ASEAN Declaration on Environmental Sustainability

WE, the Heads of State/Government of Brunei Darussalam, the Kingdom of Cambodia, the Republic of Indonesia, the Lao People’s Democratic Republic,
Malaysia, the Union of Myanmar, the Republic of the Philippines, the Republic of Singapore, the Kingdom of Thailand and the Socialist Republic of Viet
Nam, Member Countries of ASEAN, on the occasion of the 40th Anniversary of ASEAN and the 13th ASEAN Summit in Singapore;

Cognisant of mounting global concern over the environment and ASEAN’s obligations to its people in fulfilling the aims of the World Summit on Sustainable
Development (WSSD) and to achieve the UN Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), in particular to ensure environmental sustainability in the context
of sustainable development;

Determined that ASEAN should complement and support the efforts of global and regional organizations to tackle environmental issues, and in this regard
support the APEC Leaders’ Declaration on Climate Change, Energy Security and Clean Development, and Indonesia’s efforts to host the 13th Session of
the Conference of Parties (COP) to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the 3rd Session of the Conference of
the Parties Serving as the Meeting of the Parties (CMP) to the Kyoto Protocol in December 2007;

Noting with concern the findings of the Inter-governmental Panel on Climate Change’s (IPCC) Fourth Assessment Report (AR4) that the warming of the
climate system is unequivocal;

Further noting with concern, the adverse impacts of climate change caused by global emissions of greenhouse gases, particularly to the developing
countries, such as the loss of biodiversity and severe environmental, social, health and economic consequences;

Reiterating the need to build an ASEAN Community that is economically vibrant and environmentally friendly, so that the present and future generations
can enjoy a clean and sustainable environment;

Further recalling the 10 priority areas of environmental sustainability as agreed at the 7th Informal ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on the Environment, and
the key areas of Environmental Management and Natural Resource Management outlined for the period 2004-2010 in the Vientiane Action Programme
(VAP);

Reaffirming the goals of the Yangon Resolution on Sustainable Development, signed on 18 December 2003 and the Cebu Resolution on Sustainable
Development, adopted on 10 November 2006, by the Ministers of ASEAN Member Countries responsible for the environment;

Acknowledging that fossil fuels will continue to be part of the energy landscape, and that ASEAN Member Countries, who are at different stages of
economic development, will face various environment challenges and levels of resources needed to effectively address global environmental issues without
compromising competitiveness or social and economic development;

Further acknowledging the efforts of ASEAN Member Countries to ratify the ASEAN Agreement on the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources,
signed on 9 July 1985, the ASEAN Agreement on Transboundary Haze Pollution, signed on 10 June 2002, and the Agreement on the Establishment of
the ASEAN Centre for Biodiversity, signed on 27 September 2005;

Encouraging the efforts to develop an ASEAN Climate Change Initiative;

Recognising the importance of sustainable forest management in ASEAN, which will contribute significantly to the international efforts to promote
environmental sustainability, and to mitigate the effects of climate change as well as transboundary environmental pollution;

Recognising the partnership of the world community in combating land degradation in the context of the United Nations Convention to Combat
Desertification (UNCCD), a global instrument which can make a lasting contribution to the achievement of sustainable land management and environment;
and

Further recognizing the importance of protecting the natural resource base for economic and social development, including the sustainable management
and conservation of soil, water, mineral, coastal and marine resources as well as the improvement in water and air quality for the ASEAN region;

HEREBY DECLARE:


o Environmental Protection and Management

1. To honour and implement commitments to multilateral and regional sustainable development and environmental agreements, so as to achieve
the common goal of a clean and green ASEAN;
2. To intensify regional and international cooperation in promoting, sharing and implementing environmentally sustainable practices, including the
transfer of environmentally-sound technologies, the enhancement of human and institutional capacities and the promotion of sustainable
consumption and production patterns;
3. To adopt a holistic approach in fostering regional cooperation on environmental issues, with the participation of all relevant stakeholders;
including business, academics, NGOs and civil society organizations;
4. To expand on the existing work under the ASEAN Initiative on Environmentally Sustainable Cities;
5. To intensify individual and collective efforts to improve the quality of air and water within ASEAN through regional or national initiatives to
reduce industrial and transportation pollutions;
 6. To implement measures and enhance international and regional cooperation to combat transboundary environmental pollution, including haze
pollution, through, among other things, capacity building, enhancing public awareness, strengthening law enforcement, promoting
environmentally sustainable practices, as well as combating illegal logging and its associated illegal trade;
7. To endeavour to reduce by half of the number of people without sustainable access to safe drinking water by 2010 in accordance with the VAP
to meet the needs of ASEAN citizens, and significant improvement in the lives of slum dwellers by 2020 in ASEAN Member Countries in
accordance with the UN MDGs;
8. To promote the sustainable management and use of our soil, forest, coastal and marine environments as part of regional and global efforts on
biodiversity conservation, mindful of their important value as our natural heritage, and their contribution towards mitigating the effects of climate
change and environmental degradation;
9. To further promote cooperation among ASEAN Member Countries in combating land degradation for sustainable land management to support
sustainable agriculture and environment;
10. To call upon the international community to participate in and contribute to afforestation and reforestation, and to reduce deforestation, forest
degradation, and forest fires, including by promoting sustainable forest management and development, and combating illegal logging;
11. To also call on the international community to implement debt-for-sustainable development swap arrangements;
12. To forge ASEAN-wide cooperation to establish a regional nuclear safety regime, in line with our discussions at the 12th ASEAN Summit in Cebu
on 13 January 2007; the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone (SEANWFZ) Plan of Action adopted by the SEANWFZ Commission in
Manila on 29 July 2007; and the agreement of the 25th ASEAN Ministers on Energy Meeting (AMEM) on 23 August 2007;
13. To contributeto the UN Decade on Education for Sustainable Development through the ASEAN Environmental Education Action Plan to nurture
environmentally conscious ASEAN citizens;
o Responding to Climate Change
14. To work closely with the international community to better understand and adapt to the adverse impacts of climate change, including, in
particular, the related issues of greenhouse gas emissions and carbon sinks;
15. To agree that the pursuit of climate change and energy security policies should avoid introducing barriers to trade and investment;
16. To intensify cooperation on the joint research, development and deployment of low emission technologies for the cleaner use of fossil fuels,
recognising that fossil fuels will continue to play a major role in our energy mix;
17. To take concrete measures to promote the use of renewable and alternative energy sources such as solar, hydro, wind, tide, biomass, biofuels
and geothermal energy, as well as, for interested parties, civilian nuclear power, while ensuring safety and safeguards that are of current
international standards, and environmental sustainability throughout the full life cycle of production and use;
18. To improve energy efficiency in key sectors of energy use through capacity building and information sharing of best practices in managing
energy use and the adoption of appropriate technologies and practices;
19. To undertakeeffective measures towards open and competitive regional and international markets geared towards providing affordable energy
at all economic levels to facilitate the adoption of energy-efficient and low-emission technologies;
o Conservation of Natural Resources
20. To achieve by 2010, a significant reduction in the current rate of loss of biodiversity, as pledged by countries at the WSSD in 2002 and as
envisaged by the Convention on Biological Diversity;
21. To conserve our rich biodiversity, by promoting access to, and sustainable utilisation of its components, and the fair and equitable sharing of
the benefits from these biological and genetic resources;
22. To take into account biodiversity considerations in the mitigation of and adaptation to climate change;
23. To promote and support the ASEAN Centre for Biodiversity as a regional centre for biodiversity conservation and management;
24. To strengthen efforts to implement the ASEAN Regional Action Plan on Trade in Wild Fauna and Flora, 2005-2010 through mechanisms such
as the ASEAN Wildlife Enforcement Network;
25. To support the conservation and management of ASEAN Heritage Parks and encourage ASEAN Member Countries to identify more Parks;
26. To ensure the effective implementation of the ASEAN Strategic Plan on Water Resources Management;
27. To promote conservation and sustainable management of key ecosystems, including forest, coastal, and marine habitats, such as coral reefs,
through initiatives, in particular, the “Heart of Borneo”, “Forestry Eleven forum”, and the “Coral Triangle Initiative on Coral Reefs, Fisheries, and
Food Security”;
28. To agree to collectively work towards achieving an aspirational goal of significantly increasing the cumulative forest cover in the ASEAN region
by at least 10 million hectares by 2020; and
29. Foster the sustainable management and efficient use of mineral resources and environmentally-sound mining practices.

DONE in Singapore, this Twentieth Day of November in the Year Two Thousand and Seven.

For Brunei Darussalam:

HAJI HASSANAL BOLKIAH

Sultan of Brunei Darussalam

For the Kingdom of Cambodia:

SAMDECH HUN SEN

Prime Minister

For the Republic of Indonesia:

DR. SUSILO BAMBANG YUDHOYONO

President

For the Lao People’s Democratic Republic:

 BOUASONE BOUPHAVANH

Prime Minister

For Malaysia:

DATO’ SERI ABDULLAH AHMAD BADAWI

Prime Minister

For the Union of Myanmar:

GENERAL THEIN SEIN

Prime Minister

For the Republic of the Philippines:

GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO

President

For the Republic of Singapore:

LEE HSIEN LOONG

Prime Minister

For the Kingdom of Thailand:

GENERAL SURAYUD CHULANONT (RET.)

Prime Minister

For the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam:

NGUYEN TAN DUNG

Prime Minister
G.R. No. 101083 July 30, 1993

JUAN ANTONIO, ANNA ROSARIO and JOSE ALFONSO, all surnamed OPOSA, minors, and represented by their parents ANTONIO and
RIZALINA OPOSA, ROBERTA NICOLE SADIUA, minor, represented by her parents CALVIN and ROBERTA SADIUA, CARLO, AMANDA SALUD
and PATRISHA, all surnamed FLORES, minors and represented by their parents ENRICO and NIDA FLORES, GIANINA DITA R. FORTUN,
minor, represented by her parents SIGRID and DOLORES FORTUN, GEORGE II and MA. CONCEPCION, all surnamed MISA, minors and
represented by their parents GEORGE and MYRA MISA, BENJAMIN ALAN V. PESIGAN, minor, represented by his parents ANTONIO and
ALICE PESIGAN, JOVIE MARIE ALFARO, minor, represented by her parents JOSE and MARIA VIOLETA ALFARO, MARIA CONCEPCION T.
CASTRO, minor, represented by her parents FREDENIL and JANE CASTRO, JOHANNA DESAMPARADO,
minor, represented by her parents JOSE and ANGELA DESAMPRADO, CARLO JOAQUIN T. NARVASA, minor, represented by his parents
GREGORIO II and CRISTINE CHARITY NARVASA, MA. MARGARITA, JESUS IGNACIO, MA. ANGELA and MARIE GABRIELLE, all surnamed
SAENZ, minors, represented by their parents ROBERTO and AURORA SAENZ, KRISTINE, MARY ELLEN, MAY, GOLDA MARTHE and DAVID
IAN, all surnamed KING, minors, represented by their parents MARIO and HAYDEE KING, DAVID, FRANCISCO and THERESE VICTORIA, all
surnamed ENDRIGA, minors, represented by their parents BALTAZAR and TERESITA ENDRIGA, JOSE MA. and REGINA MA., all surnamed
ABAYA, minors, represented by their parents ANTONIO and MARICA ABAYA, MARILIN, MARIO, JR. and MARIETTE, all surnamed CARDAMA,
minors, represented by their parents MARIO and LINA CARDAMA, CLARISSA, ANN MARIE, NAGEL, and IMEE LYN, all surnamed OPOSA,
minors and represented by their parents RICARDO and MARISSA OPOSA, PHILIP JOSEPH, STEPHEN JOHN and ISAIAH JAMES, all
surnamed QUIPIT, minors, represented by their parents JOSE MAX and VILMI QUIPIT, BUGHAW CIELO, CRISANTO, ANNA, DANIEL and
FRANCISCO, all surnamed BIBAL, minors, represented by their parents FRANCISCO, JR. and MILAGROS BIBAL, and THE PHILIPPINE
ECOLOGICAL NETWORK, INC., petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN, JR., in his capacity as the Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources,
and THE HONORABLE ERIBERTO U. ROSARIO, Presiding Judge of the RTC, Makati, Branch 66, respondents.

Oposa Law Office for petitioners.

The Solicitor General for respondents.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

In a broader sense, this petition bears upon the right of Filipinos to a balanced and healthful ecology which the petitioners dramatically associate with the
twin concepts of "inter-generational responsibility" and "inter-generational justice." Specifically, it touches on the issue of whether the said petitioners
have a cause of action to "prevent the misappropriation or impairment" of Philippine rainforests and "arrest the unabated hemorrhage of the country's
vital life support systems and continued rape of Mother Earth."

The controversy has its genesis in Civil Case No. 90-77 which was filed before Branch 66 (Makati, Metro Manila) of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
National Capital Judicial Region. The principal plaintiffs therein, now the principal petitioners, are all minors duly represented and joined by their
respective parents. Impleaded as an additional plaintiff is the Philippine Ecological Network, Inc. (PENI), a domestic, non-stock and non-profit
corporation organized for the purpose of, inter alia, engaging in concerted action geared for the protection of our environment and natural resources. The
original defendant was the Honorable Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., then Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). His
substitution in this petition by the new Secretary, the Honorable Angel C. Alcala, was subsequently ordered upon proper motion by the petitioners.1 The
complaint2 was instituted as a taxpayers' class suit3 and alleges that the plaintiffs "are all citizens of the Republic of the Philippines, taxpayers, and
entitled to the full benefit, use and enjoyment of the natural resource treasure that is the country's virgin tropical forests." The same was filed for
themselves and others who are equally concerned about the preservation of said resource but are "so numerous that it is impracticable to bring them all
before the Court." The minors further asseverate that they "represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn." 4 Consequently, it is prayed for
that judgment be rendered:

. . . ordering defendant, his agents, representatives and other persons acting in his behalf to —

(1) Cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country;

(2) Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber license agreements.

and granting the plaintiffs ". . . such other reliefs just and equitable under the premises." 5

The complaint starts off with the general averments that the Philippine archipelago of 7,100 islands has a land area of thirty million (30,000,000)
hectares and is endowed with rich, lush and verdant rainforests in which varied, rare and unique species of flora and fauna may be found; these
rainforests contain a genetic, biological and chemical pool which is irreplaceable; they are also the habitat of indigenous Philippine cultures which have
existed, endured and flourished since time immemorial; scientific evidence reveals that in order to maintain a balanced and healthful ecology, the
country's land area should be utilized on the basis of a ratio of fifty-four per cent (54%) for forest cover and forty-six per cent (46%) for agricultural,
residential, industrial, commercial and other uses; the distortion and disturbance of this balance as a consequence of deforestation have resulted in a
host of environmental tragedies, such as (a) water shortages resulting from drying up of the water table, otherwise known as the "aquifer," as well as of
rivers, brooks and streams, (b) salinization of the water table as a result of the intrusion therein of salt water, incontrovertible examples of which may be
found in the island of Cebu and the Municipality of Bacoor, Cavite, (c) massive erosion and the consequential loss of soil fertility and agricultural
productivity, with the volume of soil eroded estimated at one billion (1,000,000,000) cubic meters per annum — approximately the size of the entire
island of Catanduanes, (d) the endangering and extinction of the country's unique, rare and varied flora and fauna, (e) the disturbance and dislocation of
cultural communities, including the disappearance of the Filipino's indigenous cultures, (f) the siltation of rivers and seabeds and consequential
destruction of corals and other aquatic life leading to a critical reduction in marine resource productivity, (g) recurrent spells of drought as is presently
experienced by the entire country, (h) increasing velocity of typhoon winds which result from the absence of windbreakers, (i) the floodings of lowlands
and agricultural plains arising from the absence of the absorbent mechanism of forests, (j) the siltation and shortening of the lifespan of multi-billion peso
dams constructed and operated for the purpose of supplying water for domestic uses, irrigation and the generation of electric power, and (k) the
reduction of the earth's capacity to process carbon dioxide gases which has led to perplexing and catastrophic climatic changes such as the
phenomenon of global warming, otherwise known as the "greenhouse effect."

Plaintiffs further assert that the adverse and detrimental consequences of continued and deforestation are so capable of unquestionable demonstration
that the same may be submitted as a matter of judicial notice. This notwithstanding, they expressed their intention to present expert witnesses as well as
documentary, photographic and film evidence in the course of the trial.

As their cause of action, they specifically allege that:

CAUSE OF ACTION

7. Plaintiffs replead by reference the foregoing allegations.

8. Twenty-five (25) years ago, the Philippines had some sixteen (16) million hectares of rainforests constituting roughly 53% of the
country's land mass.

9. Satellite images taken in 1987 reveal that there remained no more than 1.2 million hectares of said rainforests or four per cent
(4.0%) of the country's land area.

10. More recent surveys reveal that a mere 850,000 hectares of virgin old-growth rainforests are left, barely 2.8% of the entire land
mass of the Philippine archipelago and about 3.0 million hectares of immature and uneconomical secondary growth forests.

11. Public records reveal that the defendant's, predecessors have granted timber license agreements ('TLA's') to various
corporations to cut the aggregate area of 3.89 million hectares for commercial logging purposes.

A copy of the TLA holders and the corresponding areas covered is hereto attached as Annex "A".

12. At the present rate of deforestation, i.e. about 200,000 hectares per annum or 25 hectares per hour — nighttime, Saturdays,
Sundays and holidays included — the Philippines will be bereft of forest resources after the end of this ensuing decade, if not
earlier.

13. The adverse effects, disastrous consequences, serious injury and irreparable damage of this continued trend of deforestation to
the plaintiff minor's generation and to generations yet unborn are evident and incontrovertible. As a matter of fact, the environmental
damages enumerated in paragraph 6 hereof are already being felt, experienced and suffered by the generation of plaintiff adults.

14. The continued allowance by defendant of TLA holders to cut and deforest the remaining forest stands will work great damage
and irreparable injury to plaintiffs — especially plaintiff minors and their successors — who may never see, use, benefit from and
enjoy this rare and unique natural resource treasure.

This act of defendant constitutes a misappropriation and/or impairment of the natural resource property he holds in trust for the
benefit of plaintiff minors and succeeding generations.

15. Plaintiffs have a clear and constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology and are entitled to protection by the State in its
capacity as the parens patriae.

16. Plaintiff have exhausted all administrative remedies with the defendant's office. On March 2, 1990, plaintiffs served upon
defendant a final demand to cancel all logging permits in the country.

A copy of the plaintiffs' letter dated March 1, 1990 is hereto attached as Annex "B".

17. Defendant, however, fails and refuses to cancel the existing TLA's to the continuing serious damage and extreme prejudice of
plaintiffs.

18. The continued failure and refusal by defendant to cancel the TLA's is an act violative of the rights of plaintiffs, especially plaintiff
minors who may be left with a country that is desertified (sic), bare, barren and devoid of the wonderful flora, fauna and indigenous
cultures which the Philippines had been abundantly blessed with.

19. Defendant's refusal to cancel the aforementioned TLA's is manifestly contrary to the public policy enunciated in the Philippine
Environmental Policy which, in pertinent part, states that it is the policy of the State —

(a) to create, develop, maintain and improve conditions under which man and nature can thrive in productive and enjoyable
harmony with each other;

(b) to fulfill the social, economic and other requirements of present and future generations of Filipinos and;
 (c) to ensure the attainment of an environmental quality that is conductive to a life of dignity and well-being. (P.D. 1151, 6 June
1977)

20. Furthermore, defendant's continued refusal to cancel the aforementioned TLA's is contradictory to the Constitutional policy of the
State to —

a. effect "a more equitable distribution of opportunities, income and wealth" and "make full and efficient use of natural resources
(sic)." (Section 1, Article XII of the Constitution);

b. "protect the nation's marine wealth." (Section 2, ibid);

c. "conserve and promote the nation's cultural heritage and resources (sic)" (Section 14, Article XIV, id.);

d. "protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of
nature." (Section 16, Article II, id.)

21. Finally, defendant's act is contrary to the highest law of humankind — the natural law — and violative of plaintiffs' right to self-
preservation and perpetuation.

22. There is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in law other than the instant action to arrest the unabated hemorrhage of
the country's vital life support systems and continued rape of Mother Earth. 6

On 22 June 1990, the original defendant, Secretary Factoran, Jr., filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint based on two (2) grounds, namely: (1) the
plaintiffs have no cause of action against him and (2) the issue raised by the plaintiffs is a political question which properly pertains to the legislative or
executive branches of Government. In their 12 July 1990 Opposition to the Motion, the petitioners maintain that (1) the complaint shows a clear and
unmistakable cause of action, (2) the motion is dilatory and (3) the action presents a justiciable question as it involves the defendant's abuse of
discretion.

On 18 July 1991, respondent Judge issued an order granting the aforementioned motion to dismiss.7 In the said order, not only was the defendant's
claim — that the complaint states no cause of action against him and that it raises a political question — sustained, the respondent Judge further ruled
that the granting of the relief prayed for would result in the impairment of contracts which is prohibited by the fundamental law of the land.

Plaintiffs thus filed the instant special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court and ask this Court to rescind and set aside
the dismissal order on the ground that the respondent Judge gravely abused his discretion in dismissing the action. Again, the parents of the plaintiffs-
minors not only represent their children, but have also joined the latter in this case. 8

On 14 May 1992, We resolved to give due course to the petition and required the parties to submit their respective Memoranda after the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) filed a Comment in behalf of the respondents and the petitioners filed a reply thereto.

Petitioners contend that the complaint clearly and unmistakably states a cause of action as it contains sufficient allegations concerning their right to a
sound environment based on Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil Code (Human Relations), Section 4 of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 192 creating the
DENR, Section 3 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1151 (Philippine Environmental Policy), Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution recognizing the
right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology, the concept of generational genocide in Criminal Law and the concept of man's inalienable right
to self-preservation and self-perpetuation embodied in natural law. Petitioners likewise rely on the respondent's correlative obligation per Section 4 of
E.O. No. 192, to safeguard the people's right to a healthful environment.

It is further claimed that the issue of the respondent Secretary's alleged grave abuse of discretion in granting Timber License Agreements (TLAs) to
cover more areas for logging than what is available involves a judicial question.

Anent the invocation by the respondent Judge of the Constitution's non-impairment clause, petitioners maintain that the same does not apply in this case
because TLAs are not contracts. They likewise submit that even if TLAs may be considered protected by the said clause, it is well settled that they may
still be revoked by the State when the public interest so requires.

On the other hand, the respondents aver that the petitioners failed to allege in their complaint a specific legal right violated by the respondent Secretary
for which any relief is provided by law. They see nothing in the complaint but vague and nebulous allegations concerning an "environmental right" which
supposedly entitles the petitioners to the "protection by the state in its capacity as parens patriae." Such allegations, according to them, do not reveal a
valid cause of action. They then reiterate the theory that the question of whether logging should be permitted in the country is a political question which
should be properly addressed to the executive or legislative branches of Government. They therefore assert that the petitioners' resources is not to file
an action to court, but to lobby before Congress for the passage of a bill that would ban logging totally.

As to the matter of the cancellation of the TLAs, respondents submit that the same cannot be done by the State without due process of law. Once
issued, a TLA remains effective for a certain period of time — usually for twenty-five (25) years. During its effectivity, the same can neither be revised
nor cancelled unless the holder has been found, after due notice and hearing, to have violated the terms of the agreement or other forestry laws and
regulations. Petitioners' proposition to have all the TLAs indiscriminately cancelled without the requisite hearing would be violative of the requirements of
due process.

Before going any further, We must first focus on some procedural matters. Petitioners instituted Civil Case No. 90-777 as a class suit. The original
defendant and the present respondents did not take issue with this matter. Nevertheless, We hereby rule that the said civil case is indeed a class suit.
The subject matter of the complaint is of common and general interest not just to several, but to all citizens of the Philippines. Consequently, since the
parties are so numerous, it, becomes impracticable, if not totally impossible, to bring all of them before the court. We likewise declare that the plaintiffs
therein are numerous and representative enough to ensure the full protection of all concerned interests. Hence, all the requisites for the filing of a valid
class suit under Section 12, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court are present both in the said civil case and in the instant petition, the latter being but an
incident to the former.

This case, however, has a special and novel element. Petitioners minors assert that they represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn.
We find no difficulty in ruling that they can, for themselves, for others of their generation and for the succeeding generations, file a class suit. Their
personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations can only be based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a
balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. Such a right, as hereinafter expounded, considers
the "rhythm and harmony of nature." Nature means the created world in its entirety. 9 Such rhythm and harmony indispensably include, inter alia, the
judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal and conservation of the country's forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-shore areas
and other natural resources to the end that their exploration, development and utilization be equitably accessible to the present as well as future
generations. 10Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment of a
balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little differently, the minors' assertion of their right to a sound environment constitutes, at the same time, the
performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the generations to come.

The locus standi of the petitioners having thus been addressed, We shall now proceed to the merits of the petition.

After a careful perusal of the complaint in question and a meticulous consideration and evaluation of the issues raised and arguments adduced by the
parties, We do not hesitate to find for the petitioners and rule against the respondent Judge's challenged order for having been issued with grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. The pertinent portions of the said order reads as follows:

xxx xxx xxx

After a careful and circumspect evaluation of the Complaint, the Court cannot help but agree with the defendant. For although we
believe that plaintiffs have but the noblest of all intentions, it (sic) fell short of alleging, with sufficient definiteness, a specific legal
right they are seeking to enforce and protect, or a specific legal wrong they are seeking to prevent and redress (Sec. 1, Rule 2,
RRC). Furthermore, the Court notes that the Complaint is replete with vague assumptions and vague conclusions based on
unverified data. In fine, plaintiffs fail to state a cause of action in its Complaint against the herein defendant.

Furthermore, the Court firmly believes that the matter before it, being impressed with political color and involving a matter of public
policy, may not be taken cognizance of by this Court without doing violence to the sacred principle of "Separation of Powers" of the
three (3) co-equal branches of the Government.

The Court is likewise of the impression that it cannot, no matter how we stretch our jurisdiction, grant the reliefs prayed for by the
plaintiffs, i.e., to cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country and to cease and desist from receiving, accepting,
processing, renewing or approving new timber license agreements. For to do otherwise would amount to "impairment of contracts"
abhored (sic) by the fundamental law. 11

We do not agree with the trial court's conclusions that the plaintiffs failed to allege with sufficient definiteness a specific legal right involved or a specific
legal wrong committed, and that the complaint is replete with vague assumptions and conclusions based on unverified data. A reading of the complaint
itself belies these conclusions.

The complaint focuses on one specific fundamental legal right — the right to a balanced and healthful ecology which, for the first time in our nation's
constitutional history, is solemnly incorporated in the fundamental law. Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides:

Sec. 16. The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm
and harmony of nature.

This right unites with the right to health which is provided for in the preceding section of the same article:

Sec. 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill health consciousness among them.

While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under the Declaration of Principles and State Policies and not under the Bill of Rights,
it does not follow that it is less important than any of the civil and political rights enumerated in the latter. Such a right belongs to a different category of
rights altogether for it concerns nothing less than self-preservation and self-perpetuation — aptly and fittingly stressed by the petitioners — the
advancement of which may even be said to predate all governments and constitutions. As a matter of fact, these basic rights need not even be written in
the Constitution for they are assumed to exist from the inception of humankind. If they are now explicitly mentioned in the fundamental charter, it is
because of the well-founded fear of its framers that unless the rights to a balanced and healthful ecology and to health are mandated as state policies by
the Constitution itself, thereby highlighting their continuing importance and imposing upon the state a solemn obligation to preserve the first and protect
and advance the second, the day would not be too far when all else would be lost not only for the present generation, but also for those to come —
generations which stand to inherit nothing but parched earth incapable of sustaining life.

The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment. During the debates on this
right in one of the plenary sessions of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, the following exchange transpired between Commissioner Wilfrido Villacorta
and Commissioner Adolfo Azcuna who sponsored the section in question:

MR. VILLACORTA:
 Does this section mandate the State to provide sanctions against all forms of pollution — air, water and noise
pollution?

MR. AZCUNA:

Yes, Madam President. The right to healthful (sic) environment necessarily carries with it the correlative duty of
not impairing the same and, therefore, sanctions may be provided for impairment of environmental balance. 12

The said right implies, among many other things, the judicious management and conservation of the country's forests.

Without such forests, the ecological or environmental balance would be irreversiby disrupted.

Conformably with the enunciated right to a balanced and healthful ecology and the right to health, as well as the other related provisions of the
Constitution concerning the conservation, development and utilization of the country's natural resources, 13 then President Corazon C. Aquino
promulgated on 10 June 1987 E.O. No. 192, 14 Section 4 of which expressly mandates that the Department of Environment and Natural Resources "shall
be the primary government agency responsible for the conservation, management, development and proper use of the country's environment and
natural resources, specifically forest and grazing lands, mineral, resources, including those in reservation and watershed areas, and lands of the public
domain, as well as the licensing and regulation of all natural resources as may be provided for by law in order to ensure equitable sharing of the benefits
derived therefrom for the welfare of the present and future generations of Filipinos." Section 3 thereof makes the following statement of policy:

Sec. 3. Declaration of Policy. — It is hereby declared the policy of the State to ensure the sustainable use, development,
management, renewal, and conservation of the country's forest, mineral, land, off-shore areas and other natural resources, including
the protection and enhancement of the quality of the environment, and equitable access of the different segments of the population
to the development and the use of the country's natural resources, not only for the present generation but for future generations as
well. It is also the policy of the state to recognize and apply a true value system including social and environmental cost implications
relative to their utilization, development and conservation of our natural resources.

This policy declaration is substantially re-stated it Title XIV, Book IV of the Administrative Code of 1987, 15 specifically in Section 1 thereof which reads:

Sec. 1. Declaration of Policy. — (1) The State shall ensure, for the benefit of the Filipino people, the full exploration and
development as well as the judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal and conservation of the country's forest, mineral,
land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-shore areas and other natural resources, consistent with the necessity of maintaining a sound
ecological balance and protecting and enhancing the quality of the environment and the objective of making the exploration,
development and utilization of such natural resources equitably accessible to the different segments of the present as well as future
generations.

(2) The State shall likewise recognize and apply a true value system that takes into account social and environmental cost
implications relative to the utilization, development and conservation of our natural resources.

The above provision stresses "the necessity of maintaining a sound ecological balance and protecting and enhancing the quality of the environment."
Section 2 of the same Title, on the other hand, specifically speaks of the mandate of the DENR; however, it makes particular reference to the fact of the
agency's being subject to law and higher authority. Said section provides:

Sec. 2. Mandate. — (1) The Department of Environment and Natural Resources shall be primarily responsible for the
implementation of the foregoing policy.

(2) It shall, subject to law and higher authority, be in charge of carrying out the State's constitutional mandate to control and
supervise the exploration, development, utilization, and conservation of the country's natural resources.

Both E.O. NO. 192 and the Administrative Code of 1987 have set the objectives which will serve as the bases for policy formulation, and have defined
the powers and functions of the DENR.

It may, however, be recalled that even before the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, specific statutes already paid special attention to the
"environmental right" of the present and future generations. On 6 June 1977, P.D. No. 1151 (Philippine Environmental Policy) and P.D. No. 1152
(Philippine Environment Code) were issued. The former "declared a continuing policy of the State (a) to create, develop, maintain and improve
conditions under which man and nature can thrive in productive and enjoyable harmony with each other, (b) to fulfill the social, economic and other
requirements of present and future generations of Filipinos, and (c) to insure the attainment of an environmental quality that is conducive to a life of
dignity and well-being." 16 As its goal, it speaks of the "responsibilities of each generation as trustee and guardian of the environment for succeeding
generations." 17 The latter statute, on the other hand, gave flesh to the said policy.

Thus, the right of the petitioners (and all those they represent) to a balanced and healthful ecology is as clear as the DENR's duty — under its mandate
and by virtue of its powers and functions under E.O. No. 192 and the Administrative Code of 1987 — to protect and advance the said right.

A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the corelative duty or obligation to respect or protect the same gives rise to a cause of action.
Petitioners maintain that the granting of the TLAs, which they claim was done with grave abuse of discretion, violated their right to a balanced and
healthful ecology; hence, the full protection thereof requires that no further TLAs should be renewed or granted.

A cause of action is defined as:

 . . . an act or omission of one party in violation of the legal right or rights of the other; and its essential elements are legal right of the
plaintiff, correlative obligation of the defendant, and act or omission of the defendant in violation of said legal right. 18

It is settled in this jurisdiction that in a motion to dismiss based on the ground that the complaint fails to state a cause of action, 19 the question submitted
to the court for resolution involves the sufficiency of the facts alleged in the complaint itself. No other matter should be considered; furthermore, the truth
of falsity of the said allegations is beside the point for the truth thereof is deemed hypothetically admitted. The only issue to be resolved in such a case
is: admitting such alleged facts to be true, may the court render a valid judgment in accordance with the prayer in the complaint? 20 In Militante vs.
Edrosolano, 21 this Court laid down the rule that the judiciary should "exercise the utmost care and circumspection in passing upon a motion to dismiss
on the ground of the absence thereof [cause of action] lest, by its failure to manifest a correct appreciation of the facts alleged and deemed
hypothetically admitted, what the law grants or recognizes is effectively nullified. If that happens, there is a blot on the legal order. The law itself stands in
disrepute."

After careful examination of the petitioners' complaint, We find the statements under the introductory affirmative allegations, as well as the specific
averments under the sub-heading CAUSE OF ACTION, to be adequate enough to show, prima facie, the claimed violation of their rights. On the basis
thereof, they may thus be granted, wholly or partly, the reliefs prayed for. It bears stressing, however, that insofar as the cancellation of the TLAs is
concerned, there is the need to implead, as party defendants, the grantees thereof for they are indispensable parties.

The foregoing considered, Civil Case No. 90-777 be said to raise a political question. Policy formulation or determination by the executive or legislative
branches of Government is not squarely put in issue. What is principally involved is the enforcement of a right vis-a-vis policies already formulated and
expressed in legislation. It must, nonetheless, be emphasized that the political question doctrine is no longer, the insurmountable obstacle to the
exercise of judicial power or the impenetrable shield that protects executive and legislative actions from judicial inquiry or review. The second paragraph
of section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution states that:

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable
and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.

Commenting on this provision in his book, Philippine Political Law, 22 Mr. Justice Isagani A. Cruz, a distinguished member of this Court, says:

The first part of the authority represents the traditional concept of judicial power, involving the settlement of conflicting rights as
conferred as law. The second part of the authority represents a broadening of judicial power to enable the courts of justice to review
what was before forbidden territory, to wit, the discretion of the political departments of the government.

As worded, the new provision vests in the judiciary, and particularly the Supreme Court, the power to rule upon even the wisdom of
the decisions of the executive and the legislature and to declare their acts invalid for lack or excess of jurisdiction because tainted
with grave abuse of discretion. The catch, of course, is the meaning of "grave abuse of discretion," which is a very elastic phrase
that can expand or contract according to the disposition of the judiciary.

In Daza vs. Singson, 23 Mr. Justice Cruz, now speaking for this Court, noted:

In the case now before us, the jurisdictional objection becomes even less tenable and decisive. The reason is that, even if we were
to assume that the issue presented before us was political in nature, we would still not be precluded from revolving it under the
expanded jurisdiction conferred upon us that now covers, in proper cases, even the political question. Article VII, Section 1, of the
Constitution clearly provides: . . .

The last ground invoked by the trial court in dismissing the complaint is the non-impairment of contracts clause found in the Constitution. The court a
quo declared that:

The Court is likewise of the impression that it cannot, no matter how we stretch our jurisdiction, grant the reliefs prayed for by the
plaintiffs, i.e., to cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country and to cease and desist from receiving, accepting,
processing, renewing or approving new timber license agreements. For to do otherwise would amount to "impairment of contracts"
abhored (sic) by the fundamental law. 24

We are not persuaded at all; on the contrary, We are amazed, if not shocked, by such a sweeping pronouncement. In the first place, the respondent
Secretary did not, for obvious reasons, even invoke in his motion to dismiss the non-impairment clause. If he had done so, he would have acted with
utmost infidelity to the Government by providing undue and unwarranted benefits and advantages to the timber license holders because he would have
forever bound the Government to strictly respect the said licenses according to their terms and conditions regardless of changes in policy and the
demands of public interest and welfare. He was aware that as correctly pointed out by the petitioners, into every timber license must be read Section 20
of the Forestry Reform Code (P.D. No. 705) which provides:

. . . Provided, That when the national interest so requires, the President may amend, modify, replace or rescind any contract,
concession, permit, licenses or any other form of privilege granted herein . . .

Needless to say, all licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded by executive action. It is not a contract, property or a property right protested
by the due process clause of the Constitution. In Tan vs. Director of Forestry, 25 this Court held:

. . . A timber license is an instrument by which the State regulates the utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end that
public welfare is promoted. A timber license is not a contract within the purview of the due process clause; it is only a license or
privilege, which can be validly withdrawn whenever dictated by public interest or public welfare as in this case.
 A license is merely a permit or privilege to do what otherwise would be unlawful, and is not a contract between the authority, federal,
state, or municipal, granting it and the person to whom it is granted; neither is it property or a property right, nor does it create a
vested right; nor is it taxation (37 C.J. 168). Thus, this Court held that the granting of license does not create irrevocable rights,
neither is it property or property rights (People vs. Ong Tin, 54 O.G. 7576).

We reiterated this pronouncement in Felipe Ysmael, Jr. & Co., Inc. vs. Deputy Executive Secretary: 26

. . . Timber licenses, permits and license agreements are the principal instruments by which the State regulates the utilization and
disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare is promoted. And it can hardly be gainsaid that they merely evidence a
privilege granted by the State to qualified entities, and do not vest in the latter a permanent or irrevocable right to the particular
concession area and the forest products therein. They may be validly amended, modified, replaced or rescinded by the Chief
Executive when national interests so require. Thus, they are not deemed contracts within the purview of the due process of law
clause [See Sections 3(ee) and 20 of Pres. Decree No. 705, as amended. Also, Tan v. Director of Forestry, G.R. No. L-24548,
October 27, 1983, 125 SCRA 302].

Since timber licenses are not contracts, the non-impairment clause, which reads:

27
Sec. 10. No law impairing, the obligation of contracts shall be passed.

cannot be invoked.

In the second place, even if it is to be assumed that the same are contracts, the instant case does not involve a law or even an executive issuance
declaring the cancellation or modification of existing timber licenses. Hence, the non-impairment clause cannot as yet be invoked. Nevertheless, granting
further that a law has actually been passed mandating cancellations or modifications, the same cannot still be stigmatized as a violation of the non-
impairment clause. This is because by its very nature and purpose, such as law could have only been passed in the exercise of the police power of the
state for the purpose of advancing the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology, promoting their health and enhancing the general welfare.
In Abe vs. Foster Wheeler
Corp. 28 this Court stated:

The freedom of contract, under our system of government, is not meant to be absolute. The same is understood to be subject to
reasonable legislative regulation aimed at the promotion of public health, moral, safety and welfare. In other words, the constitutional
guaranty of non-impairment of obligations of contract is limited by the exercise of the police power of the State, in the interest of
public health, safety, moral and general welfare.

The reason for this is emphatically set forth in Nebia vs. New York, 29 quoted in Philippine American Life Insurance Co. vs. Auditor General,30 to wit:

Under our form of government the use of property and the making of contracts are normally matters of private and not of public
concern. The general rule is that both shall be free of governmental interference. But neither property rights nor contract rights are
absolute; for government cannot exist if the citizen may at will use his property to the detriment of his fellows, or exercise his
freedom of contract to work them harm. Equally fundamental with the private right is that of the public to regulate it in the common
interest.

In short, the non-impairment clause must yield to the police power of the state. 31

Finally, it is difficult to imagine, as the trial court did, how the non-impairment clause could apply with respect to the prayer to enjoin the respondent
Secretary from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber licenses for, save in cases of renewal, no contract would have as of
yet existed in the other instances. Moreover, with respect to renewal, the holder is not entitled to it as a matter of right.

WHEREFORE, being impressed with merit, the instant Petition is hereby GRANTED, and the challenged Order of respondent Judge of 18 July 1991
dismissing Civil Case No. 90-777 is hereby set aside. The petitioners may therefore amend their complaint to implead as defendants the holders or
grantees of the questioned timber license agreements.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 180771 April 21, 2015

RESIDENT MARINE MAMMALS OF THE PROTECTED SEASCAPE TAÑON STRAIT, e.g., TOOTHED WHALES, DOLPHINS, PORPOISES, AND OTHER
CETACEAN SPECIES, Joined in and Represented herein by Human Beings Gloria Estenzo Ramos and Rose-Liza Eisma-Osorio, In Their Capacity as
Legal Guardians of the Lesser Life-Forms and as Responsible Stewards of God's Creations, Petitioners,
vs.
SECRETARY ANGELO REYES, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Energy (DOE), SECRETARY JOSE L. ATIENZA, in his capacity as
Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), LEONARDO R. SIBBALUCA, DENR Regional Director-Region VII and in his
capacity as Chairperson of the Tañon Strait Protected Seascape Management Board, Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources (BFAR), DIRECTOR
MALCOLM J. SARMIENTO, JR., BFAR Regional Director for Region VII ANDRES M. BOJOS, JAPAN PETROLEUM EXPLORATION CO., LTD. (JAPEX), as
represented by its Philippine Agent, SUPPLY OILFIELD SERVICES, INC. Respondents.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 181527

CENTRAL VISAYAS FISHERFOLK DEVELOPMENT CENTER (FIDEC), CERILO D. ENGARCIAL, RAMON YANONG, FRANCISCO LABID, in their personal
capacity and as representatives of the SUBSISTENCE FISHERFOLKS OF THE MUNICIPALITIES OF ALOGUINSAN AND PINAMUNGAJAN, CEBU, AND
THEIR FAMILIES, AND THE PRESENT AND FUTURE GENERATIONS OF FILIPINOS WHOSE RIGHTS ARE SIMILARLY AFFECTED, Petitioners,
vs.
SECRETARY ANGELO REYES, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Energy (DOE), JOSE L. ATIENZA, in his capacity as Secretary of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), LEONARDO R. SIBBALUCA, in his capacity as DENR Regional Director-Region VII and as
Chairperson of the Tañon Strait Protected Seascape Management Board, ALAN ARRANGUEZ, in his capacity as Director - Environmental Management
Bureau-Region VII, DOE Regional Director for Region VIII1 ANTONIO LABIOS, JAPAN PETROLEUM EXPLORATION CO., LTD. (JAPEX), as represented
by its Philippine Agent, SUPPLY OILFIELD SERVICES, INC., Respondents.

CONCURRING OPINION

"Until one has loved an animal,

a part of one 's soul remains unawakened."

Anatole France

LEONEN, J.:

I concur in the result, with the following additional reasons.

In G.R. No. 180771, petitioners Resident Marine Mammals allegedly bring their case in their personal capacity, alleging that they stand to benefit or be injured from
the judgment on the issues. The human petitioners implead themselves in a representative capacity "as legal guardians of the lesser life-forms and as responsible
stewards of God's Creations."1 They use Oposa v. Factoran, Jr.2 as basis for their claim, asserting their right to enforce international and domestic environmental
laws enacted for their benefit under the concept of stipulation pour autrui.3As the representatives of Resident Marine Mammals, the human petitioners assert that
they have the obligation to build awareness among the affected residents of Tañon Strait as well as to protect the environment, especially in light of the
government's failure, as primary steward, to do its duty under the doctrine of public trust. 4

Resident Marine Mammals and the human petitioners also assert that through this case, this court will have the opportunity to lower the threshold for locus standi
as an exercise of "epistolary jurisdiction."5

The zeal of the human petitioners to pursue their desire to protect the environment and to continue to define environmental rights in the context of actual cases is
commendable. However, the space for legal creativity usually required for advocacy of issues of the public interest is not so unlimited that it should be allowed to
undermine the other values protected by current substantive and procedural laws. Even rules of procedure as currently formulated set the balance between
competing interests. We cannot abandon these rules when the necessity is not clearly and convincingly presented.

The human petitioners, in G.R. No. 180771, want us to create substantive and procedural rights for animals through their allegation that they can speak for them.
Obviously, we are asked to accept the premises that (a) they were chosen by the Resident Marine Mammals of Tañon Strait; (b) they were chosen by a
representative group of all the species of the Resident Marine Mammals; (c) they were able to communicate with them; and (d) they received clear consent from
their animal principals that they would wish to use human legal institutions to pursue their interests. Alternatively, they ask us to acknowledge through judicial
notice that the interests that they, the human petitioners, assert are identical to what the Resident Marine Mammals would assert had they been humans and the
legal strategies that they invoked are the strategies that they agree with.

In the alternative, they want us to accept through judicial notice that there is a relationship of guardianship between them and all the resident mammals in the
affected ecology.

Fundamental judicial doctrines that may significantly change substantive and procedural law cannot be founded on feigned representation.

Instead, I agree that the human petitioners should only speak for themselves and already have legal standing to sue with respect to the issue raised in their
pleading. The rules on standing have already been liberalized to take into consideration the difficulties in the assertion of environmental rights. When standing
becomes too liberal, this can be the occasion for abuse.

II
Rule 3, Section 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, in part, provides:

SECTION 1. Who may be parties; plaintiff and defendant. - Only natural or juridical persons, or entities authorized by law may be parties in a civil action.

The Rules provide that parties may only be natural or juridical persons or entities that may be authorized by statute to be parties in a civil action.

Basic is the concept of natural and juridical persons in our Civil Code:

ARTICLE 37. Juridical capacity, which is the fitness to be the subject of legal relations, is inherent in every natural person and is lost only through death. Capacity
to act, which is the power to do acts with legal effect, is acquired and may be lost.

Article 40 further defines natural persons in the following manner:

ARTICLE 40. Birth determines personality; but the conceived child shall be considered born for all purposes that are favorable to it, provided it be born later with
the conditions specified 'in the following article.

Article 44, on the other hand, enumerates the concept of a juridical person:

ARTICLE 44. The following are juridical persons:

(1) The State and its political subdivisions;

(2) Other corporations, institutions and entities for public interest or purpose, created by law; their personality begins as soon as they have been
constituted according to law;

(3) Corporations, partnerships and associations for private interest or purpose to which the law grants a juridical personality, separate and distinct from
that of each shareholder, partner or member.

Petitioners in G.R. No. 180771 implicitly suggest that we amend, rather than simply construe, the provisions of the Rules of Court as well as substantive law to
accommodate Resident Marine Mammals or animals. This we cannot do.

Rule 3, Section 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure further defines real party in interest:

SEC. 2. Parties in interest.-A real party in interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of
the suit. Unless otherwise authorized by law or these Rules, every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest. (2a)6

A litigant who stands to benefit or sustain an injury from the judgment of a case is a real party in interest. 7 When a case is brought to the courts, the real party in
interest must show that another party's act or omission has caused a direct injury, making his or her interest both material and based on an enforceable legal
right.8

Representatives as parties, on the other hand, are parties acting in representation of the real party in interest, as defined in Rule 3, Section 3 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure:

SEC. 3. Representatives as parties. - Where the action is allowed to be prosecuted or defended by a representative or someone acting in a fiduciary capacity, the
beneficiary shall be included in the title of the case and shall be deemed to be the real party in interest. A representative may be a trustee of an express rust, a
guardian, an executor or administrator, or a party authorized by law or these Rules. An agent acting in his own name and for the benefit of an undisclosed principal
may sue or be sued without joining the principal except when the contract involves things belonging to the principal.(3a)9

The rule is two-pronged. First, it defines .a representative as a party who is not bound to directly or actually benefit or suffer from the judgment, but instead brings
a case in favor of an identified real party in interest.10 The representative is an outsider to the cause of action. Second, the rule provides a list of who may be
considered as "representatives." It is not an exhaustive list, but the rule limits the coverage only to those authorized by law or the Rules of Court.11

These requirements should apply even in cases involving the environment, which means that for the Petition of the human petitioners to prosper, they must show
that (a) the Resident Marine Mammals are real parties in interest; and (b) that the human petitioners are authorized by law or the Rules to act in a representative
capacity.

The Resident Marine Mammals are comprised of "toothed whales, dolphins, porpoises, and other cetacean species inhabiting Tañon Strait."12 While relatively new
in Philippine jurisdiction, the issue of whether animals have legal standing before courts has been the subject of academic discourse in light of the emergence of
animal and environmental rights.

In the United States, anim4l rights advocates have managed to establish a system which Hogan explains as the "guardianship model for nonhuman animals":13

Despite Animal Lovers, there exists a well-established system by which nonhuman animals may obtain judicial review to enforce their statutory rights and
protections: guardianships. With court approval, animal advocacy organizations may bring suit on behalf of nonhuman animals in the same way court-appointed
guardians bring suit on behalf of mentally-challenged humans who possess an enforceable right but lack the ability to enforce it themselves.

In the controversial but pivotal Should Trees Have Standing?-Toward Legal Rights for Natural Objects, Christopher D. Stone asserts that the environment should
possess the right to seek judicial redress even though it is incapable of representing itself. While asserting the rights of
speechless entities such as the environment or nonhuman animals certainly poses legitimate challenges - such as identifying the proper spokesman -the American
legal system is already well-equipped with a reliable mechanism by which nonhumans may obtain standing via a judicially established guardianship. Stone notes
that other speechless - and nonhuman - entities such as corporations, states, estates, and municipalities have standing to bring suit on their own behalf. There is
little reason to fear abuses under this regime as procedures for removal and substitution, avoiding conflicts of interest, and termination of a guardianship are well
established.

In fact, the opinion in Animal Lovers suggests that such an arrangement is indeed possible. The court indicated that AL VA might have obtained standing in its own
right if it had an established history of dedication to the cause of the humane treatment of animals. It noted that the Fund for Animals had standing and indicated
that another more well-known advocacy organization might have had standing as well. The court further concluded that an organization's standing is more than a
derivative of its history, but history is a relevant consideration where organizations are not well-established prior to commencing legal action. ALVA was not the
proper plaintiff because it could not identify previous activities demonstrating its recognized activism for and commitment to the dispute independent of its desire to
pursue legal action. The court's analysis suggests that a qualified organization with a demonstrated commitment to a cause could indeed bring suit on behalf of the
speechless in the form of a court-sanctioned guardianship.

This Comment advocates a shift in contemporary standing doctrine to empower non-profit organizations with an established history of dedication to the cause and
relevant expertise to serve as official guardians ad !item on behalf of nonhuman animals interests. The American legal system has numerous mechanisms for
representing the rights and interests of nonhumans; any challenges inherent in extending these pre-existing mechanisms to nonhuman animals are minimal
compared to an interest in the proper administration of justice. To adequately protect the statutory rights of nonhuman animals, the legal system must recognize
those statutory rights independent of humans and provide a viable means of enforcement. Moreover, the idea of a guardianship for speechless plaintiffs is not new
and has been urged on behalf of the natural environment. 'Such a model is even more compelling as applied to nonhuman animals, because they are sentient
beings with the ability to feel pain and exercise rational thought. Thus, animals are qualitatively different from other legally protected nonhumans and therefore
have interests deserving direct legal protection.

Furthermore, the difficulty of enforcing the statutory rights of nonhuman animals threatens the integrity of the federal statutes designed to protect them, essentially
rendering them meaningless. Sensing that laws protecting nonhuman animals would be difficult to enforce, Congress provided for citizen suit provisions: the most
well-known example is found in the Endangered Species Act (ESA). Such provisions are evidence of legislative intent to encourage civic participation on behalf of
nonhuman animals. Our law of standing should reflect this intent and its implication that humans are suitable representatives of the natural environment, which
includes nonhuman animals.14 (Emphasis supplied, citation omitted)

When a court allows guardianship as a basis of representation, animals are considered as similarly situated as individuals who have enforceable rights but, for a
legitimate reason (e.g., cognitive disability), are unable to bring suit for themselves. They are also similar to entities that by their very nature are incapable of
speaking for themselves (e.g., corporations, states, and others).

In our jurisdiction, persons and entities are recognized both in law and the Rules of Court as having standing to sue and, therefore, may be properly represented
as real parties in interest. The same cannot be said about animals.

Animals play an important role in households, communities, and the environment. While we, as humans, may feel the need to nurture and protect them, we cannot
go as far as saying we represent their best interests and can, therefore, speak for them before the courts. As humans, we cannot be so arrogant as to argue that
we know the suffering of animals and that we know what remedy they need in the face of an injury.

Even in Hogan's discussion, she points out that in a case before the United States District Court for the Central District of California, Animal Lovers Volunteer
Ass'n v. Weinberger,15 the court held that an emotional response to what humans perceive to be an injury inflicted on an animal is not within the "zone-of-interest"
protected by law.16Such sympathy cannot stand independent of or as a substitute for an actual injury suffered by the claimant. 17 The ability to represent animals
was further limited in that case by the need to prove "genuine dedication" to asserting and protecting animal rights:

What ultimately proved fatal to ALVA 's claim, however, was the court's assertion that standing doctrine further required ALVA to differentiate its genuine
dedication to the humane treatment of animals from the general disdain for animal cruelty shared by the public at large. In doing so, the court found ALVA 's
asserted organizational injury to be abstract and thus relegated ALVA to the ranks of the "concerned bystander. "

....

In fact, the opinion in Animal Lovers suggests that such an arrangement is indeed possible. The court indicated that ALVA might have obtained standing in its own
right if it had an established history of dedication to the cause of the humane treatment of animals. It noted that the Fund for Animals had standing and indicated
that another more well-known advocacy organization might have had standing as well. The court further concluded that an organization's standing is more than a
derivative of its history, but history is a relevant consideration where organizations are not well-established prior to commencing legal action. ALVA was not the
proper plaintiff because it could not identify previous activities demonstrating its recognized activism for and commitment to the dispute independent of its desire to
pursue legal action. The court's analysis suggests that a qualified organization with a demonstrated commitment to a cause could indeed bring suit on behalf of the
speechless in the form of a court-sanctioned guardianship.18(Emphasis supplied, citation omitted)

What may be argued as being parallel to this concept of guardianship is the principle of human stewardship over the environment in a citizen suit under the Rules
of Procedure for Environmental Cases. A citizen suit allows any Filipino to act as a representative of a party who has enforceable rights under environmental laws
before Philippine courts, and is defined in Section 5: .

SEC. 5. Citizen suit. - Any Filipino citizen in representation of others, including minors or generations yet unborn, may file an action to enforce rights or obligations
under environmental laws. Upon the filing of a citizen suit, the court shall issue an order which shall contain a brief description of the cause of action and the reliefs
prayed for, requiring all interested parties to manifest their interest to intervene in the case within fifteen (15) days from notice thereof. The plaintiff may publish the
order once in a newspaper of a general circulation in the Philippines or furnish all affected barangays copies of said order.

There is no valid reason in law or the practical requirements of this case to implead and feign representation on behalf of animals. To have done so betrays a very
anthropocentric view of environmental advocacy. There is no way that we, humans, can claim to speak for animals let alone present that they would wish to use
our court system, which is designed to ensure that humans seriously carry their responsibility including ensuring a viable ecology for themselves, which of course
includes compassion for all living things.

Our rules on standing are sufficient and need not be further relaxed.
In Arigo v. Swift,19 I posed the possibility of further reviewing the broad interpretation we have given to the rule on standing. While representatives are not required
to establish direct injury on their part, they should only be allowed to represent after complying with the following: [I]t is imperative for them to indicate with certainty
the injured parties on whose behalf they bring the suit. Furthermore, the interest of those they represent must be based upon concrete legal rights. It is not
sufficient to draw out a perceived interest from a general, nebulous idea of a potential "injury."20

I reiterate my position in Arigo v. Swift and in Paje v. Casiño21 regarding this rule alongside the appreciation of legal standing in Oposa v. Factoran22 for
environmental cases. In Arigo, I opined that procedural liberality, especially in cases brought by representatives, should be used with great caution:

Perhaps it is time to revisit the ruling in Oposa v. Factoran.

That case was significant in that, at that time, there was need to call attention to environmental concerns in light of emerging international legal principles. While
"intergenerational responsibility" is a noble principle, it should not be used to obtain judgments that would preclude future generations from making their own
assessment based on their actual concerns. The present generation must restrain itself from assuming that it can speak best for those who will exist at a different
time, under a different set of circumstances. In essence, the unbridled resort to representative suit will inevitably result in preventing future generations from
protecting their own rights and pursuing their own interests and decisions. It reduces the autonomy of our children and our children 's children. Even before they
are born, we again restricted their ability to make their own arguments.

It is my opinion that, at best, the use of the Oposa doctrine in environmental cases should be allowed only when a) there is a clear legal basis for the
representative suit; b) there are actual concerns based squarely upon an existing legal right; c) there is no possibility of any countervailing interests existing within
the population represented or those that are yet to be born; and d) there is an absolute necessity for such standing because there is a threat of catastrophe so
imminent that an immediate protective measure is necessary. Better still, in the light of its costs and risks, we abandon the precedent all together.23 (Emphasis in
the original)

Similarly, in Paje:

A person cannot invoke the court's jurisdiction if he or she has no right or interest to protect. He or she who invokes the court's jurisdiction must be the "owner of
the right sought to be enforced." In other words, he or she must have a cause of action. An action may be dismissed on the ground of lack of cause of action if the
person who instituted it is not the real party in interest.24 The term "interest" under the Rules of Court must refer to a material interest that is not merely a curiosity
about or an "interest in the question involved." The interest must be present and substantial. It is not a mere expectancy or a future, contingent interest.

A person who is not a real party in interest may institute an action if he or she is suing as representative of a .real party in interest. When an action is prosecuted or
defended by a representative, that representative is not and does not become the real party in interest. The person represented is deemed the real party in
interest. The representative remains to be a third party to the action instituted on behalf of another.

....

To sue under this rule, two elements must be present: "(a) the suit is brought on behalf of an identified party whose right has been violated, resulting in some form
of damage, and (b) the representative authorized by law or the Rules of Court to represent the victim."

The Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases allows filing of a citizen's suit. A citizen's suit under this rule allows any Filipino citizen to file an action for the
enforcement of environmental law on behalf of minors or generations yet unborn. It is essentially a representative suit that allows persons who are not real parties
in interest to institute actions on behalf of the real party in interest.

The expansion of what constitutes "real party in interest" to include minors and generations yet unborn is a recognition of this court's ruling in Oposa v. Factoran.
This court recognized the capacity of minors (represented by their parents) to file a class suit on behalf of succeeding generations based on the concept of
intergenerational responsibility to ensure the future generation's access to and enjoyment of [the] country's natural resources.

To allow citizen's suits to enforce environmental rights of others, including future generations, is dangerous for three reasons:

First, they run the risk of foreclosing arguments of others who are unable to take part in the suit, putting into. question its representativeness. Second, varying
interests may potentially result in arguments that are bordering on political issues, the resolutions of which do not fall upon this court. Third, automatically allowing
a class or citizen's suit on behalf of minors and generations yet unborn may result in the oversimplification of what may be a complex issue, especially in light of
the impossibility of determining future generation's true interests on the matter.

In citizen's suits, persons who may have no interest in the case may file suits for others. Uninterested persons will argue for the persons they represent, and the
court will decide based on their evidence and arguments. Any decision by the court will be binding upon the beneficiaries, which in this case are the minors and the
future generations. The court's decision will be res judicata upon them and conclusive upon the issues presented. 25

The danger in invoking Oposa v. Factoran to justify all kinds of environmental claims lies in its potential to diminish the value of legitimate environmental rights.
Extending the application of "real party in interest" to the Resident Marine Mammals, or animals in general, through a judicial pronouncement will potentially result
in allowing petitions based on mere concern rather than an actual enforcement of a right. It is impossible for animals to tell humans what their concerns are. At
best, humans can only surmise the extent of injury inflicted, if there be any. Petitions invoking a right and seeking legal redress before this court cannot be a
product of guesswork, and representatives have the responsibility to ensure that they bring "reasonably cogent, rational, scientific, well-founded arguments"26 on
behalf of those they represent.

Creative approaches to fundamental problems should be welcome. However, they should be considered carefully so that no unintended or unwarranted
consequences should follow. I concur with the approach of Madame Justice Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro in her brilliant ponencia as it carefully narrows down
the doctrine in terms of standing. Resident Marine Mammals and the human petitioners have no legal standing to file any kind of petition.

However, I agree that petitioners in G.R. No. 181527, namely, Central Visayas Fisherfolk Development Center,. Engarcial, Yanong, and Labid, have standing both
as real parties in interest and as representatives of subsistence fisherfolks of the Municipalities of Aloguinsan and Pinamungahan, Cebu, and their families, and
the present and future generations of Filipinos whose rights are similarly affected. The activities undertaken under Service Contract 46 (SC-46) directly affected
their source of livelihood, primarily felt through the significant reduction of their fish harvest. 27 The actual, direct, and material damage they suffered, which has
potential long-term effects transcending generations, is a proper subject of a legal suit.

III

In our jurisdiction, there is neither reason nor any legal basis for the concept of implied petitioners, most especially when the implied petitioner was a sitting
President of the Republic of the Philippines. In G.R. No. 180771, apart from adjudicating unto themselves the status of "legal guardians" of whales, dolphins,
porpoises, and other cetacean species, human petitioners also impleaded Former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as "unwilling co-petitioner" for "her express
declaration and undertaking in the ASEAN Charter to protect Tañon Strait."28

No person may implead any other person as a co-plaintiff or co-petitioner without his or her consent. In our jurisdiction, only when there is a party that should have
been a necessary party but was unwilling to join would there be an allegation as to why that party has been omitted. In Rule 3, Section 9 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure:

SEC. 9. Non-joinder of necessary parties to be pleaded. -Whenever in any pleading in which a claim is asserted a necessary party is not joined, the pleader shall
set forth his name, if known, and shall state why he is omitted. Should the court find the reason for the omission unmeritorious, it may order the inclusion of the
omitted necessary party if jurisdiction over his person may be obtained.

The failure to comply with the order for his inclusion, without justifiable cause, shall be deemed a waiver of the claim against such party.

The non-inclusion of a necessary party does not prevent the court from proceeding in the action, and the judgment rendered therein shall be without prejudice to
the rights of such necessary party.29

A party who should have been a plaintiff or petitioner but whose consent cannot be obtained should be impleaded as a defendant in the nature of an unwilling co-
plaintiff under Rule 3, Section 10 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure:

SEC. 10. Unwilling co-plaintiff. - If the consent of any party who should be joined as plaintiff can not be obtained, he may be made a defendant and the reason
therefor shall be stated in the complaint.30

The reason for this rule is plain: Indispensable party plaintiffs who should be part of the action but who do not consent should be put within the jurisdiction of the
court through summons or other court processes. Petitioners. should not take it upon themselves to simply imp lead any party who does not consent as a
petitioner. This places the unwilling co-petitioner at the risk of being denied due process.

Besides, Former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo cannot be a party to this suit. As a co-equal constitutional department, we cannot assume that the President
needs to enforce policy directions by suing his or her alter-egos. The procedural situation caused by petitioners may have gained public attention, but its legal
absurdity borders on the contemptuous. The Former President's name should be stricken out of the title of this case.

IV

I also concur with the conclusion that SC-46 is both. illegal and unconstitutional.

SC-46 is illegal because it violates Republic Act No. ·7586 or the National Integrated Protected Areas System Act of 1992, and Presidential Decree No.
1234,31 which declared Tañon Strait as a protected seascape. It is unconstitutional because it violates the fourth paragraph of Article XII, Section 2 of the
Constitution.

Petitioner Central Visayas Fisherfolk Development Center asserts that SC-46 violated Article XII, Section 2, paragraph 1 of the .1987 Constitution because Japan
Petroleum Exploration Co., Ltd. (JAPEX) is 100% Japanese-owned.32 It further asserts that SC-46 cannot be validly classified as a technical and financial
assistance agreement executed under Article XII, Section 2, paragraph 4 of the 1987 Constitution.33 Public respondents counter that SC-46 does not fall under the
coverage of paragraph 1, but is a validly executed contract under paragraph 4.34· Public respondents further aver that SC-46 neither granted exclusive fishing
rights to JAPEX nor violated Central Visayas Fisherfolk Development Center's right to preferential use of communal marine and fishing resources.35

VI

Article XII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution states:

Section 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber,
wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the State. With the exception. of agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not be
alienated. The exploration, development, and utilization of natural resources shall be under the full control and supervision of the State. The State may directly
undertake such activities, or it may enter into co-production, joint venture, or production-sharing agreements with Filipino citizens, or corporations or associations
at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens. Such agreements may be for a period not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not
more than twenty-five years, and under such terms and conditions as may be provided by law. In cases of water rights for irrigation, water supply fisheries, or
industrial uses other than the development of water power, beneficial use may be the measure and limit of the grant.

The State shall protect the nation's marine wealth in its archipelagic waters, territorial sea, and exclusive economic zone, and reserve its use and enjoyment
exclusively to Filipino citizens.

The Congress may, by law, allow small-scale utilization of natural resources by Filipino citizens, as well as cooperative fish farming, with priority to subsistence
fishermen and fish-workers in rivers, lakes, bays, and lagoons.
The President may enter into agreements with foreign-owned corporations involving either technical or financial assistance for large-scale exploration,
development, and utilization of minerals, petroleum, and other mineral oils according to the general terms and conditions provided by law, based on real
contributions to the economic growth and general welfare of the country. In such agreements, the State shall promote the development and use of local scientific
and technical resources.

The President shall notify the Congress of every contract entered into in accordance with this provision, within thirty days from its execution. (Emphasis supplied)

I agree that fully foreign-owned corporations may participate in the exploration, development, and use of natural resources, but only through either financial
agreements or technical ones. This is the clear import of the words "either financial or technical assistance agreements." This is also

the clear result if we compare the 1987 constitutional provision with the versions in the 1973 and 1935 Constitution:

1973 CONSTITUTION

ARTICLE XIV
THE NATIONAL ECONOMY AND THE PATRIMONY OF THE NATION

SEC. 9. The disposition, exploration, development, of exploitation, or utilization of any of the natural resources of the Philippines shall be limited to citizens of the
Philippines, or to corporations or association at least sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned by such citizens. The Batasang Pambansa, in the national
interest, may allow such citizens, corporations, or associations to enter into service contracts for financial, technical, management, or other forms of assistance
with any foreign person or entity for the exploitation, development, exploitation, or utilization of any of the natural resources. Existing valid and binding service
contracts for financial, the technical, management, or other forms of assistance are hereby recognized as such. (Emphasis supplied)

1935 CONSTITUTION

ARTICLE XIII
CONSERVATION AND UTILIZATION OF NATURAL RESOURCES

SECTION 1. All agricultural timber, and mineral. lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy,
and other natural resources of the Philippines belong to the State, and their disposition, exploitation, development, or utilization shall be limited to citizens of the
Philippines, or to corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned by such citizens, subject to any existing right, grant, lease,
or concession at the time of the inauguration of the Government established under this Constitution. Natural resources, with the exception of public agricultural
land, shall not be alienated, and no license, concession, or lease for the exploitation, development, or utilization of any of the natural resources shall be granted for
a period exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for another twenty-five years, except as to water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses
other than the development of water power, in which cases beneficial use may be the measure and the limit of the grant.

The clear text of the Constitution in light of its history prevails over any attempt to infer interpretation from the Constitutional Commission deliberations. The
constitutional texts are the product of a full sovereign act: deliberations in a constituent assembly and ratification. Reliance on recorded discussion of Constitutional
Commissions, on the other hand, may result in dependence on incomplete authorship; Besides, it opens judicial review to further subjectivity from those who
spoke during the Constitutional Commission deliberations who may not have predicted how their words will be used. It is safer that we use the words already in the
Constitution. The Constitution was their product. Its words were read by those who ratified it. The Constitution is what society relies upon even at present.

SC-46 is neither a financial assistance nor a technical assistance agreement.

Even supposing for the sake of argument that it is, it could not be declared valid in light of the standards set forth in La Bugal-B'laan Tribal Association, Inc. v.
Ramos:36

Such service contracts may be entered into only with respect to minerals, petroleum and other mineral oils. The grant thereof is subject to several safeguards,
among which are these requirements:

(1) The service contract shall be crafted m accordance with a general law that will set standard or uniform terms, conditions and requirements,
presumably to attain a certain uniformity in provisions and avoid the possible insertion of terms disadvantageous to the country.

(2) The President shall be the signatory for the government because, supposedly before an agreement is presented to the President for signature, it will
have been vetted several times over at different levels to ensure that it conforms to law and can withstand public scrutiny.

(3) Within thirty days of the executed agreement, the President shall report it to Congress to give that branch of government an opportunity to look over
the agreement and interpose timely objections, if any.37 (Emphasis in the original, citation omitted)

Based on the standards pronounced in La Bugal, SC-46' S validity must be tested against three important points: (a) whether SC-46 was crafted in accordance
with a general law that provides standards, terms, and conditions; (b) whether SC-46 was signed by the President for and on behalf of the government; and (c)
whether it was reported by the President to Congress within 30 days of execution.

VII

The general law referred to as a possible basis for SC-46's validity is Presidential Decree No. 87 or the Oil Exploration and Development Act of 1972.1âwphi1 It is
my opinion that this law is unconstitutional in that it allows service contracts, contrary to Article XII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution:

The President may enter into agreements with foreign-owned corporations involving either technical or financial assistance for large-scale exploration,
development, and utilization of minerals, petroleum, and other mineral oils according to the general terms and conditions provided by law, based on real
contributions to the economic growth and general welfare of the country. In such agreements, the State shall promote the development and use of local scientific
and technical resources. (Emphasis supplied)

The deletion of service contracts from the enumeration of the kind of agreements the President may enter into with foreign-owned corporations for exploration and
utilization of resources means that service contracts are no longer allowed by the Constitution. Pursuant to Article XVIII, Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution,38 this
inconsistency renders the law invalid and ineffective.

SC-46 suffers from the lack of a special law allowing its activities. The Main Opinion emphasizes an important point, which is that SC-46 did not merely involve
exploratory activities, but also provided the rights and obligations of the parties should it be discovered that there is oil in commercial quantities in the area. The
Tañon Strait being a protected seascape under Presidential Decree No. 123439 requires that the exploitation and utilization of energy resources from that area are
explicitly covered by a law passed by Congress specifically for that purpose, pursuant to Section 14 of Republic Act No. 7586 or the National Integrated Protected
Areas System Act of 1992:

SEC. 14. Survey for Energy R6'sources. - Consistent with the policies declared in Section 2, hereof, protected areas, except strict nature reserves and natural
parks, may be subjected to exploration only for the purpose of gathering information on energy resources and only if such activity is carried out with the least
damage to surrounding areas. Surveys shall be conducted only in accordance with a program approved by the DENR, and the result of such surveys shall be
made available to the public and submitted to the President for recommendation to Congress. Any exploitation and utilization of energy resources found within NIP
AS areas shall be allowed only through a law passed by Congress.40 (Emphasis supplied)

No law was passed by Congress specifically providing the standards, terms, and conditions of an oil exploration, extraction, and/or utilization for Tañon Strait and,
therefore, no such activities could have been validly undertaken under SC-46. The National Integrated Protected Areas System Act of 1992 is clear that
exploitation and utilization of energy resources in a protected seascape such as Tañon Strait shall only be allowed through a specific law.

VIII

Former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo was not the signatory to SC-46, contrary to the requirement set by paragraph 4 of Article XII, Section 2 for service
contracts involving the exploration of petroleum. SC-46 was entered into by then Department of Energy Secretary Vicente S. Perez, Jr., on behalf of the
government. I agree with the Main Opinion that in cases where the Constitution or law requires the President to act personally on the matter, the duty cannot be
delegated to another public official.41 La Bugal highlights the importance of the President's involvement, being one of the constitutional safeguards against abuse
and corruption, as not mere formality:

At this point, we sum up the matters established, based on a careful reading of the ConCom deliberations, as follows:

• In their deliberations on what was to become paragraph 4, the framers used the term service contracts in referring to agreements x x x involving either
technical or financial assistance. • They spoke of service contracts as the concept was understood in the 1973 Constitution.

• It was obvious from their discussions that they were not about to ban or eradicate service contracts.

• Instead, they were plainly crafting provisions to. put in place safeguards that would eliminate or m minimize the abuses prevalent during the marital
law regime.42 (Emphasis in the original)

Public respondents failed to show that. Former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo was involved in the signing or execution of SC-46. The failure to comply with
this constitutional requirement renders SC-46 null and void.

IX

Public respondents also failed to show that Congress was subsequently informed of the execution and existence of SC-46. The reporting requirement is an equally
important requisite to the validity of any service contract involving the exploration, development, and utilization of Philippine petroleum. Public respondents' failure
to report to Congress about SC-46 effectively took away any opportunity for the legislative branch to scrutinize its terms and conditions.

In sum, SC-46 was executed and implemented absent all the requirements provided under paragraph 4 of Article XII, Section 2. It is, therefore, null and void.

I am of the view that SC-46, aside from not having complied with the 1987 Constitution, is also null and void for being violative of environmental laws protecting
Tañon Strait. In particular, SC-46 was implemented despite falling short of the requirements of the National Integrated Protected Areas System Act of 1992.

As a protected seascape under Presidential Decree No. 1234,43 Tañon Strait is covered by the National Integrated Protected Areas System Act of 1992. This law
declares as a matter of policy:

SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. Cognizant of the profound impact of man's activities on all components of the natural environment particularly the effect of
increasing population, resource exploitation and industrial advancement and recognizing the critical importance of protecting and maintaining the natural biological
and physical diversities of the environment notably on areas with biologically unique features to sustain human life and development, as well as plant and animal
life, it is hereby declared the policy of the State to secure for the Filipino people of present and future generations the perpetual existence of all native plants and
animals through the establishment of a comprehensive system of integrated protected areas within the classification of national park as provided for in the
Constitution.

It is hereby recognized that these areas, although distinct in features, possess common ecological values that may be incorporated into a holistic plan
representative of our natural heritage; that effective administration of these areas is possible only through cooperation among national government, local and
concerned private organizations; that the use and enjoyment of these protected areas must be consistent with the principles of biological diversity and sustainable
development.
To this end, there is hereby established a National Integrated Protected Areas System (NIPAS), which shall encompass outstanding remarkable areas and
biologically important public lands that are habitats of rare and endangered species of plants and animals, biogeographic zones and related ecosystems, whether
terrestrial, wetland or marine, all of which shall be designated as "protected areas."44 (Emphasis supplied)

Pursuant to this law, any proposed activity in Tañon Strait must undergo an Environmental Impact Assessment:

SEC. 12. Environmental Impact Assessment. - Proposals for activities which are outside the scope of the management plan for protected areas shall be subject to
an environmental impact assessment as required by law before they are adopted, and the results thereof shall be taken into consideration in the decision-making
process.45(Emphasis supplied)

The same provision further requires that an Environmental Compliance Certificate be secured under the Philippine Environmental Impact Assessment System
before arty project is implemented:

No actual implementation of such activities shall be allowed without the required Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC) under the Philippine Environment
Impact Assessment (EIA) system. In instances where such activities are allowed to be undertaken, the proponent shall plan and carry them out in such manner as
will minimize any adverse effects and take preventive and remedial action when appropriate. The proponent shall be liable for any damage due to lack of caution
or indiscretion.46 (Emphasis supplied)

In projects involving the exploration or utilization of energy resources, the National Integrated Protected Areas System Act of 1992 additionally requires that a
program be approved by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, which shall be publicly accessible. The program shall also be submitted to the
President, who in turn will recommend the program to Congress. Furthermore, Congress must enact a law specifically allowing the exploitation of energy
resources found within a protected area such as Tañon Strait:

SEC. 14. Survey for Energy Resources. - Consistent with the policies declared in Section 2, hereof, protected areas, except strict nature reserves and natural
parks, may be subjected to exploration only for the purpose of gathering information on energy resources and only if such activity is carried out with the least
damage to surrounding areas. Surveys shall be conducted only in accordance with a program approved by the DENR, and the result of such surveys shall be
made available to the public and submitted to the President for recommendation to Congress. Any exploitation and utilization of energy resources found within
NIPAS areas shall be allowed only through a taw passed by Congress.47 (Emphasis supplied)

Public respondents argue that SC-46 complied with the procedural requirements of obtaining an Environmental Compliance Certificate. 48 At any rate, they assert
that the activities covered by SC-46 fell under Section 14 of the National Integrated Protected Areas System Act of 1992, which they interpret to be an exception to
Section 12. They argue that the Environmental Compliance Certificate is not a strict requirement for the validity of SC-46 since (a) the Tañon Strait is not a nature'
reserve or natural park; (b) the exploration was merely for gathering information; and ( c) measures were in place to ensure that the exploration caused the least
possible damage to the area.49

Section 14 is not an exception to Section 12, but instead provides additional requirements for cases involving Philippine energy resources. The National Integrated
Protected Areas System Act of 1992 was enacted to recognize the importance of protecting the environment in light of resource exploitation, among
others.50 Systems are put in place to secure for Filipinos local resources under the most favorable conditions. With the status of Tañon Strait as a protected
seascape, the institution of additional legal safeguards is even more significant.

Public respondents did not validly obtain an Environmental Compliance Certificate for SC-46. Based on the records, JAPEX commissioned an environmental
impact evaluation only in the second subphase of its project, with the Environmental Management .Bureau of Region

VII granting the project an Environmental Compliance Certificate on March 6, 2007. 51

Despite its scale, the seismic surveys from May 9 to 18, 2005 were conducted without any environmental assessment contrary to Section 12 of the National
Integrated Protected Areas System Act of 1992.

XI

Finally, we honor every living creature when we take care of our environment. As sentient species, we do not lack in the wisdom or sensitivity to realize that we
only borrow the resources that we use to survive and to thrive. We are not incapable of mitigating the greed that is slowly causing the demise of our planet. Thus,
there is no need for us to feign representation of any other species or some imagined unborn generation in filing any action in our courts of law to claim any of our
fundamental rights to a healthful ecology. In this way and with candor and courage, we fully shoulder the responsibility deserving of the grace and power endowed
on our species.

ACCORDINGLY, I vote:

(a) to DISMISS G.R. No. 180771 for lack of standing and STRIKE OUT the name of Former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo from the title of this
case;

(b) to GRANT G.R. No. 181527; and

(c) to DECLARE SERVICE CONTRACT 46 NULL AND VOID for violating the 1987 Constitution, Republic Act No. 7586, and Presidential Decree No.
1234.

MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN

Associate Justice
METROPOLITAN MANILA G.R. Nos. 171947-48
DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY,
DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT
AND NATURAL RESOURCES, Present:
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION,
CULTURE AND SPORTS,[1] PUNO, C.J.,
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, QUISUMBING,
DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, YNARES-SANTIAGO,
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC CARPIO,
WORKS AND HIGHWAYS, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND CORONA,
MANAGEMENT, PHILIPPINE CARPIO MORALES,
COAST GUARD, PHILIPPINE AZCUNA,
NATIONAL POLICE MARITIME TINGA,
GROUP, and DEPARTMENT OF CHICO-NAZARIO,
THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL VELASCO, JR.,
GOVERNMENT, NACHURA,
Petitioners, REYES,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, and
- versus - BRION, JJ.
CONCERNED RESIDENTS OF
MANILA BAY, represented and
joined by DIVINA V. ILAS,
SABINIANO ALBARRACIN,
MANUEL SANTOS, JR., DINAH
DELA PEA, PAUL DENNIS
QUINTERO, MA. VICTORIA
LLENOS, DONNA CALOZA,
FATIMA QUITAIN, VENICE
SEGARRA, FRITZIE TANGKIA,
SARAH JOELLE LINTAG,
HANNIBAL AUGUSTUS BOBIS,
FELIMON SANTIAGUEL, and Promulgated:
JAIME AGUSTIN R. OPOSA,
Respondents. December 18, 2008
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

VELASCO, JR., J.:

The need to address environmental pollution, as a cause of climate change, has of late gained the attention of the international community. Media have finally trained

their sights on the ill effects of pollution, the destruction of forests and other critical habitats, oil spills, and the unabated improper disposal of garbage. And rightly so, for the

magnitude of environmental destruction is now on a scale few ever foresaw and the wound no longer simply heals by itself. [2] But amidst hard evidence and clear signs of a climate

crisis that need bold action, the voice of cynicism, naysayers, and procrastinators can still be heard.

This case turns on government agencies and their officers who, by the nature of their respective offices or by direct statutory command, are tasked to protect and preserve,

at the first instance, our internal waters, rivers, shores, and seas polluted by human activities. To most of these agencies and their official complement, the pollution menace does not

seem to carry the high national priority it deserves, if their track records are to be the norm. Their cavalier attitude towards solving, if not mitigating, the environmental pollution

problem, is a sad commentary on bureaucratic efficiency and commitment.

At the core of the case is the Manila Bay, a place with a proud historic past, once brimming with marine life and, for so many decades in the past, a spot for different

contact recreation activities, but now a dirty and slowly dying expanse mainly because of the abject official indifference of people and institutions that could have otherwise made a

difference.

This case started when, on January 29, 1999, respondents Concerned Residents of Manila Bay filed a complaint before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Imus, Cavite

against several government agencies, among them the petitioners, for the cleanup, rehabilitation, and protection of the Manila Bay. Raffled to Branch 20 and docketed as Civil Case

No. 1851-99 of the RTC, the complaint alleged that the water quality of the Manila Bay had fallen way below the allowable standards set by law, specifically Presidential Decree

No. (PD) 1152 or the Philippine Environment Code. This environmental aberration, the complaint stated, stemmed from:
 x x x [The] reckless, wholesale, accumulated and ongoing acts of omission or commission [of the defendants] resulting in the clear and present danger to
public health and in the depletion and contamination of the marine life of Manila Bay, [for which reason] ALL defendants must be held jointly and/or
solidarily liable and be collectively ordered to clean up Manila Bay and to restore its water quality to class B waters fit for swimming, skin-diving, and other
forms of contact recreation.[3]

In their individual causes of action, respondents alleged that the continued neglect of petitioners in abating the pollution of the Manila Bay constitutes a violation of,

among others:

(1) Respondents constitutional right to life, health, and a balanced ecology;

(2) The Environment Code (PD 1152);
(3) The Pollution Control Law (PD 984);
(4) The Water Code (PD 1067);
(5) The Sanitation Code (PD 856);
(6) The Illegal Disposal of Wastes Decree (PD 825);
(7) The Marine Pollution Law (PD 979);
(8) Executive Order No. 192;
(9) The Toxic and Hazardous Wastes Law (Republic Act No. 6969);
(10) Civil Code provisions on nuisance and human relations;
(11) The Trust Doctrine and the Principle of Guardianship; and
(12) International Law

Inter alia, respondents, as plaintiffs a quo, prayed that petitioners be ordered to clean the Manila Bay and submit to the RTC a concerted concrete plan of action for the

purpose.

The trial of the case started off with a hearing at the Manila Yacht Club followed by an ocular inspection of the Manila Bay. Renato T. Cruz, the Chief of the Water

Quality Management Section, Environmental Management Bureau, Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), testifying for petitioners, stated that water samples

collected from different beaches around the Manila Bay showed that the amount of fecal coliform content ranged from 50,000 to 80,000 most probable number (MPN)/ml when

what DENR Administrative Order No. 34-90 prescribed as a safe level for bathing and other forms of contact recreational activities, or the SB level, is one not exceeding 200

MPN/100 ml.[4]

Rebecca de Vera, for Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System (MWSS) and in behalf of other petitioners, testified about the MWSS efforts to reduce pollution

along the ManilaBay through the Manila Second Sewerage Project. For its part, the Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) presented, as part of its evidence, its memorandum circulars on

the study being conducted on ship-generated waste treatment and disposal, and its Linis Dagat (Clean the Ocean) project for the cleaning of wastes accumulated or washed to shore.

The RTC Ordered Petitioners to Clean Up and Rehabilitate Manila Bay

On September 13, 2002, the RTC rendered a Decision[5] in favor of respondents. The dispositive portion reads:

WHEREFORE, finding merit in the complaint, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the abovenamed defendant-government agencies, jointly and solidarily,
to clean up and rehabilitate Manila Bay and restore its waters to SB classification to make it fit for swimming, skin-diving and other forms of contact
recreation. To attain this, defendant-agencies, with defendant DENR as the lead agency, are directed, within six (6) months from receipt hereof, to act and
perform their respective duties by devising a consolidated, coordinated and concerted scheme of action for the rehabilitation and restoration of the bay.
In particular:

Defendant MWSS is directed to install, operate and maintain adequate [sewerage] treatment facilities in strategic places under its jurisdiction and increase
their capacities.

Defendant LWUA, to see to it that the water districts under its wings, provide, construct and operate sewage facilities for the proper disposal of waste.

Defendant DENR, which is the lead agency in cleaning up Manila Bay, to install, operate and maintain waste facilities to rid the bay of toxic and hazardous
substances.

Defendant PPA, to prevent and also to treat the discharge not only of ship-generated wastes but also of other solid and liquid wastes from docking vessels
that contribute to the pollution of the bay.

Defendant MMDA, to establish, operate and maintain an adequate and appropriate sanitary landfill and/or adequate solid waste and liquid disposal as well
as other alternative garbage disposal system such as re-use or recycling of wastes.

Defendant DA, through the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources, to revitalize the marine life in Manila Bay and restock its waters with indigenous
fish and other aquatic animals.
 Defendant DBM, to provide and set aside an adequate budget solely for the purpose of cleaning up and rehabilitation of Manila Bay.

Defendant DPWH, to remove and demolish structures and other nuisances that obstruct the free flow of waters to the bay. These nuisances discharge solid
and liquid wastes which eventually end up in Manila Bay. As the construction and engineering arm of the government, DPWH is ordered to actively
participate in removing debris, such as carcass of sunken vessels, and other non-biodegradable garbage in the bay.

Defendant DOH, to closely supervise and monitor the operations of septic and sludge companies and require them to have proper facilities for the treatment
and disposal of fecal sludge and sewage coming from septic tanks.

Defendant DECS, to inculcate in the minds and hearts of the people through education the importance of preserving and protecting the environment.

Defendant Philippine Coast Guard and the PNP Maritime Group, to protect at all costs the Manila Bay from all forms of illegal fishing.

No pronouncement as to damages and costs.

SO ORDERED.

The MWSS, Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA), and PPA filed before the Court of Appeals (CA) individual Notices of Appeal which were eventually consolidated and

docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 76528.

On the other hand, the DENR, Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH), Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA), Philippine Coast Guard

(PCG), Philippine National Police (PNP) Maritime Group, and five other executive departments and agencies filed directly with this Court a petition for review under Rule 45. The

Court, in a Resolution of December 9, 2002, sent the said petition to the CA for consolidation with the consolidated appeals of MWSS, LWUA, and PPA, docketed as CA-G.R. SP

No. 74944.

Petitioners, before the CA, were one in arguing in the main that the pertinent provisions of the Environment Code (PD 1152) relate only to the cleaning of specific

pollution incidents and do not cover cleaning in general. And apart from raising concerns about the lack of funds appropriated for cleaning purposes, petitioners also asserted that

the cleaning of the Manila Bayis not a ministerial act which can be compelled by mandamus.

The CA Sustained the RTC

By a Decision[6] of September 28, 2005, the CA denied petitioners appeal and affirmed the Decision of the RTC in toto, stressing that the trial courts decision did not

require petitioners to do tasks outside of their usual basic functions under existing laws.[7]

Petitioners are now before this Court praying for the allowance of their Rule 45 petition on the following ground and supporting arguments:
THE [CA] DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE NOT HERETOFORE PASSED UPON BY THE HONORABLE COURT, I.E., IT
AFFIRMED THE TRIAL COURTS DECISION DECLARING THAT SECTION 20 OF [PD] 1152 REQUIRES CONCERNED GOVERNMENT
AGENCIES TO REMOVE ALL POLLUTANTS SPILLED AND DISCHARGED IN THE WATER SUCH AS FECAL COLIFORMS.

ARGUMENTS

I
[SECTIONS] 17 AND 20 OF [PD] 1152 RELATE ONLY TO THE CLEANING OF SPECIFIC POLLUTION INCIDENTS AND [DO] NOT
COVER CLEANING IN GENERAL

II
THE CLEANING OR REHABILITATION OF THE MANILA BAY IS NOT A MINISTERIAL ACT OF PETITIONERS THAT CAN BE
COMPELLED BY MANDAMUS.

The issues before us are two-fold. First, do Sections 17 and 20 of PD 1152 under the headings, Upgrading of Water Quality and Clean-up Operations, envisage a cleanup

in general or are they limited only to the cleanup of specific pollution incidents? And second, can petitioners be compelled by mandamus to clean up and rehabilitate the Manila Bay?

On August 12, 2008, the Court conducted and heard the parties on oral arguments.

Our Ruling

We shall first dwell on the propriety of the issuance of mandamus under the premises.
 The Cleaning or Rehabilitation of Manila Bay
Can be Compelled by Mandamus

Generally, the writ of mandamus lies to require the execution of a ministerial duty.[8] A ministerial duty is one that requires neither the exercise of official discretion nor judgment. [9] It

connotes an act in which nothing is left to the discretion of the person executing it. It is a simple, definite duty arising under conditions admitted or proved to exist and imposed by

law.[10]Mandamus is available to compel action, when refused, on matters involving discretion, but not to direct the exercise of judgment or discretion one way or the other.

Petitioners maintain that the MMDAs duty to take measures and maintain adequate solid waste and liquid disposal systems necessarily involves policy evaluation and

the exercise of judgment on the part of the agency concerned. They argue that the MMDA, in carrying out its mandate, has to make decisions, including choosing where a landfill

should be located by undertaking feasibility studies and cost estimates, all of which entail the exercise of discretion.

Respondents, on the other hand, counter that the statutory command is clear and that petitioners duty to comply with and act according to the clear mandate of the law

does not require the exercise of discretion. According to respondents, petitioners, the MMDA in particular, are without discretion, for example, to choose which bodies of water they

are to clean up, or which discharge or spill they are to contain. By the same token, respondents maintain that petitioners are bereft of discretion on whether or not to alleviate the

problem of solid and liquid waste disposal; in other words, it is the MMDAs ministerial duty to attend to such services.

We agree with respondents.

First off, we wish to state that petitioners obligation to perform their duties as defined by law, on one hand, and how they are to carry out such duties, on the other, are

two different concepts. While the implementation of the MMDAs mandated tasks may entail a decision-making process, the enforcement of the law or the very act of doing what the

law exacts to be done is ministerial in nature and may be compelled by mandamus. We said so in Social Justice Society v. Atienza[11] in which the Court directed the City of Manila to

enforce, as a matter of ministerial duty, its Ordinance No. 8027 directing the three big local oil players to cease and desist from operating their business in the so-called Pandacan

Terminals within six months from the effectivity of the ordinance. But to illustrate with respect to the instant case, the MMDAs duty to put up an adequate and appropriate sanitary

landfill and solid waste and liquid disposal as well as other alternative garbage disposal systems is ministerial, its duty being a statutory imposition. The MMDAs duty in this regard

is spelled out in Sec. 3(c) of Republic Act No. (RA) 7924 creating the MMDA. This section defines and delineates the scope of the MMDAs waste disposal services to include:

Solid waste disposal and management which include formulation and implementation of policies, standards, programs and projects for proper
and sanitary waste disposal. It shall likewise include the establishment and operation of sanitary land fill and related facilities and the implementation
of other alternative programs intended to reduce, reuse and recycle solid waste. (Emphasis added.)

The MMDA is duty-bound to comply with Sec. 41 of the Ecological Solid Waste Management Act (RA 9003) which prescribes the minimum criteria for the establishment

of sanitary landfills and Sec. 42 which provides the minimum operating requirements that each site operator shall maintain in the operation of a sanitary landfill. Complementing

Sec. 41 are Secs. 36 and 37 of RA 9003,[12] enjoining the MMDA and local government units, among others, after the effectivity of the law on February 15, 2001, from using and

operating open dumps for solid waste and disallowing, five years after such effectivity, the use of controlled dumps.

The MMDAs duty in the area of solid waste disposal, as may be noted, is set forth not only in the Environment Code (PD 1152) and RA 9003, but in its charter as well.

This duty of putting up a proper waste disposal system cannot be characterized as discretionary, for, as earlier stated, discretion presupposes the power or right given by law to public

functionaries to act officially according to their judgment or conscience.[13] A discretionary duty is one that allows a person to exercise judgment and choose to perform or not to

perform.[14] Any suggestion that the MMDA has the option whether or not to perform its solid waste disposal-related duties ought to be dismissed for want of legal basis.
A perusal of other petitioners respective charters or like enabling statutes and pertinent laws would yield this conclusion: these government agencies are enjoined, as a matter of

statutory obligation, to perform certain functions relating directly or indirectly to the cleanup, rehabilitation, protection, and preservation of the Manila Bay. They are precluded from

choosing not to perform these duties. Consider:

(1) The DENR, under Executive Order No. (EO) 192,[15] is the primary agency responsible for the conservation, management, development, and proper use of the countrys

environment and natural resources. Sec. 19 of the Philippine Clean Water Act of 2004 (RA 9275), on the other hand, designates the DENR as the primary government agency

responsible for its enforcement and implementation, more particularly over all aspects of water quality management. On water pollution, the DENR, under the Acts Sec. 19(k),

exercises jurisdiction over all aspects of water pollution, determine[s] its location, magnitude, extent, severity, causes and effects and other pertinent information on pollution, and

[takes] measures, using available methods and technologies, to prevent and abate such pollution.

The DENR, under RA 9275, is also tasked to prepare a National Water Quality Status Report, an Integrated Water Quality Management Framework, and a 10-year Water Quality

Management Area Action Plan which is nationwide in scope covering the Manila Bay and adjoining areas. Sec. 19 of RA 9275 provides:

Sec. 19 Lead Agency.The [DENR] shall be the primary government agency responsible for the implementation and enforcement of this Act x x x unless
otherwise provided herein. As such, it shall have the following functions, powers and responsibilities:
a) Prepare a National Water Quality Status report within twenty-four (24) months from the effectivity of this Act: Provided, That the Department shall
thereafter review or revise and publish annually, or as the need arises, said report;

b) Prepare an Integrated Water Quality Management Framework within twelve (12) months following the completion of the status report;

c) Prepare a ten (10) year Water Quality Management Area Action Plan within 12 months following the completion of the framework for each designated
water management area. Such action plan shall be reviewed by the water quality management area governing board every five (5) years or as need
arises.

The DENR has prepared the status report for the period 2001 to 2005 and is in the process of completing the preparation of the Integrated Water Quality Management

Framework.[16] Within twelve (12) months thereafter, it has to submit a final Water Quality Management Area Action Plan.[17] Again, like the MMDA, the DENR should be made

to accomplish the tasks assigned to it under RA 9275.

Parenthetically, during the oral arguments, the DENR Secretary manifested that the DENR, with the assistance of and in partnership with various government agencies and non-

government organizations, has completed, as of December 2005, the final draft of a comprehensive action plan with estimated budget and time frame, denominated as Operation

Plan for the Manila Bay Coastal Strategy, for the rehabilitation, restoration, and rehabilitation of the Manila Bay.

The completion of the said action plan and even the implementation of some of its phases should more than ever prod the concerned agencies to fast track what are assigned them

under existing laws.

(2) The MWSS, under Sec. 3 of RA 6234,[18] is vested with jurisdiction, supervision, and control over all waterworks and sewerage systems in the territory comprising

what is now the cities of Metro Manila and several towns of the provinces of Rizal and Cavite, and charged with the duty:
(g) To construct, maintain, and operate such sanitary sewerages as may be necessary for the proper sanitation and other uses of the cities and towns comprising
the System; x x x

(3) The LWUA under PD 198 has the power of supervision and control over local water districts. It can prescribe the minimum standards and regulations for the operations

of these districts and shall monitor and evaluate local water standards. The LWUA can direct these districts to construct, operate, and furnish facilities and services for the collection,

treatment, and disposal of sewerage, waste, and storm water. Additionally, under RA 9275, the LWUA, as attached agency of the DPWH, is tasked with providing sewerage and

sanitation facilities, inclusive of the setting up of efficient and safe collection, treatment, and sewage disposal system in the different parts of the country.[19] In relation to the instant

petition, the LWUA is mandated to provide sewerage and sanitation facilities in Laguna, Cavite, Bulacan, Pampanga, and Bataan to prevent pollution in the Manila Bay.

(4) The Department of Agriculture (DA), pursuant to the Administrative Code of 1987 (EO 292), [20] is designated as the agency tasked to promulgate and enforce all laws and

issuances respecting the conservation and proper utilization of agricultural and fishery resources. Furthermore, the DA, under the Philippine Fisheries Code of 1998 (RA 8550), is,

in coordination with local government units (LGUs) and other concerned sectors, in charge of establishing a monitoring, control, and surveillance system to ensure that fisheries and
aquatic resources in Philippine waters are judiciously utilized and managed on a sustainable basis. [21] Likewise under RA 9275, the DA is charged with coordinating with the PCG

and DENR for the enforcement of water quality standards in marine waters. [22] More specifically, its Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources (BFAR) under Sec. 22(c) of RA

9275 shall primarily be responsible for the prevention and control of water pollution for the development, management, and conservation of the fisheries and aquatic resources.

(5) The DPWH, as the engineering and construction arm of the national government, is tasked under EO 292[23] to provide integrated planning, design, and construction services for,

among others, flood control and water resource development systems in accordance with national development objectives and approved government plans and specifications.

In Metro Manila, however, the MMDA is authorized by Sec. 3(d), RA 7924 to perform metro-wide services relating to flood control and sewerage management which include the

formulation and implementation of policies, standards, programs and projects for an integrated flood control, drainage and sewerage system.

On July 9, 2002, a Memorandum of Agreement was entered into between the DPWH and MMDA, whereby MMDA was made the agency primarily responsible for flood control in

Metro Manila. For the rest of the country, DPWH shall remain as the implementing agency for flood control services. The mandate of the MMDA and DPWH on flood control and

drainage services shall include the removal of structures, constructions, and encroachments built along rivers, waterways, and esteros (drainages) in violation of RA 7279, PD 1067,

and other pertinent laws.

(6) The PCG, in accordance with Sec. 5(p) of PD 601, or the Revised Coast Guard Law of 1974, and Sec. 6 of PD 979,[24] or the Marine Pollution Decree of 1976, shall

have the primary responsibility of enforcing laws, rules, and regulations governing marine pollution within the territorial waters of the Philippines. It shall promulgate its own rules

and regulations in accordance with the national rules and policies set by the National Pollution Control Commission upon consultation with the latter for the effective implementation

and enforcement of PD 979. It shall, under Sec. 4 of the law, apprehend violators who:

a. discharge, dump x x x harmful substances from or out of any ship, vessel, barge, or any other floating craft, or other man-made structures at sea, by any
method, means or manner, into or upon the territorial and inland navigable waters of the Philippines;

b. throw, discharge or deposit, dump, or cause, suffer or procure to be thrown, discharged, or deposited either from or out of any ship, barge, or other floating
craft or vessel of any kind, or from the shore, wharf, manufacturing establishment, or mill of any kind, any refuse matter of any kind or description whatever
other than that flowing from streets and sewers and passing therefrom in a liquid state into tributary of any navigable water from which the same shall float
or be washed into such navigable water; and

c. deposit x x x material of any kind in any place on the bank of any navigable water or on the bank of any tributary of any navigable water, where the same
shall be liable to be washed into such navigable water, either by ordinary or high tides, or by storms or floods, or otherwise, whereby navigation shall or may
be impeded or obstructed or increase the level of pollution of such water.

(7) When RA 6975 or the Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG) Act of 1990 was signed into law on December 13, 1990, the PNP Maritime Group

was tasked to perform all police functions over the Philippine territorial waters and rivers. Under Sec. 86, RA 6975, the police functions of the PCG shall be taken over by the PNP

when the latter acquires the capability to perform such functions. Since the PNP Maritime Group has not yet attained the capability to assume and perform the police functions of

PCG over marine pollution, the PCG and PNP Maritime Group shall coordinate with regard to the enforcement of laws, rules, and regulations governing marine pollution within the

territorial waters of the Philippines. This was made clear in Sec. 124, RA 8550 or the Philippine Fisheries Code of 1998, in which both the PCG and PNP Maritime Group were

authorized to enforce said law and other fishery laws, rules, and regulations. [25]

(8) In accordance with Sec. 2 of EO 513, the PPA is mandated to establish, develop, regulate, manage and operate a rationalized national port system in support of trade

and national development.[26] Moreover, Sec. 6-c of EO 513 states that the PPA has police authority within the

ports administered by it as may be necessary to carry out its powers and functions and attain its purposes and objectives, without prejudice to the exercise of
the functions of the Bureau of Customs and other law enforcement bodies within the area. Such police authority shall include the following:
xxxx

b) To regulate the entry to, exit from, and movement within the port, of persons and vehicles, as well as movement within the port of watercraft.[27]
 Lastly, as a member of the International Marine Organization and a signatory to the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, as amended by

MARPOL 73/78,[28] the Philippines, through the PPA, must ensure the provision of adequate reception facilities at ports and terminals for the reception of sewage from the ships

docking in Philippine ports. Thus, the PPA is tasked to adopt such measures as are necessary to prevent the discharge and dumping of solid and liquid wastes and other ship-generated

wastes into the Manila Baywaters from vessels docked at ports and apprehend the violators. When the vessels are not docked at ports but within Philippine territorial waters, it is the

PCG and PNP Maritime Group that have jurisdiction over said vessels.

(9) The MMDA, as earlier indicated, is duty-bound to put up and maintain adequate sanitary landfill and solid waste and liquid disposal system as well as other alternative garbage

disposal systems. It is primarily responsible for the implementation and enforcement of the provisions of RA 9003, which would necessary include its penal provisions, within its

area of jurisdiction.[29]

Among the prohibited acts under Sec. 48, Chapter VI of RA 9003 that are frequently violated are dumping of waste matters in public places, such as roads, canals or esteros, open

burning of solid waste, squatting in open dumps and landfills, open dumping, burying of biodegradable or non- biodegradable materials in flood-prone areas, establishment or

operation of open dumps as enjoined in RA 9003, and operation of waste management facilities without an environmental compliance certificate.

Under Sec. 28 of the Urban Development and Housing Act of 1992 (RA 7279), eviction or demolition may be allowed when persons or entities occupy danger areas such as esteros,

railroad tracks, garbage dumps, riverbanks, shorelines, waterways, and other public places such as sidewalks, roads, parks and playgrounds. The MMDA, as lead agency, in

coordination with the DPWH, LGUs, and concerned agencies, can dismantle and remove all structures, constructions, and other encroachments built in breach of RA 7279 and other

pertinent laws along the rivers, waterways, and esteros in Metro Manila. With respect to rivers, waterways, and esteros in Bulacan, Bataan, Pampanga, Cavite, and Laguna that

discharge wastewater directly or eventually into the Manila Bay, the DILG shall direct the concerned LGUs to implement the demolition and removal of such structures, constructions,

and other encroachments built in violation of RA 7279 and other applicable laws in coordination with the DPWH and concerned agencies.

(10) The Department of Health (DOH), under Article 76 of PD 1067 (the Water Code), is tasked to promulgate rules and regulations for the establishment of waste

disposal areas that affect the source of a water supply or a reservoir for domestic or municipal use. And under Sec. 8 of RA 9275, the DOH, in coordination with the DENR, DPWH,

and other concerned agencies, shall formulate guidelines and standards for the collection, treatment, and disposal of sewage and the establishment and operation of a centralized

sewage treatment system. In areas not considered as highly urbanized cities, septage or a mix sewerage-septage management system shall be employed.

In accordance with Sec. 72[30] of PD 856, the Code of Sanitation of the Philippines, and Sec. 5.1.1[31] of Chapter XVII of its implementing rules, the DOH is also ordered

to ensure the regulation and monitoring of the proper disposal of wastes by private sludge companies through the strict enforcement of the requirement to obtain an environmental

sanitation clearance of sludge collection treatment and disposal before these companies are issued their environmental sanitation permit.

(11) The Department of Education (DepEd), under the Philippine Environment Code (PD 1152), is mandated to integrate subjects on environmental education in its

school curricula at all levels.[32] Under Sec. 118 of RA 8550, the DepEd, in collaboration with the DA, Commission on Higher Education, and Philippine Information Agency, shall

launch and pursue a nationwide educational campaign to promote the development, management, conservation, and proper use of the environment. Under the Ecological Solid Waste

Management Act (RA 9003), on the other hand, it is directed to strengthen the integration of environmental concerns in school curricula at all levels, with an emphasis on waste

management principles.[33]

(12) The Department of Budget and Management (DBM) is tasked under Sec. 2, Title XVII of the Administrative Code of 1987 to ensure the efficient and sound utilization of

government funds and revenues so as to effectively achieve the countrys development objectives.[34]

One of the countrys development objectives is enshrined in RA 9275 or the Philippine Clean Water Act of 2004. This law stresses that the State shall pursue a policy of economic

growth in a manner consistent with the protection, preservation, and revival of the quality of our fresh, brackish, and marine waters. It also provides that it is the policy of the
government, among others, to streamline processes and procedures in the prevention, control, and abatement of pollution mechanisms for the protection of water resources; to

promote environmental strategies and use of appropriate economic instruments and of control mechanisms for the protection of water resources; to formulate a holistic national

program of water quality management that recognizes that issues related to this management cannot be separated from concerns about water sources and ecological protection, water

supply, public health, and quality of life; and to provide a comprehensive management program for water pollution focusing on pollution prevention.

Thus, the DBM shall then endeavor to provide an adequate budget to attain the noble objectives of RA 9275 in line with the countrys development objectives.

All told, the aforementioned enabling laws and issuances are in themselves clear, categorical, and complete as to what are the obligations and mandate of each

agency/petitioner under the law. We need not belabor the issue that their tasks include the cleanup of the Manila Bay.

Now, as to the crux of the petition. Do Secs. 17 and 20 of the Environment Code encompass the cleanup of water pollution in general, not just specific pollution incidents?

Secs. 17 and 20 of the Environment Code

Include Cleaning in General

The disputed sections are quoted as follows:

Section 17. Upgrading of Water Quality.Where the quality of water has deteriorated to a degree where its
state will adversely affect its best usage, the government agencies concerned shall take such measures as
may be necessary to upgrade the quality of such water to meet the prescribed water quality standards.

Section 20. Clean-up Operations.It shall be the responsibility of the polluter to contain, remove and
clean-up water pollution incidents at his own expense. In case of his failure to do so, the government
agencies concerned shall undertake containment, removal and clean-up operations and expenses incurred in
said operations shall be charged against the persons and/or entities responsible for such pollution.

When the Clean Water Act (RA 9275) took effect, its Sec. 16 on the subject, Cleanup Operations, amended the counterpart provision (Sec. 20) of the Environment Code

(PD 1152). Sec. 17 of PD 1152 continues, however, to be operational.

The amendatory Sec. 16 of RA 9275 reads:

SEC. 16. Cleanup Operations.Notwithstanding the provisions of Sections 15 and 26 hereof, any person who causes pollution in or pollutes water
bodies in excess of the applicable and prevailing standards shall be responsible to contain, remove and clean up any pollution incident at his own expense to
the extent that the same water bodies have been rendered unfit for utilization and beneficial use: Provided, That in the event emergency cleanup operations
are necessary and the polluter fails to immediately undertake the same, the [DENR] in coordination with other government agencies concerned, shall
undertake containment, removal and cleanup operations. Expenses incurred in said operations shall be reimbursed by the persons found to have caused such
pollution under proper administrative determination x x x. Reimbursements of the cost incurred shall be made to the Water Quality Management Fund or to
such other funds where said disbursements were sourced.

As may be noted, the amendment to Sec. 20 of the Environment Code is more apparent than real since the amendment, insofar as it is relevant to this case, merely consists in the

designation of the DENR as lead agency in the cleanup operations.

Petitioners contend at every turn that Secs. 17 and 20 of the Environment Code concern themselves only with the matter of cleaning up in specific pollution incidents, as

opposed to cleanup in general. They aver that the twin provisions would have to be read alongside the succeeding Sec. 62(g) and (h), which defines the terms cleanup operations and

accidental spills, as follows:

g. Clean-up Operations [refer] to activities conducted in removing the pollutants discharged or spilled
in water to restore it to pre-spill condition.

h. Accidental Spills [refer] to spills of oil or other hazardous substances in water

that result from accidents such as collisions and groundings.
 Petitioners proffer the argument that Secs. 17 and 20 of PD 1152 merely direct the government agencies concerned to undertake containment, removal, and cleaning

operations of a specific polluted portion or portions of the body of water concerned. They maintain that the application of said Sec. 20 is limited only to water pollution incidents,

which are situations that presuppose the occurrence of specific, isolated pollution events requiring the corresponding containment, removal, and cleaning operations. Pushing the

point further, they argue that the aforequoted Sec. 62(g) requires cleanup operations to restore the body of water to pre-spill condition, which means that there must have been a

specific incident of either intentional or accidental spillage of oil or other hazardous substances, as mentioned in Sec. 62(h).

As a counterpoint, respondents argue that petitioners erroneously read Sec. 62(g) as delimiting the application of Sec. 20 to the containment, removal, and cleanup operations for

accidental spills only. Contrary to petitioners posture, respondents assert that Sec. 62(g), in fact, even expanded the coverage of Sec. 20. Respondents explain that without its Sec.

62(g), PD 1152 may have indeed covered only pollution accumulating from the day-to-day operations of businesses around the Manila Bay and other sources of pollution that slowly

accumulated in the bay. Respondents, however, emphasize that Sec. 62(g), far from being a delimiting provision, in fact even enlarged the operational scope of Sec. 20, by including

accidental spills as among the water pollution incidents contemplated in Sec. 17 in relation to Sec. 20 of PD 1152.

To respondents, petitioners parochial view on environmental issues, coupled with their narrow reading of their respective mandated roles, has contributed to the worsening

water quality of the Manila Bay. Assuming, respondents assert, that petitioners are correct in saying that the cleanup coverage of Sec. 20 of PD 1152 is constricted by the definition

of the phrase cleanup operations embodied in Sec. 62(g), Sec. 17 is not hobbled by such limiting definition. As pointed out, the phrases cleanup operations and accidental spills do

not appear in said Sec. 17, not even in the chapter where said section is found.

Respondents are correct. For one thing, said Sec. 17 does not in any way state that the government agencies concerned ought to confine themselves to the containment,

removal, and cleaning operations when a specific pollution incident occurs. On the contrary, Sec. 17 requires them to act even in the absence of a specific pollution incident, as long

as water quality has deteriorated to a degree where its state will adversely affect its best usage. This section, to stress, commands concerned government agencies, when appropriate, to

take such measures as may be necessary to meet the prescribed water quality standards. In fine, the underlying duty to upgrade the quality of water is not conditional on the occurrence

of any pollution incident.

For another, a perusal of Sec. 20 of the Environment Code, as couched, indicates that it is properly applicable to a specific situation in which the pollution is caused by

polluters who fail to clean up the mess they left behind. In such instance, the concerned government agencies shall undertake the cleanup work for the polluters account. Petitioners

assertion, that they have to perform cleanup operations in the Manila Bay only when there is a water pollution incident and the erring polluters do not undertake the containment,

removal, and cleanup operations, is quite off mark. As earlier discussed, the complementary Sec. 17 of the Environment Code comes into play and the specific duties of the agencies

to clean up come in even if there are no pollution incidents staring at them. Petitioners, thus, cannot plausibly invoke and hide behind Sec. 20 of PD 1152 or Sec. 16 of RA 9275 on

the pretext that their cleanup mandate depends on the happening of a specific pollution incident. In this regard, what the CA said with respect to the impasse over Secs. 17 and 20 of

PD 1152 is at once valid as it is practical. The appellate court wrote: PD 1152 aims to introduce a comprehensive program of environmental protection and management. This is

better served by making Secs. 17 & 20 of general application rather than limiting them to specific pollution incidents. [35]

Granting arguendo that petitioners position thus described vis--vis the implementation of Sec. 20 is correct, they seem to have overlooked the fact that the pollution of

the Manila Bayis of such magnitude and scope that it is well-nigh impossible to draw the line between a specific and a general pollution incident. And such impossibility extends to

pinpointing with reasonable certainty who the polluters are. We note that Sec. 20 of PD 1152 mentions water pollution incidents which may be caused by polluters in the waters of

the Manila Bay itself or by polluters in adjoining lands and in water bodies or waterways that empty into the bay. Sec. 16 of RA 9275, on the other hand, specifically adverts to any

person who causes pollution in or pollutes water bodies, which may refer to an individual or an establishment that pollutes the land mass near the Manila Bay or the waterways, such

that the contaminants eventually end up in the bay. In this situation, the water pollution incidents are so numerous and involve nameless and faceless polluters that they can validly

be categorized as beyond the specific pollution incident level.

 Not to be ignored of course is the reality that the government agencies concerned are so undermanned that it would be almost impossible to apprehend the numerous

polluters of the Manila Bay. It may perhaps not be amiss to say that the apprehension, if any, of the Manila Bay polluters has been few and far between. Hence, practically nobody

has been required to contain, remove, or clean up a given water pollution incident. In this kind of setting, it behooves the Government to step in and undertake cleanup operations.

Thus, Sec. 16 of RA 9275, previously Sec. 20 of PD 1152, covers for all intents and purposes a general cleanup situation.

The cleanup and/or restoration of the Manila Bay is only an aspect and the initial stage of the long-term solution. The preservation of the water quality of the bay after the rehabilitation

process is as important as the cleaning phase. It is imperative then that the wastes and contaminants found in the rivers, inland bays, and other bodies of water be stopped from

reaching the Manila Bay. Otherwise, any cleanup effort would just be a futile, cosmetic exercise, for, in no time at all, the Manila Bay water quality would again deteriorate below

the ideal minimum standards set by PD 1152, RA 9275, and other relevant laws. It thus behooves the Court to put the heads of the petitioner-department-agencies and the bureaus

and offices under them on continuing notice about, and to enjoin them to perform, their mandates and duties towards cleaning up the Manila Bay and preserving the quality of its

water to the ideal level. Under what other judicial discipline describes as continuing mandamus, [36] the Court may, under extraordinary circumstances, issue directives with the end

in view of ensuring that its decision would not be set to naught by administrative inaction or indifference. In India, the doctrine of continuing mandamus was used to enforce directives

of the court to clean up the length of the GangesRiver from industrial and municipal pollution.[37]

The Court can take judicial notice of the presence of shanties and other unauthorized structures which do not have septic tanks along the Pasig-Marikina-San Juan Rivers, the National

Capital Region (NCR) (Paraaque-Zapote, Las Pias) Rivers, the Navotas-Malabon-Tullahan-Tenejeros Rivers, the Meycuayan-Marilao-Obando (Bulacan) Rivers, the Talisay (Bataan)

River, the Imus (Cavite) River, the Laguna De Bay, and other minor rivers and connecting waterways, river banks, and esteros which discharge their waters, with all the accompanying

filth, dirt, and garbage, into the major rivers and eventually the Manila Bay. If there is one factor responsible for the pollution of the major river systems and the Manila Bay, these

unauthorized structures would be on top of the list. And if the issue of illegal or unauthorized structures is not seriously addressed with sustained resolve, then practically all efforts

to cleanse these important bodies of water would be for naught. The DENR Secretary said as much.[38]

Giving urgent dimension to the necessity of removing these illegal structures is Art. 51 of PD 1067 or the Water Code, [39] which prohibits the building of structures within a given

length along banks of rivers and other waterways. Art. 51 reads:

The banks of rivers and streams and the shores of the seas and lakes throughout their entire length and within a zone of three (3) meters
in urban areas, twenty (20) meters in agricultural areas and forty (40) meters in forest areas, along their margins, are subject to the easement of public use
in the interest of recreation, navigation, floatage, fishing and salvage. No person shall be allowed to stay in this zone longer than what is necessary for
recreation, navigation, floatage, fishing or salvage or to build structures of any kind. (Emphasis added.)

Judicial notice may likewise be taken of factories and other industrial establishments standing along or near the banks of the Pasig River, other major rivers, and connecting

waterways. But while they may not be treated as unauthorized constructions, some of these establishments undoubtedly contribute to the pollution of the Pasig River and

waterways. The DILG and the concerned LGUs, have, accordingly, the duty to see to it that non-complying industrial establishments set up, within a reasonable period, the necessary

waste water treatment facilities and infrastructure to prevent their industrial discharge, including their sewage waters, from flowing into the Pasig River, other major rivers, and

connecting waterways. After such period, non-complying establishments shall be shut down or asked to transfer their operations.

At this juncture, and if only to dramatize the urgency of the need for petitioners-agencies to comply with their statutory tasks, we cite the Asian Development Bank-commissioned

study on the garbage problem in Metro Manila, the results of which are embodied in the The Garbage Book. As there reported, the garbage crisis in the metropolitan area is as

alarming as it is shocking. Some highlights of the report:

1. As early as 2003, three land-filled dumpsites in Metro Manila - the Payatas, Catmon and Rodriquez dumpsites - generate an alarming quantity
of lead and leachate or liquid run-off. Leachate are toxic liquids that flow along the surface and seep into the earth and poison the surface and groundwater
that are used for drinking, aquatic life, and the environment.

2. The high level of fecal coliform confirms the presence of a large amount of human waste in the dump sites and surrounding areas, which is
presumably generated by households that lack alternatives to sanitation. To say that Manila Bay needs rehabilitation is an understatement.

3. Most of the deadly leachate, lead and other dangerous contaminants and possibly strains of pathogens seeps untreated into ground water and
runs into the Marikina and Pasig River systems and Manila Bay.[40]
 Given the above perspective, sufficient sanitary landfills should now more than ever be established as prescribed by the Ecological Solid Waste Management Act (RA

9003). Particular note should be taken of the blatant violations by some LGUs and possibly the MMDA of Sec. 37, reproduced below:
Sec. 37. Prohibition against the Use of Open Dumps for Solid Waste.No open dumps shall be established and operated, nor any practice or
disposal of solid waste by any person, including LGUs which [constitute] the use of open dumps for solid waste, be allowed after the effectivity of this Act:
Provided, further that no controlled dumps shall be allowed (5) years following the effectivity of this Act. (Emphasis added.)

RA 9003 took effect on February 15, 2001 and the adverted grace period of five (5) years which ended on February 21, 2006 has come and gone, but no single sanitary

landfill which strictly complies with the prescribed standards under RA 9003 has yet been set up.

In addition, there are rampant and repeated violations of Sec. 48 of RA 9003, like littering, dumping of waste matters in roads, canals, esteros, and other public places,

operation of open dumps, open burning of solid waste, and the like. Some sludge companies which do not have proper disposal facilities simply discharge sludge into the Metro

Manila sewerage system that ends up in the Manila Bay. Equally unabated are violations of Sec. 27 of RA 9275, which enjoins the pollution of water bodies, groundwater pollution,

disposal of infectious wastes from vessels, and unauthorized transport or dumping into sea waters of sewage or solid waste and of Secs. 4 and 102 of RA 8550 which proscribes the

introduction by human or machine of substances to the aquatic environment including dumping/disposal of waste and other marine litters, discharge of petroleum or residual products

of petroleum of carbonaceous materials/substances [and other] radioactive, noxious or harmful liquid, gaseous or solid substances, from any water, land or air transport or other

human-made structure.

In the light of the ongoing environmental degradation, the Court wishes to emphasize the extreme necessity for all concerned executive departments and agencies to

immediately act and discharge their respective official duties and obligations. Indeed, time is of the essence; hence, there is a need to set timetables for the performance and completion

of the tasks, some of them as defined for them by law and the nature of their respective offices and mandates.

The importance of the Manila Bay as a sea resource, playground, and as a historical landmark cannot be over-emphasized. It is not yet too late in the day to restore

the Manila Bay to its former splendor and bring back the plants and sea life that once thrived in its blue waters. But the tasks ahead, daunting as they may be, could only be

accomplished if those mandated, with the help and cooperation of all civic-minded individuals, would put their minds to these tasks and take responsibility. This means that the State,

through petitioners, has to take the lead in the preservation and protection of the Manila Bay.

The era of delays, procrastination, and ad hoc measures is over. Petitioners must transcend their limitations, real or imaginary, and buckle down to work before the

problem at hand becomes unmanageable. Thus, we must reiterate that different government agencies and instrumentalities cannot shirk from their mandates; they must perform their

basic functions in cleaning up and rehabilitating the Manila Bay. We are disturbed by petitioners hiding behind two untenable claims: (1) that there ought to be a specific pollution

incident before they are required to act; and (2) that the cleanup of the bay is a discretionary duty.

RA 9003 is a sweeping piece of legislation enacted to radically transform and improve waste management. It implements Sec. 16, Art. II of the 1987 Constitution, which

explicitly provides that the State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.

So it was that in Oposa v. Factoran, Jr. the Court stated that the right to a balanced and healthful ecology need not even be written in the Constitution for it is assumed,

like other civil and political rights guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, to exist from the inception of mankind and it is an issue of transcendental importance with intergenerational

implications.[41] Even assuming the absence of a categorical legal provision specifically prodding petitioners to clean up the bay, they and the men and women representing them

cannot escape their obligation to future generations of Filipinos to keep the waters of the Manila Bay clean and clear as humanly as possible. Anything less would be a betrayal of

the trust reposed in them.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The September 28, 2005 Decision of the CA in CA-G.R. CV No. 76528 and SP No. 74944 and the September 13, 2002 Decision of the

RTC in Civil Case No. 1851-99 are AFFIRMED but with MODIFICATIONS in view of subsequent developments or supervening events in the case. The fallo of the RTC Decision

shall now read:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the abovenamed defendant-government agencies to clean up, rehabilitate, and preserve Manila Bay,
and restore and maintain its waters to SB level (Class B sea waters per Water Classification Tables under DENR Administrative Order No. 34 [1990]) to
make them fit for swimming, skin-diving, and other forms of contact recreation.

In particular:

(1) Pursuant to Sec. 4 of EO 192, assigning the DENR as the primary agency responsible for the conservation, management, development, and proper use of the countrys environment

and natural resources, and Sec. 19 of RA 9275, designating the DENR as the primary government agency responsible for its enforcement and implementation, the DENR is directed

to fully implement its Operational Plan for the Manila Bay Coastal Strategy for the rehabilitation, restoration, and conservation of the Manila Bay at the earliest possible time. It is

ordered to call regular coordination meetings with concerned government departments and agencies to ensure the successful implementation of the aforesaid plan of action in

accordance with its indicated completion schedules.

(2) Pursuant to Title XII (Local Government) of the Administrative Code of 1987 and Sec. 25 of the Local Government Code of 1991, [42] the DILG, in exercising the Presidents

power of general supervision and its duty to promulgate guidelines in establishing waste management programs under Sec. 43 of the Philippine Environment Code (PD 1152), shall

direct all LGUs in Metro Manila, Rizal, Laguna, Cavite, Bulacan, Pampanga, and Bataan to inspect all factories, commercial establishments, and private homes along the banks of

the major river systems in their respective areas of jurisdiction, such as but not limited to the Pasig-Marikina-San Juan Rivers, the NCR (Paraaque-Zapote, Las Pias) Rivers, the

Navotas-Malabon-Tullahan-Tenejeros Rivers, the Meycauayan-Marilao-Obando (Bulacan) Rivers, the Talisay (Bataan) River, the Imus (Cavite) River, the Laguna De Bay, and

other minor rivers and waterways that eventually discharge water into the Manila Bay; and the lands abutting the bay, to determine whether they have wastewater treatment facilities

or hygienic septic tanks as prescribed by existing laws, ordinances, and rules and regulations. If none be found, these LGUs shall be ordered to require non-complying establishments

and homes to set up said facilities or septic tanks within a reasonable time to prevent industrial wastes, sewage water, and human wastes from flowing into these rivers,

waterways, esteros, and the Manila Bay, under pain of closure or imposition of fines and other sanctions.

(3) As mandated by Sec. 8 of RA 9275,[43] the MWSS is directed to provide, install, operate, and maintain the necessary adequate waste water treatment facilities in Metro Manila,

Rizal, and Cavite where needed at the earliest possible time.

(4) Pursuant to RA 9275,[44] the LWUA, through the local water districts and in coordination with the DENR, is ordered to provide, install, operate, and maintain sewerage

and sanitation facilities and the efficient and safe collection, treatment, and disposal of sewage in the provinces of Laguna, Cavite, Bulacan, Pampanga, and Bataan where needed at

the earliest possible time.

(5) Pursuant to Sec. 65 of RA 8550,[45] the DA, through the BFAR, is ordered to improve and restore the marine life of the Manila Bay. It is also directed to assist the LGUs in Metro

Manila, Rizal, Cavite, Laguna, Bulacan, Pampanga, and Bataan in developing, using recognized methods, the fisheries and aquatic resources in the Manila Bay.

(6) The PCG, pursuant to Secs. 4 and 6 of PD 979, and the PNP Maritime Group, in accordance with Sec. 124 of RA 8550, in coordination with each other, shall apprehend violators

of PD 979, RA 8550, and other existing laws and regulations designed to prevent marine pollution in the Manila Bay.

(7) Pursuant to Secs. 2 and 6-c of EO 513[46] and the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, the PPA is ordered to immediately adopt such

measures to prevent the discharge and dumping of solid and liquid wastes and other ship-generated wastes into the Manila Bay waters from vessels docked at ports and apprehend

the violators.
 (8) The MMDA, as the lead agency and implementor of programs and projects for flood control projects and drainage services in Metro Manila, in coordination with the

DPWH, DILG, affected LGUs, PNP Maritime Group, Housing and Urban Development Coordinating Council (HUDCC), and other agencies, shall dismantle and remove

all structures, constructions, and other encroachments established or built in violation of RA 7279, and other applicable laws along the Pasig-Marikina-San Juan Rivers, the NCR

(Paraaque-Zapote, Las Pias) Rivers, the Navotas-Malabon-Tullahan-Tenejeros Rivers, and connecting waterways and esteros in Metro Manila. The DPWH, as the principal

implementor of programs and projects for flood control services in the rest of the country more particularly in Bulacan, Bataan, Pampanga, Cavite, and Laguna, in coordination with

the DILG, affected LGUs, PNP Maritime Group, HUDCC, and other concerned government agencies, shall remove and demolish all structures, constructions, and other

encroachments built in breach of RA 7279 and other applicable laws along the Meycauayan-Marilao-Obando (Bulacan) Rivers, the Talisay (Bataan) River, the Imus (Cavite) River,

the Laguna De Bay, and other rivers, connecting waterways, and esteros that discharge wastewater into the Manila Bay.

In addition, the MMDA is ordered to establish, operate, and maintain a sanitary landfill, as prescribed by RA 9003, within a period of one (1) year from finality of this Decision. On

matters within its territorial jurisdiction and in connection with the discharge of its duties on the maintenance of sanitary landfills and like undertakings, it is also ordered to cause

the apprehension and filing of the appropriate criminal cases against violators of the respective penal provisions of RA 9003,[47] Sec. 27 of RA 9275 (the Clean Water Act), and other

existing laws on pollution.

(9) The DOH shall, as directed by Art. 76 of PD 1067 and Sec. 8 of RA 9275, within one (1) year from finality of this Decision, determine if all licensed septic and sludge companies

have the proper facilities for the treatment and disposal of fecal sludge and sewage coming from septic tanks. The DOH shall give the companies, if found to be non-complying, a

reasonable time within which to set up the necessary facilities under pain of cancellation of its environmental sanitation clearance.

(10) Pursuant to Sec. 53 of PD 1152,[48] Sec. 118 of RA 8550, and Sec. 56 of RA 9003,[49] the DepEd shall integrate lessons on pollution prevention, waste management, environmental

protection, and like subjects in the school curricula of all levels to inculcate in the minds and hearts of students and, through them, their parents and friends, the importance of their

duty toward achieving and maintaining a balanced and healthful ecosystem in the Manila Bay and the entire Philippine archipelago.

(11) The DBM shall consider incorporating an adequate budget in the General Appropriations Act of 2010 and succeeding years to cover the expenses relating to the cleanup,

restoration, and preservation of the water quality of the Manila Bay, in line with the countrys development objective to attain economic growth in a manner consistent with the

protection, preservation, and revival of our marine waters.

(12) The heads of petitioners-agencies MMDA, DENR, DepEd, DOH, DA, DPWH, DBM, PCG, PNP Maritime Group, DILG, and also of MWSS, LWUA, and PPA, in line with

the principle of continuing mandamus, shall, from finality of this Decision, each submit to the Court a quarterly progressive report of the activities undertaken in accordance with

this Decision.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.
 [G.R. No. 122156. February 3, 1997]

MANILA PRINCE HOTEL, petitioner, vs. GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, MANILA HOTEL CORPORATION, COMMITTEE ON
PRIVATIZATION and OFFICE OF THE GOVERNMENT CORPORATE COUNSEL, respondents.

DECISION

BELLOSILLO, J.:

The Filipino First Policy enshrined in the 1987 Constitution, i.e., in the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the national economy and
patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos,[1] is invoked by petitioner in its bid to acquire 51% of the shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation
(MHC) which owns the historic Manila Hotel. Opposing, respondents maintain that the provision is not self-executing but requires an implementing legislation for its
enforcement. Corollarily, they ask whether the 51% shares form part of the national economy and patrimony covered by the protective mantle of the Constitution.

The controversy arose when respondent Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), pursuant to the privatization program of the Philippine Government
under Proclamation No. 50 dated 8 December 1986, decided to sell through public bidding 30% to 51% of the issued and outstanding shares of respondent MHC. The
winning bidder, or the eventual strategic partner, is to provide management expertise and/or an international marketing/reservation system, and financial support to
strengthen the profitability and performance of the Manila Hotel.[2] In a close bidding held on 18 September 1995 only two (2) bidders participated: petitioner Manila
Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the MHC or 15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian
firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid for the same number of shares at P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner.

Pertinent provisions of the bidding rules prepared by respondent GSIS state -

I. EXECUTION OF THE NECESSARY CONTRACTS WITH GSIS/MHC -

1. The Highest Bidder must comply with the conditions set forth below by October 23, 1995 (reset to November 3, 1995) or the Highest Bidder will lose the right to purchase the
Block of Shares and GSIS will instead offer the Block of Shares to the other Qualified Bidders:

a. The Highest Bidder must negotiate and execute with the GSIS/MHC the Management Contract, International Marketing/Reservation System Contract or other type of contract
specified by the Highest Bidder in its strategic plan for the Manila Hotel x x x x

b. The Highest Bidder must execute the Stock Purchase and Sale Agreement with GSIS x x x x

K. DECLARATION OF THE WINNING BIDDER/STRATEGIC PARTNER -

The Highest Bidder will be declared the Winning Bidder/Strategic Partner after the following conditions are met:

a. Execution of the necessary contracts with GSIS/MHC not later than October 23, 1995 (reset to November 3, 1995); and

b. Requisite approvals from the GSIS/MHC and COP (Committee on Privatization)/ OGCC (Office of the Government Corporate Counsel) are obtained. [3]

Pending the declaration of Renong Berhard as the winning bidder/strategic partner and the execution of the necessary contracts, petitioner in a letter to
respondent GSIS dated 28 September 1995 matched the bid price of P44.00 per share tendered by Renong Berhad.[4] In a subsequent letter dated 10 October 1995
petitioner sent a managers check issued by Philtrust Bank for Thirty-three Million Pesos (P33,000,000.00) as Bid Security to match the bid of the Malaysian Group,
Messrs. Renong Berhad x x x x[5] which respondent GSIS refused to accept.

On 17 October 1995, perhaps apprehensive that respondent GSIS has disregarded the tender of the matching bid and that the sale of 51% of the MHC may
be hastened by respondent GSIS and consummated with Renong Berhad, petitioner came to this Court on prohibition and mandamus. On 18 October 1995 the
Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining respondents from perfecting and consummating the sale to the Malaysian firm.

On 10 September 1996 the instant case was accepted by the Court En Banc after it was referred to it by the First Division. The case was then set for oral
arguments with former Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando and Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., as amici curiae.

In the main, petitioner invokes Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution and submits that the Manila Hotel has been identified with the Filipino
nation and has practically become a historical monument which reflects the vibrancy of Philippine heritage and culture. It is a proud legacy of an earlier generation
of Filipinos who believed in the nobility and sacredness of independence and its power and capacity to release the full potential of the Filipino people. To all intents
and purposes, it has become a part of the national patrimony.[6] Petitioner also argues that since 51% of the shares of the MHC carries with it the ownership of the
business of the hotel which is owned by respondent GSIS, a government-owned and controlled corporation, the hotel business of respondent GSIS being a part of
the tourism industry is unquestionably a part of the national economy. Thus, any transaction involving 51% of the shares of stock of the MHC is clearly covered by
the term national economy, to which Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, 1987 Constitution, applies. [7]

It is also the thesis of petitioner that since Manila Hotel is part of the national patrimony and its business also unquestionably part of the national economy
petitioner should be preferred after it has matched the bid offer of the Malaysian firm. For the bidding rules mandate that if for any reason, the Highest Bidder cannot
be awarded the Block of Shares, GSIS may offer this to the other Qualified Bidders that have validly submitted bids provided that these Qualified Bidders are willing
to match the highest bid in terms of price per share.[8]

Respondents except. They maintain that: First, Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution is merely a statement of principle and policy since it is
not a self-executing provision and requires implementing legislation(s) x x x x Thus, for the said provision to operate, there must be existing laws to lay down
conditions under which business may be done.[9]

Second, granting that this provision is self-executing, Manila Hotel does not fall under the term national patrimony which only refers to lands of the public
domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna and all marine
wealth in its territorial sea, and exclusive marine zone as cited in the first and second paragraphs of Sec. 2, Art. XII, 1987 Constitution. According to respondents,
while petitioner speaks of the guests who have slept in the hotel and the events that have transpired therein which make the hotel historic, these alone do not make
the hotel fall under the patrimony of the nation. What is more, the mandate of the Constitution is addressed to the State, not to respondent GSIS which possesses a
personality of its own separate and distinct from the Philippines as a State.

Third, granting that the Manila Hotel forms part of the national patrimony, the constitutional provision invoked is still inapplicable since what is being sold is
only 51% of the outstanding shares of the corporation, not the hotel building nor the land upon which the building stands. Certainly, 51% of the equity of the MHC
cannot be considered part of the national patrimony. Moreover, if the disposition of the shares of the MHC is really contrary to the Constitution, petitioner should
have questioned it right from the beginning and not after it had lost in the bidding.

Fourth, the reliance by petitioner on par. V., subpar. J. 1., of the bidding rules which provides that if for any reason, the Highest Bidder cannot be awarded the
Block of Shares, GSIS may offer this to the other Qualified Bidders that have validly submitted bids provided that these Qualified Bidders are willing to match the
highest bid in terms of price per share, is misplaced. Respondents postulate that the privilege of submitting a matching bid has not yet arisen since it only takes
place if for any reason, the Highest Bidder cannot be awarded the Block of Shares. Thus the submission by petitioner of a matching bid is premature since Renong
Berhad could still very well be awarded the block of shares and the condition giving rise to the exercise of the privilege to submit a matching bid had not yet taken
place.

Finally, the prayer for prohibition grounded on grave abuse of discretion should fail since respondent GSIS did not exercise its discretion in a capricious,
whimsical manner, and if ever it did abuse its discretion it was not so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a
duty enjoined by law. Similarly, the petition for mandamus should fail as petitioner has no clear legal right to what it demands and respondents do not have an
imperative duty to perform the act required of them by petitioner.

We now resolve. A constitution is a system of fundamental laws for the governance and administration of a nation. It is supreme, imperious, absolute and
unalterable except by the authority from which it emanates. It has been defined as the fundamental and paramount law of the nation.[10] It prescribes the permanent
framework of a system of government, assigns to the different departments their respective powers and duties, and establishes certain fixed principles on which
government is founded. The fundamental conception in other words is that it is a supreme law to which all other laws must conform and in accordance with which all
private rights must be determined and all public authority administered.[11] Under the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, if a law or contract violates any norm of
the constitution that law or contract whether promulgated by the legislative or by the executive branch or entered into by private persons for private purposes is null
and void and without any force and effect. Thus, since the Constitution is the fundamental, paramount and supreme law of the nation, it is deemed written in every
statute and contract.

Admittedly, some constitutions are merely declarations of policies and principles. Their provisions command the legislature to enact laws and carry out the
purposes of the framers who merely establish an outline of government providing for the different departments of the governmental machinery and securing certain
fundamental and inalienable rights of citizens.[12] A provision which lays down a general principle, such as those found in Art. II of the 1987 Constitution, is usually
not self-executing. But a provision which is complete in itself and becomes operative without the aid of supplementary or enabling legislation, or that which supplies
sufficient rule by means of which the right it grants may be enjoyed or protected, is self-executing. Thus a constitutional provision is self-executing if the nature and
extent of the right conferred and the liability imposed are fixed by the constitution itself, so that they can be determined by an examination and construction of its
terms, and there is no language indicating that the subject is referred to the legislature for action.[13]

As against constitutions of the past, modern constitutions have been generally drafted upon a different principle and have often become in effect extensive
codes of laws intended to operate directly upon the people in a manner similar to that of statutory enactments, and the function of constitutional conventions has
evolved into one more like that of a legislative body. Hence, unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a constitutional mandate,
the presumption now is that all provisions of the constitution are self-executing. If the constitutional provisions are treated as requiring legislation instead of self-
executing, the legislature would have the power to ignore and practically nullify the mandate of the fundamental law.[14] This can be cataclysmic. That is why the
prevailing view is, as it has always been, that -

x x x x in case of doubt, the Constitution should be considered self-executing rather than non-self-executing x x x x Unless the contrary is clearly intended, the provisions of the
Constitution should be considered self-executing, as a contrary rule would give the legislature discretion to determine when, or whether, they shall be effective. These provisions
would be subordinated to the will of the lawmaking body, which could make them entirely meaningless by simply refusing to pass the needed implementing statute.[15]

Respondents argue that Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution is clearly not self-executing, as they quote from discussions on the floor of the
1986 Constitutional Commission -

MR. RODRIGO. Madam President, I am asking this question as the Chairman of the Committee on Style. If the wording of PREFERENCE is given to
QUALIFIED FILIPINOS, can it be understood as a preference to qualified Filipinos vis-a-vis Filipinos who are not qualified. So, why do we not
make it clear? To qualified Filipinos as against aliens?

THE PRESIDENT. What is the question of Commissioner Rodrigo? Is it to remove the word QUALIFIED?

MR. RODRIGO. No, no, but say definitely TO QUALIFIED FILIPINOS as against whom? As against aliens or over aliens ?

MR. NOLLEDO. Madam President, I think that is understood. We use the word QUALIFIED because the existing laws or prospective laws will always
lay down conditions under which business may be done. For example, qualifications on capital, qualifications on the setting up of other financial
structures, et cetera (underscoring supplied by respondents).

MR. RODRIGO. It is just a matter of style.

MR. NOLLEDO. Yes.[16]

Quite apparently, Sec. 10, second par., of Art XII is couched in such a way as not to make it appear that it is non-self-executing but simply for purposes of
style. But, certainly, the legislature is not precluded from enacting further laws to enforce the constitutional provision so long as the contemplated statute squares
with the Constitution. Minor details may be left to the legislature without impairing the self-executing nature of constitutional provisions.

In self-executing constitutional provisions, the legislature may still enact legislation to facilitate the exercise of powers directly granted by the constitution,
further the operation of such a provision, prescribe a practice to be used for its enforcement, provide a convenient remedy for the protection of the rights secured or
the determination thereof, or place reasonable safeguards around the exercise of the right. The mere fact that legislation may supplement and add to or prescribe a
penalty for the violation of a self-executing constitutional provision does not render such a provision ineffective in the absence of such legislation. The omission from
a constitution of any express provision for a remedy for enforcing a right or liability is not necessarily an indication that it was not intended to be self-executing. The
rule is that a self-executing provision of the constitution does not necessarily exhaust legislative power on the subject, but any legislation must be in harmony with
the constitution, further the exercise of constitutional right and make it more available.[17] Subsequent legislation however does not necessarily mean that the subject
constitutional provision is not, by itself, fully enforceable.

Respondents also argue that the non-self-executing nature of Sec. 10, second par., of Art. XII is implied from the tenor of the first and third paragraphs of the
same section which undoubtedly are not self-executing.[18] The argument is flawed. If the first and third paragraphs are not self-executing because Congress is still
to enact measures to encourage the formation and operation of enterprises fully owned by Filipinos, as in the first paragraph, and the State still needs legislation to
regulate and exercise authority over foreign investments within its national jurisdiction, as in the third paragraph, then a fortiori, by the same logic, the second
paragraph can only be self-executing as it does not by its language require any legislation in order to give preference to qualified Filipinos in the grant of rights,
privileges and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony. A constitutional provision may be self-executing in one part and non-self-executing in
another.[19]

Even the cases cited by respondents holding that certain constitutional provisions are merely statements of principles and policies, which are basically not
self-executing and only placed in the Constitution as moral incentives to legislation, not as judicially enforceable rights - are simply not in point. Basco v. Philippine
Amusements and Gaming Corporation[20] speaks of constitutional provisions on personal dignity,[21] the sanctity of family life,[22] the vital role of the youth in nation-
building,[23] the promotion of social justice,[24] and the values of education.[25] Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance[26]refers to constitutional provisions on social justice
and human rights[27] and on education.[28] Lastly, Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Morato[29] cites provisions on the promotion of general welfare,[30] the sanctity of family life,[31] the
vital role of the youth in nation-building[32] and the promotion of total human liberation and development.[33] A reading of these provisions indeed clearly shows that
they are not judicially enforceable constitutional rights but merely guidelines for legislation. The very terms of the provisions manifest that they are only principles
upon which legislations must be based. Res ipsa loquitur.

On the other hand, Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive command which is complete in itself and which needs no
further guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its enforcement. From its very words the provision does not require any legislation to put it in operation. It is per
se judicially enforceable. When our Constitution mandates that [i]n the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering national economy and patrimony, the
State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos, it means just that - qualified Filipinos shall be preferred. And when our Constitution declares that a right exists in
certain specified circumstances an action may be maintained to enforce such right notwithstanding the absence of any legislation on the subject; consequently, if
there is no statute especially enacted to enforce such constitutional right, such right enforces itself by its own inherent potency and puissance, and from which all
legislations must take their bearings.Where there is a right there is a remedy. Ubi jus ibi remedium.

As regards our national patrimony, a member of the 1986 Constitutional Commission[34] explains -

The patrimony of the Nation that should be conserved and developed refers not only to our rich natural resources but also to the cultural heritage of our race. It
also refers to our intelligence in arts, sciences and letters. Therefore, we should develop not only our lands, forests, mines and other natural resources but also the
mental ability or faculty of our people.

We agree. In its plain and ordinary meaning, the term patrimony pertains to heritage.[35] When the Constitution speaks of national patrimony, it refers not only
to the natural resources of the Philippines, as the Constitution could have very well used the term natural resources, but also to the cultural heritage of the Filipinos.

Manila Hotel has become a landmark - a living testimonial of Philippine heritage. While it was restrictively an American hotel when it first opened in 1912, it
immediately evolved to be truly Filipino.Formerly a concourse for the elite, it has since then become the venue of various significant events which have shaped
Philippine history. It was called the Cultural Center of the 1930s. It was the site of the festivities during the inauguration of the Philippine Commonwealth. Dubbed as
the Official Guest House of the Philippine Government it plays host to dignitaries and official visitors who are accorded the traditional Philippine hospitality.[36]

The history of the hotel has been chronicled in the book The Manila Hotel: The Heart and Memory of a City.[37] During World War II the hotel was converted
by the Japanese Military Administration into a military headquarters. When the American forces returned to recapture Manila the hotel was selected by the Japanese
together with Intramuros as the two (2) places for their final stand.Thereafter, in the 1950s and 1960s, the hotel became the center of political activities, playing host
to almost every political convention. In 1970 the hotel reopened after a renovation and reaped numerous international recognitions, an acknowledgment of the
Filipino talent and ingenuity. In 1986 the hotel was the site of a failed coup d etat where an aspirant for vice-president was proclaimed President of the Philippine
Republic.

For more than eight (8) decades Manila Hotel has bore mute witness to the triumphs and failures, loves and frustrations of the Filipinos; its existence is
impressed with public interest; its own historicity associated with our struggle for sovereignty, independence and nationhood. Verily, Manila Hotel has become part
of our national economy and patrimony. For sure, 51% of the equity of the MHC comes within the purview of the constitutional shelter for it comprises the majority
and controlling stock, so that anyone who acquires or owns the 51% will have actual control and management of the hotel. In this instance, 51% of the MHC cannot
be disassociated from the hotel and the land on which the hotel edifice stands. Consequently, we cannot sustain respondents claim that the Filipino First
Policy provision is not applicable since what is being sold is only 51% of the outstanding shares of the corporation, not the Hotel building nor the land upon which
the building stands.[38]

The argument is pure sophistry. The term qualified Filipinos as used in our Constitution also includes corporations at least 60% of which is owned by
Filipinos. This is very clear from the proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional Commission -

THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Davide is recognized.

MR. DAVIDE. I would like to introduce an amendment to the Nolledo amendment. And the amendment would consist in substituting the words
QUALIFIED FILIPINOS with the following: CITIZENS OF THE PHILIPPINES OR CORPORATIONS OR ASSOCIATIONS WHOSE CAPITAL OR
CONTROLLING STOCK IS WHOLLY OWNED BY SUCH CITIZENS.

xxxx

MR. MONSOD. Madam President, apparently the proponent is agreeable, but we have to raise a question. Suppose it is a corporation that is 80-percent
Filipino, do we not give it preference?

MR. DAVIDE. The Nolledo amendment would refer to an individual Filipino. What about a corporation wholly owned by Filipino citizens?

MR. MONSOD. At least 60 percent, Madam President.

MR. DAVIDE. Is that the intention?

MR. MONSOD. Yes, because, in fact, we would be limiting it if we say that the preference should only be 100-percent Filipino.

MR. DAVIDE. I want to get that meaning clear because QUALIFIED FILIPINOS may refer only to individuals and not to juridical personalities or entities.

MR. MONSOD. We agree, Madam President.[39]

xxxx

MR. RODRIGO. Before we vote, may I request that the amendment be read again.

MR. NOLLEDO. The amendment will read: IN THE GRANT OF RIGHTS, PRIVILEGES AND CONCESSIONS COVERING THE NATIONAL ECONOMY
AND PATRIMONY, THE STATE SHALL GIVE PREFERENCE TO QUALIFIED FILIPINOS. And the word Filipinos here, as intended by the
proponents, will include not only individual Filipinos but also Filipino-controlled entities or entities fully-controlled by Filipinos.[40]

The phrase preference to qualified Filipinos was explained thus -

 MR. FOZ. Madam President, I would like to request Commissioner Nolledo to please restate his amendment so that I can ask a question.

MR. NOLLEDO. IN THE GRANT OF RIGHTS, PRIVILEGES AND CONCESSIONS COVERING THE NATIONAL ECONOMY AND PATRIMONY, THE
STATE SHALL GIVE PREFERENCE TO QUALIFIED FILIPINOS.

MR. FOZ. In connection with that amendment, if a foreign enterprise is qualified and a Filipino enterprise is also qualified, will the Filipino enterprise still
be given a preference?

MR. NOLLEDO. Obviously.

MR. FOZ. If the foreigner is more qualified in some aspects than the Filipino enterprise, will the Filipino still be preferred?

MR. NOLLEDO. The answer is yes.

MR. FOZ. Thank you.[41]

Expounding further on the Filipino First Policy provision Commissioner Nolledo continues

MR. NOLLEDO. Yes, Madam President. Instead of MUST, it will be SHALL - THE STATE SHALL GIVE PREFERENCE TO QUALIFIED
FILIPINOS. This embodies the so-called Filipino First policy. That means that Filipinos should be given preference in the grant of concessions,
privileges and rights covering the national patrimony.[42]

The exchange of views in the sessions of the Constitutional Commission regarding the subject provision was still further clarified by Commissioner Nolledo[43] -

Paragraph 2 of Section 10 explicitly mandates the Pro-Filipino bias in all economic concerns. It is better known as the FILIPINO FIRST Policy x x x x This provision was never
found in previous Constitutions x x x x

The term qualified Filipinos simply means that preference shall be given to those citizens who can make a viable contribution to the common good, because of credible
competence and efficiency. It certainly does NOT mandate the pampering and preferential treatment to Filipino citizens or organizations that are incompetent or inefficient, since
such an indiscriminate preference would be counterproductive and inimical to the common good.

In the granting of economic rights, privileges, and concessions, when a choice has to be made between a qualified foreigner and a qualified Filipino, the latter shall be chosen over
the former.

Lastly, the word qualified is also determinable. Petitioner was so considered by respondent GSIS and selected as one of the qualified bidders. It was pre-
qualified by respondent GSIS in accordance with its own guidelines so that the sole inference here is that petitioner has been found to be possessed of proven
management expertise in the hotel industry, or it has significant equity ownership in another hotel company, or it has an overall management and marketing
proficiency to successfully operate the Manila Hotel.[44]

The penchant to try to whittle away the mandate of the Constitution by arguing that the subject provision is not self-executory and requires implementing
legislation is quite disturbing. The attempt to violate a clear constitutional provision - by the government itself - is only too distressing. To adopt such a line of
reasoning is to renounce the duty to ensure faithfulness to the Constitution. For, even some of the provisions of the Constitution which evidently need implementing
legislation have juridical life of their own and can be the source of a judicial remedy. We cannot simply afford the government a defense that arises out of the failure
to enact further enabling, implementing or guiding legislation. In fine, the discourse of Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., on constitutional government is apt -

The executive department has a constitutional duty to implement laws, including the Constitution, even before Congress acts - provided that there are discoverable legal standards
for executive action. When the executive acts, it must be guided by its own understanding of the constitutional command and of applicable laws. The responsibility for reading and
understanding the Constitution and the laws is not the sole prerogative of Congress.If it were, the executive would have to ask Congress, or perhaps the Court, for an interpretation
every time the executive is confronted by a constitutional command. That is not how constitutional government operates.[45]

Respondents further argue that the constitutional provision is addressed to the State, not to respondent GSIS which by itself possesses a separate and distinct
personality. This argument again is at best specious. It is undisputed that the sale of 51% of the MHC could only be carried out with the prior approval of the State
acting through respondent Committee on Privatization. As correctly pointed out by Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., this fact alone makes the sale of the assets of
respondents GSIS and MHC a state action. In constitutional jurisprudence, the acts of persons distinct from the government are considered state action covered by
the Constitution (1) when the activity it engages in is a public function; (2) when the government is so significantly involved with the private actor as to make the
government responsible for his action; and, (3) when the government has approved or authorized the action. It is evident that the act of respondent GSIS in selling
51% of its share in respondent MHC comes under the second and third categories of state action. Without doubt therefore the transaction, although entered into by
respondent GSIS, is in fact a transaction of the State and therefore subject to the constitutional command.[46]

When the Constitution addresses the State it refers not only to the people but also to the government as elements of the State. After all, government is
composed of three (3) divisions of power - legislative, executive and judicial. Accordingly, a constitutional mandate directed to the State is correspondingly directed
to the three (3) branches of government. It is undeniable that in this case the subject constitutional injunction is addressed among others to the Executive Department
and respondent GSIS, a government instrumentality deriving its authority from the State.

It should be stressed that while the Malaysian firm offered the higher bid it is not yet the winning bidder. The bidding rules expressly provide that the highest
bidder shall only be declared the winning bidder after it has negotiated and executed the necessary contracts, and secured the requisite approvals. Since the Filipino
First Policy provision of the Constitution bestows preference on qualifiedFilipinos the mere tending of the highest bid is not an assurance that the highest bidder will
be declared the winning bidder. Resultantly, respondents are not bound to make the award yet, nor are they under obligation to enter into one with the highest
bidder. For in choosing the awardee respondents are mandated to abide by the dictates of the 1987 Constitution the provisions of which are presumed to be known
to all the bidders and other interested parties.

Adhering to the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, the subject constitutional provision is, as it should be, impliedly written in the bidding rules issued by
respondent GSIS, lest the bidding rules be nullified for being violative of the Constitution. It is a basic principle in constitutional law that all laws and contracts must
conform with the fundamental law of the land. Those which violate the Constitution lose their reason for being.

Paragraph V. J. 1 of the bidding rules provides that [i]f for any reason the Highest Bidder cannot be awarded the Block of Shares, GSIS may offer this to other
Qualified Bidders that have validly submitted bids provided that these Qualified Bidders are willing to match the highest bid in terms of price per share.[47] Certainly,
the constitutional mandate itself is reason enough not to award the block of shares immediately to the foreign bidder notwithstanding its submission of a higher, or
even the highest, bid. In fact, we cannot conceive of a stronger reason than the constitutional injunction itself.

In the instant case, where a foreign firm submits the highest bid in a public bidding concerning the grant of rights, privileges and concessions covering the
national economy and patrimony, thereby exceeding the bid of a Filipino, there is no question that the Filipino will have to be allowed to match the bid of the foreign
entity. And if the Filipino matches the bid of a foreign firm the award should go to the Filipino. It must be so if we are to give life and meaning to the Filipino First
Policy provision of the 1987 Constitution. For, while this may neither be expressly stated nor contemplated in the bidding rules, the constitutional fiat is omnipresent
to be simply disregarded. To ignore it would be to sanction a perilous skirting of the basic law.

This Court does not discount the apprehension that this policy may discourage foreign investors. But the Constitution and laws of the Philippines are
understood to be always open to public scrutiny.These are given factors which investors must consider when venturing into business in a foreign jurisdiction. Any
person therefore desiring to do business in the Philippines or with any of its agencies or instrumentalities is presumed to know his rights and obligations under the
Constitution and the laws of the forum.

The argument of respondents that petitioner is now estopped from questioning the sale to Renong Berhad since petitioner was well aware from the beginning
that a foreigner could participate in the bidding is meritless. Undoubtedly, Filipinos and foreigners alike were invited to the bidding. But foreigners may be awarded
the sale only if no Filipino qualifies, or if the qualified Filipino fails to match the highest bid tendered by the foreign entity. In the case before us, while petitioner was
already preferred at the inception of the bidding because of the constitutional mandate, petitioner had not yet matched the bid offered by Renong Berhad. Thus it did
not have the right or personality then to compel respondent GSIS to accept its earlier bid. Rightly, only after it had matched the bid of the foreign firm and the apparent
disregard by respondent GSIS of petitioners matching bid did the latter have a cause of action.

Besides, there is no time frame for invoking the constitutional safeguard unless perhaps the award has been finally made. To insist on selling the Manila Hotel
to foreigners when there is a Filipino group willing to match the bid of the foreign group is to insist that government be treated as any other ordinary market player,
and bound by its mistakes or gross errors of judgment, regardless of the consequences to the Filipino people. The miscomprehension of the Constitution is
regrettable. Thus we would rather remedy the indiscretion while there is still an opportunity to do so than let the government develop the habit of forgetting that the
Constitution lays down the basic conditions and parameters for its actions.

Since petitioner has already matched the bid price tendered by Renong Berhad pursuant to the bidding rules, respondent GSIS is left with no alternative but
to award to petitioner the block of shares of MHC and to execute the necessary agreements and documents to effect the sale in accordance not only with the bidding
guidelines and procedures but with the Constitution as well. The refusal of respondent GSIS to execute the corresponding documents with petitioner as provided in
the bidding rules after the latter has matched the bid of the Malaysian firm clearly constitutes grave abuse of discretion.

The Filipino First Policy is a product of Philippine nationalism. It is embodied in the 1987 Constitution not merely to be used as a guideline for future legislation
but primarily to be enforced; so must it be enforced. This Court as the ultimate guardian of the Constitution will never shun, under any reasonable circumstance, the
duty of upholding the majesty of the Constitution which it is tasked to defend. It is worth emphasizing that it is not the intention of this Court to impede and diminish,
much less undermine, the influx of foreign investments. Far from it, the Court encourages and welcomes more business opportunities but avowedly sanctions the
preference for Filipinos whenever such preference is ordained by the Constitution. The position of the Court on this matter could have not been more appropriately
articulated by Chief Justice Narvasa -

As scrupulously as it has tried to observe that it is not its function to substitute its judgment for that of the legislature or the executive about the wisdom and feasibility of
legislation economic in nature, the Supreme Court has not been spared criticism for decisions perceived as obstacles to economic progress and development x x x x in connection
with a temporary injunction issued by the Courts First Division against the sale of the Manila Hotel to a Malaysian Firm and its partner, certain statements were published in a
major daily to the effect that that injunction again demonstrates that the Philippine legal system can be a major obstacle to doing business here.

Let it be stated for the record once again that while it is no business of the Court to intervene in contracts of the kind referred to or set itself up as the judge of whether they are
viable or attainable, it is its bounden duty to make sure that they do not violate the Constitution or the laws, or are not adopted or implemented with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. It will never shirk that duty, no matter how buffeted by winds of unfair and ill-informed criticism.[48]

Privatization of a business asset for purposes of enhancing its business viability and preventing further losses, regardless of the character of the asset, should
not take precedence over non-material values. A commercial, nay even a budgetary, objective should not be pursued at the expense of national pride and dignity. For
the Constitution enshrines higher and nobler non-material values. Indeed, the Court will always defer to the Constitution in the proper governance of a free society;
after all, there is nothing so sacrosanct in any economic policy as to draw itself beyond judicial review when the Constitution is involved.[49]

Nationalism is inherent in the very concept of the Philippines being a democratic and republican state, with sovereignty residing in the Filipino people and from
whom all government authority emanates. In nationalism, the happiness and welfare of the people must be the goal. The nation-state can have no higher
purpose. Any interpretation of any constitutional provision must adhere to such basic concept. Protection of foreign investments, while laudible, is merely a policy. It
cannot override the demands of nationalism.[50]

The Manila Hotel or, for that matter, 51% of the MHC, is not just any commodity to be sold to the highest bidder solely for the sake of privatization. We are not
talking about an ordinary piece of property in a commercial district. We are talking about a historic relic that has hosted many of the most important events in the
short history of the Philippines as a nation. We are talking about a hotel where heads of states would prefer to be housed as a strong manifestation of their desire to
cloak the dignity of the highest state function to their official visits to the Philippines. Thus the Manila Hotel has played and continues to play a significant role as an
authentic repository of twentieth century Philippine history and culture. In this sense, it has become truly a reflection of the Filipino soul - a place with a history of
grandeur; a most historical setting that has played a part in the shaping of a country.[51]

This Court cannot extract rhyme nor reason from the determined efforts of respondents to sell the historical landmark - this Grand Old Dame of hotels in Asia
- to a total stranger. For, indeed, the conveyance of this epic exponent of the Filipino psyche to alien hands cannot be less than mephistophelian for it is, in whatever
manner viewed, a veritable alienation of a nations soul for some pieces of foreign silver. And so we ask: What advantage, which cannot be equally drawn from a
qualified Filipino, can be gained by the Filipinos if Manila Hotel - and all that it stands for - is sold to a non-Filipino? How much of national pride will vanish if the
nations cultural heritage is entrusted to a foreign entity? On the other hand, how much dignity will be preserved and realized if the national patrimony is safekept in
the hands of a qualified, zealous and well-meaning Filipino? This is the plain and simple meaning of the Filipino First Policy provision of the Philippine
Constitution. And this Court, heeding the clarion call of the Constitution and accepting the duty of being the elderly watchman of the nation, will continue to respect
and protect the sanctity of the Constitution.

WHEREFORE, respondents GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, MANILA HOTEL CORPORATION, COMMITTEE ON PRIVATIZATION and
OFFICE OF THE GOVERNMENT CORPORATE COUNSEL are directed to CEASE and DESIST from selling 51% of the shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation to
RENONG BERHAD, and to ACCEPT the matching bid of petitioner MANILA PRINCE HOTEL CORPORATION to purchase the subject 51% of the shares of the
Manila Hotel Corporation at P44.00 per share and thereafter to execute the necessary agreements and documents to effect the sale, to issue the necessary
clearances and to do such other acts and deeds as may be necessary for the purpose.

SO ORDERED.