PROBLEM AREAS IN LEGAL ETHICS – GROUP 1

TABLE OF CONTENTS
1. ATTY NOE-LACSAMA V ATTY BUSMENTE AC NO. 7269 (ACOSTA)

2. QUERY OF ATTY SILVERIO-BUFFET AM NO. 08-6-352-RTC (ASERON)

3. AGUIRRE V RANA BM NO. 1036 JUNE 10 2003 (FALUCHO)

4. RE: ELMO ABAD AM NO. 139 (GAMBOA)

5. LETTER OF ATTY CECILIO AREVALO BM 1370 MAY 9 2005 (TAGAROMA)

6. PETITION TO SIGN IN THE ROLL OF ATTYS MEDADO, BM 2540 (TAMAYO)

7. NORMA TAN & PAGAYOKAN V. BALAJADIA GR NO. 1695172006 (ZAFE)

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Atty. Edita Noe-Lacsmana vs. Atty. Yolando Busmente

A.C. No. 7269
November 23, 2011

Canon 9. A lawyer shall not directly or indirectly assist in the unauthorized practice of law

Facts:

Atty. Noe- Lacsmana alleged in her complaint for disbarment that she was the counsel for Irene
Bides, the plaintiff in a Civil case while Atty. Busmente was the counsel for the defendant
Imelda Ulaso. It was also alleged that one Atty. Elizabeth “Liza” Dela Rosa would accompany
Ulaso in court projecting to be the collaborating counsel of Busmente who signed the minutes of
the court proceedings in Civil Case 9284 form November 2003 to February of 2005 but upon
verification with the Supreme Court and Integrated Bar of the Philippines it was discovered
that she was not a lawyer.

Atty. Busmente alleged that Dela Rosa was a law graduate and her paralegal assistant whose
employment with him ended ni 2000 but was able to continue misrepresenting herself as a
lawyer with the help of her former Secretary Regine Macasieb. He also alleged that he did not
represent Ulaso in a civil case and that his signature in the answer was forged.

The IBP-CBD recommended Busmente’s suspension form the practice of law for not less than
five years as Dela Rosa continued to represent Ulaso until 2005 which belied Busmente’s
allegation that Dela Rosa was illegally practice law using his office address without his
knowledge and only due to connivance with her former secretary Macasieb.

Issue: Whether or not Busmente is guilty of directly or indirectly assisting Dela Rosa in her
illegal practice of law that warrants his suspension from the practice of law?

Held:

Yes, The court agrees with the IBP but modified the period of his suspension to six months in
reference to Canon 9 which states that a lawyer shall not directly or indirectly assist in the
unauthorized practice of law. The court ruled that the term practice of law implies customarily
and habitually holding oneself out to the public as a lawyer for compensation as a source of
livelihood or in consideration for his services. If further ruled that holding oneself as a lawyer
may be shown by acts indicative of that purpose such as identifying oneself as attorney,
appearing in court in representation of a client or associating oneself as a partner of a law office
of a law office for the general practice of law. In this case it has been established that Dela Rosa
who is not a member of the Bar, misrepresented herself as Busmente’s collaborating counsel in
Civil Case 9284. The only question is whether Busmente indirectly or directly assisted Dela Rosa
in her illegal practice of law. Pleadings and court notices were still sent to Busmente’s office
until 2005. The IBP-CBD noted that Dela Rosa’s practice should have ended in 2003 when
Macacieb left also his counter affidavit clearly showed that Busmente was the legal counsel in
Civil Case 9284 and that he allowed Dela Rosa to give legal assistance to Ulaso.

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Query of Atty Silverio-Buffet (AM No. 08-6-352-RTC)

Case Digest

Facts:
Atty. Karen M. Silverio-Buffe (Atty. Buffe) previously worked as Clerk of Court VI of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 81 of Romblon; however, she resigned from her position
effective February 1, 2008. Following her resignation, she made 8 court appearances as a private
practitioner in 4 cases before the same RTC, all within 6 months following her resignation
(between February and July 2008). Subsequently, she took an oath as a public prosecutor before
the same RTC in August 2008.

In order to preemptively settle any issues concerning prohibitions against appearing as a

private practitioner before the RTC where she used to work as Clerk of Court, she submitted a
letter-query to the Office of the Court Administrator to question Sec. 7(b) of R.A. No. 6713 (the
Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees), which places a
limitation on public officials and employees during their incumbency, and those
already separated from government employment for a period of one (1) year after separation,
in engaging in the private practice of their profession.

SECTION 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. In addition to acts and omissions of

public officials and employees now prescribed in the Constitution and existing laws, the following
shall constitute prohibited acts and transactions of any public official and employee and are
hereby declared to be unlawful:

xxx

(b) Outside employment and other activities related thereto. Public officials and
employees during their incumbency shall not:
xxx
(2) Engage in the private practice of their profession unless authorized by the
Constitution or law, provided, that such practice will not conflict or tend to conflict
with their official functions; or

xxx

These prohibitions shall continue to apply for a period of one (1) year after resignation,
retirement, or separation from public office, except in the case of subparagraph (b) (2) above, but
the professional concerned cannot practice his profession in connection with any matter before the
office he used to be with, in which case the one-year prohibition shall likewise apply.

Atty. Buffe alleged that Section 7(b)(2) of R.A. No. 6713 gives preferential treatment to an
incumbent public employee, who may engage in the private practice of his profession so long as
this practice does not conflict or tend to conflict with his official functions. In contrast, a public
official or employee who has retired, resigned, or has been separated from government service
like her, is prohibited from engaging in private practice on any matter before the office where
she used to work, for a period of one (1) year from the date of her separation from government

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employment. She justifies her position by referring to the practice of other government lawyers
known to her who, after separation from their judicial employment, immediately engaged in
the private practice of law and appeared as private counsels before the RTC branches where
they were previously employed.

The Office of the Court Administrator made the observation that the “intent of the law, as defined
in its title is to uphold the time-honored principle of public office being a public trust” and that “that the
prohibition was intended to avoid any impropriety or the appearance of impropriety which may occur in
any transaction between the retired government employee and his former colleagues, subordinates or
superiors brought about by familiarity, moral ascendancy or undue influence, as the case may be”.

The case was also referred to the Office of the Chief Attorney (OCAT), which observed “The
confusion apparently lies in the use of the term such practice after the phrase ‘provided, that’. It may
indeed be misinterpreted as modifying the phrase engage in the private practice of their profession should
be prefatory sentence that public officials during their incumbency shall not be disregarded. However,
read in its entirety, such practice may only refer to practice authorized by the Constitution or law or the
exception to the prohibition against the practice of profession. The term law was intended by the
legislature to include a memorandum or a circular or an administrative order issued pursuant to the
authority of law.”

In addition to the letter-query, Atty. Buffe also filed two (2) cases petitions for declaratory relief
with RTC’s in Manila, both of which were denied.

Issue:
Does Sec. 7(b) of R.A. 6713 give preferential treatment to an incumbent public employee, who
may engage in the private practice of his profession so long as this practice does not conflict or
tend to conflict with his official functions, while a public official or employee who has retired,
resigned, or has been separated from government service like her, is prohibited from engaging
in private practice on any matter before the office where she used to work, for a period of one
(1) year from the date of her separation from government employment?

Ruling on the Issue:

No, there is no preferential treatment.
Subsection (b)(2) prohibits public officials/employees from engaging in the private practice of
their profession during their incumbency. As an exception, a public official/employee can
engage in the practice of his or her profession under the following conditions: first, the private
practice is authorized by the Constitution or by the law; and second, the practice will not
conflict, or tend to conflict, with his or her official functions.

These prohibitions continue to apply for a period of one year after the public official or
employees resignation, retirement, or separation from public office, except for the private
practice of profession under subsection (b)(2), which can already be undertaken even within the
one-year prohibition period. As an exception to this exception, the one-year prohibited period
applies with respect to any matter before the office the public officer or employee used to
work with.

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In the case of court employees, Section 7(b)(2) of R.A. No. 6713 is not the only prohibition to
contend with; Section 5, Canon 3 of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel also applies. The
latter provision provides the definitive rule on the outside employment that an incumbent court
official or court employee may undertake in addition to his official duties:
Outside employment may be allowed by the head of office provided it complies with all of
the following requirements:
(a) The outside employment is not with a person or entity that practices law before the
courts or conducts business with the Judiciary;
(b) The outside employment can be performed outside of normal working hours and is
not incompatible with the performance of the court personnels duties and
responsibilities;
(c) That outside employment does not require the practice of law; Provided,
however, that court personnel may render services as professor, lecturer, or resource
person in law schools, review or continuing education centers or similar institutions;
(d) The outside employment does not require or induce the court personnel to disclose
confidential information acquired while performing officials duties;
(e) The outside employment shall not be with the legislative or executive branch of
government, unless specifically authorized by the Supreme Court.
Where a conflict of interest exists, may reasonably appear to exist, or where the outside
employment reflects adversely on the integrity of the Judiciary, the court personnel shall
not accept outside employment. [Emphasis supplied]

A clerk of court can already engage in the practice of law immediately after her separation from
the service and without any period limitation that applies to other prohibitions under Section 7
of R.A. No. 6713. The clerk of courts limitation is that she cannot practice her profession within
one year before the office where he or she used to work with.

A worrisome aspect of Atty. Buffe’s approach to Section 7 (b)(2) is her awareness of the law and
her readiness to risk its violation because of the unfairness she perceives in the law. The
Supreme Court found it disturbing that she first violated the law before making any inquiry By
acting in a manner that R.A. No. 6713 brands as unlawful, Atty. Buffe contravened Rule 1.01 of
Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, which provides:

CANON 1 A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF

THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND FOR LEGAL PROCESSES
xxx
Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

The Supreme Court also find that Atty. Buffe also failed to live up to her lawyers oath and
thereby violated Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility when she blatantly and
unlawfully practised law within the prohibited period by appearing before the RTC Branch she
had just left. Canon 7 states:

CANON 7. A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND THE
DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE
INTEGRATED BAR.

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By her open disregard of R.A. No. 6713, she thereby followed the footsteps of the models she
cited and wanted to replicate the former court officials who immediately waded into practice in
the very same court they came from. She, like they, disgraced the dignity of the legal profession
by openly disobeying and disrespecting the law.[20] By her irresponsible conduct, she also
eroded public confidence in the law and in lawyers.[21] Her offense is not in any way mitigated
by her transparent attempt to cover up her transgressions by writing the Court a letter-query,
which she followed up with unmeritorious petitions for declaratory relief, all of them dealing
with the same Section 7 (b)(2) issue, in the hope perhaps that at some point she would find a
ruling favorable to her cause. These are acts whose implications do not promote public
confidence in the integrity of the legal profession.[22]

Atty. Buffe had no qualms about the simultaneous use of various fora in expressing her
misgivings about the perceived unfairness of Section 7 of R.A. 6713. She formally lodged a
query with the Office of the Court Administrator, and soon after filed her successive petitions
for declaratory relief. Effectively, she exposed these fora to the possibility of embarrassment and
confusion through their possibly differing views on the issue she posed. Although this is not
strictly the forum-shopping that the Rules of Court prohibit, what she has done is something
that we cannot help but consider with disfavor because of the potential damage and
embarrassment to the Judiciary that it could have spawned.
The Supreme Court found Atty. Buffe GUILTY of professional misconduct for violating Rule
1.01 of Canon 1 and Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and imposed a fine
of P10,000, together with a stern warning to deter her from repeating her transgression and
committing other acts of professional misconduct.[35] This penalty reflects as well the Courts
sentiments on how seriously the retired, resigned or separated officers and employees of the
Judiciary should regard and observe the prohibition against the practice of law with the
office that they used to work with.

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AGUIRRE vs. RANA

B.M. No.1036 June 10,2003

FACTS:

Respondent Edwin L.Rana was among those who passed the 2000 Bar Examinations.
Respondent while not yet a lawyer, appeared as counsel for a candidate in the May 2001
elections before the Municipal Board of Election Canvassers in Masbate and filed with the
MBEC a pleading dated May 19,2001 entitled Formal Objection to the inclusion in the
canvassing of votes in some precint for the office of Vice-Mayor. In the pleading respondent
respresented himself as counsel for and in behalf of Vice Mayoralty candidate George Bunan
and signed as counsel for the latter. Furthermore, respondent also signed as counsel for Emily
Estipona-Hao on May 19,2001 in the petition filed before the MBEC praying for the
proclamation of Estipona-Hao as winning candidate for mayor of Mandaon,Masbate. On May
21,2001, one day before the scheduled mass oath taking of successful bar examinees as members
of the Philippine bar, complainant Aguirre filed against respondent a petition for Denial of
Admission to the Bar. On May 22,2001, respondent was allowed to take the lawyer’s oath but
was disallowed to from signing the Roll of Attorneys until he is cleared of the charges against
him.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent shall be denied admission to the Bar.

HELD:

Yes. Respondent was engaged in the practice of law when appeared in the proceedings before
the MBEC and filed various pleadings without license to do so. Evidence clearly show the
charge of unauthorized practice of law. Respondent called himself “ Counsel” knowing fully
well that he was not a member of the bar. Having held himself out as counsel knowing that he
had no authority to practice of law, respondent has shown moral unfitness to be a member of
the Philippine Bar. The right to practice of law is not a natural or constitutional right but it is a
privilege. It is limited to persons of good moral character with special qualifications duly
ascertained and certified. The exercise of this privilege presupposes possession of integrity,
legal knowledge, educational attainment and even public trust since a lawyer is an officer of the
court. A bar candidate does not acquire the right to practice law simply by passing the bar
examinations. The practice of law is a privilege that can be withheld even from someone who
has passed the bar, if the person seeking admission had practiced law without a license. True
enough, Rana has passed the bar and took the lawyer’s oath. However, it is the signing of Roll
of Attorneys that finally makes one a full-fledged lawyer. The fact the Rana passed the bar
exams is immaterial because the two essential requisites for becoming a lawyer is taking the
lawyer’s oath to be administered by the court and the signing in the Roll of Attorneys.

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In Re: Abad, 132 SCRA 453 (BM 139)

FACTS:

Mr. Elmo S. Abad was a successful examinee of the 1978 bar examinations. His subsequent
practice of law was questioned and complained by the President of Philippine Trial Lawyers’
Association, Inc. Respondent explained that:

– He had already paid for the Bar Admission Fee;

– He was notified of the oath-taking by the Supreme Court and signed the Lawyer’s Oath by
one clerk in the Office of the Bar Confidante;

– He participated Annual General Meeting of IBP Quezon City, and paid his statement dues
and was included as a voting member for officers and directors – also conferred to him a
certificate of Membership in Good Standing from IBP QC Chapter;

– The Supreme Court never issued any order in the striking of his name in the roll of
attorneys, and paid his dues and PTR;

ISSUE:

Whether or not the respondent is guilty of contempt of court.

HELD:

YES. Respondent was sentenced fine and imprisonment for twenty five (25) days.

RATIO:

Respondent should know that the circumstances which he narrated do not constitute his
admission to the Philippine Bar and the right (or privilege) to practice law thereafter. He should
know that two essential requisites for becoming a lawyer still had to be performed, namely: his
lawyer’s oath to be administered by this Court and his signature in the Roll of Attorneys.

He was found in violation of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court:

SEC. 3. Indirect contempt to be punished after charge and hearing – x x x:

xxx

(e) Assuming to be an attorney or an officer of a court, and acting as such without authority;

xxx

From which respondent cannot further deny.

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LETTER OF ATTY. CECILIO Y. AREVALO, JR., REQUESTING EXEMPTION FROM

PAYMENT OF IBP DUES.
[B.M. No. 1370. May 9, 2005]

FACTS: This is a request for exemption from payment of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) dues filed by petitioner Atty. Cecilio Y. Arevalo, Jr. He alleged that after being admitted to
the Philippine Bar in 1961, he became part of the Philippine Civil Service from July 1962 until
1986, then migrated to, and worked in, the USA in December 1986 until his retirement in the
year 2003. He maintained that he cannot be assessed IBP dues for the years that he was working
in the Philippine Civil Service since the Civil Service law prohibits the practice of ones
profession while in government service, and neither can he be assessed for the years when he
was working in the USA.
Petitioner contends that what he is questioning is the IBP Board of Governors Policy of Non-
Exemption in the payment of annual membership dues of lawyers regardless of whether or not
they are engaged in active or inactive practice. He asseverates that the Policy of Non-Exemption
in the payment of annual membership dues suffers from constitutional infirmities, such as equal
protection clause and the due process clause. He also posits that compulsory payment of the
IBP annual membership dues would indubitably be oppressive to him considering that he has
been in an inactive status and is without income derived from his law practice. He adds that his
removal from nonpayment of annual membership dues would constitute deprivation of
property right without due process of law.

ISSUE: Whether or nor petitioner is entitled to exemption from payment of his dues during the
time that he was inactive in the practice of law that is, when he was in the Civil Service from
1962-1986 and he was working abroad from 1986-2003?

RULING: NO
An Integrated Bar is a State-organized Bar, to which every lawyer must belong, as distinguished
from bar association organized by individual lawyers themselves, membership in which is
voluntary. Organized by or under the direction of the State, an Integrated Bar is an official
national body of which all lawyers are required to be members. They are, therefore, subject to
all the rules prescribed for the governance of the Bar, including the requirement of payment of a
reasonable annual fee for the effective discharge of the purposes of the Bar. Payment of dues is a
necessary consequence of membership in the IBP, of which no one is exempt. This means that
the compulsory nature of payment of dues subsists for as long as ones membership in the IBP
remains regardless of the lack of practice of, or the type of practice, the member is engaged in.
The right to practice law before the courts of this country should be and is a matter subject to
regulation and inquiry. And, if the power to impose the fee as a regulatory measure is
recognize[d], then a penalty designed to enforce its payment, which penalty may be avoided
altogether by payment, is not void as unreasonable or arbitrary. The practice of law is not a
property right but a mere privilege. Membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with
conditions, one of which is the payment of membership dues. Failure to abide by any of them
entails the loss of such privilege.

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IN RE: PETITION TO SIGN IN THE ROLL OF ATTORNEYS

MICHAEL A. MEDADO, Petitioner.

FACTS:

Michael Medado graduated from the University of the Philippines with the degree of Bachelor
of Laws in 1979 and passed the same year's bar examinations. He took the Attorney’s Oath at
the Philippine International Convention Center (PICC) in 1980 afterwhich he was scheduled to
sign in the Roll of Attorneys on 13 May 1980, but he failed to do so on his scheduled date,
allegedly because he had misplaced the Notice to Sign the Roll of Attorneys when he went
home to his province for a vacation. He then began working as a lawyer mainly doing corporate
and taxation work, and claim that he was not actively involved in litigation practice. Several
years later, while rummaging through his old college files, Medado found the Notice to Sign the
Roll of Attorneys. It was then that he realized that he had not signed in the roll, and that what
he had signed at the entrance of the PICC was probably just an attendance record.

In 2005, when Medado attended Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) seminars, he
was unable to provide his roll number in order for his MCLE compliances to be credited. On
2012, Medado filed an instant petition, praying that he be allowed to sign in the Roll of
Attorneys.

The Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) recommended after a clarificatory conference that the
instant petition be denied for petitioner’s gross negligence, gross misconduct and utter lack of
merit. It explained that, based on his answers, petitioner could offer no valid justification for his
negligence in signing in the Roll of Attorneys. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

Did the petitioner engaged in unauthorized practice of law for not having signed in the roll of
Attorneys.

HELD:

Petitioner has been engaged in the practice of law since 1980, a period spanning more than 30
years, without having signed in the Roll of Attorneys. He justifies this behavior by
characterizing his acts as "neither willful nor intentional but based on a mistaken belief and an
honest error of judgment."

While an honest mistake of fact could be used to excuse a person from the legal consequences of
his acts as it negates malice or evil motive, a mistake of law cannot be utilized as a lawful
justification, because everyone is presumed to know the law and its consequences. Ignorantia
factiexcusat; ignorantia legis neminem excusat.

Under the Rules of Court, the unauthorized practice of law by one’s assuming to be an attorney
or officer of the court, and acting as such without authority, may constitute indirect contempt of
court, which is punishable by fine or imprisonment or both. Such a finding, however, is in the
nature of criminal contempt and must be reached after the filing of charges and the conduct of

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hearings. In this case, while it appears quite clearly that petitioner committed indirect contempt
of court by knowingly engaging in unauthorized practice of law, we refrain from making any
finding of liability for indirect contempt, as no formal charge pertaining thereto has been filed
against him.

Knowingly engaging in unauthorized practice of law likewise transgresses Canon 9 of 'the Code
of Professional Responsibility.

CANON 9 -A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, assist in the unauthorized practice of law.

While a reading of Canon 9 appears to merely prohibit lawyers from assisting in the
unauthorized practice of law, the unauthorized practice of law by the lawyer himself is
subsumed under this provision, because at the heart of Canon 9 is the lawyer's duty to prevent
the unauthorized practice of law. This duty likewise applies to law students and Bar candidates.
As aspiring members of the Bar, they are bound to comport themselves in accordance with the
ethical standards of the legal profession.

RULING:

Instant Petition to Sign in the Roll of Attorneys is hereby GRANTED. Petitioner Michael A.
Medado is ALLOWED to sign in the Roll of Attorneys ONE (1) YEAR after receipt of this
Resolution. Petitioner is likewise ORDERED to pay a FINE of ₱32,000 for his unauthorized
practice of law. During the one year period, petitioner is NOT ALLOWED to practice law, and
is STERNLY WARNED that doing any act that constitutes practice of law before he has signed
in the Roll of Attorneys will be dealt will be severely by this Court.

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[G.R. No. 169517. March 14, 2006.]

ROGELIO A. TAN, NORMA TAN and MALIYAWAO PAGAYOKAN, petitioners, vs.

BENEDICTO M. BALAJADIA, respondent.

FACTS

An original petition for contempt was filed by petitioners Rogelio Tan, Norma Tan and
Maliyawao Pagayokan against respondent Benedicto Balajadia. Petitioners allege that
respondent filed a criminal case against them due to the alleged illegal collection of parking fees
by petitioners from respondent. In paragraph 5 of the complaint-affidavit, respondent asserted
that he is a "practicing lawyer based in Baguio City with office address at Room B-207, 2/F
Lopez Building, Session Road, Baguio City.”However, certifications issued by the Office of the
Bar Confidant and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines showed that respondent has never been
admitted to the Philippine Bar. Hence, petitioners claim that respondent is liable for indirect
contempt for misrepresenting himself as a lawyer.

In his Comment, respondent avers that the allegation in paragraph 5 of the complaint-affidavit
that he is a practicing lawyer was an honest mistake. He claims that the secretary of Atty.
Paterno Aquino prepared the subject complaint-affidavit which was patterned after Atty.
Aquino's complaint-affidavit. It appears that Atty. Aquino had previously filed a complaint-
affidavit against petitioners involving the same subject matter.

According to the respondent, Atty. Aquino's secretary copied verbatim paragraph 5 of Atty.
Aquino's complaint-affidavit. Liza Laconsay, Atty. Aquino's secretary, executed an affidavit
admitting the mistake in the preparation of the complaint-affidavit. Respondent alleged that he
did not read the complaint-affidavit because he assumed that the two complaint-affidavits
contained the same allegations with respect to his occupation and office address. Respondent
claims that he had no intention of misrepresenting himself as a practicing lawyer.

ISSUE

WON respondent is liable for direct contempt.

HELD

No, the respondent was found to be innocent for direct contempt.

Sec. 3 of the Rules of Court provide that a person guilty of assuming to be an attorney or an
officer of a court, and acting as such without authority may be punished for direct contempt.
Section 3. Indirect contempt to be punished after charge and hearing. — After a
charge in writing has been filed, and an opportunity given to the respondent to
comment thereon within such period as may be fixed by the court and to be heard
by himself or counsel, a person guilty of any of the following acts may be punished
for indirect contempt:

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(e) Assuming to be an attorney or an officer of a court, and acting as such without

authority;

The liability for the unauthorized practice of law under the Rules of Court is in the nature of
criminal contempt and the acts are punished because they are an affront to the dignity and
authority of the court, and obstruct the orderly administration of justice. In determining liability
for criminal contempt, intent is a necessary element, and no one can be punished unless the
evidence makes it clear that he intended to commit it.

Here, the records support respondent's claim that he never intended to project himself as a
lawyer to the public. It was a clear inadvertence on the part of the secretary of Atty Aquino. The
affidavit of Liza Laconsay attesting to the circumstances that gave rise to the mistake in the
drafting of the complaint-affidavit conforms to the documentary evidence on record. Taken
together, these circumstances show that the allegation in paragraph 5 of respondent's
complaint-affidavit was, indeed, the result of inadvertence.

Thus, respondent has satisfactorily shown that the allegation that he is a practicing lawyer was
the result of inadvertence and cannot, by itself, establish intent as to make him liable for indirect
contempt.

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