Heirs of Mario Malabanan vs.

Republic
G.R. NO. 179987, SEPTEMBER 3, 2013

FACTS:

On 20 February 1998, Mario Malabanan filed an application for land registration before
the RTC of Cavite-Tagaytay, covering a parcel of land situated in Silang Cavite,
consisting of 71,324 square meters. Malabanan claimed that he had purchased the
property from Eduardo Velazco, and that he and his predecessors-in-interest had been in
open, notorious, and continuous adverse and peaceful possession of the land for more
than thirty (30) years. Velazco testified that the property was originally belonged to a
twenty-two hectare property owned by his great-grandfather, Lino Velazco. Lino had
four sons– Benedicto, Gregorio, Eduardo and Esteban–the fourth being Aristedes’s
grandfather. Upon Lino’s death, his four sons inherited the property and divided it among
themselves. But by 1966, Esteban’s wife, Magdalena, had become the administrator of all
the properties inherited by the Velazco sons from their father, Lino. After the death of
Esteban and Magdalena, their son Virgilio succeeded them in administering the
properties, including Lot 9864-A, which originally belonged to his uncle, Eduardo
Velazco. It was this property that was sold by Eduardo Velazco to Malabanan.

Among the evidence presented by Malabanan during trial was a Certification dated 11
June 2001, issued by the Community Environment & Natural Resources Office,
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (CENRO-DENR), which stated that
the subject property was “verified to be within the Alienable or Disposable land per Land
Classification Map No. 3013 established under Project No. 20-A and approved as such
under FAO 4-1656 on March 15, 1982.” On 3 December 2002, the RTC approved the
application for registration.

The Republic interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals, arguing that Malabanan had
failed to prove that the property belonged to the alienable and disposable land of the
public domain, and that the RTC had erred in finding that he had been in possession of
the property in the manner and for the length of time required by law for confirmation of
imperfect title. On 23 February 2007, the Court of Appeals reversed the RTC ruling and
dismissed the appliocation of Malabanan.

Issue:
For purposes of Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree may a parcel of
land classified as alienable and disposable be deemed private land and therefore
susceptible to acquisition by prescription in accordance with the Civil Code?
HELD:
In complying with Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree, consider
that under the Civil Code, prescription is recognized as a mode of acquiring ownership of
patrimonial property. However, public domain lands become only patrimonial property
not only with a declaration that these are alienable or disposable. There must also be an
express government manifestation that the property is already patrimonial or no longer
retained for public service or the development of national wealth, under Article 422 of
the Civil Code. And only when the property has become patrimonial can the prescriptive
period for the acquisition of property of the public dominion begin to run.

(a) Patrimonial property is private property of the government. The person acquires
ownership of patrimonial property by prescription under the Civil Code is entitled to
secure registration thereof under Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree.

(b) There are two kinds of prescription by which patrimonial property may be acquired,
one ordinary and other extraordinary. Under ordinary acquisitive prescription, a person
acquires ownership of a patrimonial property through possession for at least ten (10)
years, in good faith and with just title. Under extraordinary acquisitive prescription, a
person’s uninterrupted adverse possession of patrimonial property for at least thirty (30)
years, regardless of good faith or just title, ripens into ownership.

It is clear that the evidence of petitioners is insufficient to establish that Malabanan has
acquired ownership over the subject property under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act.
There is no substantive evidence to establish that Malabanan or petitioners as his
predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the property since 12 June 1945 or
earlier. The earliest that petitioners can date back their possession, according to their own
evidence—the Tax Declarations they presented in particular—is to the year 1948. Thus,
they cannot avail themselves of registration under Section 14(1) of the Property
Registration Decree.

Neither can petitioners properly invoke Section 14(2) as basis for registration. While the
subject property was declared as alienable or disposable in 1982, there is no competent
evidence that is no longer intended for public use service or for the development of the
national evidence, conformably with Article 422 of the Civil Code. The classification of
the subject property as alienable and disposable land of the public domain does not
change its status as property of the public dominion under Article 420(2) of the Civil
Code. Thus, it is insusceptible to acquisition by prescription.
Republic vs. Sogod Development Corp.
GR.No. 175760, Feb. 17, 2016

FACTS:
On December 9, 1999, Sogod filed an application for registration and
confirmation of land title over Lot No. 2533, Cad. 827-D with an area of 23,896 square
meters and situated in Brgy. Tabunok, Municipality of Sogod, Province of Cebu. Sogod
claimed that it purchased the land "from Catalina Rivera per deed of absolute sale dated
October 28, 1996. It also averred that "by itself and through its predecessors-in-interest,
been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of since
June 12, 1945.
On February 11, 2000, the Office of the Solicitor General moved to dismiss the
Petition on the ground that Sogod was disqualified from applying for original registration
of title to alienable lands pursuant to Article XII, Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution. The
trial court issued an Order dated June 15, 2000 pronouncing a "general default against all
persons except against the Solicitor General.” On September 19, 2000, the Regional
Executive Director of the DENR, Region VII, Banilad, Mandaue City filed an Opposition
on the ground that the land was previously forest land and "was certified and released as
alienable and disposable only on January 17, 1986." Thus, it could not be registered
without violating Section 48, paragraph (b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141, otherwise
known as the Public Land Act, as amended by Republic Act No. 6940. The Office of the
Solicitor General did not present any controverting evidence.

The trial court rendered the Decision granting the application. The Office of the
Solicitor General appealed to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals rendered its
Decision affirming the Decision of the 6th Municipal Circuit Trial Court. It ruled that
Sogod was able to prove that "it and its predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of
the land since June 12, 1945 or earlier and the land sought to be registered is an
agricultural land".
The Office of the Solicitor General moved for reconsideration of the Court of
Appeals Decision. In the Resolution dated November 7, 2006, the Court of Appeals
denied the Motion for Reconsideration for lack of merit.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not the occupation of forest land prior to its classification as

alienable and disposable land may be considered for purposes of complying with the
requirements for judicial confirmation of the title.
2. Whether or not the respondent and its predecessors-in-interest have possessed
the property in the manner and length of time required by law.
HELD:

1. NO. Petitioner's claim that "The alienable nature of the land is essential to the bona
fide claim of ownership and possession since June 12, 1945" is likewise untenable.
Although adverse, open, continuous, and notorious possession in the concept of an owner
is a conclusion of law to be determined by courts, it has more to do with a person's belief
in good faith that he or she has just title to the property that he or she is occupying. It is
unrelated to the declaration that land is alienable or disposable. A possessor or occupant
of property may, therefore, be a possessor in the concept of an owner prior to the
determination that the property is alienable and disposable agricultural land. His or her
rights, however, are still to be determined under the law.

2. YES. Respondent had established (by itself and through its predecessor-in-interest) its
possession in the concept of owner of the property since 1945. It is further undisputed
that the property was declared alienable and disposable in 1986 prior to respondent's
filing of its application in 1999. The Court of Appeals, therefore, did not err in affirming
the Municipal Circuit Trial Court Decision granting respondent's application for original
registrat