Calalang vs.
Williams
G.R. No. 47800 December 2, 1940
Petitioner: Maximo Calalang
Respondents: A.D. Williams, Et al.
Ponente: Laurel, J:
Facts:
Maximo Calalang in his capacity as a private citizen and a taxpayer of
Manila filed a petition for a writ of prohibition against the respondents.
It is alleged in the petition that the National Traffic Commission, in its
resolution of July 17, 1940, resolved to recommend to the Director of the Public
Works and to the Secretary of Public Works and Communications that animal-
drawn vehicles be prohibited from passing along Rosario Street extending
from Plaza Calderon de la Barca to Dasmariñas Street from 7:30 Am to 12:30
pm and from 1:30 pm to 530 pm; and along Rizal Avenue extending from the
railroad crossing at Antipolo Street to Echague Street from 7 am to 11pm for a
period of one year from the date of the opening of the Colgante Bridge to traffic.
The Chairman of the National Traffic Commission on July 18, 1940
recommended to the Director of Public Works with the approval of the
Secretary of Public Works the adoption of the measure proposed in the
resolution aforementioned in pursuance of the provisions of the
Commonwealth Act No. 548 which authorizes said Director with the approval
from the Secretary of the Public Works and Communication to promulgate
rules and regulations to regulate and control the use of and traffic on national
roads.
On August 2, 1940, the Director recommended to the Secretary the
approval of the recommendations made by the Chairman of the National
Traffic Commission with modifications. The Secretary of Public Works
approved the recommendations on August 10, 1940.
The Mayor of Manila and the Acting Chief of Police of Manila have
enforced and caused to be enforced the rules and regulation. As a
consequence, all animal-drawn vehicles are not allowed to pass and pick up
passengers in the places above mentioned to the detriment not only of their
owners but of the riding public as well.
Issue:
1. Whether the rules and regulations promulgated by the
respondents pursuant to the provisions of
Commonwealth Act NO. 548 constitute an unlawful
inference with legitimate business or trade and abridged
the right to personal liberty and freedom of locomotion?
2. Whether the rules and regulations complained of infringe
upon the constitutional precept regarding the promotion
of social justice to insure the well-being and economic
security of all the people?
Held:
1. No. The promulgation of the Act aims to promote safe transit
upon and avoid obstructions on national roads in the interest
and convenience of the public. In enacting said law, the
National Assembly was prompted by considerations of public
convenience and welfare. It was inspired by the desire to
relieve congestion of traffic, which is a menace to the public
safety. Public welfare lies at the bottom of the
promulgation of the said law and the state in order to
promote the general welfare may interfere with personal
liberty, with property, and with business and
occupations. Persons and property may be subject to all
kinds of restraints and burdens in order to secure the general
comfort, health, and prosperity of the State. To this
fundamental aims of the government, the rights of the
individual are subordinated. Liberty is a blessing which
should not be made to prevail over authority because society
will fall into anarchy. Neither should authority be made to
prevail over liberty because then the individual will fall into
slavery. The paradox lies in the fact that the apparent
curtailment of liberty is precisely the very means of
insuring its preserving.
 2. No. Social justice means the promotion of the welfare of all
the people, the adoption by the Government of measures
calculated to insure economic stability of all the competent
elements of society, through the maintenance of a proper
economic and social equilibrium in the interrelations of the
members of the community, constitutionally, through the
adoption of measures legally justifiable, or extra-
constitutionally, through the exercise of powers underlying the
existence of all governments on the time-honored principles
of salus populi est suprema lex.
Social justice must be founded on the recognition of the
necessity of interdependence among divers and diverse units
of a society and of the protection that should be equally and
evenly extended to all groups as a combined force in our
social and economic life, consistent with the fundamental and
paramount objective of the state of promoting health, comfort
and quiet of all persons, and of bringing about “the greatest
good to the greatest number.”
PETITIONER: El Banco Español-Filipino
RESPONDENTS: Vicente Palanca
SUMMARY: El Banco instituted a foreclosure for the mortageged properties
of
Palanca which he used for security for a loan. 7 years after the foreclosure
and sale
of the property, Palanca’s administratix requested to set aside the previous
judgement on the ground that the court had no jurisdiction because no notice
was
actually received by the defendant who is a nonresident. Trial court denied
the
motion. The SC affirmed saying that since the requirement publication in a
newspaper was met, the due process requirement of the defendant’s right to
be
heard is already met. Receipt of notice is not essential. The possibility of the
clerk
failing to deliver the letter is not fatal.
DOCTRINE: In a foreclosure case, some notification of the proceedings to
the nonresident owner is everywhere recognized as essential. Statutes
generally provide for publication, and usually in addition for mailing the notice
to the defendant, if his residence is known. However, among the two, only
publication is necessarily essential.
FACTS:
1. El Banco Español-Filipino (bank) instituted action against Engracio
Palanca
to foreclose a mortgage upon various parcels of real property in Manila City.
The property was used as security for a debt by Palanca with the bank.
2. After the execution of the instrument by the mortgagor, Palanca, he
returned
to China, his native country. He then died there.
3. Since required pursuant to Section 399 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the
defendant being a nonresident at the time of the institution of the present
action, publication was made in due form in a newspaper of the City of
Manila. The court further directed that the clerk of the court should deposit
in the post office a copy of the summons and complain directed to the
defendant at his last place of residence, the City of Amoy, in the Empire of
China.
4. Whether the clerk complied with this order does not affirmatively appear.
There is however, an affidavit signed by an employee of the bank’s attorneys
showing that he (the employee) had deposited in the Manila post-office a
registered letter of the summons, affidavit and the complaint.
5. The case proceeded in the usual course. The defendant not having
appeared,
the judgment was taken against him by default, in favor of the El Banco.
Since
the defendant naturally did not satisfy the judgment, the mortgage property
was sold in a public auction and was bought by the bank.
6. 7 years after the sale, a motion was made by Vicente Palanca, as
administrator
of the estate of the original defendant, wherein Vicente requested the court to
set aside the previous order of default because the court had never acquired
jurisdiction over the defendant or over the subject of the action.
7. The lower court denied the application and from this, Vicente appealed.
ISSUE/s:
1. WoN the acquired the necessary jurisdiction to enable it to proceed with
the
foreclosure of the mortgage – YES
2. WoN the irregularity in the proceedings (the notice not being
secured)
was of such gravity as to amount to a denial of the due process of law -
NO
RULING: Judgement in question is affirmed.
RATIO:
1. The third requirement of due process is that the defendant shall have an
opportunity to be heard. In a foreclosure case, some notification of the
proceedings to the nonresident owner is everywhere recognized as essential.
2. Statutes generally provide for publication, and usually in addition for
mailing
the notice to the defendant, if his residence is known.
3. It will be observed that this mode of notification does not inolve any
absolute
assurance that the absent owner shall thereby receive actual notice. The
periodical containing the notice has a chance to not come in the defendant’s
hands. The provision also of our law relative to the mailing of notice does not
absolutely require the mailing of notice unconditionally and in every event,
but only in the case where the defendant’s residence is known.
4. Hence, actual notice to the defendant in cases of this kind is not under the
law
not be considered absolutely necessary. Reasoning of this rule: Property is
always assumed to be in the possession of the owner. It can be assumed
that
he will know of any proceeding related to it for its condemnation and sale.
5. Duty of the owner of the real estate who is a nonresident to take measures
that he is represented when his property is called into requisition. If he fails
to do this or get notice of the publiczation which have usually been required,
it is his misfortune.
6. If property of a nonresident cannot be reached by legal process upon
constructive notice, then our statues were passed in vain, for if the person is
not within the jurisdiction of the court, no judgment can operate on the
property and the courts would be powerless to assist a citizen against a
nonresident.
7. Notice was given by publication in a newspaper and this is the only form of
notice which the law unconditionally requires. This is in our (the SC) opinion
all that was absolutely necessary to sustain the proceedings.
8. All that due process of law of law thereafter requires is an opportunity for
the
defendant to be heard. As publication was duly made, it would seem highly
unreasonable to hold that the failure to mail the notice was fatal.
9. In every situation of this character (property related cases) an appropriate
remedy is always at hand. If the property has been taken without due
process
People of the Philippines and AAA v. Court of Appelas 21st Division,
Mindanao Station, Raymund Carampatana, Jeofhel Oporto, and Moises
Alquizola
G.R. No. 183652, February 25, 2015
FACTS:
After attending a graduation dinner party, AAA, together with her friends,
went to Alson’s Palace for a drinking session to celebrate their graduation.
During such session, they shared their problems with each other. AAA
became emotional and started crying, prompting her to take her first shot of
Emperador Brandy. After consuming more or less five glasses of drinks, she
felt dizzy so she laid her head down on Oporto’s lap. Oporto then started
kissing her head and they would remove her baseball cap. This angered her
so she told them to stop, and simply tried to hide her face with the cap. The
group just laughed at her and still made her drink more. She fell asleep but
was woken up so that she could drink the remaining liquor inside the Brandy
bottle. She refused but they insisted so she drank. Again, AAA fell asleep.
When she regained consciousness, she saw that she was already at the
Alquizola Lodging House. She recognized that place because she had been
there before. She would thereafter fall back asleep and wake up again. And
during one of the times that she was conscious, she saw Oporto on top of
her, kissing her on different parts of her body, and having intercourse with
her. At one point, AAA woke up while Carampatana was inserting his penis
into her private organ. Alquizola then joined and started to kiss her. For the
last time, she fell unconscious.
Accused-appellants Carampatana, Oporto and Alquizola were charged with
the crime of rape of a 16-year old girl. The RTC convicted Carampatana and
Oporto guilty as principals and Alquizola as an accomplice while the CA
acquitted them of the crime charged, hence, this present appeal, alleging that
the CA committed grave abuse of discretion in acquitting respondents.
Private respondents aver that a judgment of acquittal is immediately final and
executory and that the prosecution cannot appeal the acquittal because of
the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy.
The OSG stated the following error:
“The appellate decision of acquittal is null and void for having been rendered
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, an
exception to the principle of double jeopardy.”
ISSUE:
Did the Court of Appeals act with grave abuse of discretion in acquitting the
private respondents?
HELD:
YES, the Court of Appeals erred in acquitting private respondents. As a
general rule, the prosecution cannot appeal or bring error proceedings from a
judgment rendered in favor of the defendant in a criminal case. The reason is
that a judgment of acquittal is immediately final and executory, and the
prosecution is barred from appealing lest the constitutional prohibition
against double jeopardy be violated.
Despite acquittal, however, either the offended party or the accused may
appeal, but only with respect to the civil aspect of the decision. Or, said
judgment of acquittal may be assailed through a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court showing that the lower court, in acquitting the
accused, committed not merely reversible errors of judgment, but also
exercised grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, or a denial of due process, thereby rendering the assailed
judgment null and void.
If there is grave abuse of discretion, however, granting petitioner’s prayer is
not tantamount to putting private respondents in double jeopardy.
The petitioner has sufficiently discharged the burden of proving that the
respondent appellate court committed grave abuse of discretion in acquitting
private respondents. It appears that in reaching its judgment, the CA merely
relied on the evidence presented by the defense and utterly disregarded that
of the prosecution. A more careful perusal will reveal that it was simply lifted,
if not altogether parroted, from the testimonies of the accused, especially that
of Oporto, Carampatana, and Alquizola. It presented the private respondents’
account and allegations as though these were the established facts of the
case, which it later conveniently utilized to support its ruling of acquittal.
WHEREFORE, the Supreme Court held that the assailed CA decision be
Reversed and Set Aside and finding private respondents guilty of the crime
of rape.
Lochner v. New York
Facts of the case
The state of New York enacted a statute known as the Bakeshop Act, which
forbid bakers to work more than 60 hours a week or 10 hours a day. Lochner
was accused of permitting an employee to work more than 60 hours in one
week. The first charge resulted in a fine of $25, and a second charge a few
years later resulted in a fine of $50. While Lochner did not challenge his first
conviction, he appealed the second, but was denied in state court. Before the
Supreme Court, he argued that the Fourteenth Amendment should have
been interpreted to contain the freedom to contract among the rights
encompassed by substantive due process.
Question
Does the Bakeshop Act violate the liberty protected by the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?
Conclusion
The Court invalidated the New York law. The majority maintained that the
statute interfered with the freedom of contract, and thus the Fourteenth
Amendment's right to liberty afforded to employer and employee. The Court
further held that the New York law failed the rational basis test for
determining whether government action is constitutional. The majority
reasoned that the Bakeshop Act had no rational basis because long working
hours did not dramatically undermine the health of employees, and baking is
not particularly dangerous.
Broadly interpreting state authority to regulate under its police powers,
Justice Harlan in his dissent articulated reasoning that would inform later
decisions in the post-Lochner era. Rather than requiring the government to
prove that a law had a rational basis, he would require the party challenging
the law to prove that the test was not met. (This is the current rule.)
Lanzetta V. New Jersey
In Lanzetta v. New Jersey (1938) 306 U.S. 451, the Supreme Court found
that a New Jersey statute was so vague and uncertain as to be repugnant to
the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The statute provided that " 'any person not engaged in any lawful occupation,
known to be a member of any gang consisting of two or more persons, who
has been convicted at least three times of being a disorderly person, or who
has been convicted of any crime, in this or in any other State, is declared to
be a gangster . . .' " and may be punished by fine or imprisonment. ( Lanzetta
v. New Jersey, supra, 306 U.S. at p. 452.)
Observing that the word "gang" has numerous and varied meanings and is
undefined by the common law, the Supreme Court determined that the
descriptions and illustrations used by the lower court to ascribe meaning to
the word "are not sufficient to constitute definition, inclusive or exclusive." (
Id. at p. 45.)
The court also found that "the lack of certainty of the challenged provision is
not limited to the word 'gang' or to its dependent 'gangster.' . . . The
enactment employs the expression, 'known to be a member.' It is ambiguous.
There immediately arises the doubt whether actual or putative association is
meant. If actual membership is required, that status must be established as a
fact, and the word 'known' would be without significance. If reputed
membership is enough, there is uncertainty whether that reputation must be
general or extend only to some persons. And the statute fails to indicate what
it constitutes membership or how one may join a 'gang.' " ( Id. at p. 458.)
Because the statute condemned no act or omission, and the terms it used
were so "vague, indefinite and uncertain" (ibid.), the court concluded that it
violated the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Griswold v. Connecticut
Facts of the case
In 1879, Connecticut passed a law that banned the use of any drug, medical
device, or other instrument in furthering contraception. A gynecologist at the
Yale School of Medicine, C. Lee Buxton, opened a birth control clinic in New
Haven in conjunction with Estelle Griswold, who was the head of Planned
Parenthood in Connecticut. They were arrested and convicted of violating the
law, and their convictions were affirmed by higher state courts. Their plan
was to use the clinic to challenge the constitutionality of the statute under the
Fourteenth Amendment before the Supreme Court.
Question
Does the Constitution protect the right of marital privacy against state
restrictions on a couple's ability to be counseled in the use of contraceptives?
A right to privacy can be inferred from several amendments in the Bill of
Rights, and this right prevents states from making the use of contraception
by married couples illegal.
Conclusion
In a 7-2 decision authored by Justice Douglas, the Court ruled that the
Constitution did in fact protect the right of marital privacy against state
restrictions on contraception. While the Court explained that the Constitution
does not explicitly protect a general right to privacy, the various guarantees
within the Bill of Rights create penumbras, or zones, that establish a right to
privacy. Together, the First, Third, Fourth, and Ninth Amendments create the
right to privacy in marital relations. The Connecticut statute conflicted with
the exercise of this right and was therefore held null and void.
Justice Goldberg, joined by Justices Warren and Brennan, concurred. Rather
than finding that the right to privacy was contained in imaginary penumbras,
Goldberg located it in the Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments.
Justice Harlan concurred, arguing that the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment protects the right to privacy.
Justice White concurred, arguing that the Fourteenth Amendment was the
proper basis for the decision.
Justice Black, joined by Justice Stewart, dissented. Unpersuaded by the
loose reasoning of the majority, Black felt that there was no way to infer that
the Constitution contained a right to privacy. He also dismissed the views of
the concurrences that it could be found in the Ninth and Fourteenth
Amendments.
Justice Stewart, joined by Justice Black, filed a separate dissenting opinion.
Stewart argued that despite his personal view that the law was "uncommonly
silly," he felt that the Court had no choice but to find it constitutional.
Brief Fact Summary. Appellant Jane Roe, a pregnant mother who wished to
obtain an abortion, sued on behalf of all woman similarly situated in an effort
to prevent the enforcement of Texas statutes criminalizing all abortions except
those performed to save the life of the mother.
Synopsis of Rule of Law. Statutes that make criminal all abortions except
when medically advised for the purpose of saving the life of the mother are an
unconstitutional invasion of privacy.
Roe v. Wade
Facts. Texas statutes made it a crime to procure or attempt an abortion
except when medically advised for the purpose of saving the life of the
mother. Appellant Jane Roe sought a declaratory judgment that the statutes
were unconstitutional on their face and an injunction to prevent defendant
Dallas County District Attorney from enforcing the statutes. Appellant alleged
that she was unmarried and pregnant, and that she was unable to receive a
legal abortion by a licensed physician because her life was not threatened by
the continuation of her pregnancy and that she was unable to afford to travel
to another jurisdiction to obtain a legal abortion. Appellant sued on behalf of
herself and all other women similarly situated, claiming that the statutes were
unconstitutionally vague and abridged her right of personal privacy, protected
by the First, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments.
Issue. Do the Texas statutes improperly invade a right possessed by the
appellant to terminate her pregnancy embodied in the concept of personal
liberty contained in the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, in the
personal marital, familial, and sexual privacy protected by the Bill of Rights or
its penumbras, or among the rights reserved to the people by the Ninth
Amendment?
Held. The right to personal privacy includes the abortion decision, but the right
is not unqualified and must be considered against important state interests in
regulation.
The abortion laws in effect in the majority of the States are of relatively recent
vintage, deriving from statutory changes generally enacted in the latter half of
the 19th century. At common law abortion performed before quickening (the
first recognizable movement of the fetus in utero) was not an indictable
offense, and it is doubtful that abortion was ever a firmly established common
law crime even when it destroyed a quick fetus.
Three reasons have been advanced for the historical enactment of criminal
abortion laws. The first is that the laws are the product of a Victorian social
concern to discourage illicit sexual conduct, but this argument has been taken
seriously by neither courts nor commentators. The second reason is that the
abortion procedure is hazardous, therefore the State’s concern is to protect
pregnant women. However, modern medical techniques have altered the
situation, with abortions being relatively safe particularly in the first trimester.
The third reason is the State’s interest is in protecting the prenatal life.
However, this is somewhat negated by the fact that the pregnant woman
cannot be prosecuted for the act of abortion.
For the stage prior to the approximate end of the first trimester, the abortion
decision must be left to the medical judgment of the pregnant woman’s
attending physician, and may not be criminalized by statute.
For the stage subsequent to the approximate end of the first trimester, the
State may regulate abortion in ways reasonably related to maternal health
based upon the State’s interest in promoting the health of the mother.
For the stage subsequent to viability, the State may regulate and even
proscribe abortion, except where necessary for the preservation of the
mother’s life, based upon the State’s interest in the potential of the potential
life of the unborn child.
Procedural due process
ANG TIBAY v. CIR (HENRY)
February 27, 1940 | Laurel, J. | Procedural Due Process
PETITIONER: Ang Tibay, represented by Toribio Teodoro, et al.
RESPONDENTS: The Court of Industrial Relations, et al.
SUMMARY: Ang Tibay allegedly ran low of leather supplies and are unable
to
commit to the Philippine Army enough leather products. This lead to the
owner,
Teodoro, to decide to lay off some of its employees. All being part of NLU,
they
filed against Teodoro with unfair labor practice as ground, they were alleging
that
NWB was being unjustly favored as nobody from them was laid off. The CIR
ruled in favor of Teodoro, however the NWB appealed to the SC, who
affirmed
the decision. There was then a motion for a new trial filed by NLU with new
and
solid evidence that made the SC grant their motion in the light of procedural
due
process.
DOCTRINE: The Court of Industrial Relations may be said to be free from
the rigidity of certain procedural requirements but it does not mean that it
can, in justifiable cases coming before it, entirely ignore or disregard the
fundamental and essential requirements of due process in trials and
investigations of an administrative case.
FACTS:
1. Petitioner Ang Tibay, a leather company, experienced shortage of leather
soles on 1938, making it necessary for Toribio Teodoro (owner) to
temporarily lay off some of its employees (who in this case, apparently are
members of the National Labor Union Inc.).
2. The NLU claims that Ang Tibay is guilty of unfair labor practices because
Teodoro is discriminating against the NLU and is unjustly favoring the
National Workers’ Brotherhood (company/employer union dominated by
him) because nobody from NWB was included in those laid off.
3. Aggrieved, the employees filed a case against Ang Tibay to the CIR,
alleging
it of unfair labor practice, that Teodoro’s claim of shortage of leather is
entirely falseand unsupported by records of the BOC and the Books of
Accounts, and was only in fact a scheme to discharge members of the NLU
from work. CIR ruled in favor of NLU.
4. By appeal to the SC, the ruling was reversed after the SC found that there
was
no merit to NLU’s contention.
5. NLU then prays for the vacation of the judgment rendered by the SC with
the
following claims, among others:
a. That Teodoro’s claim of shortage of leather soles in ANG TIBAY is
entirely false and unsupported
b. Shortage of leather materials was but a scheme to systematically
discharge all members of NLU from work
c. NWB is dominated by Teodoro
6. NLU hence filed for a Motion for New Trial, with which Ang Tibay filed an
opposition for. Hence, this motion.
ISSUE/s:
2. WoN NLU was denied due process by the CIR. – YES
RULING: Motion for new trial granted, case is remanded to the CIR with
instruction
that it reopen the case, receive all such evidence as may be relevant, and
otherwise
proceed in accordance with the requirements set forth.
RATIO:
1. Cir is a special court whose functions are stated in CA No. 103. It is more
of
an administrative board than a part of the integrated judicial system. It not
only exercises judicial or quasi-judicial functions in the determination of
disputes between employers and employees but its functions are far more
comprehensive and extensive, as far as issues are concerned with
employers
and laborers, landlords and tenants, among others.
2. Its duty is to prevent or arbitrate disputes which are submitted to the
Secretary
of Labor which are to be dealt by the Court for the sake of public interest,
which is possible through reconciliation of parties and/or inducing them to
settle by amicable agreement.
3. SC had the occasion to point out that CIR is not narrowly constrained by
technical rules of procedure, and CA No. 103 requires it to act according to
justice and equity and substantial merits of the case, without regard to
technicalities or legal forms and shall not be bound by any technical rules of
legal evidence but may inform its mind in such manner as it may deem just
and equitable.
4. However, this does not entail that CIR is free from the rigidity of certain
procedural requirements most specially the fundamental and essential
requirements of due process in trials and investigations of an administrative
character. There are cardinal primary rights which must be respected even in
proceedings:
a. Right to a hearing
b. Tribunal must consider evidence presented
c. Decision must have something to support itself
d. Evidence must be substantial
e. Decision must be based on evidence presented at a hearing
f. Tribunal or body or any of its judges must act n its own independent
consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply
accept the views of a subordinate
g. The board or body should, in all controversial questions, render to
its decision in such manner that the parties to the proceeding can
know the various issue involved, and the reason for the decision
rendered
5. Since there was a failure to grasp the fundamental issue involved due to
failure to receive all relevant evidence, the motion for a new trial was
granted.
YNOT v. IAC (ELIEL)
March 20, 1987 | Cruz, J. | Substantial Due Process
PETITIONER: Restituto Ynot
RESPONDENTS: Intermediate Appellate Court, Integrated Nation Polic, and
the
Regional Director, Bureau of Animal Industry
SUMMARY: President Marcos issued EO 626-A prohibiting the movement
and
slaughtering of carabaos. Ynot was transporting six carabaos in a pump boat
from
Masbate to Iloilo when they were confiscated by the police station
commander.
Ynot sued for recovery but were unable to be produced. RTC sustained the
confiscation, and appealed to the IAC, upholding the same. Hence this
petition.
DOCTRINE: Due process is violated because the owner of the property
confiscated is denied the right to be heard in his defense and is immediately
condemned and punished.
FACTS:
1. EO 626-A prohibiting interprovincial movement of carabaos and the
slaughtering of carabaos.
2. Ynot transported six carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to Iloilo, when
they were confiscated by the police station commander of Barotac Nuevo,
Iloilo, for violation of EO 626-A
3. Ynot sued for recovery, and the RTC issued a writ of replevin upon filing of
bond. RTC sustained confiscation, since they could not longer be produced,
order the confiscation of the bond.
4. Ynot appealed the decision to the IAC, which upheld the RTC decision.
5. Hence this petition. Alleging that the EO is unconstitutional as it violates
the
due process.
ISSUE/s: August 7, 1984 Students prayed for preliminary mandatory injunction for the
1. WoN EO 626-A violates due process– YES
RULING: EO 626-A is declared unconstitutional. refusal of the National Universty to let them enrol.
RATIO:
1. The minimum requirements of due process are notice and hearing, which
generally speaking, may not be dispensed with because they are intended as
September 24, 1984 University president replied that the petitioners failure to
a safeguard agasint official arbitrariness.
2. There are instances, previous judicial hearing may be omitted without
violation of due process in view of the nature of the property involved or the enrol for the first semester of SY 84-85 is due to their own fault because the
urgency of the need to protect the general welfare from a clear and present
danger. enrollment was already closed and that DeGuzman and Ramacula’s academic
3. In the instant case, the carabaos were arbitrarily confiscated by the police
station commander, were returned to the petitioner only after he had filed a showing was “poor” and they have failures in their records and are not of good
complaint for recovery and given a supersedeas bond of P12,000., which
was scholastic standing.
ordered confiscated upon his failure to produce the carabaos when ordered
by
the trial court. ISSUE:
4. The executive order defined the prohibition, convieted the petitioner and
immediately imposed punishment, which were carried out forthright. The Whether or not a school or university have the right to deny acceptance of
measures struck at once and pounce upon the petitioner without giving him a
chance to be heard, thus denying him the centures-old guaranty of
students without due process.
elementary
fair play.
5. Due process is violated because the owner of the property confiscated is
denied the right to be heard in his defense and is immediately condemned HELD:
and
punished. The 3 students were allowed by the court to enrol. The court declared illegal

Diosdado Guzman vs National University the University’s act of imposing sanctions on students without due
FACTS:
investigation.

Students Diosadado Guzman, Ulyses Urbiztondo, and Ariel Ramacula seeks

RULING:
relief from what they describe as their school’s ” continued and persistent
Under the Education Act of 1982, the petitioners, have the right among others
refusal to allow them to enrol”
“to freely choose their field of study subject to existing curricula and to continue

BACKGROUND: their course up to graduation except in case of academic deficiency, or

violation of disciplinary regulations.”


Petitioners were being denied this right , or being disciplined without due
process, in violation of the admonition in the Manual of Regulations for Private
Schools that ” no penalty shall be imposed upon any student except for cause
as defined in the Manual and/or in the school rules and regulations as duly
promulgated and only after due investigation shall have been conducted.”
Tatad vs Sandiganbayan
FACTS:
In October 1974, a formal report was filed charging petitioner with alleged
violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. No action was taken on
said report until it was revived on December 12, 1979, two months after it
became public that petitioner had a falling out with the president. Criminal
charges were thereafter lodged against petitioner.
ISSUE(S):
Whether or not the delay in the termination of the preliminary investigation
violates petitioner’s right to due process.
RULING:
YES. Substantial adherence to the requirements of the law governing the
conduct of preliminary investigation, including substantial compliance with
the time limitation prescribed by the law for the resolution of the case by the
prosecutor, is part of the procedural due process constitutionally guaranteed
by the fundamental law. Not only under the broad umbrella of the due
process clause, but under the constitutional guarantee of “speedy
disposition” of cases as embodied in Section 16 of the Bill of Rights, the
inordinate delay is violative of the petiitioner’s constitutional rights.
Petition is GRANTED. Criminal charges against petitioner are DISMISSED.
Guiani vs. Sandiganbayan 386 SCRA 436
Tolentino v. Comelec
FACTS:
The 1971 Constitutional Convention came into being by virtue of two
resolutions of the Congress approved in its capacity as a constituent
assembly convened for the purpose of calling a convention to propose
amendments to the Constitution. After election of delegates held on
November 10, 1970, the Convention held its inaugural session on June 1,
1971. In the morning of September 28, 1970, the Convention approved
Organic Resolution No. 1 which is entitled as, "A RESOLUTION AMENDING
SECTION 1 OF ARTICLE V OF THE CONSTITUTION SO AS TO LOWER
THE VOTING AGE TO 18." On September 30, 1971, the COMELEC
"resolved" to follow the mandate of the Convention, that it will hold the said
plebiscite together with the senatorial elections on November 8, 1971 .
Petitioner, Arturo Tolentino, filed a petition for prohibition, its main thrust
being that Organic Resolution No. 1 and the necessary implementing
resolutions subsequently approved have no force and effect as laws in so far
as they provide for the holding of a plebiscite co-incident with the senatorial
elections, on the ground that the calling and holding of such a plebiscite is,
by the Constitution, a power lodged exclusively in Congress as a legislative
body and may not be exercised by the Convention, and that, under Article XV
Section 1 of the 1935 Constitution, the proposed amendment in question
cannot be presented to the people for ratification separately from each and
all other amendments to be drafted and proposed by the Constitution.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Organic Resolution No. 1 of the 1971 Constitutional
Convention violative to the Constitution.
HELD:
NO.
All the amendments to be proposed by the same Convention must be
submitted to the people in a single "election" or plebiscite. In order that a
plebiscite for the ratification of a Constitutional amendment may be validly
held, it must provide the voter not only sufficient time but ample basis for an
intelligent appraisal of the nature of the amendment per se but as well as its
relation to the other parts of the Constitution with which it has to form a
harmonious whole.
In the present context, where the Convention has hardly started considering
the merits, if not thousands, of proposals to amend the existing Constitution,
to present to the people any single proposal or a few of them cannot comply
with this requirement.
WINSTON F. GARCIA v. MARIO I. MOLINA, GR No. 157383, 2010-08-18
Facts:
Respondents Molina and Velasco, both Attorney V of the GSIS, received two
separate Memoranda[5] dated May 23, 2002 from petitioner charging them
with grave misconduct. Specifically, Molina was charged for allegedly
committing the following acts: 1) directly... and continuously helping some
alleged disgruntled employees to conduct concerted protest actions and/or
illegal assemblies against the management and the GSIS President and
General Manager; 2) leading the concerted protest activities held in the
morning of May 22, 2002 during... office hours within the GSIS compound;
and 3) continuously performing said activities despite warning from his
immediate superiors. [6] In addition to the charge for grave misconduct for
performing the same acts as Molina, Velasco was accused of performing...
acts in violation of the Rules on Office Decorum for leaving his office without
informing his supervisor of his whereabouts; and gross insubordination for
persistently disregarding petitioner's instructions that Velasco should report
to the petitioner's office.[7] These acts, according to petitioner, were
committed in open betrayal of the confidential nature of their positions and in
outright defiance of the Rules and Regulations on Public Sector Unionism. In
the same Memoranda, petitioner required respondents to submit... their
verified answer within seventy two (72) hours. Considering the gravity of the
charges against them, petitioner ordered the preventive suspension of
respondents for ninety (90) days without pay, effective immediately.[8] The
following day, a committee... was constituted to investigate the charges
against respondents.
Issues:
WHETHER THE RESPONDENTS WERE FULLY ACCORDED THE
REQUISITE OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD, WERE IN FACT HEARD AND
BEING HEARD, AND WHETHER THE CONDUCT OF PRELIMINARY
INVESTIGATION IN ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS IS AN ESSENTIAL
REQUISITE TO THE CONDUCT OF ADJUDICATION.
WHETHER THE PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION ORDERS ISSUED AGAINST
RESPONDENTS MOLINA AND VELASCO ARE VALID, WELL-FOUNDED
AND DULY RECOGNIZED BY LAW.
WHETHER PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION IS A PENALTY AND, THUS, MAY
NOT BE IMPOSED WITHOUT BEING PRECEDED BY A HEARING.
Ruling:
Section 45, Republic Act (R.A.) 8291 otherwise known as the GSIS Act of
1997, specifies its disciplining authority, viz:
By this legal provision, petitioner, as President and General Manager of
GSIS, is vested the authority and responsibility to remove, suspend or
otherwise discipline GSIS personnel for cause.
However, despite the authority conferred on him by law, such power is not
without limitations for it must be exercised in accordance with Civil Service
rules. The Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service lays
down the procedure to be observed in issuing a... formal charge against an
erring employee, to wit:
First, the complaint.
Second, the Counter-Affidavit/Comment.
Third, Preliminary Investigation.
Fourth, Investigation Report.
Fifth, Formal Charge.
It is undisputed that the Memoranda separately issued to respondents were
the formal charges against them. These formal charges contained brief
statements of material or relevant facts, a directive to answer the charges
within seventy two (72) hours from receipt thereof, an... advice that they had
the right to a formal investigation and a notice that they are entitled to be
assisted by a counsel of their choice.
Indeed, the CSC Rules does not specifically provide that a formal charge
without the requisite preliminary investigation is null and void. However, as
clearly outlined above, upon receipt of a complaint which is sufficient in form
and substance, the disciplining authority shall... require the person
complained of to submit a Counter-Affidavit/Comment under oath within three
days from receipt. The use of the word "shall" quite obviously indicates that it
is mandatory for the disciplining authority to conduct a preliminary
investigation or at least... respondent should be given the opportunity to
comment and explain his side. As can be gleaned from the procedure set
forth above, this is done prior to the issuance of the formal charge and the
comment required therein is different from the answer that may later be filed
by... respondents. Contrary to petitioner's claim, no exception is provided for
in the CSC Rules. Not even an indictment in flagranti as claimed by
petitioner.
The cardinal precept is that where there is a violation of basic constitutional
rights, courts are ousted from their jurisdiction. The violation of a party's right
to due process raises a serious jurisdictional issue which cannot be glossed
over or disregarded at will. Where the... denial of the fundamental right to
due process is apparent, a decision rendered in disregard of that right is void
for lack of jurisdiction. This rule is equally true in quasi-judicial and
administrative proceedings, for the constitutional guarantee that no man shall
be deprived... of life, liberty, or property without due process is unqualified by
the type of proceedings (whether judicial or administrative) where he stands
to lose the same.
Although administrative procedural rules are less stringent and often applied
more liberally, administrative proceedings are not exempt from basic and
fundamental procedural principles, such as the right to due process in
investigations and hearings.[37] In... particular, due process in administrative
proceedings has been recognized to include the following: (1) the right to
actual or constructive notice to the institution of proceedings which may
affect a respondent's legal rights; (2) a real opportunity to be heard
personally or... with the assistance of counsel, to present witnesses and
evidence in one's favor, and to defend one's rights; (3) a tribunal vested with
competent jurisdiction and so constituted as to afford a person charged
administratively a reasonable guarantee of honesty as well as... impartiality;
and (4) a finding by said tribunal which is supported by substantial evidence
submitted for consideration during the hearing or contained in the records or
made known to the parties affected.
It is well-settled that a decision rendered without due process is void ab initio
and may be attacked at anytime directly or collaterally by means of a
separate action, or by resisting such decision in any action or proceeding
where it is invoked.[39] Moreover, while respondents failed to raise before
the GSIS the lack of preliminary investigation, records show that in their
Urgent Motion to Resolve (their Motion to Lift Preventive Suspension Order)
filed with the CSC, respondents questioned the validity of... their preventive
suspension and the formal charges against them for lack of preliminary
investigation.[40] There is, thus, no waiver to speak of.
In the procedure adopted by petitioner, respondents were preventively
suspended in the same formal charges issued by the former without the latter
knowing that there were pending administrative cases against them. It is true
that prior notice and hearing are not required in the... issuance of a
preventive suspension order.[41] However, considering that respondents
were preventively suspended in the same formal charges that we now
declare null and void, then their preventive suspension is likewise null and
void.
As the administrative proceedings involved in this case are void, no
delinquency or misconduct may be imputed to respondents and the...
preventive suspension meted them is baseless.
Gamboa v. Chan, G.R. No. 193636, 24 July 2012
31
JUL
FACTS
Gamboa alleged that the Philippine National Police in Ilocos Norte (PNP–
Ilocos Norte) conducted a series of surveillance operations against her and
her aides, and classified her as someone who keeps a Private Army Group
(PAG). Purportedly without the benefit of data verification, PNP–Ilocos Norte
forwarded the information gathered on her to the Zeñarosa Commission,
thereby causing her inclusion in the Report’s enumeration of individuals
maintaining PAGs. Contending that her right to privacy was violated and her
reputation maligned and destroyed, Gamboa filed a Petition for the issuance
of a writ of habeas data against respondents in their capacities as officials of
the PNP-Ilocos Norte.
ISSUE
Whether or not the petition for the issuance of writ of habeas data is proper
when the right to privacy is invoked as opposed to the state’s interest in
preserving the right to life, liberty or security.
RULIG
NO.
The writ of habeas data is an independent and summary remedy designed to
protect the image, privacy, honor, information, and freedom of information of
an individual, and to provide a forum to enforce one’s right to the truth and to
informational privacy. It seeks to protect a person’s right to control
information regarding oneself, particularly in instances in which such
information is being collected through unlawful means in order to achieve
unlawful ends. It must be emphasized that in order for the privilege of the writ
to be granted, there must exist a nexus between the right to privacy on the
one hand, and the right to life, liberty or security on the other.
In this case, the Court ruled that Gamboa was unable to prove through
substantial evidence that her inclusion in the list of individuals maintaining
PAGs made her and her supporters susceptible to harassment and to
increased police surveillance. In this regard, respondents sufficiently
explained that the investigations conducted against her were in relation to the
criminal cases in which she was implicated. As public officials, they enjoy the
presumption of regularity, which she failed to overcome. [T]he state interest
of dismantling PAGs far outweighs the alleged intrusion on the private life of
Gamboa, especially when the collection and forwarding by the PNP of
information against her was pursuant to a lawful mandate. Therefore, the
privilege of the writ of habeas data must be denied.
G.R. No. 174431 BUGARIN vs REPUBLIC of the
PHILIPPINES August 6, 2012
I. Facts:
A. The late Jolly Bugarin was the Director of the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) when Ferdinand E. Marcos was still the president
of the country from 1965-1986.
B. After the downfall of Marcos in 1986, the new Aquino administration,
through the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG),
filed a petition for forfeiture of properties (of Bugarin) under Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 1379 in the Sandiganbayan.
C. The Sandiganbayan dismissed the petition for insufficiency of
evidence.
D. Bugarin filed a motion for reconsideration but was deinied by the
Sandiganbayan thus the PCGG filed for the dismissal of the case
before the Supreme Court on Dec. 18, 1991.
E. The Supreme Court found manifest errors and misapprehension of
facts leading it "to pore over the evidence extant from the records,"
F. The Supreme Court found Bugarin to have amassed wealth
totaling P2,170,163.00 from 1968 to 1980 against his total income for
the period 1967 to 1980 totaling only ₱766,548.00.
G. With this, the Court held that Bugarin’s properties, which were visibly
out of proportion to his lawful income from 1968 to 1980, should be
forfeited in favor of the government
II. Reliefs proposed for:
A. Petitioners claim that they have been deprived of their right to due
process of law when the Sandiganbayan ordered for the forfeiture of
Bugarin’s properties.
B. They fault the selection process laid down in the said case which
purportedly denied them the opportunity to show that "not all of the
late Bugarin’s properties may be forfeited."
C. Petitioners want another round of trial or hearing be conducted for
"further reception of evidence" to determine which among the
properties enumerated in the Republic case are ill-gotten wealth.
Issue: WHETHER OR NOT BUGARIN’S HEIRS SHOULD BE
ACCORDED THEIR RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS.
III. Court Ruling:
The petition is DENIED and the Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan are
AFFIRMED.
The Supreme Court ruled against petitioners Bugarin. The Supreme
Court cited the following:
Section 2 of R.A. No. 1379 provides that ”in Filing of Petition. Whenever
any public officer or employee has acquired during his incumbency an
amount of property which is manifestly out of proportion to his salary as
such public officer or employee and to his other lawful income and the
income from legitimately acquired property, said property shall be
presumed prima facie to have been unlawfully acquired”
Thus, when the government, through the PCGG, filed forfeiture
proceedings against Bugarin, it took on the burden of proving the
following:
1. The public official or employee acquired personal or real properties
during his/her incumbency;
2. This acquisition is manifestly disproportionate to his/her salary or other
legitimate income; and
3. The existence of which gives rise to a presumption that these same
properties were acquired prima facie unlawfully.
Melendrez vs. PAGC, GR No. 163859
Constitutionality of ex-parte applications for issuance of protections orders in
RA 9262 or the Anti-Violence Against Women and their Children Act of 2004
cases:
G.R. No. 170701. January 22, 2014.]
RALPH P. TUA, vs. HON. CESAR A. MANGROBANG, Presiding Judge,
Branch 22, Regional Trial Court, Imus, Cavite; and ROSSANA HONRADO-
TUA,
PERALTA, J p:
Facts: Respondent and petitioner were married on January 10, 1998 in
Makati City. They have three children, namely, Joshua Raphael born on
February 9, 1999, Jesse Ruth Lois, born on June 27, 2000, and Jezreel
Abigail, born on December 25, 2001. Respondent claimed, among others,
that: there was a time when petitioner went to her room and cocked his gun
and pointed the barrel of his gun to his head as he wanted to convince her
not to proceed with the legal separation case she filed; she hid her fears
although she was scared; there was also an instance when petitioner fed her
children with the fried chicken that her youngest daughter had chewed and
spat out; in order to stop his child from crying, petitioner would threaten him
with a belt; when she told petitioner that she felt unsafe and insecure with the
latter's presence and asked him to stop coming to the house as often as he
wanted or she would apply for a protection order, petitioner got furious and
threatened her of withholding his financial support and even held her by the
nape and pushed her to lie flat on the bed; and, on May 4, 2005, while she
was at work, petitioner with companions went to her new home and forcibly
took the children and refused to give them back to her.
Respondent thus filed a Petition for the issuance of a protection order,
pursuant to Republic Act (RA) 9262 or the Anti-Violence Against Women and
their Children Act of 2004, against her husband, petitioner. The Petition was
for herself and in behalf of her minor children.
The RTC issued ex parte a Temporary Protection Order (TPO).
Petitioner assailed the constitutionality of RA 9262 and sought to lift the TPO.
Without awaiting the resolution of the RTC on the foregoing, Petitioner filed a
petition for certiorari with the CA assailing the TPO issued for violating the
due process clause of the Constitution.
Issue:
1.Is Section 15 of RA 9262, allowing ex parte application of a TPO,
constitutional?
2. Is there an invalid delegation of legislative power to the court and to
barangay officials to issue protection orders?
Ruling:
1. Yes. The court is authorized to issue a TPO on the date of the filing of the
application after ex parte determination that there is basis for the issuance
thereof. Ex parte means that the respondent need not be notified or be
present in the hearing for the issuance of the TPO. Thus, it is within the
court's discretion, based on the petition and the affidavit attached thereto, to
determine that the violent acts against women and their children for the
issuance of a TPO have been committed.
Since "time is of the essence in cases of VAWC if further violence is to be
prevented," the court is authorized to issue ex parte a TPO after raffle but
before notice and hearing when the life, limb or property of the victim is in
jeopardy and there is reasonable ground to believe that the order is
necessary to protect the victim from the immediate and imminent danger of
VAWC or to prevent such violence, which is about to recur.
There need not be any fear that the judge may have no rational basis to
issue an ex parte order. The victim is required not only to verify the
allegations in the petition, but also to attach her witnesses' affidavits to the
petition.
The grant of a TPO ex parte cannot, therefore, be challenged as violative of
the right to due process. Just like a writ of preliminary attachment which is
issued without notice and hearing because the time in which the hearing will
take could be enough to enable the defendant to abscond or dispose of his
property, in the same way, the victim of VAWC may already have suffered
harrowing experiences in the hands of her tormentor, and possibly even
death, if notice and hearing were required before such acts could be
prevented. It is a constitutional commonplace that the ordinary requirements
of procedural due process must yield to the necessities of protecting vital
public interests, among which is protection of women and children from
violence and threats to their personal safety and security.
It should be pointed out that when the TPO is issued ex parte, the court shall
likewise order that notice be immediately given to the respondent directing
him to file an opposition within five (5) days from service. Moreover, the court
shall order that notice, copies of the petition and TPO be served immediately
on the respondent by the court sheriffs. The TPOs are initially effective for
thirty (30) days from service on the respondent. SDTaHc
Where no TPO is issued ex parte, the court will nonetheless order the
immediate issuance and service of the notice upon the respondent requiring
him to file an opposition to the petition within five (5) days from service. The
date of the preliminary conference and hearing on the merits shall likewise
be indicated on the notice.
The opposition to the petition which the respondent himself shall verify, must
be accompanied by the affidavits of witnesses and shall show cause why a
temporary or permanent protection order should not be issued.
It is clear from the foregoing rules that the respondent of a petition for
protection order should be apprised of the charges imputed to him and
afforded an opportunity to present his side. . . . . The essence of due process
is to be found in the reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit any
evidence one may have in support of one's defense. "To be heard" does not
only mean verbal arguments in court; one may be heard also through
pleadings. Where opportunity to be heard, either through oral arguments or
pleadings, is accorded, there is no denial of procedural due process.
Petitioner also assails that there is an invalid delegation of legislative power
to the court and to barangay officials to issue protection orders.
2. No. Section 2 of Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution provides that "the
Congress shall have the power to define, prescribe, and apportion the
jurisdiction of the various courts but may not deprive the Supreme Court of its
jurisdiction over cases enumerated in Section 5 hereof." Hence, the primary
judge of the necessity, adequacy, wisdom, reasonableness and expediency
of any law is primarily the function of the legislature. The act of Congress
entrusting us with the issuance of protection orders is in pursuance of our
authority to settle justiciable controversies or disputes involving rights that
are enforceable and demandable before the courts of justice or the redress
of wrongs for violations of such rights.
As to the issuance of protection order by the Punong Barangay, Section 14
pertinently provides:
SEC. 14.Barangay Protection Orders (BPOs); Who May Issue and How. —
Barangay Protection Orders (BPOs) refer to the protection order issued by
the Punong Barangay ordering the perpetrator to desist from committing acts
under Section 5 (a) and (b) of this Act. A Punong Barangay who receives
applications for a BPO shall issue the protection order to the applicant on the
date of filing after ex parte determination of the basis of the application. If the
Punong Barangay is unavailable to act on the application for a BPO, the
application shall be acted upon by any available Barangay Kagawad. If the Petitioner was issued a Delinquency Report (DR) because he was late for two
BPO is issued by a Barangay Kagawad, the order must be accompanied by minutes in his ENG 412 class, other cadets were also reported late for 5
an attestation by the Barangay Kagawad that the Punong Barangay was minutes. The DRs reached the Department of Tactical Officers and were
unavailable at the time of the issuance of the BPO. BPOs shall be effective logged and transmitted to the Company of Tactical Officers (TCO) for
for fifteen (15) days. Immediately after the issuance of an ex parte BPO, the explanation. Cudia incurred the penalty of 11 demerits and 13 touring hours.
Punong Barangay or Barangay Kagawad shall personally serve a copy of the
same on the respondent, or direct any barangay official to effect its personal
service.
The parties may be accompanied by a non-lawyer advocate in any Several days after, Cudia was reported to the Honor Committee (HC) per
proceeding before the Punong Barangay. violation of the Honor Code. Lying that is giving statements that perverts the
Hence, the issuance of a BPO by the Punong Barangay or, in his truth in his written appeal stating that his 4th period class ended at 3:00 that
unavailability, by any available Barangay Kagawad, merely orders the made him late for the succeeding class.
perpetrator to desist from (a) causing physical harm to the woman or her
child; and (2) threatening to cause the woman or her child physical harm.
Such function of the Punong Barangay is, thus, purely executive in nature, in Cudia submitted his letter of explanation on the honor report. The HC
pursuance of his duty under the Local Government Code to "enforce all laws
constituted a team to conduct the preliminary investigation on the violation, it
and ordinances," and to "maintain public order in the barangay."
recommended the case be formalized. Cudia pleaded not guilty. The result
was 8-1 guilty verdict and upon the order of the Chairman, the HC reconvened
First Class Cadet Aldrin Jeff Cudia v. The Superintendent of the in the chambers, after, the Presiding Officer announced a 9-0 guilty verdict.
Philippine Military Academy

GR Number 211362
The HC denied Cudia’s appeal. The Headquarters Tactics Group (HTG)
conducted a formal review and checking of findings. Special orders were
issued placing Cudia on indefinite leave of absence and pending approval of
Petition: Petition for Mandamus separation from the Armed Forces of the Philippines. Cudia submitted a letter
Petitioner: First Class Cadet Aldrin Jeff P. Cudia to the Office of the Commandant of Cadets requesting his re-instatement. The
matter was referred to Cadet Review and Appeals Board (CRAB) and it upheld
Respondent: The Superintendent of the Philippine Military Academy, The the decision.
Honor Committee of 2014 of the PMA and HC members, and the Cadet
Review and Appeals Board (CRAB)

Ponente: Peralta, J. Cudia wrote a letter to President Aquino but the President sustained the
findings of the CRAB. CHR-CAR issued a resolution finding probable cause
Date: February 24, 2014 for Human Rights Violations.

Facts: Issue:

Petitioner, Cadet First Class Cudia, was a member of the Siklab Diwa Class 1. Whether or not the PMA committed grave abuse of discretion in
of 2014 of the Philippine Military Academy. He was supposed to graduate with dismissing Cudia in utter disregard of his right to due process and in
honors as the class salutatorian, receive the Philippine Navy Saber as the top holding that he violated the Honor Code through lying.
Navy Cadet graduate and be commissioned as an ensign of the Navy. 2. Whether or not the court can interfere with military affairs
Ruling:
1. No. The determination of whether the PMA cadet has rights to due
process, education, and property should be placed in the context of
the Honor Code. All the administrative remedies were exhausted. A
student of a military academy must be prepared to subordinate his
private interest for the proper functioning of the institution. The PMA
may impose disciplinary measures and punishments as it deems fit
and consistent with the peculiar needs of the institution. PMA has
regulatory authority to administratively dismiss erring cadets.
PMA has a right to invoke academic freedom in the enforcement of
the internal rules and regulations.
2. Yes. The court is part of the checks-and-balance machinery mandated
by Article VIII of the Constitution. The court’s mandate (according to
Section 1, Article 8) is expanded that the duty of the courts is not only
to “settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable” but also “to determine whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of discretion on the part of any branch
or instrumentality of the Government” even if the latter does not
exercise judicial, quasi-judicial, or ministerial functions. No one is
above the law, including the military, especially in violations of
Constitutionally guaranteed rights.
Dispositive:
The petition is denied. The dismissal of Cudia from PMA is affirmed.
Roquero vs, UP Manila Chancellor, GR No. 181851 (March 9, 2010)
Galman vs. Sandiganbayan, 144 SCRA 43
Facts: Assassination of former Senator Benigno "Ninoy" Aquino, Jr. He was
killed from his plane that had just landed at the Manila International Airport.
His brain was smashed by a bullet fired point-blank into the back of his head
by an assassin. The military investigators reported within a span of three
hours that the man who shot Aquino (whose identity was then supposed to
be unknown and was revealed only days later as Rolando Galman) was a
communist-hired gunman, and that the military escorts gunned him down in
turn.
President was constrained to create a Fact Finding Board to investigate due
to large masses of people who joined in the ten-day period of national
mourning yearning for the truth, justice and freedom.
The fact is that both majority and minority reports were one in rejecting the
military version stating that "the evidence shows to the contrary that Rolando
Galman had no subversive affiliations. Only the soldiers in the staircase with
Sen. Aquino could have shot him; that Ninoy's assassination was the product
of a military conspiracy, not a communist plot. Only difference between the
two reports is that the majority report found all the twenty-six private
respondents above-named in the title of the case involved in the military
conspiracy; " while the chairman's minority report would exclude nineteen of
them.
Then Pres. Marcos stated that evidence shows that Galman was the killer.
Petitioners pray for issuance of a TRO enjoining respondent court from
rendering a decision in the two criminal cases before it, the Court resolved by
nine-to-two votes 11 to issue the restraining order prayed for. The Court also
granted petitioners a five-day period to file a reply to respondents' separate
comments and respondent Tanodbayan a three-day period to submit a copy
of his 84-page memorandum for the prosecution.
But ten days later, the Court by the same nine-to-two-vote ratio in reverse,
resolved to dismiss the petition and to lift the TRO issued ten days earlier
enjoining the Sandiganbayan from rendering its decision. The same Court
majority denied petitioners' motion for a new 5-day period counted from
receipt of respondent Tanodbayan's memorandum for the prosecution (which
apparently was not served on them).
Thus, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, alleging that the dismissal
did not indicate the legal ground for such action and urging that the case be
set for a full hearing on the merits that the people are entitled to due process.
However, respondent Sandiganbayan issued its decision acquitting all the
accused of the crime charged, declaring them innocent and totally absolving
them of any civil liability. Respondents submitted that with the
Sandiganbayan's verdict of acquittal, the instant case had become moot and
academic. Thereafter, same Court majority denied petitioners' motion for
reconsideration for lack of merit.
Hence, petitioners filed their motion to admit their second motion for
reconsideration alleging that respondents committed serious irregularities
constituting mistrial and resulting in miscarriage of justice and gross violation
of the constitutional rights of the petitioners and the sovereign people of the
Philippines to due process of law.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not petitioner was deprived of his rights as an accused.
(2) Whether or not there was a violation of the double jeopardy clause.
Held: Petitioners' second motion for reconsideration is granted and ordering
a re-trial of the said cases which should be conducted with deliberate
dispatch and with careful regard for the requirements of due process.
Deputy Tanodbayan Manuel Herrera (made his expose 15 months later
when former Pres. was no longer around) affirmed the allegations in the
second motion for reconsideration that he revealed that the Sandiganbayan
Justices and Tanodbayan prosecutors were ordered by Marcos to whitewash
the Aquino-Galman murder case. Malacañang wanted dismissal to the extent
that a prepared resolution was sent to the Investigating Panel. Malacañang
Conference planned a scenario of trial where the former President ordered
then that the resolution be revised by categorizing the participation of each
respondent; decided that the presiding justice, Justice Pamaran, (First
Division) would personally handle the trial. A conference was held in an inner
room of the Palace. Only the First Lady and Presidential Legal Assistant
Justice Lazaro were with the President. The conferees were told to take the
back door in going to the room where the meeting was held, presumably to
escape notice by the visitors in the reception hall waiting to see the
President. During the conference, and after an agreement was reached,
Pres. Marcos told them 'Okay, mag moro-moro na lamang kayo;' and that on
their way out of the room Pres. Marcos expressed his thanks to the group
and uttered 'I know how to reciprocate'.
The Court then said that the then President (code-named Olympus) had
stage-managed in and from Malacañang Palace "a scripted and
predetermined manner of handling and disposing of the Aquino-Galman
murder case;" and that "the prosecution in the Aquino-Galman case and the
Justices who tried and decided the same acted under the compulsion of
some pressure which proved to be beyond their capacity to resist. Also
predetermined the final outcome of the case" of total absolution of the
twenty-six respondents-accused of all criminal and civil liability. Pres. Marcos
came up with a public statement aired over television that Senator Aquino
was killed not by his military escorts, but by a communist hired gun. It was,
therefore, not a source of wonder that President Marcos would want the case
disposed of in a manner consistent with his announced theory thereof which,
at the same time, would clear his name and his administration of any
suspected guilty participation in the assassination. such a procedure would
be a better arrangement because, if the accused are charged in court and
subsequently acquitted, they may claim the benefit of the doctrine of double
jeopardy and thereby avoid another prosecution if some other witnesses
shall appear when President Marcos is no longer in office.
More so was there suppression of vital evidence and harassment of
witnesses. The disappearance of witnesses two weeks after Ninoy's
assassination. According to J. Herrera, "nobody was looking for these
persons because they said Marcos was in power. The assignment of the
case to Presiding Justice Pamaran; no evidence at all that the assignment
was indeed by virtue of a regular raffle, except the uncorroborated testimony
of Justice Pamaran himself. The custody of the accused and their
confinement in a military camp, instead of in a civilian jail. The monitoring of
proceedings and developments from Malacañang and by Malacañang
personnel. The partiality of Sandiganbayan betrayed by its decision: That
President Marcos had wanted all of the twenty-six accused to be acquitted
may not be denied. In rendering its decision, the Sandiganbayan overdid
itself in favoring the presidential directive. Its bias and partiality in favor of the
accused was clearly obvious. The evidence presented by the prosecution
was totally ignored and disregarded.
The record shows that the then President misused the overwhelming
resources of the government and his authoritarian powers to corrupt and
make a mockery of the judicial process in the Aquino-Galman murder cases.
"This is the evil of one-man rule at its very worst." Our Penal Code penalizes
"any executive officer who shall address any order or suggestion to any
judicial authority with respect to any case or business coming within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the courts of justice."
Impartial court is the very essence of due process of law. This criminal
collusion as to the handling and treatment of the cases by public respondents
at the secret Malacañang conference (and revealed only after fifteen months
by Justice Manuel Herrera) completely disqualified respondent
Sandiganbayan and voided ab initio its verdict. The courts would have no
reason to exist if they were allowed to be used as mere tools of injustice,
deception and duplicity to subvert and suppress the truth. More so, in the
case at bar where the people and the world are entitled to know the truth,
and the integrity of our judicial system is at stake.
There was no double jeopardy. Courts' Resolution of acquittal was a void
judgment for having been issued without jurisdiction. No double jeopardy
attaches, therefore. A void judgment is, in legal effect, no judgment at all. By
it no rights are divested. It neither binds nor bars anyone. All acts and all
claims flowing out of it are void.

Motion to Disqualify/Inhibit should have been resolved ahead. In this case,

petitioners' motion for reconsideration of the abrupt dismissal of their petition
and lifting of the TRO enjoining the Sandiganbayan from rendering its
decision had been taken cognizance of by the Court which had required the
respondents', including the Sandiganbayan's, comments. Although no
restraining order was issued anew, respondent Sandiganbayan should not
have precipitately issued its decision of total absolution of all the accused
pending the final action of this Court. All of the acts of the respondent judge
manifest grave abuse of discretion on his part amounting to lack of
jurisdiction which substantively prejudiced the petitioner.

With the declaration of nullity of the proceedings, the cases must now be
tried before an impartial court with an unbiased prosecutor. Respondents
accused must now face trial for the crimes charged against them before an
impartial court with an unbiased prosecutor with all due process.

The function of the appointing authority with the mandate of the people,
under our system of government, is to fill the public posts. Justices and
judges must ever realize that they have no constituency, serve no majority
nor minority but serve only the public interest as they see it in accordance
with their oath of office, guided only the Constitution and their own
conscience and honor.