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Unpacking the extractivist state: The role of weak state agencies in promoting
institutional change in Peru

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DOI: 10.1016/j.exis.2018.08.007

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 The Extractive Industries and Society 6 (2019) 206–214

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The Extractive Industries and Society

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Original article

Unpacking the extractivist state: The role of weak state agencies in T

promoting institutional change in Peru
Maria-Therese Gustafssona, , Martin Scurrahb
⁎

a
Stockholm University, Department of Political Science, Universitetsvagen 10F, SE-10691 Stockholm, Sweden
b
Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, Av Horacio Urteaga 694, Jesús María, Peru

ARTICLE INFO ABSTRACT

Keywords: When a resource boom has begun it is often challenging to develop institutions for governing natural resources in
Extractive governance an inclusive and sustainable manner. Whereas existing studies on resource-rich states have focused on political
Land-use zoning policies elites or social mobilization for explaining attempts to strengthen such institutions, we know less about the role
Peru of less influential reform-oriented agencies (e.g. environmental agencies, subnational governments), and what
Institutional weakness and change
explains how and why on rare occasions they are surprisingly effective in driving institutional change.
Mining conflicts
Theoretically, we draw on theories on institutional weakness and change. Based on 139 interviews, we analyze
the outcomes of different strategies adopted by the Peruvian Environmental Ministry (MINAM) to enforce a
participatory zoning and land-use planning (LUP) reform between 2008 and 2016. We argue that weak agencies
are dependent upon strategic ability, here referring to the skill of an agency to adapt its strategies to reigning
political opportunities, thereby contributing to defending or expanding its autonomy vis-á-vis powerful groups
and building alliances with societal actors that could defend it from opponents. By unpacking the dynamics
within a resource-rich state, we contribute with a nuanced analysis of the challenges of building and effectively
enforcing institutions in a context of expanding extractive industries.

1. Introduction subnational governments, in enforcing weak institutions. A few

In recent decades, governments across the globe have promoted
the expansion of extractive industries. In order to reduce the en-
vironmental and social costs of large-scale resource extraction or le-
gitimize the expansion of the extractive frontier, governments have
increasingly given in to international and domestic pressure and
adopted such institutions as free, prior and informed consent and
public participation in environmental impact assessment (Leifsen
et al., 2017). Whereas there is a consensus about the importance of
such institutions for fostering inclusive development, we know much
less about how these institutions emerge, are sustained over time and
enforced effectively (Bebbington et al., 2018: 2; Waldner and Smith,
2015). There is a burgeoning literature focusing upon the role of so-
cietal mobilization (e.g. Bebbington and Bury, 2009; Falleti and
Riofrancos, 2018), political settlements (Bebbington et al., 2018;
McCullough, 2017), and the ways in which elites or companies un-
dermine or block such institutions (Aguilar-Støen and Hirsch, 2015;
Schilling-Vacaflor et al., 2018; Gustafsson, 2017). However, we know
much less about the dynamics within states and, in particular, about
the role of less influential agencies, such as environmental agencies or
scholars have emphasized the role of subnational governments (e.g.
Bebbington et al., 2018: 12; Walter and Urkidi, 2017), as well as re-
form-oriented, entrepreneurial agencies, such as the Ombudsman,
that, despite their marginalized position in the state as a whole, have
played an important role in driving institutional change (Paredes and
De la Puente, 2017). Still, we know relatively little about the role of
such agencies and what explains more or less successful attempts to
enforce institutions for promoting inclusive development in the pre-
sence of mining. In particular, what are the sources of power and
strategies that are available for weak agencies in their efforts to en-
force such institutions in the context of expanding extractive in-
dustries? The article contributes to disentangling the power dynamics
within the Peruvian state by analyzing the environmental ministry’s
efforts to enforce participatory ecological and economic zoning (EEZ)
and related land-use planning (LUP) institutions. A wide range of
actors, such as local communities, civil society actors and the OECD
suggest that, by assessing different land-use alternatives and involving
local groups in discussions about appropriate use of land, LUP would
foster inclusive and locally sustainable resource governance in the
presence of mining (Bebbington and Bury, 2009; 17300; CEPAL/

⁎
Corresponding author.
E-mail address: mariatherese.gustafsson@statsvet.su.se (M.-T. Gustafsson).

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.exis.2018.08.007
Received 3 June 2018; Received in revised form 15 August 2018; Accepted 15 August 2018
Available online 21 September 2018
2214-790X/ © 2018 Published by Elsevier Ltd.
M.-T. Gustafsson, M. Scurrah
OECD, 2015; FAO, 1993).1 However, as planning is likely to constrain
the expansion of resource extraction, mining companies and influen-
tial state agencies are generally skeptical about LUP, and in recent
years LUP has become recentralized.2
Recognizing the heterogeneous nature of the state and drawing on
insights from the literature on institutional weakness and change
(Levitsky and Murillo, 2009, 2013; Mahoney and Thelen, 2009) and
social movements (Tarrow, 1994), the article studies the role of weak
reform-oriented agencies in enforcing LUP. We argue that weak agen-
cies are dependent upon strategic ability, here referring to the skill of an
agency to adapt the timing, speed and framing of reform efforts to
reigning political opportunities, and allow agencies to defend or expand
their autonomy vis-á-vis powerful groups and build alliances with so-
cietal actors that could defend them from opponents. Conversely, by not
acting strategically, particularly in the absence of strong, supporting
coalitions, weak agencies could further reduce their existing leeway,
resulting in their further weakening. Hence, strategic ability increases
the likelihood of success of weak agencies, even when political oppor-
tunities are adverse.
Empirically, the article is based on a within-case analysis comparing
the Peruvian environmental ministry’s (MINAM) efforts to promote LUP
during three distinct periods from 2008 until 2016, emphasizing how
actors inside and outside the state with different interests and sources of
power blocked or supported MINAM. Whereas the first (2008–2011)
and second period (2011) were characterized by relatively favorable
opportunities to promote LUP, during the third period (2012–2016)
such opportunities were limited. Variation over time in the degree of
external support and autonomy enjoyed by MINAM in relation to op-
ponents allows us to highlight the shifting political opportunities and
constraints in the face of which MINAM adopted different strategies for
implementing LUP.
Peru is an interesting case for studying weak agencies, as mining is
an important driver of economic growth. With weak civil society actors
and a unified political and economic elite, Peru also offers a hard test of
weak agencies’ ability to enforce contested institutions, such as LUP.
The article is based on empirical material collected during field
work in 2015, 2016 and 2017 (in total 4,5 months) and that consists of
written primary sources as well as 139 semi-structured interviews
during three periods with national and regional authorities, re-
presentatives of mining corporations, civil society and aid agencies. We
have also participated in national workshops, training of civil servants
and information meetings, and analyzed the implementation of LUP in
three regions. Thus, to reconstruct a complex political process we have
primarily relied on the first-hand information of key actors. To avoid
biased accounts, we carefully selected informants with different
knowledge and interests in relation to the processes studied and com-
pared their statements and, when possible, also with written docu-
ments. We analyzed the data with the support of Nvivo.
2. Studying the strategic ability of reform-oriented, weak agencies
There is a tendency in the literature on resource-rich states to por-
tray the state as a unitary actor and to focus on the role of rent-seeking
or more progressive political elites (e.g. Karl, 1997; Haslam and
Heidrich, 2016). This is hardly surprising given that large-scale re-
source projects are generally under centralized authority and political
settlements between political and economic elites shape institutional
outcomes in important ways (e.g. Bebbington et al., 2018). Still,
1 Murillo’s (2009: 2013) work on the enforcement of weak institutions to
Plataforma para el Ordenamiento territorial. Pronunciamiento: "Exigimos
un proceso de ordenamiento territorial descentralizado." Published September
14, 2016. Accessed May 18, 2018, http://ordenamientoterritorialot.blogspot.
se/2016/09/lima-14-de-setiembre-del-2016.html.
2
Interview with representative of mining companies’ interest organization,
March 2015.
207
The Extractive Industries and Society 6 (2019) 206–214
entrepreneurial agencies with a marginalized position within the state
and that lack formal authority over mining have, in many cases, in-
tervened in extractive governance in their efforts to represent their
constituencies or implement policies under their authority (e.g. Walter
and Urkidi, 2017; Paredes and De la Puente, 2017). In the following
section, we will discuss central concepts related to state strength and
strategic ability and thereafter develop a typology for studying strate-
gies of weak agencies.
We follow a tradition of scholarship which emphasizes the hetero-
geneous nature of the state (e.g. Migdal, 2001) and try to show how the
state comprises different components that may establish ties with and
intervene in the defense of various societal interests related to land and
natural resources. As Eaton’s (2017) study of Peru, Ecuador and Bolivia
demonstrates, conflicts between different levels of the state have be-
come more frequent. State strength is often unevenly distributed across
policy areas (Skocpol, 1985: 17), and commonly conceptualized along
two dimensions: capacity and autonomy (Bersch et al., 2017). Whereas
capacity refers to” the organizational and bureaucratic ability to im-
plement governing projects” (Centeno et al., 2017: 3), autonomy could
be defined as the ability to” formulate and pursue goals that are not
simply reflective of the demands or interests of social groups, classes or
society” (Skocpol, 1985: 9). Importantly, capacity and autonomy do not
necessarily vary together, but these dimensions could be combined
differently, creating agencies that are weak in different aspects. By
weak agencies we, therefore, refer to an agency that is characterized by
either low capacity and/or autonomy.
Scholars have, for instance, assessed the relation between state ca-
pacity and the relative autonomy of the state from societal actors and
shown that state agencies could compensate for weaknesses in their
capacity through close ties with powerful economic groups (Evans,
1995). Strong ties with economic actors can generate resources, in-
formation and manpower, but also reduce such agencies’ autonomy.
This may also lead to the creation of powerful segments within the state
that are dominated by narrow interests (Centeno et al., 2017: 23) and
that could undermine the ability of weaker state agencies to pursue
their goals (Soifer and Vom Hau, 2008: 224). For weak agencies trying
to enforce institutions threatening the interests of powerful economic
actors and state agencies, international support, such as that from aid
agencies or transnational civil society (cf. Keck and Sikkink, 1998), as
well as broad-based domestic support, such as that from social move-
ments or political parties (North, 1995: 25), could constitute an im-
portant source of power and enable weak agencies to build capacity and
counterbalance the resistance of corporate actors and political elites. To
generate external support is, therefore, crucial for weak agencies.
Drawing on insights from the social movement literature, we argue
that weak agencies need strategic ability to adapt to the pressures from
opponents and attract available support. A commonly-held assumption
in this literature is that the success of social movements relies on their
ability to act strategically in relation to existing political opportunities,
commonly referred to as the “consistent– but not necessarily formal or
permanent – dimensions of the political environment that provide in-
centives for people to undertake collective action by affecting their
expectations for success or failure” (Tarrow, 1994: 85). Some scholars
have demonstrated how institutional entrepreneurs with the ability to
build support by framing reforms in a way that is convincing among
groups with different interests have played important roles in driving
institutional change (Sweet et al., 2001; Paredes and De la Puente,
2017). However, it is unusual to study how weak agencies take ad-
vantage of such opportunities.
In the rest of this section, we draw primarily on Levitsky and
develop a typology (see Table 1) of different strategies. The typology
elaborates on two structural variables – “external support” and “relative
autonomy” – that shape enforcement possibilities. External support
could play an important role in enhancing capacity, as well as providing
political support. However, as suggested above, external support may
M.-T. Gustafsson, M. Scurrah
Table 1
Enforcement strategies.
Relative autonomy (vis-á-vis veto players)
High Low
External support Strong Full-scale enforcement Weak enforcement
Weak Gradual enforcement Non-enforcement
also reduce autonomy. Levitsky and Murillo ((2009): 117) define en-
forcement as the degree to which institutions such as LUP are “com-
plied with in practice” (Levitsky and Murillo, 2009: 117) and describe
different forms of enforcement of dormant institutions —from full-scale
enforcement to gradual, weak and non-enforcement. We refer to these
as enforcement strategies. These strategies differ in terms of speed,
timing, and framing of enforcement. Below we will discuss each in turn,
focusing upon the viability of the strategies in relation to different
degrees of autonomy vis-á-vis veto-players (e.g. mining companies) and
external support (international actors, civil society, political parties).
Full-scale enforcement is the most ambitious but also the riskiest
strategy for rapidly enforcing a dormant institution (Levitsky and
Murillo, 2013: 105). To be successful, this strategy is expected to re-
quire a high degree of external support and autonomy. Timing and
framing are also likely to be crucial. Still, the risk of miscalculating the
preferences and power of veto-players is high (Levitsky and Murillo,
2013: 122). Gradual enforcement refers to a strategy to enforce an in-
itially weak institution over time and is expected to be viable in cases of
relatively high autonomy, while allowing agencies to build up coali-
tions over time. While a slow process provides more opportunities to
assess the preferences of potential veto-players, there is still a risk of
miscalculation. One solution that would apply to both full-scale and
gradual enforcement is to include informal power holders in the process
(Levitsky and Murillo, 2013: 105). As these actors may use the inside
position to try to block, delay or deviate institutional reforms, institu-
tional supporters also need to be incorporated (Falleti and Riofrancos,
2018). Another solution in the case of gradual enforcement is to care-
fully frame and disguise the efforts to enforce the institution (Mahoney
and Thelen, 2009: 25), thereby ensuring institutional stability and al-
lowing the agency to develop capacities and construct coalitions while
waiting for the right moment for full-scale enforcement. Weak en-
forcement refers to the “softening (or elimination) of an institution’s
effect on informal veto players and other potential losers” (Levitsky and
Murillo, 2013: 101) and increases the likelihood that these actors ac-
cept rules that they otherwise would have tried to block. Finally, non-
enforcement refers to the efforts to ensure formal institutional stability
(Levitsky and Murillo, 2013: 101) in cases of low degrees of autonomy
and weak external support at the expense of enforcement. With regard
to weak and non-enforcement, the difference between short-term be-
havior and long-run strategies must be emphasized (Mahoney and
Thelen, 2009: 22). These are short-term strategies that allow agencies
to bide their time and build coalitions and capacity. In both of these
cases it is important to distinguish between actors with transformatory
goals and so-called “parasites” that seek to preserve an institution while
at the same time carrying out “actions that contradict the “spirit” or the
purpose of the institution, thus undermining it” (Mahoney and Thelen,
2009: 24). State agencies, for example, commonly use depolitization to
undermine the effective participation of local communities in extractive
projects (Schilling-Vacaflor et al., 2018). In the following sections we
will, after providing some background on the Peruvian case, apply this
framework to the analysis of MINAM’s efforts to institutionalize LUP
between 2008 and 2016.
3. The mining sector and planning in Peru
Peru’s mining sector underwent major transformations in the last
208
The Extractive Industries and Society 6 (2019) 206–214
three decades, including neoliberal restructuring and rapid expansion,
provoking, as a consequence, rising social conflicts. In the early 1990’s,
the authoritarian populist government of Alberto Fujimori introduced
reforms that drastically reduced the importance of state regulation and
planning institutions and debilitated political parties and civil society
organizations (Wise, 2003). The state principally assumed the role of a
promoter of private investment, in particular in the mining sector,
through attractive tax incentives and simplification of concession pro-
cedures (Bebbington et al., 2018: 45). Consequently, foreign investment
in mining increased rapidly and Peru is today the world’s third largest
producer of silver, copper, and zinc, fourth largest of lead, and the fifth
largest producer of gold.3 However, this rapid territorial transformation
has generated overlaps with other forms of land-use, in particular those
of peasant communities, resulting in a large number of conflicts. In
April 2018, the Ombudsman (2018) reported 127 socio-environmental
conflicts.
To deal with these conflicts, the government has in recent years
introduced several important reforms – such as prior consultation
(Schilling-Vacaflor et al., 2018), participation in Environmental Impact
Assessments (Jaskoski, 2014), transference of mining revenues to sub-
national governments (Arellano-Yanguas, 2011) and decentralized LUP.
Similarly, environmental institutions have, despite weak organizational
capacity, been strengthened in recent years with the creation of the
Ministry for the Environment (2008), the Office for Environmental
Evaluation and Supervision — OEFA (2008), and the National Service
for Environmental Certification — SENACE (2012) (Orihuela and
Paredes, 2017). Overall, whereas the adoption of these institutions has
helped to some extent to ensure dialogue between companies and
communities, reduce negative impacts and distribute profits, these in-
stitutions are generally weakly enforced and, in fact, MINAM itself was
directly weakened during the course of the Humala administration.
3.1. LUP as a route to inclusive and sustainable resource governance
The rapid and uncoordinated expansion of extractive industries has
generated significant geographical overlaps between mining conces-
sions, agricultural lands and water resources (Cuba et al., 2014).
Bebbington and Bury (2009), 17300) argue that, by involving local
groups in discussions about appropriate use of land, LUP could help to
align mining expansion with existing local livelihoods. In Peru, LUP
comprises a technical (EEZ) and a political (territorial ordering – Or-
denamiento Territorial – OT) process. More specifically, EEZ is defined as
‘a participatory and concerted, dynamic and flexible process aimed at
identifying different alternatives for the sustainable use of a specific
territory’ (author’s translation; DS No. 087–2004-PCM). OT is defined
as ‘a state policy, a political and technical process for taking agreed-
upon decisions among social, economic, political, and technical actors,
for an organised and sustainable use of the territory’ (RM No.
026–2010-MINAM). EEZ and OT are thus two different steps in LUP.
In Peru, demands for participatory LUP have primarily emerged
from subnational actors and civil society that are critical of the adverse
effects of extractive industries.4 They emphasize the importance of
binding LUPs that structure any investments in mining, hydrocarbons,
construction, or commercial agriculture. However, it is important to
recognize that in many countries LUP has been surrounded by conflicts
and undermined by political and economic elites' attempt to control
such policies, sometimes contributing to the reinforcement of existing
power structures (Broegaard et al., 2017; Baletti, 2012).
LUP was first proposed by international development agencies in
the 1990s. Between 2002 and 2003, two important laws, the Law of
Decentralisation (Law No. 27,783) and the Law of Regional
3
http://www.indexmundi.com/minerals/?product=leadandgraph=
production, accessed April 8, 2018.
4
See endnote 1.
M.-T. Gustafsson, M. Scurrah
Governments (Law No. 27,867), that defined regional governments’
competencies in LUP, were adopted. The second law established that
regional governments had the autonomy to formulate, execute and
approve territorial plans (article 53). In 2004, the EEZ Regulations were
adopted (DS No. 087–2004-PCM). An important aspect of this regula-
tion is that regional governments can define and delineate headwaters
as areas of conservation (article 9). However, while regional govern-
ments have the formal authority to implement LUP under the mon-
itoring of MINAM, Peru remains a highly centralized country with weak
regional governments (Eaton, 2017). The distribution of power between
the actors that are in favor (MINAM, regional governments and civil
society organizations) and opposed to LUP (Ministry of Economy and
Finance — MEF, Ministry of Energy and Mines — MINEM, and mining
corporations) is thereby uneven.
3.2. Strong and weak planning agencies in Peru
Planning was introduced in Peru in 1962 by the creation of the
National Planning Institute (INP) that was dissolved in 1992 by the
Fujimori government. From 1992 until the creation of the National
Strategic Planning Center (CEPLAN) in 2005 there was no formal, in-
tegrated planning mechanism in the Peruvian state. Since then, state
planning of land and natural resources in Peru has mainly comprised
two formal and two informal multi-level and multi-sectoral national
planning systems: the Multiyear Macroeconomic Framework (Marco
Macroeconómico Multianual – MMM) and associated Program Budgeting
within MEF and the system for granting mining concessions within
MINEM, on the one hand, and the National Strategic Planning System
directed by CEPLAN within the Premier’s Department (PCM) and re-
gional LUP directed by MINAM, on the other. A former director of
CEPLAN stated that planning “expresses not only the vision and mission
of a country and its regions but also establishes the strategic guidelines,
principal investment projects and national priorities” (Alarco Tosoni,
2017: 28) but then went on to argue that “national strategic planning
does not exist in Peru” (Alarco Tosoni, 2017: 35). Agreeing with this
assessment, we will argue that there is a high degree of institutional
incoherence between these plans and that formal planning, undertaken
by MINAM and CEPLAN, is weak, whereas de facto planning, carried
out by MEF and MINEM, is strong, resulting in selective enforcement.
These differences are also reflected in their annual budgets as a per-
centage of the total central government budget: MEF (14%), PCM (6%),
MINEM (0.7%), MINAM (0.2%), INGEMMET (0.1%) and CEPLAN
(0.01%).5
Table 2 compares the four planning institutions and the levels of
agency capacity and autonomy.
MEF’s legitimacy is based on its ability to maintain economic sta-
bility and growth (Dargent, 2015: 97). It is the ministry with the highest
concentration of internationally educated technocrats, commands a
disproportionate share of the state’s financial resources and has devel-
oped considerable capacity for analyzing and making proposals con-
cerning the policy issues relevant to other sectors of the state (Dargent,
2015; Crabtree and Durand, 2017: 98–102).6 Technocrats within MEF
have developed a high degree of autonomy in a context of a weak po-
litical class (Dargent, 2015) and MEF is by far the most powerful
ministry with high levels of capacity and autonomy.
The second most powerful ministry within the Peruvian state is
MINEM, largely because it governs the mining and oil industries, which
have been the engines of economic growth and generators of foreign
exchange and investment. Within MINEM, INGEMMET (Geological,
Mining and Metallurgical Institute) is a highly technical agency dedi-
cated to geological research and the creation and maintenance of the
mining cadaster, which has simplified and clarified mining concessions
5
https://www.mef.gob.pe/contenidos/presu_pub/anexo4_Ley30693.pdf.
6
Interview with former Minister of the Environment, August 2016.
209
The Extractive Industries and Society 6 (2019) 206–214
Table 2
Formal and de facto planning agencies in Peru.
Institution Planning instrument Capacity Autonomy
MEF MMM-PB High High
MEM Mining concessions High Medium
CEPLAN Strategic Development Plans Low Low
MINAM Land-use Planning Medium Low
for the private sector and facilitated the expansion of mining explora-
tion. While its capacity level may be classified as high, its level of au-
tonomy is less clear because, on the one hand, it is a highly technical
agency administering an almost automatic concession system where
there is little room for discretion. On the other hand, MINEM is subject
to political pressure from the country’s most powerful political lobby
where the practice of a “revolving door” operates, whereby many
ministers and high level functionaries come from or leave for the
mining and petroleum industries (Crabtree and Durand, 2017). The
links to the private sector (cf. Evans, 1995) as well as MEF contribute to
enhancing MINEM’s capacity, illustrating how the dominance of narrow
interests could create uneven capacities within the state as a whole
(Centeno et al., 2017: 23).
Although CEPLAN is located within the PCM it functions more as a
high level think tank producing reports rather than as an agency in-
fluencing government policies and decisions and determining the al-
location of resources.7 Nevertheless, it does oversee the development of
regional strategic plans which incorporate information from the re-
gional EEZ reports. In a state notorious for its focus on the short term,
the medium and long-term strategic plans developed by CEPLAN are
largely ignored (OECD, 2016: 23). In an interview with CEPLAN func-
tionaries in July, 2016, they acknowledged: “What clearly exists is a
MEF which is very strong and very powerful in all respects. MEF is the
center of the Government of Peru and decides how much is spent, on
what it is spent, how it is spent, in manner and form, etc. And this is a
power we have not been able to break.”
Finally, MINAM is responsible for monitoring the regional govern-
ments in their implementation of LUP. MINAM has strengthened its
own capacity and that of regional governments to carry out LUP,
though this has not been without difficulties given the generally weak
capacity – both technical and governance – in the regional govern-
ments. Thus, capacity building has been a slow and uneven process.
Despite MINAM’s weak capacity level and reduced degree of au-
tonomy in comparison to such de facto planning agencies as MEF and
MINEM, there has been a substantial public investment in the LUP
process and 14 out of 25 regions are in a situation to finalize their plans.
LUP has been by far the most controversial and conflictive planning
process precisely because it has involved an attempt by a government
agency to enforce an institutional innovation in alliance with relatively
disempowered regional governments and in the face of opposition from
the country’s most powerful industry.
4. Three strategies employed to promote LUP
Based on the conceptual framework we developed, this section
analyzes how MINAM, in a context of shifting opportunities and con-
straints during three distinct periods between 2008 and 2016, both
adopted different strategies for promoting LUP and demonstrated dif-
ferent degrees of strategic ability.
7
Interviews with two former directors of CEPLAN, May 2017, and, a former
CEPLAN functionary, July 2016, two former high level functionaries of MINEM,
July 2016, and a well-informed academic economist, July 2016.
M.-T. Gustafsson, M. Scurrah The Extractive Industries and Society 6 (2019) 206–214

4.1. A gradual enforcement strategy (2008–2011) opposition and attract resources important for building up its own and
regional governments’ capacity to enforce LUP. In 2010, MINAM was
During this period, the political opportunities for promoting LUP also close to the adoption of a law on LUP, an important step in its
were relatively favorable. As a new, comparatively weak ministry, institutionalization. However, the strategies adopted in the subsequent
MINAM was not perceived as a threat by technocratic and business period paralyzed and, with regard to the law proposal, dismantled the
actors and could therefore advance relatively autonomously. Thus, it advances achieved to that point.
was a time when an institutional innovation could advance in its im-
plementation. At the same time, MINAM and regional governments
4.2. A full-scale enforcement strategy in the face of mining expansion
obtained resources from both MEF and international development
(2011)
agencies that perceived LUP as an innovation in regional planning,
rather than as an instrument for opposing mining projects. Thus
At the beginning of the brief second period, given the high-level
framed, it was possible to reduce possible opposition from the mining
political support from the newly elected reformist government, there
industry. Within this context, MINAM was able to significantly improve
seemed to be a political opportunity to make more rapid advances in
its level of technical expertise and overall implementation capacity, as
LUP. In this context, MINAM employed an aggressive strategy similar to
well as advance the LUP law proposal.
that adopted by the Velasco Government in the 1970s which, for a time,
Upon his appointment in 2008 as the first Minister for the
achieved a degree of autonomy which enabled it to advance its radical
Environment, Antonio Brack was able to obtain considerable financial
reform agenda (Cleaves and Scurrah, 1980: 132-136). However, the
support from the international community.8 These resources and links
autonomous space for advancing regional LUP abruptly closed down
to the international community gave MINAM some leverage and re-
when the Cajamarca regional government, initially with support from
duced its dependence on MEF.
MINAM, employed its LUP report (OR No. 018-2010-GR.CAJ-CR) to
The promotion of LUP advanced within the new ministry as a re-
attempt to block the Conga mining project. The resulting open con-
latively invisible and autonomous activity.9 The initial, technical phase
frontation with the mining industry and its allies proved to be dama-
of LUP was not only promoted by the central government but also by
ging to the development of LUP, which was now framed as a political
NGOs with international financial support and MINAM’s accompani-
instrument to oppose mining expansion.
ment. In a manner similar to participatory budgeting and development
In his inaugural Message to the Nation on July 28, 2011, newly-
planning, one informant described LUP as an institutional innovation in
elected President Ollanta Humala announced that one of the priorities
the context of a return to democracy and a renewed effort at decen-
of his government would be “to advance profoundly in the policies of
tralization.10 Another informant claimed that MEF was supportive and
land-use planning in order to define, in a participatory way, the rational
participated in different meetings with MINAM.11 Furthermore, in-
use of our territory”.15 This, together with the unanimous passage of the
volvement of mining industry representatives in a multisectoral ad-
law approving prior consultation of indigenous peoples (Law No.
visory commission enabled MINAM to understand its opponent.
29785), passed shortly afterwards, could be interpreted as a radical
During this period, only 5 out of 25 regions completed their EEZ.
shift in government policy. During the election campaign Humala and
Two factors stand out as important explanations for the relatively slow
his advisors had argued that measures such as these were necessary to
progress. First, MINAM, as a newly created ministry, lacked the tech-
even up the balance in favor of those affected by extractive activities
nical capacity to offer training and methodological guidelines to re-
and to reduce the number and intensity of socio environmental con-
gional governments, although it was free from external interference
flicts, which were attributed in many cases to the automatic granting of
aimed at restricting its autonomy.12 Second, the implementation of the
mining concessions. LUP’s most active proponents argued publicly that
decentralization reform had been incomplete and created regional
it would enable subnational governments to develop plans which would
governments with unclear mandates, weak capacities and heavy de-
indicate zones where mining would be suitable or recommendable with
pendence on the central government for funding (Eaton, 2017). For the
conditions or restrictions and zones where it would be inadvisable or
regional governments, the development of LUP was not only a new
forbidden. In March, 2015, a lawyer at a Lima-based NGO argued that
experience but one with unclear immediate benefits. These conditions
“these plans are no longer seen as technical processes but also as social
suggested that a “slow and steady” strategy would consolidate the
and political processes involving concertation and of interest for de-
process more than a “fast and furious” one, whose risks are illustrated in
ciding the use of the territory.” Such plans would complement and
the following section.
correct the mining concession process and would be tantamount to
One important factor that enabled regional governments and
territorial reorganization.
MINAM to advance with LUP was the investment financing that was
The new Minister for the Environment and his team were viewed
obtained from 2004 onwards from MEF.13 MINAM adopted a con-
with deep suspicion by mining companies, as reflecting the views of the
ciliatory approach towards the private sector, reinforcing a perception
more radical wing of the environmental movement. In the words of a
of LUP as a promising innovation for gradually strengthening regional
mining executive in July, 2016: “To talk to a company in general about
governance rather than as a threat to the continued expansion of
EEZ and LUP, even socially responsible companies,. . . they will tell you
mining and other extractive activities.14 Hence, overall, this strategy
that they are afraid of them and of what is behind them.” This limited
was relatively successful as it enabled MINAM to neutralize possible
the room for agreement between mining companies, many of whom
were not willing to accept any limitations to the exploitation of their
8 concessions, and an environment ministry whose leadership was sen-
http://www.inforegion.pe/20590/peru-es-un-pais-importante-en-la-
conservacion-del-equilibrio-climatico-del-mundo/. sitive to the demands of the communities affected by mining. Already in
9
Interviews with functionary at MINAM, April 2015, and functionary, 2010, mining corporations had withdrawn from the Cajamarca LUP
MINAM, July 2016. technical committee and the influential Confederation of Private
10
Interview with advisor to regional governments, March 2015. Business Institutions (CONFIEP) had withdrawn from the national
11
Interview with functionary at MINAM, May 2011. multisectoral committee in protest at what they saw as manipulation of
12
Interviews with advisor to regional governments, Lima-based NGO, March the LUP in Cajamarca.16 This led to a halt in the discussions concerning
2015, and July 2016.
13
Interview with former functionary at MEF, and former Minister for
15
Agriculture and for Housing, August 2016. http://www.noticiasser.pe/15/04/2015/medio-ambiente/ordenamiento-
14
Interview with functionary at MINAM, April 2015, and functionary, territorial-la-prioridad-postergada. Accessed 20 December, 2016.
16
MINAM, July 2016. Letter from CONFIEP to MINAM, November 8, 2010

210
M.-T. Gustafsson, M. Scurrah
a revised law to fill the gaps in the LUP process. Humala had neither a
solid political coalition nor organized social support with which to
defend a vigorous enforcement of LUP in the face of private sector
opposition. Thus, MINAM overestimated the political support it would
receive from the president.17
Those representing rural interests had expressed concern about the
possible approval of mining projects in the headwaters of river basins
and the regional government’s technical team recommended in the EEZ
report that mining be allowed “with restrictions”. The regional council
accepted these recommendations and in October 2011 approved the
EEZ.18
However, when this was followed by a Regional Ordinance (OR No.
036-2011-GR.CAJ-CR), which declared that the conservation, protec-
tion and intangibility of all the headwaters in the Cajamarca region was
in the public interest “in harmony with the national and regional sus-
tainable development plans”, the regional government and its allies in
MINAM were seen to be using the EEZ process to support mobilizations
against the Conga project,19 which was in a river basin headwater.
Since most mines in Peru are located in such headwaters, the mining
industry perceived this as a threat to its very existence and not simply
as opposition to a particular project located in a particular Andean
ecosystem.20 This transformed MINAM from being perceived as sup-
portive of the Cajamarca regional government in its technical planning
process to being perceived as supportive of the Cajamarca regional
government in its opposition to the Conga mining project and, finally,
to being perceived as in opposition to MEF and MINEM and their allies
in the mining sector in general. Hence, the process revealed profound
disagreements within the central government, in particular between
MINAM and MINEM, who took different public sides in the conflict. As
a consequence, both ministers, as well as the Prime Minister, were
forced to resign.
Since the correlation of political and financial resources clearly fa-
vored the mining industry and their national and international allies,
the Humala government reached a face-saving solution, which involved
suspension of the Conga project and the declaration by the
Constitutional Tribunal of the ordinance in defense of the river basin
headwaters as unconstitutional.
The conflict clearly illustrates how these types of reforms require
more than political will and that the absence of strong political parties
and social movements as allies that could back up regional actors un-
dermined MINAM’s full-enforcement strategy and limited the possibi-
lities for employing LUP to challenge powerful groups within the cen-
tral government and private sector. The speed with which the
Cajamarca regional government advanced with its EEZ report and
pressured MINAM to allow it to prepare its regional LUP transformed
what had been a gradual enforcement process which might require
adaptation into one that immediately threatened new mining projects.
The timing was also poor: international development organizations that
in Peru as well as in many other countries (Broegaard et al., 2017) had
supported LUP decided to reduce their support. According to one aid
agency executive, this was due to pressure from MEF.21 Most important,
the LUP process was now being framed both by supporters and oppo-
nents as a tool for legitimizing opposition to mining and for restricting
the freedom of action of the private sector in general.
17
Interview with former Minister for the Environment, May 2017.
18
Regional Ordinance No. 034-2011-Gr.CAJ-CR.
19
N° 036-2011-GR.CAJ-CR.
20
Interview with advisor to Grupo Norte, March 2015.
21
Interview with representative of international development agency, May
2017.
211
The Extractive Industries and Society 6 (2019) 206–214
4.3. Securing the survival of LUP through a non-enforcement strategy
(2012–2016)
In the aftermath of the Conga conflict, the political opportunities for
institutionalizing LUP were very limited. Manuel Pulgar-Vidal, who was
appointed Minister for the Environment at the end of 2011, opted for a
non-enforcement strategy by creating a team in MINAM which would
be seen as credible by environmental specialists and be able to con-
struct a technical defense of the ministry and its policies in bargaining
with private sector oriented ministries, such as MEF and MINEM, and
by exercising closer control over the regional governments to improve
their technical capacities but also to prevent them from using these
capacities to go beyond technical reports and produce land-use plans.
During this period, the tensions inherent to the limited decentralization
of the EEZ-LUP system became apparent. At the same time as the re-
gional governments were responsible for developing land-use plans,
MINAM was responsible to lead, monitor and implement the EEZ-LUP
system. This responsibility also included the development of metho-
dological guidelines, training of technical staff, approving EEZ and
other technical reports and promoting changes in the legal norms
governing the system.22 MINAM came to use this power to depoliticize
LUP and reduce its enforcement.
A number of factors seem to have influenced this decision to adopt
such a strategy: (1) the defeat of MINAM under its previous leadership
in the confrontation with the alliance between the private sector, MEF
and MINEM; (2) the political weakness of other ministries (such as
Culture and Agriculture, for example) with which MINAM could find
common ground; and (3) a fragmented civil and political society. In this
context, Pulgar-Vidal and his team decided to strengthen the technical
capacity of the ministry, offer training and technical assistance to re-
gional governments and avoid a public association with social and
environmental movements critical of the government’s support to the
private sector.23 MINAM demonstrated that it was a loyal member of
the governing team by accepting and publicly defending legislation
weakening LUP. It was a strategy that eschewed “politics” and external
alliances in favor of the defense and advance of its interests behind
closed doors within the Council of Ministers and informal interactions
with representatives of mining companies.24 However, in doing so, the
strategy strengthened MINAM and the regional governments at the
expense of not enforcing LUP as an institution. Planning capacities were
strengthened but no plans were produced and thus LUP was not en-
forced.
During 2012 and 2013, MINAM was able to make some advances
in its regional LUP agenda. The LUP directorate within MINAM was
reorganized and given a more technical orientation. Although
Acuerdo Nacional No. 34,25 defining LUP as a national priority, was
approved in April 2014, the discussions leading up to this decision
demonstrated the fragmentation and lack of consensus within the
state over LUP.26
From late 2013 onwards, MINAM opted for attempting to increase
its capacity by consolidating the technocratic nature of LUP and de-
fending its autonomy as overseer by developing additional planning
instruments and monitoring and attempting to control their
22
In a similar manner, the Ministry of Agriculture is the ente rector governing
the rural land titling system where the regional governments are responsible for
granting land titles.
23
Interviews with the minister and Vice Minister for the Environment,
August 2016 and May 2017.
24
Interview with high-level functionary at MINAM, August 2016.
25
Acuerdo Nacional (National Agreement) is a set of public policies that are
elaborated and approved through extensive dialogues and consensus and are
supposed to guide government decision making over the long term.
26
Interviews with advisor to regional governments, Lima-based NGO, March
2015, and functionaries, Sociedad National de Minería, Petroleo e Energía
(National Society of Mining, Oil, and Energy - SNMPE), April 2015.
M.-T. Gustafsson, M. Scurrah
implementation in the regions.27 Rather than abandoning LUP alto-
gether, MINAM engaged in a series of actions to delay and avoid the
creation and approval of any land-use plans. In May, MINAM published
a methodological guide which described seven specialized studies that
needed to be made after the EEZ report and before work could begin on
the land-use plan (MINAM, 2016). In 2012, MINAM had managed to
obtain MEF approval for a budgetary program, which could be used to
fund the final phase of LUP but in 2016 this was unilaterally canceled,
illustrating how relationships with strong agencies shape the ability of
weak agencies to carry out their policies. According to a MEF func-
tionary, MEF tried to block MINAM several times by threatening to
withdraw resources but, due to support from President Humala,
MINAM succeeded in continuing to construct the LUP system.28 In re-
sponse, MINAM reinforced its discourse, framing LUP as a technical
procedure which required increased control over the preparation of
EEZs and other documents. It also blocked the preparation or approval
of land-use plans in the regions to avoid provoking a reaction from the
private sector and its allies. As a result, mining companies were gen-
erally satisfied with this new orientation of LUP.29
As mineral prices began to decline, the government became in-
creasingly concerned about how to maintain the rhythm of large mining
investments. Durand (2016: 59) has demonstrated how the private
sector and its ideologues in the media began a persistent campaign,
which identified government rules and regulations, especially those in
defense of the environment, as the principal barrier to private invest-
ment and economic growth. MEF proposed a series of legislative
“packages” aimed at lowering environmental standards and speeding
up approval processes of mining projects, which were passed by Con-
gress. Law No. 30230, passed in July 2014, specified that regional LUPs
would only serve as guides for government policies and decisions, and
their implementation would not be obligatory. Furthermore, they
would now have to be approved by the Council of Ministers, enabling
MEF, MINEM or other ministries to exercise veto power. In Durand’s
view, the adoption of 30230 is an example of state capture by the
business community (Durand, 2016: 56).
The minister attempted to defend the ministry by highlighting
programs, such as global climate change, that enjoyed widespread po-
litical support, consolidating the LUP process technically, and advan-
cing as many EEZs as possible (from 5 in 2011 to 14 at the end of the
government’s term). However, at the same time, by delaying the review
and approval processes of EEZs and the specialized studies and by not
exercising its prerogative to approve land-use plans, the strategy to
enforce LUP was subordinated to the strategy to defend MINAM itself.
As a result of MINAM’s non-enforcement strategy, at the end of the
Humala government’s term, there had been no regional LUPs developed
or approved in Peru. Thus, there were both changes in the content of
the institution of LUP and changes in the degree of enforcement of the
institution.30 The lack of autonomy from powerful actors inside and
outside the state is the most important explanation for this. However,
we also argue that MINAM failed to act strategically and take advantage
of existing opportunities to build coalitions with subnational govern-
ments and civil society.31
During this period, when the opportunity structures were adverse,
MINAM opted for reducing or abandoning its alliances with non-state
actors, concentrated its efforts on consolidating relations with im-
portant actors within the state and business community, thus reducing
its autonomy, at the same time as the implementation capacity of both
27
Interview with LUP specialist, regional government, Cajamarca, August
2016.
28
Interview with manager at MEF, July 2016.
29
Interview with functionaries, SNMPE, July, 2016.
30
We thank one of the article’s reviewers for suggesting this distinction.
31
In an interview in May, 2017, a former deputy environmental minister had
reached the same conclusion.
212
The Extractive Industries and Society 6 (2019) 206–214
MINAM and regional governments was significantly strengthened.
Enforcement was paralyzed as the process was stalled at the EEZ report
point and the creation of plans halted. However, the proximity to
powerful actors prevented MINAM from taking the opportunities to
advance with LUP, once they arose.
5. Conclusion
In this article, we have analyzed efforts to build and effectively
enforce institutions aimed at fostering participation and inclusive de-
velopment in the presence of mining, emphasizing the role of weak
agencies, such as environmental agencies or subnational governments.
More specifically, we have argued that for weak agencies, strategic
ability, referring to the skill to adapt the speed, timing and framing of
institutional strengthening to reigning political opportunities, is highly
consequential. We recognize the profound power asymmetries and
adverse structural conditions that the literature on extractive govern-
ance has carefully studied, and that institutional change is ultimately
dependent on the support of political elites and transnational extractive
industry (e.g. Bebbington et al., 2016). Yet, as this literature has also
shown, local communities have in many cases exercised pressure and
sought to re-politicize formal instruments such as territorial planning
(e.g. Leifsen, 2017; Leifsen et al., 2017) and even succeeded in blocking
large-scale resource projects (e.g. Paredes, 2016; Gustafsson, 2018).
Our analysis suggests that the same logic could be applied to actors
within the state. Using an analogy from boxing, strategic ability may
allow weak agencies to “compete above their category” and defend or
even expand their autonomy and build their capacity. Conversely,
failing to do so may significantly reduce or close future opportunities.
Drawing on the literature on institutional strengthening and change, we
conceptualized different types of enforcement strategies –from full-
scale to non-enforcement – placing them in different structural contexts
with varying degrees of autonomy vis-á-vis veto-players and external
support.
One of the lessons from this study is that gradual enforcement is the
most convenient strategy for weak agencies when external support and
autonomy from veto players is low. As Falleti and Riofranco’s (2018)
study on prior consultation in Ecuador and Bolivia demonstrates, for an
institution to gain strength, mobilization in the initial phase and poli-
tical incorporation in the second phase are crucial. Paredes and De la
Puente (2017) have similarly demonstrated that broad-based societal
support and involvement in international advocacy networks were
crucial for the Ombudsman’s successful consolidation of conflict med-
iation institutions in Peru. In a context where social mobilization is
weak, gradual enforcement may allow weak agencies to build alliances
over time and assess the willingness and ability of mining companies to
block institutional enforcement. However, during the first period,
MINAM only made half-hearted attempts to include civil society orga-
nizations, thereby undermining its opportunities to consolidate LUP.
With regard to full-scale enforcement, our analysis of the second period
clearly illustrates that if weak agencies are not backed up by strong
mobilizations or international support, this strategy could destroy what
has already been achieved and have durable negative effects on future
opportunities for institutional development. This situation could be
contrasted with the popular consultation about the Tambogrande
mining project in Peru. In this case, the regional government had strong
support from local, national and international civil society actors,
which explains its ability to halt the project (Walter and Urkidi, 2017:
269). Still, this isolated success had neither positive nor negative im-
pacts on the institutionalization of popular consultation in Peru, al-
though it did lead to its replication in other countries in Latin America
(Walter and Urkidi, 2017).
The analysis also demonstrated the risks associated with employing
the non-enforcement strategy and simultaneously engaging in close
interactions with powerful actors within the state and business com-
munity. As illustrated during the third period, whereas this may allow
M.-T. Gustafsson, M. Scurrah
weak agencies to increase their capacity they also run the risk of being
co-opted and carrying out “actions that contradict the “spirit” or the
purpose of the institution, thus undermining it” (Mahoney and Thelen,
2009: 24). The difficulties faced by the Ministry of Culture in enforcing
free, prior and informed consultation of indigenous peoples in colla-
boration with MINEM and mining companies provide another example
in Peru of the risks of engaging closely with powerful actors in enfor-
cing institutions affecting those actors’ interests. Scholars have de-
monstrated the ways in which MINEM has sought to depoliticize and
undermine consultation processes (Schilling-Vacaflor et al., 2018).
Overall, our analysis demonstrates that the ability to adapt speed,
timing and framing to the reigning political context is highly con-
sequential for weak agencies’ ability to strengthen institutions affecting
the interests of powerful actors. To develop alliances with institutional
supporters is also crucial.
Beyond these empirical conclusions, the article has implications for
on-going debates related to the governance of extractive industries.
First, it speaks to debates about the challenges associated with in-
stitution building in a context of expanding extractive industries. The
literature on resource-rich states typically focuses on political settle-
ments (Bebbington et al., 2018) and the role of political elites (e.g. Karl,
1997; Nem Singh and Salah Ovadia, 2018; Haslam and Heidrich, 2016)
and social mobilization (e.g. Falleti and Riofrancos, 2018; Bebbington
and Bury, 2009) in explaining the emergence of institutions governing
extractive industries in a sustainable manner. Building on this invalu-
able scholarship we have shifted the focus to weaker agencies and to
what factors explain more or less successful attempts to strengthen in-
stitutions that foster inclusive development. Peru, with its weak parties
and social movements and unified political and economic elite, re-
presents a least likely case for successful institutional strengthening.
Thus, more empirical research is needed on reform-oriented agencies in
states where the political conditions are more favorable. Theoretically,
we expect theories on institutional weakness and change could offer
explanatory leverage and contribute to advance on-going debates on
extractive governance.
Second, our results also shed light on the complicated relationship
between autonomy and capacity in resource-rich states. Some studies
have analyzed the ways in which particular state agencies develop
degrees of autonomy vis-á-vis political elites and the transnational ex-
tractive industry (e.g. subnational governments, constitutional courts,
Ombudsman) and actively support local communities (e.g. Walter and
Urkidi, 2017; Jaskoski, 2014; Paredes, 2016). Our analysis also illus-
trates how reform-oriented agencies, by reducing their autonomy vis-á-
vis powerful actors, could gain access to resources and enhance their
capacity. Still, close interactions with powerful actors also entail the
risk of co-optation and depoliticization. Gaining a better understanding
of the outcomes from such difficult strategic considerations is important
for explaining under what conditions institutions for governing natural
resources in an inclusive and sustainable manner are effectively en-
forced.
Conflict of interest
The authors do not state any conflict of interest.
Funding
This work was supported by the Norwegian Research Council
(Project: “Extracting Justice?”) and Anna Ahlström & Ellen Terserus
Foundation, Stockholm University (Project: “Territorial Planning as a
Solution to Socio-Environmental Conflicts?”).
Acknowledgements
We are grateful to all the persons that have contributed to this re-
search, especially to all the interviewees and to Harry Echegaray, who
213
The Extractive Industries and Society 6 (2019) 206–214
transcribed the interviews. We would also like to thank the following
persons who have taken their time to read and provide valuable com-
ments on the manuscript: Anthony Bebbington; Peter Cleaves; Kent
Eaton; Manuel Glave; Steven Levitsky; Stephanie McNulty; Roger
Merino; Kenneth Roberts; Anders Sjögren, and two anonymous re-
viewers. Thanks also go to Marisa Remy and Natalia Gonzalez for or-
ganizing a research seminar at Instituto de Estudios Peruanos.
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