ORIGINAL CONCURRENT JURISDICTION; ORIGINAL EXCLUSIVE at liberty to interfere with its action.
VE at liberty to interfere with its action. This doctrine is applicable to civil cases, to criminal
JURISDICTION
PAFIN VS YANIGASAWA
FACTS: Respondent Eiji Yanagisawa (Eiji), a Japanese national, contracted a marraige with
Evelyn F. Castaeda, Filipina. Evelyn purchased a 152 square-meter townhouse unit located in
Paranaque City. The Registry of Deeds for Paraaque issued Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT)
No. 99791 to Evelyn P. Castaeda, Filipino, married to Ejie Yanagisawa, Japanese citizen both
of legal age.
- Eiji filed a complaint for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with Evelyn on the ground of
bigamy in RTC Makati. During the pendency of the case, Eiji filed a Motion for the Issuance of a
Restraining Order against Evelyn and an Application for a Writ of a Preliminary Injunction to
enjoined Evelyn from disposing or encumbering all of the properties registered in her name.
- Evelyn obtained a load of P500,000.00 from petitioner Pacific Ace Finance Ltd. (PAFIN). To
secure the loan, Evelyn executed a real real estate mortgage (REM) in favor of PAFIN.
- The RTC MAKATI had dissolved Eiji and Evelyns marriage, and had ordered the liquidation of
their registered properties, including the Paraaque townhouse unit, with its proceeds to be divided
between the parties.
- Eiji learned about the REM and filed a complaint for annulment of REM against Evelyn and
PAFIN in RTC Paranaque.
- RTC PARANAQUE dismissed the complaint for failure of the plaintiff to state a cause of action
against defendants.
- CA reversed the decision of RTC Paranaque and annulled the REM executed by Evelyn in
favor of PAFIN. The CA noted that Eiji anchored his complaint upon Evelyns violation of her
commitment to the Makati RTC and to Eiji that she would not dispose of, alienate, or encumber
the properties registered in her name, including the Paraaque townhouse unit.
ISSUE: Whether the Paraaque RTC can rule on the issue of ownership, even as the same issue
was already ruled upon by the Makati RTC and is pending appeal in the CA.
RULING: It simply ruled that the Makati RTC had acquired jurisdiction over the said question and
should not have been interfered with by the Paraaque RTC. The CA only clarified that it was
improper for the Paranaque RTC to have reviewed the ruling of a co-equal court.
- The Court agrees with the CA. The issue of ownership and liquidation of properties acquired
during the cohabitation of Eiji and Evelyn has been submitted for the resolution of the Makati
RTC, and is pending appeal before the CA. The doctrine of judicial stability or non-interference
dictates that the assumption by the Makati RTC over the issue operates as an insurmountable
barrier to the subsequent assumption by the Paraaque RTC. By insisting on ruling on the same
issue, the Paraaque RTC effectively interfered with the Makati RTCs resolution of the issue and
created the possibility of conflicting decisions. Cojuangco v. Villegas states: The various
branches of the [regional trial courts] of a province or city, having as they have the same or equal
authority and exercising as they do concurrent and coordinate jurisdiction, should not, cannot
and are not permitted to interfere with their respective cases, much less with their orders or
judgments. A contrary rule would obviously lead to confusion and seriously hamper the
administration of justice. The matter is further explained thus:
It has been held that "even in cases of concurrent jurisdiction, it is, also,
axiomatic that the court first acquiring jurisdiction excludes the other
courts."
In addition, it is a familiar principle that when a court of competent jurisdiction acquires jurisdiction
over the subject matter of a case, its authority continues, subject only to the appellate authority,
until the matter is finally and completely disposed of, and that no court of co-ordinate authority is
prosecutions, and to courts-martial. The principle is essential to the proper and orderly
administration of the laws; and while its observance might be required on the grounds of judicial
comity and courtesy, it does not rest upon such considerations exclusively, but is enforced to
prevent unseemly, expensive, and dangerous conflicts of jurisdiction and of the process.
CIVIL SERVICE VS COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS: Respondents Dante G. Guevarra (Guevarra) and Augustus F. Cezar (Cezar)
were the Officer-in-Charge/President and the Vice President for Administration,
respectively, of the Polytechnic University of the Philippines (PUP) in 2005. Petitioner
Honesto L. Cueva (Cueva), then PUP Chief Legal Counsel, filed an administrative case
against Guevarra and Cezar for violation of Section 4 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6713.
- Both Guevarra and Cezar admittedly had 17 pending cases for violation of Section
3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 before the Sandiganbayan.
- CSC issued a resolution formally charging Guevarra with Dishonesty and Cezar with
Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service after a prima facie finding that
they had committed acts punishable under the Civil Service Law and Rules.
- Subsequently, the respondents filed their Motion for Reconsideration and Motion to
Declare Absence of Prima Facie Case. CSC dismissed the MR.
- Guevarra and Cezar filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition before the CA
essentially questioning the jurisdiction of the CSC over the administrative complaint
filed against them by Cueva.
- CA rendered granted the petition and nullified the questioned resolutions of the CSC
for having been rendered without jurisdiction.
- the CA noted that the CSC erred in recognizing the complaint filed by Cueva,
reasoning out that the latter should have exhausted all administrative remedies by first
bringing his grievances to the attention of the PUP Board of Regents.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Civil Service Commission has original concurrent
jurisdiction over administrative cases falling under the jurisdiction of heads of agencies.
RULING:
- The court ruled that CSC has concurrent original jurisdiction with the Board of Regents
over administrative cases
- The Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Servicer(the Uniform Rules)
explicitly allows the CSC to hear and decide administrative cases directly brought
before it.
- The court said that admittedly, the CSC has appellate jurisdiction over disciplinary
cases decided by government departments, agencies and instrumentalities.
However, a complaint may be filed directly with the CSC, and the Commission
has the authority to hear and decide the case, although it may opt to deputize a
department or an agency to conduct the investigation. x x x
xxxxxxxxx
We are mindful of certain special laws that allow the creation of disciplinary committees
and governing bodies in different branches, subdivisions, agencies and
instrumentalities of the government to hear and decide administrative complaints
against their respective officers and employees. Be that as it may, we cannot interpret
the creation of such bodies nor the passage of laws such as R.A. Nos. 8292 and 4670
allowing for the creation of such disciplinary bodies as having divested the CSC of its
inherent power to supervise and discipline government employees, including those in
the academe. To hold otherwise would not only negate the very purpose for which the
CSC was established, i.e. to instill professionalism, integrity, and accountability in our
civil service, but would also impliedly amend the Constitution itself.
- Based on all of the foregoing, the inescapable conclusion is that the CSC may take
cognizance of an administrative case filed directly with it against an official or employee
of a chartered state college or university. This is regardless of whether the complainant
is a private citizen or a member of the civil service and such original jurisdiction is
shared with the Board of Regents of the school.
- Firstly, it should be emphasized that the CSC has original concurrent
jurisdiction shared with the governing body in question, in this case, the Board
of Regents of PUP. This means that if the Board of Regents first takes cognizance
of the complaint, then it shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of the CSC.
Thus, not all administrative cases will fall directly under the CSC. Secondly,
Section 47, Chapter 7, Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of the Administrative Code
affords the CSC the option of whether to decide the case or to deputize some
other department, agency or official to conduct an investigation into the matter,
thereby considerably easing the burden placed upon the CSC.
LLAMAS VS CA
FACTS: petitioners were charged before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati with,
as aforesaid, the crime of other forms of swindling.
- RTC rendered its Decision on June 30, 1994, finding petitioners guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime charged and sentencing them to suffer the penalty of
imprisonment for two months and to pay the fine of P18,085.00 each
- Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court and further denied petitioners
motion for reconsideration.
- Petitioners filed their petition for review however, on March 13, 2000, denied the same
for petitioners failure to state the material dates. Since it subsequently denied
petitioners motion for reconsideration, the judgment of conviction became final and
executory.
- With the consequent issuance by the trial court of Warrant of Arrest, the police failed
to arrest petitioner Francisco R. Llamas because he was nowhere to be found.
- Petitioner Francisco moved for the lifting or recall of the warrant of arrest, raising for
the first time the issue that the trial court had no jurisdiction over the offense charged.
- The Court initially dismissed on technical grounds the petition in the September 24,
2001 Resolution, but reinstated the same, on motion for reconsideration, in the October
22, 2001 Resolution.
- Petitioners filed a petition for Annulment of Judgment and Certiorari, with Preliminary
Injunction to CA. CA denied the petition for annulment of judgment on the ground that
the annulment of judgment is not applicable in criminal cases.
ISSUE: W/N PETITIONERS ARE BARRED FROM RAISING SUCH QUESTION OF
JURISDICTION AT ANY TIME AND IN FACT MAINTAIN THAT RESPONDENT
COURTS HAD NO JURISDICTION IN LAW AND ENLIGHTENING DOCTRINES TO
TRY AND DECIDE THIS CASE;
RULING: The remedy cannot be resorted to when the RTC judgment being questioned
was rendered in a criminal case. The 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure itself
does not permit such recourse, for it excluded Rule 47 from the enumeration of the
provisions of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure which have suppletory
application to criminal cases. Section 18, Rule 124 thereof, provides:
Sec. 18. Application of certain rules in civil procedure to criminal cases. – The
provisions of Rules 42, 44 to 46 and 48 to 56 relating to procedure in the Court of
Appeals and in the Supreme Court in original and appealed civil cases shall be applied
to criminal cases insofar as they are applicable and not inconsistent with the provisions
of this Rule.
There is no basis in law or the rules, therefore, to extend the scope of Rule 47 to criminal
cases. As we explained in Macalalag v. Ombudsman, when there is no law or rule
providing for this remedy, recourse to it cannot be allowe
Here, petitioners are invoking the remedy under Rule 47 to assail a decision in a
criminal case. Following Bitanga, this Court cannot allow such recourse, there being no
basis in law or in the rules.
In substance, the petition must likewise fail. The trial court which rendered the assailed
decision had jurisdiction over the criminal case.
Jurisdiction being a matter of substantive law, the established rule is that the
statute in force at the time of the commencement of the action determines the
jurisdiction of the court. In this case, at the time of the filing of the information,
the applicable law was Batas Pambansa Bilang 129, approved on August 14,
1981, which pertinently provides:
Section 20. Jurisdiction in criminal cases. — Regional Trial Courts shall
exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all criminal cases not within the
exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal or body, except those now falling under
the exclusive and concurrent jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan which shall hereafter
be exclusively taken cognizance of by the latter.
Section 32. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts
and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in criminal cases. — Except in cases falling within
the exclusive original jurisdiction of Regional Trial Courts and of the Sandiganbayan,
the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts shall exercise:
(1) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all violations of city or municipal
ordinances committed within their respective territorial jurisdiction; and
(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with
imprisonment of not exceeding four years and two months, or a fine of
not more than four thousand pesos, or both such fine and imprisonment,
regardless of other imposable accessory or other penalties, including the civil
liability arising from such offenses or predicated thereon, irrespective of kind,
nature, value, or amount thereof: Provided, however, That in offenses
involving damage to property through criminal negligence they shall
have exclusive original jurisdiction where the imposable fine does not
exceed twenty thousand pesos.
Clearly, from a reading of the information, the jurisdiction over the criminal case was
with the RTC and not the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC). The MeTC could not have
acquired jurisdiction over the criminal action because at the time of the filing of the
information, its jurisdiction was limited to offenses punishable with a fine of not more
than ₱4,000.00.
MASLAG VS MONZON
FACTS:
- Petitioner filed a Complaint for reconveyance of real property with declaration of nullity
of original certificate of title (OCT) against respondents (MONZON) in MTC Benguet.
- After trial, the MTC found respondent Monzon guilty of fraud in obtaining an OCT over
petitioner’s property. It ordered her to reconvey the said property to petitioner, and to
pay damages and costs of suit.
- Respondents appealed to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of La Trinidad, Benguet.
- RTC declared that the MTC had no jurisdiction over petitioner’s cause of action. It
further held that it will take cognizance of the case pursuant to Section 8, Rule 40 of
the Rules of Court.
- Petitioner assailed the decision of RTC and filed a petition for review on Certiorari before
CA.
- CA dismissed the petition for review. Petitioners filed an MR but CA dismissed the MR. CA said
the perusal of the May 4, 2004 Resolution of the RTC, which is the subject matter of
the appeal, clearly reveals that it took cognizance of the MTC case in the exercise of
its appellate jurisdiction. Consequently, as We have previously enunciated, the proper
remedy, is a petition for review under Rule 42 and not an ordinary appeal under Rule
41.
ISSUE: W/N CA was correct in dismissing the appeal filed by petitioner
considering that MTC has the original jurisdiction over the case.
RULING: In this case this action "involved title to real property," on the other hand,
was defined as an action where "the plaintiff’s cause of action is based on a claim that
she owns such property or that she has the legal rights to have exclusive control,
possession, enjoyment, or disposition of the same.
- Under the present state of the law, in cases involving title to real property, original and
exclusive jurisdiction belongs to either the RTC or the MTC, depending on the assessed
value of the subject property. Batas Pambansa Blg. (BP) 129,29 as amended by
Republic Act (RA) No. 7691,30 provides:
Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. – Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive
original jurisdiction:
(1) In all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of
pecuniary estimation;
(2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property,
or any interest therein, where the assessed value of the property involved
exceeds Twenty thousand pesos (₱20,000.00) or for civil actions in Metro
Manila, where x x x the assessed value of the property exceeds Fifty thousand
pesos ([P]50,000.00) except actions for forcible entry into and unlawful
detainer of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction over which is conferred upon
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts;
SEC. 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts in Civil Cases. — Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts
and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:
(3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title to, or possession
of, real property, or any interest therein where the assessed value of the property or
interest therein does not exceed Twenty thousand pesos (₱20,000.00) or, in civil
actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed value does not exceed Fifty thousand
pesos (₱50,000.00) x x x.
In the case at bench, annexed to the Complaint is a Declaration of Real Property dated
November 12, 1991, which was later marked as petitioner’s Exhibit "A", showing that
the disputed property has an assessed value of ₱12,400 only. Such assessed value of
the property is well within the jurisdiction of the MTC. In fine, the RTC, thru Judge
Cabato, erred in applying Section 19(1) of BP 129 in determining which court has
jurisdiction over the case and in pronouncing that the MTC is divested of original and
exclusive jurisdiction.
An appeal erroneously taken to the Court of Appeals shall not be transferred to the
appropriate court but shall be dismissed outright.
There are two modes of appealing an RTC decision or resolution on issues of fact and
law. The first mode is an ordinary appeal under Rule 41 in cases where the RTC
exercised its original jurisdiction. It is done by filing a Notice of Appeal with the RTC.
The second mode is a petition for review under Rule 42 in cases where the RTC
exercised its appellate jurisdiction over MTC decisions. It is done by filing a Petition for
Review with the CA. Simply put, the distinction between these two modes of appeal
lies in the type of jurisdiction exercised by the RTC in the Order or Decision being
appealed.
As discussed above, the MTC has original and exclusive jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the case; hence, there is no other way the RTC could have taken cognizance
of the case and review the court a quo’s Judgment except in the exercise of its appellate
jurisdiction. Besides, the new RTC Judge who penned the May 4, 2004 Resolution,
Judge Diaz de Rivera, actually treated the case as an appeal despite the October 22,
2003 Order. He started his Resolution by stating, "This is an appeal from the Judgment
rendered by the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of La Trinidad Benguet" and then
proceeded to discuss the merits of the "appeal." In the dispositive portion of said
Resolution, he reversed the MTC’s findings and conclusions and remanded residual
issues for trial with the MTC.
Thus, in fact and in law, the RTC Resolution was a continuation of the proceedings that
originated from the MTC. It was a judgment issued by the RTC in the exercise of its
appellate jurisdiction. With regard to the RTC’s earlier October 22, 2003 Order, the
same should be disregarded for it produces no effect (other than to confuse the parties
whether the RTC was invested with original or appellate jurisdiction). It cannot be
overemphasized that jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred only by law and it
is "not within the courts, let alone the parties, to themselves determine or conveniently
set aside. Neither would the active participation of the parties nor estoppel operate to
confer original and exclusive jurisdiction where the court or tribunal only wields
appellate jurisdiction over the case. Thus, the CA is correct in holding that the proper
mode of appeal should have been a Petition for Review under Rule 42 of the Rules of
Court, and not an ordinary appeal under Rule 41.
To reiterate, only statutes can confer jurisdiction. Court issuances cannot seize or
appropriate jurisdiction. It has been repeatedly held that "any judgment, order or
resolution issued without jurisdiction is void and cannot be given any effect." By
parity of reasoning, an order issued by a court declaring that it has original and
exclusive jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case when under the law it has none
cannot likewise be given effect. It amounts to usurpation of jurisdiction which cannot be
countenanced.
Since BP 129 already apportioned the jurisdiction of the MTC and the RTC in cases
involving title to property, neither the courts nor the petitioner could alter or disregard
the same. Besides, in determining the proper mode of appeal from an RTC Decision or
Resolution, the determinative factor is the type of jurisdiction actually exercised by the
RTC in rendering its Decision or Resolution. Was it rendered by the RTC in the exercise
of its original jurisdiction, or in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction? In short, we look
at what type of jurisdiction was actually exercised by the RTC. We do not look into what
type of jurisdiction the RTC should have exercised. This is but logical. Inquiring into
what the RTC should have done in disposing of the case is a question which already
involves the merits of the appeal, but we obviously cannot go into that where the mode
of appeal was improper to begin with.
MAGLALANG VS PAGCOR
FACTS: Petitioner was a teller at the Casino Filipino, Angeles City Branch, Angeles
City, which was operated by respondent Philippine Amusement and Gaming
Corporation (PAGCOR), a government-owned or controlled corporation existing by
virtue of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1869.
- In December 2008, while he was performing his functions as teller, he committed an
error counting the money of a lady customer name Cecilia. Due to tension that arose
between the two, they were invited to the casino’s Internal Security Office in order to
air their respective sides.
- He was required to file an Incident Report. By January 2009, he was issued a memo
charging him with Discourtesy. He was later on found guilty of the same and 30-day
suspension was imposed.
- He filed MR seeking reversal of the decision of the Board and also Motion for
Production to be furnished with documents relative to the case. Both were denied.
- He then filed petition for certiorari under Rule 65 before the CA. He ascribed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction to the acts of PAGCOR
in adjudging him guilty of the charge, in failing to observe the proper procedure in the
rendition of its decision and in imposing the harsh penalty of a 30-day suspension. He
further explained that he did not appeal to the Civil Service Commission because the
penalty imposed on him was only a 30-day suspension which is not within the CSC’s
appellate jurisdiction.
-CA outrightly dismissed the petition for certiorari for being premature as petitioner
failed to exhaust administrative remedies before seeking recourse and held that the
CSC has jurisdiction over issues involving the employer-employee relationship in all
branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities and agencies of the Government, including
government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters such as PAGCOR.
ISSUE: THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION HAS APPELLATE JURISDICTION
OVER THE SUSPENSION OF THE PETITIONER DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE
PENALTY INVOLVED IS NOT MORE THAN THIRTY (30) DAYS
RULING: Section 37 (a) and (b) of P.D. No. 807, otherwise known as the Civil Service
Decree of the Philippines, provides for the unavailability of any appeal:
Section 37. Disciplinary Jurisdiction.
(a) The Commission shall decide upon appeal all administrative disciplinary
cases involving the imposition of a penalty of suspension for more than thirty
days, or fine in an amount exceeding thirty days’ salary, demotion in rank or
salary or transfer, removal or dismissal from Office. xxx
(b) The heads of departments, agencies and instrumentalities, provinces,
cities and municipalities shall have jurisdiction to investigate and decide
matters involving disciplinary action against officers and employees under
their jurisdiction. Their decisions shall be final in case the penalty
imposed is suspension for not more than thirty days or fine in an amount
not exceeding thirty days’ salary.
Similar provisions are reiterated in the aforequoted Section 47 30 of E.O. No. 292
essentially providing that cases of this sort are not appealable to the CSC. Correlatively,
we are not unaware of the Concurring Opinion of then Chief Justice Puno in CSC v.
Dacoycoy,31 where he opined, to wit:
In truth, the doctrine barring appeal is not categorically sanctioned by the Civil Service
Law.1âwphi1 For what the law declares as "final" are decisions of heads of agencies
involving suspension for not more than thirty (30) days or fine in an amount not
exceeding thirty (30) days salary. But there is a clear policy reason for declaring these
decisions final. These decisions involve minor offenses. They are numerous for they
are the usual offenses committed by government officials and employees. To allow
their multiple level appeal will doubtless overburden the quasijudicial machinery of our
administrative system and defeat the expectation of fast and efficient action from these
administrative agencies. Nepotism, however, is not a petty offense. Its deleterious
effect on government cannot be over-emphasized. And it is a stubborn evil. The
objective should be to eliminate nepotic acts, hence, erroneous decisions allowing
nepotism cannot be given immunity from review, especially judicial review. It is
thus non sequitur to contend that since some decisions exonerating public officials
from minor offenses can not be appealed, ergo, even a decision acquitting a
government official from a major offense like nepotism cannot also be appealed.
Nevertheless, decisions of administrative agencies which are declared final and
unappealable by law are still subject to judicial review. In Republic of the Phils. v.
Francisco,32 we held:
Since the decision of the Ombudsman suspending respondents for one (1) month
is final and unappealable, it follows that the CA had no appellate jurisdiction to review,
rectify or reverse the same. The Ombudsman was not estopped from asserting in this
Court that the CA had no appellate jurisdiction to review and reverse the decision of
the Ombudsman via petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. This is not
to say that decisions of the Ombudsman cannot be questioned. Decisions of
administrative or quasi-administrative agencies which are declared by law final
and unappealable are subject to judicial review if they fail the test of
arbitrariness, or upon proof of gross abuse of discretion, fraud or error of law.
When such administrative or quasi-judicial bodies grossly misappreciate evidence of
such nature as to compel a contrary conclusion, the Court will not hesitate to reverse
the factual findings. Thus, the decision of the Ombudsman may be reviewed,
modified or reversed via petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court, on a finding that it had no jurisdiction over the complaint, or of grave
abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction.
- It bears stressing that the judicial recourse petitioner availed of in this case before the
CA is a special civil action for certiorari ascribing grave abuse of discretion, amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of PAGCOR, not an appeal. Suffice it to
state that an appeal and a special civil action such as certiorari under Rule 65 are
entirely distinct and separate from each other. One cannot file petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Rules where appeal is available, even if the ground availed of is
grave abuse of discretion. A special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 lies only
when there is no appeal, or plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course
of law. Certiorari cannot be allowed when a party to a case fails to appeal a judgment
despite the availability of that remedy, as the same should not be a substitute for the
lost remedy of appeal. The remedies of appeal and certiorari are mutually exclusive
and not alternative or successive.
In sum, there being no appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law in view of petitioner's allegation that P AGCOR has acted without
or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction, the CA's outright dismissal of the petition for certiorari on the
basis of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies is bereft of any legal standing and
should therefore be set aside.
Finally, as a rule, a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is valid only when the question
involved is an error of jurisdiction, or when there is grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the court or tribunals exercising quasi-
judicial functions. Hence, courts exercising certiorari jurisdiction should refrain from
reviewing factual assessments of the respondent court or agency. Occasionally,
however, they are constrained to wade into factual matters when the evidence on
record does not support those factual findings; or when too much is concluded, inferred
or deduced from the bare or incomplete facts appearing on record. 34 Considering the
circumstances and since this Court is not a trier of facts, 35 remand of this case to the
CA for its judicious resolution is in order.
YOSHIZAKI VS JOY TRAINING
FACTS: Richard and Linda Johnson were members of Joy Training’s Board of
Trustees who sold the real properties, a wrangler jeep, and other personal properties
in favor of the spouses Sally and YoshioYoshizaki. Joy Training filed an action for
cancellation of sales alleging that the spouses Johnson is without the requisite authority
from the Board of Directors.
- The RTC ruled in favor of the spouses Yoshizaki. It found that Joy Training owned
the real properties and it authorized he spouses Johnson to sell the real properties. It
recognized that there were only five actual members of the board of trustees;
consequently, a majority of the board of trustees validly authorized the sale. It also ruled
that the sale of personal properties was valid because they were registered in the
spouses Johnson’s name.
- The CA upheld the RTC’s jurisdiction over the case but reversed its ruling with
respect to the sale of real properties. It also ruled that the resolution of RTC was void
because it was not approved by a majority of the board of trustees.
- Peititoner filed review on certiorari under Rule 45 of ROC avers that the RTC
has no jurisdiction over the case. She points out that the complaint was
principally for the nullification of a corporate act. The transfer of the SEC’s original
and exclusive jurisdiction to the RTC does not have any retroactive application because
jurisdiction is a substantive matter.
ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction over the present case
RULING: Jurisdiction over the subject matter is the power to hear and determine
cases of the general class to which the proceedings before a court belong. It is
conferred by law. The allegations in the complaint and the status or relationship of the
parties determine which court has jurisdiction over the nature of an action. The same
test applies in ascertaining whether a case involves an intra-corporate controversy.
- The CA correctly ruled that the RTC has jurisdiction over the present case. Joy
Training seeks to nullify the sale of the real properties on the ground that there was no
contract of agency between Joy Training and the spouses Johnson. This was beyond
the ambit of the SEC’s original and exclusive jurisdiction prior to the enactment of
Republic Act No. 8799 which only took effect on August 3, 2000.
- As a general rule, a petition for review on certiorari precludes this Court from
entertaining factual issues; we are not duty-bound to analyze again and weigh the
evidence introduced in and considered by the lower courts. However, the present
case falls under the recognized exception that a review of the facts is warranted when
the findings of the lower courts are conflicting. Accordingly, we will examine the
relevant pieces of evidence presented to the lower court.
OKOL VS SLIMMERS WORLD INTERNATIONAL
FACTS: Respondent Slimmers World International employed petitioner Leslie Okol a
management trainee.
She rose up the ranks to become Head Office Manager and then Director and Vice
President until her dismissal prior to Okol's dismissal, Slimmers World preventively
suspended Okol. The suspension arose from the seizure of an equipment by the
Bureau of Customs for the reason of being undervalued.
Okol filed a complaint with the NLRC against Slimmers World, Behavior Modifications,
Inc. and Moy for illegal suspension, illegal dismissal, unpaid commissions, damages
and attorney's fees. Respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss.
The labor arbiter granted the Motion to Dismiss. The labor arbiter ruled that Okol was
the vice-president of Slimmers World at the time of her dismissal. Since it involved a
corporate officer, the dispute was an intra-corporate controversy falling outside the
jurisdiction of the Arbitration branch.
The NLRC reversed and set aside the labor arbiter's order. In CA, the court reversed
the decision of NLRC and affirmed the decision of Labor Arbiter. NLRC ruled that the
case, being an intra-corporate dispute, falls within the jurisdiction of the regular courts
pursuant to 8799.
ISSUE: The issue revolves mainly on whether petitioner was an employee or a
corporate officer of Slimmers World
RULING: In the present case, the respondents, in their motion to dismiss filed before
the labor arbiter, questioned the jurisdiction of the NLRC in taking cognizance of
petitioners complaint. Under the amended by-laws of the respondent, the documents
submitted by respondents, petitioner was a director and officer of Slimmers World. The
charges of illegal suspension, illegal dismissal, unpaid commissions, reinstatement and
back wages imputed by petitioner against respondents fall squarely within the ambit of
intra-corporate disputes. In a number of cases, we have held that a corporate officers
dismissal is always a corporate act, or an intra-corporate controversy which arises
between a stockholder and a corporation. The question of remuneration involving a
stockholder and officer, not a mere employee, is not a simple labor problem but a matter
that comes within the area of corporate affairs and management and is a corporate
controversy in contemplation of the Corporation Code
DOCTRINE: It is a settled rule that jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by
law. The determination of the rights of a director and corporate officer dismissed from
his employment as well as the corresponding liability of a corporation, if any, is an intra-
corporate dispute subject to the jurisdiction of the regular courts. Thus, the appellate
court correctly ruled that it is not the NLRC but the regular courts which have jurisdiction
over the present case
Therefore, NLRC, has no jurisdiction over the case.
PAT-OG VS CSC
DOCTRINE: Where concurrent jurisdiction exists in several tribunals, the body that
first takes cognizance of the complaint shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of the
others. In this case, it was CSC which first acquired jurisdiction over the case because
the complaint was filed before it. Thus, it had the authority to proceed and decide the
case to the exclusion of the DepEd and the Board of Professional Teachers.
FACTS: Robert Bang-on (Bang-on), was a 14-year old second year high school
student. He attended his class at the basketball court. Pat-og as his teacher instructed
them to form 2 lines and fall in line, thinking that there are 3 lines were formed he stayed
in between the 2 lines. Pat-og then held his right arm and punched his stomach without
warning for failing to follow instructions as a result he suffered stomach pain for several
days and was confined in a hospital. As a result he filed an affidavit-complaint against
Pat-og, a third year high school teacher of the same school, before the Civil Service
Commission-Cordillera Administrative Region (CSC-CAR).
SC-CAR found the existence of a prima facie case for misconduct and formally charged
Pat-og.
While the proceedings of the administrative case were ongoing, the RTC rendered its
judgment in the criminal case and found Pat-og guilty of the offense of slight physical
injury. He was meted the penalty of imprisonment from eleven (11) to twenty (20) days.
Following his application for probation, the decision became final and executory and
judgment was entered.
Meanwhile, in the administrative case, a pre-hearing conference was conducted after
repeated postponement by Pat-og. With the approval of the CSC-CAR, the prosecution
submitted its position paper in lieu of a formal presentation of evidence and formally
offered its evidence,... which included the decision in the criminal case. It offered the
affidavits of Raymund Atuban, a classmate of Bang-on; and James Domanog, a third
year high school student, who both witnessed Pat-og hit Bang-on in the stomach.
The CSC affirmed the decision of CSC-CAR.
The CA affirmed the decision of CSC. It agreed that Pat-og was estopped from
questioning the jurisdiction of the CSC as the records clearly showed that he actively
participated in the proceedings. It was of the view that Pat-og was not denied due
process when he failed to cross-examine Bang-on and his witnesses because he was
given the opportunity to be heard and present his evidence before the CSC-CAR and
the CSC.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN IT RULED THAT PETITIONER IS
ESTOPPED FROM QUESTIONING THE JURISDICTION OF THE CIVIL SERVICE
COMMISSION TO HEAR AND DECIDE THE ADMINISTRATIVE CASE AGAINST HIM
RULING: under Section 9 of R.A. No. 4670, the jurisdiction over administrative cases
of public school teachers is lodged with the investigating committee constituted
therein. Also, under Section 23 of R.A. No. 7836 (the Philippine Teachers
Professionalization Act of 1994), the Board of Professional Teachers is given the
power, after due notice and hearing, to suspend or revoke the certificate of registration
of a professional teacher for causes enumerated therein.
Concurrent jurisdiction is that which is possessed over the same parties or subject
matter at the same time by two or more separate tribunals. When the law bestows upon
a government body the jurisdiction to hear and decide cases involving specific matters,
it is to be presumed that such jurisdiction is exclusive unless it be proved that another
body is likewise vested with the same jurisdiction, in which case, both bodies have
concurrent jurisdiction over the matter.
Where concurrent jurisdiction exists in several tribunals, the body that first takes
cognizance of the complaint shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of the others. In
this case, it was CSC which first acquired jurisdiction over the case because the
complaint was filed before it. Thus, it had the authority to proceed and decide the case
to the exclusion of the DepEd and the Board of Professional Teachers.
In CSC v. Alfonso, it was held that special laws, such as R.A. No. 4670, do not divest
the CSC of its inherent power to supervise and discipline all members of the civil
service, including public school teachers. Pat-og, as a public school teacher, is first and
foremost, a civil servant accountable to the people and answerable to the CSC for
complaints lodged against him as a public servant. To hold that R.A. No. 4670 divests
the CSC of its power to discipline public school teachers would negate the very purpose
for which the CSC was established and would impliedly amend the Constitution itself.
To further drive home the point, it was ruled in CSC v. Macud that R.A. No. 4670, in
imposing a separate set of procedural requirements in connection with administrative
proceedings against public school teachers, should be construed to refer only to the
specific procedure to be followed in administrative investigations conducted by the
DepEd. By no means, then, did R.A. No. 4670 confer an exclusive disciplinary authority
over public school teachers on the DepEd.
At any rate, granting that the CSC was without jurisdiction, the petitioner is indeed
estopped from raising the issue. Although the rule states that a jurisdictional question
may be raised at any time, such rule admits of the exception where, as in this case,
estoppel has supervened.20 Here, instead of opposing the CSC’s exercise of
jurisdiction, the petitioner invoked the same by actively participating in the proceedings
before the CSC-CAR and by even filing his appeal before the CSC itself; only raising
the issue of jurisdiction later in his motion for reconsideration after the CSC denied his
appeal. This Court has time and again frowned upon the undesirable practice of a party
submitting his case for decision and then accepting the judgment only if favorable, but
attacking it for lack of jurisdiction when adverse.21
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN VS RODRIGUEZ
FACTS: The Ombudsman received a complaint for abuse of authority dishonesty,
oppression, misconduct in office, and neglect of duty against Rolson
Rodriguez, punong barangay in Negros Occidental
The sangguniang bayan of Binalbagan, Negros Occidental, through vice-mayor Jose
G. Yulo, received a similar complaint against Rodriguez.
The sangguniang bayan exercises its jurisdiction to hear and decide the case. The
Ombudsman also exercises it jurisdiction.
Complainants filed a motion to withdraw the complaint lodged in the sangguniang
bayan on the ground that they wanted to prioritize the complaint filed in the
Ombudsman. The municipal vice-mayor dismissed the case filed in the sangguniang
bayan.
In his position paper, Rodriguez insisted that the sangguniang bayan still continued to
exercise jurisdiction over the complaint filed against him. He claimed he had not
received any resolution or decision dismissing the complaint filed in the sangguniang
bayan. In reply, complainants maintained there was no more complaint pending in
the sangguniang bayan since the latter had granted their motion to withdraw the
complaint. In a rejoinder, Rodriguez averred that the sangguniang bayan resolution
dismissing the case filed against him was not valid because only the vice-mayor signed
it.
RULING OF OMBUDSMAN, the Ombudsman found Rodriguez guilty of dishonesty
and oppression. It imposed on Rodriguez the penalty of dismissal from the service with
forfeiture of all benefits, disqualification to hold public office, and forfeiture of civil
service eligibilities. Rodriguez filed a motion for reconsideration, the Ombudsman
denied the motion for reconsideration.
RULING OF CA, the Court of Appeals set aside for lack of jurisdiction the Decision of
the Ombudsman and directed the sangguniang bayan to proceed with the hearing on
the administrative case. The appellate court reasoned that the sangguniang bayan had
acquired primary jurisdiction over the person of Rodriguez to the exclusion of the
Ombudsman.
Petitioners filed a petition for review.
ISSUE: Whether it was the sangguniang bayan or the Ombudsman that first acquired
jurisdiction.
RULING: The primary jurisdiction of the Ombudsman to investigate any act or omission
of a public officer or employee applies only in cases cognizable by
the Sandiganbayan. In cases cognizable by regular courts, the Ombudsman has
concurrent jurisdiction with other investigative agencies of government. Republic Act
No. 8249, otherwise known as An Act Further Defining the Jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan, limits the cases that are cognizable by the Sandiganbayan to
public officials occupying positions corresponding to salary grade 27 and
higher. The Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over private respondent who,
as punong barangay, is occupying a position corresponding to salary grade 14 under
Republic Act No. 6758, otherwise known as the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989
Under Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code, the
sangguniang panlungsod or sangguniang bayan has disciplinary authority over any
elective barangay official, to wit:
SEC. 61. Form and Filing of Administrative Complaints. A verified
complaint against any erring elective official shall be prepared as
follows:
(c) A complaint against any elective barangay official shall be filed
before the sangguniang panlungsod or sangguniang
bayan concerned whose decision shall be final and executory.
Clearly, the Ombudsman has concurrent jurisdiction with the sangguniang
bayan over administrative cases against elective barangay officials occupying
positions below salary grade 27, such as private respondent in this case.
DOCTRINE: In administrative cases involving the concurrent jurisdiction of
two or more disciplining authorities, the body in which the complaint is filed
first, and which opts to take cognizance of the case, acquires jurisdiction to
the exclusion of other tribunals exercising concurrent jurisdiction. In this
case, since the complaint was filed first in the Ombudsman, and the
Ombudsman opted to assume jurisdiction over the complaint, the
Ombudsmans exercise of jurisdiction is to the exclusion of
the sangguniang bayan exercising concurrent jurisdiction.
It is a hornbook rule that jurisdiction is a matter of law. Jurisdiction, once
acquired, is not lost upon the instance of the parties but continues until the
case is terminated.] When herein complainants first filed the complaint in the
Ombudsman, jurisdiction was already vested on the latter. Jurisdiction could
no longer be transferred to the sangguniang bayan by virtue of a subsequent
complaint filed by the same complainants.
As a final note under Section 60 of the Local Government Code,
the sangguniang bayan has no power to remove an elective barangay official.
Apart from the Ombudsman, only a proper court may do so. Unlike the
sangguniang bayan, the powers of the Ombudsman are not merely
recommendatory. The Ombudsman is clothed with authority to directly
remove an erring public official other than members of Congress and the
Judiciary who may be removed only by impeachment.
The grants the petition and sets aside the decision of the CA and affirm the
decision of the Ombudsman.
IN RE PETITION FOR SEPARATION OF PROPERTY: MULLER VS MULLER
FACTS: Petitioner Elena Buenaventura Muller and Respondent Helmut Muller
(German) got married and lived in Germany owned by the respondent parents but then
they decided to reside in the Philippines permanently. The respondent had inherit the
house in Germany from his parents which he sold and used the proceeds for purchase
of a parcel of land in Antipolo, Rizal and he registered it in the name of petitioner, Elena
Buenaventura Muller. Due to incompatibilities and maltreatment of respondent to the
petitioner, the spouses eventually separated. The respondent filed a petition for
separation of properties before RTC Quezon City.
RTC granted said petition and ordered equal partition of personal properties located
within the country, excluding those acquired by gratuitous title during the marriage. With
regard to the Antipolo property the court ruled that he cannot recover his funds because
the property was purchased in violation of Section 7, Article XII of the Constitution.
The respondent elevated the case to the Court of Appeals, which reversed the decision
of the RTC. It held that respondent merely prayed for reimbursement for the purchase
of the Antipolo property, and not acquisition or transfer of ownership to him. It ordered
the respondent to REIMBURSE the petitioner the amount of P528,000.00 for the
acquisition of the land and the amount of P2,300,000.00 for the construction of the
house situated in Antipolo, Rizal.
Elena Muller then filed a petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether respondent is entitled to reimbursement of the funds used for the
acquisition of the Antipolo property.
RULING: Aliens, whether individuals or corporations, are disqualified from acquiring
lands of the public domain. Hence, they are also disqualified from acquiring private
lands. The primary purpose of the constitutional provision is the conservation of the
national patrimony.
This constitutional provision closes the only remaining avenue through which
agricultural resources may leak into aliens hands. It would certainly be futile to prohibit
the alienation of public agricultural lands to aliens if, after all, they may be freely so
alienated upon their becoming private agricultural lands in the hands of Filipino citizens.
The Court of Appeals erred in holding that an implied trust was created and resulted by
operation of law in view of petitioners marriage to respondent. Save for the exception
provided in cases of hereditary succession, respondents disqualification from
owning lands in the Philippines is absolute. Not even an ownership in trust is
allowed. Besides, where the purchase is made in violation of an existing statute and in
evasion of its express provision, no trust can result in favor of the party who is guilty of
the fraud. To hold otherwise would allow circumvention of the constitutional prohibition.
Invoking the principle that a court is not only a court of law but also a court of
equity, is likewise misplaced.
DOCTRINE: It has been held that equity as a rule will follow the law and will not permit
that to be done indirectly which, because of public policy, cannot be done directly. He
who seeks equity must do equity, and he who comes into equity must come with clean
hands. The latter is a frequently stated maxim which is also expressed in the principle
that he who has done inequity shall not have equity. It signifies that a litigant may be
denied relief by a court of equity on the ground that his conduct has been inequitable,
unfair and dishonest, or fraudulent, or deceitful as to the controversy in issue.
Thus, in the instant case, respondent cannot seek reimbursement on the ground
of equity where it is clear that he willingly and knowingly bought the property
despite the constitutional prohibition.
Further, the distinction made between transfer of ownership as opposed to recovery of
funds is a futile exercise on respondents part. To allow reimbursement would in effect
permit respondent to enjoy the fruits of a property which he is not allowed to own.
As already observed, the finding that his wife had used her own money to purchase the
property cannot, and will not, at this stage of the proceedings be reviewed and
overturned. But even if it were a fact that said wife had used conjugal funds to
make the acquisition, the considerations just set out to militate, on high
constitutional grounds, against his recovering and holding the property so
acquired, or any part thereof. And whether in such an event, he may recover from
his wife any share of the money used for the purchase or charge her with
unauthorized disposition or expenditure of conjugal funds is not now inquired
into; that would be, in the premises, a purely academic exercise.
Petition was granted.
REYES VS LIM
FACTS: Petitioner David Reyes filed a complaint for annulment of contract and
damages against respondents in RTC. The complaint alleged that Reyes as seller and
Lim as buyer entered into a contract to sell a parcel of land with a monthly rental of
P35,000.
The complaint claimed that Reyes had informed Harrison Lumber to vacate the
Property before the end of January 1995. Reyes also informed Keng and Harrison
Lumber that if they failed to vacate by 8 March 1995, he would hold them liable for the
penalty of P400,000 a month as provided in the Contract to Sell.
Lim filed his Answer stating that he was ready and willing to pay the balance of the
purchase price on or before 8 March 1995.
Lim requested a meeting with Reyes through the latters daughter on the signing of the
Deed of Absolute Sale and the payment of the balance but Reyes kept postponing their
meeting.
Reyes offered to return the P10 million down payment to Lim because Reyes was
having problems in removing the lessee from the Property. Lim rejected Reyes offer
and proceeded to verify the status of Reyes title to the Property. Lim learned that Reyes
had already sold the Property to Line One Foods Corporation (Line One) on 1 March
1995 for P16,782,840.
Lim requested in open court that Reyes be ordered to deposit the P10 million down
payment with the cashier of the Regional Trial Court of Paranaque. The trial court
granted this motion.
Reyes filed a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 with the Court of Appeals. Reyes
prayed that the Orders of the trial court be set aside for having been issued with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. CA dismissed the petition for lack
of merit.
ISSUE: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in finding the trial court could issue the
questioned Orders on grounds of equity when there is an applicable law on the matter,
that is, Rules 57 to 61 of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure.
RULING: The instant case, however, is precisely one where there is a hiatus in the law
and in the Rules of Court. If left alone, the hiatus will result in unjust enrichment to
Reyes at the expense of Lim. The hiatus may also imperil restitution, which is a
precondition to the rescission of the Contract to Sell that Reyes himself seeks. This is
not a case of equity overruling a positive provision of law or judicial rule for there is
none that governs this particular case. This is a case of silence or insufficiency of the
law and the Rules of Court. In this case, Article 9 of the Civil Code expressly mandates
the courts to make a ruling despite the silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the
laws. This calls for the application of equity, which fills the open spaces in the law.
Thus, the trial court in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction may validly order the deposit
of the P10 million down payment in court.
DOCTRINE: The purpose of the exercise of equity jurisdiction in this case is to prevent
unjust enrichment and to ensure restitution. Equity jurisdiction aims to do complete
justice in cases where a court of law is unable to adapt its judgments to the special
circumstances of a case because of the inflexibility of its statutory or legal
jurisdiction. Equity is the principle by which substantial justice may be attained in cases
where the prescribed or customary forms of ordinary law are inadequate.
Reyes is seeking rescission of the Contract to Sell. In his amended answer, Lim is also
seeking cancellation of the Contract to Sell. The trial court then ordered Reyes to
deposit in court the P10 million down payment that Lim made under the Contract to
Sell. Reyes admits receipt of the P10 million down payment but opposes the order to
deposit the amount in court. Reyes contends that prior to a judgment annulling the
Contract to Sell, he has the right to use, possess and enjoy the P10 million as its
owner unless the court orders its preliminary attachment.
To subscribe to Reyes contention will unjustly enrich Reyes at the expense of
Lim. Reyes sold to Line One the Property even before the balance of P18 million under
the Contract to Sell with Lim became due on 8 March 1995. On 1 March 1995, Reyes
signed a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of Line One. On 3 March 1995, the Register of
Deeds issued TCT No. 134767 in the name of Line One. Reyes cannot claim ownership
of the P10 million down payment because Reyes had already sold to another buyer the
Property for which Lim made the down payment. In fact, in his Comment dated 20
March 1996, Reyes reiterated his offer to return to Lim the P10 million down payment.
PICHAY VS OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY FOR LEGAL
AFFAIRS
FACTS: President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Executive Order No. 12 (E.O. 12)
creating the Presidential Anti-Graft Commission (PAGC) and vesting it with the power
to investigate or hear administrative cases or complaints for possible graft and
corruption, among others, against presidential appointees and to submit its report and
recommendations to the President.
On November 15, 2010, President Benigno Simeon Aquino III issued Executive Order
No. 13 (E.O. 13), abolishing the PAGC and transferring its functions to the Office of the
Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs (ODESLA), more particularly to its newly-
established Investigative and Adjudicatory Division (IAD).
Respondent Finance Secretary Cesar V. Purisima filed before the IAD-ODESLA a
complaint affidavit for grave misconduct against petitioner Prospero A. Pichay, Jr.,
Chairman of the Board of Trustees of the Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA)
which arose from the purchase of (445,377) shares of stock of Express Savings Bank,
Inc.
Now alleging that no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy is available to him in
the ordinary course of law, petitioner has resorted to the instant petition for certiorari
and prohibition.
ISSUE: E.O. 13 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR USURPING THE POWER OF
CONGRESS TO DELEGATE QUASI-JUDICIAL POWERS TO ADMINISTRATIVE
AGENCIES
RULING: In the case of Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB v. Zamora the Court affirmed that
the President's authority to carry out a reorganization in any branch or agency of the
executive department is an express grant by the legislature by virtue of E.O. 292
(otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987).
Under E.O 292, it allows the president to reoganize his office "to achieve simplicity,
economy and efficiency." The Office of the President is the nerve center of the
Executive Branch. President is limited to merely transferring functions or agencies from
the Office of the President to Departments or Agencies, and vice versa. Generally, this
authority to implement organizational changes is limited to transferring either an office
or a function from the Office of the President to another Department or Agency, and the
other way around.
The IAD-ODESLA is a fact-finding and recommendatory body not vested with quasi-
judicial powers. DOCTRINE: Fact-finding is not adjudication and it cannot be
likened to the judicial function of a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial
agency or office. The function of receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom
the facts of a controversy is not a judicial function. To be considered as such, the
act of receiving evidence and arriving at factual conclusions in a controversy must be
accompanied by the authority of applying the law to the factual conclusions to the end
that the controversy may be decided or determined authoritatively, finally and
definitively, subject to such appeals or modes of review as may be provided by law.
The President's authority to issue E.O. 13 and constitute the IAD-ODESLA as his fact-
finding investigator cannot be doubted. The IAD-ODESLA does not encroach upon the
powers and duties of the Ombudsman. Every law has in its favor the presumption of
constitutionality, and to justify its nullification, there must be a clear and unequivocal
breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful and argumentative one. Petitioner has failed
to discharge the burden of proving the illegality of E.O. 13, which IS indubitably a valid
exercise of the President's continuing authority to reorganize the Office of the
President.
SPOUSES DACUDAO VS SECRETARY OF JUSTICE
FACTS: The petitioners filed a case of syndicated estafa against Celso Delos Angeles
and his associates after the petitioners were defrauded in a business venture.
Thereafter, the DOJ Secretary issued Department Order 182 which directs all
prosecutors in the country to forward all cases already filed against Celso Delos
Angeles, Jr. and his associates to the secretariat of DOJ in Manila for appropriate
action.
However, in a separate order which is Memorandum dated March 2009, it was said
that cases already filed against Celso Delos Angeles et. al of the Legacy Group of
Companies in Cagayan De Oro City need not be sent anymore to the Secretariat of
DOJ in Manila. Because of such DOJ orders, the complaint of petitioners was
forwarded to the secretariat of the Special Panel of the DOJ in Manila.
Aggrieved, Spouses Dacudao filed this petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus
assailing to the respondent Secretary of justice grave abuse of discretion in issuing the
department Order and the Memorandum, which according to the violated their right to
due process, right to equal protection of the law and right to speedy disposition of the
cases.
The petitioners opined that orders were unconstitutional or exempting from coverage
cases already filed and pending at the Prosecutor’s Office of Cagayan De Oro City.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), representing respondent Secretary of
Justice, maintains the validity of DO No. 182 and DOJ Memorandum dated March 2,
2009, and prays that the petition be dismissed for its utter lack of merit.
ISSUE: W/N Did respondent Secretary of Justice commit grave abuse of discretion in
issuing DO No. 182.
RULING: The writ of certiorari is available only when any tribunal, board or officer
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction,
and there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law.
DOCTRINE: The sole office of the writ of certiorari is the correction of errors of
jurisdiction, which includes the commission of grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of jurisdiction. In this regard, mere abuse of discretion is not enough to warrant the
issuance of the writ. The abuse of discretion must be grave, which means either that
the judicial or quasi-judicial power was exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by
reason of passion or personal hostility, or that the respondent judge, tribunal or board
evaded a positive duty, or virtually refused to perform the duty enjoined or to act in
contemplation of law, such as when such judge, tribunal or board exercising judicial or
quasi-judicial powers acted in a capricious or whimsical manner as to be equivalent to
lack of jurisdiction.
For a special civil action for certiorari to prosper, therefore, the following requisites must
concur, namely: (a) it must be directed against a tribunal, board or officer exercising
judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (b) the tribunal, board, or officer must have acted
without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction; and (c) there is no appeal nor any plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law. The burden of proof lies on petitioners to
demonstrate that the assailed order was issued without or in excess of jurisdiction or
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Yet, petitioners have not shown a compliance with the requisites. To start with, they
merely alleged that the Secretary of Justice had acted without or in excess of his
jurisdiction. Also, the petition did not show that the Secretary of Justice was an
officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions. Instead, the Secretary of
Justice would appear to be not exercising any judicial or quasi-judicial functions
because his questioned issuances were ostensibly intended to ensure his
subordinates’ efficiency and economy in the conduct of the preliminary investigation of
all the cases involving the Legacy Group. The function involved was purely executive
or administrative.
The fact that the DOJ is the primary prosecution arm of the Government does not
make it a quasi-judicial office or agency. Its preliminary investigation of cases is
not a quasi-judicial proceeding. Nor does the DOJ exercise a quasi-judicial function
when it reviews the findings of a public prosecutor on the finding of probable cause in
any case. Indeed, in Bautista v. Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court has held that a
preliminary investigation is not a quasi-judicial proceeding, stating:
x x x the prosecutor in a preliminary investigation does not determine the guilt or
innocence of the accused. He does not exercise adjudication nor rule-making functions.
Preliminary investigation is merely inquisitorial, and is often the only means of
discovering the persons who may be reasonably charged with a crime and to enable
the fiscal to prepare his complaint or information. It is not a trial of the case on the merits
and has no purpose except that of determining whether a crime has been committed
and whether there is probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty thereof. While
the fiscal makes that determination, he cannot be said to be acting as a quasi-court, for
it is the courts, ultimately, that pass judgment on the accused, not the fiscal.
There may be some decisions of the Court that have characterized the public
prosecutor’s power to conduct a preliminary investigation as quasi-judicial in nature.
Still, this characterization is true only to the extent that the public prosecutor, like a
quasi-judicial body, is an officer of the executive department exercising powers akin to
those of a court of law.
But the limited similarity between the public prosecutor and a quasi-judicial body quickly
endsthere. For sure, a quasi-judicial body is an organ of government other than a court
of law or a legislative office that affects the rights of private parties through either
adjudication or rule-making; it performs adjudicatory functions, and its awards and
adjudications determine the rights of the parties coming before it; its decisions have the
same effect as the judgments of a court of law. In contrast, that is not the effect
whenever a public prosecutor conducts a preliminary investigation to determine
probable cause in order to file a criminal information against a person properly charged
with the offense, or whenever the Secretary of Justice reviews the public prosecutor’s
orders or resolutions.
HEIRS OF SPS CRISPULO FERRER VS CA
FACTS: The present case arose from an injunction suit instituted by the petitioners
against respondent National Power Corporation (Napocor) in RTC. Petitioners sought
to enjoin Napocor from selling the Caliraya Hydroelectric Power Plant, as they claimed
ownership over portions of the land where the power plant stood specifically Lot 1873
and Lot 72. Additionally, the petitioners demanded payment of damages from
Napocor as rentals for the use and occupation of the lots since 1936 the year Napocor
first occupied the lot and began construction of the power plant. NAPOCOR denied the
petitioners allegations.
RTC dismissed the petitioners action for injunction and claim for damages. The trial
court ruled that the petitioners failed to present convincing proof of their claim of
ownership. The petitioners assailed the RTC decision through a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 of ROC filed with the CA. CA affirmed the decision of RTC.
ISSUE: W/N petitioners 2nd MR is correct.
RULING: No, the petitioners 2nd MR is not correct. Section 3, Rule 15 of the Internal
Rules of the Supreme Court (IRSC) sets forth the rule when the Court may entertain a
second motion for reconsideration.
Sec. 3. Second motion for reconsideration. The Court shall
not entertain a second motion for reconsideration, and any exception
to this rule can only be granted in the higher interest of justice by the
Court en banc upon a vote of at least two-thirds of its actual
membership. There is reconsideration in the higher interest of justice
when the assailed decision is not only legally erroneous, but is
likewise patently unjust and potentially capable of causing
unwarranted and irremediable injury or damage to the parties. A
second motion for reconsideration can only be entertained before the
ruling sought to be reconsidered becomes final by operation of law
or by the Courts declaration.
In the Division, a vote of three Members shall be required
to elevate a second motion for reconsideration to the Court En Banc.
Aside from meeting the voting requirements, a movant is required by the IRSC to
substantially show that a reconsideration of the Courts ruling is necessary in the higher
interest of justice, which standard is satisfied upon proving that the assailed ruling is
both (1) legally erroneous and (2) patently unjust and potentially capable of causing
unwarranted and irremediable injury or damage to the parties.
In this case, petitioners reasons do not sufficiently establish that a reversal of the Courts
ruling will serve the higher interest of justice. On the contrary, for the Court to consider
and find meritorious the petitioners argument will mean abandoning settled principles
of law to accommodate the petitioners stale and clearly unsubstantiated claims.
The petitioners insist that the Bureau of Lands certificate, stating that their predecessor
Crispulo Ferrer was a survey claimant of the property covered by Cadastral Survey No.
90 of Lumban, Laguna, sufficiently establishes their claim over Lot 1873, despite our
consistent ruling that the certificate is no proof of title of ownership over the property.
Notably, nothing in the certificate indicated whether Crispulo Ferrer was actually in
possession of Lot 1873 or for how long he had been in possession thereof. We find the
matter and duration of the petitioners and their predecessors possession relevant in
view of the petitioners contention that they acquired ownership of Lot 1873 through
prescription, i.e., the lapse of the requisite 30-year period provided in Article 1137 of
the Civil Code.
DOCTRINE: The essence of the Courts adjudicatory function is to apply the law
to facts, as supported by the evidence and the records. The petitioners have
already exhausted all possible legal arguments and, as we have discussed, none of
which are compelling enough to require reconsideration of our past ruling. To be sure,
repetitive filing of legally useless submissions cannot pressure this Court into taking
another look at an unmeritorious case; they can only increase the petitioners legal
expenses, as in this case, where we are ordering the payment of double costs for the
act of unnecessarily and stubbornly wasting the Courts time.
VDA. DE BALLESTEROS VS RURAL BANK
FACTS: petitioner Lucia Barrameda Vda. De Ballesteros (Lucia) filed a complaint
for Annulment of Deed of Extrajudicial Partition, Deed of Mortgage and Damages with
prayer for Preliminary Injunction against her children all surnamed Ballesteros, and the
Rural Bank of Canaman, Inc., Baao Branch (RBCI) before the RTC-Iriga.
In her complaint, Lucia alleged that her deceased husband, Eugenio, left two (2)
parcels of land, without her knowledge and consent, her children executed a deed of
extrajudicial partition and Rico mortgaged Parcel B of the estate in favor of RBCI which
mortgage was being foreclosed for failure to settle the loan secured by the lot; and that
Lucia was occupying Parcel B and had no other place to live.
RBCI claimed that in 1979, Lucia sold one of the two parcels to Rico which represented
her share in the estate of her husband. RBCI was undergoing liquidation.
RTC- Iriga dismissed the complaint of petitioner and ruled that this court has no
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action.
Lucia appealed the RTC ruling to the CA on the ground that the RTC-Iriga erred in
dismissing the case because it had jurisdiction over the case.
CA ordered the consolidation of Civil Case n RTC-Iriga and the liquidation case pending
before RTC-Makati
Petitioner filed a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of ROC.
ISSUE: Whether a liquidation court can take cognizance of a case wherein the main
cause of action is not a simple money claim against a bank ordered closed, placed
under receivership of the PDIC, and undergoing a liquidation proceeding.
RULING: The court ruled that yes. A liquidating court can take cognizance of the
case. Indeed, the Court recognizes the doctrine on adherence of
jurisdiction. Lucia, however, must be reminded that such principle is not without
exceptions. It is well to quote the ruling of the CA on this matter, thus:
DOCTRINE: This Court is not unmindful nor unaware of the doctrine
on the adherence of jurisdiction. However, the rule on adherence
of jurisdiction is not absolute and has exceptions. One of the
exceptions is that when the change in jurisdiction is curative in
character (Garcia v. Martinez, 90 SCRA 331 [1979]; Calderon, Sr.
v. Court of Appeals, 100 SCRA 459 [1980]; Atlas Fertilizer
Corporation v. Navarro, 149 SCRA 432 [1987]; Abad v. RTC of
Manila, Br. Lll, 154 SCRA 664 [1987]).
For sure, Section 30, R.A. 7653 is curative in character
when it declared that the liquidation court shall have jurisdiction in
the same proceedings to assist in the adjudication of the disputed
claims against the Bank.The interpretation of this Section (formerly
Section 29, R.A. 265) becomes more obvious in the light of its
intent. In Manalo v. Court of Appeals (366 SCRA 752, [2001]), the
Supreme Court says:
xxx The requirement that all claims
against the bank be pursued in the liquidation
proceedings filed by the Central Bank is intended
to prevent multiplicity of actions against the
insolvent bank and designed to establish due
process and orderliness in the liquidation of the
bank, to obviate the proliferation of litigations and
to avoid injustice and arbitrariness (citing Ong v.
CA, 253 SCRA 105 [1996]). The lawmaking body
contemplated that for convenience, only one
court, if possible, should pass upon the claims
against the insolvent bank and that the
liquidation court should assist the
Superintendents of Banks and regulate his
operations (citing Central Bank of the Philippines,
et al. v. CA, et al., 163 SCRA 482 [1988]).
DACOYCOY VS IAC
FACTS: petitioner Jesus Dacoycoy filed before the Regional Trial Court, Antipolo,
Rizal, a complaint against private respondent Rufino de Guzman praying for the
annulment of two (2) deeds of sale involving a parcel of riceland and damages for
private respondent's refusal to have said deeds of sale set aside upon petitioner's
demand.
The trial court dismissed the complaint on the ground of improper venue.
Petitioner appealed to the Intermediate Appellate Court, now Court of Appeals, which
in its decision of April 11, 1986, affirmed the order of dismissal of his complaint.
ISSUE: May the trial court motu proprio dismiss a complaint on the ground of improper
venue?
RULING: The motu proprio dismissal of petitioner's complaint by respondent trial court
on the ground of improper venue is plain error, obviously attributable to its inability to
distinguish between jurisdiction and venue.
Questions or issues relating to venue of actions are basically governed by Rule 4 of the
Revised Rules of Court. It is said that the laying of venue is procedural rather than
substantive. It relates to the jurisdiction of the court over the person rather than the
subject matter. Provisions relating to venue establish a relation between the plaintiff
and the defendant and not between the court and the subject matter. Venue relates to
trial not to jurisdiction, touches more of the convenience of the parties rather than the
substance of the case.
DOCTRINE: Jurisdiction treats of the power of the court to decide a case on the merits;
while venue deals on the locality, the place where the suit may be had.
In Luna vs. Carandang we emphasized:
(1) A Court of First Instance has jurisdiction over suits involving title to, or
possession of, real estate wherever situated in the Philippines, subject to the
rules on venue of actions (Manila Railroad Company vs. Attorney General,
etc., et al., 20 Phil. 523; Central Azucarera de Tarlac vs. De Leon, et al., 56
Phil. 169; Navarro vs. Aguila, et al., 66 Phil. 604; Lim Cay, et al. vs. Del
Rosario, etc., et al., 55 Phil. 692);
(2) Rule 4, Section 2, of the Rules of Court requiring that an action involving
real property shall be brought in the Court of First Instance of the province
where the land lies is a rule on venue of actions, which may be waived
expressly or by implication.
In the instant case, even granting for a moment that the action of petitioner is a real
action, respondent trial court would still have jurisdiction over the case, it being a
regional trial court vested with the exclusive original jurisdiction over "all civil actions
which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein . . ." in
accordance with Section 19 (2) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129. With respect to the
parties, there is no dispute that it acquired jurisdiction over the plaintiff Jesus Dacoycoy,
now petitioner, the moment he filed his complaint for annulment and damages.
Respondent trial court could have acquired jurisdiction over the defendant, now private
respondent, either by his voluntary appearance in court and his submission to its
authority, or by the coercive power of legal process exercised over his person.
DOLOT VS PAJE
FACTS: petitioner Maricris D. Dolot (Dolot), together with the parish priest of the Holy
Infant Jesus Parish and the officers of Alyansa Laban sa Mina sa Matnog (petitioners),
filed a petition for continuing mandamus, damages and attorney’s fees with the RTC of
Sorsogon to stop the mining in Matnog. The case was summarily dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction by the RTC. The petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but it was
denied in the Resolution. Petitioner Dolot filed a petition for review on certiorar and
went straight to this Court on pure questions of law.
ISSUE: whether the RTC-Branch 53 has jurisdiction to resolve Civil Case No. 2011-
8338. The other issue is whether the petition is dismissible on the grounds that: (1)
there is no final court decree, order or decision that the public officials allegedly failed
to act on; (2) the case was prematurely filed for failure to exhaust administrative
FACTS: Private respondent Jessie John Gimenez (Gimenez) filed, on behalf of the
Yuchengco family and of the Malayan Insurance Co. a criminal complaint before the
RTC of Makati for 13 counts of libel under Art 355 in relation to 353 of the RPC against
herein petitioners who are officers of Parents Enabling Parents Coalition, Inc (PEPCI).
Pepci is a large group of disgruntled plan holders of Pacific Plans, Inc (PPI) – a wholly
owned subsidiary of Great Pacific Life Assurance Corp, also owned by Yuchengco
remedies; and (3) the petitioners failed to attach judicial affidavits and furnish a copy of
the complaint to the government or appropriate
RULING: Jurisdiction and Venue
In dismissing the petition for lack of jurisdiction, the RTC, in its Order dated September
16, 2011, apparently relied on SC Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 7 defining the
territorial areas of the Regional Trial Courts in Regions 1 to 12, and Administrative
Circular (Admin. Circular) No. 23-2008, designating the environmental courts "to try
and decide violations of environmental laws x x x committed within their respective
territorial jurisdictions." Thus, it ruled that its territorial jurisdiction was limited within the
boundaries of Sorsogon City and the neighboring municipalities of Donsol, Pilar,
Castilla, Casiguran and Juban and that it was "bereft of jurisdiction to entertain, hear
and decide [the] case, as such authority rests before another co-equal court."15
Such reasoning is plainly erroneous. The RTC cannot solely rely on SC A.O. No. 7 and
Admin. Circular No. 23-2008 and confine itself within its four corners in determining
whether it had jurisdiction over the action filed by the petitioners.
DOCTRINE: None is more well-settled than the rule that jurisdiction, which is the
power and authority of the court to hear, try and decide a case, is conferred by law. It
may either be over the nature of the action, over the subject matter, over the person of
the defendants or over the issues framed in the pleadings. By virtue of Batas
Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 129 or the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, jurisdiction over
special civil actions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus is vested in the RTC.
Particularly, Section 21(1) thereof provides that the RTCs shall exercise original
jurisdiction –
in the issuance of writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas
corpus and injunction which may be enforced in any part of their respective regions.
The RTC need not be reminded that venue relates only to the place of trial or the
geographical location in which an action or proceeding should be brought and does not
equate to the jurisdiction of the court. It is intended to accord convenience to the parties,
as it relates to the place of trial, and does not restrict their access to the courts.
Consequently, the RTC’s motu proprio dismissal of Civil Case No. 2011-8338 on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction is patently incorrect.
At most, the error committed by the petitioners in filing the case with the RTC of
Sorsogon was that of improper venue. A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC or the Rules of Procedure
for Environmental Cases (Rules) specifically states that a special civil action for
continuing mandamus shall be filed with the "[RTC] exercising jurisdiction over the
territory where the actionable neglect or omission occurred x x x."
BONIFACIO vs RTC OF MAKATI
Gr no. 184800 May 5, 2010
Group of Companies (YGC) – who had previously purchased traditional pre-need
educational plans but were unable to collect thereon due to liquidity concerns, filed for
corporate rehabilitation with prayer of suspension of payments before the Makati RTC.
Decrying PPI’s refusal to honor its obligations under the educational plans, PEPCI
sought to provide a forum by which the plan holders could seek redress for their loss
under the policies by maintaining a website with the address of www.pepcoalition.com.
Gimenez alleged that the same website is easily accessible to the public. He further
alleged that upon accessing the above-stated website in Makati on various dates, he
was appalled to read numerous articles which maliciously and recklessly caused to be
published by PEPCI containing highly derogatory statements and false accusations
against the Yuchengco Family, YGC, and Malayan.
By resolution, the Makati Prosecutor’s Office filed 13 counts of libel after finding
probable cause to indict the accused. Several of the accused appealed the
Prosecutor’s resolution to the Secretary of Justice which reversed the finding of
probable cause and directed the withdrawal of the information on the ground that
internet libel, as a crime, is inexistent.
Petitioner then filed before the Makati RTC a Motion to Quash the information on the
ground that it failed to vest jurisdiction on the Makati RTC. Citing Macasaet v people,
petitioners maintained that the information failed to allege a particular place within the
trial court’s jurisdiction where the subject article was printed and first published or that
the offended party resided in Makati at the time the alleged defamatory material was
printed and first published. The RTC of Makati, despite finding probable cause,
quashed the information, but upon motion for reconsideration, allowed the prosecution
to amend the information and the latter moved to have the amended information
admitted. Petitioners once more moved to have the amended information quashed on
the same ground but the RTC ruled that the information was sufficient in form.
Macasaet etal vs Co
G.R. No. 156759 June 5, 2013
Facts: On July 3, 2000, respondent, a retired police officer assigned at the Western
Police District in Manila, sued Abante Tonite, a daily tabloid of general circulation; its
Publisher Allen A. Macasaet; its Managing Director Nicolas V. Quijano; its Circulation
Manager Isaias Albano; its Editors Janet Bay, Jesus R. Galang and Randy Hagos; and
its Columnist/Reporter Lily Reyes (petitioners), claiming damages because of an
allegedly libelous article petitioners published in the June 6, 2000 issue of Abante
Tonite. The suit, docketed as Civil Case No. 0097907, was raffled to Branch 51 of the
RTC, which in due course issued summons to be served on each defendant, including
Abante Tonite, at their business address at Monica Publishing Corporation, 301-305
3rd Floor, BF Condominium Building, Solana Street corner A. Soriano Street,
Intramuros, Manila. In the morning of September 18, 2000, RTC Sheriff Raul Medina
proceeded to the stated address to effect the personal service of the summons on the
defendants. But his efforts to personally serve each defendant in the address were futile
because the defendants were then out of the office and unavailable. He returned in the
afternoon of that day to make a second attempt at serving the summons, but he was
informed that petitioners were still out of the office. He decided to resort to substituted
service of the summons, and explained why in his sheriff’s return dated September 22,
2005.
Issue: Whether or not jurisdiction over the petitioners have been acquired.
Ruling: Yes. Jurisdiction over the person, or jurisdiction in personam –the power of the
court to render a personal judgment or to subject the parties in a particular action to the
judgment and other rulings rendered in the action is an element of due process that is
essential in all actions, civil as well as criminal, except in actions in rem or quasi in rem.
ISSUE: W/N the RTC of Makati acted with grave abuse of discretion in admitting the
amended information despite the failure to allege that the libelous articles were printed
and first published by the accused in Makati.
RULING: Yes, the venue of the action seeks to prevent undue harassment on the part
of the publisher by the complainant who, if the amended information would be allowed,
can file in all other locations where the pepcoalition website is likewise accessed or
capable of being accessed. The amended information in the present case opted to lay
the venue by availing of the second. RA 4363 amended Art 360 of the RPC which sets
the venue for the filing of an information for a libel case. To credit Gimenez’s premise
of equating his first access to the defamatory article on petitioner’s website in Makati
with printing and first publication would spawn the very ills that the amendment to Art
360 of the RPC sought to discourage and prevent.
RATIO: Venue is jurisdictional in criminal actions such that the place where the crime
was committed determines not only the venue of the action but constitutes an essential
element of jurisdiction. It is clear that the venue of libel cases where the complainant is
a private individual is limited to only two places. 1) where the complainant actually
resides at the time of the commission of the offense, and 2) where the alleged
defamatory article was printed and first published
Jurisdiction over the defendant in an action in rem or quasi in rem is not required, and
the court acquires jurisdiction over an action as long as it acquires jurisdiction over the
res that is the subject matter of the action. The purpose of summons in such action is
not the acquisition of jurisdiction over the defendant but mainly to satisfy the
constitutional requirement of due process.
ATTY. FE Q. PALMIANO-SALVADOR, v. CONSTANTINO ANGELES, substituted by
LUZ G. ANGELES G.R. No. 171219 September 3, 2012
Facts: Angeles is one of the registered owners of a parcel of land located at 1287
Castanos street, Sampaloc, Manila, evidenced by transfer certificate of title no. 150872.
the subject parcel of land was occupied by Jelly Galiga from 1979 up to 1993, as a
lessee with a lease contract. subsequently, Fe Salvador alleged that she bought on
September 7, 1993 the subject parcel of land from Galiga who represented that he was
the owner, being one in possession. Salvador remained in possession of said subject
property from November 1993 up to the present.
On November 18, 1993, the registered owner, the Angeles, sent a letter to
Salvador demanding the latter to vacate the property, which was not heeded by
salvador. upon such, Angeles thru one Rosauro Diaz, jr. filed a complaint for ejectment
on October 12, 1994 with the MTC of manila.
The MTC rendered its decision on November 29, 1999 in favor of Angeles. Salvador
filed an appeal wherein she alleged that Diaz, who filed the complaint for ejectment,
had no authority from angeles at the time of filing of the suit. however, salvador's appeal
was denied by the RTC due to such denial she filed a motion for reconsideration which
was also denied. Salvador elevated the case to the ca via a petition for review, but said
petition was dismissed for lack of merit.
Hence, Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, praying
that the Decision of the Court of Appeals denying petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration, be reversed and set aside was filed in the SC.
Issues: whether or not Diaz has authority and CA is guilty of grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess jurisdiction.
Ruling: Rosauro Diaz's (respondent's representative) failed to present proof of his
authority to represent respondent (plaintiff before the MeTC) in filing the complaint. This
basic issue has been ignored by the MeTC and the RTC, while the CA absolutely failed
to address it despite of its importance to determine the court's jurisdiction over the
complaint and the plaintiff.
The complaint before the MeTC was filed in the name of respondent, but it
was one Rosauro Diaz who executed the verification and certification dated October
12, 1994. On December 11, 1995, more than a year after the complaint was filed,
respondent attached to his Reply and/or Comment to Respondent's Position Paper,4 a
document entitled (SPA) s in favor of Rosauro Diaz.
However, said SPA was executed only on November 16, 1994, or more than
a month after the complaint was filed, appearing to have been notarized by one Robert
F. McGuire of Santa Clara County. Observe, further, that there was no certification from
the Philippine Consulate General in San Francisco, California, U.S.A, that said person
is indeed a notary public in Santa Clara County, California. Verily, the court cannot give
full faith and credit to the official acts of said Robert McGuire, and hence, no evidentiary
weight or value can be attached to the document designated as an SPA dated
November 16, 1994. Thus, there is nothing on record to show that Diaz had been
authorized by respondent to initiate the action against petitioner.
The effect of a complaint filed by one who has not proven his authority to
represent a plaintiff in filing an action is illustrared in Tamondong v. Court of Appeals,the
Court categorically stated that "if a complaint is filed for and in behalf of the plaintiff [by
one] who is not authorized to do so, the complaint is not deemed filed. An unauthorized
complaint does not produce any legal effect. Hence, the court should dismiss the
complaint on the ground that it has no jurisdiction over the complaint and the plaintiff."
This ruling was reiterated in Cosco Philippines Shipping, Inc. v. Kemper Insurance
Company ,where the Court went on to say that "in order for the court to have authority
to dispose of the case on the merits, it must acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter
and the parties. Courts acquire jurisdiction over the plaintiffs upon the filing of the
complaint, and to be bound by a decision, a party should first be subjected to the court's
jurisdiction. Clearly, since no valid complaint was ever filed with the MTC, the same did
not acquire jurisdiction over the person of respondent.
Pursuant to the foregoing rulings, therefore, the MeTC never acquired jurisdiction over
this case and all proceedings before it were null and void. The courts could not have
delved into the very merits of the case, because legally, there was no complaint to
speak of. The court's jurisdiction cannot be deemed to have been invoked at all.
Therefore Petition is GRANTED. The Decision of RTC and CA are SET ASIDE AND
NULLIFIED. The complaint filed by respondent before the Metropolitan Trial Court is
hereby DISMISSED.
OPTIMA REALTY CORPORATION vs. HERTZ PHIL. EXCLUSIVE CARS, INC.,
G.R. No. 183035 January 9, 2013
FACTS: Optima is engaged in the business of leasing and renting out commercial
spaces and buildings to its tenants it entered into a Contract of Lease with HERTZ
PHIL. EXCLUSIVE CARS, INC., over a 131-square-meter office unit and a parking slot
in the Optima Building for a period of three years commencing on 1 March 2003 and
ending on 28 February 2006. On 9 March 2004, the parties amended their lease
agreement by shortening the lease period to two years and five months, commencing
on 1 October 2003 and ending on 28 February 2006.
Renovations in the Optima Building commenced in January and ended in
November 2005. As a result, Hertz alleged that it experienced a 50% drop in monthly
sales and a significant decrease in its personnel’s productivity. It then requested a 50%
discount on its rent for the months of May, June, July and August 2005. On 8 December
2005, Optima granted the request of Hertz. However, the latter still failed to pay its
rentals for a total of seven months and Ilikewise failed to pay its utility bills for the
months for a total of four months.
On 8 December 2005, Optima wrote another letter to Hertz, reminding the
latter that the Contract of Lease could be renewed only by a new negotiation between
the parties and upon written notice by the lessee to the lessor at least 90 days prior to
the termination of the lease period. As no letter was received from Hertz regarding its
intention to seek negotiation and extension of the lease contract within the 90-day
period, Optima informed it that the lease would expire on 28 February 2006 and would
not be renewed.
On 21 December 2005, Hertz wrote a letter belatedly advising Optima of the
former’s desire to negotiate and extend the lease. However, as the Contract of Lease
provided that the notice to negotiate its renewal must be given by the lessee at least
90 days prior to the expiration of the contract, petitioner no longer entertained
respondent’s notice. On 30 January 2006, Hertz filed a Complaint for Specific
Performance, Injunction and Damages and/or Sum of Money with prayer for the
issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and Writ of Preliminary Injunction
(Complaint for Specific Performance) against Optima.
On 1 March 2006, Optima, through counsel, wrote Hertz a letter requiring the
latter to surrender and vacate the leased premises in view of the expiration of the
Contract of Lease on 28 February 2006. It likewise demanded payment of the sum of
₱420,967.28 in rental arrearages, unpaid utility bills and other charges.Hertz, however,
refused to vacate the leased premises. As a result, Optima was constrained to file
before the MeTC a Complaint for Unlawful Detainer and Damages with Prayer for the
Issuance of a TRO and/or Preliminary Mandatory Injunction (Unlawful Detainer
Complaint) against Hertz.
On 14 March 2006, Summons for the Unlawful Detainer Complaint was served
on Henry Bobiles, quality control supervisor of Hertz, who complied with the telephone
instruction of manager Rudy Tirador to receive the Summons. On 28 March 2006, or
14 days after service of the Summons, Hertz filed a Motion for Leave of Court to file
Answer with Counterclaim and to Admit Answer with Counterclaim. In that Motion, Hertz
stated that, "in spite of the defective service of summons, it opted to file the instant
Answer with Counterclaim with Leave of Court." In the same Motion, it likewise prayed
that, in the interest of substantial justice, the Answer with Counterclaim attached to the
Motion for Leave to File Answer should be admitted regardless of its belated filing, since
the service of summons was defective.
MeTC rendered a Decision, ruling that petitioner Optima had established its right to
evict Hertz from the subject premises due to nonpayment of rentals and the expiration
of the period of lease. Upon such, Rule 45 Petition assailing the Court of Appeals (CA)
which reversed the Decision and Resolution of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Makati
City. The RTC had affirmed Decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Makati
City evicting respondent Hertz Phil. Exclusive Cars, Inc. (Hertz) and ordering it to pay
back rentals and other arrearages to petitioner Optima Realty Corporation (Optima).
ISSUE: Whether the MeTC properly acquired jurisdiction over the person of
respondent Hertz
RULING: The Petition is granted and reverse the assailed Decision and Resolution of
the appellate court. The MeTC acquired jurisdiction over the person of respondent
Hertz. In civil cases, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant may be acquired
either by service of summons or by the defendant’s voluntary appearance in court and
submission to its authority. In this case, the MeTC acquired jurisdiction over the person
of respondent Hertz by reason of the latter’s voluntary appearance in court.
In Philippine Commercial International Bank v. Spouses Dy, we had occasion to state:
Preliminarily, jurisdiction over the defendant in a civil case is acquired either by the
coercive power of legal processes exerted over his person, or his voluntary appearance
in court. As a general proposition, one who seeks an affirmative relief is deemed to
have submitted to the jurisdiction of the court. It is by reason of this rule that we have
had occasion to declare that the filing of motions to admit answer, for additional time to
file answer, for reconsideration of a default judgment, and to lift order of default with
motion for reconsideration, is considered voluntary submission to the court's
jurisdiction. This, however, is tempered by the concept of conditional appearance, such
that a party who makes a special appearance to challenge, among others, the court's
jurisdiction over his person cannot be considered to have submitted to its authority.
Prescinding from the foregoing, it is thus clear that:
(1) Special appearance operates as an exception to the general rule on voluntary
appearance;(2) Accordingly, objections to the jurisdiction of the court over the person
of the defendant must be explicitly made, i.e., set forth in an unequivocal manner; and
(3) Failure to do so constitutes voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the court,
especially in instances where a pleading or motion seeking affirmative relief is filed and
submitted to the court for resolution.
In this case, the records show that the following statement appeared in respondent’s
Motion for Leave to File Answer:
In spite of the defective service of summons, the defendant opted to file the instant
Answer with Counterclaim with Leave of Court, upon inquiring from the office of the
clerk of court of this Honorable Court and due to its notice of hearing on March 29, 2005
application for TRO/Preliminary Mandatory Injunction was received on March 26, 2006.
Furthermore, the Answer with Counterclaim filed by Hertz never raised the defense of
improper service of summons. The defenses that it pleaded were limited to litis
pendentia, pari delicto, performance of its obligations and lack of cause of action.
Finally, it even asserted its own counterclaim against Optima. Measured against the
standards in Philippine Commercial International Bank, these actions lead to no other
conclusion than that Hertz voluntarily appeared before the court a quo. We therefore
rule that, by virtue of the voluntary appearance of respondent Hertz before the MeTC,
the trial court acquired jurisdiction over respondent’s.
Editha Padlan vs Sps. Elenita and Felisimo dinglasan
Gr no. 180321, March 20, 2013
FACTS: Respondent Elenita Dinglasan was the registered owner of a parcel of land
which is covered by TCT. While on board a jeepney, Elenita’s mother, Lilia, had a
conversation with one Maura Passion regarding the sale of the said property. Believing
that Maura was a real estate agent, Lilia borrowed the owner’s copy of the TCT from
Elenita and gave it to Maura.
Maura then subdivided the property into several lots under the name of Elenita and her
husband Felicisimo Dinglasan. Through a falsified deed of sale bearing the forged
signature of Elenita and her husband Felicisimo, Maura was able to sell the lots to
different buyers. On April 26, 1990, Maura sold one of the lots to Lorna Ong (Lorna),
who later sold the lot to petitioner Editha Padlan for P
4,000.00. Thus, TCT issued under the former’s name was cancelled and another TCT
was issued in the name of Editha Padlan.
Respondents filed a case Cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Title before the RTC.
Summons was, thereafter, served to petitioner through her mother, Anita Padlan. The
RTC rendered a Decision finding petitioner to be a buyer in good faith and,
consequently, dismissed the complaint. Not satisfied, respondents sought recourse
before the CA. CA rendered a Decision in favor of the respondent. Consequently, the
CA reversed and set aside the Decision of the RTC and ordered the cancellation of the
TCT issued in the name of Lorna and the petitioner, and the revival of respondents’
own title.
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration. Petitioner argued that not only
did the complaint lacks merit, the lower court failed to acquire jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the case and the person of the petitioner.
ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC acquired jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case
RULING: No. In no uncertain terms, the Court has already held that a complaint must
allege the assessed value of the real property subject of the complaint or the interest
thereon to determine which court has jurisdiction over the action.
n the case at bar, the only basis of valuation of the subject property is the value alleged
in the complaint that the lot was sold by Lorna to petitioner in the amount of P4,000.00.
No tax declaration was even presented that would show the valuation of the subject
property. In fact, in one of the hearings, respondents’ counsel informed the court that
they will present the tax declaration of the property in the next hearing since they have
not yet obtained a copy from the Provincial Assessor’s Office.
However, they did not present such copy. To reiterate, where the ultimate objective of
the plaintiffs is to obtain title to real property, it should be filed in the proper court having
jurisdiction over the assessed value of the property subject thereof. Since the amount
alleged in the Complaint by respondents for the disputed lot is only P4,000.00, the MTC
and not the RTC has jurisdiction over the action. Therefore, all proceedings in the RTC
are null and void.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ROMEO ESTREBELLA,
accused-appellant. G.R. No. 71464 August 4, 1988
FACTS: After due trial, the court, rendered a decision the Court finds accused Romeo
Estrebella guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape and hereby sentences
him to suffer the penalty.
Appellant insists that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction to try the case because
the complaint was filed by complainant who was a minor and a mental retardate
contrary to the provisions of Rule 110, Secs. 4 and 5 of the Revised Rules of Court and
Art. 344 of the Revised Penal Code, the pertinent portions reading as follows: The
offended party, even if she were a minor, has the right to institute the prosecution for
the above offenses, independently of her parents, grandparents or guardian, unless
she is incompetent or incapable of doing so upon grounds other than her minority. (Rule
110, Sec. 4, Rules of Court; Rule 110, Sec. 5, 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure.)
The offenses of seduction, abduction, rape or acts of lasciviousness shall not be
prosecuted except upon a complaint filed by the offended party or her parents,
grandparents, or guardian, nor, in any case, if the offender has been expressly
pardoned by the above named persons, as the case may be.(Also, Article 344 of the
Revised Penal Code)
ISSUES:
I . The trial court erred in convicting the accused-appellant of the crime of rape despite
the insufficiency of evidence adduced by the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.
II .The trial court gravely erred in trying the case on ground of lack of jurisdiction.
RULING: It is of course well-settled that jurisdiction over the subject matter of an action
in this case the crime of rape is and may be conferred only by law, and that jurisdiction
over a given crime not vested by law upon a particular court, may not be conferred
thereon by the parties involved in the offense. (Manila Railroad v. Atty. General, 20 Phil.
523; Perkins v. Roxas, 72 Phil. 514, cited in Valdepenas vs. People, 16 SCRA 871).
But the aforementioned provision of Art. 344 does not determine the jurisdiction of our
courts over the offenses therein enumerated. It could not affect said jurisdiction,
because the same with respect to the instant crime is governed by the Judiciary Act of
1948, not by the Revised Penal Code, which deals primarily with the definition of crimes
and the factors pertinent to the punishment of the culprits.
The complaint required in said Art. 344 is merely a condition precedent to the
exercise by the proper authorities of the power to prosecute the guilty parties. And such
condition has been imposed out of consideration for the offended woman and her family
who might prefer to suffer the outrage in silence rather than go through with the scandal
of a public trial. (Samilin v. Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, 57 Phil. 298, 304,
cited in Valdepenas v. People, supra)
In the case at bar, while the complaint may have been technically in the sense
that complainant was incompetent, this defect has been cured when complainant's
brother Fernando Alcala took the witness stand for the prosecution. The brother's
testimony shows the consent and willingness of the family of complainant, who cannot
give her consent obviously, to have the private offense committed against the latter
publicly tried. Substantially, this is what is required by the rules. Evidently, by
undergoing trial, the family of complainant chose to denounce the injustice committed
against the latter in public and thus agreed to bear the personal effects of said
exposure. Undoubtedly, therefore, the trial court had jurisdiction to try the case.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the guilt of the accused has been proved beyond
reasonable doubt. The assailed decision is hereby AFFIRMED.
MEDICAL PLAZA MAKATI CONDOMINIUMCORPORATION vs. ROBERT H.
CULLEN
G.R. No. 181416 November 11, 2013
FACTS: Respondent (Cullen) purchased from Meridien Land Holding, Inc. (MLHI)
condominium Unit No. 1201 of the petitioner. Old title was later cancelled and new title
(CCT 64218) was issued in respondent’s name. On 19 September 2002,
petitioner(MPMCC) demanded from Cullen payment for unpaid association dues and
assessments claiming a carry-over of MLHI. Cullen refused claiming they are being
religiously paid.
Consequently, Cullen was prevented from exercising his right to vote and be voted
during election of MPMCC’s BOD. When MLHI clarified that his dues had already been
settled and upon MPMCC’s failure to explain why is such, he filed a Complaint for
Damages against MPMCC in RTC Makati, acting as a regular court. MPMCC and MLHI
moved to dismiss mainly on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. On 9 September 2009,
the RTC dismissed the complaint on the ground that the action falls within the exclusive
jurisdiction of HLURB and that the issues raised are intra-corporate between the
corporation and member. On appeal, the CA reversed RTC decision holding that the
controversy is an ordinary civil action for damages within the jurisdiction of regular
courts. When motions for reconsideration was denied, petitioners filed the present
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.
ISSUES: The court has jurisdiction to decide over an intra-corporate controversy
cognizable by a special commercial court and whether or not the court has decided the
instant case in a way not in accord with law or with the applicable decisions of the
supreme court when it took cognizance of the appeal while raising only pure questions
of law.
RULING: It is held that the dispute as to the validity of the assessments is purely an
intra-corporate matter between petitioner and respondent and is thus within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the RTC sitting as a special commercial court. More so in this
case as respondent repeatedly questioned his characterization as a delinquent
member and, consequently, petitioner’s decision to bar him from exercising his rights
to vote and be voted for. These issues are clearly corporate and the demand for
damages is just incidental. Being corporate in nature, the issues should be threshed
out before the RTC sitting as a special commercial court. The issues on damages can
still be resolved in the same special commercial court just like a regular RTC which is
still competent to tackle civil law issues incidental to intra-corporate disputes filed
before it. Thus, the intra-corporate dispute between petitioner and respondent is still
within the jurisdiction of the RTC sitting as a special commercial court and not the
HLURB.
SPOUSES ROMEO PAJARES and IDA T. PAJARES vs. REMARKABLE LAUNDRY
AND DRY CLEANING, represented by ARCHEMEDES G. SOLIS
G.R. No. 212690 February 20, 2017
“Breach of contract may give rise to an action for specific performance or rescission of
contract.1 It may also be the cause of action in a complaint for damages filed pursuant
to Art. 1170 of the Civil Code.2 In the specific performance and rescission of contract
cases, the subject matter is incapable of pecuniary estimation; hence jurisdiction
belongs to the Regional Trial Court (RTC). In the case for damages, however, the court
that has jurisdiction depends upon the total amount of the damages claimed.”
Facts: Remarkable Laundry and Dry Cleaning filed a Complaint denominated as
"Breach of Contract and Damages" against spouses Romeo and Ida Pajares before
the RTC of Cebu City. Respondent alleged that it entered into a Remarkable Dealer
Outlet Contract with petitioners whereby the latter, acting as a dealer outlet, shall
accept and receive items or materials for laundry which are then picked up and
processed by the former in its main plant or laundry outlet; that petitioners violated
Article IV (Standard Required Quota & Penalties) of said contract, which required them
to produce at least 200 kilos of laundry items each week, when they ceased dealer
outlet operations on account of lack of personnel; that respondent made written
demands upon petitioners for the payment of penalties imposed and provided for in the
contract, but the latter failed to pay; and, that petitioners' violation constitutes breach of
contract. The RTC dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction.
Respondent filed its Motion for Reconsideration to Court of Appeals. And the CA
rendered the assailed Decision setting aside the Order of the RTC and remanding the
case to the court a quo for further proceedings. Petitioners sought to reconsider, but
were denied. Hence, appealed the Petition.
Issue: Whether or not the CA erred in declaring that the RTC had jurisdiction over
respondent's Complaint which, although denominated as one for breach of contract, is
essentially one for simple payment of damages.
Ruling: The Court grants the Petition. The RTC was correct in categorizing Civil Case
as an action for damages seeking to recover an amount below its jurisdictional limit. In
ruling that respondent's Complaint is incapable of pecuniary estimation and that the
RTC has jurisdiction, the CA comported itself with the following ratiocination: A case
for breach of contract is a cause of action either for specific performance or rescission
of contracts. An action for rescission of contract, as a counterpart of an action for
specific performance, is incapable of pecuniary estimation, and therefore falls under
the jurisdiction of the RTC.
Then in Administrative Circular No. 09-94 this Court declared that "where the claim for
damages is the main cause of action, or one of the causes of action, the amount of
such claim shall be considered in determining the jurisdiction of the court." In other
words, where the complaint primarily seeks to recover damages, all claims for damages
should be considered in determining which court has jurisdiction over the subject matter
of the case regardless of whether they arose from a single cause of action or several
causes of action.
SPOUSES ROMEO PAJARES and IDA T. PAJARES vs. REMARKABLE LAUNDRY
AND DRY CLEANING, represented by ARCHEMEDES G. SOLIS
G.R. No. 212690 February 20, 2017
Facts: Remarkable Laundry and Dry Cleaning filed a Complaint denominated as
"Breach of Contract and Damages" against spouses Romeo and Ida Pajares before
the RTC of Cebu City. Respondent alleged that it entered into a Remarkable Dealer
Outlet Contract with petitioners whereby the latter, acting as a dealer outlet, shall
accept and receive items or materials for laundry which are then picked up and
processed by the former in its main plant or laundry outlet; that petitioners violated
Article IV (Standard Required Quota & Penalties) of said contract, which required them
to produce at least 200 kilos of laundry items each week, when they ceased dealer
outlet operations on account of lack of personnel; that respondent made written
demands upon petitioners for the payment of penalties imposed and provided for in the
contract, but the latter failed to pay; and, that petitioners' violation constitutes breach of
contract. The RTC dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction.
Respondent filed its Motion for Reconsideration to Court of Appeals. And the CA
rendered the assailed Decision setting aside the Order of the RTC and remanding the
case to the court a quo for further proceedings. Petitioners sought to reconsider, but
were denied. Hence, appealed the Petition.
Issue: Whether or not the CA erred in declaring that the RTC had jurisdiction over
respondent's Complaint which, although denominated as one for breach of contract, is
essentially one for simple payment of damages.
Ruling: The Court grants the Petition. The RTC was correct in categorizing Civil Case
as an action for damages seeking to recover an amount below its jurisdictional limit. In
ruling that respondent's Complaint is incapable of pecuniary estimation and that the
RTC has jurisdiction, the CA comported itself with the following ratiocination: A case
for breach of contract is a cause of action either for specific performance or rescission
of contracts. An action for rescission of contract, as a counterpart of an action for
specific performance, is incapable of pecuniary estimation, and therefore falls under
the jurisdiction of the RTC.
Then in Administrative Circular No. 09-94 this Court declared that "where the claim for
damages is the main cause of action, or one of the causes of action, the amount of
such claim shall be considered in determining the jurisdiction of the court." In other
words, where the complaint primarily seeks to recover damages, all claims for damages
should be considered in determining which court has jurisdiction over the subject matter
of the case regardless of whether they arose from a single cause of action or several
causes of action.
San Miguel Properties Inc vs Perez Gr no. 166836, Sept. 4, 2013
FACTS: Petitioner San Miguel Properties Inc. purchased from B.F. Homes, Inc. 2,130
residential lots situated in its subdivision BF Homes Parañaque. The transactions were
embodied in three separate deeds of sale. The TCTs covering the lots bought under
the first and second deeds were fully delivered to San Miguel Properties, but 20 TCTs
covering 20 of the 41 parcels of land purchased under the third deed of sale, were not
delivered to San Miguel Properties.
On its part, BF Homes claimed that it withheld the delivery of the 20 TCTs for parcels
of land purchased under the third deed of sale because Atty. Orendain had ceased to
be its rehabilitation receiver at the time of the transactions after being meanwhile
replaced as receiver by FBO Network Management, Inc. on May 17, 1989 pursuant to
an order from the SEC. BF Homes refused to deliver the 20 TCTs despite demands.
Thus, San Miguel Properties filed a complaint-affidavit in the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Las Piñas charging respondent directors and officers of BF Homes with
non-delivery of titles in violation of Section 25, in relation to Section 39, both of
Presidential Decree No. 957.
At the same time, San Miguel Properties sued BF Homes for specific
performance in the HLURB praying to compel BF Homes to release the 20 TCTs in its
favor. San Miguel Properties filed a motion to suspend proceedings in the OCP Las
Piñas, citing the pendency of BF Homes’ receivership case in the SEC. In its
comment/opposition, BF Homes opposed the motion to suspend. In the meantime,
however, the SEC terminated BF Homes’ receivership on September 12, 2000,
prompting San Miguel Properties to file on October 27, 2000 a reply to BF Homes’
comment/opposition coupled with a motion to withdraw the sought suspension of
proceedings due to the intervening termination of the receivership. The OCP Las Piñas
rendered its resolution, dismissing San Miguel Properties’ criminal complaint for
violation of Presidential Decree No. 957 on several grounds, one of which was that
there existed a prejudicial question necessitating the suspension of the criminal action
until after the issue on the liability of the distressed BF Homes was first determined by
the SEC en banc or by the HLURB.
ISSUE: Whether the HLURB administrative case brought to compel the delivery of the
TCTs could be a reason to suspend the proceedings on the criminal complaint for the
violation of Section 25 of Presidential Decree No. 957 on the ground of a prejudicial
question.
RULING: YES. A prejudicial question is understood in law to be that which arises in a
case the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved in the criminal
case, and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. It is determinative of
the criminal case, but the jurisdiction to try and resolve it is lodged in another court or
tribunal. It is based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but is so intimately
connected with the crime that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused. The
rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is to avoid conflicting decisions.
The determination of whether the proceedings ought to be suspended
because of a prejudicial question rested on whether the facts and issues raised in the
pleadings in the specific performance case were so related with the issues raised in the
criminal complaint for the violation of Presidential Decree No. 957, such that the
resolution of the issues in the former would be determinative of the question of guilt in
the criminal case. An examination of the nature of the two cases involved is thus
necessary.
An action for specific performance is the remedy to demand the exact
performance of a contract in the specific form in which it was made, or according to the
precise terms agreed upon by a party bound to fulfill it. Evidently, before the remedy of
specific performance is availed of, there must first be a breach of the contract.
On the other hand, Presidential Decree No. 957 is a law that regulates the
sale of subdivision lots and condominiums in view of the increasing number of incidents
wherein "real estate subdivision owners, developers, operators, and/or sellers have
reneged on their representations and obligations to provide and maintain properly" the
basic requirements and amenities, as well as of reports of alarming magnitude of
swindling and fraudulent manipulations perpetrated by unscrupulous subdivision and
condominium sellers and operators.
SMART COMMUNICATIONS, INC. vs. ARSENIO ALDECOA, JOSE B. TORRE,
CONRADO U. PUA, GREGORIO V. MANSANO, JERRY CORPUZ and ESTELITA
ACOSTA,
G.R. No. 166330 September 11, 2013
FACTS: Petitioner is a domestic corporation engaged in the telecommunications
business. On March 9, 2000, petitioner entered into a contract of lease with Florentino
Sebastian in which the latter agreed to lease to the former a piece of vacant lot,
measuring around 300 square meters, located in Barangay Vira, Roxas, Isabela
(leased property).Petitioner, through its contractor, Allarilla Construction, immediately
constructed and installed a cellular base station on the leased property. Inside the
cellular base station is a communications tower, rising as high as150 feet, with
antennas and transmitters; as well as a power house open on three sides containing a
25KVA diesel power generator. Around and close to the cellular base station are
houses, hospitals, clinics, and establishments, including the properties of respondents
Arsenio Aldecoa, Jose B. Torre, Conrado U. Pua, Gregorio V. Mansano, Jerry Corpuz,
and Estelita Acosta.
Respondents filed before the RTC on May 23, 2000 a Complaint against petitioner for
abatement of nuisance and injunction with prayer for temporary restraining order and
writ of preliminary injunction,
Henc, a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by
petitioner Smart Communications, Inc., seeking the reversal of the Decision and
Resolution dated of the Court of Appeals. The appellate court (I) reversed and set aside
the Order of the Regional Trial Court of Roxas, Isabela, dismissing the complaint for
abatement of nuisance and injunction against petitioner, and (2) entered a new
judgment declaring petitioner's cellular base station located in Barangay Vira,
Municipality of Roxas, Province of Isabela, a nuisance and ordering petitioner to cease
and desist from operating the said cellular base station.
Issue: whether or not the CA was correct in reversing the decision of RTC and denying
to reconsider its decision The Court of Appeals erred when it resolved an issue that
was not submitted to it for resolution and in the process had usurped a purely executive
function.
There is no showing that respondents availed themselves of the afore-mentioned
administrative remedies prior to instituting Civil Case No. Br. 23-632-2000 before the
RTC. While there are accepted exceptions to the principle of exhaustion of
administrative remedies and the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, respondents never
asserted nor argued any of them. Thus, there is no cogent reason for the Court to apply
the exceptions instead of the general rule to this case.
Ordinarily, failure to comply with the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies
and the doctrine of primary jurisdiction will result in the dismissal of the case for lack of
cause of action. However, the Court herein will not go to the extent of entirely dismissing
Civil Case No. Br. 23-632-2000. The Court does not lose sight of the fact that
respondents’ Complaint in Civil Case No. Br. 23-632-2000 is primarily for abatement of
nuisance; and respondents alleged the lack of HLURB requirements for the cellular
base station, not to seek nullification of petitioner’s locational clearance, but to support
their chief argument that said cellular base station is a nuisance which needs to be
abated.
The issue of whether or not the locational clearance for said cellular base station is
valid is actually separate and distinct from the issue of whether or not the cellular base
station is a nuisance; one is not necessarily determinative of the other. While the first
is within the primary jurisdiction of the HLURB and, therefore, premature for the courts
to rule upon in the present case, the latter is within the jurisdiction of the courts to
determine but only after trial proper.
A long line of cases establishes the basic rule that the court will not interfere in matters
which are addressed to the sound discretion of government agencies entrusted with
the regulation of activities coming under the special technical knowledge and training
of such agencies
Based on the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies and its corollary
doctrine of primary jurisdiction, it was premature for the Court of Appeals to take
cognizance of and rule upon the issue of the validity or nullity of petitioner’s locational
clearance for its cellular base station into account any of the foregoing considerations
or tests before summarily dismissing. The reasoning of the RTC that similar cellular
base stations are scattered in heavily populated areas nationwide and are not declared
nuisances is unacceptable. As to whether or not this specific cellular base station of
petitioner is a nuisance to respondents is largely dependent on the particular factual
circumstances involved in the instant case, which is exactly why a trial for threshing out
disputed or contested factual issues is indispensable. Evidently, it was the RTC which
engaged in speculations and unsubstantiated conclusions.
Without presentation by the parties of evidence on the contested or disputed facts,
there was no factual basis for declaring petitioner's cellular base station a nuisance and
ordering petitioner to cease and desist from operating the same.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED.
The Decision dated July 16, 2004 and Resolution dated December 9, 2004 of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 71337 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Let the records
of the case be REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 23, of Roxas, Isabela,
which is DIRECTED to reinstate Civil Case No. Br. 23-632-2000 to its docket and
proceed with the trial and adjudication thereof with appropriate dispatch in accordance
with this Decision.
 Gentleman) and violation of the 97th Article of War (Conduct Prejudicial to Good Order
and Military Discipline) for failing to disclose all his assets in his Sworn Statement of
PROVINCE OF AKLAN VS JODY KING CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION Assets and Liabilities and Net worth for the year 2003 as required by RA 3019, as
amended in relation to RA 6713.
Gr. no. 197592 and 202623 Nov. 27, 2013

Garcia, among others, argued that the confirmation issued by the OP directing his two-
FACTS: The Province of Aklan and Jody King Construction entered into a contract for
year detention in a penitentiary had already been fully served following his preventive
the design and construction of the Caticlan Port and terminal. In the course of
confinement subject to Article 29 of the RPC (Revised Penal Code). He was released
construction, Petitioner Aklan issued a change orders for additional works and again
on December 16, 2010 after a preventive confinement for six years and two months.
entered into a negotiated contract with respondent for the construction of Passenger
He was initially confined at his quarters at Camp General Emilio Aguinaldo before he
Terminal Building. After the construction of Phase 1 and change orders were agreed,
was transferred to the Intelligence Service of the Armed Forces of the Philippines
respondent allegedly failed to settle.
(ISAFP) Detention Center, and latter to the Camp Crame Custodial Detention Center.
Then, respondent sued petitioner to RTC for collection a sum of money. The trial court
Hence, on September 16, 2011, or a week after the OP confirmed the sentence of the
issued a writ of preliminary attachment, Petitioner denied any unpaid balance. RTC
court martial against him, Garcia was arrested and detained and continues to be
rendered decision in favor of respondent, issued a writ execution and garnished
detained, for 2 years, at the maximum security compound of the National Penitentiary
petitioners funds deposited in different banks. Petitioner filed petition in the CA, but it
in Muntinlupa. The OP stated that Art 29 of the RPC is not applicable in Military Courts
was denied for its failure to file a timely motion for reconsideration and is stopped from
for it is separate and distinct from ordinary courts.
invoking the doctrine of primary jurisdiction as it stopped from making the doctrine or
primary jurisdiction as it only raised after its notice of appeal was denied. Hence, this
petition. ISSUE: Whether or not Article 29 of the RPC is applicable in Military Courts

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner is stopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the
RTC and the applicability of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction
RULING: Petition GRANTED. COA has primary jurisdiction over money claim and
petitioner is not stopped from not raising the issue of jurisdiction. The doctrine of
primary jurisdiction, which are based on sound public policy and practical
considerations, are not inflexible rules.
There are many accepted exceptions, such as: (a) where there is estoppel on the part
of the party invoking the doctrine; (b) where the challenged administrative act is patently
illegal, amounting to lack of jurisdiction; (c) where there is unreasonable delay or official
inaction that will irretrievably prejudice the complainant; (d) where the amount involved
is relatively small so as to make the rule impractical and oppressive; (e) where the
question involved is purely legal and will ultimately have to be decided by the courts of
justice; (f) where judicial intervention is urgent; (g) when its application may cause great
and irreparable damage; (h) where the controverted acts violate due process; (i) when
the issue of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies has been rendered moot; (j)
when there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy; (k) when strong public
interest is involved; and, (l) in quo warranto proceedings. All the proceedings and
decisions of the court in violation of the doctrine rendered null and void
GARCIA v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
G.R. No. 198554 July 30, 2012
RULING: The Court ruled that applying the provisions of Article 29 of the Revised Penal
Code (RPC) (Period of preventive imprisonment deducted from time of imprisonment),
the time within which the petitioner was under preventive confinement should be
credited to the sentence confirmed by the Office of the President, subject to the
conditions set forth by the same law.
The Court held that “the General Court Martial is a court within the strictest sense of
the word and acts as a criminal court.” As such, certain provisions of the RPC, insofar
as those that are not provided in the Articles of War and the Manual for Courts-Martial,
can be supplementary. “Absent any provision as to the application of a criminal concept
in the implementation and execution of the General Court Martial’s decision, the
provisions of the Revised Penal Code, specifically Article 29 should be applied. In fact,
the deduction of petitioner’s (Garcia) period of confinement to his sentence has been
recommended in the Staff Judge Advocate Review.”
THE DIOCESE OF BACOLOD vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND THE
ELECTION OFFICER OF BACOLOD CITY G.R. No. 205728 January 21, 2015
FACTS: On February 21, 2013, petitioners posted two (2) tarpaulins within a private
compound housing the San Sebastian Cathedral of Bacolod. Each tarpaulin was
approximately six feet (6′) by ten feet (10′) in size. They were posted on the front walls
of the cathedral within public view. The first tarpaulin contains the message “IBASURA
RH Law” referring to the Reproductive Health Law of 2012 or Republic Act No. 10354.
The second tarpaulin is the subject of the present case.

FACTS: Garcia, tried by the Special General Court Martial NR 2, was charged with and This tarpaulin contains the heading “Conscience Vote” and lists candidates as
convicted of violation of the 96th Article of War (Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and either “(Anti-RH) Team Buhay” with a check mark, or “(Pro-RH) Team Patay” with an
“X” mark. The electoral candidates were classified according to their vote on the
adoption of Republic Act No. 10354, otherwise known as the RH Law. Those who voted
for the passing of the law were classified by petitioners as comprising “Team Patay,”
while those who voted against it form “Team Buhay.”
Respondents conceded that the tarpaulin was neither sponsored nor paid for by any
candidate. Petitioners also conceded that the tarpaulin contains names ofcandidates
for the 2013 elections, but not of politicians who helped in the passage of the RH Law
but were not candidates for that election.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the size limitation and its reasonableness of the tarpaulin is a
political question, hence not within the ambit of the Supreme Court’s power of
review.
2. Whether or not the petitioners violated the principle of exhaustion of
administrative remedies as the case was not brought first before the
COMELEC En Banc or any if its divisions.
RULING:
FIRST ISSUE: No. The Court ruled that the present case does not call for the exercise
of prudence or modesty. There is no political question. It can be acted upon by this
court through the expanded jurisdiction granted to this court through Article VIII, Section
1 of the Constitution. The concept of a political question never precludes judicial review
when the act of a constitutional organ infringes upon a fundamental individual or
collective right. Even assuming arguendo that the COMELEC did have the discretion
to choose the manner of regulation of the tarpaulin in question, it cannot do so by
abridging the fundamental right to expression.
Also the Court said that in our jurisdiction, the determination of whether an issue
involves a truly political and non-justiciable question lies in the answer to the question
of whether there are constitutionally imposed limits on powers or functions conferred
upon political bodies. If there are, then our courts are duty-bound to examine whether
the branch or instrumentality of the government properly acted within such limits.
A political question will not be considered justiciable if there are no constitutionally
imposed limits on powers or functions conferred upon political bodies. Hence, the
existence of constitutionally imposed limits justifies subjecting the official actions of the
body to the scrutiny and review of this court.
In this case, the Bill of Rights gives the utmost deference to the right to free speech.
Any instance that this right may be abridged demands judicial scrutiny. It does not fall
squarely into any doubt that a political question brings.
SECOND ISSUE: No. The Court held that the argument on exhaustion of administrative
remedies is not proper in this case. Despite the alleged non-exhaustion of
administrative remedies, it is clear that the controversy is already ripe for adjudication.
Ripeness is the “prerequisite that something had by then been accomplished or
performed by either branch or in this case, organ of government before a court may
come into the picture.”
Petitioners’ exercise of their right to speech, given the message and their medium, had
understandable relevance especially during the elections. COMELEC’s letter
threatening the filing of the election offense against petitioners is already an actionable
infringement of this right. The impending threat of criminal litigation is enough to curtail
petitioners’ speech.
SEGUNDA SANTIAGO and VALERIO FLORES v. PABLO VALENZUELA and
MOISES PARDO, Provincial Sheriffs of Camarines Sur, G.R. No. L-670. April 30,
1947
FACTS: Defendants and appellees filed in the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur
a motion to dismiss the complaint of the plaintiffs-appellants on the ground, among
others. that the plaintiffs’ cause of action is barred by a prior judgment of the Justice of
the Peace of Minalabac in another case between the same parties and for the same
cause.
The Court, considering the allegations in the complaint, wherein the said judgment of
the Justice of the Peace of Minalabac is quoted and alleged to have been fraudulently
obtained, and the answer of the defendants, dismissed the complaint on the ground
"that the allegation that the said judgment has been fraudulently obtained is unfounded
and without merits.” and therefore the plaintiffs’ cause of action is barred by said prior
judgment of the justice of the peace, or res judicata.
The attorney for the plaintiffs received notice of the order dismissing the complaint on
April 2, 1946, according to the registry return card attached to the record: and on May
3, 1946, the appellants filed a motion for new trial on the ground that "the evidence was
insufficient to justify the order dismissing the complaint and that it is openly contrary to
law."
The lower court, in its order of May 11, denied the motion for new trial for the reason
that it did not comply with the requirements of section 2, Rule 37, and a copy of said
order was sent on May 14 by ordinary mail. On May 18 the plaintiffs-appellants filed the
notice of appeal and record on appeal, and a petition to appeal as pauper which was
granted, and the in its order of May 28, approved the record on saying that, "The record
on appeal having been filed within the period fixed by law, it is thereby approved.’’
The defendants-appellees have not objected to the approval of the record on appeal
on May 18 by the trial court on the ground that the appeal has not been taken and
perfected on time, and have not filed with the appellate court a motion to dismiss the
appeal on said ground until after the appellants had presented their brief. And the
question for us to resolve now is that raised in the appellees’ motion dismiss the
appellants’ appeal.
ISSUES: Whether or not motion to appeal is a natural right and Whether or not the
appellee is estopped.
RULING: The right to appeal is not a natural right, but statutory. The appellate
jurisdiction of the courts is conferred by law, and may be exercised only in the manner
and in accordance with the provisions thereof. But although appellate courts are vested
with appellate jurisdiction to affirm modify or reverse the judgments of the inferior courts
cannot exercise it in a particular case unless and until each and every one of the steps
or requirements prescribed by law for the perfection of the appeal have been complied
with.
If a party does not take or perfect his appeal within the time prescribed by law, the
appellate court cannot acquire appellate jurisdiction, and for that reason the compliance
with said requirements is jurisdictional, according to this Court, Unlike the original
jurisdiction over a particular case which is acquired by the filing of a complaint the
alleges a cause of action which is within the power of the court to try and decide, and
by the service of the summon upon, or voluntary appearance of, the defendant, the
appellate jurisdiction is acquired by the appellate court over the subject matter and
parties by the perfection of the appeal. By the perfection of the appeal, the jurisdiction
over the subject matter and the parties of the court exercising original jurisdiction is
transferred to the appellate court Before that the jurisdiction over the case remains in
the trial court.
Section 13 of Rule 41, of the Rules of Court provides that "where the notice of appeal,
appeal bond, or record on appeal is filed but not within the period of time herein
provided, the appeal shall be dismissed." This provision refers evidently to a motion to
dismiss the appeal or objection to the approval thereof, filed in the Court of First
Instance or the trial court. After the appeal has been approved or allowed, and the
record on appeal transmitted to the appellate court, the law applicable is section 1, Rule
52, which provides, among others, that "an appeal may be dismissed by the Court of
Appeals (or Supreme Court under section 1, Rule 58), on its own motion or On that of
the appellee, on the following grounds: (a) Failure to file, within the period prescribed
by these rules, the notice of appeal, appeal bond or record on appeal.
Section 3, Rule 41, requires the filing with the trial court of a notice of appeal, an appeal
bond, and a record on appeal within the period of thirty days from notice of order or
judgment for the perfection of the appeal. This Court has liberally construed this
provision in the light of that of section 2, Rule 1 and that the court may extend the time
or allow the perfection of the appeal beyond the prescribed period if it be satisfactorily
shown that there is a justifiable reason, such as fraud, accident, mistake or excusable
negligence, or similar supervening casualty, without fault of the appellant, which the
court may deem sufficient reason for relieving him from the consequences of his failure
to comply strictly with the law. In such case the appeal is deemed taken and perfected
on time, and the appellate court acquires appellate jurisdiction.
The reason why section 1, Rule 52, uses the subjunctive "may" and not the imperative
"shall" employed in section 13 of Rule 41, is that if the appellee had objected to the
appeal or moved for the dismissal thereof on account of the matter of time in the lower
court, the motion to dismiss the appeal filed by the appellee with the appellate court
has the effect of an appeal from the order of the trial court denying his motion, and the
appellate court may deny the motion to dismiss ratifying thereby the order of the trial
court, or grant said motion, reversing in effect the action taken by the court below on
’he matter, if it appears that the appeal has not been perfected within the prescribed
If no objection or motion to dismiss the appeal has been filed with the court below, the
appellate court may dismiss the appeal if the record shows that the appeal has not
been taken and perfected on time, for although parties are obliged to watch the dockets
of the courts and inform themselves of the entry of decrees and orders, nevertheless
circumstances may arise which, if they do not absolve the parties from that duty,
operate to relieve the appellee of the consequences of such failure; or it may deny the
motion to dismiss the appeal, it appears from the record that the approval of the appeal
by the trial court after the expiration of the prescribed time was for sufficient reason or
cause, or that had the appellee objected to it in the trial court the appellant might have
satisfactorily shown that there was justifiable reason for relieving the appellant from the
consequences of his failure by perfect the appeal on time.
And if the motion to dismiss the appeal on the ground under consideration is filed for
the first time with the appellate court after the appellant had paid the docketing fee and
the cost of printing the record on appeal, and especially after he had filed his brief, the
appellate court should deny the motion, for the appellee may be considered in estoppel
or estopped from filing said motion, because he would have, by his silence or failure to
object in time, led the appellant to believe that the appellee was also satisfied that the
delay, if any, was due to justifiable cause, and to incur those necessary expenses.
"Appellant claims that appellee is estopped from any right to the motion to dismiss, by
allowing the bill of exceptions to be approved by allowing the appellant to go to the
expense of printing the bill of exceptions and the expense and trouble of preparing and
printing, his brief, which was filed on August 31, 1931, and on account of not raising
the question as to the right to appeal until October 27, 1931, when appellee’s brief was
filed.
The right to object to the taking of an appeal or the issuance of a writ of error may be
waived by appellee or defendant in error whenever the objection is founded upon some
act or omission on the part of appellant or plaintiff in error, which may be pleaded by
his opponent as an estoppel to the right of review. This waiver may arise from express
stipulation, or it may be implied from some act on the part of appellee or defendant in
error, such as joining issue on the appeal or of error, or from some other act showing
acquiescence or evincing intention to treat the appeal or writ of error as valid.
"Thus, in Luengo & Martinez v. Herrero (17 Phil., 29), wherein the appellees made a
motion in their brief, to dismiss the appeal, this court ruled that the motion came too
late, saying: These questions were presented to this court for the first time on the
hearing of the case upon its merits. They should have been raised and determined by
motion before the case was called for hearing. Before the hearing of the case upon its
merits all preliminary questions should be disposed of, and when such questions as
these are raised for the first time upon the hearing of the case on , its merits they come
too late. In view of the foregoing, the appellees’ motion to dismiss appellants’ appeal is
denied, and the appellees are allowed to file their brief within the prescribed period from SERAFIN TIJAM, ET AL. vs.MAGDALENO SIBONGHANOY alias GAVINO
notice of this resolution. SIBONGHANOY and LUCIA BAGUIO G.R. No. L-21450 April 15, 1968

FACTS: The action at bar, which is a suit for collection of a sum of money in the sum
of exactly P 1,908.00, exclusive of interest filed by Serafin Tijam and Felicitas Tagalog
against Spouses Magdaleno Sibonghanoy and Lucia Baguio, was originally instituted
in the Court of First Instance of Cebu on July 19, 1948. A month prior to the filing of the
complaint, the Judiciary Act of 1948 (R.A. 296) took effect depriving the Court of First
Instance of original jurisdiction over cases in which the demand, exclusive of interest,
is not more than P 2,000.00 (Secs. 44[c] and 86[b], R.A. 296.)
Furthermore, it has also been held that after voluntarily submitting a cause and
encountering an adverse decision on the merits, it is too late for the loser to question
the jurisdiction or power of the court (Pease vs. Rathbun-Jones etc., 243 U.S. 273, 61
L. Ed. 715, 37 S. Ct. 283; St. Louis etc. vs. McBride, 141 U.S. 127, 35 L. Ed. 659). And
in Littleton vs. Burgess, 16 Wyo. 58, the Court said that it is not right for a party who
has affirmed and invoked the jurisdiction of a court in a particular matter to secure an
affirmative relief, to afterwards deny that same jurisdiction to escape a penalty.

The case has already been pending now for almost 15 years, and throughout the entire
proceeding the appellant never raised the question of jurisdiction until the receipt of the
Court of Appeals' adverse decision. Considering that the Supreme Court has the
exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all cases in which jurisdiction of any inferior court
is in issue, the Court of Appeals certified the case to the Supreme Court along with the
records of the case.
ISSUE: Whether or not the appellant's motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance during the pendency of the appeal will prosper.
RULING: A party may be estopped or barred from raising a question in different ways
and for different reasons. Thus we speak of estoppel by deed or by record, and of
estoppel by laches.
Laches, in a general sense is failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained
length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been
done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time,
warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or
declined to assert it.
The facts of this case shows that from the time the Surety became a quasi-party on
July 31, 1948, it could have raised the question of the lack of jurisdiction of the Court
of First Instance of Cebu to take cognizance of the present action by reason of the sum
of money involved which, according to the law then in force, was within the original
exclusive jurisdiction of inferior courts. It failed to do so. Instead, at several stages of
the proceedings in the court a quo as well as in the Court of Appeals, it invoked the
jurisdiction of said courts to obtain affirmative relief and submitted its case for a final
adjudication on the merits. It was only after an adverse decision was rendered by the
Court of Appeals that it finally woke up to raise the question of jurisdiction. Were we to
sanction such conduct on its part, We would in effect be declaring as useless all the
proceedings had in the present case since it was commenced on July 19, 1948 and
compel the judgment creditors to go up their Calvary once more. The inequity and
unfairness of this is not only patent but revolting.
The orders appealed from are hereby affirmed, with costs against the appellant Manila
Surety and Fidelity Company, Inc

The doctrine of laches or of "stale demands" is based upon grounds of public policy
which requires, for the peace of society, the discouragement of stale claims and, unlike
the statute of limitations, is not a mere question of time but is principally a question of
the inequity or unfairness of permitting a right or claim to be enforced or asserted.

It has been held that a party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to sure affirmative
relief against his opponent and, after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate
or question that same jurisdiction (Dean vs. Dean, 136 Or. 694, 86 A.L.R. 79). In the
case just cited, by way of explaining the rule, it was further said that the question
whether the court had jurisdiction either of the subject-matter of the action or of the
parties was not important in such cases because the party is barred from such conduct
not because the judgment or order of the court is valid and conclusive as an
adjudication, but for the reason that such a practice cannot be tolerated obviously for
reasons of public policy.
Venancio Figueroa y Cervantes, petitioner vs People of the Philippines, applying the principle of estoppel by laches in the exceptional case of Sibonghanoy,
respondent the Court therein considered the patent and revolting inequity and unfairness of having
GR No. 147406 July 14, 2008 the judgment creditors go up their Calvary once more after more or less 15 years. The
same, however, does not obtain in the instant case.
Facts: On August 19, 1998, RTC convicted the petitioner of reckless imprudence
resulting in homicide. In his appeal before the CA, the petitioner questioned for the first WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED.
time the RTC’s jurisdiction. Criminal Case No. 2235-M-94 is hereby DISMISSED without prejudice.

CA, however, considered the petitioner to have actively participated in the trial and to
have belatedly attacked the jurisdiction of RTC; thus, he was already estopped by
laches from asserting the RTC’s lack of jurisdiction. CA affirmed RTC’s decision.

Petitioner filed the instant petition for review on certiorari. While both the appellate court
and the Solicitor General acknowledge the fact that RTC did not have jurisdiction, they
nevertheless are of the position that the principle of estoppel by laches has already
precluded the petitioner from questioning the jurisdiction of the RTC, the trial went on
for 4 years with the petitioner actively participating therein and without him ever raising
the jurisdictional infirmity. The petitioner, for his part, counters that the lack of jurisdiction
of a court over the subject matter may be raised at any time even for the first time on
appeal. As undue delay is further absent herein, the principle of laches will not be
applicable.

Issue: Whether or not the case should be dismissed on the ground of lack of jurisdiction
on the part of the RTC, notwithstanding the fact that the petitioner failed to raise the
issue during the trial and the alleged laches in relation to the doctrine in Tijam vs.
Sibonghanoy.

Ruling: YES. SC dismissed the case without prejudice.

The ruling in Sibonghanoy on the matter of jurisdiction is the exception rather than the
general rule. For it to be invoked, laches should clearly be present; that is, lack of
jurisdiction must have been raised so belatedly as to warrant the presumption that the
party entitled to assert it had abandoned or declined to assert it.

In the instant case, the petitioner is in no way estopped by laches in assailing the
jurisdiction of the RTC, considering that he raised the lack thereof in his appeal before
the appellate court. At that time, no considerable period had yet elapsed for laches to
attach. True, delay alone, though unreasonable, will not sustain the defense of estoppel
by laches unless it further appears that the party, knowing his rights, has not sought to
enforce them until the condition of the party pleading laches has in good faith become
so changed that he cannot be restored to his former state, if the rights be then enforced,
due to loss of evidence, change of title, intervention of equities, and other causes. In

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