THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 209227, March 25, 2015

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CHARLIE OROSCO, Accused-Appellant.

DECISION

VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

On appeal is the Decision1 dated March 22, 2013 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 05171
which affirmed the Decision2 dated June 24, 2011 of the Regional Trial Court of Legazpi City, Branch 10 finding
the accused-appellant Charlie Orosco guilty of the crime of Robbery with Homicide.

Appellant, along with Abner Astor, “John Doe” and “Peter Doe,” were charged with Robbery with Homicide
defined and penalized under Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. The Information reads as
follows: cha nRoblesv irt ual Lawlib rary

That on or about the 16th day of May, 2006, in the City of Legazpi, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and helping one another, with
intent of gain and by means of violence, did then and there [willfully], unlawfully, feloniously and forcibly enter
the store owned by one Lourdes Yap situated at Purok 4, Barangay Rawis, Legazpi City, and once inside said
store, take, steal and carry away cash money, to the damage and prejudice of said Lourdes Yap, and by reason
of or on occasion of said robbery, and for the purpose of enabling them to take, steal and carry away the
aforesaid cash money in pursuance of their conspiracy, did then and there [willfully], unlawfully and feloniously
and taking advantage of their superior strength and with intent to kill, attack, assault and stab the aforesaid
Lourdes Yap, thereby inflicting upon her injury which directly caused her untimely death, to the damage and
prejudice of her legal heirs.

CONTRARY
cralawlawl ibra ry
TO LAW.3cralawred

The factual scenario presented by the prosecution is based on the eyewitness account of Albert M. Arca (Arca),
the postmortem findings of Sr. Pol. Chief Insp. Dr. James Margallo Belgira who conducted the autopsy on the
cadaver of the victim, and the victim’s grandson, Ryan Francis Yap.

Arca testified that on May 16, 2006, about one o’clock in the afternoon, he went to the store of Lourdes Yap
(Yap) at Purok 4, Barangay Rawis, Legazpi City. He was buying ice but it was not yet hardened (frozen) so
he went home. At around two o’clock, he was again sent on errand to buy ice at the same store. After
purchasing the ice, he noticed there was a verbal tussle between Yap and two male customers. The men were
arguing that they were given insufficient change and insisting they gave a P500 bill and not P100. When Yap
opened the door, the two men entered the store. From outside the store and thru its open window grills, he
saw one of the men placed his left arm around the neck of Yap and covered her mouth with his right hand
while the other man was at her back restraining her hands. He recognized the man who was holding the hands
of Yap as Charlie Orosco (appellant), while he described the man who covered her mouth as thin, with less
hair and dark complexion. The latter stabbed Yap at the center of her chest. When they released her, she
fell down on the floor. Appellant then took a thick wad of bills from the base of the religious icon or “santo” at
the altar infront of the store’s window, after which he and the man who stabbed Yap fled together with two
other men outside who acted as lookouts. Arca went near the bloodied victim but also left and went home
afraid because he was seen by one of the lookouts.4 cralaw red

Yap was brought to the Aquinas University Hospital but she was declared dead on arrival. Later, at the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI) Legazpi City District office, Arca gave descriptions of the faces of appellant and
the dark thin man who stabbed Yap (“John Doe”). From a surveillance digital photo and video clip shown to
him, Arca positively identified Abner Astor (Astor) as one of the two men sitting beside the store as
lookouts. Consequently, warrants of arrest were issued against appellant and Astor. But only appellant was
arrested as Astor, John Doe and Peter Doe remained at large.

Dr. Belgira affirmed the findings in his Medico-Legal Report5 stating: chanRob lesvi rtua lLawl ibra ry

TRUNK:
 1) Stab wound, left anterior costal region, measuring 2 x 0.5 cm, 5 cm from the anterior midline, 9
cm deep. The wound tract is directed posteriorwards, upwards and medialwards, cutting the sixth
anterior thoracic rib and piercing the heart.

CONCLUSION:

The cause of death is hemorrhagic shock secondary to a stab wound of the trunk. cralawlawlib rary

He explained that it was possible that the lone stab wound caused by a sharp object, such as a knife, was
inflicted while the victim was standing, and found no other injuries such as defense wounds.6 cralawred

For his defense, appellant testified that on the date and time of the incident, he was at his house in Bigaa
taking care of his three-year-old child while his wife was washing clothes. He stayed in the house until his
wife finished the laundry at past 3:00 p.m. He denied knowing Yap and his co-accused Astor. While he
admitted that he was a resident of Purok 4, Bgy. Rawis, his family transferred to their other house at Bigaa. He
denied knowing Arca and he does not know of any motive for Arca to testify against him. He worked in a
copra company in Lidong but stopped reporting for work after May 16, 2006 as he was selling fish. He was
arrested by the police at the rotunda in Legazpi when he was buying medicine for his sick child.7 c ralaw red

Appellant’s wife, Teresa Magdaong-Orosco also testified to confirm that at the time of the incident he was at
their house while she was doing the laundry just adjacent to their house. On cross-examination, she was
asked the distance between their place and Bgy. Rawis and she replied that it will take less than one hour
from Bigaa to Rawis.8 cra lawred

On June 24, 2011, the trial court rendered judgment convicting appellant of the crime charged, thus: chanRoblesvi rtual Lawl ibra ry

WHEREFORE, above premises considered, the Court hereby finds accused Charlie Orosco GUILTY of the crime
of robbery with homicide. He is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, to pay the heirs
of Lourdes Yap P75,000.00 as civil indemnity for the fact of death, P75,000.00 as moral damages and
P30,000.00 as exemplary damages.

Insofar as the other accused is concerned, the case is hereby sent to the archives, pending their eventual
arrest.

So Ordered.9 cra lawlawlib ra ry

Appellant went to the CA but his appeal was dismissed. The CA upheld his conviction as it found no compelling
reason to deviate from the factual findings and conclusions of the trial court.

In this petition, appellant reiterates the arguments he raised before the CA that the trial court erred in giving
credit to the uncorroborated eyewitness testimony of Arca who could not point to him during the trial, and
that even granting that criminal charges may be imputed against him, it should only be robbery and not the
complex crime of robbery with homicide considering the fact that it was not him who stabbed Yap.

The appeal lacks merit.

It is settled that witnesses are to be weighed not numbered, such that the testimony of a single, trustworthy
and credible witness could be sufficient to convict an accused. The testimony of a sole witness, if found
convincing and credible by the trial court, is sufficient to support a finding of guilt beyond reasonable
doubt. Corroborative evidence is necessary only when there are reasons to warrant the suspicion that the
witness falsified the truth or that his observation had been inaccurate.10 cra lawred

In this case, both the trial and appellate courts found the testimony of the lone eyewitness, Arca, convincing
notwithstanding that he was quite slow in narrating the incident to the court and that he initially desisted from
physically pointing to appellant as the one who held Yap’s hands from behind and took her money at the store
after she was stabbed by appellant’s cohort (John Doe).

In his direct examination, Arca named appellant as one of those who robbed and killed Yap but refused to
pinpoint him in open court, thus: chanRoblesvi rt ual Lawlib rary

ACP NUQUI
xxxx
Q. This person who was holding the hands of Lourdes Yap, were you able to identify him?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Do you know the name of this person?
A. Yes, sir. He is Charlie.
Q. Do you know the family name?
A. Orosco, sir.
Q. If this Charlie Orosco whom you said was then holding the hands of Lourdes Yap, if he is in Court,
would you please point to him?
WITNESS (answering)
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Please look around you and point at him.
A. He is here.
Q. If he is in Court, please point at him.
Q. Why can’t you point at him?
COURT INTERPRETER
At this juncture, the witness is somewhat trembling.
ACP NUQUI
Oh, you see.
ATTY. BAÑARES
The witness can not answer.
ACP NUQUI
By the look of the witness, Your Honor, he is afraid. Perhaps….
xxxx
ACP NUQUI (continuing)
Q. Please point at him.
ATTY. BAÑARES
We have already foreseen the witness to pinpoint at anyone.
ACP NUQUI
No. He said that the….
ATTY. BAÑARES
Then, let him voluntarily do it.
ACP NUQUI
Okay.
ATTY. BAÑARES
Your Honor, I move that the prosecutor will transfer to another question because we keep on
waiting already.
ACP NUQUI
Your Honor, it is understandable that even he is slow, he keeps on glancing at the person.
COURT
Observations are all noted.
xxxx
ACP NUQUI
At this point, Your Honor, I would like to make of record that when it comes to the person of
Charlie Orosco, Your Honor, he stopped and did not say ---- he did not nod or do anything of
what he has been doing when the other persons were identified.
COURT
Okay. Noted.11

Arca continued with his testimony on how Yap was stabbed by appellant’s companion and appellant taking the
thick wad of P1,000 bills before fleeing along with the two lookouts. When asked for the fourth time to pinpoint
appellant, Arca was still hesitant:

Q. Now, is this Charlie Orosco here in Court?

A. Yes, sir, he is around.
Q. This person who took the money or Charlie Orosco you said “he is in Court,” will you please look
at him.
xxxx
ACP NUQUI (continuing)
Q. Is he now in Court?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Please point at him.
ATTY BAÑARES
The same observation, Your Honor.
COURT
Oh, the same observation?
ACP NUQUI
Yes, Your Honor, he is hesitant. It is understandable because he is afraid.
xxxx
COURT (to the witness)
Q. Why can you not point at Charlie Orosco who according to you he is inside the Court?
WITNESS (answering)
A. I can’t afford to point at him.
ACP NUQUI (to the witness)
Q. Why?
A. I am afraid.
COURT
He can not because he is afraid.12 (Emphasis supplied)
cralawlawl ibra ry

At the next hearing, Arca was recalled to the witness stand and this time he was able to pinpoint appellant as
among those persons who robbed and killed Yap, thus: chanRoble svirt ual Lawlib rary

PROSECUTOR NUQUI
Q- You mentioned that you saw two (2) persons talking to Lourdes Yap. Who are these persons you
are referring to?
ATTY. CHAN
Your Honor please, we are again registering our objection.
COURT
Witness may answer.
WITNESS
A- Charlie Orosco and a certain thin person.
PROSECUTOR NUQUI
Q- Why are you able to say that Charlie Orosco was one of the persons talking, how long have you
known Charlie Orosco?
A- He always go with a fisherman and act as helper and because of that I know him.
xxxx
PROSECUTOR NUQUI
Q- You mentioned that you have long known Charlie Orosco. Will you look around and
point to him if he is in Court?
INTERPRETER
At this juncture, the witness is pointing to a man wearing a yellow T-shirt with handcuff
and when asked answered by the name of Charlie Orosco.
PROSECUTOR NUQUI
No further questions Your Honor.13
cralawlawl ibra ry

Assessing the identification made by Arca, the trial court concluded that he had positively identified appellant
as one of the perpetrators of the robbery and killing of Yap, viz: chanRoble svirtual Lawlib ra ry

Here, Albert Arca, the prosecution’s main witness, positively identified accused Orosco as one of [the] two
men who robbed and killed Lourdes Yap on that fateful day. As observed by the trial court during the bail
hearings, when asked to identify one of the men who robbed and killed the victim, Arca was trembling and
constantly looking towards the direction of accused Orosco. Though simple-minded, Arca was well-aware of
the possible consequences his testimony could trigger. To the Court’s mind, Arca’s act of constantly looking
towards Orosco’s direction whenever he was asked to point out one of the culprits, is a mute but eloquent
manner of identifying Orosco as one of the perpetrators of the crime. As such, Arca’s act is sufficient
identification already.

Later, when Arca was recalled to the stand to answer some additional questions, he was able to gather enough
courage to point out to Orosco as the man who held the hands of Lourdes Yap while his companion stabbed
her. Arca stated that he was hesitant to identify and point out accused earlier because he feared what Orosco
might do to him. Incidentally, both Orosco and his wife stated that they do know neither Albert Arca nor
Lourdes Yap. Thus, it appears that there is no reason whatsoever for Arca to lie and attribute the crime to
Orosco. Following settled jurisprudence, Arca’s positive identification of Orosco prevails over the latter’s
alibi.14 c ralawlawl ibra ry

We find no compelling or cogent reason to deviate from the findings of the trial court on its evaluation of
Arca’s testimony. The well-settled rule in this jurisdiction is that the trial court’s findings on the credibility of
witnesses are entitled to the highest degree of respect and will not be disturbed on appeal without any clear
showing that it overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight or substance
which could affect the result of the case.15c ralaw red

Appellant repeatedly harped on the hesitation of Arca to point to him at the trial. However, as the trial court’s
firsthand observation of said witness’ deportment revealed, Arca’s fear of appellant sufficiently explains his
initial refusal to point to him in open court during his direct examination. Arca was finally able to point to
appellant as one of the perpetrators of the robbery and killing of Yap during his additional direct examination
when he had apparently mustered enough courage to do so.

Robbery with homicide is defined under Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, which provides in
part:chanRoble svirtual Lawlib ra ry

Art. 294. Robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons – Penalties. – Any person guilty of robbery
with the use of violence against or intimidation of any person shall suffer:

1. The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death, when by reason or on occasion of the robbery, the crime of
homicide shall have been committed, or when the robbery shall have been accompanied by rape or intentional
mutilation or arson. cralawlawlib ra ry

The elements of the crime of robbery with homicide are: (1) the taking of personal property is committed with
violence or intimidation against persons; (2) the property taken belongs to another; (3) the taking is done
with animo lucrandi; and (4) by reason of the robbery or on the occasion thereof, homicide (used in its generic
sense) is committed.16 Homicide is said to have been committed by reason or on the occasion of robbery if it
is committed (a) to facilitate the robbery or the escape of the culprit; (b) to preserve the possession by the
culprit of the loot; (c) to prevent discovery of the commission of the robbery; or (d) to eliminate witnesses to
the commission of the crime.17 In robbery with homicide, the original criminal design of the malefactor is to
commit robbery, with homicide perpetrated on the occasion or by reason of the robbery. The intent to commit
robbery must precede the taking of human life. The homicide may take place before, during or after the
robbery.18 c ralawred

Here, the homicide was committed by reason of or on the occasion of the robbery as appellant and John Doe
had to kill Yap to accomplish their main objective of stealing her money. The earlier verbal tussle where the
two pretended to have paid a greater amount and asked for the correct change was just a ploy to get inside
the store where the victim kept her earnings. To verify whether the cash payment was indeed a P500 or P100
bill, the victim let them enter the store but once inside they got hold of her and stabbed her. Appellant,
however, argues that if he had committed any offense, it was only robbery since Arca testified that it was
John Doe, whom he described as a thin man, who stabbed the victim.

We disagree.

The evidence presented by the prosecution clearly showed that appellant acted in conspiracy with his co-
accused. Appellant and John Doe first engaged the unsuspecting victim in a verbal altercation until she allowed
them to enter the store. Upon getting inside, they held the victim with John Doe wrapping his arm around her
neck while appellant held her hands at the back. With the victim pressed between the two of them, John Doe
stabbed her once in her chest before releasing her. Once she fell down, appellant quickly took the money
placed at the altar inside the store and fled together with John Doe and the two lookouts outside the store. All
the foregoing indicate the presence of conspiracy between appellant and his co-accused in the perpetration of
robbery and killing of the victim.

It must be stressed that appellant played a crucial role in the killing of the victim to facilitate the robbery. He
was behind the victim holding her hands while John Doe grabbed her at the neck. His act contributed in
rendering the victim without any means of defending herself when John Doe stabbed her frontally in the chest.
Having acted in conspiracy with his co-accused, appellant is equally liable for the killing of Yap.
As we held in People v. Baron19 c ralawre d

The concerted manner in which the appellant and his companions perpetrated the crime showed beyond
reasonable doubt the presence of conspiracy. When a homicide takes place by reason of or on the occasion
of the robbery, all those who took part shall be guilty of the special complex crime of robbery with
homicide whether they actually participated in the killing, unless there is proof that there was an
endeavor to prevent the killing. There was no evidence adduced in this case that the appellant attempted
to prevent the killing. Thus, regardless of the acts individually performed by the appellant and his co-accused,
and applying the basic principle in conspiracy that the “act of one is the act of all,” the appellant is guilty as a
co-conspirator. As a result, the criminal liabilities of the appellant and his co-accused are one and the same.
(Emphasis supplied) c ralawlawl ibra ry

In sum, the CA did not err in affirming the conviction of appellant for robbery with homicide. Appellant was
positively identified by prosecution eyewitness Arca as among those who perpetrated the robbery and killing
of Yap at the latter’s store on May 16, 2006 in Bgy. Rawis, Legazpi City. This positive identification prevails
over accused’s defense of alibi. As pointed out by the trial court, it was not physically impossible for appellant
to be at the scene of the crime considering the presence of many public conveyances which would drastically
cut the one hour walk from Bigaa to Rawis to only a “couple of minutes.” 20 cra lawred

On the award of damages, the trial court was correct in sentencing appellant to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and ordering him to pay P75,000.00 as civil indemnity for the fact of death and P75,000.00 as moral
damages, conformably with prevailing jurisprudence.21 We also find the award of exemplary damages in the
amount of P30,000.00 proper due to the presence of the aggravating circumstances of treachery and abuse
of superior strength, though these were not alleged in the information. While an aggravating circumstance not
specifically alleged in the information (albeit established at trial) cannot be appreciated to increase the criminal
liability of the accused, the established presence of one or two aggravating circumstances of any kind or nature
entitles the offended party to exemplary damages under Article 2230 of the Civil Code because the
requirement of specificity in the information affected only the criminal liability of the accused, not his civil
liability.22
cra lawred

The aforesaid sums shall earn the legal interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the finality of
judgment until full payment.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision dated March 22, 2013 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CR-HC No. 05171 affirming the Decision dated June 24, 2011 of the Regional Trial Court of Legazpi City,
Branch 10 in Criminal Case No. 10916 is AFFIRMED. The sums awarded as civil indemnity (P75,000.00),
moral damages (P75,000.00) and exemplary damages (P30,000.00) shall earn legal interest at the rate of
6% per annum from the finality of judgment until full payment.

With costs against the accused-appellant.

SO ORDERED. cralawlawlibra ry
SECOND DIVISION

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 175978

Plaintiff-Appellee,

Present:

QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson,

CARPIO MORALES,

TINGA,

- versus - VELASCO, JR., and

BRION, JJ

SAMUEL ALGARME y BONDA Promulgated:

@ Stingray (deceased) and
RIZALDY GELLE y BISCOCHO,

Accused-Appellants.

February 12, 2009

x --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
 DECISION

BRION, J.:

We review in this appeal the September 7, 2006 decision of the Court of

Appeals1 (CA) in CA-G.R. CEB-CR-HC No. 00239, affirming with modification
the June 25, 2002 decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), 2 Branch 60, Cadiz
City. The RTC decision found accused-appellants Samuel Algarme y Bonda
(Samuel) and Rizaldy Gelle y Biscocho (Rizaldy) guilty of the crime of robbery with
homicide, and sentenced them to suffer the death penalty.

ANTECEDENT FACTS

The prosecution charged the appellants before the RTC with the special
complex crime of robbery with homicide under an Information that states:

That on or about 2:45 a.m. of September 19, 1995 at Cadiz City Park, Cadiz
City, Negros Occidental, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused conspiring, confederating and helping one another
 with evident premeditation and treachery and with intent to kill, did then and there,
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault, attack and stab to death one Loreto
Batarilan y Ladiona, a tricycle driver, in order to rob, steal, and take away a belt
bag containing money and the wrist watch Seiko 5; and inflicting upon the person
of Loreto Batarilan the following injuries, to wit:

Penetrating to perforating stab wounds:

*2 cm. at epigastric area

*1-2 cm. in the following areas of the back

=11th rib scapular line, right

=4 wounds at right scapular area
=4 wounds at left scapular area
=1wound at interscapular area, left
=2 wounds infrascapular area, left

*1 wound supraclavicular area, left

*1 wound infra-suricular area, left

CAUSE OF DEATH: Cardio-pulmonary arrest due to hypovolemic shock

secondary to Multiple Stab wounds, which directly caused the death of the said
victim Loreto Batarilan, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of the said victim
in the amount, to wit:

P50,000.00 as indemnity for the death of the victim.

ACT CONTRARY TO LAW.3

The appellants pleaded not guilty to the charge. The prosecution presented the
following witnesses in the trial on the merits that followed: Rudy Pepito (Rudy); Dr.
Jimmily Aguiling (Dr. Aguiling); Norman Palma (Norman); Police Officer 3
Landolfo Acita (PO3 Acita); and Alicia Batarilan (Alicia). Rizaldy was the lone
defense witness.

Rudy narrated that he slept at the Maricom Detachment Office located in

Punta Cabahug, Cadiz City and rode a tricycle bound for Ceres Bus Terminal at
around 2:45 a.m. of September 19, 1995 because his service vehicle broke down.4
As the tricycle passed by the Cadiz City Park, he saw a parked empty tricycle and
an old man being stabbed by three (3) persons. Two (2) persons held the victim while
the third one stabbed him. Rudy described the person who stabbed the victim to be
white and tall, while the other two (2) who held the victim were short.5

He further narrated that the victim was stabbed several times in front and at
the back and cried for help as he was being stabbed. The driver of the tricycle he was
riding, apparently afraid, increased the vehicles speed as they passed the stabbing
scene. When they reached the Ceres Bus Terminal, he (Rudy) immediately boarded
a bus bound for Sagay.6 He returned to Cadiz on September 21, 1995 and told Cesar
Ladiona (Cesar), a barangay tanod, that he saw a person being stabbed at the park
in the morning of September 19. Cesar brought him to the Cadiz City Jail where he
was asked whether he could recognize the assailants. He identified the person who
stabbed the victim from among the prisoners in jail.7

He testified on cross-examination that the tricycle he was riding was very near
the scene of the stabbing incident,8 and that the park was very brightly lit that night.9
He stated that he did not immediately report the stabbing incident upon arriving at
the Ceres Bus Terminal because he was afraid and because the Ceres bus bound for
Sagay was already leaving.10 When he reported the stabbing incident to Cesar on
September 21, 1995, Cesar asked him if he could identify the assailants. He replied
that he could, but only through their faces. Cesar then brought him to the city jail11
where the Chief of Police asked him to point out the persons responsible for the
stabbing he reported. He recognized two (2) of the assailants from among the many
prisoners inside the jail. He recalled that the prisoners were not brought out of their
cell when he was asked to identify the assailants.12
 Dr. Aguiling, Medical Officer III at the Cadiz City Emergency Clinic, testified
that he went to Cabahug Street near the City Hall in the morning of September 19,
1995 at the request of the police. At the place, he saw the body of an elderly male
person sprawled on the ground, about 10 meters away from a parked empty
tricycle.13 He found that of the 12 wounds inflicted on the victims body, four (4)
were fatal. The wounds could have been caused by a bladed weapon.14 According
to Dr. Aguiling, the victims cause of death was cardio-pulmonary arrest due to
hypovolemic shock secondary to multiple stab wounds.15

Norman, a tricycle driver residing in Cadiz City, narrated that he brought his
passengers to Ester Pharmacy and Villa Consing, respectively, in the early morning
of September 19, 1995; afterwards, he went to Cabahug Street and saw Melanie, the
wife of a co-driver. Melanie asked him to look for her (Melanies) husband. Melanie
boarded his tricycle and requested to be brought to the Ester Pharmacy.16 On the
way there, he saw Loreto Batarilan (Loreto) driving his own tricycle and trailing his;
he also saw three (3) persons walking towards the direction of the Emergency Clinic.
He identified two of them as Rizaldy and Stingray both of whom he had known for
a long time. He went back towards the direction of the City Hall after Melanie
alighted at the Ester Pharmacy.17 He saw Loretos parked tricycle as he passed by
the City Hall on Cabahug Street; he then saw Loretos body full of blood lying on the
street. He also saw Rizaldy, Stingray, and a certain John Doe, about two (2) extended
arms length away from the victims body, walking towards the park carrying a belt
bag.18 He recalled that there were no other persons in the park during that time. He
went to the police headquarters to report the incident, but the headquarters was
closed. He then went to the Ester Pharmacy and requested the security guard to call
the police.19

PO3 Acita, Duty Investigator at the Cadiz City Police Station, testified that at
around 3:00 a.m. of September 19, 1995, the desk officer received a telephone call
informing the police about a dead person found near the City Hall. Together with
five (5) members of the Cadiz Police, he immediately went to Cabahug Street to
verify the report. At the reported place, he saw the body of a person lying on the
ground, full of blood. He likewise saw a tricycle parked near the City Park along
Cabahug Street. He inspected the tricycle and saw blood stains on the drivers seat.
Thereafter, he and the other members of the police requested Dr. Aguiling and a
photographer to come to the crime scene.20

Alicia, the victims wife, declared on the witness stand that her husband was a
tricycle driver; that her husband wore a Seiko watch when he left to ply his route in
the early morning of September 19, 1995. He also carried a belt bag containing
P1,200.00 plus loose change; the money was intended for the purchase of spare parts
for the tricycle.21 She further narrated that she only learned of the death of her
husband from her daughter in the morning of September 19, 1995. Only her children
went to the crime scene. She added that her husband earned P200.00 a day.22

The defense presented appellant Rizaldy who gave a different version of

events.

Rizaldy testified that he did not know his co-accused, Samuel, prior to their
arrest on September 21, 1995. At around 2:45 a.m. of September 19, 1995, he was
watching a billiard game in front of his house on Mabini Street, Cadiz City.23 Police
Officer Boy Caedo (PO Caedo) arrested him at around 9:00 a.m. of September 21,
1995. He was brought to the police station where PO Caedo showed him a shirt and
a black shorts, and asked whether he owned them. When he answered in the negative,
PO Caedo told him to go home. Thereafter, he was surprised to receive a notice from
the prosecutors office informing him that he was one of the accused in the killing of
Loreto. He and Samuel were brought to the City Prosecutors Office where they were
asked to secure the services of a lawyer and to file their counter-affidavits within 10
days. A certain Atty. Del Pilar came to him and advised him not to make a counter-
affidavit.24 He insisted that he had slept in the house of the spouses Mercedes and
Manuel Apuhin (spouses Apuhin) in the morning of September 19, 1995, and that
Mercedes told him at around 7 a.m. that an old man had been killed in the park.25

He admitted on cross-examination that Norman identified him at the police

headquarters as one of the persons who had robbed and killed the victim.26 He stated
that he had been staying since 1994 at the house of the spouses Apuhin as a
household helper. He likewise stated that the Apuhin house was a two-minute walk
from the Cadiz City Park.27
 The RTC convicted appellants Samuel and Rizaldy of the special complex
crime of robbery with homicide in its decision of June 25, 2002, as follows:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, this Court finds accused

Samuel Algarme y Bonda and Rizaldy Gelle y Biscocho (all detained) GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with Homicide as charged in the
Information and there being an aggravating circumstance of treachery attendant
thereto without any mitigating circumstance to offset the same, hereby sentences
the accused to the penalty of DEATH.

The two accused are all hereby ordered immediately committed to the
National Penitentiary for the execution of their sentence, and the Clerk of Court of
this Court is hereby directed to immediately forward the entire records of this case
to the Supreme Court for automatic review.

The two accused are further ordered to jointly and solidarily pay the heirs
of the victim the amount of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) by way of
indemnity for the death of LORETO BATARILAN, together with the amount of
THREE THOUSAND PESOS (P3,000.00) representing the cash amount and the
value of the wrist watch of the victim by way of reparation, and the amount of
THREE HUNDRED SEVENTY-FOUR THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED PESOS
(P374,400.00) by way of the loss of the earning capacity of the victim, Loreto
Batarilan, plus the amount of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) as moral
damages, and the further amount of TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS (P20,000.00)
as exemplary damages. The award for the loss of earning capacity together with the
moral and exemplary damages for which docket fees and legal fees, the Clerk of
Court of this Court is hereby directed to charge as liens on the award of damages
the said docket and other legal fees.

The case against alias Stingray who is still at-large is hereby ordered
ARCHIVED to be immediately revived upon his arrest.

Costs against accused Samuel Algarme and Rizaldy Gelle.

SO ORDERED.28
 The RTC, after receiving an information that one of the appellants had
escaped confinement and subsequently been killed in a shoot-out with the police,
issued an Order directing the counsels for both the prosecution and defense, as well
as the BJMP Warden and Chief of Police of PNP Cadiz City, to submit a report on
the incident.29 They reported and confirmed that Samuel had indeed been killed on
February 29, 1996 in a police shoot-out. Based on this confirmed development, the
trial court issued an Order dated October 17, 2002 modifying the dispositive portion
of its June 25, 2002 decision and dismissing the case against Samuel.30

On appeal, we endorsed this case to the CA for appropriate action and

disposition31 pursuant to our ruling in People v. Mateo.32 The CA, in its decision
of September 7, 2006, affirmed the RTC decision with the modification that the
death penalty imposed on Rizaldy be reduced to reclusion perpetua.
In his brief,33 the appellant argues that the RTC erred

1. in giving credence to the positive identification by the two (2)

prosecution witnesses pointing to him as the perpetrator of the crime
charged;

2. in finding that a conspiracy existed between him and his co-accused

Samuel;

3. in imposing the death penalty even if treachery had not been proven;
and

4. in convicting him of the crime charged even if its elements had not
been proven beyond reasonable doubt.

THE COURTS RULING

 We resolve to deny the appellants appeal as his guilt has been proven
beyond reasonable doubt, but we modify the lower courts decision with respect
to the crime committed, the penalty imposed, and the awarded indemnities.

Sufficiency of the Prosecution Evidence

An established rule in appellate review is that the trial courts factual findings
including its assessment of the credibility of the witnesses, the probative weight of
their testimonies, and the conclusions drawn from the factual findings are accorded
great respect and even conclusive effect. In our review of cases, these factual
findings and conclusions assume greater weight if they are affirmed by the CA.
Despite this enhanced persuasive effect, we nevertheless fully scrutinize the records
(as we did in this case), since the penalty of reclusion perpetua that the CA imposed
on the appellant demands no less than this kind of careful and deliberate
consideration.34

A distinguishing feature of the present case is the presence of a witness Rudy

who, in his November 27, 1995 testimony, positively identified the appellants as the
perpetrators. To directly quote from the records:
PROSECUTOR FRANCES V. GUANZON

Q: So when you were on board the tricycle and you were passing the
City Park, has [sic] there any unusual incident that transpired?

RUDY PEPITO

A: I saw a tricycle.

Q: Aside from the tricycle, what other things did you see?

A: An old man was stabbed.

xxx
Q: You said that an old man was stabbed? Did you see the person who
stabbed the old man?

A: I saw.

Q: How many persons stabbed the old man?

A: Three persons.

Q: How was the old man stabbed by these three (3) persons?

A: The old man was held by two persons while the other one
stabbed him.

Q: Can you describe the person, the one who actually stabbed the
victim?

A: Yes, maam.

Q: How does he look?

A: He was the one who stabbed the old man. He was white and tall.

Q: You said there were two persons who held the person while this
white tall person stabbed the old man. Can you describe the person
who held the old man, their appearance, their height, if you can
recall?

A: The two persons were short.

xxxx

Q: When you arrived on September 21, 1995 from Sagay to Cadiz, was
there anything that transpired?

A: When I arrived, I told Cesar that somebody was stabbed at the park.

Q: Who is this Cesar?

A: A Barangay Tanod.

Q: So, when you told him about what you saw on September 19, 1995,
what did this Cesar, who is a barangay tanod, do?

A: Cesar brought me to the Jail and asked me to identify the person.

Q: So, in other words, you were brought by barangay tanod Cesar to

the Cadiz City Jail to look at the persons who were inside the jail, is
that what you mean?

A: Yes.

Q: So, at the City Jail, were you able to identify the person who stabbed
Loreto Batarilan on the evening of September 19, 1995?

A: Yes, mam.

Q: How many were they did you see inside the Cadiz City Jail? [sic]

A: Three persons.

Q: When you said that there were three and the one who actually
stabbed was tall and white? If they are present in Court, can you
identify him? [sic]

A: Yes, maam.
.
Q: Please look around and point to the person who you described
as tall and white?

A: (Witness pointing to a person inside the courtroom who when

asked answer [sic] to the name Samuel Algarme)
 Q: You mentioned also that out of these two other persons who are
short held the old man while he was being stabbed by a white
man. [sic] If one of these short men who held Loreto Batarilan
on September 19, 1995 is present in this courtroom, can you
identify him?

A: Yes, maam.

Q: Please look around and point to one of these two persons who
held Loreto Batarilan on the evening of September 19, 1995
while he was stabbed by Samuel Algarme?

A: (Witness pointing to a person sitting inside the Courtroom who

when asked answered to the name Rizaldy Gelle)

Q: You said that there were three? What about the other persons who
held Loreto Batarilan when he was stabbed by Samuel Algarme, if
he is present in court, can you identify him?

A; Yes, maam.

Q: Is he present in Court today?

A: He is not here, maam.35 [Emphasis ours]

Rudys testimony was clear and straightforward; he never wavered in pointing

to the appellants as the persons who held and stabbed Loreto in the morning of
September 19, 1995. Significantly, the testimony of another prosecution witness
Norman supported Rudys story with respect to the presence of the appellants at the
crime scene. Although Norman did not say anything categorical about the actual
stabbing, he saw the appellants whom he had known for a long time in the same
vicinity as the victim before the stabbing and after the stabbing walking near the
victims lifeless body and carrying the latters belt bag.

These testimonies, when considered together, lead to no conclusion other than

the appellants direct participation in the stabbing that led to the victims death. To
reiterate, the appellants and the victim were in the same vicinity before the stabbing;
soon after, the appellants were seen holding and stabbing the victim; immediately
thereafter, they were also seen walking away, carrying the victims bag. In
considering these testimonies, we find it very significant that the defense failed to
refute the testimonies of Rudy and Norman through evidence showing motive that
could lead them to falsely testify against the appellants. In the absence of such
evidence, we can conclude that their testimonies are worthy of full faith and credit.36

Admissibility of Identification

Rizaldy challenges the reliability and integrity of the positive identification

Rudy made. He claims that his in-court identification was facilitated by a highly
suggestive and irregular out-of-court identification process. He harps on the fact that
the out-of-court identification was not made in a police line up but in a mere show-
up.
 We find this challenge to be baseless as we fail to see any flaw that would
invalidate Rudys out-of-court identification of the appellants. We see no basis, too,
to support the conclusion that the in-court identification an identification made
independently of the out-of court identification is itself tainted with invalidity.37

In People v. Teehankee, Jr.,38 we explained the procedure for out-of-court

identification and the test to determine its admissibility:

Out-of-court identification is conducted by the police in various ways. It is

done thru show-ups where the suspect alone is brought face-to-face with the witness
for identification. It is done thru mug shots where photographs are shown to the
witness to identify the suspect. It is also done thru line-ups where a witness identifies
the suspect from a group of persons lined up for the purpose x x x x In resolving the
admissibility of and relying on out-of-court identification of suspects, courts have
adopted the totality of circumstances test where they consider the following factors,
viz: (1) the witness' opportunity to view the criminal at the time of the crime; (2) the
witness degree of attention at that time; (3) the accuracy of any prior description,
given by the witness; (4) the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the
identification; (5) the length of time between the crime and the identification; and,
(6) the suggestiveness of the identification procedure.
Applying the totality-of-circumstances test, we find Rudys out-of-court
identification to be reliable and thus admissible. First, Rudy testified that the
tricycle he was riding passed very near the place where the victim was stabbed, and
that the park at that time was very bright. Second, Rudy was simply riding a
tricycle when the stabbing, a very startling incident, happened; no competing
incident took place to draw his attention away from the incident; and the event,
being startling, consumed his full attention and gave him the chance to see clearly
the features of the person stabbed, the manner he was stabbed, and the appearance
of the assailants. Third, he stated with certainty that he could identify the assailants
faces when he reported the incident to barangay tanod Cesar. Fourth, the
identification took place within two (2) days from the stabbing incident; he
explained fully why it took him two days to come forward and report the stabbing.
Finally, there was nothing suggestive or irregular about Rudys out-of-court
identification of the appellants; it was not even a show-up as Rizaldy suggests
where the suspects, tagged as the persons to be identified, are brought face-to-face
with the witness for confirmation of identification. When Rudy arrived at the
police station, he was asked to point to the assailants from among the many
prisoners inside the cell; he was not compelled to focus his attention on any
specific person or persons. There was also no evidence that the police had supplied
or even suggested to Rudy that the appellants were the suspected perpetrators.
Thus, Rudys identification was spontaneous, independent, and untainted by any
improper suggestion.

We do not agree that an identification is unreliable simply because it was not

conducted in a police line up. No law or police regulation requires a police line up
for proper identification in every case. There can still be a proper and reliable
identification even in the absence of a line up, for as long as the identification is
unaffected by prior or contemporaneous improper suggestions that point out the
suspect to the witness as the perpetrator to be identified.39
 Granting arguendo that the out-of-court identification was irregular as the
appellants claim, this identification did not foreclose the admissibility of Rudys
independent in-court identification.40 It must be stressed that in convicting the
appellants for the crime charged, the courts a quo did not rely solely on Rudys
identification at the city jail or on an in-court identification based on the city jail
identification. Rudys November 27, 1995 court testimony clearly shows that he
positively identified Samuel and Rizaldy independently of the previous
identification he made at the city jail. His testimony, including his identification of
the appellants, was positive, straightforward, and categorical. In People v. Timon41
where the appellants likewise questioned the reliability of their in-court
identification vis--vis their out-of-court identification, this Court ruled:

Even assuming arguendo the appellants out-of-court identification was

defective, their subsequent identification in court cured any flaw that may have
initially attended it. We emphasize that the inadmissibility of a police line-up
identification x x x should not necessarily foreclose the admissibility of an
independent in-court identification. We also stress that all the accused-appellants
were positively identified by the prosecution eyewitnesses during the trial.42

The Appellants Alibi

In stark contrast with the prosecutions case is Rizaldys weak and

uncorroborated defense.
 He claimed he was in front of his house watching a billiard game in the early
morning of September 19, 1995. On cross-examination, he retracted this statement
and insisted that he slept at the house of the spouses Apuhin located on Cabahug
Street on September 19, 1995.

These inconsistencies impact on a basic component that the defense of alibi

requires that there be physical impossibility for the accused to be at the scene of the
crime or its immediate vicinity at the time of its commission. If the appellant
cannot be consistent about his whereabouts, then he cannot hope to prove the
physical impossibility that the defense of alibi requires in order to merit serious
consideration.

At any rate, the physical impossibility for the appellant to be at the scene of
the crime on the date of its commission is negated by his own testimony that the
Apuhin house is a mere two-minute walk from the city park. More importantly, the
appellant was positively identified by Rudy. The settled rule in weighing
contradictory statements is that alibi cannot prevail over the positive identification
of the appellant by a credible witness, as in this case.43

The Crime Committed

Article 294, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code provides:

Art. 294. Robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons Penalties. -

 Any person guilty of robbery with the use of violence against or intimidation of any
person shall suffer:

1. The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death, when by reason or on

occasion of the robbery, the crime of homicide shall have been
committed, or when the robbery shall have been accompanied by rape or
intentional mutilation or arson.

A special complex crime of robbery with homicide takes place when a

homicide is committed either by reason, or on the occasion, of the robbery.44 To
sustain a conviction for robbery with homicide, the prosecution must prove the
following elements: (1) the taking of personal property belonging to another; (2)
with intent to gain; (3) with the use of violence or intimidation against a person; and
(4) on the occasion or by reason of the robbery, the crime of homicide, as used in its
generic sense, was committed.45 A conviction requires certitude that the robbery is
the main purpose, and objective of the malefactor and the killing is merely
incidental to the robbery.46 The intent to rob must precede the taking of human
life but the killing may occur before, during or after the robbery.47
 In People v. Salazar,48 this Court expounded on the concept of robbery with
homicide under Article 294(1) of the Revised Penal Code, thus:

The Spanish version of Article 294 (1) of the Revised Penal Code reads:
1.0--Con la pena de reclusion perpetua a muerte, cuando con motivo o con ocasion
del robo resultare homicidio. Chief Justice Ramon C. Aquino explains that the use
of the words con motivodel robo permits of no interpretation other than that the
intent of the actor must supply the connection between the homicide and the
robbery in order to constitute the complex offense. If that intent comprehends the
robbery, it is immaterial that the homicide may in point of time immediately
precede instead of follow the robbery. Where the original design comprehends
robbery, and homicide is perpetrated by reason or on the occasion of the
consummation of the former, the crime committed is the special complex offense,
even if homicide precedes the robbery by an appreciable interval of time. On the
other hand, if the original criminal design does not clearly comprehend
robbery, but robbery follows the homicide as an afterthought or as a minor
incident of the homicide, the criminal acts should be viewed as constitutive of
two offenses and not of a single complex offense. Robbery with homicide arises
only when there is a direct relation, an intimate connection, between the
robbery and the killing, even if the killing is prior to, concurrent with, or
subsequent to the robbery. [Emphasis ours]

In the case before us, the RTC convicted the appellants of robbery with
homicide based on the testimonies of Rudy, Alicia, and Norman. The CA affirmed
this finding without any explanation on how the crime came to be the special
complex crime of robbery with homicide. To be sure, Rudys testimony clinched the
case against the appellants with respect to the victims stabbing and resulting death.
The lower courts apparently deduced the intent to rob from the testimonies of Alicia
and Norman.

Alicia, in her testimony of August 27, 1996, testified that her husband had a
belt bag containing P1,200.00, more or less, and wore a Seiko watch when he left to
ply his route in the early morning of September 19, 1995. To
directly quote from the records:

PROSECUTOR FRANCES V. GUANZON

Q: So on September 19, 1995 at about 12:00 midnight he was still

alive, did he not go out to drive a tricycle at that time?

ALICIA BATARILAN:

A: Yes, maam. He went out to drive his tricycle.

xxx

Q: When he left your house was he carrying anything or did he have

anything in his possession?

A: He was [sic] with him a belt bag and a watch.

Q: What was the content of the belt bag if you know?

A: His money.

Q: Did you know how much his money was?

A: P1,200.00 and loose change.

Q: Why do you know that he had with him P1,200.00 and loose
change at that time.

A: He had with him P1,200.00 because he was intending to buy spare

parts of the tricycle.49
 Norman, in his testimony dated June 6, 1996, testified that he saw the
appellants, together with a John Doe, carrying a belt bag and walking away from the
victims body. We quote the pertinent portions of his testimony:

PROSECUTOR FRANCES V. GUANZON

Q: While you were at Cabahug Street somewhere at the City Park, was
there anything that you had noticed?

NORMAN PALMA

A: Yes maam.

Q: What was that?

A: I saw the tricycle of the old man without anybody on it.

Q: Who is this old man you are referring to?

A: I am referring to Loreto Batarilan.

Q: Where was the tricycle located?

A: Beside the City Park near the globe.

Q: And then what other things did you see?

A: I saw the old man lying down with blood.

Q: And where was the old man situated?

A: Beside the City Hall.

Q: And what else did you see?

A: I saw the three (3) persons walking towards the park with belt
bag.
Q: And who were these (3) persons you saw going towards the park
carrying a belt bag?

A: Stingray.

Q: Who else?

A: Gelle.

Q: And you said there were three, who was the other one?

A: I do not know his name but I can recognize his face.

Q: What was the distance of these three persons when you saw them
from the body of the old man you said?

A: Maybe about two (2) extended arms length away.

Q: Were there other persons walking also towards the park at that time
aside from these three (3) persons?

A: No more.

xxxx

Q: You mentioned that you saw three (3) persons and you mentioned
Stingray. If this Stingray is present in Court, can you identify him?

A: Yes, maam.

Q: Please look around and point to Stingray?

A: He is not around.

Q: You said the other one is named Rizaldy Gelle. Is he present in

Court?

A: Yes, maam.

Q: Please look around and point to Rizaldy Gelle.

COURT:
 Witness pointing to a person sitting inside the courtroom who
when asked answered to the name of Rizaldy Gelle. x x x50
[Emphasis ours]

Based on these testimonies, the RTC concluded that the appellants primary
criminal intent was to rob the victim. Thus it held:

Likewise, witness Alicia Batarilan also testified that her husband, the victim
herein, went out from their houses for his usual schedule of driving, the victim had
with him a belt bag containing the amount of One Thousand Two Hundred Pesos
(P1,200.00) plus loose change and the victim was wearing a wrist watch valued at
One Thousand Eight Hundred Pesos (P1,800.00), and this fact was proven by the
prosecution that a robbery took place before the killing of the victim considering
that after the incident the belt bag containing cash and the wrist watch of the victim
was seen being worn by one of the three persons who perpetrated the crime, since
as testified to by witness Norman Palma that when he saw the three persons walking
towards the park with a belt bag, no other persons were seen in the vicinity of the
crime immediately before or after the commission of the crime, thus it is logical to
conclude that the three persons indeed perpetrated the robbery and the killing of the
victim x x x

To sustain a conviction for the special complex crime of robbery with

homicide, the prosecution must establish with certitude that the killing was a mere
incident to the robbery, the latter being the perpetrators main purpose and
objective.51 It is not enough to suppose that the purpose of the author of the
homicide was to rob; a mere presumption of such fact is not sufficient.
 In the case before us, the testimonies of Norman and Alicia merely established
two (2) facts: that the victim carried a belt bag containing money on that fateful
morning of September 19, 1995; and the appellants were seen carrying the said belt
bag walking near the victims body. From these established facts, we hold that the
prosecution failed to establish the linkage required by law between a robbery and a
homicide to characterize the crime as the special complex crime of robbery with
homicide; there was no showing of the appellants intention determined by their acts,
prior to, contemporaneous with and subsequent to the commission of the crime to
commit robbery. There was likewise no testimony to show whether the appellants
intended to kill the victim in order to steal the belt bag, or whether the killing was
merely an afterthought. Thus, the appellants primary intent remains a mystery. The
fact that they were in possession of the victims belt bag after the killing does not
ipso facto give rise to the conclusion that their overriding intention was to rob the
victim.

We have held in several cases52 that where the evidence satisfactorily

establishes that the appellant did kill and unlawfully take the personal property of
the victim, but the original criminal design to commit robbery was not duly proven
the accused-appellant should be held liable for the separate crimes of homicide or
murder (as the case may be) and theft, and not for the special complex crime of
robbery with homicide.
 This Court recognizes that the Information accused the appellants of the
crime of robbery with homicide. The established rule, however, is that the nature
and character of the crime charged are determined, not by the given designation of
the specific crime, but by the facts alleged in the Information.53 In this case, all the
elements relevant to the killing and the taking of property were properly stated in
the Information; only the statement of the specific crime committed a conclusion
of law remained to be correctly made. This, we do in this Decision.

Homicide or Murder?

The Information alleged the aggravating circumstance of treachery.

However, we cannot appreciate this circumstance as the prosecution failed to show
proof that the appellants made some preparation to kill the victim in a manner that
would ensure the execution of the crime or make it impossible or difficult for the
person attacked to defend himself.54

The Information likewise alleged the aggravating circumstance of evidence

premeditation. For this aggravating circumstance to be appreciated, the following
must be proven: 1) the time when the accused decided to commit the crime; 2) an
overt act manifestly indicating that the accused clung to such determination; and 3)
between the decision and the execution, a sufficient lapse of time that allowed for
reflection on the consequences of the act contemplated.55 None of these elements
have been established in the case before us.

In the absence of any circumstance which would qualify the victims killing
to murder, we hold that the appellant should be held liable only for the crime of
homicide.

The Proper Penalties

The penalty for homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code is
reclusion temporal. In the absence of any modifying circumstance proven by the
prosecution or by the defense, the penalty shall be imposed in its medium period.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the appellant can be sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty whose minimum shall be within the range of prision mayor
(the penalty next lower in degree to that provided in Article 249) and whose
maximum shall be within the range of reclusion temporal in its medium period.

Article 309 of the Revised Penal Code provides the following penalties for
the crime of theft:

Art. 309. Penalties. - Any person guilty of theft shall be punished by:

xxx

3. The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods, if the
value of the property stolen is more than 200 pesos but does not exceed 6,000 pesos.
 In the absence of any mitigating or aggravating circumstance, the maximum
term of the indeterminate penalty, which is prision correccional in its minimum
and medium periods, should be imposed in the medium period or one (1) year,
eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days, to two (2) years, eleven (11) months
and ten (10) days. The minimum of the indeterminate penalty is anywhere within
the range of the penalty next lower, or arresto mayor, in its medium and maximum
periods which is two (2) months and one (1) day to six (6) months.

Civil Indemnity

a. Homicide

The award for civil indemnity is mandatory and is granted to the heirs of the
victim without need of proof other than the commission of the crime.56 Pursuant
to current jurisprudence,57 an award of P50,000.00 to the victims heirs is in order.

Moral damages are mandatory in cases of murder and homicide without

need of allegation and proof other than the death of the victim. Consistent with this
rule, we award the amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages in accordance with
prevailing jurisprudence.58
 We likewise award loss of earning capacity to the victims heirs. As a rule,
documentary evidence should be presented to substantiate a claim for loss of
earning capacity. By way of exception, damages may be awarded despite the
absence of documentary evidence, provided testimony exists that the victim was
either (1) self-employed, earning less than the minimum wage under current labor
laws, and judicial notice may be taken of the fact that no documentary evidence is
usually available in the victims line of work; or (2) employed as a daily wage
worker, earning less than the minimum wage under current labor laws.59 Given
Alicias testimony that her husband was a tricycle driver earning P200.00 a day, we
hold that the heirs are entitled to an award representing the loss of the victims
earning capacity computed under the following formula:

Net Earning Capacity = 2/3 x (80 less the age of the victim at the time of death) x
(Gross Annual Income less the Reasonable and Necessary Living Expenses)

The records show that Loretos annual gross income was P72,000.00 per
annum computed from his monthly rate of P6,000.00 (or P200.00 per day). His
reasonable and necessary living expenses are estimated at 50% of this gross
income, leaving a balance of P36,000.00. His life expectancy, on the other hand is
assumed to be 2/3 of the age 80 less 62, his age at the time of death. Applying the
formula yields the net earning capacity of P432,000.00.

We can only award actual damages to the extent actually proven by

evidence, i.e., upon competent proof and the best evidence obtainable by the
injured party. In this case, the prosecution failed to present any receipt to prove the
claim for expenses incurred in relation with the victims death. Nevertheless, we
can award P25,000.00 as temperate damages pursuant to our ruling in People v.
Abrazaldo60 that temperate damages of P25,000.00 may be awarded in place of
actual damages, where the amount of actual damages for funeral expenses cannot
be determined with certainty under the rules of evidence.

b. Theft

The only evidence of the amount stolen from the victim is the belt bag that,
according to Alicia contained P1,200.00, more or less. No valuation was ever made
on the cost of the belt bag. While the victim also had a Seiko watch when he left
home before he died, no proof exists that the appellants took the watch. Hence, we
can only order the heirs indemnified to the extent of P1,200.00.

WHEREFORE, in view of these considerations, the Decision of the Court

of Appeals in CA-G.R. CEB-CR-HC No. 00239 is MODIFIED as follows:

(1) Appellant Rizaldy Gelle is found GUILTY of the separate crimes of

homicide and theft.

(2) For the crime of homicide, the appellant is SENTENCED to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of twelve (12) years of prision
mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of
reclusion temporal, as maximum; he is likewise ORDERED to PAY the
 victims heirs the following amounts: (a) P50,000.00 as civil indemnity;
(b) P50,000.00 as moral damages; (c) P25,000.00 as temperate damages;
and (d) P432,000.00 as indemnity for loss of earning capacity.

(3) For the crime of theft, the appellant is SENTENCED to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of six (6) months of arresto
mayor, as minimum, to two (2) years, eleven (11) months and ten (10)
days of prision correccional, as maximum; he is likewise ORDERED to
PAY the victims heirs the amount of P1,200.00 representing the value of
the money stolen.

Costs against appellant Rizaldy Gelle y Biscocho.

SO ORDERED.

ARTURO D. BRION

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:
 LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING

Associate Justice

Chairperson

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES DANTE O. TINGA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts
Division.
 LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING

Associate Justice

Chairperson

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division
Chairpersons Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above
Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the opinion of the Courts Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO

Chief Justice
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. FAUSTO OBEDO
y BORBAJO alias TITING, accused-appellant.

DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

This is an appeal from the decision,61 dated February 1, 1995, of the Regional Trial
Court (Branch 1), Tagum, Davao, insofar as it finds appellant Fausto Obedo guilty of
robbery with homicide and sentences him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and
to pay the heirs of the victims the amount of P100,000.00 as civil indemnity for the deaths
of spouses Wilfredo and Jinky Luayon, P40,000.00 as moral damages, and P100,000.00
as actual and compensatory damages, and to pay the costs.
On May 7, 1990, appellant was charged with Robbery with Homicide under Art. 294,
par. 1, in relation to Arts. 293 and 249 of the Revised Penal Code, in an Information
docketed as Criminal Case No. 7382, which reads:
That on or about February 21, 1990, in the Municipality of Kapalong, Province of
Davao, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping with Arnold Ranalan Alias
Opong and Alias Tony Villamor, who are now deceased, armed with a revolver, with
intent of gain and by means of violence and intimidation of persons, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and carry away cash money amounting to
TEN THOUSAND (P10,000.00) PESOS, Philippine Currency, belonging to the spouses
Wilfredo Luayon and Jinky Luayon, and on the occasion of the said robbery, the said
accused, with intent to kill, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack,
assault and shoot Wilfredo Luayon and Jinky Luayon, thereby inflicting upon them
wounds which caused their death, and further causing actual, moral and compensatory
damages to the heirs of the victims.
Contrary to law.62
When arraigned on July 31, 1990, appellant pleaded not guilty to the crime charged;
whereupon trial ensued.
The prosecution presented seven witnesses, namely: Dominador Luayon, Pat.
Aguedo Ganiera, Jesus Saraga, Abundo Mahinay, Dionisio Luayon, Carolina Saraga, and
Jerry Abando.
The gist of their testimonies is as follows:
The victims, spouses Wilfredo Luayon and Alice Jinky Luayon, are residents of
Kapalong, Davao. Wilfredo was a farmer who tilled his own rice field and earned his
income by selling palay (rice produce) after drying it.63 On February 19, 1990, after selling
palay, he kept his earnings, amounting approximately to P20,000.00, in a cavan (wooden
chest) inside his house.64
On February 21, 1990, at around 7 oclock in the evening, appellant together with
Arnold Ranalan and Tony Villamor went to the house of Jesus Saraga and requested the
latter to accompany them to the house of Wilfredo. Without asking any questions, Saraga
agreed. On the way to the house of Wilfredo, Saraga saw Ranalan remove a gun tucked
in his waist on the left side and held it. After escorting the three, Saraga went home. 65 At
around 7:30 oclock in the evening, Dominador Luayon, the brother of Wilfredo, heard a
commotion in the latters house. Dominador was at the balcony of his house, 50 meters
away from Wilfredos house, when he heard bottles falling to the floor. Shortly thereafter,
he heard his sister-in-law, Jinky, crying for help, so he hurriedly ran towards the house.
He slowly walked to the door but, finding it locked, went to the yard instead. He heard his
brother uttering the words, Why are you doing this to us, Pong?, after which, he heard
gunshots. Out of fear, Dominador laid on the ground, around four to five meters from one
of the windows of the house, and waited. He then heard the window being destroyed, and
after a while, saw two persons jump out from the window. Because the house was lighted
by a kerosene lamp, he saw appellant Fausto Obedo, alias Titing,66 jump first, followed by
Arnold Ranalan, alias Pong.67 Sensing that something happened, Dominador got up and
shouted for help. His brother-in-law, Alvis Milla, arrived, and they both went inside the
house through the broken window. He first saw Jinky upstairs, hardly breathing with her
baby alive and playing with her bloodied breasts. He next saw Wilfredo, his head hanging
in the crib.68
Moments later, Dionisio Luayon, another brother of Wilfredo, arrived. He saw the
wooden chest ajar with things and some loose coins scattered on the floor. He attended
to Jinky who whispered to him that they were robbed by the appellant and Ranalan. Both
victims died before they could be brought to the hospital.69 The Certificates of Death of
the two victims reveal that they died of irreversible shock and gunshot wounds.70
At around 10 oclock in the evening, riding in a motorcycle, appellant, Ranalan and
Villamor went to Abundio Mahinays house to borrow a shirt from him as Ranalans shirt
was stained with blood.71
Pat. Aguedo Ganiera, chief intelligence and member of the investigation section of
the Integrated National Police (INP) in Kapalong, Davao, and his team conducted a
follow-up investigation on the incident. According to his investigation report,72 on February
28, 1990, his team captured Arnold Ranalan who voluntarily confessed and admitted to
have participated in robbing and killing the Luayon spouses in Kapalong, Davao.
However, a few minutes after he was captured and handcuffed, Ranalan managed to
escape and held a boy hostage. The PC/Alsa Masa Detachment, which assisted Pat.
Ganieras team, was prompted to subdue Ranalan by shooting him. Ranalan was rushed
to the Davao Doctors Hospital and later on transferred to Davao Medical Center where
he was treated. Unfortunately, a few hours later, he died due to the gunshot wound he
had sustained.
The team next made a follow-up on Antonio Villamor, alias Tony, in Davao City. They
learned that he was allegedly shot to death by unidentified persons at Claveria, Davao
City.
As to appellant Obedo, the team was able to arrest him in Maniki, Kapalong, Davao
on March 1, 1990 at around 7:00 oclock in the evening and turned him over to the Station
Commander for proper disposition.
On the other hand, the defense presented three witnesses, namely: Jose Rana,
Vicente Gutierrez and appellant Fausto Obedo.
Appellants defenses are denial and alibi. According to him, he is engaged in the
business of buying and selling livestock. He lives in Kapalong, Davao but he frequents
several barangays in order to buy pigs, carabaos and cows. He claims that on February
21, 1990, he went to Gabuyan, a neighboring barangay, at around 10:30 oclock in the
morning because he was informed that a resident is looking for a buyer of carabao. He
headed home to Kapalong at around 11 oclock in the morning and stayed home for the
rest of the day to attend to his sand and gravel business. According to him, he was
arrested without a warrant and detained on February 28, 1990 although no complaint or
information against him has been filed yet. He admitted that he knew Wilfredo and Jinky
Luayon personally, as he buys carabaos and pigs from them regularly, the last of which
was about a month before the incident. However, he denies that he killed and robbed the
victims. He instead intimated that Jesus Saraga, who is a known tambay, and the two
others (Ranalan and Villamor) may have had a hand in the incident.73
The defense presented Jose Rana and Vicente Gutierrez to prove the good moral
character of the appellant. According to Rana, he has known the appellant for 15 years
because the latter served as his agent in buying cows, carabaos and pigs. He knows
accused to be a farmer and a contractor of sand and gravel. 74 Gutierrez, on the other
hand, testified that he has known the accused since childhood. According to him, the
accused has no criminal record nor was he ever involved in any criminal incident except
for the instant case.75
On February 1, 1995, the trial court rendered its decision. It held that circumstantial
evidence proved that accused is a co-conspirator of Ranalan and Villamor in the
commission of the crime of robbery with homicide, surpassing direct evidence in weight
and probative value. It gave weight to the affirmative testimonies of witnesses over the
denial of the accused. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds the accused FAUSTO
OBEDO y Borbajo, 39 years of age, married to Fely C. Bitangga, alleged
businessman/farmer, and resident of Maniki, Kapalong, Davao, guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with Homicide penalized under Article 293 and
249 of the Revised Penal Code, as charged in the information, and is hereby sentenced
to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, with all the accessory penalties provided by
law, and to indemnify the heirs of the victims Wilfredo and Alice Jinky Cuerpo-Luayon as
follows:
1. As indemnity for each death: FIFTY THOUSAND (P50,000.00) PESOS, or, a total
of ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND (P100,000.00) PESOS for the two (2) deaths;
2. As and for moral damages: TWENTY THOUSAND (P20,000.00) PESOS, or, a
total of FORTY THOUSAND (P40,000.00) PESOS for the two (2) deaths;
 3. As and for actual and compensatory damages, which includes funeral expenses,
burial and other necessary expenses: FIFTY THOUSAND (P50,000.00) PESOS,
or, a total of ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND (P100,000.00) PESOS for the two (2)
deaths;
and to restitute to the lawful heirs of the deceased-victims spouses, Wilfredo and Alice
C. Luayon, the amount of TEN THOUSAND (P10,000.00) PESOS, Philippine Currency,
which is the amount robbed from said victims and as reflected in the information, and to
pay the costs.
In the service of this sentence, said accused Fausto Obedo y Borbajo, alias Titing
shall immediately be turned over to the custody of The Director, Bureau of Corrections,
National Bilibid Prisons, Muntinlupa, Metro Manila, pursuant to Supreme Court Circular
No. 4-92-A dated April 20, 1992, amending SC Administrative Circular No. 4-92 dated
January 14, 1992, and is therefore hereby ordered committed to the custody of the
Provincial Warden of Davao Province preparatory to his remittance to the National Bilibid
Prisons. As a consequence, the bail bond posted by said accused is hereby ordered
cancelled. Let the corresponding mittimus or commitment order be issued forthwith.
IT IS SO ORDERED.76
Hence, the present appeal. Appellant claims that there is no evidence to support his
conviction and that the constitutional presumption of innocence remained untarnished
and can be invoked in favor of the accused.77
The Court finds that the trial court erred in finding the appellant guilty of robbery with
homicide.
In order to be convicted of robbery with homicide, four (4) elements are necessary:
(a) the taking of personal property with the use of violence or intimidation against the
person; (b) the property taken belongs to another; (c) the taking is characterized by intent
to gain or animus lucrandi; and, (d) on the occasion of the robbery or by reason thereof
the crime of homicide was committed.78 It is necessary that the robbery itself be proved
as conclusively as any other essential element of the crime.79 For there to be robbery,
there must be taking of personal property belonging to another, with intent to gain, by
means of violence against or intimidation of any person or by using force upon things. 80
In this case, aside from the fact that no inventory was conducted after the incident,
as is usually done in robbery cases,81 the prosecution did not convincingly establish the
corpus delicti of the crime of robbery. Corpus delicti has been defined as the body or
substance of the crime and, in its primary sense, refers to the fact that a crime has actually
been committed.82 As applied to a particular offense, it means the actual commission by
someone of the particular crime charged.83 In this case, the element of taking as well as
the existence of the money alleged to have been lost and stolen by appellant was not
adequately established. We find that no sufficient evidence stands to show either the
amount of money stolen from the victims wooden chest or if any amount was in fact stolen
from them at all. While the Information against appellant alleged that he, together with
Ranalan and Villamor, stole money amounting to P10,000.00 from the victims, Dionisio
Luayon, Wilfredos brother, who claim to have knowledge of his brothers earnings kept in
the wooden chest, could not state with certainty the exact amount placed in the wooden
chest four days before the incident as well as the amount of money that was left after
payment of debts before the alleged robbery. He testified thus:
Q Will you please tell this Honorable Court what was the source of income of your
brother during his lifetime?
A He was also a farmer, sir.
Q Now, tell us, please, Mr. Dionisio Luayon, if days before the incident of February 21,
1990 your brother told you that he has income from the farm?
A Yes.
Q Tell us what was the source of this income?
A Because he sold palay, sir.
Q Do you have a personal knowledge how many sacks of rice that was sold by your
brother?
A About seventy (70) sacks.
Q Earlier you said that your occupation is a farmer. From that experience, can you tell
 this Honorable Court if we are to relate in terms of income, in money, how much
these seventy (70) sacks of rice will produce?
A In my estimate, sir, about Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos.
Q So, this money was kept by your brother in the house?
A Yes.
Q In what specific place of the house?
A In their cavan, sir.
Q Now, when you were inside the house on that evening of February 21, 1990 were
you able to see this cavan you are referring now?
A Yes.
....
Q Tell this Honorable Court what was the situation of this wooden chest when you saw
it that evening?
A It was already opened, sir.
Q What else?
A The things that were inside were already scattered.
Q Was the money kept by your brother in that wooden chest?
A Yes.84 (Emphasis ours)
On cross-examination, he testified:
Q Now, you said you saw the chest where your brother used to keep his money. Are
you telling the Court that you actually saw your brother putting his money inside the
chest or you were just presuming or you were just told?
A I saw it, sir.
Q How many days before the alleged robbery did you see your deceased brother put
his money in that chest?
A About four (4) days, sir.
Q Did you . . . do you know how much money he put in that chest?
A Not less than Twenty Thousand (P20,000.00) Pesos.
Q Did he count the money before you when he placed that money in the chest?
A Yes.
....
Q And did you tell Dominador and Alvis that that chest contains the money of your
 deceased brother?
A I did not tell them, sir.
Q Did you not tell Dominador and Alvis that that chest was the receptacle of the money
of your deceased brother in the amount of Twenty Thousand (P20,000.00) Pesos?
Did you not tell them?
A The actual?
Q At that time when you went there in the night of the incident?
A I told them that the money was placed there at the wooden trunk.
Q Now, when you were asked by Atty. Arafol whether the chest still contains the money
when you arrive you said, yes.
Did you remember having been asked that question and answered yes?
A Yes, the loose change was there but the paper bills were not already there.
Q So, you were very sure that those changes what do you mean by changes, coins or
also papers?
A Loose coins.
Q Did you see your deceased brother put those coins there at the time when he
counted the money of P20,000.00?
A Yes.
Q How much coins did he place there?
A I do not know about the loose coins.
Q How about the paper bills, how much?
A About Twenty Thousand (P20,000.00) Pesos.
Q So, when you stated a while ago that your deceased brother put Twenty Thousand
(P20,000.00) Pesos there it is not true because it is more than P20,000.00, after all?
A Because it was only my estimate, sir.
Q So, the P20,000.00 you mentioned was only estimated by you, you do not know
really that it was the exact amount?
A Yes, because he might have gotten some of the amount because he has debts
considering that he is a farmer.85 (Underscoring ours)
Clearly therefrom, the amount of money in the chest on the date when the alleged
robbery took place was not established. There was no adequate proof of the robbery.
Aside from the loose coins that were found, the prosecution failed to show conclusively
that the chest contained money at the time of the incident. There was no substantial link
between the alleged loss of the contents of the wooden chest and the appellant, for the
money was never seen in the possession of the appellant.86 While there is testimony that
the victims had money four days before the incident, the hiatus between the acquisition
of the money by the victims and the commission of the delict itself was long enough for
the victims to be able to send the money elsewhere, 87 such as to pay off their debts, as
testified to by Dionisio himself. The prosecution failed to show by concrete evidence that
certain amount of money was taken by the appellant.
The trial court erred in relying on the testimony of Dionisio Luayon to establish that
robbery has been committed by appellant. It is axiomatic that evidence to be believed
must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness but must also be credible in
itself, such that common experience and observation of mankind lead to the inference of
its probability under the circumstances.88 In criminal prosecution, the court is always
guided by evidence that is tangible, verifiable and in harmony with the usual course of
human experience and not by mere conjecture or speculation.89 Testimonies that do not
adhere to this standard are necessarily accorded little weight or credence.90
The Court finds the narration of Dionisio Luayon on the circumstances pertaining to
the ante mortem statement of Jinky Luayon improbable and beyond belief for being
contrary to human nature and experience. He testified as follows:
Q What about his wife?
A She was almost dying and I think she has something to say.
Q What did you do upon observing that manifestation from the wife of your brother?
A I went nearer and I held her and asked her, (Witness demonstrating by raising his
two hands as if holding something).
Q Now, when you embraced her, what did you do?
A I asked her who was responsible.
Q Was she able to answer?
A Yes.
Q Tell us what was her answer, please?
A According to her, they were robbed by Titing and Ompong.
ATTY. ARAFOL:
Q Now, if this Titing you said earlier, if presented to you, you can identify him?
A Yes.
Q Why can you identify him?
A Because he is a resident of Gabuyan for a long time and I am familiar to him also
because I spent my schooldays in Gabuyan, sir.
Q You did not report to the police authorities of Kapalong that your sister-in-law at the
brink of her death told you that it was a certain Titing and a certain Ompong who
robbed her and her husband?
A No, sir.
Q Of course, the police authorities of Kapalong investigated this incident? You know
that?
A Yes.
Q And you never volunteered to testify in spite of the fact that you know that the police
authorities investigated the death of your sister-in-law and your brother, you never
offered to give him a statement as to that particular aspect wherein your dying sister-
in-law told you that it was Ompong and Titing who robbed them?
A Because I already told the story to my parents.
Q You never told this matter to the police, only to your parents?
A Yes.
Q What about . . . except your parents, who else did you tell this incident or report this
incident?
A My other sister.
Q What is the name of that other sister?
A Josephine Luayon.
Q When you told this incident to your parents did not your parents advise you to see
the police authorities especially the Chief of the INP, Mr. Galagala?
A He told me that I will tell it, sir, if it will be needed.
Q So, at that time you did not believe that your testimony or your statement was
necessary in order to help the authorities solve the crime?
A I was thinking, sir.
Q And yet you never reported this incident to the police?
 A No, sir.
Q You know Chief Galagala of the police of Kapalong? You know him personally, is it
not?
A Yes.
Q As a matter of fact you have known him for quite a long time even before February
1990 before this incident you are relating here?
A Yes. 91
The testimony of Dionisio goes beyond logic and normal human experience. First, we
find it extremely incredible that Jinky who was shot and in the brink of death would reply
to Dionisios query as to who was responsible, that they were robbed by appellant and
Ranalan instead of telling him who shot her and her husband. Second, we likewise find it
starkly unbelievable that if Jinky really told Dionisio who the culprits were, he failed to give
the names of appellant and Ranalan to the police investigators as the persons mentioned
by Jinky before her death. Third, it is equally unacceptable that he did not report to the
police that he saw the wooden chest of the deceased spouses open and the things in it
scattered on the floor on the night of February 21, 1990 when he found both victims dying.
Instead, he decided to withhold such vital informations notwithstanding the fact that he
knew the Chief of Police for a quite long time before the date of the incident. It is equally
incredible that Dionisio did not deem it necessary to report to the police what he knew
about the money of the deceased victims and what he heard from the dying Jinky. Also,
the trial court should have discredited the testimony of Dionisio that the Chief of Police
advised him to tell what he knows if it will be needed. Said officer was not presented to
attest to his advise, if it were true. Further, his testimony was not corroborated by either
of his parents or his sister. Not one of them was presented in court to substantiate his
testimony. Considering his close relationship to the victims, it would have been natural
for him to report all that he knows to the investigating officer not only for a speedy solution
of the case but also to ensure that his brother and sister-in-law would get justice for their
deaths. Thus, we find that the trial court erred in giving probative weight to the testimony
of Dionisio.
The Court and the trial court as well cannot presume that there was robbery merely
because Dionisio Luayon said so. It is essential to prove the intent to rob. 92 This
necessarily includes evidence to the effect that the appellant carried away the effects or
personalty of the deceased.93 In the instant case, there is absence of positive proof that
appellant intended to rob the deceased or that he was the one who carried away the
money belonging to the victims. The burden of proof rests on the prosecution to establish
that the money amounting to P10,000.00 as alleged in the Information was taken from
the victims on February 21, 1990, and, that it was taken by appellant or at the very least,
by his companions. In failing to discharge such burden of proof, the Court cannot in
conscience rely on mere presumptions and conjectures to hold that the appellant had
committed robbery on the night in question.
Thus, since the corpus delicti of the crime of robbery has not been sufficiently
established beyond reasonable doubt, appellant may not be held liable for robbery.
Absent any evidence that the appellant indeed robbed the victim, the special complex
crime of robbery with homicide cannot stand.94 The Court has no choice but to resolve the
doubt in favor of the appellant.
The trial court erred as well in finding appellant guilty of homicide.
The testimony of Dominador Luayon failed to prove that appellant committed or
participated in committing the crime of robbery with homicide. After a careful study of the
records, Dominador fared no better than his brother Dionisio on the witness stand. He
pointed to appellant as one of the three conspirators who killed his brother and sister-in-
law because he allegedly saw him and Ranalan jump out of the window of his brothers
house moments after the gunfires. However, in his affidavit,95 dated March 1, 1990,
Dominador did not mention the names of the persons he saw jump out of the window.
The affidavit reads:
Q-5:Then what transpired next?
A- That while I was at the immediate premises of the house of Wilfredo (my
brother) I got difficulty on where to pass to climb upstairs in the house
considering that the door was closed. Then while I was still downstairs I heard
burst of a gun four (4) times and after which, two male factors/suspects
jumped from the house by passing at the window and ran away. At this
juncture my brother in law named ALBIS MILLA arrived and immediately
climbed upstairs in the house of Wilfredo and I followed. We also passed at
the window for the door was still closed. And while inside I noticed that my
brother Wilfredo and his wife Jinky were hovering between life and death and
while maneuvering/initiating to transport the victims to the doctor, the couple
succumbed to death while still in their house.96 (Emphasis ours)
When he testified in court, Dominador tried to explain this material omission in his
affidavit by claiming that he wanted to tell the name of appellant but he was not asked by
the investigator.97 He said:
Q And you also know the accused Fausto Obedo very well?
A Yes, Sir, because they are friends.
Q They are close friends, as a matter of fact, Fausto Obedo and your deceased
brother, Wilfredo Luayon?
A I do not know if they are close friends but I know that they are friends.
...
Q Once you mentioned only the name Fausto Obedo as one of those who jumped out
of the window of the house of the deceased brother of yours, when did you decide
to tell or to reveal the name of Fausto Obedo as one of those who jumped out of the
window?
A I would like to tell it before but I was not asked.
...
Q You said you were not asked by the investigator who were the suspects who jumped
out of the window, why did you state in your affidavit that there were two (2)
malefactors who jumped out of the window if you were not asked?
ATTY. ARAFOL:
Your Honor please, before the witness answer, counsel is referring a question from the
record in the sworn statement. May we ask what paragraph?
ATTY. RAMA:
Paragraph 5 of the question and answer thereto.
ATTY. ARAFOL:
Paragraph 5 speaks for itself. It is a question what transpired next. There is no identity,
there is no question as to how many persons jumped out. . .
COURT:
I will allow that question.
WITNESS:
A I did not mention it because I was not asked about the name of that person who
jumped out.98 (Underscoring ours)
This explanation is too lame to be accepted. The question posed by the investigator
to Dominador called for a narration of what Dominador knew about the incident. He
voluntarily gave the information that he saw two persons jump out of the window and yet,
strangely enough, although he knew appellant and Ranalan very well, 99 he did not mention
their names. It casts serious doubt on the credibility of Dominador as a prosecution
witness. The identity of the malefactors is too important a detail for anyone who allegedly
witnessed the incident to overlook its omission in the very statement of the incident one
is giving.100 The omissions strongly and indubitably indicate Dominadors actual ignorance
of the real identity of the perpetrators of the crime.
The general rule has always been that discrepancies between the statement of the
affiant in his affidavit and those made by him on the witness stand do not necessarily
discredit him since ex parte affidavits are generally incomplete.101 Affidavits are generally
subordinated in importance to open Court declarations because they are oftentimes
executed when an affiants mental faculties are not in such a state as to afford him a fair
opportunity of narrating in full what actually transpired and are sometimes prepared with
partial suggestions from the administering officer.102 The exception to the rule is where the
omission in the affidavit refers to a very important detail of the incident such that the affiant
would not have failed to mention it, and which omission could affect the affiants
credibility.103
In the instant case, Dominador admitted on the witness stand that when he gave his
sworn statement, the person of appellant was still very fresh in his mind, and yet, in the
same breadth, he testified that he was not able to tell the name of the appellant except
for his built, size and standing, thus:
ATTY. RAMA:
Q Now, before you signed Exhibit 1and 1-a, did somebody read it for you?
A Yes, Sir.
Q Who read it for you?
A The policeman.
Q Was it read to you in English or in the Visayan dialect?
A It was read in English and then he translated it into the Visayan dialect.
Q You understood the same?
A Yes, sir.
Q And they are all true, what is contained in this exhibit?
A Yes, Sir.
Q You signed it after the same was translated to you in Visayan dialect, correct?
A Yes, Sir.
Q And is it not true that Judge Agayan also translated this document Exhibits 1 and 1-
a to you which you signed?
A Yes, Sir.
Q Now, you signed this affidavit one week after the death of your brother Wilfredo
Luayon. You still remember when you signed this Exhibits 1 and 1-a, it was still fresh
in your mind the two (2) persons who allegedly jumped out of the window of the
house of your deceased brother?
A Yes, Sir.
Q When you executed this Exhibit 1 and 1-a the person of Fausto Obedo was still very
fresh in your mind?
A Yes, Sir.
Q And you stated in your affidavit the identity and the name of the person who jumped
out of the window of the house of your deceased brother, Wilfredo Luayon?
A I was not able to tell the name of Fausto Obedo but his built, his size, and his
standing.
Q Why did you not mention the name of Fausto Obedo and Arnold Ranalan as the two
persons who jumped out of the window of the house of brother, Wilfredo Luayon in
Exhibit 1 and 1-a?
ATTY. ARAFOL:
In the affidavit, Your Honor, the name of Arnold Ranalan was mentioned.
ATTY. RAMA:
We will read this affidavit, Your Honor.
It is question No. 5 and the answer thereto which we request the Court Interpreter to
read this for the record, Your Honor.
COURT:
Alright.
MRS. MORTA:
 (Reading Question No. 5 and answer thereto of the affidavit of the witness)
Q Then what transpired next?
A That while I was at the immediate premises of the house of Wilfredo (my brother) I
got difficulty on where to pass to climb upstair in the house considering that the door
was close. Then while I was still downstairs I heard burst of a gun in four times (4)
and after which, two male factors/suspects jumped from the house by passing at the
window and ran away. At this juncture my brother in law named Albis Milla arrived
and immediately climbed upstairs in the house of Wilfredo and I followed. We also
passed at the window for the door was still close. And while inside I noticed that my
brother Wilfredo and his wife Jinky were hovering between life and death and while
maneuvering/initiating to transport the victims to the doctor, the couple succumb to
death while still in the house.
ATTY. RAMA:
Q Having admitted that Exhibit 1 and 1-a was read to you in English and translated to
you in Visayan dialect and having admitted that you understood the same, in the
question and answer that was read to you, you have mentioned the name of Fausto
Obedo and Arnold Ranalan as the person who jumped out of the window of the
house of your brother?
ATTY. RAMA:
The witness cannot answer, Your Honor. We will wait for his answer.104
Moreover, it is unbelievable that Dionisio did not recognize the two men he met. The
identities of the perpetrators of the crime are so material to the evidence of the
prosecution that the failure of the witnesses to identify and name the culprits during the
taking of their sworn statements cannot be taken merely as insignificant.
Prosecution witnesses Dominador as well as Dionisio Luayon failed to give a credible
and consistent account of the identities of the persons responsible for the killing of
spouses Wilfredo and Jinky Luayon as well as of the alleged robbery.
We are thus left with no clear picture of the events that transpired on February 21,
1990 and of the identity of the perpetrators.
The circumstantial evidence relied upon by the trial court in convicting the appellant
do not suffice to warrant a finding of guilt. The fact that at around 7 oclock in the evening
of February 21, 1990, Jesus Saraga accompanied appellant, Ranalan and Villamor to
Wilfredos house, and while on their way to the house of Wilfredo, he saw Ranalan get
hold of a gun tucked in the latters waist105 does not prove that robbery and killing took
place. The crime was committed at around 7:30 oclock in the evening. The prosecution
failed to show what transpired during the 30-minute span of time. Further, that Abundio
Mahinay saw appellant, Ranalan and Villamor at around 10 oclock in the evening of
February 21, 1990 when Ranalan borrowed a shirt from him because he was then wearing
a bloodstained shirt106 does not provide much support. What he witnessed transpired two
hours and a half after the incident. The link between the bloodstained shirt of Ranalan
and the participation of appellant in the killing was not sufficiently established.
For the foregoing reasons, although denial and alibi are generally held to be weak
and unavailing, these defenses gain commensurate strength when the credibility of the
prosecution witnesses is wanting and questionable and when the evidence for the
prosecution is frail and effete.107 The prosecution cannot rely on the weakness of the
evidence for the defense but must depend on the strength of its own evidence to prove
the guilt of the accused.108
It cannot be overemphasized that the constitutional presumption of innocence
demands not only that the prosecution prove that a crime has been committed but, more
importantly, the identity of the person or persons who committed the crime.109 In the case
at bar, the prosecution evidence failed to meet the quantum of proof beyond reasonable
doubt necessary for conviction in a criminal case to overcome the presumption of
innocence accorded by the Constitution to an accused.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and appellant
is ACQUITTED on the ground of reasonable doubt. The Director of the National Bilibid
Prisons, Muntinlupa, Metro Manila is directed to forthwith cause the immediate release of
appellant, unless the latter is detained for some other lawful cause, and to inform the
Court accordingly within ten (10) days from notice of the action taken by him.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, (Chairman), Quisumbing, and Callejo, Sr., JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 209342

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee

vs.
CRISENTE PEPAÑO NUÑEZ, Accused-Appellant

DECISION

LEONEN, J.:

To convict an accused, it is not sufficient for the prosecution to present a positive identification by a
witness during trial due to the frailty of human memory. It must also show that the identified person
matches the original description made by that witness when initially reporting the crime. The
unbiased character of the process of identification by witnesses must likewise be shown.

Criminal prosecution may result in the severe consequences of deprivation of liberty, property, and,
where capital punishment is imposed, life. Prosecution that relies solely on eyewitness identification
must be approached meticulously, cognizant of the inherent frailty of human memory. Eyewitnesses
who have previously made admissions that they could not identify the perpetrators of a crime but,
years later and after a highly suggestive process of presenting suspects, contradict themselves and
claim that they can identify the perpetrator with certainty are grossly wanting in credibility.
Prosecution that relies solely on these eyewitnesses' testimonies fails to discharge its burden of
proving an accused's guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

This resolves an appeal from the assailed June 26, 2013 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CR HC No. 04474, which affirmed with modification the February 24, 2010 Decision2 of Branch
67, Regional Trial Court, Binangonan, Rizal. This Regional Trial Court Decision found accused-
appellant Crisente Pepaño Nuñez (Nuñez) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of robbery with homicide.

In an Information, George Marciales (Marciales), Orly Nabia (Nabia), Paul Pobre (Pobre), and a
certain alias "Jun'' (Jun) were charged with robbery with homicide, under Article 294(1) of the
Revised Penal Code,3 as follows:

That on or about the 22nd of June 2000, in the Municipality of Binangonan, Province of Rizal,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
conspiring, confederating and mutually helping and aiding one another, armed with handguns, by
means of violence against or intimidation of the persons of Felix V. Regencia, Alexander C. Diaz and
Byron G. Dimatulac, with intent to gain, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take
and carry away the money amounting to ₱5,000.00 belonging to the Caltex gasoline station owned
by the family of Felix V. Regencia to their damage and prejudice; that on the occasion of the said
robbery and to insure their purpose, the said accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually
helping and aiding one another, with intent to kill, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault and shoot said Felix V. Regencia, Alexander C. Diaz and Byron G.
Dimatulac on the different parts of their bodies, thereby inflicting gunshot wounds which directly
caused their deaths.4

At first, only Marciales and Nabia were arrested, arraigned, and tried. In its December 9, 2005
Decision,5 the Regional Trial Court found the offense of robbery with homicide as alleged in the
Information, along with Marciales and Nabia's conspiracy with Pobre and Jun to commit this offense,
to have been established. Thus, it pronounced Marciales and Nabia guilty beyond reasonable doubt
and sentenced them to death.6 The case against Pobrn and Jun was archived subject to revival upon
their apprehension.7
On July 2, 2006, accused-appellant Nunez was apprehended by the Philippine National Police
Regional Intelligence Office on the premise that he was the same ''Paul Pobre" identified in the
Inforn1ation. Upon arraigru11ent, Nuñez moved that the case against him be dismissed as he was
not the "Paul Pobre" charged in the Information. However, prosecution witnesses identified him as
one (1) of the alleged robbers and his motion to dismiss was denied. The information was then
atnended to state Nuñez's name in lieu of "Paul Pobre."8

During trial, the prosecution manifested that it would be adopting the evidence already presented in
the course of Marciales and Nabia's trial. Apart from this, it also recalled prosecution witnesses
Ronalyn Cruz (Cruz) and Relen Perez (Perez). In their testimonies, they both positively identified
Nunez as among the perpetrators of the crime.9

Cruz's testimony recounted that in the evening of June 22, 2000, she was working as an attendant at
the Caltex gasoline station mentioned in the Infonnation. She was then sitting near the g1;1,soline
pumps with her co-employees, the deceased Byron G. Dimatulac (Dimatulac) and prosecution
witness Pierez. They noticed that the station's office was being held up. There were two (2) persons
poking guns at and asking for money from the deceased Alex Diaz (Diaz) and Felix Regencia
(Regencia). Regencia hancied money to one (1) of the robbers while the other robber reached for a
can of oil. Regencia considered this as enough of a distraction to put up a fight. Regencia and Diaz
grappled with the robbers. In the scuffle, Diaz shouted. At the sound of this, two (2) men ran to the
office. The first was identified to be Marciales and the second, according to Cruz, was Nunez.
Dimatulac also ran to the office to assist Regencia and Oiaz. Marciales then shot Dimatulac while
Nunez shot Diaz. Cruz and Perez sought refuge in a computer shop. About 10 to 15 minutes later,
they returned to the gasoline station where they found Diaz already dead, Dimatulac gasping for
breath, and Regencia wounded and crawling. By then, the robbers were rushing towards the
highway.10

Perez's testimony recounted that in the evening of June 22, 2000, she was working as a sales clerk
in the Caltex gasoline station adverted to in the Information. While seated with Cruz near the
gasoline pumps, she saw Nuñez, who was pointing a gun at Diaz, and another man who was
pointing a gun at Regencia, inside the gasoline station's office. Diaz shouted that they were being
robbed. Another man then rushed to the gasoline station's office, as did her co-employee Dimatulac.
A commotion ensued where the robber identified as Marciales shot Dimatulac, Diaz, and Regencia.
They then ran to their employer's house.11

Nunez testified in his own defense and recalled the circumstances of his apprehension. He stated
that when he was apprehended on July 2, 2006, he was on his way to his aunt's fish store where he
was helping since 1999 when a man approached him. He was then dragged and mauled. With his
face covered, he was boarded on a vehicle and brought to Camp Vicente Lim in Laguna. He further
claimed that on June 22, 2000, he was in Muzon, Taytay, Rizal with his aunt at her fish store until
about 5:00 p.m. before going home. At home, his aunt's son fetched him to get pails from the store
and bring them to his aunt's house.12

On February 24, 2010, the Regional Trial Court rendered a Decision13 finding Nunez guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of robbery with homicide. This four (4)-page Decision incorporated the original
Regional Trial Court December 9, 2005 Decision and added the following singular paragraph in
explaining Nunez's supposed complicity:

To convict Nunez of robbery with homicide requires proof beyond reasonable doubt that he: (1) took
personal property which belongs to another; (2) the taking is unlawful; (3) the taking is done with
intent to gain; and (4) the taking was accomplished with the use of violence against or intimidation of
persons or by using force upon things. Article 294(1) of the Revised Penal Code and (5) when by
reason or on occasion of the robbery, the crime of homicide shall have been committed[.] The facts
are simple. Nuñez along with Marciales and Nabia robbed the Tayuman Caltex gas station of
₱5,000.00 and some cans of oil. For such booty, he[,] along with his fellow thieves[,] shot and killed
Felix Regencia, Alexander C. Diaz and Byron G. Dimatulac. He was positively and unequivocally
identified by Renel Cruz and Ronalyn Perez as [one] of the perpetrators even as he tried to hide
behind another name and was arrested later. He ran but could not hide as the long arm of the law
finally caught up with him. As a defense, he can only offer his weak alibi which cannot offset the
positive identification of the prosecution witnesses. His guilt was proven beyond reasonable doubt.14

The Regional Trial Court rendered judgment, as follows:

Based on the foregoing, we find accused Crisente Pepaño Nuñez

GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with Homicide under Article 294 (1) of the
Revised Penal Code and sentences (sic) him to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and order
him to pay:

1. The heirs of Felix Regencia Php. 151,630.00 expenses for the wake, burial lot and funeral service;
Php. 75,000.00 death indemnity; Php. 5,000.00 money stolen from the victim; exemplary damages
of Php. 50,000.00; and Php. 2,214,000.00 unearned income;

2. The heirs of Alexander Diaz Php. 20,000.00 expenses for funeral service; Php. 75,000.00 death
indemnity; Php. 50,000.00 exemplary damages; and Php. 1,774,080.00 unearned income;

3. The heirs of Byron Dimatulac Php. 18,000.00 for funeral service; Php. 75,000.00 death indemnity;
Php. 50,000.00 exemplary damages; and Php. 966,240.00 unearned income[;] and

4. The costs.

Let the case against alias "Jun" who remains at large be archived.

SO ORDERED.15

On March 5, 2010, Nuñez fifed his Notice of Appeal.16

On June 26, 2013, the Court of Appeals rendered its assailed Decision17 affirming Nunez's
conviction, with modification to the awards of moral and exemplary damages, as follows:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the appeal is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. The
Decision dated February 24, 2010 of the Regional Trial Court of Binangonan, Rizal, Branch 67, in
Criminal Case No. 00-473 is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Accused-appellant Crisente
Pepaño Nuñez is ordered to pay ₱75,000.00 as moral damages and ₱30,000.00 as exemplary
damages each to the heirs of Felix Regencia, the heirs of Alexander Diaz and the heirs of Byron
Dimatulac.

SO ORDERED.18

Nuñez then filed his Notice of Appeal.19

The Court of Appeals elevated the records of this case to this Court on October 22, 2013 pursuant to
its Resolution dated July 23, 2013. The Resolution gave due course to Nuñez's Notice of Appeal.20
In its Resolution21 dated December 4, 2013, this Court noted the records forwarded by the Court of
Appeals and informed the parties that they may file their supplemental briefs. However, both parties
manifested that they would no longer do so.22

The occurrence of the robbery occasioned by the killing of Regencia, Diaz, and Dimatulac is no
longer in issue as it has been established in the original proceedings which resulted in the conviction
of Marciales and Nabia.

All that remains in issue for this Court's resolution is whether or not accused-appellant Crisente
Pepaño Nuñez is the same person, earlier identified as Paul Pobre, who acted in conspiracy with
Marciales and Nabia.

Contrary to the conclusions of the Court of Appeals and Regional Trial Court, this Court finds that it
has not been established beyond reasonable doubt that accused-appellant Crisente Pepaño Nuñez
is thy same person identified as Paul Pobre. Thus, this Court reverses the courts a quo and acquits
accused-appellant Crisente Pepano Nunez.

The prosecution's case rises and falls on the testimonies of eyewitnesses Cruz and Perez. The
necessity of their identification of Nunez is so manifest that the prosecution saw it fit to recall them to
the stand, even as it merely adopted the evidence already presented in the trial of Marciales and
Nabia. Cruz's and Perez's testimonies centered on their supposed certainty as to how it was Nuñez
himself, excluding any other person, who participated in the robbery and homicide.

This Court finds this supposed certainty and the premium placed on it by the Court of Appeals and
the Regional Trial Court to be misplaced.

There are two (2) principal witnesses who allegedly identified accused-appellant as the same Pobre
who participated in the robbery holdup. When Cruz, the first witness, was initially put on the witness
stand, she asserted that she could not recall any of the features of Pobre. After many years, with the
police presenting her with accused-appellant, she positively identified him as the missing
perpetrator. The second principal witness' testimony on the alleged participation of accused-
appellant is so fundamentally at variance with that of the other principal witness. The prosecution did
not account for the details of the presentation of accused· appellant to the two (2) witnesses after he
was arrested. Finally, these witnesses' alleged positive identification occurred almost eight (8) years,
for the first witness, and almost nine (9) years, for the second witness, from the time of the
commission of the offense.

The frailty of human memory is a scientific fact. The danger of inordinate reliance on human memory
in criminal proceedings, where conviction results in the possible deprivation of liberty, property, and
even life, is equally established.

Human memory does not record events like a video recorder. In the first place, human memory is
more selective than a video camera. The sensory environment contains a vast amount of
information, but the memory process perceives and accurately records only a very small percentage
of that information. Second, because the act of remembering is reconstructive, akin to putting puzzle
pieces together, human memory can change in dramatic and unexpected ways because of the
passage of time or subsequent events, such as exposure to "postevent" information like
conversations with other witnesses or media reports. Third, memory can also be altered through the
reconstruction process. Questioning a witness about what he or she perceived and requiring the
witness to reconstruct the experience can cause the witness memory to change by unconsciously
blending the actual fragments of memory of the event with information provided during the memory
retrieval process.23

Eyewitness identification, or what our jurisprudence commendably refers to as "positive

identification," is the bedrock of many pronouncements of guilt. However, eyewitness identification is
but a product of flawed human memory. In an expansive examination of 250 cases of wrongful
convictions where convicts were subsequently exonerated by DNA testing, Professor Brandon
Garett (Professor Garett) noted that as much as 190 or 76% of these Wrongful convictions were
occasioned by flawed eyewitness identifications.24 Another observer has more starkly characterized
eyewitness identifications as ''the leading cause of wrongful convictions."25

Yet, even Professor Garrett's findings are not novel. The fallibility of eyewitness identification has
been recognized and has been the subject of concerted scientific study for more than a century:

This seemingly staggering rate of involvement of eyewitness errors in wrongful convictions is,
unfortunately, no surprise. Previous studies have likewise found eyewitness errors to be implicated
in the majority of cases of wrongful conviction. But Garrett's analysis went farther than these
previous studies. He not only documented that eyewitness errors occurred in his cases. He also tried
to determine why they occurred - an issue eyewitness science has investigated for over 100 years.26

The dangers of the misplaced primacy of eyewitness identification are two (2)-pronged: on one level,
eyewitness identifications are inherently prone to error; on another level, the appreciation by
observers, such as jurors, judges, and law enforcement officers of how an eyewitness identifies
supposed culprits is just as prone to error:

The problem of eyewitness reliability could not be more clearly documented. The painstaking work of
the Innocence Project, Brandon Garrett, and others who have documented wrongful convictions,
participated in the exonerations of the victims, and documented the role of flawed evidence of all
sorts has clearly and repeatedly revealed the two-pronged problem of unreliability for eyewitness
evidence: (1) eyewitness identifications are subject to substantial error, and (2) observer judgments
of witness accuracy are likewise subject to substantial error.27

The bifurcated difficulty of misplaced reliance on eyewitness identification is borne not only by the
intrinsic limitations of human memory as the basic apparatus on which the entire exercise of
identification operates. It is as much the result of and is exacerbated by extrinsic factors such as
environmental factors, flawed procedures, or the mere passage of time:

More than 100 years of eyewitness science has supported other conclusions as well. First, the ability
to match faces to photographs (even when the target is present while the witness inspects the lineup
or comparison photo) is poor and peaks at levels far below what might be considered reasonable
doubt. Second, eyewitness accuracy is further degraded by pervasive environmental characteristics
typical · of many criminal cases such as: suboptimal lighting; distance; angle of view; disguise;
witness distress; and many other encoding conditions. Third, memory is subject to distortion due to a
variety of influences not under the control of law enforcement that occur between the criminal event
and identification procedures and during such procedures. Fourth, the ability of those who must
assess the accuracy of eyewitness testimony is poor for a variety of reasons. Witnesses' ability to
report on many issues affecting or reflecting accuracy is flawed and subject to distortion (e.g.,
reports of duration of observation. distance, attention, confidence, and others). thereby providing a
flawed basis for others' judgments of accuracy.28

Likewise, decision-makers such as jurists and judges, who are experts in law, procedure, and logic,
may simply not know better than what their backgrounds and acquired inclinations permit:
Additionally, the limits and determinants of performance for facial recognition are beyond the
knowledge of attorneys, judges, and jurors. The traditional safeguards such as cross-examination
are not effective and cannot be effective in the absence of accurate knowledge of the limits and
determinants of witness performance among both the cross-examiners and the jurors who must
judge the witness. Likewise, cross-examination cannot be effective if the witness reports elicited by
cross-examination are flawed: for example, with respect to factors such as original witnessing
conditions (e.g., duration of exposure), post-event influences (e.g., conversations with co-witnesses),
or police suggestion (e.g., repo1is of police comments or behaviors during identification
procedures).29

II

Legal traditions in various jurisdictions have been responsive to the scientific reality of the frailty of
eyewitness identification.

In the United States, the Supreme Court "ruled for the first time that the Constitution requires
suppression of some identification evidence"30 in three (3) of its decisions, all rendered on June
12, 1967-United States v. Wade,31 Gilbert v. California, 32 and Stovall v. Denno.33 Stovall emphasized
that such suppression, when appropriate, was "a matter of due process."34

Until the latter half of the twentieth century, the general rule in the United States was that any
problems with the quality of eyewitness identification evidence went to the weight, not the
admissibility, of that evidence and that the jury bore the ultimate responsibility for assessing the
credibility and reliability of an eyewitness's identification. In a trilogy of landmark cases released on
the same day in 1967, however, the Supreme Court ruled for the first time that the Constitution
requires suppression of some identification evidence. In United
States v. Wade and Gilbert v. California, the Court held that a post-indictment lineup is a critical
stage in a criminal prosecution, and, unless the defendant waives his Sixth Amendment rights,
defense counsel's absence from such a procedure requires suppression of evidence from the lineup.
The court also ruled, however, that even when the lineup evidence itself must be suppressed, a
witness would be permitted to identify the defendant in court if the prosecution could prove the
witness had an independent source for his identification ...

….

In Stovall v. Denno, the Court held that, regardless of whether a defendant's Sixth Amendment rights
were in1plicated or violated, some identification procedures are "so unnecessarily suggestive and
conducive to irreparable mistaken identification" that eyewitness evidence must be suppressed as a
matter of due process.35 (Citations omitted)

In Wade, the United States Supreme Court noted that the factors judges should evaluate in deciding
the independent source question include:

[T]he prior opportunity to observe the alleged criminal act, the existence of any discrepancy between
any pre-lineup description and the defendant's actual description, any identification prior to lineup of
another person, the identification by picture of the defendant prior to the lineup, failure to identify the
defendant on a prior occasion, and the lapse of time between the alleged act and the lineup
identification."36

Nine (9) months later, in Simmons v. United States, the United States Supreme Court calibrated its
approach by "focusing in that case on the overall reliability of the identification evidence rather than
merely the flaws in the identification procedure."
Ultimately, the Court concluded there was no due process violation in admitting the evidence
because there was little doubt that the witnesses were actually correct in their identification of
Simmons. Scholars have frequently characterized Simmons as the beginning of the Court's
unraveling of the robust protection it had offered in Stovall; while Stovall provided a per se rule of
exclusion for evidence derived from flawed procedures, Simmons rejected this categorical approach
in favor of a reliability analysis that would often allow admission of eyewitness evidence even when
an identification procedure was unnecessarily suggestive.37

In more recent Supreme Court decisions, the United States has "reaffirmed its shift toward a
reliability analysis, as opposed to a focus merely on problematic identification procedures" beginning
in 1972 through Neil v. Biggers:38

The Biggers Court stated that, at least in a case in which the confrontation and trial had taken place
before Stovall, identification evidence would be admissible, even if there had been an unnecessarily
suggestive procedure, so long as the evidence was reliable under the totality of the circumstances.
To inform its reliability analysis, the Biggers Court articulated five factors it considered relevant to the
inquiry:

[(l)] the opportunity of the witness to view the criminal at the time of the crime, [(2)] the witness'
degree of attention, [(3)] the accuracy of the witness' prior description of the criminal, [(4)] the level of
certainty demonstrated by the witness at the confrontation, and [(5)] the length of time between the
crime and the confrontation.

The Biggers Court clearly proclaimed that the "likelihood of misidentification," rather than a
suggestive procedure in and of itself, is what violates a defendant's due process rights. However,
the BiggersCourt left open the possibility that per se exclusion of evidence derived from
unnecessarily suggestive confrontations might be available to defendants whose confrontations and
trials took place after Stovall.39

The Biggers standard was further affirmed in 1977 in Manson v. Brathwaite; 40

The Manson Court made clear that the standard from Biggers would govern all due process
challenges to eyewitness evidence, stating that judges should weigh the five factors against the
"corrupting effect of the suggestive identification." Ultimately, the Court affirmed that "reliability is the
linchpin in determining the admissibility of identification testimony." In rejecting the per se
exclusionary rule, the Court acknowledged that such a rule would promote greater deterrence
against the use of suggestive procedures, and it noted a "surprising unanimity among scholars" that
the per se approach was "essential to avoid serious risk of miscarriage of justice." However, the
Court concluded the cost to society of not being able to use reliable evidence of guilt in criminal
prosecutions would be too high. The Manson Court also made clear that its new stm1dard would
apply to both pre-trial and in-court identification evidence, thus resulting in a unified analysis of all
identification evidence in the wake of suggestive procedures. In contrast, the Stovall Court had not
specified whether unnecessarily suggestive procedures would require per se exclusion of both pre-
trial identification evidence and any in-court identification, or alternatively, whether witnesses who
had viewed unnecessarily suggestive procedures might nonetheless be allowed to identify
defendants in court after an independent source determination.41

A 2016 article notes that Manson "remains the federal constitutional standard."42 It' also notes that
"[t]he vast majority of states have also followed Manson in interpreting the requirements of their own
constitutions."43
The United Kingdom has adopted the Code of Practice for the Identification of Persons by Police
Officers.44 It "concerns the principal methods used by police to identify people in connection with the
investigation of offences and the keeping of accurate and reliable criminal records" and covers
eyewitness identifications. This Code puts in place measures advanced by the corpus of research in
enhancing the reliability of eyewitness identification, specifically by impairing the suggestive
tendencies of conventional procedures. Notable measures include having a parade of at least nine
(9) people, when one (1) suspect is included, to at least 14 people, when two (2) suspects are
included45 and forewarning the witness that he or she may or may not actually see the suspect in the
lineup.46Additionally, there should be a careful recording of the witness' pre-identification description
of the perpetrator47 and explicit instructions for police officers to not "direct the witness' attention to
any individual."48

III

Domestic jurisprudence recognizes that eyewitness identification is affected by "normal human

fallibilities and suggestive influences."49 People v. Teehankee, Jr. 50 introduced in this jurisdiction the
totality of circumstances test, which relies on factors already identified by the United States Supreme
Court in Neil v. Biggers:51

(1) the witness' opportunity to view the criminal at the time of the crime;

(2) the witness' degree of attention at that time; (3) the accuracy of any prior description given by the
witness; (4) the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the identification; (5) the length of
time between the crime and the identification; and, (6) the suggestiveness of the identification
procedure.52

A witness' credibility is ascertained by considering the first two factors, i.e., the witness' opportunity
to view the malefactor at the time of the crime and the witness' degree of attention at that time,
based on conditions of visibility and the extent of time, little and fleeting as it may have been, for the
witness to be exposed to the perpetrators, peruse their features, and ascertain their
identity.53 In People v. Pavillare: 54

Both witnesses had ample opportunity to observe the kidnappers and to remember their faces. The
complainant had close contact with the kidnappers when he was abducted and beaten up, and later
when the kidnappers haggled on the amount of the ransom money. His cousin met Pavillare face to
face and actually dealt with him when he paid the ransom money. The two-hour period that the
complainant was in close contact with his abductors was sufficient for him to have a recollection of
their physical appearance. Complainant admitted in court that he would recognize his abductors if he
s[aw] them again and upon seeing Pavillare he immediately recognized him as one of the
malefactors as he remember[ed] him as the one who blocked his way, beat him up, haggled with the
complainant's cousin and received the ransom money. As an indicium of candor the private
complainant admitted that he d[id] not recognize the co-accused, Sotero Santos for which reason the
case was dismissed against him.55

Apart from extent or degree of exposure, this Court has also appreciated a witness' specialized skills
or extraordinary capabilities.56 People v. Sanchez57 concerned the theft of an armored car. The
witness, a trained guard, was taken by this Court as being particularly alert about his surroundings
during the attack.

The degree of a witness' attentiveness is the result of many factors, among others: exposure time,
frequency of exposure, the criminal incident's degree of violence, the witness' stress levels and
expectations, and the witness' activity during the commission of the crime.58
The degree of the crime's violence affects a witness' stress levels. A focal point of psychological
studies has been the effect of the presence of a weapon on a witness' attentiveness. Since the
1970s, it has been hypothesized that the presence of a weapon captures a witness' attention,
thereby reducing his or her attentiveness to other details such as the perpetrator's facial and other
identifying features.59 Research on this has involved an enactme1'1t model involving two (2) groups:
first, an enactment with a gun; and second, an enactment of the same incident using an implement
like a pencil or a syringe as substitute for an actual gun. Both groups are then asked to identify the
culprit in a lineup. Results reveal a statistically significant difference in the accuracy of eyewitness
identification between the two (2) groups:60

[T]he influence of [a weapon focus] variable on an eyewitness's performance can only be estimated
post hoc. Yet the data here do offer a rather strong statement: To not consider a weapon's effect on
eyewitness performance is to ignore relevant information. The weapon effect does reliably occur,
particularly in crin1es of short duration in which a threatening wea.pon is visible. Identification
accuracy and feature accuracy of eyewitnesses are likely to be affected, although, as previous
research has noted ... there is not necessarily a concordance between the two.61

Our jurisprudence has yet to give due appreciation to scientific; data on weapon focus. Instead, what
is prevalent is the contrary view which empirical studies discredit.62 For instance, in People v.
Sartagoda:

[T]he most natural reaction for victims of criminal violence [is] to strive to see the looks a..11d faces
of their assailants and observe the manner in which the crime was committed. Most often the face of
the assailant and body movements thereof, create a lasting impression which cannot easily be
erased from their memory.63

Rather than a sweeping approbation of a supposed natural propensity for remembering the faces of
assailants, this Court now emphasizes the need for courts to appreciate the totality of circumstances
in the identification of perpetrators of crimes.

Apart from the witness' opportunity to view the perpetrator during the commission of the Grime and
the witness' degree of attention at that time, the accuracy of any prior description given by the
witness is equally vital. Logically, a witness' credibility is enhanced by the extent to which his or her
initial description of the perpetrator matches the actual appearance of the person ultimately
prosecuted for the offense.

Nevertheless, discrepancies, when properly accounted for, should not be fatal to the prosecution's
case, For instance, in Lumanog v. People,64 this Court recognized that age estimates cannot be
made accurately:

Though his estimate of Joel's age was not precise, it was not that far from his true age, especially if
we consider that being a tricycle driver who was exposed daily to sunlight, Joel's looks may give a
first impression that he is older than his actual age. Moreover Alejo's description of Lumanog as
dark-skinned was made two (2) months prior to the dates of the trial when he was again asked to
identify him in court. When defense counsel posed the question of the discrepancy in Alejo's
description of Lumanog who was then prese11ted as having a fair complexion and was 40 years old,
the private prosecutor manifested the possible effect of Lumanog's incarceration for such length of
time as to make his appearance different at the time of trial.65

The totality of circumstances test also requires a consideration of the degree of certainty
demonstrated by the witness at the moment of identification. What is most critical here is the initial
identification made by the witness during investigation and case build-up, not identification during
trial.66

A witness' certainty is tested in court during cross-examination. In several instances, this Court has
considered a witness' straight and candid recollection of the incident, undiminished by the rigors of
cross-examination as an indicator of credibility.67

Still, certainty on the witness stand is by no means conclusive. By the time a witness takes the
stand, he or she shall have likely made narrations to investigators, to responding police or barangay
officers, to the public prosecutor, to any possible private prosecutors, to the families of the victims,
other sympathizers, and even to the media. The witness, then, may have established certainty, not
because of a foolproof cognitive perception and recollection of events but because of consistent
reinforcement borne by becoming an experienced narrator. Repeated narrations before different
audiences may also prepare a witness for the same kind of scrutiny that he or she will encounter
during cross-examination. Again, what is more crucial is certainty at the onset or on initial
identification, not in a relatively belated stage of criminal proceedings.

The totality of circumstances test also requires a consideration of the length of time between the
crime and the identification made by the witness. "It is by now a well established fact that people are
less accurate and complete in their eyewitness accounts after a long retention interval than after a
short one."68 Ideally then, a prosecution witness must identify the suspect immediately after the
incident. This Court has considered acceptable an identification made two (2) days after the
commission of a crime,69 not so one that had an interval of five and a half (5 1/2)months.70

The passage of time is not the only factor that diminishes memory. Equally jeopardizing is a witness'
interactions with other individuals involved in the event.71 As noted by cognitive psychologist
Elizabeth F. Loftus, "[p]ost[-]event information can not only enhance existing memories but also
change a witness's memory and even cause nonexistent details to become incorporated into a
previously acquired memory."72

Thus, the totality of circumstances test also requires a consideration of the suggestiveness of the
identification procedure undergone by a witness. Both verbal and non-verbal information might
become inappropriate cues or suggestions to a witness:

A police officer may tell a witness that a suspect has been caught and the witness should look at
some photographs or come to view a lineup and make an identification. Even if the policeman does
not explicitly mention a suspect, it is likely that the witness will believe he is being asked to identify a
good suspect who will be one of the members of the lineup or set of photos ... If the officer should
unintentionally stare a bit longer at the suspect, or change his tone of voice when he says, "Tell us
whether you think it is number one, two, THREE, four, five, or six," the witness's opinion might be
swayed.73

In appraising the suggestiveness of identification procedures, this Court has previously considered
prior or contemporaneous74 actions of law enforcers, prosecutors, media, or even fellow witnesses.

In People v. Baconguis,75 this Court acquitted the accused, whose identification was tainted by an
improper suggestion.76 There, the witness was made to identify the suspect inside a detention cell
which contained only the suspect.77

People v. Escordiaz78 involved robbery with rape. Throughout their ordeal, the victim and her
companions were blindfolded.79 The victim, however, felt a "rough projection''80 on the back of the
perpetrator. The perpetrator also spoke, thereby familiarizing the victim with his
voice.81 Escordial recounted the investigative process which resulted in bringing the alleged
perpetrator into custody. After several individuals were interviewed, the investigating officer had an
inkling of who to look for. He "found accused-appellant [in a] basketball court and 'invited' him to go
to the police station for questioning."82 When the suspect was brought to the police station, the rape
victim was already there. Upon seeing the suspect enter, the rape victim requested to see the
suspect's back. The suspect removed his shirt. When the victim saw a "rough projection" on the
suspect's back, she spoke to the police and stated that the suspect was the perpetrator. The police
then brought in the other witnesses to identify the suspect. Four (4) witnesses were taken to the cell
containing the accused and they consistently pointed to the suspect even as four (4) other
individuals were with him in the cell.83

This Court found the show-up, with respect to the rape victim, and the lineup, with respect to the four
(4) other witnesses, to have been tainted with irregularities. It also noted that the out-of-court
identification could have been the subject of objections to its admissibility as evidence although
these objections were never raised during trial.84

Although these objections were not timely raised, this Court found that the prosecution failed to
establish the accused's guilt beyond reasonable doubt and acquitted the accused.85 It noted that the
victim was blindfolded throughout her ordeal. Her identification was rendered unreliable by her own
admission that she could only recognize her perpetrator through his eyes and his voice. It reasoned
that, given the limited exposure of the rape victim to the perpetrator, it was difficult for her to
immediately identify the perpetrator. It found the improper suggestion made by the police officer as
having possibly aided in the identification of the suspect.86 The Court cited with approval the following
excerpt from an academic journal:

Social psychological influences.Various social psychological factors also increase the danger of
suggestibility in a lh1eup confrontation. Witnesses, like other people, are motivated by a desire to be
correct and to avoid looking foolish. By arranging a lineup, the police have evidenced their belief that
they have caught the criminal; witnesses, realizing this, probably will feel foolish if they cannot
identify anyone and therefore1 may choose someone despite residual uncertainly. Moreover, the
need to reduce psychological discomfort often motivates the victim of a crime to find a likely target
for feelings of hostility.

Finally, witnesses are highly motivated to behave like those around them. This desire to conform
produces an increased need to identify someone in order to show the police that they, too, feel that
the criminal is in the lineup, and makes the witnesses particularly vulnerable to any clues conveyed
by the police or other witnesses as to whom they suspect of the crime.87 (Emphasis in the original)

People v. Pineda, 88 involved six (6) perpetrators committing robbery with homicide aboard a
passenger bus.89 A passenger recalled that one (1) of the perpetrators was referred to as "Totie" by
his companions. The police previously knew that a certain Totie Jacob belonged to the robbery gang
of Rolando Pineda (Pineda). At that time also, Pineda and another companion were in detention for
another robbery. The police presented photographs of Pineda and his companion to the witness,
who positively identified the two (2) as among the perpetrators.90

This Court found the identification procedure unacceptable.91 It then articulated two (2) rules for out-
of-court identifications through photographs:

The first rule in proper photographic identification procedure is that a series of photographs must be
shown, and not merely that of the suspect. The second rule directs that when a witness is shown a
group of pictures, their arrangement and display should in no way suggest which one of the pictures
pertains to the suspect.92
Non-compliance with these rules suggests that any subsequent corporeal identification made by a
witness may not actually be the result of a reliable recollection of the criminal incident. Instead, it will
simply confirm false confidence induced by the suggestive presentation of photographs to a witness.

Pineda further identified 12 danger signals that might indicate erroneous identification. Its list is by
no means exhaustive, but it identifies benchmarks which may complement the application of the
totality of circumstances rule. These danger signals are:

(1) the witness originally stated that he could not identify anyone;

(2) the identifying witness knew the accused before the crime, but made no accusation against him
when questioned by the police;

(3) a serious discrepancy exists between the identifying witness' original description and the actual
description of the accused;

(4) before identifying the accused at the trial, the witness erroneously identified some other person;

(5) other witnesses to the crime fail to identify the accused;

(6) before trial, the witness sees the accused but fails to identify him;

(7) before the commission of the crime, the witness had limited opportunity to see the accused;

(8) the witness and the person identified are of different racial groups;

(9) during his original observation of the perpetrator of the crime, the witness was unaware that a
crime was involved;

(10) a considerable time elapsed between the witness' view of the criminal and his identification of
the accused;

(11) several persons committed the crime; and

(12) the witness fails to make a positive trial identification.93

Pineda underscored that "[t]he more important duty of the prosecution is to prove the identity of the
perpetrator and not to establish the existence of the crime."94 Establishing the identity of perpetrators
is a difficult task because of this jurisdiction's tendency to rely more on testimonial evidence rather
than on physical evidence. Unlike the latter, testimonial evidence can be swayed by improper
suggestions. Legal scholar Patrick M. Wall notes that improper suggestion "probably accounts for
more miscarriages of justice than any other single factor[.]"95 Marshall Houts, who served the Federal
Bureau of Investigation and the American judiciary, concurs and considers eyewitness identification
as "the most unreliable form of evidence[.]"96

People v. Rodrigo97 involved the same circumstances as Pineda. The police presented a singular
photograph for the eyewitness to identify the person responsible for a robbery with homicide. The
witness identified the person in the photograph as among the perpetrators. This Court stated that,
even as the witness subsequently identified the suspect in court, such identification only followed an
impermissible suggestion in the course of the photographic identification. This Court specifically
stated that a suggestive identification violates the right of the accused to due process, denying him
or her of a fair trial:98

The greatest care should be taken in considering the identification of the accused especially, when
this identification is made by a sole witness and the judgment in the case totally depends on the
reliability of the identification. This level of care and circumspection applies with greater vigor when,
as in the present case, the issue goes beyond pure credibility into constitutional dimensions arising
from the due process rights of the accused.

….

The initial photographic identification in this case carries serious constitutional law implications in
terms of the possible violation of the due process rights of the accused as it may deny him his rights
to a fair trial to the extent that his in-court identification proceeded from and was influenced by
impermissible suggestions in the earlier photographic identification. In the context of this case, the
investigators might not have been fair to Rodrigo if they themselves, purposely or unwittingly, fixed in
the mind of Rosita, or at least actively prepared her mind to, the thought that Rodrigo was one of the
robbers. Effectively, this act is no different from coercing a witness in identifying an accused, varying
only with respect to the means used. Either way, the police investigators a.re the real actors in the
identification of the accused; evidence of identification is effectively created when none really
exists.99 (Emphasis supplied)

IV

Applying these standards, this Court finds the identification made by prosecution witnesses Cruz and
Perez unreliable. Despite their identification, there remains reasonable doubt if accused-appellant
Nuñez is the same Pobre who supposedly committed the robbery with homicide along with
Marciales and Nabia.

The prosecution banks on the following portion of Cruz's testimony.100 The Court of Appeals heavily
relies on the same portion, reproducing parts of it in its Decision:101

Q: Madam Witness, where were you on June 22, 2000 in the afternoon?

A: I was on duty at Tayuman Caltex station, Ma'am.

Q: And while you were on duty, what happened if any?

A: While we were on duty there was a pick-up which was getting gas and a person was in front and
we were joking baka kami mahold-up yun pala, hinoholdup na kami sa opisina.

Q: You mentioned that there was already hold-up happening?

A: Yes, Ma'am.

Q: What time was that when you noticed that holdup?

A: Around 8:00p.m.

Q: Where was the hold-up going on?

A: In the office, Ma'am.

Q: And how far is that office from where you were at that time, how many meters?

A: From here to the wall of the court.

Court:

Anyway, I have the reference.

Prosecutor Aragones:

Q: What happened after you saw that there was [a] hold[-up] going on inside the office of the Caltex
Station?

A: After that me and my companions ran to the computer shop which is beside the office.

Q: By the way, why were you at the Caltex gasoline station?

A: I was an attendant, Ma'am.

Q: You mentioned that you proceeded to the computer shop which is beside the office?

A: Yes, Ma'am.

Q: Where did you run, inside or outside the computer shop?

A: Inside, Ma'am.

Q: Before you went inside, what did you witness after you saw that there was hold-up inside the
office?

A: I saw that one of our companions, a gun was pointed to him and also to our employer.

Q: Who was your companion you saw who was pointed with a gun?

A: Alex Diaz, and Kuya Alex my employer.

Q: Who were those persons who pointed guns to your co-worker and to your employer?

A: The two accused who were first arrested.

Q: Aside from the two accused, do they have other companions?

A: Yes, Ma'am.

Q: Who was that person who was also with the two accused?

A: Paul Pobre.
Q: By the way, who were those two accused you are referring to according to you were arrested?

A: George Marciales and I cannot remember the other one.

Q: You mentioned of the name Paul Pobre, kindly look around if there is any Paul Pobre in court?

A: Yes, Ma'am, he is here.

Q: Can you point to him?

A: He is that one (pointing)

INTERPRETER;

Witness is pointing to a person wearing yellow shirt who when asked gave his name as Crisanto
Pepafio.

PROSECUTOR ARAGONES:

Q: Who told you that the name of that person is Paul Pobre?

A: Kuya Rommel

Q: Who is Kuya Rommel?

A: Brother of my employer Kuya Alex.

Q: Who was apprehended in Laguna?

A: He is the one, Paul Pobre.

Q: What was the participation of that person you pointed to as being the companion of accused
George Marciales and the other one?

A: He was the one who entered last and who shot.

COURT:

Q: Who did he shoot?

A: Kuya Alex.102

The prosecution similarly banks on the narration and identification made by Perez:

Q: Madam Witness when Alex, the accused you pointed a while ago, the other accused Marciales
and your boss, all of them were inside the computer shop, the office of Caltex?

A: At first no[,] ma'am[.] Nagsimula po kasi andoon po kami sa labas may lalaking nakatayo po doon
sa malapit sa road, sya po yung na[] identify before as George Marciales. Ang nakita po lang naming
una sa loob apat po sila si boss, si Alex, that man (Nunez) and the man identified before as Orly
Nabia.

Q: Where were you at that time when these four persons were inside the office?

A: We were sitting in an island near the three pumps in front of the gas station[,] ma'am.

Q: The office in relation to that island is at the back, is that correct?

A: Yes[,] ma'am.

Q: There were no customers at that time?

A: None[,] ma'am.

Q: The cashier were (sic) Alex is positioned is facing you[.] [I]s that correct?

A: Yes[,] ma'am.

Q: So it was the back of the accused that you saw, is that correct?

A: No[,] ma'am. Sa pinto po kasi yung register namin e. So andito po si Alex nakatungo po sya
andito po yung accused naka[-]ganito po sya, nakatutok pos a (sic) kanya. (Witness was standing
while demonstrating the incident between the accused and Alex inside the office) very clear po yung
itsura nya nung nakita po namin sya.

Q: How far is that island from the cashier, from the place you were seated right now?

A: Around 4 to 5 meters[,] ma'am.

Q: Were you able to hear the conversation considering that distance of 4 to 5 meters?

A: I heard nothing[,] ma'am[,] except when Alex shouted[,] "Byron tulong, hinoholdap tayo[.]"

Q: Alex was shouting while he was still inside the office?

A: Yes[,] ma'am.

Q: And it was Byron who ran towards the office?

A: The first one was George Marciales, Byron only followed him.

Q: Where was George Marciales before he entered that office?

A: He was near the road[,] ma'am.

Q: But that is not within the gas station's premises?

A: Bali eto po yung pinaka sementado, andito sya. (Witness referring to the place where Marciales
is)
Q: When you said the cemented area, you were referring to the National road?

A: Yes[,] ma'am.

Q: After Byron went inside the said office, were you able to see what happened inside?

A: Yes[,] ma'am. Nakasuntok po sya ng isa kay George tapos tinadyakan po siya sa tagiliran tsaka
binaril po sya. Tapos bumagsak napo (sic) sya.

Q: You were still outside your office at that time?

A: Yes[,] ma'am.

Q: Nobody was with you at that time aside from your co-employees, only the accused was inside at
that time?

A: Yes[,] ma'am.

Q: You did not run or ask for help considering that that Caltex is along the National road? A:
Honestly speaking[,] we were not able to say anything at that time[,]ma'am.

A: After po ng pag shoot sa kanila tumakbo po kami ni Rona doon sa may computer shop, sa bahay
po nila. Pagkaraan po ng ilang minuto lumabas kami nakita po naming sila na nagtatakbuhan
together with Kuya Lawrence. Nakita po naming (sic) sila na tumatakbo, yung dalawa papuntang
Angono, yung isa hindi ko na po alam kung [saan] nagpunta. Nakita na lang po naming si boss na
gmnagapang asking for help.103

The Court of Appeals also favorably cited the following identification made by Perez:

Prosecutor Aragones

Q : Now can you look inside the court and tell us if there is anybody here who took part in that
incident or involved in that incident?

Relen Perez

A: Him[,] ma'am. (witness pointing to the accused)

Q: What was the participation of that man whom you pointed today in that robbery with homicide
incident in Caltex gasoline station?

A: He was the one who was pointing a gun to my co-employee Alexander Diaz[,] ma'am.104

These identifications are but two (2) of a multitude of circumstances that the Regional Trial Court
and the Court of Appeals should have considered in determining whether or not the prosecution has
surmounted the threshold of proof beyond reasonable doubt. Lamentably, they failed to give due
recognition to several other factors that raise serious doubts on the soundness of the identification
made by prosecution witnesses Cruz and Perez.
First and most glaringly, Cruz had previously admitted to not remembering the appearance of the
fourth robber, the same person she would later claim with supposed certainty as Nuñez. In the
original testimony she made in Marciales and Nabia's trial in 2002, she admitted to her inability to
identify the fourth robber:

Fiscal Dela Cuesta

Q: Can you describe the other holdupper during that date and time who were the companions of
George Marciales?

Ronalyn Cruz

A: I cannot describe them[,] ma 'am.

Q: Why can you not describe the appearance of the other holdupper?

A: I cannot remember their appearances, ma 'am.

….

Fiscal Dela Cuesta

Q: At what particular point in time that the 4th holdupper went inside the office?

Ronalyn Cruz

A: When they were wrestling with each other, ma'am.

Q: Was that before the shooting or after?

A: Before the shooting[,] ma'am.105

Second, by the time Cruz and Perez stood at the witness stand and identified Nuñez, roughly eight
(8) years had passed since the robbery incident.

Third, as the People's Appellee's Brief concedes, witnesses' identification of Nunez did not come
until after he had been arrested. In fact, it was not until the occasion of his arraigmnent,106 Nuñez was
the sole object of identification, in an identification process that had all but pinned him as the
perpetrator.

VI

Cruz's admission that she could not identify the fourth robber anathemized any subsequent
identification. Moreover, the prosecution, the Court of Appeals, and the Regional Trial Court all failed
to account for any intervening occurrence that explains why and how Cruz shifted from complete
confusion to absolute certainty. Instead, they merely took her and Perez's subsequent identification
as unassailable and trustworthy because of a demeanor apparently indicating certitude.

The conviction of an accused must hinge less on the certainty displayed by a witness when he or
she has already taken the stand but more on the certainty he or she displayed and the accuracy he
or she manifested at the initial and original opportunity to identify the perpetrator. Cruz had originally
admitted to not having an iota of certainty, only to make an unexplained complete reversal and
implicate Nunez as among the perpetrators. She jeopardized her own credibility.

Cruz's and Perez's predicaments are not aided by the sheer length of time that had lapsed from the
criminal incident until the time they made their identifications. By the time Cruz made the
identification, seven (7) years and eight (8) months had lapsed since June 22, 2000. As for Perez,
eight (8) years and nine (9) months had already lapsed.

In People v. Rodrigo, 107 this Court considered a lapse of five and a half (5 1/2) months as unreliable.
Hence, there is greater reason that this Court must exercise extreme caution for identifications made
many years later. This is consistent with the healthy sense of incredulity expected of courts in
criminal cases, where the prosecution is tasked with surmounting the utmost threshold of proof
beyond reasonable doubt.

It is not disputed that Nunez's identification by Cruz and Perez was borne only by Nunez's arrest on
July 2, 2006. The prosecution even acknowledged that his identification was initially done only to
defeat his motion to have the case against him dismissed.108 Evidently, Nuñez's identification before
trial proper was made in a context which had practically induced witnesses to identify Nuñez as a
culprit. Not only was there no effort to countervail the likelihood of him being identified, it even
seemed that the prosecution and others that had acted in its behalf such as tile apprehending
officers, had actively designed a situation where there would be no other possibility than for him to
be identified as the perpetrator of the crime.

The dubiousness of Nunez's presentation for identification is further exacerbated by the

circumstances of his apprehension. In a Manifestation filed with the Court of Appeals, and which,
quite notably, the prosecution never bothered repudiating, Nunez recounted how his apprehension
appeared to have been borne by nothing more than the crudeness and sloth of police officers:

6). That, the truth of the matter as far as the offended charged against me, I ha[ve] no any
truthfulness (sic) nor having any reality as it was indeed only a mere strong manufactured, fabricated
and unfounded allegations against me just to get even with me of my [untolerable] disciplinary
actions of some individuals who had a personal grudge against me.

….

9). That, with all due respect, I ha[ve] nothing to do with the offensed (sic) charged and it is not true
that the case was done was charged against me it is Paul Borbe y Pipano it was wrong person pick-
up by the police officer, because the said Paul Borbe y [P]ipano was charged of several crimes,
while me my record has no single offense against me.

10). That, with due respect, there was no truthfulness that I was the one who committed the said
crime, it was a big mistake because we have the [same 1 family name they just pick up the wrong
person which is innocent to the said crime.

11). That, with all due respect, it was not true, also that it was me who committed the said crime, it
was Paul Borbe y Pipano is the one because he was habitual in doing crime in our community, in
fact my record is clean never been committed any crime in my life, I am a concern citizen who can
help our community well.109 (Emphasis supplied)
The identification made during Nunez's trial, where eyewitnesses vaunted certainty, was but an
offshoot of tainted processes that preceded his trial. This Court finds Nunez's identification prior to
trial bothersome and his subsequent and contingent identification on the stand more problematic.

Nunez's identification, therefore, fails to withstand the rigors of the totality of circumstances test.
First, the witnesses failed to even give any prior description of him. Second, a prosecution witness
failed to exhibit even the slightest degree of certainty when originally given the chance to identify him
as the supposed fourth robber. Third, a significantly long amount of time had lapsed since the
criminal incident; the original witness' statement that none of his features were seen as to enable his
identification; and the positive identification made of him when the case was re-opened. And finally,
his presentation for identification before and during trial was peculiarly, even worrisomely,
suggestive as to practically induce in prosecution witnesses the belief that he, to the exclusion of any
other person, must have been the supposed fourth robber.

These deficiencies and the doubts over Cruz's and Perez's opportunity to peruse the fourth robber's
features and their degree of attentiveness during the crime clearly show that this case does not
manage to satisfy even one (1) of the six (6) factors that impel consideration under the totality of
circumstances test.

VII

Recall that both prosecution witnesses Cruz and Perez acknowledged the extreme stress and fright
that they experienced on the evening of June 22, 2000. As both Cruz and Perez recalled, it was
1âw phi 1

enough for them to run and seek refuge in a computer shop. Their tension was so palpable that even
Cruz's and Perez's recollections of what transpired and of how Nuñez supposedly participated in the
crime are so glaringly different:

According to Cruz, two (2) other persons initiated the robbery, by pointing guns at Regencia and
Diaz inside the gasoline station's office. It was supposedly only later, when Diaz shouted, that a third
robber, Marciales, and a fourth robber, allegedly Nunez, ran in, to assist the first two (2) robbers. In
contrast, Perez claimed that Nuñez was one (1) of the two (2) robbers who were initially already in
the office. Nunez was then supposedly pointing a gun at Diaz while the other robber was pointing a
gun at Regencia.

They both claim that after Diaz shouted, the first two (2) robbers received assistance. Cruz,
however, claims that two (2) additional robbers came to the aid of the first two (2), while Perez
claims that there was only one (1) additional robber.

In the scuffle that ensued in the office, Cruz claims that Marciales shot Dimatulac while Nunez shot
Diaz. For her part, Perez claims that Marciales was the only one who fired shots at Regencia, Diaz,
and Dimatulac.

Jurisprudence holds that inconsistencies in the testimonies of prosecution witnesses do not

necessarily jeopardize the prosecution's case.110 This, however, is on1 y true o f mm. or m.
consistencies that are ultimately inconsequential or merely incidental to the overarching narrative of
what crime was committed; how, when, and where it was committed; and who committed it. "It is
well-settled that inconsistencies on minor details do not affect credibility as they only refer to
collateral matters which do not touch upon the commission of the crime itself."111

The inconsistencies here between Cruz and Perez are far from trivial. At issue is precisely the
participation of an alleged conspirator whose name the prosecution did not even know for proper
indictment. Yet, where the prosecution witnesses cannot agree is also precisely how the person who
now stands accused actually participated in the commission of the offense. Their divergences are so
glaring that they demonstrate the prosecution's failure to establish Nunez's complicity.

VIII

These failings by the prosecution vis-a-vis the totality of circumstances test are also indicative of
many of the 12 danger signals identified in People v. Pineda12 to be present in this case. On the first,
fifth, and twelfth danger signals, prosecution witness Cruz originally made an unqualified admission
that she could not identify the fourth robber. On the third danger signal, there is not even an initial
description ·with which to match or counter-check Nuñez. On the tenth danger signal, a considerable
amount of time had passed since Cruz and Perez witnessed the crime and their identification of
Nunez. On the eleventh danger signal, several perpetrators committed the crime.

IX

Conviction in criminal cases demands proof beyond reasonable doubt. While this does not require
absolute certainty, it calls for moral certainty. It is the degree of proof that appeals to a magistrate's
1âw phi 1

conscience:

An accused has in his favor the presumption of innocence which the Bill of Rights guarantees.
Unless his guilt is shown beyond reasonable doubt, he must be acquitted. This reasonable doubt
standard is demanded by the due process clause of the Constitution which protects the accused
from conviction except upon proof beyond reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the
crime with which he is charged. The burden of proof is on the prosecution, and unless it discharges
that burden the accused need not even offer evidence in his behalf, and he would be entitled to an
acquittal. Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not, of course, mean such degree of proof as
excluding possibility of error, produces absolute certainty. Moral certainty only is required, or that
degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind. The conscience must be
satisfied that the accused is responsible for the offense charged.113

This Court is unable to come to a conscientious satisfaction as to Nuñez's guilt. On the contrary, this
Court finds it bothersome that a man of humble means appears to have been wrongly implicated, not
least because of lackadaisical law enforcement tactics, and has been made to suffer the severity
and ignominy of protracted prosecution, intervening detention, and potential conviction. Here, this
Court puts an end to this travesty of justice. This Court acquits accused-appellant.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated June 26, 2013 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 04474 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accused-appellant Crisente Pepaño
Nuñez is ACQUITTED for reasonable doubt. He is ordered immediately RELEASED from detention,
unless confined for any other lawful cause.

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished to the Director of the Bureau of Corrections, Muntinlupa City,
for immediate implementation. The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is directed to report to this
Court within five (5) days from receipt of this Decision the action he has taken. A copy shall also be
furnished to the Director General of Philippine National Police for his information.

Let entry of judgment be issued immediately.

SO ORERED.
MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice
Chairperson

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN SAMUEL R. MARTIRES

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ALEXANDER G. GESMUNDO
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to the Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation,
I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Chief Justice
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. LARRY
LAURENTE y BEJASA, MELVIN DAGUDOG, and RICHARD
DISIPULO, accused.
LARRY LAURENTE y BEJASA, accused-appellant.

DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., J.:

This is a case for our automatic review in view of the death penalty imposed
[1]

upon accused-appellant Larry Laurente (hereinafter Laurente).

In a decision promulgated on 23 August 1994 in Criminal Case No.
[2]

104785, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig, Branch 156, found Laurente
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Highway Robbery with
Homicide, defined and penalized under P.D. No. 532, and sentenced him to
[3]

suffer the penalty of death; to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the amount of
P50,000.00, and to pay them P27,300.00 as funeral expenses and P100,000.00
as moral and exemplary damages; and to pay the costs.
We declare at the outset that even granting ex gratia that the established
facts prove beyond reasonable doubt that Laurente and his two co-accused
indeed committed the acts charged in the information, Laurente cannot be
[4]

validly convicted for highway robbery with homicide under P.D. No. 532. The
object of the decree is to deter and punish lawless elements who commit acts
of depredation upon persons and properties of innocent and defenseless
inhabitants who travel from one place to another - which acts constitute either
piracy or highway robbery/brigandage - thereby disturbing the peace, order, and
tranquility of the nation and stunting the economic and social progress of the
people. It is directed against acts of robbery perpetrated by outlaws
[5]

indiscriminately against any person on Philippine highways, as defined therein,

and not those committed against a predetermined or particular
victim. Accordingly, a robbery committed on a Philippine highway by persons
who are not members of the prescribed lawless elements or directed only
against a specific, intended, or preconceived victim, is not a violation of P.D.
No. 532. This Court, per Mr. Justice Florenz D. Regalado, so held in People vs.
Puno and a reiteration of the discussion therein is in order. Thus:
[6]

Contrary to the postulation of the Solicitor General Presidential Decree No.

532 is not a modification of Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code on kidnapping
and serious illegal detention, but of Articles 306 and 307 on brigandage. This is
evident from the fact that the relevant portion thereof which treats of highway
robbery invariably uses this term in the alternative and synonymously with
brigandage, that is, as highway robbery/brigandage. This is but in line with our
previous ruling, and which still holds sway in criminal law, that highway
robbers (ladrones) and brigands are synonymous.
Harking back to the origin of our law on brigandage (bandolerismo) in order
to put our discussion thereon in the proper context and perspective, we find that
a band of brigands, also known as highwaymen or freebooters, is more than a
gang of ordinary robbers. Jurisprudence on the matter reveals that during the
early part of the American occupation of our country, roving bands were
organized for robbery and pillage and since the then existing law against
robbery was inadequate to cope with such moving bands of outlaws, the
Brigandage Law was passed.
The following salient distinctions between brigandage and robbery are
succinctly explained in a treatise on the subject and are of continuing validity:

The main object of the Brigandage Law is to prevent the formation of bands of
robbers. The heart of the offense consists in the formation of a band by more than
three armed persons for the purpose indicated in Art. 306. Such formation is sufficient
to constitute a violation of Art. 306. It would not be necessary to show, in a
prosecution under it, that a member or members of the band actually committed
robbery or kidnapping or any other purpose attainable by violent means. The crime is
proven when the organization and purpose of the band are shown to be such as are
contemplated by Art. 306. On the other hand, if robbery is committed by a band,
whose members were not primarily organized for the purpose of committing robbery
or kidnapping, etc., the crime would not be brigandage, but only robbery. Simply
because robbery was committed by a band of more than three armed persons, it would
not follow that it was committed by a band of brigands. In the Spanish text of art. 306,
it is required that the band sala a los campos para dedicarse a robar.

In fine, the purpose of brigandage is, inter alia, indiscriminate highway

robbery. If the purpose is only a particular robbery, the crime is only robbery, or
robbery in band if there are at least four armed participants. The martial law
legislator, in creating and promulgating Presidential Decree No. 532 for the
objectives announced therein, could not have been unaware of that distinction
and is presumed to have adopted the same, there being no indication to the
contrary. This conclusion is buttressed by the rule on contemporaneous
construction, since it is one drawn from the time when and the circumstances
under which the decree to be construed originated. Contemporaneous
exposition or construction is the best and strongest in the law.
Further, that Presidential Decree No. 532 punishes as highway robbery or
brigandage only acts of robbery perpetrated by outlaws indiscriminately against
any person or persons on Philippine highways as defined therein, and not acts
of robbery committed against only a predetermined or particular victim, is
evident from the preambular clauses thereof, to wit:

WHEREAS, reports from law enforcement agencies reveal that lawless elements are
still committing acts of depredation upon the persons and properties of innocent and
defenseless inhabitants who travel from one place to another, thereby disturbing the
peace, order and tranquility of the nation and stunting the economic and social
progress of the people;

WHEREAS, such acts and depredations constitute x x x highway robbery/brigandage

which are among the highest forms of lawlessness condemned by the penal statutes of
all countries;

WHEREAS, it is imperative that said lawless elements be discouraged from

perpetrating such acts and depredations by imposing [a] heavy penalty on the
offenders, with the end in view of eliminating all obstacles to the economic, social,
educational and community progress of the people; (Italics supplied.)

Indeed, it is hard to conceive of how a single act of robbery against a

particular person chosen by the accused as their specific victim could be
considered as committed on the innocent and defenseless inhabitants who
travel from one place to another, and which single act of depredation could be
capable of stunting the economic and social progress of the people as to be
considered among the highest forms of lawlessness condemned by the penal
statutes of all countries, and would accordingly constitute an obstacle to the
economic, social, educational and community progress of the people, such that
said isolated act would constitute the highway robbery or brigandage
contemplated and punished in said decree. This would be an exaggeration
bordering on the ridiculous.
True, Presidential Decree No. 532 did introduce amendments to Articles
306 and 307 of the Revised Penal Code by increasing the penalties, albeit
limiting its applicability to the offenses stated therein when committed on the
highways and without prejudice to the liability for such acts if
committed. Furthermore, the decree does not require that there be at least four
armed persons forming a band of robbers; and the presumption in the Code
that said accused are brigands if they use unlicensed firearms no longer obtains
under the decree. But, and this we broadly underline, the essence of
brigandage under the Code as a crime of depredation wherein the unlawful acts
are directed not only against specific, intended or preconceived victims, but
against any and all prospective victims anywhere on the highway and
whosoever they may potentially be, is the same as the concept of brigandage
which is maintained in Presidential Decree No. 532, in the same manner as it
was under its aforementioned precursor in the Code and, for that matter, under
the old Brigandage Law.
Erroneous advertence is nevertheless made by the court below to the fact
that the crime of robbery committed by appellants should be covered by the
said amendatory decree just because it was committed on a highway. Aside
from what has already been stressed regarding the absence of the requisite
elements which thereby necessarily puts the offense charged outside the
purview and intendment of that presidential issuance, it would be absurd to
adopt a literal interpretation that any unlawful taking of property committed on
our highways would be covered thereby. It is an elementary rule of statutory
construction that the spirit of intent of the law should not be subordinated to the
letter thereof. Trite as it may appear, we have perforce to stress the elementary
caveat that he who considers merely the letter of an instrument goes but skin
deep into its meaning, and the fundamental rule that criminal justice inclines in
favor of the milder form of liability in case of doubt.
If the mere fact that the offense charged was committed on a highway would
be the determinant for the application of Presidential Decree No. 532, it would
not be far-fetched to expect mischievous, if not absurd, effects on the corpus of
our substantive criminal law. While we eschew resort to a reductio ad
absurdum line of reasoning, we apprehend that the aforestated theory adopted
by the trial court falls far short of the desideratum in the interpretation of laws,
that is, to avoid absurdities and conflicts. For, if a motor vehicle, either
stationary or moving on a highway, is forcibly taken at gunpoint by the accused
who happened to take a fancy thereto, would the location of the vehicle at the
time of the unlawful taking necessarily put the offense within the ambit of
Presidential Decree No. 532, thus rendering nugatory the categorical provisions
of the Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972? And, if the scenario is one where the
subject matter of the unlawful asportation is large cattle which are incidentally
being herded along and traversing the same highway and are impulsively set
upon by the accused, should we apply Presidential Decree No. 532 and
completely disregard the explicit prescriptions in the Anti-Cattle Rustling Law of
1974?
We do not entertain any doubt, therefore, that the coincidental fact that the
robbery in the present case was committed inside a car which, in the natural
course of things, was casually operating on a highway, is not within the situation
envisaged by Section 2(e) of the decree in its definition of terms. Besides, that
particular provision precisely define[s] highway robbery/brigandage and, as we
have amply demonstrated, the single act of robbery conceived and committed
by appellants in this case does not constitute highway robbery or brigandage.
(citations omitted)
In the instant case, there is not a shred of evidence that Laurente and his co-
accused, or their acts, fall within the purview of P.D. No. 532, as interpreted
above. Thus, to repeat, Laurente cannot be validly convicted for highway
robbery with homicide under P.D. No 532.
Assuming further, however, that Laurente and his co-accused may be
convicted under P.D. No. 532, the death penalty cannot be legally imposed on
Laurente. While it is true that Section 3 of the said decree prescribes the penalty
of death for highway robbery with homicide, the imposition of capital
punishment was suspended by Section 19(1), Article III of the 1987
[7]

Constitution.[8]

The reimposition of the death penalty by R.A. No. 7659 did not ipso jure lift
[9]

the suspension as far as P.D. No. 532 is concerned. An examination of the

former reveals that while it specifically imposed the death penalty or restored it
for certain crimes, it failed to do so for the latter - in fact, R.A. No. 7659 does
[10]

not mention P.D. No. 532 at all. Clearly, by failing to squarely deal with P.D. No.
532, Congress is deemed not to have considered highway robbery with
homicide a heinous crime; or if it did, it found no compelling reason to reimpose
the death penalty therefor.
Nevertheless, the amended information hereinafter quoted indubitably[11]

shows, that except for the emphasis of the place where the robbery was
committed, i.e., a highway, the charge is actually for robbery with homicide as
defined and penalized under Article 294(1) of the Revised Penal Code. This
provision now reads, as amended by Section 9 of R.A. No. 7659:

ART. 294. Robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons. - Penalties. -

Any person guilty of robbery with the use of violence against or intimidation of any
person shall suffer:

1. The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death, when by reason or on occasion

of the robbery, the crime of homicide shall have been committed, or when
the robbery shall have been accompanied by rape or intentional mutilation
or arson x x x.

Simply, the information remains a valid information for robbery with

homicide under the above provision. The investigating prosecutors
characterization that it was for highway robbery with homicide is of no
moment. On the matter of an accuseds right to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation, it is elementary that what determines the offense
[12]
charged is not the characterization made by the prosecutor who prepared the
information, but the allegations in the indictment. [13]

Accordingly, on the assumption that the prosecution established beyond

reasonable doubt all the elements of robbery and of homicide committed on the
occasion thereof, Laurente can nevertheless be meted the penalty of death
under Article 294(1) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A.
No. 7659, since the crime was committed on 14 February 1994, or one month
and thirteen days after the effectivity of R.A. No. 7659. But whether the
prosecution in fact discharged its burden is an entirely different matter which
goes into the merits of this appeal.
We shall then turn our attention to the appeal proper.
In an information dated 17 February 1994 and filed with the trial court
[14]

on 21 February 1994, Laurente was charged with the crime of Highway

Robbery with Homicide. The information was later amended to include his co-
accused, Melvin Dagudog and Richard Disipulo. The indictment in the
amended information read as follows:

That on or about the 14th day of February, 1994 in the Municipality of Pasig, Metro
Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, conspiring and confederating together with Melvin Dagudog and
Richard Disipulo, who are still at large, and all of them mutually helping and aiding
one another, with intent of [sic] gain and by means of force, violence and
intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, rob and
divest from Herminiano G. Artana of his earnings in and [sic] undetermined amount
along F. Concepcion St., Bgy. San Joaquin, Pasig, Metro Manila, which is a
Philippine Highway; that on the occasion of the said robbery and for the purpose of
enabling them to take, divest and carry away the said money, in pursuance of their
conspiracy and for the purpose of insuring success of their criminal act, said accused
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously strangle said victim with a
leather belt and hit him with a blunt instrument, causing him to sustain physical
injuries which directly caused his death.

CONTRARY TO LAW. [15]

Laurente was taken into custody on 15 February 1994, but his two co-
[16]

accused have remained at large. The case then proceeded as against Laurente
only.
Upon arraignment, with the assistance of counsel de oficio, Laurente
entered a plea of not guilty. At trial on the merits, the prosecution presented
[17]

four witnesses, namely: (1) SPO1 Crispin Pio, the investigating/arresting officer;
(2) eyewitness Myra Guinto; (3) Felicitas Matematico, the victims daughter; and
(4) Dr. Emmanuel Araas, the medico-legal officer of the Philippine National
Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory Services, who performed the autopsy on the
victim. The prosecution attempted to present the other eyewitness, Noel Guinto
(Myras brother-in-law), but despite the issuance of a warrant for his arrest and
the trial courts grant of one last chance to present him, the prosecution was
unable to do so. [18]

SPO1 Crispin Pio testified that on 14 February 1994, while on duty as a

homicide investigator at the Pasig Police Station, he received a case
assignment relative to one Herminio Artana. He proceeded to the place of the
incident, which was just a few meters away from the exit gate of the Capitol
Compound in Pasig. Upon arrival, he saw a parked taxicab and looked inside
it. He saw a dead man, who, he supposed, was the taxicab driver. Pio recalled
that the taxicab was an Adet taxi, but he forgot its plate number. [19]

At such time, Pio asked the Guinto siblings-in-law and other persons
present about the incident, but gained no meaningful information from them. He
conducted a cursory investigation and saw that the body sustained
strangulation marked [sic] and wounds on the face and head, thus he sent the
body to the PNP Crime Laboratory for examination. He then conducted a crime
scene search inside the taxicab and within the vicinity, which yielded a colored
brown wallet containing an SSS [Social Security System] ID of x x x Larry
Laurente and a leather belt supposedly used in strangling the dead man. [20]

Pio took the articles, went to the police station to make an incident report,
and requested the SSS to secure the complete record of Laurente. From the
SSS records, the police authorities learned that Laurente lived somewhere in
Kalawaan Sur, Pasig; accordingly, a follow-up team was formed to arrest him. [21]

Pio further testified that on 15 February 1994, the follow-up team arrested
and brought Laurente to the police station for investigation, and that during the
investigation, after having been apprised of his constitutional rights, Laurente:

[V]erbally admitted that he together with his friend[s] Richard and Melvin boarded
the taxicab and they grabbed the taxicab driver and after which they strangulated [sic]
the driver with the use of [the] belt while Melvin hit the taxi driver with the used [sic]
of a blunt instrument at the head and face. [22]

Thereafter, Laurente was put under [sic] police line-up wherein the 2
witnesses positively identified him as one of the 3 persons they saw coming
from the taxicab. Pio was present during the conduct of the police line-up and,
under his and his superiors supervision, he had the line-up photographed
[23]

(Exhibits D and D-1). [24]

 Pio next took the statements of the witnesses (Exhibits F and G) and the [25]

complainant (Exhibit E), proceeded to make his report (Exhibit I), executed
[26] [27]

an affidavit (Exhibit H) attesting to the conduct of the investigation and arrest,

[28]

and secured the death certificate of the victim from the PNP Crime Laboratory
(Exhibit J). To close his testimony on direct examination, Pio identified
[29]

Laurente and further disclosed their efforts to locate the other suspects. [30]

On cross-examination, Pio clarified certain details regarding the findings of

the investigation, e.g., the locus criminis was well lit as a lamp post was
nearby. However, Pio admitted that although he informed Laurente of his
[31]

constitutional rights while he was investigated at the police station, Laurente

was not represented by counsel during such investigation; he was merely
accompanied by a sister and some cousins. Nevertheless, despite the absence
of counsel, Laurente verbally admitted his complicity in the crime, although the
admission was not reduced in writing. [32]

Myra Guinto testified that on 14 February 1994, at about 9:15 p.m., she was
selling cigarettes at Sitio Square, Shaw Boulevard, Pasig, around a meter away
from the Provincial Capitol. At such time, she saw people scrambling inside a
[33]

yellow taxicab which was at the stop position on the other side of the
Street. Three men then left the taxicab, ran towards her, and at the time these
men passed in front of her, they were about 2 arms length[s] away. These men
then boarded a jeepney headed towards Pasig. A fourth man approached the
taxicab, saw the taxicab driver inside already dead and called the police. [34]

She was questioned by the policemen upon their arrival, and at a later date,
reduced her statements into writing (Exhibit F). After she identified Exhibit F,
Guinto then identified Larry Laurente as one of the three men who left the
taxicab and passed in front of her. [35]

On cross-examination, Guinto declared that the taxi was rather of old

vintage and that it did not have tinted windows, in fact, one could see the
persons inside the taxi. She likewise declared that the place where she first saw
the taxicab had a big white bulb and was approximately fifteen meters away
from where she was selling cigarettes. [36]

Felicitas Matematico testified that the victim was her father and presented
the following as evidence of funeral expenses: (a) several pieces of paper with
the tagalog caption nagastos noong lamay (Exhibit K); (b) a receipt dated 22
[37] [38]

February 1994 for P800.00, for the construction of a niche cover (Exhibit
L); and (c) a receipt dated 21 February 1994 from Sta. Marta Funeral Homes
[39]

for P 10,000.00 (Exhibit N); for a total of P27,300.00. To close her testimony
[40]

on direct examination, she stated that she was still sad about the death of her
father; and when asked to quantify her sadness, she responded that her mother
was in a better position to do so.
[41]

Dr. Emmanuel Araas testified on the autopsy he conducted on the cadaver

of the victim and the medico-legal report (Exhibit O) he made on 15 February
1994. He reiterated his finding that the cause of death of the victim was
[42]

traumatic injuries of head, and that he suffered the following injuries: (1)
Hematoma, right peri-orbital region, measuring 5 by 3 cm., 4 cm. on the anterior
midline; and (2) Contusion, neck, measuring 15 by 1.8 cm., crossing the anterior
midline, 2 cm. to the right and 13 cm. to the left, and that [t]here are subdural
and subarachnoidal hemorrhages. He opined that the injuries could have been
caused by a hard blunt instrument, such as a belt, a piece of wood, or a head
(buckle) of a belt.
[43]

On his part, accused Larry Laurente interposed the defense of alibi. On the
witness stand, he related that on 14 February 1994, at around 3:00 to 3:30 p.m.,
he was in his house at Consorcia Street, San Joaquin, Pasig, together with his
friends Melvin Dagudog and Richard Disipulo. Supposedly, they began a
drinking session at around 3:30 p.m. which lasted four hours, during which
period they consumed two bottles of Tanduay 5 years. After that, he did not
leave his house anymore, as he got so drunk, lost consciousness, and did not
[44]

wake up until 4:00 a.m. the next day. It was only then that he found out his two
friends had left his house.
[45]

In the morning of 15 February 1994, he had to look for his wallet as it got
lost in [his] wooden bed (papag) where [he slept]. That wallet contained an I.D.,
SSS number and P250.00. He then presumed that Melvin Dagudog and
Richard Disipulo had taken his wallet as they were the only ones in the house
during the drinking session. Having failed to obtain any information from his
neighbors, Mang Roming and Ate Baby, as to where Dagudog and Disipulo had
gone, he went home to rest; then he took a shower and got ready to report for
work. He had been a shingle molder at Winning Enterprises for the past three
years, with offices in Taguig, Rizal. He maintained that on 15 February 1994,
[46]

he reported for work at 6:00 a.m. and stayed in the office till 8:00 p.m.
[47]

After returning home from work, four policemen were waiting for him, and in
Laurentes own words, bigla na lang po akong sinugod at hinila. He surmised
[48]

that they were policemen even if they were not in uniform because they were
holding guns. Although they had no warrant of arrest, the policemen brought
him to the Pasig police station where he was investigated for being a hold-
upper; and throughout the investigation, he was not assisted by counsel. On [49]

cross-examination of Laurente, the prosecution obtained an admission that it

would take him about half an hour to travel from his house to the Provincial
Capitol. [50]

On 23 August 1994, the trial court promulgated the challenged decision

wherein, as stated earlier, it found Laurente guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
highway robbery with homicide punishable by death as a single indivisible
penalty under Presidential Decree No. 532 entitled Anti-Piracy and Anti-
Highway Robbery Law of 1974. It gave full faith and credit to the eyewitness
[51]

account of Myra Guinto and rejected the defense of alibi proffered by the
Laurente as he failed miserably to give any evidence to support this
claim. Regarding Laurentes presence at the locus criminis, it relied on the
[52]

positive identification made by Myra and Laurentes SSS ID card which was
found inside the taxicab of the victim. Apparently, finding it difficult to impose a
death penalty, the trial court stated:

[W]hile the undersigned Presiding Judge does not believe in the imposition of the
death penalty as a form of punishment, as he has stated about a month ago in Criminal
Case No. 104781, entitled People of the Philippines vs. Elpidio Mercado. et al., this
same Court, nevertheless, in obedience to the law which is his duty to uphold, the
Court hereby sentences accused LARRY LAURENTE y Bejasa to death x x x. [53]

Laurente forthwith filed a Notice of Appeal. The trial court noted therein that
the review by this Court was automatic. [54]

In his Brief, Laurente assigns the following errors committed by the trial
court, but being interrelated, discusses them jointly:
I.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT ACCUSED-APPELLANT

LARRY LAURENTE WAS POSITIVELY IDENTIFIED BY THE PROSECUTION
WITNESS.

II.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF

HIGHWAY ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE
ELEMENTS OF COMMITTING SUCH CRIME WERE NOT SUBSTANTIALLY
PROVEN BY THE PROSECUTION. [55]

Laurente anchors his prayer for acquittal on the unreliability of the positive
identification made of him by the lone eyewitness who testified at the trial, Myra
Guinto. He initially attempts to discredit this by deducing from Myras testimony
in court that she was neither able to recognize the three men she allegedly saw
coming out of the taxicab, nor see Laurente stab the victim. Thus:
ATTY. FERNANDEZ:
xxx xxx xxx
Q: By the way, do you know these men who came out from the taxi and passed by you?
A: No, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
(TSN, May 6, 1994)
Q: And also did not have any knowledge that there was a stabbing incident that
happened inside the taxi?
A: None, sir.
Q: Now, you said that there were three men who ran passed [sic] infront of you. Is that
correct?
A: Yes. sir.
Q: And because of that speed, you were not able to identify any of these persons?
A: No, sir. I was able to recognize one of them because they ran in front of me, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: Will you describe to the Honorable Court how fast these man passed by in front of
you?
A: It was quite fast, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: You identified the accused in this case as the one who allegedly killed the victim in
this case. Is that correct?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Now, did you personally see the accused stabbed [sic] the victim or killed [sic] the
victim?
A: No, sir. (Ibid, p. 7-8) (Italics Ours)[56]

Hence, Laurente concludes that [t]he identification [by Myra Guinto] of the
accused-appellant in the police line-up as one of those who killed the victim. . .
is . . . not entirely reliable. [57]

Laurente then continues his assault on Myras positive identification by

surmising:

[T]hat it was only thru the SSS ID Card of the accused-appellant which was found
inside the taxicab that made the police authorities conclude or suspect [the] accused-
appellant. . .. Thus, in all probability, the identification. . . in the police line-up was
because of the SSS ID Card but not for the reason that she recognized the accused-
appellant on the night of the incident.
[58]

As to his SSS ID card in the wallet found inside the taxicab, Laurente
submits that the said card:

[W]ill not suffice as a ground for conviction, for neither was it established that
accused-appellant had left the I.D. while committing the felony. It may well be that
who ever took appellants wallet with the I.D. in it purposely left the same to implicate
[the appellant] . . ..It was established by the defense that the wallet of the accused-
appellant which contained his SSS ID Card was stolen from him by his co-accused
[and] this allegation remain[s] unrebutted by the prosecution. [59]

Finally, Laurente challenges the trial courts rejection of the defense of alibi
and relates this to the allegedly improbable positive identification by Myra
Guinto and ultimately, the constitutional presumption of innocence:

While it may be admitted that the defense of alibi. . . is. . . weak this gains strength
when the evidence of the prosecution is equally weak. As earlier discussed, there is no
positive identification of the [appellant] by. . . Myra Guinto, thus the defense of alibi
of the appellant perforce prevails. As held, the weakness of alibi of the accused could
not strengthen the prosecutions case for settled is [the] rule that the prosecution must
rely on the strength of its evidence and not on the weakness of the defense.
(People v. Garcia, 215 SCRA 349) Further, alibi as a defense assumes commensurate
strength . . . where the evidence presented by the prosecution [is] unreliable and
uncertain since it is not relieved of the onus probandi just because alibi is the defense
invoked by the accused (People v. Jalon, 215 SCRA 680). [60]

At bottom, Laurentes line of reasoning flows as such: First, the positive

identification by Myra Guinto is unreliable as she did not see the three men who
came out of the taxicab, neither did she see Laurente stab the victim. Second,
in the light of the improbability of Myra having adequately seen Laurente at
the locus criminis, the positive identification at the police line-up necessarily
cannot be relied upon as well. Third, without the positive identification of
Laurente, only his SSS ID card found inside the taxicab links him to the crime;
however, Laurente satisfactorily proved that his wallet containing his SSS ID
card had been taken. Hence, he concludes, the spurious positive identification,
either at the scene of the crime or at the police line-up, coupled with the weak
link provided by his SSS ID card found inside the taxicab, should not be allowed
to overcome the defense of alibi and the presumption of innocence.
 Laurentes attempts to cast doubt upon the positive identification made of
him by Myra must fail.
Laurentes contention that Myra did not see the three men who came out of
the taxicab deserves scant consideration. As the proceedings below clearly
established, the place where Myra saw Laurente was well-lit due to a lamp post
nearby and the latter was only two arms lengths away from her when he passed
in front of her. Moreover, she identified Laurente at the police line-up, which
was even photographed, and in open court. Finally, as observed by the trial
court:

Nothing in the demeanor of prosecution witness Myra Guinto would indicate that she
harbors ill-feelings towards accused Larry Laurente that she will falsely testify against
him. Her testimony is thus given much weight by the Court. . . [61]

This assessment of the credibility of eyewitness Myra Guinto deserves the

highest respect of this Court, considering that the trial court had the direct
opportunity to observe her deportment and manner of testifying and availed of
the various aids to determine whether she was telling the truth or concocting
lies. This is a settled rule in this jurisdiction and the exceptions
[62]

thereto, viz., some fact or circumstance of weight and influence has been
overlooked or the significance of which has been misinterpreted, which if
considered might affect the result of the case, have not been shown to exist
[63]

in this case.
Equally settled is the rule that where there is no evidence, and nothing to
indicate that the principal witnesses for the prosecution - like Myra in this case
- were actuated by improper motive, the presumption is that they were not so
actuated and their testimony is entitled to full faith and credit. [64]

Laurentes next contention that Myra did not actually see him stab the victim
must likewise fail. From the circumstances obtaining in this case, it cannot be
doubted that Laurente and his companions acted in conspiracy in committing
the crime. They were together in the taxicab when it stopped and Myra saw
them scrambling inside, after which, they ran off and boarded a jeepney to
escape. On the matter of proving the existence of conspiracy, it is settled that
direct proof of the previous agreement to commit a crime is not necessary. It
may be deduced from the mode and manner by which the offense was
perpetrated, or inferred from the acts of the accused themselves when such
point to a joint purpose and design, concerted action and community of
interest. There is no doubt in our minds that the victim was killed by the co-
[65]

conspirators. That Myra did not actually see that it was Laurente who stabbed
the victim is of no moment. Once conspiracy is established, the act of one is the
act of all. [66]

Laurentes story on the alleged loss of his SSS ID card and its being found
in the taxicab is simply unbelievable. As to his defense, the trial court assessed
Laurentes testimony in this manner:
Accused Larry Laurente would like the Court to believe that he was
someplace else when the hold-up and killing . . . occurred . . . During his
testimony, he first claimed to have gone to work on February 14, 1994, and then
on the same breath, he suddenly changed his mind and said that he was
absent. He would also like to convince the Court that his co-accused in this
case, Richard Disipulo and Melvin Dagudog, came out of the blue, had a
drinking session with him, and just left with nary a word to him.
Evidence to be believed must proceed not only from the mouth of a credible
witness but the same must be credible in itself as when it conforms to the
common experience and observation of mankind. (People vs. Jalon, 215 SCRA
680).
The Court also noted that [the] accused. . . contradicted himself when he
said that he ha[d] been a molder . . in Tagig, Metro Manila for the past three (3)
years and yet, he has only been in Manila from Negros Oriental last October!
Such inconsistencies destroy his credibility and further bolster the Courts
findings that his defense of alibi is merely invoked as a matter of convenience. [67]

We are in full accord with such assessment, and further reiterate the rule
that alibi, being the weakest of all defenses as it is easy to fabricate and difficult
to disprove, cannot prevail over and is worthless in the face of the positive
identification of the accused. But most telling in this case is that Laurentes alibi
[68]

does not meet the requirements of time and place. It is not enough to prove that
the accused was somewhere else when the crime was committed, but he must
also demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that it was physically
impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime at the time the same
was committed. On cross- examination, Laurente admitted that it would take
[69]

about half an hour to traverse the distance from his house to the scene of the
crime. Such distance is so near as not to preclude his having been at the
[70]

scene of the crime when it was committed. We are, therefore, left with no option
but to rule that the prosecution has discharged its burden to prove the
commission of homicide by Laurente and to reject his defense of alibi.
Proof of the commission of robbery, however, must be examined more
closely.
 Laurente pleads that the prosecution failed to prove the element of robbery,
thus, his conviction of the crime charged should not be sustained. On this score,
Laurente calls this Courts attention to the fact:

[T]hat not a single [shred of] evidence was introduced by the prosecution to prove
robbery or unlawful taking of property from the victim. Nothing was shown whether
the victim was divested of his money or other personal belongings. It cannot be
presumed that the main purpose of the killing . . . was to rob [the victim]. There must
be evidence showing the unlawful taking of another by means of violence or force
upon things to make the accused-appellant liable under Pres. Dec. No. 532. . .. [71]

An examination of the records of this case reveals that the following

constitute the evidence to prove the robbery aspect of the offense: the
statement given by the victims daughter to the investigating! arresting
officer, and the contents of the affidavit executed by the investigating/arresting
[72]

officer himself. [73]

The police statement of the victims daughter contained the following

exchange:
05. t: Nalaman mo ha naman kung ano ang dahilan at pinatay ang iyong
tatay?
s: Ang tatay ko po ay hinoldap.
06. t: Ano naman ang trabaho nang iyong tatay, para siya holdapin?
s: Siya po ay taxi driver.
xxx xxx xxx
08. t: Nalaman mo ha naman kung magkano ang nakuha O naholdap sa
iyong tatay?
s: Hindi ko po alam kung magkano pero wala na po ang kinita niya sa
pagpapasada ng taxi.
09. t: Papaano naman ninyo nalaman na hinoldap at napatay ang iyong
tatay?
s. Nuong pang gabi ng petsa 14 ng Pebrero 1994, mayroon pong pumunta sa
aming bahay at kami po ay inimpormahan na ang aking tatay ay hinoldap at
napatay habang sakay siya ng kanyang inilalabas na taxi.[74] (italics supplied)

Clearly, such constituted inadmissible hearsay as any knowledge as to the

robbery aspect of the offense was not derived from her own perception and [75]

did not fall within any of the exceptions to the hearsay rule. However, [76]

assuming arguendo that the said statements were admissible for failure of the
defense counsel to raise a timely objection, nevertheless, such statements
carry no probative value. [77]
 On the subject of SPO1 Pios affidavit concerning the conduct of the
investigation, it becomes the sole piece of evidence to prove the robbery in the
case before us. The relevant portion is quoted hereunder:

That . . . a crime scene search was conducted by this investigator, during said search, .
. . a leather wallet colored brown was found on the passenger seat at the back . . .
further the personal belongings of the dead man known as the taxi driver was [sic]
intact, however, his daily earnings was [sic] missing, showing that the victim was
robbed before being killed. . .. (italics supplied)
[78]

This Court holds that the above statements, as the lone measure by which
to judge the commission of robbery, are insufficient to prove the same, i.e., that
the victim actually earned money and that these earnings were unlawfully taken
by the accused. The prosecution, in this regard, failed to discharge the burden
of proof and satisfy the quantum of evidence for the robbery aspect in this case.
A conviction for robbery simply cannot be had in the light of the total
absence of evidence regarding the taxicab drivers earnings and the sweeping
statement that the personal belongings of the dead man . . . [were] intact.
Moreover, the prosecution did not even bother to introduce evidence as to what
time the victim in this case started plying his route, which may have led to a
reasonable inference that he had earned some money by the time the crime
was committed. In sum, there is no conclusive evidence proving the physical
act of asportation by Laurente and his co-accused. [79]

It is settled that in order to sustain a conviction for the crime of robbery with
homicide, it is imperative that the robbery itself be proven as conclusively as
any other essential element of a crime. In the absence of such proof, the killing
of the victim would only be simple homicide or murder, depending on the
absence or presence of qualifying circumstances. [80]

We thus rule that the crime committed by Laurente is homicide under Article
249 of the Revised Penal Code and penalized therein with reclusion
temporal. Since no modifying circumstances have been established, it shall be
imposed in its medium period pursuant to Article 64(1) of the Revised Penal
Code.
In passing, this Court notes with much concern that the law enforcers in this
case failed to respect Laurentes rights against unlawful arrest and during[81]

custodial investigation. [82]

In this case, the follow-up team which arrested Laurente on 15 February

1994 had only the latters SSS ID card as possible basis to link Laurente to the
crime. None of the members of the team were eyewitnesses to the commission
of the crime; they had, therefore, nothing to support a lawful warrantless arrest
under Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. Under this section, a peace
officer or a private person may, without warrant, arrest a person only: (a) when
in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; (b) when an offense has in
fact been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that
the person to be arrested has committed it; and (c) when the person to be
arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place
where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is
pending, or has escaped while being transferred from confinement to another.
SPO1 Crispin Pio candidly admitted that he investigated Laurente without
the benefit of counsel after Laurente was arrested, although he informed him of
his constitutional rights. As to what these rights were, he never disclosed;
moreover, neither did Pio demonstrate that he exerted the requisite effort to
ensure that Laurente understood his rights. Undoubtedly, the custodial
[83]

investigation had commenced, as the police authorities had in fact pinpointed

Laurente as the author or one of the authors of the crime or had focused on him
as a suspect thereof. Finally, there is no evidence that Laurente waived the
rights to remain silent and to counsel. Section 12(1), Article III of the 1987
Constitution provides as follows:

SEC. 12 (1). Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall
have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and
independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the
services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived
except in writing and in the presence of counsel.

There was then a total disregard of the duties of an investigator during

custodial investigation, which this Court laid down in Morales
vs. Enrile, reiterated in several cases.
[84] [85]

It cannot be overemphasized that the rights enshrined in the Bill of

Rights are the very mechanisms by which the delicate balance between
[86]

governmental power and individual liberties is maintained. Thus, it does not

bode well for society when our law enforcers defy the fundamental law of the
land in ignoring these rights designed to ensure the very equilibrium of our
democracy.
It must, however, be pointed out that the conviction of Laurente is not based
on his alleged oral admission during his custodial investigation by SPO1 Crispin
Pio.
 WHEREFORE, the challenged decision of Branch 156 of the Regional Trial
Court of Pasig in Criminal Case No. 104785 is hereby modified as to the nature
of the offense committed. As modified, accused-appellant LARRY LAURENTE
y BEJASA is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt, as co-principal by direct
participation, of the crime of Homicide, defined and penalized under Article 249
of the Revised Penal Code, and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, said
accused-appellant LARRY LAURENTE y BEJASA is hereby sentenced to
suffer an indeterminate penalty ranging from Ten (10) years of prision mayor
medium, as minimum, to Seventeen (17) years and Four (4) months of reclusion
temporal medium, as maximum. In all other respects, the appealed decision is
AFFIRMED.
Costs against the accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED
SECOND DIVISION

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 175978

Plaintiff-Appellee,
Present:

QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson,

CARPIO MORALES,
TINGA,
- versus - VELASCO, JR., and
BRION, JJ

Promulgated:
SAMUEL ALGARME y BONDA @
Stingray (deceased) and RIZALDY
February 12, 2009
GELLE y BISCOCHO,
Accused-Appellants.

x --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

BRION, J.:
We review in this appeal the September 7, 2006 decision of the Court of
Appeals[1] (CA) in CA-G.R. CEB-CR-HC No. 00239, affirming with modification
the June 25, 2002decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), [2] Branch 60, Cadiz City.
The RTC decision found accused-appellants Samuel Algarme y Bonda (Samuel) and
Rizaldy Gelle yBiscocho (Rizaldy) guilty of the crime of robbery with homicide, and
sentenced them to suffer the death penalty.

ANTECEDENT FACTS

The prosecution charged the appellants before the RTC with the special
complex crime of robbery with homicide under an Information that states:

That on or about 2:45 a.m. of September 19, 1995 at Cadiz City

Park, Cadiz City, Negros Occidental, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused
conspiring, confederating and helping one another with evident
premeditation and treachery and with intent to kill, did then and there,
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault, attack and stab to death one
Loreto Batarilan y Ladiona, a tricycle driver, in order to rob, steal, and
take away a belt bag containing money and the wrist watch Seiko 5; and
inflicting upon the person of Loreto Batarilan the following injuries, to
wit:

Penetrating to perforating stab wounds:

*2 cm. at epigastric area

*1-2 cm. in the following areas of the back

=11th rib scapular line, right

=4 wounds at right scapular area
 =4 wounds at left scapular area
=1wound at interscapular area, left
=2 wounds infrascapular area, left

*1 wound supraclavicular area, left

*1 wound infra-suricular area, left

CAUSE OF DEATH: Cardio-pulmonary arrest due to hypovolemic

shock secondary to Multiple Stab wounds, which directly caused the
death of the said victim Loreto Batarilan, to the damage and prejudice of
the heirs of the said victim in the amount, to wit:

P50,000.00 as indemnity for the death of the victim.

ACT CONTRARY TO LAW.[3]

The appellants pleaded not guilty to the charge. The prosecution presented the
following witnesses in the trial on the merits that followed: Rudy Pepito (Rudy); Dr.
Jimmily Aguiling (Dr. Aguiling); Norman Palma (Norman); Police Officer 3 Landolfo
Acita (PO3 Acita); and Alicia Batarilan (Alicia). Rizaldy was the lone defense witness.

Rudy narrated that he slept at the Maricom Detachment Office located in Punta
Cabahug, Cadiz City and rode a tricycle bound for Ceres Bus Terminal at
around 2:45 a.m. of September 19, 1995 because his service vehicle broke
down.[4] As the tricycle passed by the Cadiz City Park, he saw a parked empty
tricycle and an old man being stabbed by three (3) persons. Two (2) persons held
the victim while the third one stabbed him. Rudy described the person who stabbed
the victim to be white and tall, while the other two (2) who held the victim were
short.[5]

He further narrated that the victim was stabbed several times in front and at the
back and cried for help as he was being stabbed. The driver of the tricycle he was
riding, apparently afraid, increased the vehicles speed as they passed the stabbing
scene. When they reached the Ceres Bus Terminal, he (Rudy) immediately boarded
a bus bound for Sagay.[6] He returned to Cadiz on September 21, 1995 and told
Cesar Ladiona (Cesar), a barangay tanod, that he saw a person being stabbed at the
park in the morning of September 19. Cesar brought him to the Cadiz City Jail where
he was asked whether he could recognize the assailants. He identified the person
who stabbed the victim from among the prisoners in jail.[7]

He testified on cross-examination that the tricycle he was riding was very near the
scene of the stabbing incident,[8] and that the park was very brightly lit that
night.[9] He stated that he did not immediately report the stabbing incident upon
arriving at the Ceres Bus Terminal because he was afraid and because the Ceres bus
bound for Sagay was already leaving.[10] When he reported the stabbing incident to
Cesar on September 21, 1995, Cesar asked him if he could identify the assailants.
He replied that he could, but only through their faces. Cesar then brought him to
the city jail[11] where the Chief of Police asked him to point out the persons
responsible for the stabbing he reported. He recognized two (2) of the assailants
from among the many prisoners inside the jail. He recalled that the prisoners were
not brought out of their cell when he was asked to identify the assailants.[12]

Dr. Aguiling, Medical Officer III at the Cadiz City Emergency Clinic, testified that he
went to Cabahug Street near the City Hall in the morning of September 19, 1995 at
the request of the police. At the place, he saw the body of an elderly male person
sprawled on the ground, about 10 meters away from a parked empty tricycle.[13] He
found that of the 12 wounds inflicted on the victims body, four (4) were fatal. The
wounds could have been caused by a bladed weapon.[14] According to Dr. Aguiling,
the victims cause of death was cardio-pulmonary arrest due to hypovolemic shock
secondary to multiple stab wounds.[15]
 Norman, a tricycle driver residing in Cadiz City, narrated that he brought his
passengers to Ester Pharmacy and Villa Consing, respectively, in the early morning
of September 19, 1995; afterwards, he went to Cabahug Street and saw Melanie,
the wife of a co-driver. Melanie asked him to look for her (Melanies) husband.
Melanie boarded his tricycle and requested to be brought to the Ester
Pharmacy.[16] On the way there, he saw Loreto Batarilan (Loreto) driving his own
tricycle and trailing his; he also saw three (3) persons walking towards the direction
of the Emergency Clinic. He identified two of them as Rizaldy and Stingray both of
whom he had known for a long time. He went back towards the direction of the
City Hall after Melanie alighted at the Ester Pharmacy.[17] He saw Loretos parked
tricycle as he passed by the City Hall on Cabahug Street; he then saw Loretos body
full of blood lying on the street. He also saw Rizaldy, Stingray, and a certain John
Doe, about two (2) extended arms length away from the victims body, walking
towards the park carrying a belt bag.[18] He recalled that there were no other
persons in the park during that time. He went to the police headquarters to report
the incident, but the headquarters was closed. He then went to the Ester Pharmacy
and requested the security guard to call the police.[19]

PO3 Acita, Duty Investigator at the Cadiz City Police Station, testified that at
around 3:00 a.m. of September 19, 1995, the desk officer received a telephone call
informing the police about a dead person found near the City Hall. Together with
five (5) members of the Cadiz Police, he immediately went to Cabahug Street to
verify the report. At the reported place, he saw the body of a person lying on the
ground, full of blood. He likewise saw a tricycle parked near
the City Park along Cabahug Street. He inspected the tricycle and saw blood stains
on the drivers seat. Thereafter, he and the other members of the police requested
Dr. Aguiling and a photographer to come to the crime scene.[20]

Alicia, the victims wife, declared on the witness stand that her husband was
a tricycle driver; that her husband wore a Seiko watch when he left to ply his route
in the early morning of September 19, 1995. He also carried a belt bag
containing P1,200.00 plus loose change; the money was intended for the purchase
of spare parts for the tricycle.[21]She further narrated that she only learned of the
death of her husband from her daughter in the morning of September 19,
1995. Only her children went to the crime scene. She added that her husband
earned P200.00 a day.[22]

The defense presented appellant Rizaldy who gave a different version of

events.

Rizaldy testified that he did not know his co-accused, Samuel, prior to their
arrest on September 21, 1995. At around 2:45 a.m. of September 19, 1995, he was
watching a billiard game in front of his house on Mabini Street, Cadiz City.[23] Police
Officer Boy Caedo (PO Caedo) arrested him at around 9:00 a.m. of September 21,
1995. He was brought to the police station where PO Caedo showed him a shirt and
a black shorts, and asked whether he owned them. When he answered in the
negative, PO Caedo told him to go home. Thereafter, he was surprised to receive a
notice from the prosecutors office informing him that he was one of the accused in
the killing of Loreto. He and Samuel were brought to the City Prosecutors Office
where they were asked to secure the services of a lawyer and to file their counter-
affidavits within 10 days. A certain Atty. Del Pilar came to him and advised him not
to make a counter-affidavit.[24] He insisted that he had slept in the house of the
spouses Mercedes and Manuel Apuhin (spouses Apuhin) in the morning
of September 19, 1995, and that Mercedes told him at around 7 a.m. that an old
man had been killed in the park.[25]

He admitted on cross-examination that Norman identified him at the police

headquarters as one of the persons who had robbed and killed the victim.[26] He
stated that he had been staying since 1994 at the house of the spouses Apuhin as
a household helper. He likewise stated that the Apuhin house was a two-minute
walk from the Cadiz City Park.[27]

The RTC convicted appellants Samuel and Rizaldy of the special complex
crime of robbery with homicide in its decision of June 25, 2002, as follows:
 WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, this Court finds accused
Samuel Algarme y Bonda and Rizaldy Gelle y Biscocho (all detained)
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with Homicide
as charged in the Information and there being an aggravating
circumstance of treachery attendant thereto without any mitigating
circumstance to offset the same, hereby sentences the accused to the
penalty of DEATH.

The two accused are all hereby ordered immediately committed

to the National Penitentiary for the execution of their sentence, and the
Clerk of Court of this Court is hereby directed to immediately forward the
entire records of this case to the Supreme Court for automatic review.

The two accused are further ordered to jointly and solidarily pay
the heirs of the victim the amount of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS
(P50,000.00) by way of indemnity for the death of LORETO BATARILAN,
together with the amount of THREE THOUSAND PESOS (P3,000.00)
representing the cash amount and the value of the wrist watch of the
victim by way of reparation, and the amount of THREE HUNDRED
SEVENTY-FOUR THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED PESOS (P374,400.00) by
way of the loss of the earning capacity of the victim, Loreto Batarilan,
plus the amount of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) as moral
damages, and the further amount of TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS
(P20,000.00) as exemplary damages. The award for the loss of earning
capacity together with the moral and exemplary damages for which
docket fees and legal fees, the Clerk of Court of this Court is hereby
directed to charge as liens on the award of damages the said docket and
other legal fees.

The case against alias Stingray who is still at-large is hereby

ordered ARCHIVED to be immediately revived upon his arrest.
 Costs against accused Samuel Algarme and Rizaldy Gelle.

SO ORDERED.[28]

The RTC, after receiving an information that one of the appellants had
escaped confinement and subsequently been killed in a shoot-out with the police,
issued an Order directing the counsels for both the prosecution and defense, as
well as the BJMP Warden and Chief of Police of PNP Cadiz City, to submit a report
on the incident.[29] They reported and confirmed that Samuel had indeed been
killed on February 29, 1996 in a police shoot-out. Based on this confirmed
development, the trial court issued an Order dated October 17, 2002 modifying the
dispositive portion of its June 25, 2002 decision and dismissing the case against
Samuel.[30]

On appeal, we endorsed this case to the CA for appropriate action and

disposition[31] pursuant to our ruling in People v. Mateo.[32] The CA, in its decision
of September 7, 2006, affirmed the RTC decision with the modification that the
death penalty imposed on Rizaldy be reduced to reclusion perpetua.

In his brief,[33] the appellant argues that the RTC erred

1. in giving credence to the positive identification by the two (2)

prosecution witnesses pointing to him as the perpetrator of the crime
charged;

2. in finding that a conspiracy existed between him and his co-accused

Samuel;
 3. in imposing the death penalty even if treachery had not been proven;
and

4. in convicting him of the crime charged even if its elements had not been
proven beyond reasonable doubt.

THE COURTS RULING

We resolve to deny the appellants appeal as his guilt has been proven beyond
reasonable doubt, but we modify the lower courts decision with respect to the
crime committed, the penalty imposed, and the awarded indemnities.

Sufficiency of the Prosecution Evidence

An established rule in appellate review is that the trial courts factual findings
including its assessment of the credibility of the witnesses, the probative weight of
their testimonies, and the conclusions drawn from the factual findings are accorded
great respect and even conclusive effect. In our review of cases, these factual
findings and conclusions assume greater weight if they are affirmed by the CA.
Despite this enhanced persuasive effect, we nevertheless fully scrutinize the
records (as we did in this case), since the penalty of reclusion perpetua that the CA
imposed on the appellant demands no less than this kind of careful and deliberate
consideration.[34]

A distinguishing feature of the present case is the presence of a witness Rudy who,
in his November 27, 1995 testimony, positively identified the appellants as the
perpetrators. To directly quote from the records:

PROSECUTOR FRANCES V. GUANZON

Q: So when you were on board the tricycle and you were passing
the City Park, has [sic] there any unusual incident that
transpired?

RUDY PEPITO

A: I saw a tricycle.

Q: Aside from the tricycle, what other things did you see?

A: An old man was stabbed.

xxx
Q: You said that an old man was stabbed? Did you see the person
who stabbed the old man?

A: I saw.

Q: How many persons stabbed the old man?

A: Three persons.

Q: How was the old man stabbed by these three (3) persons?
A: The old man was held by two persons while the other one
stabbed him.

Q: Can you describe the person, the one who actually stabbed the
victim?

A: Yes, maam.

Q: How does he look?

A: He was the one who stabbed the old man. He was white and
tall.

Q: You said there were two persons who held the person while this
white tall person stabbed the old man. Can you describe the
person who held the old man, their appearance, their
height, if you can recall?

A: The two persons were short.

xxxx

Q: When you arrived on September 21, 1995 from Sagay to Cadiz,

was there anything that transpired?
A: When I arrived, I told Cesar that somebody was stabbed at the
park.

Q: Who is this Cesar?

A: A Barangay Tanod.

Q: So, when you told him about what you saw on September 19,
1995, what did this Cesar, who is a barangay tanod, do?

A: Cesar brought me to the Jail and asked me to identify the

person.

Q: So, in other words, you were brought by barangay tanod Cesar

to the Cadiz City Jail to look at the persons who were inside
the jail, is that what you mean?

A: Yes.

Q: So, at the City Jail, were you able to identify the person who
stabbed Loreto Batarilan on the evening of September 19,
1995?

A: Yes, mam.

Q: How many were they did you see inside the Cadiz City Jail? [sic]
A: Three persons.

Q: When you said that there were three and the one who actually
stabbed was tall and white? If they are present in Court,
can you identify him? [sic]

A: Yes, maam.
.
Q: Please look around and point to the person who you described
as tall and white?

A: (Witness pointing to a person inside the courtroom who when

asked answer [sic] to the name Samuel Algarme)

Q: You mentioned also that out of these two other persons who
are short held the old man while he was being stabbed by
a white man. [sic] If one of these short men who held
Loreto Batarilan on September 19, 1995 is present in this
courtroom, can you identify him?

A: Yes, maam.

Q: Please look around and point to one of these two persons who
held Loreto Batarilan on the evening of September 19,
1995 while he was stabbed by Samuel Algarme?

A: (Witness pointing to a person sitting inside the Courtroom

who when asked answered to the name Rizaldy Gelle)
 Q: You said that there were three? What about the other persons
who held Loreto Batarilan when he was stabbed by Samuel
Algarme, if he is present in court, can you identify him?

A; Yes, maam.

Q: Is he present in Court today?

A: He is not here, maam.[35] [Emphasis ours]

Rudys testimony was clear and straightforward; he never wavered in pointing to

the appellants as the persons who held and stabbed Loreto in the morning
of September 19, 1995. Significantly, the testimony of another prosecution witness
Norman supported Rudys story with respect to the presence of the appellants at
the crime scene. Although Norman did not say anything categorical about the
actual stabbing, he saw the appellants whom he had known for a long time in the
same vicinity as the victim before the stabbing and after the stabbing walking near
the victims lifeless body and carrying the latters belt bag.

These testimonies, when considered together, lead to no conclusion other

than the appellants direct participation in the stabbing that led to the victims
death. To reiterate, the appellants and the victim were in the same vicinity before
the stabbing; soon after, the appellants were seen holding and stabbing the victim;
immediately thereafter, they were also seen walking away, carrying the victims
bag. In considering these testimonies, we find it very significant that the defense
failed to refute the testimonies of Rudy and Norman through evidence showing
motive that could lead them to falsely testify against the appellants. In the absence
of such evidence, we can conclude that their testimonies are worthy of full faith
and credit.[36]

Admissibility of Identification

Rizaldy challenges the reliability and integrity of the positive identification

Rudy made. He claims that his in-court identification was facilitated by a highly
suggestive and irregular out-of-court identification process. He harps on the fact
that the out-of-court identification was not made in a police line up but in a mere
show-up.

We find this challenge to be baseless as we fail to see any flaw that would
invalidate Rudys out-of-court identification of the appellants. We see no basis, too,
to support the conclusion that the in-court identification an identification made
independently of the out-of court identification is itself tainted with invalidity.[37]

In People v. Teehankee, Jr.,[38] we explained the procedure for out-of-

court identification and the test to determine its admissibility:
Out-of-court identification is conducted by the police in various ways. It is
done thru show-ups where the suspect alone is brought face-to-face with the witness
for identification. It is done thru mug shots where photographs are shown to the
witness to identify the suspect. It is also done thru line-ups where a witness identifies
the suspect from a group of persons lined up for the purpose x x x x In resolving the
admissibility of and relying on out-of-court identification of suspects, courts have
adopted the totality of circumstances test where they consider the following
factors, viz: (1) the witness' opportunity to view the criminal at the time of the crime;
(2) the witness degree of attention at that time; (3) the accuracy of any prior
description, given by the witness; (4) the level of certainty demonstrated by the
witness at the identification; (5) the length of time between the crime and the
identification; and, (6) the suggestiveness of the identification procedure.
Applying the totality-of-circumstances test, we find Rudys out-of-court
identification to be reliable and thus admissible. First, Rudy testified that the tricycle
he was riding passed very near the place where the victim was stabbed, and that the
park at that time was very bright. Second, Rudy was simply riding a tricycle when
the stabbing, a very startling incident, happened; no competing incident took place
to draw his attention away from the incident; and the event, being startling,
consumed his full attention and gave him the chance to see clearly the features of
the person stabbed, the manner he was stabbed, and the appearance of the
assailants. Third, he stated with certainty that he could identify the assailants faces
when he reported the incident to barangay tanod Cesar. Fourth, the identification
took place within two (2) days from the stabbing incident; he explained fully why it
took him two days to come forward and report the stabbing. Finally, there was
nothing suggestive or irregular about Rudys out-of-court identification of the
appellants; it was not even a show-up as Rizaldy suggests where the suspects, tagged
as the persons to be identified, are brought face-to-face with the witness for
confirmation of identification. When Rudy arrived at the police station, he was asked
to point to the assailants from among the many prisoners inside the cell; he was not
compelled to focus his attention on any specific person or persons. There was also
no evidence that the police had supplied or even suggested to Rudy that the
appellants were the suspected perpetrators. Thus, Rudys identification was
spontaneous, independent, and untainted by any improper suggestion.

We do not agree that an identification is unreliable simply because it was not

conducted in a police line up. No law or police regulation requires a police line up
for proper identification in every case. There can still be a proper and reliable
identification even in the absence of a line up, for as long as the identification is
unaffected by prior or contemporaneous improper suggestions that point out the
suspect to the witness as the perpetrator to be identified.[39]

Granting arguendo that the out-of-court identification was irregular as the

appellants claim, this identification did not foreclose the admissibility of
Rudys independent in-court identification.[40] It must be stressed that in convicting
the appellants for the crime charged, the courts a quo did not rely solely on Rudys
identification at the city jail or on an in-court identification based on the city jail
identification. Rudys November 27, 1995 court testimony clearly shows that he
positively identified Samuel and Rizaldy independently of the previous
identification he made at the city jail. His testimony, including his identification of
the appellants, was positive, straightforward, and categorical. In People v.
Timon[41] where the appellants likewise questioned the reliability of their in-court
identification vis--vis their out-of-court identification, this Court ruled:
Even assuming arguendo the appellants out-of-court identification was
defective, their subsequent identification in court cured any flaw that may have
initially attended it. We emphasize that the inadmissibility of a police line-up
identification x x x should not necessarily foreclose the admissibility of an
 independent in-court identification. We also stress that all the accused-appellants were
positively identified by the prosecution eyewitnesses during the trial.[42]

The Appellants Alibi

In stark contrast with the prosecutions case is Rizaldys weak and uncorroborated
defense.

He claimed he was in front of his house watching a billiard game in the early
morning of September 19, 1995. On cross-examination, he retracted this statement
and insisted that he slept at the house of the spouses Apuhin located on Cabahug
Street on September 19, 1995.
These inconsistencies impact on a basic component that the defense of alibi
requires that there be physical impossibility for the accused to be at the scene of the
crime or its immediate vicinity at the time of its commission. If the appellant cannot
be consistent about his whereabouts, then he cannot hope to prove the physical
impossibility that the defense of alibi requires in order to merit serious consideration.

At any rate, the physical impossibility for the appellant to be at the scene of
the crime on the date of its commission is negated by his own testimony that the
Apuhin house is a mere two-minute walk from the city park. More importantly, the
appellant was positively identified by Rudy. The settled rule in weighing
contradictory statements is that alibi cannot prevail over the positive identification
of the appellant by a credible witness, as in this case.[43]

The Crime Committed

Article 294, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code provides:

Art. 294. Robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons
Penalties. - Any person guilty of robbery with the use of violence against or
intimidation of any person shall suffer:

1. The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death, when by reason or

on occasion of the robbery, the crime of homicide shall have
been committed, or when the robbery shall have been
accompanied by rape or intentional mutilation or arson.
 A special complex crime of robbery with homicide takes place when a
homicide is committed either by reason, or on the occasion, of the robbery. [44] To
sustain a conviction for robbery with homicide, the prosecution must prove the
following elements: (1) the taking of personal property belonging to another; (2)
with intent to gain; (3) with the use of violence or intimidation against a person;
and (4) on the occasion or by reason of the robbery, the crime of homicide, as used
in its generic sense, was committed.[45] A conviction requires certitude that
the robbery is the main purpose, and objective of the malefactor and the killing
is merely incidental to the robbery.[46] The intent to rob must precede the taking
of human life but the killing may occur before, during or after the robbery.[47]

In People v. Salazar,[48] this Court expounded on the concept of robbery with

homicide under Article 294(1) of the Revised Penal Code, thus:

The Spanish version of Article 294 (1) of the Revised Penal Code
reads: 1.0--Con la pena de reclusion perpetua a muerte, cuando con
motivo o con ocasion del robo resultare homicidio. Chief Justice Ramon
C. Aquino explains that the use of the words con motivodel robo permits
of no interpretation other than that the intent of the actor must supply
the connection between the homicide and the robbery in order to
constitute the complex offense. If that intent comprehends the
robbery, it is immaterial that the homicide may in point of time
immediately precede instead of follow the robbery. Where the original
design comprehends robbery, and homicide is perpetrated by reason or
on the occasion of the consummation of the former, the crime
committed is the special complex offense, even if homicide precedes the
robbery by an appreciable interval of time. On the other hand, if the
original criminal design does not clearly comprehend robbery, but
robbery follows the homicide as an afterthought or as a minor incident
of the homicide, the criminal acts should be viewed as constitutive of
two offenses and not of a single complex offense. Robbery with
homicide arises only when there is a direct relation, an intimate
connection, between the robbery and the killing, even if the killing is
 prior to, concurrent with, or subsequent to the robbery. [Emphasis
ours]

In the case before us, the RTC convicted the appellants of robbery with
homicide based on the testimonies of Rudy, Alicia, and Norman. The CA affirmed
this finding without any explanation on how the crime came to be the special
complex crime of robbery with homicide. To be sure, Rudys testimony clinched the
case against the appellants with respect to the victims stabbing and resulting death.
The lower courts apparently deduced the intent to rob from the testimonies of
Alicia and Norman.

Alicia, in her testimony of August 27, 1996, testified that her husband had a
belt bag containing P1,200.00, more or less, and wore a Seiko watch when he left
to ply his route in the early morning of September 19, 1995. To
directly quote from the records:

PROSECUTOR FRANCES V. GUANZON

Q: So on September 19, 1995 at about 12:00 midnight he was

still alive, did he not go out to drive a tricycle at that time?

ALICIA BATARILAN:

A: Yes, maam. He went out to drive his tricycle.

xxx
 Q: When he left your house was he carrying anything or did he
have anything in his possession?

A: He was [sic] with him a belt bag and a watch.

Q: What was the content of the belt bag if you know?

A: His money.

Q: Did you know how much his money was?

A: P1,200.00 and loose change.

Q: Why do you know that he had with him P1,200.00 and loose
change at that time.

A: He had with him P1,200.00 because he was intending to buy

spare parts of the tricycle.[49]

Norman, in his testimony dated June 6, 1996, testified that he saw the
appellants, together with a John Doe, carrying a belt bag and walking away from
the victims body. We quote the pertinent portions of his testimony:

PROSECUTOR FRANCES V. GUANZON

Q: While you were at Cabahug Street somewhere at the City Park,
was there anything that you had noticed?

NORMAN PALMA

A: Yes maam.

Q: What was that?

A: I saw the tricycle of the old man without anybody on it.

Q: Who is this old man you are referring to?

A: I am referring to Loreto Batarilan.

Q: Where was the tricycle located?

A: Beside the City Park near the globe.

Q: And then what other things did you see?

A: I saw the old man lying down with blood.

Q: And where was the old man situated?

A: Beside the City Hall.

Q: And what else did you see?

A: I saw the three (3) persons walking towards the park with belt
bag.

Q: And who were these (3) persons you saw going towards the
park carrying a belt bag?

A: Stingray.

Q: Who else?

A: Gelle.

Q: And you said there were three, who was the other one?

A: I do not know his name but I can recognize his face.

Q: What was the distance of these three persons when you saw
them from the body of the old man you said?

A: Maybe about two (2) extended arms length away.

Q: Were there other persons walking also towards the park at that
time aside from these three (3) persons?

A: No more.

xxxx

Q: You mentioned that you saw three (3) persons and you
mentioned Stingray. If this Stingray is present in Court, can
you identify him?

A: Yes, maam.

Q: Please look around and point to Stingray?

A: He is not around.

Q: You said the other one is named Rizaldy Gelle. Is he present in

Court?

A: Yes, maam.

Q: Please look around and point to Rizaldy Gelle.

COURT:
 Witness pointing to a person sitting inside the courtroom who
when asked answered to the name of Rizaldy Gelle. x x
x[50] [Emphasis ours]

Based on these testimonies, the RTC concluded that the appellants primary
criminal intent was to rob the victim. Thus it held:

Likewise, witness Alicia Batarilan also testified that her husband,

the victim herein, went out from their houses for his usual schedule of
driving, the victim had with him a belt bag containing the amount of One
Thousand Two Hundred Pesos (P1,200.00) plus loose change and the
victim was wearing a wrist watch valued at One Thousand Eight Hundred
Pesos (P1,800.00), and this fact was proven by the prosecution that a
robbery took place before the killing of the victim considering that after
the incident the belt bag containing cash and the wrist watch of the
victim was seen being worn by one of the three persons who perpetrated
the crime, since as testified to by witness Norman Palma that when he
saw the three persons walking towards the park with a belt bag, no other
persons were seen in the vicinity of the crime immediately before or after
the commission of the crime, thus it is logical to conclude that the three
persons indeed perpetrated the robbery and the killing of the victim x x
x

To sustain a conviction for the special complex crime of robbery with

homicide, the prosecution must establish with certitude that the killing was a mere
incident to the robbery, the latter being the perpetrators main purpose and
objective.[51] It is not enough to suppose that the purpose of the author of the
homicide was to rob; a mere presumption of such fact is not sufficient.

In the case before us, the testimonies of Norman and Alicia merely
established two (2) facts: that the victim carried a belt bag containing money on
that fateful morning of September 19, 1995; and the appellants were seen carrying
the said belt bag walking near the victims body. From these established facts, we
hold that the prosecution failed to establish the linkage required by law between a
robbery and a homicide to characterize the crime as the special complex crime of
robbery with homicide; there was no showing of the appellants intention
determined by their acts, prior to, contemporaneous with and subsequent to the
commission of the crime to commit robbery. There was likewise no testimony to
show whether the appellants intended to kill the victim in order to steal the belt
bag, or whether the killing was merely an afterthought. Thus, the appellants
primary intent remains a mystery. The fact that they were in possession of the
victims belt bag after the killing does not ipso facto give rise to the conclusion that
their overriding intention was to rob the victim.

We have held in several cases[52] that where the evidence satisfactorily

establishes that the appellant did kill and unlawfully take the personal property of
the victim, but the original criminal design to commit robbery was not duly
proven the accused-appellant should be held liable for the separate crimes of
homicide or murder (as the case may be) and theft, and not for the special complex
crime of robbery with homicide.

This Court recognizes that the Information accused the appellants of the crime
of robbery with homicide. The established rule, however, is that the nature and
character of the crime charged are determined, not by the given designation of the
specific crime, but by the facts alleged in the Information.[53] In this case, all the
elements relevant to the killing and the taking of property were properly stated in the
Information; only the statement of the specific crime committed a conclusion of law
remained to be correctly made.This, we do in this Decision.

Homicide or Murder?

The Information alleged the aggravating circumstance of treachery. However,

we cannot appreciate this circumstance as the prosecution failed to show proof that
the appellants made some preparation to kill the victim in a manner that would
ensure the execution of the crime or make it impossible or difficult for the person
attacked to defend himself.[54]
 The Information likewise alleged the aggravating circumstance of evidence
premeditation. For this aggravating circumstance to be appreciated, the following
must be proven: 1) the time when the accused decided to commit the crime; 2) an
overt act manifestly indicating that the accused clung to such determination; and 3)
between the decision and the execution, a sufficient lapse of time that allowed for
reflection on the consequences of the act contemplated. [55] None of these elements
have been established in the case before us.

In the absence of any circumstance which would qualify the victims killing to
murder, we hold that the appellant should be held liable only for the crime of
homicide.

The Proper Penalties

The penalty for homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code
is reclusion temporal. In the absence of any modifying circumstance proven by the
prosecution or by the defense, the penalty shall be imposed in its medium
period. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the appellant can be sentenced to
an indeterminate penalty whose minimum shall be within the range of prision
mayor (the penalty next lower in degree to that provided in Article 249) and whose
maximum shall be within the range of reclusion temporal in its medium period.

Article 309 of the Revised Penal Code provides the following penalties for
the crime of theft:

Art. 309. Penalties. - Any person guilty of theft shall be punished by:

xxx
3. The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods, if the
value of the property stolen is more than 200 pesos but does not exceed 6,000 pesos.

In the absence of any mitigating or aggravating circumstance, the maximum

term of the indeterminate penalty, which is prision correccional in its minimum and
medium periods, should be imposed in the medium period or one (1) year, eight (8)
months and twenty-one (21) days, to two (2) years, eleven (11) months and ten (10)
days. The minimum of the indeterminate penalty is anywhere within the range of the
penalty next lower, or arresto mayor, in its medium and maximum periods which is
two (2) months and one (1) day to six (6) months.
Civil Indemnity

a. Homicide

The award for civil indemnity is mandatory and is granted to the heirs of the
victim without need of proof other than the commission of the crime.[56] Pursuant to
current jurisprudence,[57] an award of P50,000.00 to the victims heirs is in order.

Moral damages are mandatory in cases of murder and homicide without need
of allegation and proof other than the death of the victim. Consistent with this rule,
we award the amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages in accordance with prevailing
jurisprudence.[58]

We likewise award loss of earning capacity to the victims heirs. As a rule,

documentary evidence should be presented to substantiate a claim for loss of earning
capacity.By way of exception, damages may be awarded despite the absence of
documentary evidence, provided testimony exists that the victim was either (1) self-
employed, earning less than the minimum wage under current labor laws, and
judicial notice may be taken of the fact that no documentary evidence is usually
available in the victims line of work; or (2) employed as a daily wage worker,
earning less than the minimum wage under current labor laws.[59] Given Alicias
testimony that her husband was a tricycle driver earning P200.00 a day, we hold
that the heirs are entitled to an award representing the loss of the victims earning
capacity computed under the following formula:

Net Earning Capacity = 2/3 x (80 less the age of the victim at the time of
death) x (Gross Annual Income less the Reasonable and Necessary Living
Expenses)

The records show that Loretos annual gross income was P72,000.00 per
annum computed from his monthly rate of P6,000.00 (or P200.00 per day). His
reasonable and necessary living expenses are estimated at 50% of this gross income,
leaving a balance of P36,000.00. His life expectancy, on the other hand is assumed
to be 2/3 of the age 80 less 62, his age at the time of death. Applying the formula
yields the net earning capacity of P432,000.00.

We can only award actual damages to the extent actually proven by

evidence, i.e., upon competent proof and the best evidence obtainable by the injured
party. In this case, the prosecution failed to present any receipt to prove the claim
for expenses incurred in relation with the victims death. Nevertheless, we can
award P25,000.00 as temperate damages pursuant to our ruling in People v.
Abrazaldo[60] that temperate damages of P25,000.00 may be awarded in place of
actual damages, where the amount of actual damages for funeral expenses cannot be
determined with certainty under the rules of evidence.
b. Theft

The only evidence of the amount stolen from the victim is the belt bag that,
according to Alicia contained P1,200.00, more or less. No valuation was ever made
on the cost of the belt bag. While the victim also had a Seiko watch when he left
home before he died, no proof exists that the appellants took the watch. Hence, we
can only order the heirs indemnified to the extent of P1,200.00.

WHEREFORE, in view of these considerations, the Decision of the Court of

Appeals in CA-G.R. CEB-CR-HC No. 00239 is MODIFIED as follows:

(1) Appellant Rizaldy Gelle is found GUILTY of the separate crimes of

homicide and theft.

(2) For the crime of homicide, the appellant is SENTENCED to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of twelve (12) years of prision
mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months
of reclusion temporal, as maximum; he is
likewise ORDERED to PAY the victims heirs the following amounts:
(a) P50,000.00 as civil indemnity; (b) P50,000.00 as moral damages;
(c) P25,000.00 as temperate damages; and (d) P432,000.00 as indemnity
for loss of earning capacity.

(3) For the crime of theft, the appellant is SENTENCED to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of six (6) months of arresto
mayor, as minimum, to two (2) years, eleven (11) months and ten (10) days
of prision correccional, as maximum; he is
likewise ORDERED to PAY the victims heirs the amount of P1,200.00
representing the value of the money stolen.

Costs against appellant Rizaldy Gelle y Biscocho.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 208527

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff -Appellee,

vs
ARDO BACERO y CASABON, Accused-Appellant.

DECISION

PEREZ, J.:

Before this court is an appeal of the July 26, 2012 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
CR.- H.C. No. 05040 affirming the January 11, 2011 Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Antipolo City, Branch 73 in Crim. Case No. 03-25345, finding accused-appellant Ardo
Bacero y Casabon (accused-appellant) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the special complex crime
of Robbery with Homicide as defined and penalized under Article 294, paragraph (1)of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended by Section 9 of Republic Act No. 7659.

On March 27, 2003, an Information3 for the special complex crime of Robbery with Homicide was
filed against accused-appellant and several men whose true identities were unknown at the time of
filing, namely, Victor Bisaya, Rodel, Rommel, John Doe and Peter Doe. The accusatory portion of
the Information reads:

"That on or about the 24th day of March, 2003, in the Municipality of Taytay, Province of Rizal,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named accused, in
conspiracy with @Victor Bisaya, @Rodel, @Rommel, @John Doe, @Peter Doe[,] whose true
identities and whereabouts are still unknown, with the use of deadly bladed weapons, with intent to
gain and by means or force, violence and intimidation, did then and th.ere willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously rob, take and divest one Virgilio San Juan[, Jr.] y Molina @Jun of his Nokia 3310
cellphone valued at Php4,500.00 and one Juliet Bunot y Dumdum of her Smart Buddy 3388 model
cellphone valued at [P]2,400.00 and cash money amounting to [P]70.00, to the damage and
prejudice of both offended parties in the total amount of Php6,970.00; that by reason and on the
occasion of the robbery, the above-named accused, with intent to kill, and by means of the qualifying
aggravating circumstances of treachery, evident premeditation and superior strength, did, then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab with said deadly bladed weapons,
said Virgilio San Juan[, Jr.] y Molina @Jun, hitting him on the different parts of his body, thereby
inflicting upon the victim mortal stabbed wounds which directly caused his death.

CONTRARY TO LAW."4

On arraignment, accused-appellant entered a plea of NOT GUILTY.5 Trial on the merits ensued
thereafter.

The Facts

The antecedent facts as culled from the Plaintiff-Appellee's Brief6 and the records of the case are
summarized as follows:

At around 4:45 o'clock in the afternoon of March 24, 2003, Juliet Dumdum-Bunot and her boyfriend,
Virgilio "Jun" San Juan[, Jr., y Molina] were attacked by six men while they were having a small
picnic at the Monteverde Royal Subdivision in Taytay, Rizal. One of the men, later identified as the
accused-appellant, forcibly grabbed Jun's cellphone after stabbing him on the face with a knife. Juliet
was unable to help Jun as her face was being shoved down towards her thighs by one of accused-
appellant's companions. Every time Juliet fought back, the unidentified man punched her. Despite
her struggle, Juliet could hear Jun shouting "Huwag po, huwag po, Diyos ko po". Juliet was
restrained by one of the men; her face was covered with a towel and her hands were tied with
another towel. Fortunately, according to Juliet, the towel was loosely tied and thin enough for her to
see through it and identify the man who attacked her. When Juliet freed herself from the loosely tied
towels, she immediately looked for Jun but he was nowhere to be found. She sought assistance
from the· Monteverde Royale Subdivision security guards. They roamed around the subdivision and
saw Jun's lifeless body in a grassy area.

At the police station later that day, Juliet Dumdum Bunot (Juliet) told Senior Police Officer 1 Rogelio
V. Marundan (SPOl Marundan), then Chief Investigator of Taytay Police, that two of the assailants'
faces were familiar to her but she was uncertain of their identities. She also mentioned that the face
of one of the men who attacked Virgilio San Juan, Jr. y Molina (Jun) was familiar as she had seen
him in the neighborhood. She identified said assailant as having long hair. Still distraught over the
horrifying incident, Juliet was unable to remember the faces of the other assailants. She was advised
to calm down and to head home. Two days after, Juliet informed Senior Police Officer 1 William S.
Texon (SPOl Texon) that she remembered one of the assailants. Juliet claimed that she was familiar
with accused-appellant's face because she used to see him three to four times a week whenever he
was plying his tricycle route outside her house. According to the Pinagsamang Sinumpaang
Salaysay7 executed by SPOl Marundan, SPO1 Tecson and Police Officer 2 Manuelito Inosanto (PO2
Inosanto ), a team of investigating officers and several civilian agents was formed for the purpose of
conducting a follow-up investigation in the vicinity of Javier Compound, San Francisco Village,
Muzon, Taytay, Rizal. During the conduct of the follow-up investigation, Juliet, accompanied by the
investigating officers, spotted accused-appellant standing in front of his house and identified him as
the long-haired assailant. The officers invited accused-appellant back to the police station. A police
line-up was conducted and accused-appellant was positively identified by Juliet. Accused-appellant
initially denied any involvement in the incident but after thirty minutes, he admitted to the robbery
and the killing.8 He also gave the names and whereabouts of his companions, namely: Victor Waray,
a certain Rodel and Rommel, and another man who was an acquaintance of Victor Waray.

On July 10, 2003, Juliet executed a supplemental affidavit9 for the purpose of identifying the other
five assailants. Juliet implicated Victor "Waray" Magcuro (Victor), Rommel David (Rommel), Edwin
Soberano y Dela Cruz (Edwin), Nelson Ampatin (Nelson) and Rodel Zacarias (Rodel). According to
Juliet, she asked around for their respective names when she chanced upon the suspects having a
drink outside a compound. Accused Edwin is a tricycle driver who knew Juliet since December 2002.
On April 3, 2003, he was invited by the Taytay police for questioning but was immediately released
by midnight of the same day. On October 23, 2003, he was arrested by virtue of a warrant. On
January 11, 2011, the RTC eventually acquitted Edwin for lack of sufficient evidence to warrant his
conviction.10

Accused-appellant proffers the defenses of alibi and denial. He posits that he was just a victim of
mistaken identity and at the time the incident supposedly happened, he was in his house gathering
wood. Moreover, accused-appellant claims that on the day he was arrested, he was forced to admit
the crime after being tortured by the police.11 Divina Esguerra Chiong (Chiong), a witness for the
defense, executed an affidavit12 dated April 8, 2003 claiming that she witnessed the incident from her
sister's house, which was overlooking the scene of the crime, and that she is positive that accused-
appellant was not one of the assailants.

The prosecution presented the testimony of Estella Arellano San Juan (Estella),13 widow of the
deceased, to prove that the deceased was gainfully employed and to prove the damages and
expenses incurred in relation to the death of Jun.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

The RTC ruled that Juliet was able to positively identify accused-appellant as one of the six persons
who approached Jun and was in fact, the person who used a knife in stabbing Jun in the face. The
trial court gave weight to the fact that Juliet was able to identify accused-appellant as one of the
assailants as early as the day after the incident. The trial court held that the same categorical and
straightforward identification cannot be said with respect to accused Edwin who was not immediately
identified by Juliet despite the fact that he was already in police custody a little over a week after the
incident. Edwin was only identified by Juliet when she executed her supplemental affidavit roughly 3
months after the incident. For the trial court, the fact that Edwin was arrested only on October 23,
2003 or 7 months after the incident makes his identification not quite similar to Juliet's identification
of Bacero. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, accused Arclo Bacero y Garingo is hereby found GUILTY
beyond reasonable [doubt] of the crime of Robbery with Homicide and is sentenced to suffer the
penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and is ordered to pay the heirs of Virgilio San Juan[,Jr. y Molina] [P]l
72,000.00 in actual damages, [P]200,000.00 in moral damages, [P] 100,000.00 in exemplary
damages with costs against suit.

Accused Edwin Soberano is ACQUITTED of the crime charged for lack of sufficient evidence to
warrant his conviction. He is therefore ordered released from detention unless he is being detained
for some other case or cause other than the instant case.

The case against Nelson Ampatin, Victor Magcoro, Rommel David and Rodel Zacarias is ordered
archived and the corresponding warrant of arrest is hereby issued against them for their immediate
apprehension.

SO ORDERED.14

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Aggrieved by the RTC decision, accused-appellant elevated the case to the CA. Accused-appellant
questioned Juliet's credibility and contended that her testimony anent the identity of the accused-
appellant as one of the perpetrators is highly doubtful for the reason that her statements were
contradictory. Relying on a previous case,15the defense maintained that the fact that Juliet knew
accused-appellant before the crime but made no accusation against him when questioned by the
police is a danger signal indicating that identification may be erroneous.16 The appellate court found
no cogent reason to deviate from the findings of the trial court. The CA gave deference to the trial
court's appreciation of the facts and credibility of witnesses. The dispositive portion of the decision
reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision dated 11 January 2011
of the Regional Trial Court, Fourth Judicial Region, Branch 73, Antipolo City in Crim. Case No. 03-
25345 finding accused-appellant Ardo Bacero y Casabon guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of robbery with homicide under Article 294 (1) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and
sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that
accused-appellant, in addition to the said penalty, is not eligible for parole and he is further ordered
to indemnify the heirs of the victim Virgilio San Juan, Jr. y Molina the following amounts: (1)
Php75,000.00 as civil indemnity; (2) Php75,000.00 as moral damages; (3) Php30,000.00 as
exemplary damages; (4) Php75,871.30 as actual damages; (5)Php2,5 l 8,634.68 for loss of earning
capacity; and (6) interest on all damages awarded at the rate of 6% per annum from the finality of
this judgment until fully paid. Costs against accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.17

Accused-appellant filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the July 26, 2012 Decision of the appellate
court. Finding that the grounds relied upon in the said Motion were mere reiterations of the matters
already considered passed upon, the CA denied the Motion for Reconsideration for lack of merit in a
Resolution dated December 4, 2012. On December 26, 2012, accused-appellant appealed the
Decision of the CA dated July 26, 2012. Accused-appellant's Notice of Appeal was given due course
and the records were ordered elevated to this Court for review.18

In a Resolution19 dated October 9, 2013, this Court required the parties to submit their respective
supplemental briefs. Both the OSG and the accused-appellant manifested that they are adopting all
the arguments contained in their respective briefs in lieu of filing supplemental briefs.20

Our Ruling

This Court finds no reason to deviate from the findings and conclusions of the courts below as the
degree of proof required in criminal cases has been met in the case at bar. We rule that accused-
appellant's contentions of mistaken identity, torture, and denial are bereft of merit.

Extra-judicial Confession

Accused-appellant claims that he was coerced into admitting the crime. We hold that his allegation
of being subjected to torture does not find support in the evidence on record. There was no proof,
such as a medical certificate, that would show that accused-appellant suffered bodily harm while
under the custody of police officers. In previous cases, the Court has disregarded allegations of
torture when the accused did not file any complaint against his alleged malefactors for
maltreatment.21

Notwithstanding the fact that torture was not sufficiently proven, the extra-judicial confession made
at the police station remains inadmissible in evidence. R.A. No. 7438, the law defining the rights of
persons under custodial investigation, provides:

"Section 2. (d) - Any extrajudicial confession made by a person arrested, detained or under custodial
investigation shall be in writing and signed by such person in the presence of his counsel or in the
latter's absence, upon a valid waiver, and in the presence of any of the parents, elder brothers and
sisters, his spouse, the municipal mayor, the municipal judge, district school superyisor, or priest or
minister of the gospel as chosen by him; otherwise, such extrajudicial confession shall be
inadmissible as evidence in any proceeding."

The admission made by accused-appellant was neither put into writing nor made in the presence of
persons mentioned in the law. Thus, there can be no conclusion other than that the extra-judicial
confession is inadmissible in evidence. Nevertheless, the positive identification of accused-appellant
as the perpetrator of the crime warrants his conviction.

Positive Identification of Accused-appellant

The defense maintains that Juliet's testimony anent the identity of accused-appellant as one of the
perpetrators is highly doubtful. Accused-appellant harps on the inconsistencies in Juliet's statements
regarding the suspects' identities. We cannot sustain such argument casting doubt on Juliet's
positive identification- of accused-appellant's participation in the commission of the crime. Time and
again, this Court has held that when the credibility of a witness is in issue, the trial court's calibration
of the testimonies of the witnesses and its assessment of the probative weight thereof, are accorded
high respect if not conclusive effect, most especially when such findings are affirmed by the
appellate court.22 Unless there is a clear showing that the trial court and the appellate court
overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight and substance, this
rule should not be disturbed.23

Jurisprudence is replete with various ways of conducting out-of-court identifications.24 It may be done
thru show-ups, where the suspect alone is brought face to face with the witness or thru mug
shots, where only photographs are shown to the witness. Identification can also be done thru line-
ups where a witness identifies the suspect from a group of persons.25 To maintain the integrity of in-
court identification during trial, courts have fashioned out rules to assure its fairness and compliance
with the requirements of constitutional due process.26 In a long line of cases, the Court has reiterated
the totality of circumstances test adopted from American Jurisprudence and set forth in People v.
Teehankee, Jr.,27 which has been the guide in resolving the admissibility of out-of-court identification.
Under the totality of circumstances test, the following factors are considered: (1) the witness'
opportunity to view the criminal at the time of the crime; (2) the witness' degree of attention at that
time; (3) the accuracy of any prior description given by the witness; (4) the level of ce1iainty
demonstrated by the witness at the identification; (5) the length of time between the crime and the
identification; and (6) the suggestiveness of the identification procedure.28

Juliet identified accused-appellant out-of-court on two separate occasions, viz: (1) when she saw
accused-appellant in front of the latter's house after roaming the vicinity and (2) at a police line-up
conducted by SPO1 Tecson. We rule that the out-of-court identifications made by Juliet satisfied the
totality of circumstances test. Juliet was at the scene of the crime when the incident happened and
she was able to see the faces of the assailants through the loosely tied blindfold. Moreover, the most
natural reaction of a witness to a crime is "to strive to look at the appearance of the perpetrator and
to observe the manner in which the offense is perpetrated."29 Most often, the face and body
movements of the assailant create a lasting impression which cannot be easily erased from their
memory.30 We agree with the appellate court that eyewitnesses can remember with a high degree of
reliability the identity of criminals at any given time precisely because of the unusual acts of violence
committed right before their eyes.31Though this Court is aware that such pronouncement should be
applied with great caution, there is no compelling circumstance in this case that would warrant its
non-application.

Accused-appellant contends that Juliet's description of the appellant as a man having long hair lacks
the highest degree of certainty. We find this contention unmeritorious. The lack of a detailed
description of the assailants should not lead to a conclusion that the identification was erroneous.
Victims of violent crimes have varying reactions to shocking events. Juliet cannot be expected to
immediately remember the detailed features of the assailants' faces as she was still in a state of
shock. Though she was unable to describe in detail the appearances of the assailants, she was able
to immediately identify Bacero when she saw him two days after the incident. Nevertheless,
assuming for the sake of argument that Juliet's out-of-court identification was improper, it will have
no bearing on the conviction of accused-appellant. It has long been settled that an out-of court
identification does not necessarily foreclose the admissibility of an independent in-court identification
and that "even assuming that an out-of-court identification was tainted with irregularity, the
subsequent identification in court cured any flaw that may have attended it."32 Furthermore, the
records show that there is no improper motive for Juliet to impute a serious crime to the accused-
appellant.33

Unmeritorious Defense of Mistaken Identity

Accused-appellant posited the defense of mistaken identity which is essentially in the nature of
denial and alibi. It is established jurisprudence that denial cannot prevail over the witnesses' positive
identification of the accused-appellant; more so where the defense did not present convincing
evidence that it was physically impossible for accused-appellant to have been present at the crime
scene at the time of the commission of the crime.34 We quote with approval the disquisition of the
appellate court, to wit:

The defenses of denial and alibi are the weakest of defenses in criminal cases and the same are
self-serving negative evidence. They cannot prevail over the spontaneous, positive, and credible
testimony of the prosecution witness who pointed to and identified the accused-appellant as one of
the malefactors. Moreover, for the defense of alibi to prosper, the requirements of time and place
must be strictly met. It is not enough to prove that the accused was somewhere else when the crime
was committed, but he must also demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that it was
physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime at the time the same was
committed. Accused-appellant's feeble. denial and alibi crumble in the face of Juliet's affirmative
testimony.

In accused-appellant's attempt to support his mistaken identity claim, the defense presented the
testimony of Chiong, accused-appellant's long time friend. The RTC and CA correctly did not give
credence to the testimony of Chiong. When a defense witness is a close friend, courts should view
such testimony with skepticism,35 more so when the same is uncorroborated, as in the case at bar.

Robbery with Homicide

The trial and appellate courts committed no error in convicting the accused-appellant of Robbery
with Homicide. Section 9, Article 294, paragraph (1) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by
1âwphi1

R.A. No. 7659, reads:

" Art. 294 - Any person guilty of robbery with the use of violence against or intimidation of any person
shall suffer:

1. The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death, when by reason or on occasion of the robbery, the
crime of homicide shall have been committed, or when the robbery shall have been accompanied by
rape or intentional mutilation or arson."

To warrant a conviction for Robbery with Homicide, the prosecution must prove the confluence of the
following elements: (l) the taking of personal property with the use of violence or intimidation against
a person; (2) the property taken thus belongs to another; (3) the taking is characterized by intent to
gain or animus lucrandi; and (4) on occasion of the robbery or by reason thereof, the crime of
homicide, which is used in a generic sense, was committed.36 In proving Robbery with Homicide, it is
necessary that the robbery itself be established conclusively as any other essential element of the
crime.37 In the instant case, the elaborate testimony of Juliet and her positive identification of
accused-appellant as one of the assailants support the charge of the component offense of Robbery.
In previous cases,38 We had occasion to explain that intent to rob is an internal act but it may be
inferred from proof of violent unlawful taking of personal property and when the fact of asportation
has been established beyond reasonable doubt, conviction is justified even if the subject property is
not presented in court. "After all, the property stolen may have already been abandoned, thrown
away or destroyed by the robber."39

As to the allegation of the presence of the aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength,
we quote the ruling of the CA with approval, to wit:
"The trial court correctly appreciated the aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength.
The aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength is considered whenever there is
notorious inequality of forces between the victim and the aggressor that is plainly and obviously
advantageous to the aggressor and purposely selected or taken advantage of to facilitate the
commission of the crime. It is taken into account whenever the aggressor purposely used excessive
force that is out of proportion to the means of defense available to the person attacked. The
felonious acts of accused-appellant and the other malefactors of robbing and killing the victim were
clearly executed with abuse of superior strength. Their combined force and physical strength
overwhelmed the victim and left him defenseless. Accused-appellant struck with his knife the
unarmed victim. The multiple stab wounds sustained by the victim indisputably show that the group
of accused-appellant took advantage of their superior strength to perpetrate the crime."40

In numerous cases,41 We held that when the killing is committed by reason of or on the occasion of
the robbery, the qualifying circumstances attendant to the killing would be considered as generic
aggravating circumstances. Thus, in the case at bar, the circumstance of abuse of superior strength
serves to aggravate the crime.

Penalty and Damages

Persons found guilty of committing the special complex crime of Robbery with Homicide are
punishable with reclusion perpetua to death.42 Considering that the generic aggravating circumstance
of abuse of superior strength was alleged in the information and proven during the trial, accused-
appellant shall suffer the penalty of death pursuant to Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended.43 Nonetheless, in light of R.A. No. 9346,44 the penalty shall be reduced from death
to reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole.

Applying the adjusted amounts for damages laid down in the recently decided case
of People v. Jugueta,45 We modify the damages awarded by the trial and appellate courts. Accused-
appellant shall be liable to the heirs of the deceased for civil indemnity in the amount of
P100,000.00, as the imposable penalty would have been death, were it not for the enactment of R.A.
No. 9346. Accused-appellant shall also be liable for moral damages in the amount of Pl00,000.00
and exemplary damages in the amount of P100,000.00.

In awarding actual damages amounting to Pl72,000.00, the RTC erroneously included amounts
stated in handwritten lists of expenses,46 which were self-serving. A receipt dated months after the
death of the victim47 was also erroneously included in the computation of actual damages awarded
by the trial court. Time and again, this Court has held that only expenses supported by receipts and
which appear to have been actually expended in connection with the death of the victims may be
allowed.48 Only substantiated expenses and those which appear to have been genuinely incurred in
connection with the death, wake or burial of the victim will be recognized by the courts.49 This Court
has repeatedly held that self-serving statements of account are not sufficient basis for an award of
actual damages. To justify an award of actual damages, it is necessary for the claimant to produce
competent proof and the best evidence obtainable. Verily, "a list of expenses cannot replace receipts
when the latter should have been issued as a matter of course in business transactions."50 The CA,
on the other hand, erroneously excluded in the computation for actual damages the amount stated in
an unofficial receipt51 issued by George & Elvie Store. The said tape receipt issued by the store,
though unofficial because of the absence of a TIN number, contained material particulars such as
the date of the transaction, the place of transaction, the items purchased, and the cost of items
purchased. To the mind of this Court, the same constitutes competent proof. The heirs of the victims,
as claimants, should not be prejudiced by the store's failure to issue official receipts.
All in all, an examination of the records reveals that the following competent proofs of expenses
incurred in connection with the death, wake and burial of the victim were submitted:

Official Receipt dated March 30, 2003, issued by Kairiz Funeral P45,000.00
Service (Exhibit 1)

Official Receipt dated April 01, 2003, issued by Our Lady of Light P27,000.00
Parish (Exhibit J)
Official Receipt dated April 06, 2003, issued by Pilipinas Makro, P2,842.05
Inc. (Exhibit K)
Official Receipt dated April 9, 2003, issued by Ever Shoppers Inc. P21,029.25
Supermarket52

Receipt dated March 28, 2003, issued by George & Elvie Store53 P89.00
TOTAL P75, 960.30

Based on the foregoing, accused-appellant shall be liable to the heirs of the victim for the amount of
P75,960.30 as actual damages.

Lastly, the heirs of the victim are likewise entitled to indemnity for loss of earning
capacity54 amounting to P2,5l9,405.86. Such indemnification partakes of the nature of actual
damages and thus, must be duly proven by competent proof.55 Estella, wife of the victim, testified on
the income of her husband and presented documentary evidence to show that her husband was
gainfully employed at the time of his death. A Certification dated July 03, 200656 issued by Mitsubishi
Motors Philippines Corporation was presented to prove that the victim was employed in the said
company as a regular sealing man with a salary rate of P80.33/hour. Pursuant to
jurisprudence,57 such certification shall be considered as sufficient basis for a fair and reasonable
computation of the victim's loss of earning capacity. Loss of earning capacity is computed as follows:

Net Earning Capacity= Life expectancy x [Gross Annual Income – Living Expenses]

= [2/3 (80 - age at death)] x [GAI - 50% of GAI]

= [2/3 (80- 3158)] x [ Pl54, 233.6059 -P77,116.80]

= [2/3 (49)] x P77,116.80

= 32.67xP77,116.80

= P2,519,405.86

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR. CR.-H.C. No. 05040 dated July 26,
2012 is hereby AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION. Accused-appellant Ardo Bacero y Casabon is
found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Robbery with Homicide and sentenced to suffer the
penalty of Reclusion Perpetua without eligibility for parole and ordered to pay the heirs of Virgilio M.
San Juan, Jr. the amounts of Pl00,000.00 as civil indemnity, P100,000.00 as moral damages,
Pl00,000.00 as exemplary damages, P75,960.30 as actual damages, and P2,519,405.86 as
indemnity for loss of earning capacity. All monetary awards for damages shall earn interest at the
legal rate of 6% per annum from the date of finality of this judgment until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice
Chairperson

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

(On Wellness Leave)

JOSE C. MENDOZA*
Associate Justice

BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice
Third Division, Chairperson

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I
certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Chief Justice
G.R. Nos. 95353-54 March 7, 1996

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
PAUL SANDOVAL and PAULINO PAT, accused. PAULINO PAT, accused-appellant.

ROMERO, J.:p

Paulino Pat seeks the reversal of the May 18, 1990 decision1 of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 7, convicting him and Raul
Sandoval of the special complex crime of robbery with homicide under Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code and highway robbery as
defined under Presidential Decree No. 532, hereinafter to be known as P.D. No. 532. Said decision also imposed on him the penalty
of reclusion perpetua and the indemnification of the heirs of Franklin Baguio in the amount of P30,000, for robbery with homicide, and the
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment for twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years, ten (10) months and one (1) day, for
highway robbery (Criminal Cases Nos. CBU-8728 & CBU-8732).

These criminal cases were spawned by an incident occurring at around 1:30 in the early morning of
May 31, 1986, in Cebu City. The prosecution proved that at that time, a group of young men
composed of Romeo Laurente, Franklin Baguio, Amelito Undalok, Dirk Padilla, Erwin Tabaque and
Nemesio Dakay, together with a young woman named Judith Pabular, had decided to spend the
night in the house of Dakay after attending an amateur singing contest in Pasil. Four of them,
headed by Dakay, walked ahead to the latter's house while Laurente, Baguio and Undalok lagged
behind. They then took their snacks at the Balaga store.

While walking along the street, Undalok noticed by the light of the mercury lamp of the electric post
two persons whom he later identified as Paul Sandoval and Paulino Pat, following them about a
fathom away.2 Panicking, the three walked faster but Sandoval and Pat told them not to run.
Although they nevertheless walked faster, the two overtook them. Hastily, Sandoval went through
Baguio's pocket. Pat, who was armed with a hunting knife, frisked Laurente and divested him of his
wallet and wrist watch.

Pat then joined Sandoval who was with Baguio. Pat was around a foot away from Sandoval when he
obstructed Undalok's view. Baguio offered his wristwatch to Sandoval but the latter kept on
searching Baguio's pockets. However, Baguio covered one of his pockets with his hands so that his
wallet could not be taken.3 At this juncture, Laurente walked slowly away and then broke into a run.
Undalok started retreating to follow Laurente, when he saw Sandoval stab Baguio in the chest with a
knife by a downward thrusting of his right hand, sending the latter staggering back.4

Subsequently, when Baguio was autopsied by Dr. Jesus P. Cerna, medico-legal officer of the PC-
INP Metrodiscom, the latter found that he sustained two abrasions each on the right elbow and on
the left leg, and two stab wounds: one on the left side of the chest which penetrated the thoracic
cavity and incised the upper lobe of the left lung, and another on the right chest which incised the
right lung.5 The victim died of severe hemorrhage secondary to stab wounds.6

On June 5, 1986, Undalok went to the police station where, after giving his statement to the
police,7 he was made to peep inside a room with a policeman and Sandoval inside. He then pointed
to Sandoval as one of the perpetrators of the crimes.8 Later, the police brought Pat inside the same
room. Undalok was asked by the police whether Pat was Sandoval's companion, which fact he
confirmed.9

As a result of the identification of Sandoval and Pat as the authors of the crimes, the following
informations were filed against them on June 6, 1986:
 Criminal Case No. CBU-8728 for robbery with homicide —

That on or about the 31st day of May, 1986, at about 1:30 o'clock dawn, in the City of
Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said
accused, armed with a knife, conniving and confederating together and mutually
helping each other, with deliberate intent, with intent of gain and by means of
intimidation upon person, to wit: by pointing a knife at one Franklin Baguio and
ordering him to yield his wallet and upon refusal of said Franklin Baguio to yield his
wallet, said accused stabbed said Franklin Baguio, thereby inflicting upon him the
following physical injuries:

HEMORRHAGE, ACUTE, SEVERE SECONDARY TO STAB

WOUNDS, CHEST, ANTERIOR ASPECT

as a consequence of which said Franklin Baguio died instantaneously.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Criminal Case No. CBU-8732 for violation of PD 532 —

That on or about the 31st day of May, 1986, at about 1:30 o'clock dawn, in the City of
Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said
accused, armed with a knife, conniving and confederating together and mutually
helping each other, with deliberate intent, with intent of gain and by means of
violence and intimidation upon persons, to wit: by threatening one Romeo Laurente
with said knife and without the consent of said Romeo Laurente, did then and there
take, steal and carry away the following:

one (1) wristwatch

one (1) wallet
Cash in the amount of P10.00

valued in all at P710.00, while the latter was walking along A. Lopez St., a public
highway, to the damage and prejudice of the latter in the amount aforestated.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

When arraigned, accused Sandoval and Pat pleaded not guilty to the charges. At the trial, the
prosecution presented the aforegoing version of the commission of the crimes based on the
testimonies of three witnesses: Undalok, Dr. Cerna and Saturnino Baguio.

The defense, on the other hand, contended that another person or group of persons perpetrated the
crimes, interposing denial and alibi. Thus, while defense witness Vicente Cana, a member of the
San Nicolas Police Sub-station who was on duty at dawn of May 31, 1986, admitted that Pat and
Sandoval were "picked up right on that day,10 he affirmed that there were "so many suspects" and
one of them was a certain "Roland."11 Cpl. Liberato P. Lozano added that Pat and Sandoval could
not have been picked up on May 31, 1986 as it was only from June 1 to June 5 or 6 that the police
began "simultaneous(ly) picking up suspects."12

Enrique Restauro, a barangay tanod, testified that at early dawn of May 31, 1986, he was on his way
home after conducting a roving patrol when, at a distance of 200 meters, he saw a person being
stabbed.13 From that distance, he noticed that the assailant had a "flat nose and . . . high cheek
bones." 14 Notably, the defense counsel himself elicited from Restauro the fact that he "only heard
that that person was stabbed.15 He also heard from people gathered in the area that the assailant
was one Poland Sobrevilla, who was notoriously known as a violent person.

For his part, Virgilio Nacion, a driver-mechanic, testified that he was then repairing the carburetor of
his taxicab when he saw a homosexual being stabbed. The two assailants, whom he could identify if
he sees them, ran away when the barangay police and people arrived. One of the assailants even
asked him for a ride on his cab but he declined, saying that it was still out of order. He, too, heard
from people around that a certain "Roland" was the culprit. He admitted having known Pat and
Sandoval as they were his neighbors, clearly implying that they could not have been the felons.

Like Nacion, Wilfredo Gonzaga testified that he knew Pat and Sandoval and, without going into
specifics, declared that he knew where the two were at the time of the commission of the crimes.16

To buttress its theory that they did not commit the crimes, the defense presented Manuel Gatis, the
father of Wilfredo Gatis or Gates who was a "police character" known by the aliases "Allan,"
"Roland" and "Tawilwil Ninja."17According to Manuel Gatis, at around 2:30 o'clock in the morning of
May 31, 1986, Wilfredo arrived at their home in A. Lopez St., Cebu City, with two companions. He
overheard one of them ask the other why he stabbed a person. The other person replied that he
stabbed their victim because of his refusal to surrender his watch and wallet.18Manuel clarified that it
was his son, Wilfredo or Tawilwil, who said that he killed the hardheaded victim.19 However, Tawilwil
was himself killed by policemen in a shootout on March 11, 1988.20

Bruno Zafra, erstwhile chief investigator at the San Nicolas Police Sub-station on May 31, 1986,
supported the defense theory by testifying that although it was Cpl. Aballe who was the duty
investigator, he was at the police station when a homosexual ("bayot") who was being investigated,
named a certain "Roland" and two unidentified persons as the suspects in the crimes, and revealed
that the scene of the crime was dark because the bulb at the electric post was busted.21

Having shifted the blame on others, the defense presented the accused to prove their respective
alibis. Raul Sandoval, a 27-year-old laborer at the Seaman Trade Center who resided in 35 A. Lopez
St., Cebu City, claimed that in the evening of May 31, 1989, he slept with his friend Paulino Pat to
help the latter in his rice-and-assorted-goods store. He clarified that he slept with Pat that Saturday
night. When told that the crime for which he was being accused transpired early in the morning of
May 31, 1986, he denied having participated therein, asserting that at that time, he was sleeping
with his friend, Pat.22

Sandoval admitted having learned of the crimes on Sunday morning and that he was investigated by
the police on June 5, 1986. He denied that at the police station, someone had pointed him out as the
person responsible for the crimes. He was made to "pose and turn around" in order that the police
could verify that "the persons who killed the homosexual was of the same build as me and had curly
hair."23

On cross-examination, Sandoval admitted that the last time he slept in Pat's house was when he
was arrested, adding that he had slept there for seven nights before May 31.24 He also admitted that
the Balaga Store was about thirty (30) meters away from the house of his relatives with whom he
was staying and that Pat's house was around twenty (20) meters away from his relatives' house and
about fifty (50) meters away from the Balaga store.25 He claimed having learned of the involvement of
Tawilwil in the crimes but he did not report the matter to the police because of fear of retaliation from
Tawilwil and because he "had no authority to tell."26
Paulino Pat gave the same address as Sandoval's — 35 A. Lopez St. According to Pat, he was in
his store at said address, sleeping with Sandoval, when the crimes occurred. Sandoval went to his
store at around 8:30 o'clock in the evening of May 30, 1986. Upon waking up at 5:00 o'clock in the
morning of May 31, he opened his store. From then on until around 11:00 o'clock in the morning of
June 5, 1986, he was in the store.

Pat claimed that neither he nor Sandoval was known by the nicknames "Roland" or "Alan".27 He
admitted that the distance between his house and that of Sandoval was sixty (60) meters and that
between his store and Balaga's Store was also sixty (60) meters, while that between Sandoval's
house and Balaga's Store was 120 meters.28 He also admitted that in the evening of May 30, 1988
until dawn the following day, A. Lopez was well-lighted. During that night, while Sandoval was his
guest, he did not offer him anything, not even beer. After talking about Sandoval's girlfriends, they
slept at around 8:30 p.m.29

From what Pat heard about the crime, Tawilwil, whom he only knew by face, was involved. It was
Tawilwil's father who used to pass by his store, who approached him and volunteered to testify.
Neither had he met nor known Amelito Undalok and therefore, he could not possibly have had any
misunderstanding with him.30

On May 18, 1990, the trial court rendered its Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE —

In Criminal Case No. CBU-8728 — finding accused RAUL SANDOVAL and

PAULINO PAT guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with
Homicide, each of them is hereby sentenced to suffer reclusion perpetua, to
indemnify the heirs of the deceased Franklin Baguio the sum of Thirty Thousand
(P30,000.00) Pesos, and to pay the costs.

In Criminal Case No. CBU-8732 — finding accused RAUL SANDOVAL and

PAULINO PAT guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Highway Robbery,
each is hereby sentenced to an imprisonment of from Twelve (12) Years and One (1)
Day to Twelve (12) Years, Ten (10) Months and Twenty (20) Days, and to pay the
costs.

SO ORDERED.

The two accused filed a common notice of appeal. 31 On June 6, 1989, Pat was ordered released
from detention upon filing a cash bond in the amount of P20,000.00.32 On the other hand, counsel for
Sandoval filed a manifestation and motion stating that he was availing of the provision of the new
Rules on Criminal Procedure that the original bail bond shall continue to be considered as such until
the final determination of the case, and praying that should said manifestation not be favorably
considered, that he be given a 30-day period within which to put up an appeal bond.33 On June 11,
1990, the trial court gave Sandoval until June 20, 1990 within which to post an appeal bond.34

On June 15, 1990, counsel for Sandoval filed a motion stating that, upon receipt of the Order of June
11, 1990, he called up the Seaman Trade Center where Sandoval worked and learned that
Sandoval "ha(d) been absent the last few days," and praying that said Order be served on Sandoval
himself.35 Granting said prayer, the court tried to serve the Order on him but it turned out that
Sandoval had resigned from the Seaman Trade Center a month before.36 Consequently, the private
prosecutor filed an ex-parte manifestation and motion stating that in all probability, Sandoval would
evade service of his sentence and prayed for the issuance of a warrant for his arrest.3 7Accordingly,
on July 9, 1990, the trial court ordered the issuance of a warrant of arrest against
Sandoval.38Thereafter, a new counsel appeared for Pat with his conformity39 and his former counsel,
Atty. Gregorio Escasinas, withdrew his appearance.40

Hence, the instant appeal of Paulino Pat raising the following as errors of the trial court: (a) appellant
should have been charged only with the complex crime of robbery with homicide and imposed only
the penalty of reclusion perpetua plus indemnity and costs; (b) motive should have been established
because both accused were gainfully employed; (c) the testimony of Amelito Undalok was unreliable
because it was full of fallacies, contradictions and biases; and (d) accused should be acquitted due
to reasonable doubt.

In contending that only the crime of robbery with homicide should have been charged, appellant
reasons out that "the other charge is already absorbed and the penalty to be imposed should be in
the maximum" of Art. 294 of the Revised Penal Code.41

It is basic in criminal procedure that an accused may be charged with as many crimes as defined in
our penal laws even if these arose from one incident. Thus, where a single act is directed against
one person but said act constitutes a violation of two or more entirely distinct and unrelated
provisions of law, or by a special law and the Revised Penal Code, the prosecution against one is
not an obstacle to the prosecution of the other.42 Such crimes should be alleged in separate
informations pursuant to Section 13, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court which provides that a complaint
or information "must charge but one offense, except only in those cases in which existing laws
prescribe a single punishment for various offenses."

In this case, the fiscal or prosecutor, upon whose direction and control the filing of criminal cases
rests, pursuant to Section 5 of Rule 110,43 exercised his discretion and determined that appellant and
Sandoval violated two distinct penal laws in robbing Laurente and Baguio, and killing the latter on a
city street. Indeed, because the City Fiscal considered the two accused to have been in conspiracy,
he charged them both with the complex crime of robbery with homicide as defined and penalized
under Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code with respect to the robbing and killing of Baguio and, in
a separate information, also charged them with violation of P.D. No. 532, the 1974 law against
highway robbery, as regards the robbing of Laurente. The informations filed, however, indicate that
the filing by the fiscal of two separate charges was impelled by the fact that in the same incident,
there were two victims.

This Court finds, however, that only the crime of simple robbery, not violation of P.D. No. 532, should
have been charged in Criminal Case No. CBU-8732 regarding the robbing of Laurente. In People
v. Puno,44 the Court explicitly held that P.D. No. 532 is a modification of Articles 306 and 307 on
brigandage"45 which is committed by more than three persons. According to the late Chief Justice
Ramon C. Aquino, as it is committed by a cuadrilla, brigandage is "sometimes confounded with
the robo en cuadrilla in Art. 295 of the same Code."46 The clear implication is that the number of
offenders, as well as the frequency with which they perpetrate robbery, may determine whether a
crime is simple robbery or highway robbery as defined in P.D. No. 532.4 7

Thus, in the Puno case, the Court explained that P.D. No. 532 treats of "highway
robbery/brigandage" or "indiscriminate highway robbery" and, therefore, "(I)f the purpose is only a
particular robbery, the crime is only robbery, or robbery in band if there are at least four armed
participants."48 Citing the perambular clauses of P.D. No. 532,49 the Court said:

Indeed, it is hard to conceive of how a single act of robbery against a particular

person chosen by the accused as their specific victim could be considered as
committed on the "innocent and defenseless inhabitants who travel from one place to
 another," and which single act of depredation would be capable of "stunting the
economic and social progress of the people" as to be considered "among the highest
forms of lawlessness condemned by the penal statutes of all countries," and would
accordingly constitute an obstacle "to the economic, social, educational and
community progress of the people," such that said isolated act would constitute the
highway robbery or brigandage contemplated and punished in said decree.

This would be an exaggeration bordering on the ridiculous.50

From the information in criminal Case No. CBU-8732, it is apparent that violation of P.D. No. 532
was charged simply because the crimes transpired while the victim, Romeo Laurente, "was walking
along A. Lopez St., a public highway." In this regard, in the same Puno case, the Court said:

Erroneous advertence is nevertheless made by the court below to the fact that the
crime of robbery committed by appellants should be covered by the amendatory
decree just because it was committed on a highway. Aside from what has already
been stressed regarding the absence of the requisite elements which thereby
necessarily puts the offense charged outside the purview and intendment of that
presidential issuance, it would be absurd to adopt a literal interpretation that any
unlawful taking of property committed on our highways would be covered thereby. It
is an elementary rule of statutory construction that the spirit or intent of the law
should not be subordinated to the letter thereof. Trite as it may appear, we have
perforce to stress the elementary caveat that he who considers merely the letter of
an instrument goes but skin deep into its meaning, and the fundamental rule that
criminal justice inclines in favor of the milder form of liability in case of doubt.

If the mere fact that the offense charged was committed on a highway would be the
determinant for the application of Presidential Decree No. 532, it would not be far-
fetched to expect mischievous, if not absurd, effects on the corpus of our substantive
criminal law. While we eschew resort to a reductio ad absurdum line of reasoning, we
apprehend that the aforestated theory adopted by the trial court falls far short of
the desideratum in the interpretation of laws, that is, to avoid absurdities and
conflicts. . . 51

Prescinding from the Court's elucidation on the crime of highway robbery under P.D. No. 532, the
unavoidable conclusion is that, while the information in Criminal Case No. CBU-8732 is for violation
of P.D. No. 532, appellant may only be held liable for simple robbery as defined in Article 293
considering that it alleges facts which correspond to the elements of the latter crime. We need not
belabor the rule that in interpreting an information, what controls is not the designation but the
description of the offense charged.52

The elements of robbery as defined in Article 29353 of the Revised Penal Code are the following: (a)
that there be personal property belonging to another; (b) that there is unlawful taking of that property;
(c) that the taking is with intent to gain; and (d) that there is violence against or intimidation of
persons or force upon things.54 These elements alleged in the information are present in Criminal
Case No. CBU-8732. A wristwatch and a wallet valued at P710.00 belonging to Romeo Laurente
were proven beyond reasonable doubt to have been taken by appellant by intimidating the victim
with a hunting knife. Appellant's intent to gain or animo lucrandi is presumed in the allegation, duly
proven, that the appellant appropriated to himself the things taken.55

With respect to Criminal Case No. CBU-8728, this Court cannot agree with the lower court that
appellant and Sandoval committed robbery with homicide. By the testimonial account of eyewitness
Undalok, Baguio was killed by Sandoval because he resisted the latter's efforts at searching his
pockets. Undoubtedly, as shown by their overt acts, the intent of both Sandoval and appellant was to
rob Franklin Baguio. However, under the same account of the said eyewitness, it is not clear
whether appellant or Sandoval succeeded in taking Baguio's wallet. What has been indubitably
proven is that Sandoval stabbed Baguio to death because of the latter's refusal to surrender his
wallet. Worth emphasizing is the fact that even the information does not allege that Sandoval
succeeded in taking Baguio's wallet. It merely alleges that Sandoval pointed a knife at Baguio,
ordered the latter "to yield his wallet and upon refusal of said Franklin Baguio to yield his wallet, said
accused stabbed" Baguio resulting in injuries which caused his death. Moreover, not even the
victim's father, Saturnino Baguio, had testified that any personal item was missing from the body of
his son. While it was conclusively proven by their overt acts that their intention was to rob Baguio, it
was not shown that Baguio's wallet was taken. From the evidence presented, the crime committed
was attempted robbery with homicide.

Since only Sandoval stabbed Baguio and committed the crime of homicide, appellant may be held
responsible therefor only upon proof beyond reasonable doubt of conspiracy between them. In a
long line of cases, the court has held that when homicide is committed as a consequence of or on
the occasion of the robbery, all those who took part as principals in the robbery will also be held
guilty as principals of the special complex crime of robbery with homicide although they did not
actually take part in the homicide, unless it clearly appears that they endeavored to prevent the
homicide.56 In the case at bench, appellant showed unity of purpose with Sandoval in attempting to
rob Baguio when, even after he had taken Laurente's wristwatch and wallet, he still searched Baguio
with a clear purpose of asporting personal property from him. Having conspired with Sandoval in the
attempt to rob Baguio, appellant may not escape liability for the resulting homicide because he was
not shown to have prevented its commission.

In an attempt at exoneration, appellant contends that he cannot be convicted of the crimes charged
because he had no motive to commit them, considering that he had a means of livelihood and that,
by the nature of the crimes committed, only young drug addicts with a string of criminal records
could have perpetrated them. As this Court has time and again held, proof of motive is not
indispensable to conviction57 especially if the accused has been positively identified by an
eyewitness58 and his participation therein has been definitely established.59 Ordinary human
experience shows that even a normal person who is perceived by others to have no reason at all to
commit a crime may, in fact, commit an act violative of the law and be held liable therefor, as long as
he is identified beyond reasonable doubt as the perpetrator of the crime.

What is pivotal in this case is the credibility of the sole eyewitness to the crimes, Amelito Undalok.
The jurisprudentially-embedded rule in this regard is that when the issue of credibility of a witness is
concerned, appellate courts will generally not disturb the findings of the trial court.60 In this case,
notwithstanding his gruelling eight days at the witness stand which were punctuated by snide
remarks on his sexuality by defense counsel,61Undalok remained unswerving about his story and,
according to the trial court, "maintained his frank and open manner (and) straightforward
declaration"62 on appellant's culpability.

Appellant's contention that Undalok's testimony should not merit credence because of certain
inconsistencies therein deserves scant consideration, it appearing that such "inconsistencies"
concerned minor
details.63 Moreover, the absence of evidence to show any improper motive why Undalok should
testify falsely against appellant and implicate him in such grave crimes, indicates that there is no
such motive and that his testimony is worthy of full faith and credit. 64
Parenthetically, appellant's identity as one of the perpetrators of the crimes is bolstered by the
affidavit of Romeo Laurente65 which corroborates Undalok's positive identification of appellant. While
said affidavit was not offered by the prosecution as an exhibit, and Laurente himself was not
presented as a witness, the sole testimony of Undalok on appellant's identity and culpability, being
clear and straightforward and found worthy of credence by the trial court, suffices to
convict.66 Laurente's affidavit and testimony would have served no more purpose than to corroborate
Undalok's testimony.67

Appellant's complicity in the crimes having been established beyond reasonable doubt, in criminal
case No. CBU-8728 for attempted robbery with homicide under Art. 297, he shall serve the
indeterminate penalty within the range of prison mayor in its maximum period and reclusion
temporal in its maximum period in the absence of mitigating or aggravating circumstances,68 and
indemnify the heirs of Franklin Baguio in accordance with law. In Criminal Case No. CBU-8732 for
the crime of robbery under Arts. 293 and 294(5) of the Revised Penal Code where no aggravating
and mitigating circumstances likewise attended its commission, he shall be imposed the
indeterminate sentence within the range of prison correccional in its medium period and prison
mayor in its minimum period.

WHEREFORE, the Decision of Branch 7 of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City in Criminal case
Nos. CBU-8728 and CBU-8732 is hereby modified. Appellant Paulino Pat is hereby found guilty of
the following crimes and imposed the corresponding penalties:

(a) In Criminal Case No. CBU-8728, he is convicted of the crime of attempted robbery with homicide
for which he shall suffer the indeterminate penalty of ten (10) years and one (1) day of prison
mayor maximum, as minimum, to eighteen (18) years, eight (8) months and one day (1) of reclusion
temporal maximum, as maximum penalty.

(b) In Criminal Case No. CBU-8732, he is convicted of the crime of simple robbery and accordingly
imposed the indeterminate sentence of four (4) years of prison correccional medium, as minimum, to
eight (8) years of prison mayor minimum, as maximum penalty and shall reimburse Romeo Laurente
the amount of seven hundred ten pesos (P710.00).

The indemnity for the death of Franklin Baguio is hereby increased from P30,000.00 to P50,000.00.

Service of these sentences shall be in accordance with Art. 70 of the Revised Penal Code.

A copy of this Decision shall be served upon the Philippine National Police and the National Bureau
of Investigation to immediately effect the arrest of Raul Sandoval so that he may serve the penalties
imposed upon him by Law.

Costs against accused-appellant Paulino Pat.

SO ORDERED.