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SUNVILLE TIMBER PRODUCTS, INC., petitioner, vs. HON. ALFONSO G.

ABAD, as Judge
RTC, Br. 22 of Pagadian City, COURT OF APPEALS, ISIDRO GILBOLINGO AND
ROBUSTIANO BUGTAI, respondents.
GR. No. 85502 February 24, 1992

FACTS:

The petitioner was granted a Timber License Agreement (TLA), authorizing it to cut, remove and
utilize timber within the concession area covering 29,500 hectares of forest land in Zamboanga del
Sur, for a period of ten years expiring on September 31, 1992.‘

in 1987, herein private respondents filed a petition with the DENR for the cancellation of the TLA
on the ground of serious violations of its conditions and the provisions of forestry laws and
regulations.

The same charges were subsequently made, also by the herein private respondents, in a complaint
for injunction with damages against the petitioner.

The petitioner moved to dismiss this case on three grounds, to wit: 1) the court had no jurisdiction
over the complaint; 2) the plaintiffs had not yet exhausted administrative remedies; and 3) the
injunction sought was expressly prohibited by section 1 of PD 605.

Judge Alfonso G. Abad denied the motion to dismiss and the motion for reconsideration. The
petitioner then elevated the matter to the CA, which sustained the trial court .The CA held that the
doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies was not without exception and pointed to the
several instances approved by this Court where it could be dispensed with. The respondent court
found that in the case before it, the applicable exception was the urgent need for judicial
intervention.

The decision also declared invalid Section 1 of PD 605, which provides:

Sec. 1. No court of the Philippines shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining order, preliminary
injunction or preliminary mandatory injunction in any case involving or growing out of the
issuance, approval or disapproval, revocation or suspension of, or any action whatsoever by the
proper administrative official or body on concessions, licenses, permits, patents, or public grants
of any kind in connection with the disposition, exploitation, utilization, exploration and/or
development of the natural resources of the Philippines.

This was held to be an encroachment on the judicial power vested in the Supreme Court

RULING:

The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies calls for resort first to the appropriate
administrative authorities in the resolution of a controversy falling under their jurisdiction before
the same may be elevated to the courts of justice for review. Non-observance of the doctrine results
in lack of a cause of action, which is one of the grounds allowed in the Rules of Court for the
dismissal of the complaint. The deficiency is not jurisdictional. Failure to invoke it operates as a
waiver of the objection as a ground for a motion to dismiss and the court may then proceed with
the case as if the doctrine had been observed.

One of the reasons for the doctrine of exhaustion is the separation of powers, which enjoins upon
the Judiciary a becoming policy of non-interference with matters coming primarily (albeit not
exclusively) within the competence of the other departments. The theory is that the administrative
authorities are in a better position to resolve questions addressed to their particular expertise and
that errors committed by subordinates in their resolution may be rectified by their superiors if given
a chance to do so. A no less important consideration is that administrative decisions are usually
questioned in the special civil actions of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, which are allowed
only when there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy available to the petitioner. It may
be added that strict enforcement of the rule could also relieve the courts of a considerable number
of avoidable cases which otherwise would burden their heavily loaded dockets.
and the lower courts by Article VIII, Section 1, of the Constitution. The respondent court cited
Export Processing Zone Authority v. Dulay, where several presidential decrees were declared
unconstitutional for divesting the courts of the judicial power to determine just compensation in
expropriation cases.
ISSUES:
Whether the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies was not correctly applied and that
the declaration of the unconstitutionality of Section 1 of PD 605 was improper.
RULING:
The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies calls for resort first to the appropriate
administrative authorities in the resolution of a controversy falling under their jurisdiction before
the same may be elevated to the courts of justice for review. Non-observance of the doctrine results
in lack of a cause of action, which is one of the grounds allowed in the Rules of Court for the
dismissal of the complaint. The deficiency is not jurisdictional. Failure to invoke it operates as a
waiver of the objection as a ground for a motion to dismiss and the court may then proceed with
the case as if the doctrine had been observed.

One of the reasons for the doctrine of exhaustion is the separation of powers, which enjoins upon
the Judiciary a becoming policy of non-interference with matters coming primarily (albeit not
exclusively) within the competence of the other departments. The theory is that the administrative
authorities are in a better position to resolve questions addressed to their particular expertise and
that errors committed by subordinates in their resolution may be rectified by their superiors if given
a chance to do so. A no less important consideration is that administrative decisions are usually
questioned in the special civil actions of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, which are allowed
only when there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy available to the petitioner. It may
be added that strict enforcement of the rule could also relieve the courts of a considerable number
of avoidable cases which otherwise would burden their heavily loaded dockets.
Paat v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 111107 January 10 1997

Facts:
On May 19, 1989, the truck of private respondent Victoria de Guzman was seized by DENR
because the driver could not produce the required documents for the forest products found
concealed in the truck. Four days later, Petitioner Jovito Layugan, CENRO, issued an order of
confiscation and asked the owners to submit an explanation why the truck should not be forfeited
within fifteen days. Private respondent, however, failed to do so. R.E.D. Rogelio Baggayan of
DENR sustained Layugan's action of confiscation and ordered the forfeiture of the truck. de
Guzman filed a letter of reconsideration but was subsequently denied. The letter was forwarded to
the Secretary of DENR pursuant to the respondent’s wishes. During the pendency of the resolution,
however, the respondent filed a suit for replevin. The petitioners filed a motion to dismiss but was
later denied by the RTC. Their motion for reconsideration was likewise denied and the petition for
certiorari filed before the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the RTC. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the confiscation of the truck was valid.
Held:
Yes. The suit for replevin is never intended as a procedural tool to question the orders of
confiscation and forfeiture issued by the DENR in pursuance to the authority given under P.D.
705, as amended. The provision of Section 68 of P.D. 705 before its amendment by E.O. 277 and
the provision of Section 1 of E.O. No. 277 amending the aforementioned Section 68 could never
be clearer.
REPUBLIC v. CA and BERNABE
G.R. No. L-40402 March 16, 198

FACTS: Lot No. 622 of the Mariveles Cadastre was declared public land in a decision rendered
before the last war in Cadastral Case No. 19, LRC Cadastral Record No. 1097. On July 6, 1965
such lot was segregated from the forest zone and released and certified by the Bureau of Forestry
as an Agricultural Land for disposition under the Public Land Act.
On April 26, 1967, Respondents filed in the CFI of Bataan a petition to reopen Cadastral
Case No. 19 to perfect their rights and register their titles to said lots. They alleged that they
acquired ownership and possession of said parcels of land by purchase from the original owners
thereof, whose possession of the same including that of the herein respondents, has always been
continuous, open, active, exclusive, public, adverse and in the concept of owners for more than 30
years.
The Director of Forestry filed an opposition to the above petition but later withdrew the
same upon verification of findings that this portion of the timberland had already been released
from the mass of the public forests. Subsequently, the Acting Prov. Fiscal of Bataan, for and in
behalf of the Director of Lands filed his opposition alleging that the land is STILL Public Land
and as such cannot be the subject of a land registration proceeding under Act 496.
The lower court adjudicated in favor or respondent Bernabes, finding that the latter have
complied with all the terms and conditions entitling them to a grant. This decision having become
final, the Commissioner of Land Registration issued the corresponding decrees of registration. On
the other hand, petitioner DL through the Solicitor Gen. filed a petition for review of the decrees.
Afterwards, he filed an Amended Petition for Review, adding: that respondents executed simulated
deeds of sale conveying portions of the subject parcels to third parties for fictitious considerations
in order to remove the same from the coverage of Sec. 38 of Act 496, but in truth, buyers are mere
dummies of petitioners; hence, not purchasers for value.
The CFI denied this petition and on appeal, the CA affirmed the questioned decision.
Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration having been denied for lack of merit; hence, this petition.
ISSUE: WON THE LOTS CLAIMED BY RESPONDENTS COULD LEGALLY BE THE
SUBJECT OF A JUDICIAL CONFIRMATION OF TITLE UNDER SEC. 48 (b) OF
COMMONWEALTH ACT 141 AS AMENDED BY R.A. 1942.
HELD: NEGATIVE. The Supreme Court ruled that Sec. 48 (b) of CA 141, as amended, applies
exclusively to public lands. Forest lands or areas covered with forests are excluded. Thus,
possession of forest lands, however long cannot ripen into private ownership. A parcel of forest
land is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Bureau of Forestry and beyond the power and
jurisdiction of the cadastral court to register under the Torrens System.
Thus, even if the reopening of the cadastral proceedings was at all possible, private respondents
have not qualified for a grant under Section 48 (b) of CA 141. They can only be credited with 1
year, 9 mos. and 20 days of possession and occupation of the lots involved, counted from July 6,
1965 when the lots involved had been segregated from the forest zone and released by the BOF as
an agricultural land for disposition under the Public Land Act. As such, respondents and their
predecessors in interest could not have possessed the lots for the required period of 30 years as
disposable agricultural land.

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