This disqualification rule, as enshrined under Section 8, Article X of the 1987 Constitution and reiterated in Sec.

43 (b) of the
Local Government Code of 1991, prohibits local elective officials from serving more than three (3) consecutive terms in the
same position. It ensures that there is a change in leadership every after three consecutive terms of a local elective official to
give chance to some other qualified individuals. Although the rule appears to be simple, the same has been a fertile ground for
disputes stemming from varying interpretations of said rule.

In Abundo v. Comelec (2012), the Supreme Court laid down the following requisites for the applicability of the rule: (1) that the
official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the same local government post; and (2) that he has fully
served three consecutive terms.

The Abundo ruling likewise summarized various cases where the applicability of this rule was tested. These cases relate to: (1)
assumption of office by operation of law, (2) assumption of office after winning a recall election, (3) conversion of a
municipality to a city, and (4) declaration of the proclaimed candidate as the losing party in an election contest, and other
analogous cases.

ASSUMPTION OF OFFICE BY OPERATION OF LAW

In Borja, Jr. v. Comelec (1998), Capco was elected vice-mayor but he eventually succeeded as mayor by operation of law due to
the death of the incumbent mayor. Capco was then elected as mayor for two more terms after his assumption by operation of
law. On his third attempt to re-election, his disqualification was sought. The Supreme Court held that “it is not enough that an
individual served three consecutive terms in an elective local office, he must also have been elected to the same position for
the same number of times before the disqualification can apply.” Thus, the initial assumption by operation of law was not
counted for purposes of the three-term limit rule.

ASSUMPTION OF OFFICE AFTER WINNING IN A RECALL ELECTION

In Socrates v. Comelec (2002), Hagedorn was elected and served as mayor for three consecutive terms. After that Hagedorn
opted not to run for the next elections, in which Socrates eventually won. However, while serving his term, Socrates faced
recall proceedings. Hagedorn ran for the former’s unexpired term, so Socrates sought his disqualification. The Supreme Court
upheld Hagedorn’s candidacy to run in the recall election, since after his third term “he became a private citizen until the recall
election” where he won.

CONVERSION OF A MUNICIPALITY INTO A CITY

In Latasa v. Comelec (2003), Latasa served as Mayor of the Municipality of Digos for three consecutive terms. During his third
term, Digos was converted to a component city. When he filed his candidacy for city mayor, the Supreme Court ruled that “the
conversion of a municipality to a city does not constitute an interruption of the incumbent official’s continuity of service.” Thus,
the rule was applied.

LOSING IN AN ELECTION CONTEST

In Lonzanida v. Comelec (1999), Lonzanida was elected and served as mayor for three terms from 1989-1998. However, his
proclamation relative to the 1995 election (for his 3rd term) was declared as null on the ground of failure of elections. Three
months before the 1998 elections, Lonzanida vacated the mayoralty post. In the May 1998 elections, Lonzanida again filed his
certificate of candidacy. This was questioned by his opponent.

The Supreme Court held that “Lonzanida cannot be considered as having been duly elected to the post in the May 1995
elections since his assumption of office as mayor cannot be deemed to have been by reason of a valid election but by reason of
a void proclamation.” It was also stated that “Lonzanida did not fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoral term having been ordered to
vacate his post before the expiration of the term, a situation which amounts to an involuntary relinquishment of office.” Thus,
the rule did not apply.

Contrast this to Ong v. Alegre (2006), Ong was elected and served as mayor for three terms from 1995-2004. During the 1998
elections, the Comelec nullified Ong’s proclamation on account that he lost during the 1998 elections. Nonetheless, the
decision became final and executory on July 4, 2001 when Ong had fully served the 1998-2001 term and was in fact already
starting to serve the 2001-2004 term. In 2004, he filed his certificate of candidacy for the same position which his opponent
questioned. Ong invoked the ruling in Lonzanida.

The Supreme Court held that “his assumption of office as mayor for the term 1998-2001 constitutes service for the full
term.”Lonzanida did not apply because the conditions are different. Ong was deemed to have served for a full term because
Ong’s proclamation was voided only after the expiry of the term. It was further noted that “the decision declaring Ong as not
having won the 1998 elections was without practical and legal use and value.” “His proclamation as the duly elected mayor in
the 1998 mayoralty election coupled by his assumption of office and his continuous exercise of the functions thereof from start
to finish of the term, should legally be taken as service for a full term in contemplation of the three-term limit rule.”

Based on the foregoing, the rule is applicable for as long as a local elective official (1) has been elected and (2) had served for
three consecutive terms in the same position. As such, an official who merely assumed office by operation of law can run for
the same position for three consecutive terms since he was not elected to the position. Likewise, an officer who has been
elected and had served three consecutive terms will not be disqualified to run for a recall election for the same position since
there has been an interruption in the continuity of terms of office after his third term. Lastly, an official who did not serve a full
term for having been declared to have lost an election contest can still run for the same position since the requirements are not
complied with.

On the other hand, the rule is applicable to disqualify a local elective official to run for a fourth consecutive term over the same
position even if the municipality has been converted into a city, or when a local elective official has been declared to have lost
an election only after he had already served his full term.
1992-2001: X was Mayor of a municipality for 3 consecutive terms
Before May 2001 elections: The municipality became a new city
2001 elections: X filed COC for mayor of the new city
Was X qualified to run for Mayor of the new city?
Answer: NO
LATASA VS COMELEC
It can be seen from Lonzanida and Adormeo that the law contemplates a rest period during which the local elective official
steps down from office and ceases to exercise power or authority over the inhabitants of the territorial jurisdiction of a
particular local government unit.
Should petitioner be allowed another three consecutive terms as mayor of the City of Digos, petitioner would then be possibly
holding office as chief executive over the same territorial jurisdiction and inhabitants for a total of eighteen consecutive years.
This is the very scenario sought to be avoided by the Constitution, if not abhorred by it.
Spirit of the law was applied

1993: X, the VM succeeded Y, the M who died, by operation of law. X served as Mayor until 1995.
1995-1998: X was elected and served as Mayor
1998-2001: X was re-elected and again served as Mayor
2001 Elections: Was X barred to run as Mayor?
Answer: NO, for 2 reasons:
i. In 1993, he was not elected because he succeeded by operation of law
ii. In 1993, he was elected not in the same office because during the 1st term, he was elected for the position of VM, and not
for M
BORJA, JR. VS COMELEC
Private respondent was first elected as vice- mayor, but upon the death of the incumbent mayor, he occupied the latter
’s post for the unexpired term. He was, thereafter, elected for two more terms. The Court held that when private respondent
occupied the post of the mayor upon the incumbent’s death and served for the remainder of the term, he cannot be construed
as having served a full term as contemplated under the subject constitutional provision. The term served must be one “for
which [the official concerned] was elected.”

ALDOVINO VS COMELEC
Q: Is the preventive suspension of an elected public official an interruption of his term of office for purposes of the three-term
limit rule?
A: “Interruption” of a term exempting an elective official from the three-term limit rule is one that involves no less than the
involuntary loss of title to office. An officer who is preventively suspended is simply barred from exercising the functions of his
office but title to office is not lost.

In 1994, 1997 and 2002: X was elected Punong Barangay

2004: X ran and won as municipal councilor, leaving his post as punong barangay
2007: X filed COC for the position of punong barangay (the same barangay)
Is he qualified?
Answer: NO
BOLOS, JR. VS COMELEC
The Court agrees with the COMELEC that there was voluntary renunciation as Punong Barangay. The COMELEC correctly held:
It is our finding that Nicasio Bolos, Jr.’s relinquishment of the office of Punong Barangay of Biking, Dauis, Bohol, as a
consequence of his assumption to office as Sangguniang Bayan member of Dauis, Bohol, on July 1, 2004, is a voluntary
renunciation.
All the acts attending his pursuit of his election as municipal councilor point out to an intent and readiness to give up his post
as Punong Barangay once elected to the higher elective office. He knew that his election as municipal councilor
would entail abandonment of the position he held, and he intended to forego of it. Abandonment, like resignation,
is voluntary

1988-1995: X was elected and served as Mayor for 2 consecutive terms

1995: X was re-elected and started serving as Mayor
1997: Comelec ruled that X was not validly proclaimed and X stepped down as ordered by the Comelec.
1998 elections: Was X barred to run as Mayor?
Answer: NO

LONZANIDA VS COMELEC
Petitioner was elected and served two consecutive terms as mayor from 1988 to 1995. He then ran again for the same
position in the May 1995 elections, won and discharged his duties as mayor. However, his opponent contested his
proclamation before the RTC, which ruled that there was a failure of elections and declared the position of mayor vacant. The
COMELEC affirmed this ruling and petitioner acceded to the order to vacate the post. During the May 1998 elections,
petitioner therein again filed his certificate of candidacy for mayor. A petition to disqualify him was filed on the ground that
he had already served three consecutive terms. The Court ruled, however, that petitioner cannot be considered as having been
duly elected to the post in the May 1995 elections, and that petitioner did not fully serve the 1995- 1998 mayoralty term by
reason of involuntary relinquishment of office.
1995-1998: X was elected and served as Mayor
1998-2001: X was re-elected and served as mayor, but an election protest was filed against X in 1998
2001-2004: X was re-elected and served as mayor, and the 1998 election protest was decided against X
2004 elections: Was X qualified to run as mayor?
Answer: NO
FRANCIS ONG VS JOSEPH ALEGRE
Petitioner Ong was duly elected mayor (San Vicente) in the May 1995 and again in the May 2001 elections and serving the
July 1, 1995- June 30, 1998 and the July 1, 2001-June 30, 2004 terms in full. The controversy revolved around the 1998-2001
term. Ong ran for mayor of the same municipality in the May 1998 elections and actually served the 1998- 2001 term by
virtue of a proclamation initially declaring him mayor-elect of San Vicente. But after the term 1998-2001, it was declared that
Ong was not the real winner in the elections. The question was whether or not Ong’s assumption of office as Mayor of San
Vicente from July 1, 1998 to June 30, 2001, may be considered as one full term service.
The Supreme Court held that such assumption of office constitutes, for Francis, “service for the full term”, and should be
counted as a full term served in contemplation of the three-term limit prescribed by the constitutional and statutory
provisions, supra, barring local elective officials from being elected and serving for more than three consecutive term for the
same position.
His proclamation by the Municipal Board of Canvassers of San Vicente as the duly elected mayor in the 1998 mayoralty
election coupled by his assumption of office and his continuous exercise of the functions thereof from start to finish of the
term, should legally be taken as service for a full term in contemplation of the three-term rule (even if he was later on, after
the full term, declared that he was not the winner in the election).
Same Ruling in ATTY. RIVERA III VS COMELEC

Lingating v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 153475, November 13, 2002,

the respondent Mayor, having been found guilty of the
administrative charges and ordered removed from office, had seasonably
filed a motion for reconsideration with the Sanggunian Panlalawigan, and
no action on his motion was taken, then the decision of the Sanggunian
Panlalawigan never became final. After the respondent was re-elected, he
may no longer be removed from office for that administrative offense.
Effect of re-election.
The re-election of a local official bars the
continuation of the administrative case against him, inasmuch as the reelection of
the official is tantamount to condonation by the people of whatever past misdeeds
he may have committed
Aguinaldo doctrine
A public official cannot be removed from office for administrative misconduct committed during a prior term, since his
reelection to the office operates as a condonation of the officer ’s previous misconduct by the people to the extent of cutting
off his right to remove him therefor.
It applies only to administrative case for misconduct, so the official may still be held criminally or civilly liable for the same
act.

1992-2001: X was elected and served as Mayor for 3 consecutive terms

2001 elections: X did not run; Y was elected Mayor
2002: Y faced recall election and X filed certificate of candidacy for the recall elections
Can X participate in the recall elections?
Answer: YES
SOCRATES VS COMELEC
The principal issue was whether or not private respondent Hagedorn was qualified to run during the recall elections.
Hagedorn had already served for three consecutive terms as mayor from 1992 until 2001 and did not run in the immediately
following regular elections. On July 2, 2002, the barangay officials of Puerto Princesa convened themselves into a Preparatory
Recall Assembly to initiate the recall of the incumbent mayor, Socrates. On August 23, 2002, Hagedorn filed his certificate of
candidacy for mayor in the recall election. A petition for his disqualification was filed on the ground that he cannot run for the
said post during the recall elections for he was disqualified from running for a fourth consecutive term. The Court ruled in
favor of Hagedorn, holding that the principle behind the three-term limit rule is to prevent consecutiveness of the service of
terms, and that there was in his case a break in such consecutiveness after the end of his third term and before the recall
election.