23. Atong Paglaum, Inc.

vs Commission on Elections

694 SCRA 477 – Political Law – Constitutional Law – Legislative Department – Party-List System

This case partially abandoned the rulings in Ang Bagong Bayani vs COMELEC and BANAT vs COMELEC.

Atong Paglaum, Inc. and 51 other parties were disqualified by the Commission on Elections in the May 2013 party-list elections
for various reasons but primarily for not being qualified as representatives for marginalized or underrepresented sectors.

Atong Paglaum et al then filed a petition for certiorari against COMELEC alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of
COMELEC in disqualifying them.

ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in disqualifying the said party-lists.

HELD: No. The COMELEC merely followed the guidelines set in the cases of Ang Bagong Bayani and BANAT. However, the
Supreme Court remanded the cases back to the COMELEC as the Supreme Court now provides for new guidelines which
abandoned some principles established in the two aforestated cases. The new guidelines are as follows:

I. Parameters. In qualifying party-lists, the COMELEC must use the following parameters:

1. Three different groups may participate in the party-list system: (1) national parties or organizations, (2) regional parties or
organizations, and (3) sectoral parties or organizations.

2. National parties or organizations and regional parties or organizations do not need to organize along sectoral lines and do not
need to represent any “marginalized and underrepresented” sector.

3. Political parties can participate in party-list elections provided they register under the party-list system and do not field
candidates in legislative district elections. A political party, whether major or not, that fields candidates in legislative district
elections can participate in party-list elections only through its sectoral wing that can separately register under the party-list
system. The sectoral wing is by itself an independent sectoral party, and is linked to a political party through a coalition.

4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be “marginalized and underrepresented” or lacking in “well-defined political
constituencies.” It is enough that their principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns of their sector. The sectors
that are “marginalized and underrepresented” include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities,
handicapped, veterans, and overseas workers. The sectors that lack “well-defined political constituencies” include professionals,
the elderly, women, and the youth.

5. A majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the “marginalized and underrepresented” must
belong to the “marginalized and underrepresented” sector they represent. Similarly, a majority of the members of sectoral parties
or organizations that lack “well-defined political constituencies” must belong to the sector they represent. The nominees of
sectoral parties or organizations that represent the “marginalized and underrepresented,” or that represent those who lack “well-
defined political constituencies,” either must belong to their respective sectors, or must have a track record of advocacy for their
respective sectors. The nominees of national and regional parties or organizations must be bona-fide members of such parties or
organizations.

6. National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall not be disqualified if some of their nominees are disqualified,
provided that they have at least one nominee who remains qualified.

II. In the BANAT case, major political parties are disallowed, as has always been the practice, from participating in the party-list
elections. But, since there’s really no constitutional prohibition nor a statutory prohibition, major political parties can now
participate in the party-list system provided that they do so through their bona fide sectoral wing (see parameter 3 above).

Allowing major political parties to participate, albeit indirectly, in the party-list elections will encourage them to work
assiduously in extending their constituencies to the “marginalized and underrepresented” and to those who “lack well-defined
political constituencies.”
Ultimately, the Supreme Court gave weight to the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission when they were drafting the
party-list system provision of the Constitution. The Commissioners deliberated that it was their intention to include all parties
into the party-list elections in order to develop a political system which is pluralistic and multiparty. (In the BANAT case, Justice
Puno emphasized that the will of the people should defeat the intent of the framers; and that the intent of the people, in ratifying
the 1987 Constitution, is that the party-list system should be reserved for the marginalized sectors.)

III. The Supreme Court also emphasized that the party-list system is NOT RESERVED for the “marginalized and
underrepresented” or for parties who lack “well-defined political constituencies”. It is also for national or regional parties. It is
also for small ideology-based and cause-oriented parties who lack “well-defined political constituencies”. The common
denominator however is that all of them cannot, they do not have the machinery – unlike major political parties, to field or
sponsor candidates in the legislative districts but they can acquire the needed votes in a national election system like the party-list
system of elections.

If the party-list system is only reserved for marginalized representation, then the system itself unduly excludes other cause-
oriented groups from running for a seat in the lower house.

As explained by the Supreme Court, party-list representation should not be understood to include only labor, peasant, fisherfolk,
urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, overseas workers, and other sectors that by their nature are
economically at the margins of society. It should be noted that Section 5 of Republic Act 7941 includes, among others, in its
provision for sectoral representation groups of professionals, which are not per se economically marginalized but are still
qualified as “marginalized, underrepresented, and do not have well-defined political constituencies” as they are ideologically
marginalized.

34. Jocelyn Limkaichong vs Commission on Elections

583 SCRA 1 – Political Law – The Legislative Department – Jurisdiction of the Electoral Tribunals

Jocelyn Limkaichong ran as a representative in the 1st District of Negros Oriental. Olivia Paras, her rival, and some other
concerned citizens filed disqualification cases against Limkaichong. Limkaichong is allegedly not a natural born citizen of the
Philippines because when she was born her father was still a Chinese and that her mom, though Filipino, lost her citizenship by
virtue of her marriage to Limkaichong’s dad. During the pendency of the case against Limkaichong before the (Commission on
Elections) COMELEC. Election day came and votes were cast. Results came in and Limkaichong won over her rival Paras.
COMELEC after due hearing declared Limkaichong as disqualified. About 2 days after the counting of votes, COMELEC
declared Limkaichong as a disqualified candidate.

On the following days however, notwithstanding their proclamation disqualifying Limkaichong, the COMELEC issued a
proclamation announcing Limkaichong as the winner of the recently conducted elections. This is in compliance with Resolution
No. 8062 adopting the policy-guidelines of not suspending the proclamation of winning candidates with pending disqualification
cases which shall be without prejudice to the continuation of the hearing and resolution of the involved cases. Paras countered the
proclamation and she filed a petition before the COMELEC. Limkaichong asailed Paras’ petition arguing that since she is now
the proclaimed winner, the COMELEC can no longer exercise jurisdiction over the matter. It should be the HRET which should
exercise jurisdiction from then on. COMELEC agreed with Limkaichong.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not the proclamation done by the COMELEC is valid.

2. Whether or not COMELEC should still exercise jurisdiction over the matter.

HELD:

1. The proclamation of Limkaichong was valid. The COMELEC Second Division rendered its Joint Resolution dated May 17,
2007. On May 20, 2007, Limkaichong timely filed with the COMELEC En Banc her motion for reconsideration as well as for
the lifting of the incorporated directive suspending her proclamation. The filing of the motion for reconsideration effectively
suspended the execution of the May 17, 2007 Joint Resolution. Since the execution of the May 17, 2007 Joint Resolution was
suspended, there was no impediment to the valid proclamation of Limkaichong as the winner. Section 2, Rule 19 of the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure provides:

Sec. 2. Period for Filing Motions for Reconsideration. – A motion to reconsider a decision, resolution, order or ruling of a
Division shall be filed within five (5) days from the promulgation thereof. Such motion, if not pro forma, suspends the execution
for implementation of the decision, resolution, order and ruling.

2. No. The HRET must exercise jurisdiction after Limkaichong’s proclamation. The SC has invariably held that once a winning
candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office as a Member of the lower house, the COMELEC’s jurisdiction
over election contests relating to his election, returns, and qualifications ends, and the HRET’s own jurisdiction begins. It
follows then that the proclamation of a winning candidate divests the COMELEC of its jurisdiction over matters pending before
it at the time of the proclamation. The party questioning his qualification should now present his case in a proper proceeding
before the HRET, the constitutionally mandated tribunal to hear and decide a case involving a Member of the House of
Representatives with respect to the latter’s election, returns and qualifications. The use of the word “sole” in Section 17, Article
VI of the Constitution and in Section 250 of the OEC underscores the exclusivity of the Electoral Tribunals’ jurisdiction over
election contests relating to its members.

41. SCB PHILIPPINES VS SENATE COMMITTEE ON BANKS, FINANCIAL INSTITUTION AND CURRENCIES EN
BANC G.R. No. 167173 December 27, 2007

FACTS:
SCB Phil Branch had criminal and civil charges against them before the courts in Metro Manila for selling unregistered foreign
securities in violation of Securities Regulation Code (RA 8799). Enrile, in his privileged speech, urged the Senate to immediately
conduct an inquiry in aid of legislation, to prevent the occurrences of a similar fraudulent in the future. The respondent
Committee then set an initial hearing to investigate, in aid of legislation thereto. SCB stressed that there were cases allegedly
involving the same issues subject of legislative inquiry, thus posting a challenge to the jurisdiction of respondent Committee to
continue with the inquiry.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent Committee, by aid of legislation, would encroach upon the judicial powers vested solely in the
courts who took cognizance of the foregoing cases.

RULING:
Yes. The unmistakable objective of the investigation, as set forth in the resolution, as initiated in the privileged speech of Senate
President Enrile, was simply "to denounce the illegal practices committed by a foreign bank in selling unregistered foreign
securities xxx", and at the conclusion of the said speech "to immediately conduct an inquiry, in aid of legislation, so as to prevent
the occurrence of a similar fraudulent in the future." The mere filing of a criminal or administrative complaint before a court or a
quasi- judicial body should not automatically bar the conduct of legislation. The exercise of sovereign legislative authority, of
which the power of legislative inquiry is an essential component, cannot be made subordinate to a criminal or an administrative
investigation. The intent of legislative inquiries is to arrive at a policy determination, which may or may not be enacted into law.
Except only when it exercises the power to punish for contempt, the committees of the Senate or the House of Representatives
cannot penalize violators even there is overwhelmingly evidence of criminal culpability. Other than proposing or initiating
amendatory or remedial legislation, respondent Committee can only recommend measures to address or remedy whatever
irregularities may be unearthed during the investigation, although it may include in its Report a recommendation for criminal
indictment of persons who may appear liable. At best, the recommendation, along with the evidence, contained in such Report
would only be persuasive, but it is still up to the prosecutorial agencies and the courts to determine the liabilities of the offender.

48. Aquilino Pimentel vs Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita

472 SCRA 587 – Political Law – Commission on Appointment – Ad Interim Appointments vs Appointments in an Acting
Capacity

Law on Public Officers – Modes and Kinds of Appointment

While Congress was in session, due to vacancies in the cabinet, then president Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (GMA) appointed
Arthur Yap et al as secretaries of their respective departments. They were appointed in an acting capacity only. Senator Aquilino
Pimentel together with 7 other senators filed a complaint against the appointment of Yap et al. Pimentel averred that GMA cannot
make such appointment without the consent of the Commission on Appointment; that, in accordance with Section 10, Chapter 2,
Book IV of Executive Order No. 292, only the undersecretary of the respective departments should be designated in an acting
capacity and not anyone else.

On the contrary, then Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita averred that the president is empowered by Section 16, Article VII of
the 1987 Constitution to issue appointments in an acting capacity to department secretaries without the consent of the
Commission on Appointments even while Congress is in session. Further, EO 292 itself allows the president to issue temporary
designation to an officer in the civil service provided that the temporary designation shall not exceed one year.

During the pendency of said case, Congress adjourned and GMA issued ad interim appointments re-appointing those previously
appointed in acting capacity.

ISSUE: Whether or not the appointments made by ex PGMA is valid.

HELD: Yes. The argument raised by Ermita is correct. Further, EO 292 itself provided the safeguard so that such power will not
be abused hence the provision that the temporary designation shall not exceed one year. In this case, in less than a year after the
initial appointments made by GMA, and when the Congress was in recess, GMA issued the ad interim appointments – this also
proves that the president was in good faith.

It must also be noted that cabinet secretaries are the alter egos of the president. The choice is the president’s to make and the
president normally appoints those whom he/she can trust. She cannot be constrained to choose the undersecretary. She has the
option to choose. An alter ego, whether temporary or permanent, holds a position of great trust and confidence. Congress, in the
guise of prescribing qualifications to an office, cannot impose on the President who her alter ego should be.

The office of a department secretary may become vacant while Congress is in session. Since a department secretary is the alter
ego of the President, the acting appointee to the office must necessarily have the President’s confidence. That person may or may
not be the permanent appointee, but practical reasons may make it expedient that the acting appointee will also be the permanent
appointee.

Anent the issue that GMA appointed “outsiders”, such is allowed. EO 292 also provides that the president “may temporarily
designate an officer already in the government service or any other competent person to perform the functions of an office in the
executive branch.” Thus, the President may even appoint in an acting capacity a person not yet in the government service, as long
as the President deems that person competent.