with the duty of administering
justice are competent, honorable, trustworthy men and women in whom the Courts and the
clients may repose full confidence.
In the case of Obusan vs. Obusan, Jr., 19 a complaint for disbarment was filed against a
member of the bar by his wife. She was able to prove that he had abandoned his wife and
their son; and that he had adulterous relations with a married but separated woman.
Respondent was not able to overcome the evidence presented by his wife that he was guilty
of grossly immoral conduct. In another case, 20 a lawyer was disbarred when he abandoned
his lawful wife and cohabited with another woman who had borne him a child. The Court
held that respondent failed to maintain the highest degree of morality expected and required
of a member of the bar.
In the present case, the record shows that despite previous sanctions imposed upon him by
this Court, respondent continued his illicit liaison with a woman other than his lawfully-
wedded wife. The report of the Commissioner assigned to investigate thoroughly the
complaint found respondent far from contrite; on the contrary, he exhibited a cavalier
attitude, even arrogance, in the face of charges against him. The IBP Board of Governors,
tasked to determine whether he still merited the privileges extended to a member of the
legal profession, resolved the matter against him. For indeed, evidence of grossly immoral
conduct abounds against him and could not be explained away. Keeping a mistress, entering
into another marriage while a prior one still subsists, as well as abandoning and/or
mistreating complainant and their children, show his disregard of family obligations, morality
and decency, the law and the lawyer's oath. Such gross misbehavior over a long period of
time clearly shows a serious flaw in respondent's character, his moral indifference to scandal
in the community, and his outright defiance of established norms. All these could not but put
the legal profession in disrepute and place the integrity of the administration of justice in
peril, hence the need for strict but appropriate disciplinary action.

IN VIEW THEREOF, respondent Atty. Lauro L. Tapucar is hereby DISBARRED. The Clerk of Court
is directed to strike out his name from the Roll of Attorneys.
A.C. No. 6593 February 4, 2010
MAELOTISEA S. GARRIDO, Complainant,
vs.
ATTYS. ANGEL E. GARRIDO and ROMANA P. VALENCIA, Respondents.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
Maelotisea Sipin Garrido filed a complaint-affidavit 1 and a supplemental affidavit 2 for
disbarment against the respondents Atty. Angel E. Garrido (Atty. Garrido) and Atty. Romana
P.Valencia (Atty. Valencia) before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Committee on
Discipline charging them with gross immorality. The complaint-affidavit states:
1. That I am the legal wife of Atty. Angel E. Garrido by virtue of our marriage on
June 23, 1962 at San Marcelino Church, Ermita, Manila which was solemnized by
Msgr. Daniel Cortes x x x
2. That our marriage blossomed into having us blessed with six (6) children, namely,
Mat Elizabeth, Arnel Angelito, Madeleine Eloiza, Arnel Angelo, Arnel Victorino and
Madonna Angeline, all surnamed Garrido;
3. x x x x
4. That on May, 1991, during my light moments with our children, one of my
daughters, Madeleine confided to me that sometime on the later part of 1987, an
unknown caller talked with her claiming that the former is a child of my husband. I
ignored it and dismissed it as a mere joke. But when May Elizabeth, also one of my
daughters told me that sometime on August 1990, she saw my husband strolling at
the Robinson’s Department Store at Ermita, Manila together with a woman and a
child who was later identified as Atty. Ramona Paguida Valencia and Angeli Ramona
Valencia Garrido, respectively x x x
5. x x x x
6. That I did not stop from unearthing the truth until I was able to secure the
Certificate of Live Birth of the child, stating among others that the said child is their
daughter and that Atty. Angel Escobar Garrido and Atty. Romana Paguida Valencia
were married at Hongkong sometime on 1978.
7. That on June 1993, my husband left our conjugal home and joined Atty. Ramona
Paguida Valencia at their residence x x x
8. That since he left our conjugal home he failed and still failing to give us our
needed financial support to the prejudice of our children who stopped schooling
because of financial constraints.
xxxx
That I am also filing a disbarment proceedings against his mistress as alleged in the same
affidavit, Atty. Romana P. Valencia considering that out of their immoral acts I suffered not
only mental anguish but also besmirch reputation, wounded feelings and sleepless nights; x x
x
In his Counter-Affidavit,3 Atty. Garrido denied Maelotisea’s charges and imputations. By way
of defense, he alleged that Maelotisea was not his legal wife, as he was already married to
Constancia David (Constancia) when he married Maelotisea. He claimed he married
Maelotisea after he and Constancia parted ways. He further alleged that Maelotisea knew all
his escapades and understood his "bad boy" image before she married him in 1962. As he
and Maelotisea grew apart over the years due to financial problems, Atty. Garrido met Atty.
Valencia. He became close to Atty. Valencia to whom he confided his difficulties. Together,
they resolved his personal problems and his financial difficulties with his second family. Atty.
Garrido denied that he failed to give financial support to his children with Maelotisea,
emphasizing that all his six (6) children were educated in private schools; all graduated from
college except for Arnel Victorino, who finished a special secondary course. 4 Atty. Garrido
alleged that Maelotisea had not been employed and had not practiced her profession for the
past ten (10) years.
Atty. Garrido emphasized that all his marriages were contracted before he became a member
of the bar on May 11, 1979, with the third marriage contracted after the death of Constancia
on December 26, 1977. Likewise, his children with Maelotisea were born before he became a
lawyer.
In her Counter-Affidavit,5 Atty. Valencia denied that she was the mistress of Atty. Garrido. She
explained that Maelotisea was not the legal wife of Atty. Garrido since the marriage between
them was void from the beginning due to the then existing marriage of Atty. Garrido with
Constancia. Atty. Valencia claimed that Maelotisea knew of the romantic relationship
between her and Atty. Garrido, as they (Maelotisea and Atty. Valencia) met in 1978.
Maelotisea kept silent about her relationship with Atty. Garrido and had maintained this
silence when she (Atty. Valencia) financially helped Atty. Garrido build a house for his second
family. Atty. Valencia alleged that Maelotisea was not a proper party to this suit because of
her silence; she kept silent when things were favorable and beneficial to her. Atty. Valencia
also alleged that Maelotisea had no cause of action against her.
In the course of the hearings, the parties filed the following motions before the IBP
Commission on Bar Discipline:
First, the respondents filed a Motion for Suspension of Proceedings 6 in view of the criminal
complaint for concubinage Maelotisea filed against them, and the Petition for Declaration of
Nullity7 (of marriage) Atty. Garrido filed to nullify his marriage to Maelotisea. The IBP
Commission on Bar Discipline denied this motion for lack of merit.
Second, the respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss 8 the complaints after the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City declared the marriage between Atty. Garrido and Maelotisea "an
absolute nullity." Since Maelotisea was never the legal wife of Atty. Garrido, the respondents
argued that she had no personality to file her complaints against them. The respondents also
alleged that they had not committed any immoral act since they married when Atty. Garrido
was already a widower, and the acts complained of were committed before his admission to
the bar. The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline also denied this motion. 9
Third, Maelotisea filed a motion for the dismissal of the complaints she filed against the
respondents, arguing that she wanted to maintain friendly relations with Atty. Garrido, who is
the father of her six (6) children. 10 The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline likewise denied this
motion.11
On April 13, 2004, Investigating Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan (Investigating
Commissioner San Juan) submitted her Report and Recommendation for the respondents’
disbarment.12 The Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP Board of Governors (IBP Board of
Governors) approved and adopted this recommendation with modification under Resolution
No. XVI-2004-375 dated July 30, 2004. This resolution in part states:
x x x finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the
applicable laws and rules, and considering that Atty. Garrido exhibited conduct which lacks
the degree of morality required as members of the bar, Atty. Angel E. Garrido is hereby
DISBARRED for gross immorality. However, the case against Atty. Romana P. Valencia is hereby
DISMISSED for lack of merit of the complaint.
Atty. Garrido moved to reconsider this resolution, but the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline
denied his motion under Resolution No. XVII-2007-038 dated January 18, 2007.
Atty. Garrido now seeks relief with this Court through the present petition for review. He
submits that under the circumstances, he did not commit any gross immorality that would
warrant his disbarment. He also argues that the offenses charged have prescribed under the
IBP rules.
Additionally, Atty. Garrido pleads that he be allowed on humanitarian considerations to retain
his profession; he is already in the twilight of his life, and has kept his promise to lead an
upright and irreproachable life notwithstanding his situation.
In compliance with our Resolution dated August 25, 2009, Atty. Alicia A. Risos-Vidal (Atty.
Risos-Vidal), Director of the Commission on Bar Discipline, filed her Comment on the petition.
She recommends a modification of the penalty from disbarment to reprimand, advancing the
view that disbarment is very harsh considering that the 77-year old Atty. Garrido took
responsibility for his acts and tried to mend his ways by filing a petition for declaration of
nullity of his bigamous marriage. Atty. Risos-Vidal also notes that no other administrative case
has ever been filed against Atty. Garrido.
THE COURT’S RULING
After due consideration, we resolve to adopt the findings of the IBP Board of Governors
against Atty. Garrido, and to reject its recommendation with respect to Atty. Valencia.
General Considerations
Laws dealing with double jeopardy or with procedure – such as the verification of pleadings
and prejudicial questions, or in this case, prescription of offenses or the filing of affidavits of
desistance by the complainant – do not apply in the determination of a lawyer’s qualifications
and fitness for membership in the Bar. 13 We have so ruled in the past and we see no reason to
depart from this ruling.14 First, admission to the practice of law is a component of the
administration of justice and is a matter of public interest because it involves service to the
public.15 The admission qualifications are also qualifications for the continued enjoyment of
the privilege to practice law. Second, lack of qualifications or the violation of the standards for
the practice of law, like criminal cases, is a matter of public concern that the State may inquire
into through this Court. In this sense, the complainant in a disbarment case is not a direct
party whose interest in the outcome of the charge is wholly his or her own; 16 effectively, his
or her participation is that of a witness who brought the matter to the attention of the Court.
As applied to the present case, the time that elapsed between the immoral acts charged and
the filing of the complaint is not material in considering the qualification of Atty. Garrido
when he applied for admission to the practice of law, and his continuing qualification to be a
member of the legal profession. From this perspective, it is not important that the acts
complained of were committed before Atty. Garrido was admitted to the practice of law. As
we explained in Zaguirre v. Castillo,17 the possession of good moral character is both a
condition precedent and a continuing requirement to warrant admission to the bar and to
retain membership in the legal profession. Admission to the bar does not preclude a
subsequent judicial inquiry, upon proper complaint, into any question concerning the mental
or moral fitness of the respondent before he became a lawyer. 18 Admission to the practice
only creates the rebuttable presumption that the applicant has all the qualifications to
become a lawyer; this may be refuted by clear and convincing evidence to the contrary even
after admission to the Bar.19
Parenthetically, Article VIII Section 5(5) of the Constitution recognizes the disciplinary
authority of the Court over the members of the Bar to be merely incidental to the Court's
exclusive power to admit applicants to the practice of law. Reinforcing the implementation of
this constitutional authority is Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court which expressly
states that a member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by
the Supreme Court for, among others, any deceit, grossly immoral conduct, or violation of the
oath that he is required to take before admission to the practice of law.
In light of the public service character of the practice of law and the nature of disbarment
proceedings as a public interest concern, Maelotisea’s affidavit of desistance cannot have the
effect of discontinuing or abating the disbarment proceedings. As we have stated, Maelotisea
is more of a witness than a complainant in these proceedings. We note further that she filed
her affidavits of withdrawal only after she had presented her evidence; her evidence are now
available for the Court’s examination and consideration, and their merits are not affected by
her desistance. We cannot fail to note, too, that Mealotisea filed her affidavit of desistance,
not to disown or refute the evidence she had submitted, but solely becuase of compassion
(and, impliedly, out of concern for her personal financial interest in continuing friendly
relations with Atty. Garrido).
Immoral conduct involves acts that are willful, flagrant, or shameless, and that show a moral
indifference to the opinion of the upright and respectable members of the
community.20 Immoral conduct is gross when it is so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act, or
so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree, or when committed under such
scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the community’s sense of decency. 21 We
make these distinctions as the supreme penalty of disbarment arising from conduct requires
grossly immoral, not simply immoral, conduct. 22
In several cases, we applied the above standard in considering lawyers who contracted an
unlawful second marriage or multiple marriages.
In Macarrubo v. Macarrubo,23 the respondent lawyer entered into multiple marriages and
subsequently used legal remedies to sever them. We ruled that the respondent’s pattern of
misconduct undermined the institutions of marriage and family – institutions that this society
looks up to for the rearing of our children, for the development of values essential to the
survival and well-being of our communities, and for the strengthening of our nation as a
whole. In this light, no fate other than disbarment awaited the wayward respondent.
In Villasanta v. Peralta,24 the respondent lawyer married the complainant while his marriage
with his first wife was subsisting. We held that the respondent’s act of contracting the second
marriage was contrary to honesty, justice, decency and morality. The lack of good moral
character required by the Rules of Court disqualified the respondent from admission to the
Bar.
25
Similar to Villasanta was the case of Conjuangco, Jr. v. Palma, where the respondent secretly
contracted a second marriage with the daughter of his client in Hongkong. We found that the
respondent exhibited a deplorable lack of that degree of morality required of members of the
Bar. In particular, he made a mockery of marriage – a sacred institution that demands respect
and dignity. We also declared his act of contracting a second marriage contrary to honesty,
justice, decency and morality.
In this case, the undisputed facts gathered from the evidence and the admissions of Atty.
Garrido established a pattern of gross immoral conduct that warrants his disbarment. His
conduct was not only corrupt or unprincipled; it was reprehensible to the highest degree.
First, Atty. Garrido admitted that he left Constancia to pursue his law studies; thereafter and
during the marriage, he had romantic relationships with other women. He had the gall to
represent to this Court that the study of law was his reason for leaving his wife; marriage and
the study of law are not mutually exclusive.
Second, he misrepresented himself to Maelotisea as a bachelor, when in truth he was already
married to Constancia.26 This was a misrepresentation given as an excuse to lure a woman
into a prohibited relationship.
Third, Atty. Garrido contracted his second marriage with Maelotisea notwithstanding the
subsistence of his first marriage. This was an open admission, not only of an illegal liaison, but
of the commission of a crime.
Fourth, Atty. Garrido engaged in an extra-marital affair with Atty. Valencia while his two
marriages were in place and without taking into consideration the moral and emotional
implications of his actions on the two women he took as wives and on his six (6) children by
his second marriage.
Fifth, instead of making legal amends to validate his marriage with Maelotisea upon the
death of Constancia, Atty. Garrido married Atty. Valencia who bore him a daughter.
Sixth, Atty. Garrido misused his legal knowledge and convinced Atty. Valencia (who was not
then a lawyer) that he was free to marry, considering that his marriage with Maelotisea was
not "valid."
Seventh, as the evidence on record implies, Atty. Garrido married Atty. Valencia in Hongkong
in an apparent attempt to accord legitimacy to a union entered into while another marriage
was in place.
Eighth, after admission to the practice of law, Atty. Garrido simultaneously cohabited and had
sexual relations with two (2) women who at one point were both his wedded wives. He also
led a double life with two (2) families for a period of more than ten (10) years.
Lastly, Atty. Garrido petitioned for the nullity of his marriage to Maelotisea. Contrary to the
position advanced by Atty. Alicia A. Risos-Vidal, this was not an act of facing up to his
responsibility or an act of mending his ways. This was an attempt, using his legal knowledge,
to escape liability for his past actions by having his second marriage declared void after the
present complaint was filed against him.
By his actions, Garrido committed multiple violations relating to the legal profession,
specifically, violations of the bar admission rules, of his lawyer’s oath, and of the ethical rules
of the profession.
He did not possess the good moral character required of a lawyer at the time of his admission
to the Bar.27 As a lawyer, he violated his lawyer’s oath, 28 Section 20(a) of Rule 138 of the Rules
of Court,29 and Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, 30 all of which commonly
require him to obey the laws of the land. In marrying Maelotisea, he committed the crime of
bigamy, as he entered this second marriage while his first marriage with Constancia was
subsisting. He openly admitted his bigamy when he filed his petition to nullify his marriage to
Maelotisea.
He violated ethical rules of the profession, specifically, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which commands that he "shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct"; Canon 7 of the same Code, which demands that "[a] lawyer shall at all
times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession"; Rule 7.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, which provides that, "[a] lawyer shall not engage in conduct that
adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor should he, whether in public or private
life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession."
As a lawyer, his community looked up to Atty. Garrido with the expectation and that he would
set a good example in promoting obedience to the Constitution and the laws. When he
violated the law and distorted it to cater to his own personal needs and selfish motives, he
discredited the legal profession and created the public impression that laws are mere tools of
convenience that can be used, bended and abused to satisfy personal whims and desires. In
this case, he also used the law to free him from unwanted relationships.
The Court has often reminded the members of the bar to live up to the standards and norms
expected of the legal profession by upholding the ideals and principles embodied in the Code
of Professional Responsibility. 31 Lawyers are bound to maintain not only a high standard of
legal proficiency, but also of morality, including honesty, integrity and fair dealing. 32 Lawyers
are at all times subject to the watchful public eye and community approbation. 33Needless to
state, those whose conduct – both public and private – fail this scrutiny have to be disciplined
and, after appropriate proceedings, accordingly penalized. 34
Atty. Valencia
We agree with the findings of Investigating Commissioner San Juan that Atty. Valencia should
be administratively liable under the circumstances for gross immorality:
x x x The contention of respondent that they were not yet lawyers in March 27, 1978 when
they got married shall not afford them exemption from sanctions, for good moral character is
required as a condition precedent to admission to the Bar. Likewise there is no distinction
whether the misconduct was committed in the lawyer’s professional capacity or in his private
life. Again, the claim that his marriage to complainant was void ab initio shall not relieve
respondents from responsibility x x x Although the second marriage of the respondent was
subsequently declared null and void the fact remains that respondents exhibited conduct
which lacks that degree of morality required of them as members of the Bar. 35
Moral character is not a subjective term but one that corresponds to objective reality. 36 To
have good moral character, a person must have the personal characteristics of being good. It
is not enough that he or she has a good reputation, i.e., the opinion generally entertained
about a person or the estimate in which he or she is held by the public in the place where she
is known.37 The requirement of good moral character has four general purposes, namely: (1)
to protect the public; (2) to protect the public image of lawyers; (3) to protect prospective
clients; and (4) to protect errant lawyers from themselves. 38 Each purpose is as important as
the other.
Under the circumstances, we cannot overlook that prior to becoming a lawyer, Atty. Valencia
already knew that Atty. Garrido was a married man (either to Constancia or to Maelotisea),
and that he already had a family. As Atty. Garrido’s admitted confidante, she was under the
moral duty to give him proper advice; instead, she entered into a romantic relationship with
him for about six (6) years during the subsistence of his two marriages. In 1978, she married
Atty. Garrido with the knowledge that he had an outstanding second marriage. These
circumstances, to our mind, support the conclusion that she lacked good moral character;
even without being a lawyer, a person possessed of high moral values, whose confidential
advice was sought by another with respect to the latter’s family problems, would not
aggravate the situation by entering into a romantic liaison with the person seeking advice,
thereby effectively alienating the other person’s feelings and affection from his wife and
family.
While Atty. Valencia contends that Atty. Garrido’s marriage with Maelotisea was null and void,
the fact remains that he took a man away from a woman who bore him six (6) children.
Ordinary decency would have required her to ward off Atty. Garrido’s advances, as he was a
married man, in fact a twice-married man with both marriages subsisting at that time; she
should have said no to Atty. Garrido from the very start. Instead, she continued her liaison
with Atty. Garrido, driving him, upon the death of Constancia, away from legitimizing his
relationship with Maelotisea and their children. Worse than this, because of Atty. Valencia’s
presence and willingness, Atty. Garrido even left his second family and six children for a third
marriage with her. This scenario smacks of immorality even if viewed outside of the prism of
law.1avvphi1
We are not unmindful of Atty. Valencia’s expressed belief that Atty. Garrido’s second marriage
to Maelotisea was invalid; hence, she felt free to marry Atty. Garrido. While this may be
correct in the strict legal sense and was later on confirmed by the declaration of the nullity of
Atty. Garrido’s marriage to Maelotisea, we do not believe at all in the honesty of this
expressed belief.
The records show that Atty. Valencia consented to be married in Hongkong, not within the
country. Given that this marriage transpired before the declaration of the nullity of Atty.
Garrido’s second marriage, we can only call this Hongkong marriage a clandestine marriage,
contrary to the Filipino tradition of celebrating a marriage together with family. Despite Atty.
Valencia’s claim that she agreed to marry Atty. Garrido only after he showed her proof of his
capacity to enter into a subsequent valid marriage, the celebration of their marriage in
Hongkong39 leads us to the opposite conclusion; they wanted to marry in Hongkong for the
added security of avoiding any charge of bigamy by entering into the subsequent marriage
outside Philippine jurisdiction. In this regard, we cannot help but note that Atty. Valencia
afterwards opted to retain and use her surname instead of using the surname of her
"husband." Atty. Valencia, too, did not appear to mind that her husband did not live and
cohabit with her under one roof, but with his second wife and the family of this marriage.
Apparently, Atty. Valencia did not mind at all "sharing" her husband with another woman.
This, to us, is a clear demonstration of Atty. Valencia’s perverse sense of moral values.
Measured against the definition of gross immorality, we find Atty. Valencia’s actions grossly
immoral. Her actions were so corrupt as to approximate a criminal act, for she married a man
who, in all appearances, was married to another and with whom he has a family. Her actions
were also unprincipled and reprehensible to a high degree; as the confidante of Atty. Garrido,
she preyed on his vulnerability and engaged in a romantic relationship with him during the
subsistence of his two previous marriages. As already mentioned, Atty. Valencia’s conduct
could not but be scandalous and revolting to the point of shocking the community’s sense of
decency; while she professed to be the lawfully wedded wife, she helped the second family
build a house prior to her marriage to Atty. Garrido, and did not object to sharing her
husband with the woman of his second marriage.
without undermining the dignity of the legal profession and without placing the integrity of
the administration of justice into question. She was not an on-looker victimized by the
circumstances, but a willing and knowing full participant in a love triangle whose incidents
crossed into the illicit.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court resolves to:
(1) DISBAR Atty. Angel E. Garrido from the practice of law for gross immorality, violation of
the Lawyer’s Oath; and violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 7 and Rule 7.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility; and

We find that Atty. Valencia violated Canon 7 and Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional
(2) DISBAR Atty. Romana P. Valencia from the practice of law for gross immorality, violation of
Responsibility, as her behavior demeaned the dignity of and discredited the legal profession.
Canon 7 and Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
She simply failed in her duty as a lawyer to adhere unwaveringly to the highest standards of
morality.40 In Barrientos v. Daarol,41 we held that lawyers, as officers of the court, must not
only be of good moral character but must also be seen to be of good moral character and Let a copy of this Decision be attached to the personal records of Atty. Angel E. Garrido and
must lead lives in accordance with the highest moral standards of the community. Atty. Atty. Romana P. Valencia in the Office of the Bar Confidant, and another copy furnished the
Valencia failed to live up to these standards before she was admitted to the bar and after she Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
became a member of the legal profession.
The Clerk of Court is directed to strike out the names of Angel E. Garrido and Rowena P.
Conclusion Valencia from the Roll of Attorneys.

Membership in the Bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. As a privilege bestowed by

law through the Supreme Court, membership in the Bar can be withdrawn where
circumstances concretely show the lawyer’s lack of the essential qualifications required of
lawyers. We resolve to withdraw this privilege from Atty. Angel E. Garrido and Atty. Rowena P.
Valencia for this reason.

In imposing the penalty of disbarment upon the respondents, we are aware that the power to
disbar is one to be exercised with great caution and only in clear cases of misconduct that
seriously affects the standing and character of the lawyer as a legal professional and as an
officer of the Court.42

We are convinced from the totality of the evidence on hand that the present case is one of
them. The records show the parties’ pattern of grave and immoral misconduct that
demonstrates their lack of mental and emotional fitness and moral character to qualify them
for the responsibilities and duties imposed on lawyers as professionals and as officers of the
court.

While we are keenly aware of Atty. Garrido’s plea for compassion and his act of supporting his
children with Maelotisea after their separation, we cannot grant his plea. The extent of his
demonstrated violations of his oath, the Rules of Court and of the Code of Professional
Responsibility overrides what under other circumstances are commendable traits of
character.

In like manner, Atty. Valencia’s behavior over a long period of time unequivocally
demonstrates a basic and serious flaw in her character, which we cannot simply brush aside
A.M. No. P-99-1287 January 26, 2001
OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. MISAEL M. LADAGA, Branch Clerk of Court, Regional Trial Court, Branch 133, Makati
City, respondent.
KAPUNAN, J.:
In a Letter, dated August 31, 1998, respondent Atty. Misael M. Ladaga, Branch Clerk of Court
of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 133, requested the Court Administrator, Justice
Alfredo L. Benipayo, for authority to appear as pro bono counsel of his cousin, Narcisa
Naldoza Ladaga, in Criminal Case No. 84885, entitled "People vs. Narcisa Naldoza Ladaga" for
Falsification of Public Document pending before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City,
Branch 40.1 While respondent's letter-request was pending action, Lisa Payoyo Andres, the
private complainant in Criminal Case No. 84885, sent a letter to the Court Administrator,
dated September 2, 1998, requesting for a certification with regard to respondent's authority
to appear as counsel for the accused in the said criminal case. 2 On September 7, 1998, the
Office of the Court Administrator referred the matter to respondent for comment. 3
In his Comment,4 dated September 14, 1998, respondent admitted that he had appeared in
Criminal Case No. 84885 without prior authorization. He reasoned out that the factual
circumstances surrounding the criminal case compelled him to handle the defense of his
cousin who did not have enough resources to hire the services of a counsel de parte; while,
on the other hand, private complainant was a member of a powerful family who was out to
get even with his cousin. Furthermore, he rationalized that his appearance in the criminal
case did not prejudice his office nor the interest of the public since he did not take advantage
of his position. In any case, his appearances in court were covered by leave applications
approved by the presiding judge.1âwphi1.nêt
On December 8, 1998, the Court issued a Resolution denying respondent's request for
authorization to appear as counsel and directing the Office of the Court Administrator to file
formal charges against him for appearing in court without the required authorization from
the Court.5 On January 25, 1999, the Court Administrator filed the instant administrative
complaint against respondent for violating Sec. 7(b)(2) of Republic Act No. 6713, otherwise
known as the "Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees,"
which provides:
Sec. 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. – In addition to acts and omissions of
public officials and employees now prescribed in the Constitution and existing laws,
the following shall constitute prohibited acts and transactions of any public official
and employee and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
x x x There is no question that Atty. Misael Ladaga appeared as counsel for and in behalf
(b) Outside employment and other activities related thereto. – Public
officials and employees during their incumbency shall not:
x x x
(2) Engage in the private practice of their profession unless
authorized by the Constitution or law, Provided, that such
practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with their official
functions;
In our Resolution, dated February 9, 1999, we required respondent to comment on the
administrative complaint.
In his Comment, respondent explained that he and Ms. Ladaga are "close blood cousins" who
belong to a "powerless family" from the impoverished town of Bacauag, Surigao del Norte.
From childhood until he finished his law degree, Ms. Ladaga had always supported and
guided him while he looked up to her as a mentor and an adviser. Because of their close
relationship, Ms. Ladaga sought respondent's help and advice when she was charged in
Criminal Case No. 84885 for falsification by the private complainant, Lisa Payoyo Andres,
whose only purpose in filing the said criminal case was to "seek vengeance" on her cousin. He
explained that his cousin's discord with Ms. Andres started when the latter's husband, SPO4
Pedro Andres, left the conjugal home to cohabit with Ms. Ladaga. During the course of their
illicit affair, SPO4 Andres and Ms. Ladaga begot three (3) children. The birth certificate of their
eldest child is the subject of the falsification charge against Ms. Ladaga. Respondent stated
that since he is the only lawyer in their family, he felt it to be his duty to accept Ms. Ladaga's
plea to be her counsel since she not have enough funds to pay for the services of a lawyer.
Respondent also pointed out that in his seven (7) years of untainted government service,
initially with the Commission on Human Rights and now with the judiciary, he had performed
his duties with honesty and integrity and that it was only in this particular case that he had
been administratively charged for extending a helping hand to a close relative by giving a free
legal assistance for "humanitarian purpose." He never took advantage of his position as
branch clerk of court since the questioned appearances were made in the Metropolitan Trial
Court of Quezon City and not in Makati where he is holding office. He stressed that during the
hearings of the criminal case, he was on leave as shown by his approved leave applications
attached to his comment.
In our Resolution, dated June 22, 1999, we noted respondent's comment and referred the
administrative matter to the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Judge
Josefina Guevarra-Salonga, for investigation, report and recommendation.
In her Report, dated September 29, 1999, Judge Salonga made the following findings and
recommendation:
of his cousin, Narcisa Naldoza Ladaga, an accused in Criminal Case No. 84-885 for
"Falsification of Public Documents" before the METC of Quezon City. It is also
 denied that the appearance of said respondent in said case was without the
previous permission of the Court.
An examination of the records shows that during the occasions that the respondent
appeared as such counsel before the METC of Quezon City, he was on official leave
of absence. Moreover, his Presiding Judge, Judge Napoleon Inoturan was aware of
the case he was handling. That the respondent appeared as pro bonocounsel
likewise cannot be denied. His cousin-client Narcisa Ladaga herself positively
declared that the respondent did not receive a single centavo from her. Helpless as
she was and respondent being the only lawyer in the family, he agreed to represent
her out of his compassion and high regard for her.
It may not be amiss to point out, this is the first time that respondent ever handled
a case for a member of his family who is like a big sister to him. He appeared for
free and for the purpose of settling the case amicably. Furthermore, his Presiding
Judge was aware of his appearance as counsel for his cousin. On top of this, during
all the years that he has been in government service, he has maintained his
integrity and independence.
RECOMMENDATION
In the light of the foregoing, it appearing that the respondent appeared as counsel
for his cousin without first securing permission from the Court, and considering that
this is his first time to do it coupled with the fact that said appearance was not for a
fee and was with the knowledge of his Presiding Judge, it is hereby respectfully
recommended that he be REPRIMANDED with a stern warning that any repetition
of such act would be dealt with more severely.6
We agree with the recommendation of the investigating judge.
Respondent is charged under Sec. 7(b)(2) of the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for
Public Officials and Employees which prohibits civil servants from engaging in the private
practice of their profession. A similar prohibition is found under Sec. 35, Rule 138 of the
Revised Rules of Court which disallows certain attorneys from engaging in the private practice
of their profession. The said section reads:
SEC. 35. Certain attorneys not to practice. – No judge or other official or employee
of the superior courts or of the Office of the Solicitor General, shall engage in
private practice as a member of the bar or give professional advise to clients.
However, it should be clarified that "private practice" of a profession, specifically the law
profession in this case, which is prohibited, does not pertain to an isolated court appearance;
rather, it contemplates a succession of acts of the same nature habitually or customarily
holding one's self to the public as a lawyer.
In the case of People vs. Villanueva,7 we explained the meaning of the term "private practice"
prohibited by the said section, to wit:
We believe that the isolated appearance of City Attorney Fule did not constitute
private practice, within the meaning and contemplation of the Rules. Practice is
more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary action, a
succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual exercise
(State vs. Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan. 864, 42 LRA, N.S. 768). Practice of law to fall
within the prohibition of statute has been interpreted as customarily or habitually
holding one's self out to the public, as a lawyer and demanding payment for such
services (State vs. Bryan, 4 S. E. 522, 98 N. C. 644, 647). The appearance as counsel
on one occasion, is not conclusive as determinative of engagement in the private
practice of law. The following observation of the Solicitor General is noteworthy:
"Essentially, the word private practice of law implies that one must have
presented himself to be in the active and continued practice of the legal
profession and that his professional services are available to the public for
a compensation, as a source of his livelihood or in consideration of his
said services."
For one thing, it has never been refuted that City Attorney Fule had been given
permission by his immediate superior, the Secretary of Justice, to represent the
complainant in the case at bar, who is a relative.8
Based on the foregoing, it is evident that the isolated instances when respondent appeared
as pro bono counsel of his cousin in Criminal Case No. 84885 does not constitute the "private
practice" of the law profession contemplated by law.
Nonetheless, while respondent's isolated court appearances did not amount to a private
practice of law, he failed to obtain a written permission therefor from the head of the
Department, which is this Court as required by Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Revised Civil
Service Rules, thus:
Sec 12. No officer or employee shall engage directly in any private business,
vocation, or profession or be connected with any commercial, credit, agricultural,
or industrial undertaking without a written permission from the head of the
Department: Provided, That this prohibition will be absolute in the case of those
officers and employees whose duties and responsibilities require that their entire
time be at the disposal of the Government; Provided, further, That if an employee is
granted permission to engage in outside activities, time so devoted outside of office
hours should be fixed by the agency to the end that it will not impair in any way the
efficiency of the officer or employee: And provided, finally, That no permission is
necessary in the case of investments, made by an officer or employee, which do not
involve real or apparent conflict between his private interests and public duties, or
in any way influence him in the discharge of his duties, and he shall not take part in
the management of the enterprise or become an officer of the board of directors. 9
Respondent entered his appearance and attended court proceedings on numerous occasions,
i.e., May 4-15, 1998, June 18, 1998, July 13, 1998 and August 5, 1998, as borne out by his
own admission. It is true that he filed leave applications corresponding to the dates he
appeared in court. However, he failed to obtain a prior permission from the head of the
Department. The presiding judge of the court to which respondent is assigned is not the head
of the Department contemplated by law.1âwphi1.nêt

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent Atty. Misael M. Ladaga is

hereby REPRIMANDED with a stern warning that any repetition of such act would be dealt
with more severely.