35. G.R. No.

L-37878 November 25, 1932

MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY, petitioner, vs. PASAY TRANSPORTATION COMPANY, INC., ET AL.,

Facts: Act No. 1446 was passed. Section 11 of the Act provides: "Whenever any franchise or right of way
is granted to any other person or corporation, now or hereafter in existence, over portions of the lines
and tracks of the grantee herein, the terms on which said other person or corporation shall use such
right of way, and the compensation to be paid to the grantee herein by such other person or corporation
for said use, shall be fixed by the members of the Supreme Court, sitting as a board of arbitrators, the
decision of a majority of whom shall be final."
Pursuant to said Act, Meralco filed a petition requesting the members of the Supreme Court, sitting as a
board of arbitrators, to fix the terms upon which certain transportation companies shall be permitted to
use the Pasig bridge of the Manila Electric Company and the compensation to be paid to the Manila
Electric Company by such transportation companies.
Copies of the petition were directed to be sent to transportation companies affected by the petition.
Opposition was entered to the petition by a number of public utility operators.
Issue: Whether or not the members of the Supreme Court sit as arbitrators and fix the terms and
compensation as is asked of them in this case?
Held: The Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands represents one of the three divisions of power in our
government. It is judicial power and judicial power only which is exercised by the Supreme Court. Just as
the Supreme Court, as the guardian of constitutional rights, should not sanction usurpations by any
other department of the government, so should it as strictly confine its own sphere of influence to the
powers expressly or by implication conferred on it. The Supreme Court and its members should not and
cannot be required to exercise any power or to perform any trust or to assume any duty not pertaining
to or connected with the administering of judicial functions.
Section 11 of Act No. 1446 contravenes the maxims which guide the operation of a democratic
government constitutionally established, and that it would be improper and illegal for the members of
the Supreme Court, sitting as a board of arbitrators, the decision of a majority of whom shall be final, to
act on the petition of the Manila Electric Company.
36. FERNANDO LOPEZ vs. GERARDO ROXAS and PET
G.R. No. L-25716 . July 28, 1966

FACTS : Petitioner Fernando Lopez and respondent

Gerardo Roxaswere candidates for the position of Vice-President of the
Philippines in the general elections held on November 9, 1965. Petitioner
Fernando was later proclaimed to the latter office with 3,531,550 votes,
or a plurality of 26,724 votes over his closest opponent, respondent
Gerardo M. Roxas, in whose favor 3,504,826 votes had been tallied,
according to said resolution. On January 5, 1966, respondent filed, with
the Presidential Electoral Tribunal, Election Protest No. 2, contesting the
election of petitioner herein as Vice-President of the Philippines, upon the
ground that it was not he, but said respondent, who had obtained the
largest number of votes for said office. Petitioner Lopez instituted in the
Supreme Court the present original action, for prohibition with
preliminary injunction, against respondent Roxas, to prevent the
Presidential Electoral Tribunal from hearing and deciding the
aforementioned election contest, upon the ground that Republic Act No.
1793, creating said Tribunal, is "unconstitutional," and that, "all
proceedings taken by it are a nullity"on the grounds that it was not
provided in the constitution. He even furthered that it rendered
unconstitutional since the members of the tribunal are the Supreme
Court justices;Congress created another court within the SC a violation
of the constitution.
ISSUE : WON RA 1793 is unconstitutional on the ground that election
protest for president and vice president is not provided in the
constitution and that its enactment created a new court within the SC.
RULING : NO. Instead of indicating that Congress may not enact
Republic Act No. 1793, the aforementioned provision of the Constitution,
establishing said Electoral Tribunals for Members of Congress only,
proves the exact opposite, namely: that the Constitution intended to vest
Congress with discretion to determine by law whether or not the election
of a president-elect or that of a vice-president-elect may be contested
and, if Congress should decide in the affirmative, which court of
justice shall have jurisdiction to hear the contest. Republic Act No. 1793
has not created a new or separate court. It has merely conferred upon
the Supreme Court the functions of a Presidential Electoral Tribunal.
Indeed, the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals and courts of first
instance, are vested with original jurisdiction, as well as with appellate
jurisdiction, in consequence of which they are booth trial courts and
appellate courts, without detracting from the fact that there is only one
Supreme Court, one Court of Appeals, and one court of first instance,
clothed with authority to discharged said dual functions.So, the PET is
not inferior to the SC , it is the same Court although the functions
peculiar to said Tribunal are more limited in scope than those of the SC
in the exercise of its ordinary functions. Hence, the enactment of RA no.
1793 does not entail an assumption by Congress of the power of
appointment vested by the Constitution in the President. It merely
connotes the imposition of an additional duties upon the Members of the
SC.
Wherefore, the petition herein is hereby dismissed and the writs
therein prayed for denied accordingly. The aforesaid motion is, moreover,
denied. With costs against the petitioner.