Borja vs Comelec Case Digest

Three-Term Limit

Facts:

Jose T. Capco, Jr. was elected as Vice-Mayor of Pateros on January 18, 1988 for a term ending on June 30, 1992.
On September 2, 1989, he became Mayor, by operation of law, upon the death of the incumbent, Cesar Borja.
Thereafter, Capco was elected and served as Mayor for two more terms, from 1992 to 1998. On March 27, 1998,
Capco filed a Certificate of Candidacy for Mayor of Pateros in the May 11, 1998 elections. Petitioner Benjamin U.
Borja, Jr., who was also a candidate for mayor, sought Capco’s disqualification on the ground that Capco would
have already served as Mayor for 3 consecutive terms by June 30, 1998; hence, he would be ineligible to serve for
another term. The Second Division of the Comelec declared Capco disqualified but the Comelec en banc reversed
the decision and declared Capco eligible to run for mayor. Capco was subsequently voted and proclaimed as mayor.

Issue:

Whether or not a vice-mayor who succeeds to the office of mayor by operation of law and serves the remainder of
the term is considered to have served a term in that office for the purpose of the three-term limit.

Held:

No. The term limit for elective local officials must be taken to refer to the right to be elected as well as the right to
serve the same elective position. Consequently, it is not enough that an individual has served three consecutive terms
in an elective local office, he must also have been elected to the same position for the same number of times before
the disqualification can apply. Capco was qualified to run again as mayor in the next election because he was not
elected to the office of mayor in the first term but simply found himself thrust into it by operation of law. Neither
had he served the full term because he only continued the service, interrupted by the death, of the deceased mayor.
The vice-mayor’s assumption of the mayorship in the event of the vacancy is more a matter of chance than of
design. Hence, his service in that office should not be counted in the application of any term limit.

The policy embodied in the constitutional provision (Art. X, §8) is not only to prevent the establishment of political
dynasties but also to enhance the freedom of choice of the people. A consideration of the historical background of
Art. X, §8 of the Constitution reveals that the members of the Constitutional Commission were as much concerned
with preserving the freedom of choice of the people as they were with preventing the monopolization of political
power. In discussing term limits, the drafters of the Constitution did so on the assumption that the officials
concerned were serving by reason of election. To consider Capco to have served the first term in full and therefore
ineligible to run a third time for reelection would be not only to falsify reality but also to unduly restrict the right of
the people to choose whom they wish to govern them. (Borja vs Comelec, G.R. No. 133495, September 3, 1998)

Lonzanida vs. Comelec

Facts:

Romeo Lonzanida was elected and had served as municipal mayor of San Antonio, Zambales in terms 1989-1992,
1992-1995 and 1995-1998. However, his proclamation relative to the 1995 election was protested and was
eventually declared by the RTC and then by COMELEC null and void on the ground of failure of elections.

On February 27, 1998, or about three months before the May 1998 elections, Lonzanida vacated the mayoralty post
in light of a COMELEC order and writ of execution it issued. Juan Alvez, Lonzanida’s opponent assumed office for
the remainder of the term.

In the May 1998 elections, Lonzanida again filed his certificate of candidacy. His opponent, Efren Muli, filed a
petition for disqualification on the ground that Lonzanida had already served three consecutive terms in the same
post. On May 13, 1998, petitioner Lonzanida was proclaimed winner.

The COMELEC granted the petition for disqualification.

Petitioner Lonzanida challenged the validity of the COMELEC resolution maintaining that he was duly elected
mayor for only two consecutive terms and that his assumption of office in 1995 cannot be counted as service of a
term for the purpose of applying the three term limit for local government officials, because he was not the duly
elected mayor of San Antonio in the May 1995 elections. He also argued that the COMELEC ceased to have
jurisdiction over the petition for disqualification after he was proclaimed winner in the 1998 mayoral elections as the
proper remedy is a petition for quo warranto with the appropriate regional trial court under Rule 36 of the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure.

The private respondent maintained that the petitioner’s assumption of office in 1995 should be considered as service
of one full term because he discharged the duties of mayor for almost three years until March 1, 1998 or barely a
few months before the next mayoral elections.

Issues:

1. WON petitioner’s assumption of office as mayor of San Antonio Zambales from May 1995 to 1998 may be
considered as service of one full term for the purpose of applying the three-term limit for elective local government
officials.

2. WON COMELEC ceased to have jurisdiction over the petition for disqualification after petitioner was proclaimed
winner.

Held:

1. NO. Two conditions for the application of the disqualification must concur: 1) that the official concerned has
been elected for three consecutive terms in the same local government post and 2) that he has fully served three
consecutive terms.

“To recapitulate, the term limit for elective local officials must be taken to refer to the right to be elected as well as

the right to serve in the same elective position. Consequently, it is not enough that an individual has served three

consecutive terms in an elective local office, he must also have been elected to the same position for the same

number of times before the disqualification can apply.”

The two requisites for the application of the three term rule are absent. First, the petitioner cannot be considered as
having been duly elected to the post in the May 1995 elections, and second, the petitioner did not fully serve the
1995-1998 mayoral term by reason of involuntary relinquishment of office.

After a re-appreciation and revision of the contested ballots the COMELEC itself declared by final judgment that
petitioner Lonzanida lost in the May 1995 mayoral elections and his previous proclamation as winner was declared
null and void. His assumption of office as mayor cannot be deemed to have been by reason of a valid election but
by reason of a void proclamation. It has been repeatedly held by this court that a proclamation subsequently
declared void is no proclamation at all and while a proclaimed candidate may assume office on the strength of the
proclamation of the Board of Canvassers he is only a presumptive winner who assumes office subject to the final
outcome of the election protest. Lonzanida did not serve a term as mayor of San Antonio, Zambales from May 1995
to March 1998 because he was not duly elected to the post; he merely assumed office as presumptive winner, which
presumption was later overturned by the COMELEC when it decided with finality that Lonzanida lost in the May
1995 mayoral elections.

Second, the petitioner cannot be deemed to have served the May 1995 to 1998 term because he was ordered to
vacate his post before the expiration of the term. The respondents’ contention that the petitioner should be deemed
to have served one full term from May 1995-1998 because he served the greater portion of that term has no legal
basis to support it; it disregards the second requisite for the application of the disqualification, i.e., that he has fully
served three consecutive terms. The second sentence of the constitutional provision under scrutiny states,
“Voluntary renunciation of office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity
of service for the full term for which he was elected. “The clear intent of the framers of the constitution to bar any
attempt to circumvent the three-term limit by a voluntary renunciation of office and at the same time respect the
people’s choice and grant their elected official full service of a term is evident in this provision. Voluntary
renunciation of a term does not cancel the renounced term in the computation of the three term limit; conversely,
involuntary severance from office for any length of time short of the full term provided by law amounts to an
interruption of continuity of service. The petitioner vacated his post a few months before the next mayoral elections,
not by voluntary renunciation but in compliance with the legal process of writ of execution issued by the
COMELEC to that effect. Such involuntary severance from office is an interruption of continuity of service and
thus, the petitioner did not fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoral term.

In sum, the petitioner was not the duly elected mayor and that he did not hold office for the full term; hence, his
assumption of office from May 1995 to March 1998 cannot be counted as a term for purposes of computing the
three term limit. The Resolution of the COMELEC finding him disqualified on this ground to run in the May 1998
mayoral elections should therefore be set aside.

2. NO. It was held in the case of Sunga vs. COMELEC that the proclamation or the assumption of office of a
candidate against whom a petition for disqualification is pending before the COMELEC does not divest the
COMELEC of jurisdiction to continue hearing the case and to resolve it on the merits.

Section 6 of RA 6646 specifically mandates that:

“Sec. 6. Effects of disqualification Case.- any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified

shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared

by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes

in such election, the court or commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry or protest

and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the

proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong.”

The clear legislative intent is that the COMELEC should continue the trial and hearing of the disqualification case to
its conclusion i.e., until judgment is rendered. The outright dismissal of the petition for disqualification filed before
the election but which remained unresolved after the proclamation of the candidate sought to be disqualified will
unduly reward the said candidate and may encourage him to employ delaying tactics to impede the resolution of the
petition until after he has been proclaimed.

It must be emphasized that the purpose of a disqualification proceeding is to prevent the candidate from running or,
if elected, from serving, or to prosecute him for violation of the election laws. Obviously, the fact that a candidate
has been proclaimed elected does not signify that his disqualification is deemed condoned and may no longer be the
subject of a separate investigation.” (Lonzanida vs. Comelec, G.R. No. 135150. July 28, 1999)

Montebon vs. Comelec

Facts:

Montebon had been elected for three consecutive terms as municipal councilor of Tuburan, Cebu in 1998, 2001, and
2004 elections. However, in January 2004, or during his second term, he succeeded and assumed the position of
vice-mayor of Tuburan when the incumbent vice-mayor retired. When he filed his certificate of candidacy again as
municipal councilor for 2007 elections, a petition for disqualification was filed against him based on the three-term
limit rule. In his answer, Montebon argued that he cannot be disqualified on the ground of the 3-term limit rule
because his second term was interrupted when he assumed the position of vice-mayor due to the retirement of
elected vicemayor Petronilo Mendoza. Petitioners maintained that Montebon's assumption of office as vice-mayor in
January 2004 should not be considered an interruption in the service of his second term since it was a voluntary
renunciation of his office as municipal councilor.

Issue:

Was Montebon's assumption to the vice-mayoralty position considered an involuntary severance or interruption?

Held:

Yes. Succession in local government offices is by operation of law. Section 44 of Republic Act No. 7160, provides
that if a permanent vacancy occurs in the office of the vice mayor, the highest ranking sanggunian member shall
become vice mayor.

The legal successor is not given any option under the law on whether to accept the vacated post or not. Section 44 of
the Local Government Code makes no exception. Only if the highest-ranking councilor is permanently unable to
succeed to the post does the law speak of alternate succession. Under no circumstances can simple refusal of the
official concerned be considered as permanent inability within the contemplation of law. Essentially therefore, the
successor cannot refuse to assume the office that he is mandated to occupy by virtue of succession. He can only do
so if for some reason he is permanently unable to succeed and occupy the post vacated.

Thus, succession by law to a vacated government office is characteristically not voluntary since it involves the
performance of a public duty by a government official, the non-performance of which exposes said official to
possible administrative and criminal charges of dereliction of duty and neglect in the performance of public
functions. It is therefore more compulsory and obligatory rather than voluntary.

In this case, a permanent vacancy occurred in the office of the vice-mayor due to the retirement of Vice Mayor
Mendoza. Montebon, being the highest ranking municipal councilor, succeeded him in accordance with law.
Thus, Montebon's assumption of office as vice-mayor in January 2004 was an involuntary severance from his office
as municipal councilor, resulting in an interruption in the service of his 2001-2004 term. It cannot be deemed to have
been by reason of voluntary renunciation because it was by operation of law. (Montebon vs. Comelec, G.R. No.
180444. April 9, 2008)

Note:

● Since the law no less allowed Montebon to vacate his post as councilor in order to assume office as vicemayor, his
occupation of the higher office cannot, without more, be deemed as a voluntary renunciation of his position as
councilor.

ABUNDO v. COMELEC, GR No. 201716, 2013-01-08

Facts:
For four (4) successive regular elections, namely, the 2001, 2004, 2007 and 2010 national and local elections,
Abundo vied for the position of municipal mayor of Viga, Catanduanes.
In the 2004 electoral derby, however, the Viga municipal board of canvassers initially proclaimed as winner one
Jose Torres (Torres), who, in due time, performed the functions of the office of mayor.
Abundo protested
Torres' election and proclamation. Abundo was eventually declared the winner of the 2004 mayoralty electoral
contest, paving the way for his assumption of office starting May 9, 2006 until the end of the 2004-2007 term on
June 30, 2007, or for a period of a little over one year... and one month.
Then came the May 10, 2010 elections where Abundo and Torres again opposed each other.
When Abundo filed his certificate of candidacy... for the mayoralty seat
Torres lost no time in seeking the former's disqualification... to run,... predicated on the three-consecutive term limit
rule.
On June 16, 2010,... COMELEC... issued a Resolution... finding for Abundo,... accordingly proclaimed 2010 mayor-
elect of Viga... private respondent Ernesto R. Vega (Vega) commenced a quo warranto... action... to unseat Abundo
on essentially the same grounds Torres raised in his petition to disqualify.
Issues:
The Commission En Banc committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it
declared that Abundo has consecutively served for three terms despite the fact that he only served the remaining one
year and one month of the second... term as a result of an election protest.
whether the service of a term less than the full three years by an elected official arising from his being declared as
the duly elected official upon an election protest is considered as full service of the term for purposes of the...
application of the three consecutive term limit for elective local officials.
Ruling:
The consecutiveness of what otherwise would have been Abundo's three successive, continuous mayorship was
effectively broken during the 2004-2007 term when he was initially deprived of title to, and was veritably...
disallowed to serve and occupy, an office to which he, after due proceedings, was eventually declared to have been
the rightful choice of the electorate.
To constitute a disqualification to run for an elective local office pursuant to the aforequoted constitutional and
statutory provisions, the following requisites must concur:
(1) that the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the same local government post; and
(2) that he has fully served three consecutive terms.
the Court finds Abundo's case meritorious and declares that the two-year period during which his opponent, Torres,
was serving as mayor should be considered as an interruption, which effectively removed Abundo's case from the
ambit of the three-term... limit rule.
during the term 2004-2007, and with the enforcement of the decision of the election protest in his favor,... Abundo
assumed the mayoralty post... for a period of a little over one year... and one month... it cannot be said that Mayor
Abundo was able to serve fully the entire 2004-2007 term to which he was otherwise entitled.
In the present case, during the period of one year and ten months,... Abundo cannot plausibly claim, even if he
wanted to, that he could hold office of the mayor as a matter of right. Neither can he assert title to the same nor...
serve the functions of the said elective office.
The reason is simple: during that period, title to hold such office and the corresponding right to assume the functions
thereof still belonged to his opponent, as proclaimed election winner.
Abundo cannot be said to have retained title to the mayoralty office as he was at that time not the duly proclaimed
winner who would have the legal right to assume and serve such elective office. For... another, not having been
declared winner yet, Abundo cannot be said to have lost title to the office since one cannot plausibly lose a title
which, in the first place, he did not have. Thus, for all intents and purposes,... Abundo was not entitled to the elective
office until the election protest was finally resolved in his favor.
Consequently, there was a hiatus of almost two years, consisting of a break and effective interruption of his service,
until he assumed the office and served barely over a year of the remaining term.
RIVERA III VS COMELEC

Facts:

In the May 2004 elections, respondent Marino "Boking" Morales ran as candidate for mayor of Mabalacat,
Pampanga for the term 2004-2007. Petitioner Dee filed with the COMELEC a petition to cancel Morales’
Certificate of Candidacy on the ground that he was elected and had served three previous consecutive terms as
mayor of Mabalacat. They alleged that his candidacy violated Section 8, Article X of the Constitution and Section
43 (b) of RA 7160.

Respondent Morales admitted that he was elected mayor of Mabalacat for the term 1995-1998 (first term) and 2001-
2004 (third term), but he served the second term from 1998-2001 only as a "caretaker of the office" or as a "de facto
officer" since his proclamation as mayor was declared void by the Regional Trial Court (RTC). He was also
preventively suspended by the Ombudsman in an anti-graft case from January to July 1999.

Issue:

1. Has Morales already served his 3 consecutive term?

2. If so, who should then take his position?

Held:

1. For the three-term limit for elective local government officials to apply, two conditions or requisites must concur,
to wit: (1) that the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the same local government
post, and (2) that he has fully served three consecutive terms.

Respondent Morales was elected for the term 1998-2001. He assumed the position. He was mayor for the entire
period notwithstanding the Decision of the RTC in the electoral protest case filed by petitioner Dee ousting him
(Morales) as mayor (because the trial court’s ruling was promulgated only after the expiry of the 1998-2001 term).
Respondent Morales is now serving his fourth term. He has been mayor of Mabalacat continuously without any
break since 1995. In just over a month, by June 30, 2007, he will have been mayor of Mabalacat for twelve (12)
continuous years. His assumption of office for the second term constituted “service for the full term” and should
be counted as a full term served in contemplation of the three-term limit prescribed by the constitutional and
statutory provisions barring local elective officials from being elected and serving for more than three consecutive
terms for the same position.

The framers of the Constitution, by including this exception, wanted to establish some safeguards against the
excessive accumulation of power as a result of consecutive terms. Therefore, having found respondent Morales
ineligible, his Certificate of Candidacy dated December 30, 2003 should be cancelled. Not being a candidate, the
votes cast for him SHOULD NOT BE COUNTED and must be considered stray votes.

2. The question now is whether it is the vice-mayor or petitioner Dee who shall serve for the remaining portion of
the 2004 to 2007 term. In Labo v. Comelec, this Court has ruled that a second place candidate cannot be proclaimed
as a substitute winner, thus:

The rule, therefore, is: the ineligibility of a candidate receiving majority votes does not entitle the eligible candidate

receiving the next highest number of votes to be declared elected. A minority or defeated candidate cannot be

deemed elected to the office.

As a consequence of petitioner’s ineligibility, a permanent vacancy in the contested office has occurred. This should
now be filled by the vice-mayor in accordance with Section 44 of the Local Government Code, to wit:

Sec. 44. Permanent vacancies in the Offices of the Governor, Vice-Governor, Mayor and Vice-Mayor. – (a) If a

permanent vacancy occurs in the office of the governor or mayor, the vice-governor or the vice-mayor concerned

shall become the governor or mayor. (Rivera III vs. Comelec, G.R. No. 167591. May 9, 2007)

DIZON VS. COMELEC

Facts:

Roberto L. Dizon, a resident and taxpayer of Mabalacat, Pampanga, filed a case with the COMELEC to disqualify
Marino P. Morales, the incumbent mayor of Mabalacat on the ground that the latter was elected and had fully served
three previous consecutive terms in violation of Section 43 of the Local Government Code. Dizon alleged that
Morales was municipal mayor in 1995, 1998, 2001 and 2004. Thus, Morales should not have been allowed to have
filed his Certificate of Candidacy on March 2007 for the same position and same municipality.

Morales, on the other hand, contended that he is still eligible and qualified to run as mayor of Mabalacat because he
was not elected for the said position in the 1998 elections. He averred that the COMELEC en banc affirmed the
decision of the RTC declaring Anthony D. Dee as the duly elected Mayor of Mabalacat in the 1998 elections. Thus,
he was not elected for the said position in the 1998 elections. His term should be reckoned from 2001. He added that
his election in 2004 is only for his second term.

COMELEC Second Division ruled in favor of Morales and denied the petition. It took judicial notice of SC’s ruling
in the Rivera case promulgated on May 9, 2007 where it was held that Morales was elected as mayor of Mabalacat
in 1995, 1998 and 2001 (notwithstanding the RTC Decision in an electoral protest case that the then proclamation of
Morales was void). The SC ruled in that case that Morales violated the three-term limit under Section 43 of the
LGC. Hence, Morales was considered not a candidate in the 2004 elections, and this failure to qualify for the 2004
elections is a gap and allows him to run again for the same position in 2007 elections.

Issues:

1. WON the period served by Morales in the 2004-2007 term (although he was ousted from his office as Mayor on
May16, 2007) should be considered his fourth term

2. WON the 2007-2010 term of Morales is his 5th term

Held:
1. NO. In our decision promulgated on 9 May 2007, this Court unseated Morales during his fourth term. We
cancelled his Certificate of Candidacy dated 30 December 2003. This cancellation disqualified Morales from being a
candidate in the May 2004 elections. The votes cast for Morales were considered stray votes.

Both Article X, Section 8 of the Constitution and Section 43(b) of the Local Government Code state that the term of
office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, shall be three years, and no such official shall serve for
more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be
considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected.

There should be a concurrence of two conditions for the application of the disqualification: (1) that the official
concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the same local government post and (2) that he has fully
served three consecutive terms.

In the Rivera case, we found that Morales was elected as mayor of Mabalacat for four consecutive terms: 1995-
1998, 1998-2001, 2001-2004, and 2004-2007. We disqualified Morales from his candidacy in the May 2004
elections because of the three-term limit. Although the trial court previously ruled that Morales’ proclamation for the
1998-2001 term was void, there was no interruption of the continuity of Morales’ service with respect to the 1998-
2001 term because the trial court’s ruling was promulgated only on 4 July 2001, or after the expiry of the 1998-2001
term.

Our ruling in the Rivera case served as Morales’ involuntary severance from office with respect to the 2004-2007
term. Involuntary severance from office for any length of time short of the full term provided by law amounts to an
interruption of continuity of service. Our decision in the Rivera case was promulgated on 9 May 2007 and was
effective immediately. The next day, Morales notified the vice mayor’s office of our decision. The vice mayor
assumed the office of the mayor from 17 May 2007 up to 30 June 2007. The assumption by the vice mayor of the
office of the mayor, no matter how short it may seem to Dizon, interrupted Morales’ continuity of service. Thus,
Morales did not hold office for the full term of 1 July 2004 to 30 June 2007. (4th term)

2. Dizon claims that the 2007-2010 term is Morales’ fifth term in office. NO. Morales occupied the position of
mayor of Mabalacat for the following periods:

1995-1998
1998-2001
2001-2004
2004-2007.

However, because of his disqualification, Morales was not the duly elected mayor for the 2004-2007 term. Neither
did Morales hold the position of mayor of Mabalacat for the full term. Morales cannot be deemed to have served the
full term of 2004-2007 because he was ordered to vacate his post before the expiration of the term. Morales’
occupancy of the position of mayor of Mabalacat from 2004-2007 cannot be counted as a term for purposes of
computing the three-term limit. Indeed, the period from 17 May 2007 to 30 June 2007 served as a gap for purposes
of the three-term limit rule. Thus, the present 1 July 2007 to 30 June 2010 term is effectively Morales’ first term for
purposes of the three-term limit rule. (Dizon v. Comelec, G.R. No. 182088, January 30, 2009)

LATASA VS. COMLEC

Facts:

Petitioner Latasa, was elected mayor of the Municipality of Digos, Davao del Sur in the elections of 1992, 1995, and
1998. In February 2001, he filed his certificate of candidacy for city mayor for the 2001 elections. He stated therein
that he is eligible therefor, and likewise disclosed that he had already served for three consecutive terms as mayor of
the Municipality of Digos and is now running for the first time for the position of city mayor.

Sunga, also a candidate for city mayor in the said elections, filed before the COMELEC a petition to deny
petitioner's candidacy since the latter had already been elected and served for three consecutive terms. Petitioner
countered that this fact does not bar him from filing a certificate of candidacy for the 2001 elections since this will
be the first time that he will be running for the post of city mayor.

The Comelec’s First Division denied petitioner's certificate of candidacy. However, his motion for reconsideration
was not acted upon by the Comelec en banc before election day and he was proclaimed winner. Only after the
proclamation did the Comelec en banc issue a resolution that declared him disqualified from running for mayor of
Digos City, and ordered that all votes cast in his favor should not be counted.

Petitioner appealed, contending that when Digos was converted from a municipality to a city, it attained a different
juridical personality separate from the municipality of Digos. So when he filed his certificate of candidacy for city
mayor, it should not be construed as vying for the same local government post.

Issue:

Is petitioner Latasa eligible to run as candidate for the position of mayor of the newly-created City of Digos
immediately after he served for three consecutive terms as mayor of the Municipality of Digos?

Held:
As a rule, in a representative democracy, the people should be allowed freely to choose those who will govern them.
Article X, Section 8 of the Constitution is an exception to this rule, in that it limits the range of choice of the people.

Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law,
shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of
the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full
term for which he was elected.

An elective local official, therefore, is not barred from running again in for same local government post, unless two
conditions concur: 1.) that the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms to the same local
government post, and 2.) that he has fully served three consecutive terms.

True, the new city acquired a new corporate existence separate and distinct from that of the municipality. This does
not mean, however, that for the purpose of applying the subject Constitutional provision, the office of the municipal
mayor would now be construed as a different local government post as that of the office of the city mayor. As stated
earlier, the territorial jurisdiction of the City of Digos is the same as that of the municipality. Consequently, the
inhabitants of the municipality are the same as those in the city. These inhabitants are the same group of voters who
elected petitioner Latasa to be their municipal mayor for three consecutive terms. These are also the same
inhabitants over whom he held power and authority as their chief executive for nine years.

The framers of the Constitution specifically included an exception to the peoples freedom to choose those who will
govern them in order to avoid the evil of a single person accumulating excessive power over a particular territorial
jurisdiction as a result of a prolonged stay in the same office. To allow petitioner Latasa to vie for the position of
city mayor after having served for three consecutive terms as a municipal mayor would obviously defeat the very
intent of the framers when they wrote this exception. Should he be allowed another three consecutive terms as
mayor of the City of Digos, petitioner would then be possibly holding office as chief executive over the same
territorial jurisdiction and inhabitants for a total of eighteen consecutive years. This is the very scenario sought to be
avoided by the Constitution, if not abhorred by it.(Latasa vs. Comelec, G.R. No. 154829, 10 December 2003)

Note:

● It cannot be denied that the Court has previously held in Mamba-Perez v. COMELEC that after an elective official
has been proclaimed as winner of the elections, the COMELEC has no jurisdiction to pass upon his qualifications.
An opposing party's remedies after proclamation would be to file a petition for quo warranto within ten days after
the proclamation. Time and again, this Court has held that rules of procedure are only tools designed to facilitate the
attainment of justice, such that when rigid application of the rules tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial
justice, this Court is empowered to suspend their operation. We will not hesitate to set aside technicalities in favor of
what is fair and just.

Adormeo vs Comelec Case Digest

Recall, Term of Office, Three-Term Limit, Voluntary Renunciation

Facts:

Ramon Talaga, Jr. served as mayor of Lucena City during terms 1992-1995 and 1995-1998. During the 1998
elections, Talaga lost to Bernard G. Tagarao. However, before Tagarao’s 1998-2001 term ended, a recall election
was conducted in May 2000 wherein Talaga won and served the unexpired term of Tagarao until June 2001. When
Talaga ran for mayor in 2001, his candidacy was challenged on the ground that he had already served as mayor for
three consecutive terms in violation of the three term-limit rule. Comelec found Talaga disqualified to run for
mayor. Talaga filed a motion for reconsideration which Comelec granted. Talaga was then elected Mayor.

Issue:

Whether Talaga was disqualified to run as mayor given that he had already served two full terms and he won in the
2000 recall elections.

Held:

The term limit for elective local officials must be taken to refer to the right to be elected as well as the right to serve
in the same elective position. Consequently, it is not enough that an individual has served three consecutive terms in
an elective local office, he must also have been elected to the same position for the same number of times before the
disqualification can apply.

For nearly two years Talaga was a private citizen. The continuity of his mayorship was disruptedby his defeat in the
1998 elections. The time between his second term and the recall election is sufficient interruption. Thus, there was
no three consecutive terms as contemplated in the disqualifications in the LGC.
Talaga only served two consecutive full terms. There was a disruption when he was defeated in the 1998 elections.
His election during the 2000 recall election is not a continuation of his two previous terms which could constitute his
third term thereby barring him for running for a fourth term. Victory in the 2000 recall election is not the “voluntary
renunciation” contemplated by the law. (Adormeo vs Comelec, G.R. No. 147927, February 4, 2002)

SOCRATES VS. COMELEC

Facts:

528 members of the then incumbent barangay officials of the Puerto Princesa convened themselves into a
Preparatory Recall Assembly ("PRA" for brevity). The PRA was convened to... initiate the recall... of Socrates...
who assumed office as Puerto Princesa's mayor. The members of the PRA designated. PRA passed Resolution...
which declared its loss of confidence in Socrates and called for his recall.

The PRA requested the COMELEC to schedule the recall election.Socrates filed with the COMELEC a petition... to
nullify and deny due course to the Recall Resolution. COMELEC... promulgated a resolution dismissing for lack of
merit Socrates' petition... and scheduled the recall election. The petitions were all anchored on the ground that
"Hagedorn is disqualified from running for a fourth consecutive term, having been elected and having served as
mayor of the city for three (3) consecutive full... terms immediately prior to the instant recall election for the same
post. COMELEC affirmed the resolution declaring Hagedorn qualified to run in the recall election.

Issues:

Whether Hagedorn is qualified to run for mayor in the recall election of Puerto Princesa

Ruling:

After three consecutive terms, an elective local official cannot seek immediate reelection for a fourth term. The
prohibited election refers to the next regular election for the same office following the end of the third consecutive
term. Any subsequent election, like a... recall election, is no longer covered by the prohibition for two reasons. First,
a subsequent election like a recall election is no longer an immediate reelection after three consecutive terms.
Second, the intervening period constitutes an involuntary interruption in the... continuity of service.

After three consecutive terms, an elective local official cannot seek immediate reelection for a fourth term. The
prohibited election refers to the next regular election for the same office following the end of the third consecutive
term. Any subsequent election, like a... recall election, is no longer covered by the prohibition for two reasons. First,
a subsequent election like a recall election is no longer an immediate reelection after three consecutive terms.
Second, the intervening period constitutes an involuntary interruption in the... continuity of service.what the
Constitution prohibits is an immediate reelection for a fourth term following three consecutive terms. The
Constitution, however, does not prohibit a subsequent reelection for a fourth term as long as the reelection is not
immediately after the end of the third... consecutive term. A recall election mid-way in the term following the third
consecutive term is a subsequent election but not an immediate reelection after the third term.

Neither does the Constitution prohibit one barred from seeking immediate reelection to run in any other subsequent
election involving the same term of office. What the Constitution prohibits is a consecutive fourth term.

The prohibited election referred to by the framers of the Constitution is the immediate reelection after the third term,
not any other subsequent election. In the case of Hagedorn, his candidacy in the recall election... is not an immediate
reelection after his third consecutive term. The immediate reelection that the Constitution barred Hagedorn from
seeking referred to the... regular elections in 2001. Hagedorn did not seek reelection in the 2001 elections.

After Hagedorn ceased to be mayor on... he became a private citizen until the recall election of... when he won by
3,018 votes over his closest opponent, Socrates. Hagedorn's recall term does not retroact to include the tenure in
office of Socrates. Hagedorn can only be disqualified to run in the 2002 recall election if the recall term is made to
retroact to 2001, for only then can the recall... term constitute a fourth consecutive term.

A local official who serves a recall term should know that the recall term is in itself one term although less than
three years. This is the inherent limitation he takes by running and winning in the recall... election.In summary, we
hold that Hagedorn is qualified to run in the... recall election for mayor of Puerto Princesa... because:

Hagedorn is not running for immediate reelection following his three consecutive terms as mayor which ended on
June 30, 2001;

Hagedorn's continuity of service as mayor was involuntarily interrupted from June 30, 2001 to September 24, 2002
during which time he was a private citizen;

Hagedorn's recall term from September 24, 2002 to June 30, 2004 cannot be made to retroact to June 30, 2001 to
make a fourth consecutive term because factually the recall term is not a fourth consecutive term; and

Term limits should be construed strictly to give the fullest possible effect to the right of the electorate to choose their
leaders.
Aldovino VS COMELEC

FACTS:

Lucena City councilor Wilfredo F. Asilo was elected to the said office for three consecutive terms: 1998-2001,
2001-2004, and 2004-2007. In September 2005, during his third term of office, the Sandiganbayan issued an order
of 90-day preventive suspension against him in relation to a criminal case. The said suspension order was
subsequently lifted by the Court, and Asilo resumed the performance of the functions of his office.
Asilo then filed his certificate of candidacy for the same position in 2007. His disqualification was sought by herein
petitioners on the ground that he had been elected and had served for three consecutive terms, in violation of the
three-term Constitutional limit.

ISSUE:

WON the suspensive condition interrupts the three-term limitation rule of COMELEC?

RULING:

NO. The preventive suspension of public officials does not interrupt their term for purposes of the three-term limit
rule under the Constitution and the Local Government Code (RA 7160).

The candidacy of Lucena City Councilor Wilfredo F. Asilo for a fourth term in the 2007 elections was in
contravention of the three-term limit rule of Art. X, sec. 8 of the Constitution since his 2004-2007 term was not
interrupted by the preventive suspension imposed on him, the SC granted the petition of Simon B. Aldovino, Danilo
B. Faller, and Ferdinand N. Talabong seeking Asilo’s disqualification.
“Preventive suspension, by its nature, does not involve an effective interruption of service within a term and should
therefore not be a reason to avoid the three-term limitation,” held the Court. It noted that preventive suspension can
pose as a threat “more potent” than the voluntary renunciation that the Constitution itself disallows to evade the
three-term limit as it is easier to undertake and merely requires an easily fabricated administrative charge that can be
dismissed soon after a preventive suspension has been imposed.