ONG CHIA v.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE COURT OF APPEALS

Facts:
Ong Chia was born in China. At the age of 66, he filed a verified petition to be admitted as a Filipino
citizen under CA 473 a.k.a. the Revised Naturalization Law, as amended. On Chia, after stating his qualification
and the lack of disqualifications, stated that his petition for citizenship was not acted upon by the Special
Committee on Naturalization, OSG, since the same was not reconstituted after the February 1986 revolution.

During the hearings, Ong Chia along with 3 witnesses testified as to his qualification. Since the
Prosecutor was impressed and decided not to counteract the testimonies, the trial court granted the petition
and admitted Ong Chia to Philippine citizenship.

However, the State, through the OSG, appealed (with annexed documents) contending that Ong Chia:
(1) failed to state all the names by which he is or had been known i.e. Loreto Chia Ong; (2) failed to state all his
former places of residence in violation of CA 473 i.e. J.M. Basa Street, Iloilo; (3) failed to conduct himself in a
proper and irreproachable manner during his entire stay in the Philippines i.e. he cohabited with his wife 8
years prior to their marriage (annexed is the marriage contract in 1977 and Joint Affidavit of Ong Chia and his
wife); (4) has no known lucrative trade or occupation and his previous incomes has been insufficient or
misdeclared as per the annexed income tax returns; and (5) failed to support his petition with the appropriate
documentary evidence i.e. marriage contract for the alleged first marriage before a judge in 1953.

The CA reversed the trial court decision. Hence, the present petition by Ong Chia contending that CA
erred in considering the documents which had merely been annexed by the State to it’s appellant’s brief. Not
having been presented and formally offered as evidence, they are mere scraps of paper devoid of any
evidentiary value contrary to Rule 132, sec. 34 of the Revised Rules on Evidence which provides that the court
shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered.

Issue: WON the Revised Rules on Evidence applies in the case

Held: No. According to Rule 143 of the Rules of Court: “These rules shall not apply to land registration,
cadastral and election cases, naturalization and insolvency proceedings, and other cases not herein provided
for, except by analogy or in a suppletory character and whenever practicable and convenient.” (Emphasis
added)

Prescinding from the above, the rule on formal offer of evidence (Rule 132, §34) now being invoked
by Ong Chia is clearly not applicable to the present case involving a petition for naturalization. The only
instance when said rules may be applied by analogy or suppletorily in such cases is when it is "practicable and
convenient." That is not the case here, since reliance upon the documents presented by the State for the first
time on appeal, in fact, appears to be the more practical and convenient course of action considering that
decision in naturalization proceedings are not covered by the rule on res judicata. Consequently, a final
favorable judgment does not preclude the State from later on moving for a revocation of the grant of
naturalization on the basis of the same documents.

It is settled, however, that naturalization laws should be rigidly enforced and strictly construed in
favor of the government and against the applicant.
 ZULUETA V. COURT OF APPEALS

Facts:
Cecilia Zulueta, wife of Alfredo Martin entered the clinic of her husband, a doctor of medicine, and in
the presence of her mother, a driver and private respondent’s secretary, forcibly opened the drawers and
cabinet in her husband’s clinic and took 157 documents consisting of private correspondence between Dr.
Martin and his alleged paramours, greeting cards, cancelled checks, diaries, Dr. Martin’s passport, and
photographs. The documents and papers were seized for use in evidence in a case for legal separation and for
disqualification from the practice of medicine which petitioner had filed against her husband.
Dr. Martin brought this action below for recovery of the documents and papers and for damages
against petitioner. The case was filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch X, which, after trial,
rendered judgment for private respondent, Dr. Alfredo Martin, declaring him “the capital/exclusive owner of
the properties described in paragraph 3 of plaintiff’s Complaint or those further described in the Motion to
Return and Suppress” and ordering Cecilia Zulueta and any person acting in her behalf to immediately return
the properties to Dr. Martin and to pay him P5,000.00, as nominal damages; P5,000.00, as moral damages and
attorney’s fees; and to pay the costs of the suit. The writ of preliminary injunction earlier issued was made
final and petitioner Cecilia Zulueta and her attorneys and representatives were enjoined from “using or
submitting/admitting as evidence” the documents and papers in question. On appeal, the Court of Appeals
affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court. Hence this petition.
Issues: WON admissibility of the documents taken by the wife as evidence in the case for legal separation and
for disqualification from the practice of medicine which the petitioner had filed against her husband.
Held: Yes. Indeed the documents and papers in question are inadmissible in evidence. The constitutional
injunction declaring “the privacy of communication and correspondence [to be] inviolable” is no less
applicable simply because it is the wife (who thinks herself aggrieved by her husband’s infidelity) who is the
party against whom the constitutional provision is to be enforced. The only exception to the prohibition in the
Constitution is if there is a “lawful order [from a] court or when public safety or order requires otherwise, as
prescribed by law.” Any violation of this provision renders the evidence obtained inadmissible “for any
purpose in any proceeding.
The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify any one of them in breaking the drawers and
cabinets of the other and in ransacking them for any telltale evidence of marital infidelity. A person, by
contracting marriage, does not shed his/her integrity or his right to privacy as an individual and the
constitutional protection is ever available to him or to her.
The law insures absolute freedom of communication between the spouses by making it privileged.
Neither husband nor wife may testify for or against the other without the consent of the affected spouse while
the marriage subsists. Neither may be examined without the consent of the other as to any communication
received in confidence by one from the other during the marriage, save for specified exceptions. But one thing
is freedom of communication; quite another is a compulsion for each one to share what one knows with the
other. And this has nothing to do with the duty of fidelity that each owes to the other.
 PEOPLE VS YATAR

Facts:

Appellant Yatar and his wife were living in the house of Isabel Dawang together with the victim, Kathylyn Uba.
In June 1998, appellant’s wife left the house because of their frequent quarrels. Appellant received from the
victim, Kathylyn Uba, a letter from his estranged wife in the early morning on June 30, 1998. Appellant was
seen by Apolonia Wania and Beverly Denneng at 1:00 p.m. of June 30, 1998 near the kitchen of the house of
Isabel Dawang, acting strangely and wearing a dirty white shirt with collar. Judilyn Pas-a saw appellant going
down the ladder of the house of Isabel at 12:30 p.m., wearing a dirty white shirt, and again at 1:30 p.m., this
time wearing a black shirt. Appellant hurriedly left when the husband of Judilyn Pas-a was approaching.
Salmalina Tandagan saw appellant in a dirty white shirt coming down the ladder of the house of Isabel on the
day Kathylyn Uba was found dead. The door leading to the second floor of the house of Isabel Dawang was
tied by a rope. The victim, Kathylyn Uba, lay naked in a pool of blood with her intestines protruding from her
body on the second floor of the house of Isabel Dawang, with her stained pants, bra, underwear and shoes
scattered along the periphery. Laboratory examination revealed sperm in the victim’s vagina. The stained or
dirty white shirt found in the crime scene was found to be positive with blood. DNA of the semen found on the
victim’s vagina, compared with the DNA profile of the appellant are identical and Appellant escaped two days
after he was detained but was subsequently apprehended.

Issue: WON the judgement of conviction was meritorious.

Ruling: Yes. The testimonies of the witnesses are afforded credibility as the Supreme Court will not interfere
with the judgment of the trial court in determining the credibility of witnesses unless there appears in the
record some fact or circumstance of weight and influence which has been overlooked or the significance of
which has been misinterpreted. The latter is in a better and unique position of hearing first hand the
witnesses and observing their deportment, conduct and attitude.

Furthermore, the circumstantial evidence presentedby the prosecution, as presented in the facts of this case,
proves beyond doubt that the accused committed the crime.Circumstantial evidence, to be sufficient to
warrant a conviction, must form an unbroken chain which leads to a fair and reasonable conclusion that the
accused, to the exclusion of others, is the perpetrator of the crime. To determine whether there is sufficient
circumstantial evidence, three requisites must concur: (1) there is more than one circumstance; (2) facts on
which the inferences are derived are proven; and (3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to
produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.

As to the use of DNA evidence, under Philippine law, evidence is relevant when it relates directly to a fact in
issue as to induce belief in its existence or non-existence. In this case, the DNA evidence obtained which was
appreciated by the court a quo is relevant and reliable since it is reasonably based on scientifically valid
principles of human genetics and molecular biology.
The judgment in a criminal case can be upheld only when there is relevant evidence from which the court can
properly find or infer that the accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt. Proof beyond reasonable doubt
requires moral certainty of guilt in order to sustain a conviction. Moral certainty is that degree of certainty
that convinces and directs the understanding and satisfies the reason and judgment of those who are bound
to act conscientiously upon it. It is certainty beyond reasonable doubt. This requires that the circumstances,
taken together, should be of a conclusive nature and tendency; leading, on the whole, to a satisfactory
conclusion that the accused, and no one else, committed the offense charged. In view of the totality of
evidence appreciated thus far, the present case passes the test of moral certainty.
 TATING vs. MARCELLA, TATING and COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS:
On October 14, 1969, Daniela sold the subject property to her granddaughter, herein petitioner Nena Lazalita
Tating. The contract of sale was embodied in a duly notarized Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Daniela in
favor of Nena. Subsequently, title over the subject property was transferred in the name of Nena. She declared
the property in her name for tax purposes and paid the real estate taxes due thereon for the years 1972,
1973, 1975 to 1986 and 1988.However, the land remained in possession Daniela. On December 28, 1977,
Daniela executed a sworn statement claiming that she had actually no intention of selling the property; the
true agreement between her and Nena was simply to transfer title over the subject property in favor of the
latter to enable her to obtain a loan by mortgaging the subject property for the purpose of helping her defray
her business expenses; she later discovered that Nena did not secure any loan nor mortgage the property; she
wants the title in the name of Nena cancelled and the subject property reconveyed to her. Daniela died on July
29, 1988 leaving her children as her heirs. In a letter dated March 1, 1989, Carlos informed Nena that when
Daniela died they discovered the sworn statement she executed on December 28, 1977 and, as a consequence,
they are demanding from Nena the return of their rightful shares over the subject property as heirs of Daniela.
Nena did not reply. Efforts to settle the case amicably proved futile. Hence, her son filed a complaint with the
RTC praying for the nullification of the Deed of Absolute Sale. RTC decide in favour or the plaintiff and was
affirmed by the C A.
ISSUE: Whether the Sworn Statement should have been rejected outright by the lower courts.
RULING: The Court finds that both the trial court and the CA committed error in giving the sworn statement
probative weight. Since Daniela is no longer available to take the witness stand as she is already dead, the
RTC and the CA should not have given probative value on Daniela's sworn statement for purposes of proving
that the contract of sale between her and petitioner was simulated and that, as a consequence, a trust
relationship was created between them. Considering that the Court finds the subject contract of sale between
petitioner and Daniela to be valid and not fictitious or simulated, there is no more necessity to discuss the
issue as to whether or not a trust relationship was created between them. WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision
and Resolution of the Court of Appeals, affirming the Decision of the Regional Trial Court, are REVERSED AND
SET ASIDE. The complaint of the private respondents is DISMISSED.
 PEOPLE OF THEPHILIPPINES vs.RODRIGO SALAFRANCA

Facts:

Johnny Bolanon (Bolanon) was stabbed by Rodrigo Salafranca (Salafranca) on the night of July 31, 1993, after
the said incident, the assailant ran away. Bolanon still being able to walk, went to his uncle, Rodolfo B. Estanñ o
to seek help. After having known of the incident, Estanñ o then brought Bolanon to PGH. On their way to the
hospital on board a taxi, Bolanon confided to Estanñ o about the incident and told him that it was Salafranca
who stabbed him and a certain Augusto Mendoza witnessed the said incident. At around 2:30am, despite
receiving medical attention, Bolanon succumbed to death.

Issue: WON the utterance of Bolanonis qualified as a dying declaration or part of the res gestae?

Ruling: Yes. Such circumstances are qualified as both a dying declaration and a part of res gestae, the Court
has recognized that the statement of the victim an hour before his death and right after the incident bore all
the earmarks either of a dying declaration or part of the res gestae.

Generally, dying declaration is inadmissible as evidence being hearsay, however, it may be admitted
when the following requisites concur:
(a) that the declaration must concern the cause and surrounding circumstances of the declarant’s
death;
(b) that at the time the declaration is made, the declarant is under a consciousness of an impending
death;
(c) that the declarant is competent as a witness; and
(d) that the declaration is offered in a criminal case for homicide, murder, or parricide, in which the
declarant is a victim.

All the requisites were met. Bolanon communicated his statements, identifying Salafranca as the
person who had stabbed him; that at the time of his declaration, he was conscious of his impending death.
Bolanon died in the emergency room a few minutes after admission, which occurred under three hours after
the incident.
Furthermore, a declaration is deemed part of the res gestae and is admissible in evidence when the
following requisites concur:

a. the principal act, the res gastae, is a startling occurrence

b. the statements are made before the declarant had time to contrive or devise; and
c. the statements must concern the occurrence in question and its immediately attending
circumstances.

The requisites for admissibility as part of the res gestae concur herein. That when he gave the identity of
the assailant, Bolanon was referring to a startling occurrence, and had no time to contrive his identification.
His utterance was made in spontaneity and only in reaction to such startling occurrence. The statement was
relevant because it identified Salafranca as the perpetrator.

Hence, such circumstances are qualified as both a dying declaration and a part of res gestae for having
borne the requisites of the both principles.
 SCC CHEMICALS CORPORATION vs. CA

FACTS:
SCC Chemicals Corporation through its chairman, private respondent DaniloArrieta and vice president, Pablo
(Pablito) Bermundo, obtained a loan from State Investment House Inc (hereinafter SIHI) in the amount of
P129,824.48. The loan carried an annual interest rate of 30% plus penalty charges of 2% per month on the
remaining balance of the principal upon non-payment on the due date-January 12, 1984. To secure the
payment of the loan, DaniloArrieta and private respondent LeopoldoHalili executed a Comprehensive Surety
Agreement binding themselves jointly and severally to pay the obligation on the maturity date which was not
paid.

SIHI filed Civil Case for a sum of money with a prayer for preliminary attachment against SCC, Arrieta, and
Halili with the Regional Trial Court of Manila. The case was then set for pre-trial. The parties were allowed to
meet out-of-court in an effort to settle the dispute amicably. No settlement was reached, but stipulation of
facts was agreed upon. The case then proceeded to trial on the sole issue of whether or not the defendants
were liable to the plaintiff and to what extent was the liability.

SIHI presented one witness to prove its claim. The cross-examination of said witness was postponed several
times due to one reason or another at the instance of either party. The case was calendared several times for
hearing but each time, SCC or its counsel failed to appear despite notice. SCC was finally declared by the trial
court to have waived its right to cross-examine the witness of SIHI and the case was deemed submitted for
decision. On March 22, 1993, the lower court promulgated its decision in favor of SIHI.

Issues:
1. Whether the testimony of private respondent’s witness is hearsay.
2. Whether the promissory note was genuine and genuinely executed as required by law.
3. Whether the “best evidence rule” should be applied.

Ruling:
1. The Court of Appeals correctly found that the witness of SIHI was a competent witness as he testified
to facts, which he knew of his personal knowledge. Thus, the requirements of Section 36, Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court as to the admissibility of his testimony were satisfied.
Rule 130, Section 36 reads:
SEC. 36. Testimony generally confined to personal knowledge; hearsay excluded. – A witness can testify
only to those facts which he knows of his personal knowledge; that is, which are derived from his own
perception, except as otherwise provided in these rules.

Petitioner's reliance on Section 36, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court is misplaced. As a rule, hearsay
evidence is excluded and carries no probative value. However, the rule does admit of an exception. Where a
party failed to object to hearsay evidence, then the same is admissible.The rationale for this exception is to be
found in the right of a litigant to cross-examine. It is settled that it is the opportunity to cross-examine which
negates the claim that the matters testified to by a witness are hearsay.However, the right to cross-examine
may be waived. The repeated failure of a party to cross-examine the witness is an implied waiver of such right.
Petitioner was afforded several opportunities by the trial court to cross-examine the other party's witness.
Petitioner repeatedly failed to take advantage of these opportunities. No error was thus committed by the
respondent court when it sustained the trial court's finding that petitioner had waived its right to cross-
examine the opposing party's witness. It is now too late for petitioner to be raising this matter of hearsay
evidence.

2. Petitioner's admission as to the execution of the promissory note by it through private respondent
Arrieta and Bermundo at pre-trial sufficed to settle the question of the genuineness of signatures. The
admission having been made in a stipulation of facts at pre-trial by the parties, it must be treated as a judicial
admission. Under Section, 4 Rule 129 of the Rules of Court, a judicial admission requires no proof.
 3. Respondent SIHI had no need to present the original of the documents as there was already a judicial
admission by petitioner at pre-trial of the execution of the promissory note and receipt of the demand letter. It
is now too late for petitioner to be questioning their authenticity. Its admission of the existence of these
documents was sufficient to establish its obligation. Petitioner failed to submit any evidence to the contrary or
proof of payment or other forms of extinguishment of said obligation. No reversible error was thus committed
by the appellate court when it held petitioner liable on its obligation
Arellano University School of Law
2018-2019

Evidence
Preliminary Consideration
Case Digest

Submitted to:
Judge Byron San Pedro

Submitted by:
Arianne Dimaano