CAINTA CATHOLIC SCHOOL G.R. No.

151021
and MSGR. MARIANO This Collective Bargaining Agreement
T. BALBAGO, shall become effective and binding upon the
Petitioners, Present: parties from January 1, 1986 up to May 31,
1989. At least sixty (60) days before the
QUISUMBING, J., expiration of this Agreement, the parties hereto
Chairperson, shall submit written proposals which shall be
- versus - CARPIO, made the basis of negotiations for the execution
CARPIO-MORALES, of a new agreement.
TINGA, and
VELASCO, JR., JJ. If no new agreement is reached by the
CAINTA CATHOLIC SCHOOL parties at the expiration of this agreement, all
EMPLOYEES UNION Promulgated: the provisions of this Agreement shall remain full
(CCSEU), force and in effect, up to the time a new
Respondent. May 4, 2006 Agreement shall be executed.[5]
x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

Msgr. Mariano Balbago (Balbago) was appointed School

DECISION Director in April 1987. From this time, the Union became inactive.

TINGA, J.: It was only in 10 September 1993 that the Union held an election of

officers, with Mrs. Rosalina Llagas (Llagas) being elected as President;

The main issue for resolution hinges on the validity of a stipulation in
a Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) that allows management to
retire an employee in its employ for a predetermined lengthy period
but who has not yet reached the minimum compulsory retirement
age provided in the Labor Code. Jurisprudence has answered the
question in the affirmative a number of times and our duty calls for
the application of the principle of stare decisis. As a consequence, we
grant the petition and reverse the Court of Appeals.
Paz Javier (Javier), Vice-President; Fe Villegas (Villegas), Treasurer;
and Maria Luisa Santos (Santos), Secretary. Llagas was then the Dean
of the Student Affairs while Villegas and Santos were Year-Level
Chairmen.The other elected officers were Rizalina Fernandez, Ester
Amigo, secretaries; Nena Marvilla, treasurer; Gilda Galange and
Jimmy del Rosario, auditors; Filomeno Dacanay and Adelina Andres,
P.R.O.s; and Danilo Amigo and Arturo Guevarra, business managers.[6]

On 15 October 1993, the School retired Llagas and Javier, who had
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 rendered more than twenty (20) years of continuous service,
of the Rules of Court, assailing the Decision[1] dated 20 August 2001 pursuant to Section 2, Article X of the CBA, to wit:
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 50851, which reversed the

Resolutions dated 31 January 1997,[2] and 30 April 1997[3] of the An employee may be retired, either
upon application by the employee himself or by
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), Third Division in NLRC the decision of the Director of the School,
NCR CC No. L-000028-93 (NLRC RAB-IV-7-6827-94-R), as well as the upon reaching the age of sixty (60)
or after having rendered at
Resolution[4] dated 6 December 2001.

least twenty (20) years of service to the School

The antecedent facts follow: the last three (3) years of which must be
continuous.[7]

On 6 March 1986, a Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) was

Three (3) days later, the Union filed a notice of strike with the
entered into between Cainta Catholic School (School) and the Cainta
National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) docketed as
Catholic School Employees Union (Union) effective 1 January
NCMB-RB-12-NS-10-124-93.
1986 to 31 May 1989. This CBA provided, among others, that:

ARTICLE IX On 8 November 1993, the Union struck and picketed the Schools
DURATION OF AGREEMENT
entrances.

On 11 November 1993, then Secretary of Labor Ma. Nieves R.
Confesor issued an Order certifying the labor dispute to the National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). The dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED,
this Office hereby certifies the labor dispute at
the Cainta Catholic School to the National Labor
Relations Commission for compulsory
arbitration, pursuant to Article 263(g) of the
Labor Code as amended.
Accordingly, all striking teachers and
employees are directed to return to work within
24 hours from receipt of this Order and the
School Administrator to accept all returning
employees under the same terms and conditions
prevailing prior to the strike.
Furthermore, the effects of the
termination of Ms. Rosalinda Llagas and Paz A.
Javier are hereby suspended. In line with this
Order, the School Administration is ordered to
reinstate them to their former positions without
loss of seniority rights and privileges pending
determination of the validity of their dismissal.
Both parties are further directed to
cease and desist from committing any acts that
might aggravate the situation.
SO ORDERED.[8]
On 20 December 1993, the School filed a petition directly
with the NLRC to declare the strike illegal.
On 27 July 1994, the Union filed a complaint[9] for unfair
labor practice before the NLRC docketed as NLRC Case No. RAB-IV-7-
6827-94-R, entitled, Cainta Catholic School Employees Union
v. Cainta Catholic School, et. al., before Arbitration Branch IV. Upon
motion, then Labor Arbiter Oswald Lorenzo ordered the consolidation
of this unfair labor practice case with the above-certified case.
On 31 January 1997, the NLRC rendered a Resolution
favoring the School.
Three (3) issues were passed upon by the NLRC, namely: (1)
whether the retirement of Llagas and Javier is legal; (2) whether the
School is guilty of unfair labor practice; and (3) whether the strike is
legal.
The NLRC ruled that the retirement of Llagas and Javier is
legal as the School was merely exercising an option given to it under
the CBA.[10] The NLRC dismissed the unfair labor practice charge
against the School for insufficiency of evidence. Furthermore, it was
found that the strike declared by the Union from 8 to 12 November
1993 is illegal, thereby declaring all union officers to have lost their
employment status.[11]
The Union moved for reconsideration but it was denied in a
Resolution dated 30 April 1997.
Hence, on 9 July 1997, the Union filed a petition for
certiorari before this Court docketed as G.R. No. 129548. The Court
issued a temporary restraining order (TRO) against the enforcement
of the subject resolutions effective as of 23 July 1997. The School,
however, filed a motion for clarification considering that it had
already enforced the 31 January 1997 NLRC Resolution.
On 28 July 1997, ten (10) regular teachers, who were
declared to have lost their employment status under the aforesaid
NLRC Resolution reported back to work but the School refused to
accept them by reason of its pending motion for clarification. This
prompted the Union to file a petition for contempt against Balbago
and his agents before this Court, docketed as G.R. No. 130004, which
was later on consolidated with G.R. No. 129548.
Pursuant to the ruling of this Court in St. Martin Funeral
Homes v. NLRC,[12] the case was referred to the Court of Appeals and
re-docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 50851.
On 20 August 2001, the Court of Appeals rendered a
decision giving due course and granting the petition to annul and set
aside the 31 January 1997 and 30 April 1997 Resolutions of the NLRC;
while dismissing the petition for contempt for lack of merit. The
decretal portion of the decision reads:
 WHEREFORE, premises considered,
the petition to annul and set aside the 31 January
1997 and the 30 April 1997 resolutions of the
National Labor Relations Commission
is GRANTED. Judgment is
hereby RENDERED directing private
respondents: 1) to REINSTATE the terminated
union officers, except Rosalinda Llagas, Paz
Javier, Gilda Galange and Ester Amigo, to their
former positions without loss of seniority rights
and other privileges with full backwages,
inclusive of allowances and other benefits or
their monetary equivalent from 9 June 1997 up
to the time of their actual reinstatement; 2) to
pay Rosalinda Llagas: a) separation pay
equivalent to one (1) month pay for every year of
service, in lieu of reinstatement, with full
backwages, inclusive of allowances and other
benefits or their monetary equivalent from 9
June 1997 up to the time of the finality of this
decision; b) moral and exemplary damages in the
amount of ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00) and
five thousand (P5,000.00), respectively; 3) to pay
Paz Javier, or her heirs: a) unpaid salaries,
inclusive of allowances and other benefits,
including death benefits, or their monetary
equivalent from the time her compensation was
withheld from her up to the time of her death; b)
separation pay equivalent to one (1) months
salary for every year of service; and c) moral and
exemplary damages in the amount of ten
thousand pesos (P10,000.00) and five thousand
pesos (P5,000.00), respectively.
Private respondents are also ordered
to pay petitioner union attorneys fees equivalent
to five percent (5%) of the total judgment award.
The petition for contempt, however,
is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.[13]
In reversing the decision of the NLRC, the Court of Appeals
construed the retirement of Llagas and Javier as an act amounting to
unfair labor practice when viewed against the backdrop of the
relevant circumstances obtaining in the case. The appellate court
pointed out, thus:
The two happened to be the most
vocal, dynamic and influential of all union officers
and members and they held considerable suasion
over the other employees. Rosalinda Llagas
objected to the signing of the prepared form
distributed by the school, as a consequence of
which, no one accomplished the form, and
opposed the formation of the high school faculty
club as the teachers already had sufficient
representation through the union. Paz Javier, on
the other hand, demanded that she be given the
floor during the faculty club organizational
meeting and went on to win the presidency of the
faculty club, conclusively showing that she
enjoyed the support of the high school
teachers. They were therefore a new and
different breed of union leaders assertive,
militant and independent the exact opposite of
former union president Victor Javier who seemed
to be passive, cooperative and pacific. The school
saw the two as threats which it could not control,
and faced with a very uncomfortable situation of
having to contend with an aggressive union which
just dominated the high school faculty club
(except for Joel Javeniar, all of the faculty clubs
officers were union members; Rollo, p. 418), the
school decided to nip in the bud the reactivated
union by retiring its most prominent leaders.
xxxx
It is not difficult to see the anti-union
bias of the school. One of the first acts of private
respondent Msgr. Balbago immediately after his
assumption of office as school director was to ask
for a moratorium on all union activities. With the
union in inactive status, the school felt secure and
comfortable but when the union reactivated, the
school became apprehensive and reacted by
retiring the unions two topmost officers by
invoking the provisions of the CBA. When the
union furnished the school, through counsel, a
copy of a proposed CBA on 3 November 1993, the
school in a cavalier fashion ignored it on the
pretext that the union no longer enjoyed the
majority status among the employees x x x[14]
The appellate court concluded that the retirement of the
two (2) union officers was clearly to bust the reactivated union.
Having established that the School committed unfair labor practice,
the Court of Appeals declared that the no-strike, no-lockout clause in
the CBA was not violated when the union members staged a strike
from 8 to 12 November 1993.[15] It further held that minor disorders
or isolated incidents of perceived coercion attending the strike do not
categorize it as illegal:
We studied carefully the available
records and found that the existence of force
during the strike was certainly not pervasive and
widespread, or consistently and deliberately
resorted to as a matter of policy, so as to stamp
the strike with illegality, or to cause the loss of
employment of the guilty party x x x [16]
The motion for reconsideration subsequently filed by the School was
denied in a Resolution dated 6 December 2001, save in case of some
union officers where the appellate court modified its ruling granting At the outset, only questions of law are entertained by this Court

them separation pay instead of reinstatement because of their through a petition for review on certiorari. There are, however, well-

retirement or death.[17] recognized exceptions such as in this case when the factual findings

of the NLRC and the Court of Appeals are contradictory.[24] A re-

Thereafter, petitioners filed this petition for review on certiorari
evaluation of the records of this case is necessary for its proper
raising three main issues, summarized as: (1) whether the Schools
resolution.
decision to retire Llagas and Javier constitutes unfair labor practice;

(2) whether the strike was legal; and (3) whether some union officers
The key issue remains whether the forced retirement of Llagas and
ordered dismissed are entitled to backwages.[18]
Javier was a valid exercise of management prerogative. Undoubtedly,

the retirement of the two (2) union officers triggered the declaration
The School avers that the retirement of Llagas and Javier
of strike by the Union, and the ruling on whether the strike was legal
was clearly in accordance with a specific right granted under the
is highly dependent on whether the retirement was valid.
CBA. The School justifies its actions by invoking our rulings

in Pantranco North Express, Inc. v. NLRC[19] and Bulletin Publishing

We are impelled to reverse the Court of Appeals and affirm the
Corporation v. Sanchez[20] that no unfair labor practice is committed
validity of the termination of employment of Llagas and Javier, arising
by management if the retirement was made in accord with
as it did from a management prerogative granted by the mutually-
management prerogative or in case of voluntary retirement, upon
negotiated CBA between the School and the Union.
approval of management.

Pursuant to the existing CBA,[25] the School has the option

The Union, relying on the findings made by the Court of
to retire an employee upon reaching the age limit of sixty (60) or after
Appeals,[21] argues that the retirement of the two union officers is a
having rendered at least twenty (20) years of service to the School,
mere subterfuge to bust the union.[22]
the last three (3) years of which must be continuous. Retirement is a

different specie of termination of employment from dismissal for just

The NLRC, however, gave another justification to sustain the validity
or authorized causes under Articles 282 and 283 of the Labor Code.
of the two union officers forcible retirement, viz:
While in all three cases, the employee to be terminated may be

unwilling to part from service, there are eminently higher standards

The retirement of Rosalinda Llagas has
become inevitable because, being a managerial to be met by the employer validly exercising the prerogative to
employee by reason of her position as Dean of
dismiss for just or authorized causes. In those two instances, it is
Student Affairs, she accepted the Union
presidency.She lost the trust and confidence on indispensable that the employer establish the existence of just or
her by the SCHOOL as she occupied a managerial
position as Dean of Student Affairs. . . Being also authorized causes for dismissal as spelled out in the Labor Code.
the union president, she has allowed her loyalties
Retirement, on the other hand, is the result of a bilateral act of the
to be divided between the administration and the
union. parties, a voluntary agreement between the employer and the

employee whereby the latter after reaching a certain age agrees

As to Paz Javier, her retirement was and/or consents to sever his employment with the former.[26]
decided upon after an evaluation shows that she
was not performing well as her students were
complaining about her brusque attitude and bad
language, aside from being habitually absent and Article 287 of the Labor Code, as amended, governs
late. [23] retirement of employees, stating:

ART. 287. Retirement.

 Any employee may be retired upon
reaching the retirement age established in the agent with respect to the terms and conditions of employment;
collective bargaining agreement or other hence, when the private respondent ratified the CBA with his union,
applicable employment contract.
he concurrently agreed to conform to and abide by its provisions.
In case of retirement, the employee
Thus, the Court asserted, [p]roviding in a CBA for compulsory
shall be entitled to receive such retirement
benefits as he may have earned under existing retirement of employees after twenty-five (25) years of service is legal
laws and any collective bargaining agreement and
other agreements: Provided, however, That an and enforceable so long as the parties agree to be governed by such
employees retirement benefits under any
CBA.[27]
collective bargaining agreement and other
agreements shall not be less than those provided
herein.
A similar set of facts informed our decision in Progressive
In the absence of a retirement plan or Development Corporation v. NLRC.[28] The CBA therein stipulated that
agreement providing for retirement benefits of
employees in the establishment, an employee an employee with [20] years of service, regardless of age, may be
upon reaching the age of sixty (60) years or more,
but not beyond sixty-five (65) years which is retired at his option or at the option of the company. The stipulation
hereby declared the compulsory retirement age, was used by management to compulsorily retire two employees with
who has served at least five (5) years in the said
establishment, may retire and shall be entitled to more than 20 years of service, at the ages of 45 and 38. The Court
retirement pay equivalent to at least one-half
affirmed the validity of the stipulation on retirement as consistent
(1/2) month salary for every year of service, a
fraction of at least six (6) months being with Article 287 of the Labor Code.
considered as one whole year.

Philippine Airlines, Inc. v. Airline Pilots Association of the

Phils.[29] further bolsters the Schools position. At contention therein

The CBA in the case at bar established 60 as the compulsory
was a provision of the PAL-ALPAP Retirement Plan, the Plan having
retirement age. However, it is not alleged that either Javier or Llagas
subsequently been misquoted in the CBA mutually negotiated by the
had reached the compulsory retirement age of 60 years, but instead
parties. The Plan authorized PAL to exercise the option of retirement
that they had rendered at least 20 years of service in the School, the
over pilots who had chosen not to retire after completing 20 years of
last three (3) years continuous. Clearly, the CBA provision allows the
service or logging over 20,000 hours for PAL. After PAL exercised such
employee to be retired by the School even before reaching the age of
option over a pilot, ALPAP charged PAL with illegal dismissal and
60, provided that he/she had rendered 20 years of service. Would
union-busting. While the Secretary of Labor upheld the unilateral
such a stipulation be valid? Jurisprudence affirms the position of the
retirement, it nonetheless ruled that PAL should first consult with the
School.
pilot to be retired before it could exercise such option. The Court

struck down that proviso, ruling that the requirement to consult the
Pantranco North Express, Inc. v. NLRC, cited by petitioners,
pilots prior to their retirement defeats the exercise by management
finds direct application in this case. The CBA involved
of its option to retire the said employees, [giving] the pilot concerned
in Pantranco allowed the employee to be compulsorily retired upon
an undue prerogative to assail the decision of management.
reaching the age of 60 or upon completing [25] years of service to

[Pantranco]. On the basis of the CBA, private respondent was

By their acceptance of the CBA, the Union and its members
compulsorily retired by Pantranco at the age of 52, after 25 years of
are obliged to abide by the commitments and limitations they had
service. Interpreting Article 287, the Court ruled that the Labor Code
agreed to cede to management. The questioned retirement
permitted employers and employees to fix the applicable retirement
provisions cannot be deemed as an imposition foisted on the Union,
age at below 60 years of age. Moreover, the Court also held that there
which very well had the right to have refused to agree to allowing
was no illegal dismissal since it was the CBA itself that incorporated
management to retire retire employees with at least 20 years of
the agreement reached between the employer and the bargaining
service.

It should not be taken to mean that retirement provisions
agreed upon in the CBA are absolutely beyond the ambit of judicial
review and nullification. A CBA, as a labor contract, is not merely
contractual in nature but impressed with public interest. If the
retirement provisions in the CBA run contrary to law, public morals,
or public policy, such provisions may very well be voided. Certainly, a
CBA provision or employment contract that would allow management
to subvert security of tenure and allow it to unilaterally retire
employees after one month of service cannot be upheld. Neither will
the Court sustain a retirement clause that entitles the retiring
employee to benefits less than what is guaranteed under Article 287
of the Labor Code, pursuant to the provisions express proviso thereto
in the provision.
Yet the CBA in the case at bar contains no such infirmities
which must be stricken down. There is no essential difference
between the CBA provision in this case and those we affirmed
in Pantranco and Progressive. Twenty years is a more than ideal
length of service an employee can render to one employer. Under
ordinary contemplation, a CBA provision entitling an employee to
retire after 20 years of service and accordingly collect retirement
benefits is reward for services rendered since it enables an employee
to reap the fruits of his labor particularly retirement benefits, whether
lump-sum or otherwise at an earlier age, when said employee, in
presumably better physical and mental condition, can enjoy them
better and longer.[30]
We affirm the continued validity of Pantranco and its
kindred cases, and thus reiterate that under Article 287 of the Labor
Code, a CBA may validly accord management the prerogative to
optionally retire an employee under the terms and conditions
mutually agreed upon by management and the bargaining union,
even if such agreement allows for retirement at an age lower than the
optional retirement age or the compulsory retirement age. The Court
of Appeals gravely erred in refusing to consider this case from the
perspective of Pantranco, or from the settled doctrine enunciated
therein.
What the Court of Appeals did instead was to favorably
consider the claim of the Union that the real purpose behind the
retirement of Llagas and Javier was to bust the union, they being its
president and vice-president, respectively. To that end, the appellate
court favorably adopted the citation by the Union of the American
case of NLRB v. Ace Comb, Co.,[31] which in turn was taken from a
popular local labor law textbook. The citation stated that [f]or the
purpose of determining whether or not a discharge is discriminatory,
it is necessary that the underlying reason for the discharge be
established. The fact that a lawful cause for discharge is available is
not a defense where the employee is actually discharged because of
his union activities.[32]
Reliance on NLRB v. Ace Comb, Co. was grossly inapropos.
The case did not involve an employee sought to be retired, but one
who cited for termination from employment for cause, particularly for
violating Section 8(a)(3) of the National Labor Relations Act, or for
insubordination. Moreover, the United States Court of Appeals Eighth
Circuit, which decided the case, ultimately concluded that here the
evidence abounds that there was a justifiable cause for [the
employees] discharge,[33] his union activities
notwithstanding.Certainly, the Union and the Court of Appeals would
have been better off citing a case wherein the decision actually
concluded that the employee was invalidly dismissed for union
activities despite the ostensible existence of a valid cause for
termination.
Nonetheless, the premise warrants considering whether
management may be precluded from retiring an employee whom it is
entitled to retire upon a determination that the true cause for
compulsory retirement is the employees union activities.
The law and this Court frowns upon unfair labor practices
by management, including so-called union-busting. Such illegal
practices will not be sustained by the Court, even if guised under
ostensibly legal premises. But with respect to an active unionized
employee who claims having lost his/her job for union activities, there
are different considerations presented if the termination is justified
under just or authorized cause under the Labor Code; and if detriment is ultimately to the union itself, promoting as it would a

separation from service is effected through the exercise of a duly stagnating entrenched leadership.

accorded management prerogative to retire an employee. There is

perhaps a greater imperative to recognize the management We can thus can comfortably uphold the principle, as

prerogative on retirement than the prerogative to dismiss employees reiterated in Philippine Airlines,[34] that the exercise by the employer

for just or authorized causes. For one, there is a greater subjectivity, of a valid and duly established prerogative to retire an employee does

not to mention factual dispute, attached to the concepts of just or not constitute unfair labor practice.

authorized cause than retirement which normally contemplates

merely the attainment of a certain age or a certain number of years

in the service. It would be easier for management desirous to There are other arguments raised by petitioners. We need

eliminate pesky union members to abuse the prerogative of to discuss them only in brief, as they are no longer central to the

termination for such purpose since the determination of just or resolution of this case.

authorized cause is rarely a simplistic question, but involves facts

highly prone to dispute and subjective interpretation. The School insisted that Llagas and Javier were actually

managerial employees, and it was illegal for the Union to have called
On the other hand, the exercise by management of its
a strike on behalf of two employees who were not legally qualified to
retirement prerogative is less susceptible to dubitability as to the
be members of the Union in the first place.[35] The Union, on the other
question whether an employee could be validly retired. The only
hand, maintains that they are rank-and-file employees.
factual matter to consider then is whether the employee concerned

had attained the requisite age or number of years in service pursuant

Article 212(m) of the Labor Code defines a managerial
to the CBA or employment agreement, or if none, pursuant to Article
employee as "one who is vested with powers or prerogatives to lay
287 of the Labor Code. In fact, the question of the amount of
down and execute management policies and/or to hire, transfer,
retirement benefits is more likely to be questioned than the
suspend, lay-off, recall, discharge, assign or discipline employees, or
retirement itself. Evidently, it more clearly emerges in the case of
to effectively recommend such managerial actions." The functions of
retirement that management would anyway have the right to retire
the Dean of Student Affairs, as occupied by Llagas, are enumerated in
an employee, no matter the degree of involvement of said employee
the Faculty Manual. The salient portions are hereby enumerated:
in union activities.
a. Manages the High School
Department with the Registrar and Guidance
There is another point that militates against the Union. A Counselors (acting as a COLLEGIAL BODY) in the
ruling in its favor is tantamount to a concession that a validly drawn absence of the Director or Principal.

management prerogative to retire its employees can be judicially b. Enforces the school rules and
regulations governing students to maintain
interfered on a showing that the employee in question is highly
discipline.
valuable to the union. Such a rule would be a source of mischief, even
xxxx
if narrowly carved out by the Court, for it would imply that an active
g. Plans with the Guidance Counselors
union member or officer may be, by reason of his/her importance to
student leadership training programs to
the union, somehow exempted from the normal standards of encourage dynamic and responsible leadership
among the students and submits the same for
retirement applicable to the other, perhaps less vital members of the the approval of the Principal/Director.
union. Indeed, our laws protection of the right to organize labor does
xxxx
not translate into perpetual job security for union leaders by reason
i. Studies proposals on extra-curricular
of their leadership role alone. Should we entertain such a notion, the or co-curricular activities and projects proposed
 by teachers and students and recommends to
the Principal/Director the necessary approval. In the same vein, a reading of the above functions leads us

to conclude that Javier was a supervisory employee. Verily, Javier

j. Implements and supervises activities
and projects approved by the Principal/Director made recommendations as to what actions to take in hiring,
so that the activities and projects follow faithfully
termination, disciplinary actions, and management policies, among
the conditions set forth by the Principal/Director
in the approval. others.

k. Assists in the planning, supervising

and evaluating of programs of co-curricular
We can concede, as the Court of Appeals noted, that such
activities in line with the philosophy and
objectives of the School for the total job descriptions or appellations are meaningless should it be
development of the students.
established that the actual duties performed by the employees
l. Recommends to the Principal policies concerned are neither managerial nor supervisory in nature. Yet on
and rules to serve as guides to effective
implementation of the student activity this point, we defer to the factual finding of the NLRC, the proximate
program.[36]
trier of facts, that Llagas and Javier were indeed managerial and
xxxx supervisory employees, respectively.

Having established that Llagas is a managerial employee,

It is fairly obvious from a perusal of the list that the Dean of Student
she is proscribed from joining a labor union,[38] more so being elected
Affairs exercises managerial functions, thereby classifying Llagas as a
as union officer. In the case of Javier, a supervisory employee, she
managerial employee.
may join a labor union composed only of supervisory

employees.[39] Finding both union officers to be employees not

Javier was occupying the position of Subject Area Coordinator. Her
belonging to the rank-and-file, their membership in the Union has
duties and responsibilities include:
become questionable, rendering the Union inutile to represent their

cause.
1. Recommends to the
principals consideration the appointment of
faculty members in the department, their
promotion, discipline and even termination; Since the strike has been declared as illegal based on the

foregoing discussion, we need not dwell on its legality with respect to

2. Recommends advisory
responsibilities of faculty members; the means employed by the Union.

3. Recommends to the
principal curricular changes, purchase the books
Finally, there is neither legal nor factual justification in
and periodicals, supplies and equipment for the
growth of the school; awarding backwages to some union officers who have lost their

4. Recommends his/her employment status, in light of our finding that the strike is illegal. The
colleagues and serves as channel between ruling of the NLRC is thus upheld on this point. We are also satisfied
teachers in the department the principal and/or
director.[37] with the disposition of the NLRC that mandates that Llagas and Javier

(or her heirs) receive their retirement benefits.

Supervisory employees, as defined in Article 212(m) are

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolution dated 31
those who, in the interest of the employer, effectively recommend
January 1997 of the National Labor Relations Commission in NLRC
such managerial actions if the exercise of such authority is not merely
NCR CC No. L-000028-93 is REINSTATED.
routinary or clerical in nature but requires the use of independent

judgment.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 108855. February 28, 1996] METROLAB INDUSTRIES,
INC., petitioner, vs. HONORABLE MA. NIEVES ROLDAN-CONFESOR,
in her capacity as Secretary of the Department of Labor and
Employment and METRO DRUG CORPORATION EMPLOYEES
ASSOCIATION-FEDERATION OF FREE WORKERS, respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; FINDINGS OF FACT OF
ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES; RULE; CASE AT BAR. - We
reaffirm the doctrine that considering their expertise in their
respective fields, factual findings of administrative agencies
supported by substantial evidence are accorded great respect
and binds this Court. The Secretary of Labor ruled, thus: x x x
Any act committed during the pendency of the dispute that
tends to give rise to further contentious issues or increase the
tensions between the parties should be considered an act of
exacerbation. One must look at the act itself, not on speculative
reactions. A misplaced recourse is not needed to prove that a
dispute has been exacerbated. For instance, the Union could
not be expected to file another notice of strike. For this would
depart from its theory of the case that the layoff is subsumed
under the instant dispute, for which a notice of strike had
already been filed. On the other hand, to expect violent
reactions, unruly behavior, and any other chaotic or drastic
action from the Union is to expect it to commit acts disruptive
of public order or acts that may be illegal. Under a regime of
laws, legal remedies take the place of violent ones. x xx Protest
against the subject layoffs need not be in the form of violent
action or any other drastic measure. In the instant case the
Union registered their dissent by swiftly filing a motion for a
cease and desist order. Contrary to petitioners allegations, the
Union strongly condemned the layoffs and threatened mass
action if the Secretary of Labor fails to timely intervene: x x x 3.
This unilateral action of management is a blatant violation of
the injunction of this Office against committing acts which
would exacerbate the dispute. Unless such act is enjoined the
Union will be compelled to resort to its legal right to mass
actions and concerted activities to protest and stop the said
management action. This mass layoff is clearly one which would
result in a very serious dispute unless this Office swiftly
intervenes. x x x Metrolab and the Union were still in the
process of resolving their CBA deadlock when petitioner
implemented the subject layoffs. As a result, motions and
oppositions were filed diverting the parties attention, delaying
resolution of the bargaining deadlock and postponing the
signing of their new CBA, thereby aggravating the whole
conflict.
2. LABOR AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION; TERMINATION OF
EMPLOYMENT; EXERCISE OF MANAGEMENT PREROGATIVES;
NOT ABSOLUTE; SUBJECT TO EXCEPTIONS IMPOSED BY LAW.
- This Court recognizes the exercise of management
prerogatives and often declines to interfere with the legitimate
business decisions of the employer. However, this privilege is
not absolute but subject to limitations imposed by law. In PAL
vs. NLRC, (225 SCRA 301 [1993]), we issued this reminder: ... the
exercise of management prerogatives was never considered
boundless. Thus, in Cruz vs. Medina (177 SCRA 565 [1989]), it
was held that managements prerogatives must be without
abuse of discretion ...All this points to the conclusion that the
exercise of managerial prerogatives is not unlimited. It is
circumscribed by limi(ations found in law, a collective
bargaining agreement, or the general principles of fair play and
justice (University of Sto. Tomas v. NLRC, 190 SCRA 758 [1990]).
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR AN EXCEPTION. - The case at
bench constitutes one of the exceptions. The Secretary of Labor
is expressly given the power under the Labor Code to assume
jurisdiction and resolve labor disputes involving industries
indispensable to national interest. The disputed injunction is
subsumed under this special grant of authority. Art. 263 (g) of
the Labor Code specifically provides that: x x x (g) When, in his
opinion, there exists a labor dispute causing or likely to cause a
strike or lockout in an industry indispensable to the national
interest, the Secretary of Labor and Employment may assume
jurisdiction over the dispute and decide it or certify the same to
the Commission for compulsory arbitration. Such assumption or
certification shall have the effect of automatically enjoining the
intended or impending strike or lockout as specified in the
assumption or certification order. If one has already taken place
at the time of assumption or certification, all striking or locked
out employees shall immediately return to work and the
employer shall immediately resume operations and readmit all
workers under the same terms and conditions prevailing before
the strike or lockout. The Secretary of Labor and Employment
or the Commission may seek the assistance of law enforcement
agencies to ensure compliance with this provision as well as
with such orders as he may issue to enforce the same. . . . That
Metrolabs business is of national interest is not disputed.
Metrolab is one of the leading manufacturers and suppliers of
medical and pharmaceutical products to the country. Metrolabs
management prerogatives, therefore, are not being unjustly
curtailed but duly balanced with and tempered by the
limitations set by law, taking into account its special character
and the particular circumstances in the case at bench.
4. ID.; LABOR RELATIONS; INELIGIBILITY OF MANAGERIAL
EMPLOYEES TO JOIN, FORM AND ASSIST ANY LABOR
ORGANIZATION; PROHIBITION EXTENDED TO CONFIDENTIAL
EMPLOYEES. - Although Article 245 of the Labor Code limits the
ineligibility to join, form and assist any labor organization to
managerial employees, jurisprudence has extended this
prohibition to confidential employees or those who by reason
of their positions or nature of work are required to assist or act
in a fiduciary manner to managerial employees and hence, are
likewise privy to sensitive and highly confidential records.
5. ID.; ID.; EXCLUSION OF CONFIDENTIAL EMPLOYEES FROM THE
RANK AND FILE BARGAINING UNIT; NOT TANTAMOUNT TO
DISCRIMINATION. - Confidential employees cannot be
classified as rank and file. As previously discussed, the nature of
employment of confidential employees is quite distinct from
the rank and file, thus, warranting a separate
category.Excluding confidential employees from the rank and
file bargaining unit, therefore, is not tantamount to
discrimination.
APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL
Bautista Picazo Buyco Tan & Fider for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for public respondent.
Perfecto V. Fernandez, Jose P. Fernandez & Cristobal P.
Fernandez for Metro Drug Corporation.
DECISION
KAPUNAN, J.:
 This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised
Rules of Court seeking the annulment of the Resolution and Omnibus
Resolution of the Secretary of Labor and Employment dated 14 April
1992 and 25 January 1993, respectively, in OS-AJ-04491-11 (NCMB-
NCR-NS-08-595-9 1; NCMB-NCR-NS-09-678-91) on grounds that these
were issued with grave abuse of discretion and in excess of
jurisdiction.
Private respondent Metro Drug Corporation Employees
Association-Federation of Free Workers (hereinafter referred to as
the Union) is a labor organization representing the rank and file
employees of petitioner Metrolab Industries, Inc. (hereinafter
referred to as Metrolab/MII) and also of Metro Drug, Inc.
On 31 December 1990, the Collective Bargaining Agreement
(CBA) between Metrolab and the Union expired. The negotiations for
a new CBA, however, ended in a deadlock.
Consequently, on 23 August 1991, the Union filed a notice of
strike against Metrolab and Metro Drug Inc. The parties failed to
settle their dispute despite the conciliation efforts of the National
Conciliation and Mediation Board.
To contain the escalating dispute, the then Secretary of Labor
and Employment, Ruben D. Torres, issued an assumption order dated
20 September 1991, the dispositive portion of which reads, thus:
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, and pursuant to Article 263
(g) of the Labor Code, as amended, this Office hereby assumes
jurisdiction over the entire labor dispute at Metro Drug, Inc. - Metro
Drug Distribution Division and Metrolab Industries Inc.
Accordingly, any strike or lockout is hereby strictly enjoined. The
Companies and the Metro Drug Corp. Employees Association - FFW
are likewise directed to cease and desist from committing any and all
acts that might exacerbate the situation.
Finally, the parties are directed to submit their position papers and
evidence on the aforequoted deadlocked issues to this office within
twenty (20) days from receipt hereof.
SO ORDERED.[1] (Italics ours.)
On 27 December 1991, then Labor Secretary Torres issued an
order resolving all the disputed items in the CBA and ordered the
parties involved to execute a new CBA.
Thereafter, the Union filed a motion for reconsideration.
On 27 January 1992, during the pendency of the
abovementioned motion for reconsideration, Metrolab laid off 94 of
its rank and file employees.
On the same date, the Union filed a motion for a cease and
desist order to enjoin Metrolab from implementing the mass layoff,
alleging that such act violated the prohibition against committing acts
that would exacerbate the dispute as specifically directed in the
assumption order.[2]
On the other hand, Metrolab contended that the layoff was
temporary and in the exercise of its management prerogative. It
maintained that the company would suffer a yearly gross revenue loss
of approximately sixty-six (66) million pesos due to the withdrawal of
its principals in the Toll and Contract Manufacturing
Department. Metrolab further asserted that with the automation of
the manufacture of its product Eskinol, the number of workers
required its production is significantly reduced.[3]
Thereafter, on various dates, Metrolab recalled some of the laid
off workers on a temporary basis due to availability of work in the
production lines.
On 14 April 1992, Acting Labor Secretary Nieves Confesor issued
a resolution declaring the layoff of Metrolabs 94 rank and file workers
illegal and ordered their reinstatement with full backwages. The
dispositive portion reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Unions motion for reconsideration is granted in
part, and our order of 28 December 1991 is affirmed subject to the
modifications in allowances and in the close shop provision. The
layoff of the 94 employees at MII is hereby declared illegal for the
failure of the latter to comply with our injunction against committing
any act which may exacerbate the dispute and with the 30-day
notice requirement.Accordingly, MII is hereby ordered to reinstate
the 94 employees, except those who have already been recalled, to
their former positions or substantially equivalent, positions with full
backwages from the date they were illegally laid off on 27 January
1992 until actually reinstated without loss of seniority rights and
other benefits. Issues relative to the CBA agreed upon by the parties
and not embodied in our earlier order are hereby ordered adopted
for incorporation in the CBA. Further, the dispositions and directives
contained in all previous orders and resolutions relative to the
instant dispute, insofar as not inconsistent herein, are reiterated.
Finally, the parties are enjoined to cease and desist from committing
any act which may tend to circumvent this resolution.
SO RESOLVED.[4]
On 6 March 1992, Metrolab filed a Partial Motion for
Reconsideration alleging that the layoff did not aggravate the dispute
since no untoward incident occurred as a result thereof. It, likewise,
filed a motion for clarification regarding the constitution of the
bargaining unit covered by the CBA.
On 29 June 1992, after exhaustive negotiations, the parties
entered into a new CBA. The execution, however, was without
prejudice to the outcome of the issues raised in the reconsideration
and clarification motions submitted for decision to the Secretary of
Labor.[5]
Pending the resolution of the aforestated motions, on 2
October 1992, Metrolab laid off 73 of its employees on grounds of
redundancy due to lack of work which the Union again promptly
opposed on 5 October 1992.
On 15 October 1992, Labor Secretary Confesor again issued a
cease and desist order. Metrolab moved for a reconsideration.[6]
On 25 January 1993, Labor Secretary Confesor issued the
assailed Omnibus Resolution containing the following orders:
xxx xxx xxx.
1. MIIs motion for partial reconsideration of our 14 April 1992
resolution specifically that portion thereof assailing our ruling that
the layoff of the 94 employees is illegal, is hereby denied. MII is
hereby ordered to pay such employees their full backwages
computed from the time of actual layoff to the time of actual recall;
2. For the parties to incorporate in their respective collective
bargaining agreements the clarifications herein contained; and
3. MIIs motion for reconsideration with respect to the consequences
of the second wave of layoff affecting 73 employees, to the extent of
assailing our ruling that such layoff tended to exacerbate the
dispute, is hereby denied. But inasmuch as the legality of the layoff
was not submitted for our resolution and no evidence had been
adduced upon which a categorical finding thereon can be based, the
same is hereby referred to the NLRC for its appropriate action.
Finally, all prohibitory injunctions issued as a result of our
assumption of jurisdiction over this dispute are hereby lifted.
SO RESOLVED.[7]
Labor Secretary Confesor also ruled that executive secretaries
are excluded from the closed-shop provision of the CBA, not from the
bargaining unit.
On 4 February 1993, the Union filed a motion for execution.
Metrolab opposed. Hence, the present petition for certiorari with
application for issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order.
On 4 March 1993, we issued a Temporary Restraining Order
enjoining the Secretary of Labor from enforcing and implementing the
assailed Resolution and Omnibus Resolution dated 14 April 1992 and
25 January 1993, respectively.
In its petition, Metrolab assigns the following errors:
A assume jurisdiction over the dispute and decide it or certify the
THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT HON. SECRETARY OF LABOR AND
EMPLOYMENT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AND
EXCEEDED HER JURISDICTION IN DECLARING THE TEMPORARY
LAYOFF ILLEGAL AND ORDERING THE REINSTATEMENT AND
PAYMENT OF BACKWAGES TO THE AFFECTED EMPLOYEES.*
B
THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT HON. SECRETARY OF LABOR AND
EMPLOYMENT GRAVELY ABUSED HER DISCRETION IN INCLUDING
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIES AS PART OF THE BARGAINING UNIT OF
RANK AND FILE EMPLOYEES.[8]
Anent the first issue, we are asked to determine whether or not
public respondent Labor Secretary committed grave abuse of
discretion and exceeded her jurisdiction in declaring the subject
layoffs instituted by Metrolab illegal on grounds that these unilateral
actions aggravated the conflict between Metrolab and the Union who
were, then, locked in a stalemate in CBA negotiations.
Metrolab argues that the Labor Secretarys order enjoining the
parties from committing any act that might exacerbate the dispute is
overly broad, sweeping and vague and should not be used to curtail
the employers right to manage his business and ensure its viability.
We cannot give credence to Metrolabs contention.
This Court recognizes the exercise of management prerogatives
and often declines to interfere with the legitimate business decisions
of the employer. However, this privilege is not absolute but subject to
limitations imposed by law.[9]
In PAL v. NLRC,[10] we issued this reminder:
xxx xxx xxx
. . .the exercise of management prerogatives was never considered
boundless. Thus, in Cruz vs. Medina ( 177 SCRA 565 [1989]), it was
held that managements prerogatives must be without abuse of
discretion....
xxx xxx xxx
All this points to the conclusion that the exercise of managerial
prerogatives is not unlimited. It is circumscribed by limitations found
in law, a collective bargaining agreement, or the general principles of
fair play and justice (University of Sto. Tomas v. NLRC, 190 SCRA 758
[1990]). . . . (Italics ours.)
xxx xxx xxx.
The case at bench constitutes one of the exceptions. The
Secretary of Labor is expressly given the power under the Labor Code
to assume jurisdiction and resolve labor disputes involving industries
indispensable to national interest. The disputed injunction is
subsumed under this special grant of authority. Art. 263 (g) of the
Labor Code specifically provides that:
xxx xxx xxx
(g) When, in his opinion, there exists a labor dispute causing or likely
to cause a strike or lockout in an industry indispensable to the
national interest, the Secretary of Labor and Employment may
same to the Commission for compulsory arbitration. Such
assumption or certification shall have the effect of automatically
enjoining the intended or impending strike or lockout as specified in
the assumption or certification order. If one has already taken place
at the time of assumption or certification, all striking or locked out
employees shall immediately return to work and the employer shall
immediately resume operations and readmit all workers under the
same terms and conditions prevailing before the strike or
lockout. The Secretary of Labor and Employment or the Commission
may seek the assistance of law enforcement agencies to ensure
compliance with this provision as well as with such orders as he may
issue to enforce the same. . . (Italics ours.)
xxx xxx xxx.
That Metrolabs business is of national interest is not
disputed. Metrolab is one of the leading manufacturers and suppliers
of medical and pharmaceutical products to the country.
Metro labs management prerogatives, therefore, are not being
unjustly curtailed but duly balanced with and tempered by the
limitations set by law, taking into account its special character and the
particular circumstances in the case at bench.
As aptly declared by public respondent Secretary of Labor in its
assailed resolution:
xxx xxx xxx.
MII is right to the extent that as a rule, we may not interfere with
the legitimate exercise of management prerogatives such as
layoffs. But it may nevertheless be appropriate to mention here that
one of the substantive evils which Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code
seeks to curb is the exacerbation of a labor dispute to the further
detriment of the national interest. When a labor dispute has in fact
occurred and a general injunction has been issued restraining the
commission of disruptive acts, management prerogatives must
always be exercised consistently with the statutory objective.[11]
xxx xxx xxx.
Metrolab insists that the subject layoffs did not exacerbate their
dispute with the Union since no untoward incident occurred after the
layoffs were implemented. There were no work disruptions or
stoppages and no mass actions were threatened or
undertaken. Instead, petitioner asserts, the affected employees
calmly accepted their fate as this was a matter which they had been
previously advised would be inevitable.[12]
After a judicious review of the record, we find no compelling
reason to overturn the findings of the Secretary of Labor.
We reaffirm the doctrine that considering their expertise in
their respective fields, factual findings of administrative agencies
supported by substantial evidence are accorded great respect and
binds this Court.[13]
The Secretary of Labor ruled, thus:
xxx xxx xxx.
Any act committed during the pendency of the dispute that tends to
give rise to further contentious issues or increase the tensions
between the parties should be considered an act of
exacerbation. One must look at the act itself, not on speculative
reactions. A misplaced recourse is not needed to prove that a
dispute has been exacerbated. For instance, the Union could not be
expected to file another notice of strike. For this would depart from
its theory of the case that the layoff is subsumed under the instant
dispute, for which a notice of strike had already been filed. On the
other hand, to expect violent reactions, unruly behavior, and any
other chaotic or drastic action from the Union is to expect it to
commit acts disruptive of public order or acts that may be
illegal. Under a regime of laws, legal remedies take the place of
violent ones.[14]
xxx xxx xxx.
Protest against the subject layoffs need not be in the form of violent
action or any other drastic measure. In the instant case the Union
registered their dissent by swiftly filing a motion for a cease and
desist order.Contrary to petitioners allegations, the Union strongly
condemned the layoffs and threatened mass action if the Secretary
of Labor fails to timely intervene:
xxx xxx xxx.
3. This unilateral action of management is a blatant violation of the
injunction of this Office against committing acts which would
exacerbate the dispute. Unless such act is enjoined the Union will be
compelled to resort to its legal right to mass actions and concerted
activities to protest and stop the said management action. This mass
layoff is clearly one which would result in a very serious labor
dispute unless this Office swiftly intervenes.[15]
xxx xxx xxx.
Metrolab and the Union were still in the process of resolving
their CBA deadlock when petitioner implemented the subject
layoffs. As a result, motions and oppositions were filed diverting the
parties attention, delaying resolution of the bargaining deadlock and
postponing the signing of their new CBA, thereby aggravating the
whole conflict.
We, likewise, find untenable Metrolabs contention that the
layoff of the 94 rank-and-file employees was temporary, despite the
recall of some of the laid off workers.
If Metrolab intended the layoff of the 94 workers to be
temporary, it should have plainly stated so in the notices it sent to the
affected employees and the Department of Labor and Employment.
Consider the tenor of the pertinent portions of the layoff notice to the
affected employees:
xxx xxx xxx.
Dahil sa mga bagay na ito, napilitan ang ating kumpanya na
magsagawa ng lay-off ng mga empleyado sa Rank & File dahil
nabawasan ang trabaho at puwesto para sa kanila. Marami sa atin
ang kasama sa lay-off dahil wala nang trabaho para sa
kanila. Mahirap tanggapin ang mga bagay na ito subalit kailangan
nating gawin dahil hindi kaya ng kumpanya ang magbayad ng
suweldo kung ang empleyado ay walang trabaho. Kung tayo ay
patuloy na magbabayad ng suweldo, mas hihina ang ating kumpanya
at mas marami ang maaring maapektuhan.
Sa pagpapatupad ng lay-off susundin natin ang LAST IN-FIRST OUT
policy. Ang mga empleyadong may pinakamaikling serbisyo sa
kumpanya ang unang maaapektuhan. Ito ay batay na rin sa nakasaad
sa ating CBA na ang mga huling pumasok sa kumpanya ang unang
masasama sa lay-off kapag nagkaroon ng ganitong mga kalagayan.
Ang mga empleyado na kasama sa lay-off ay nakalista sa sulat na ito.
Ang umpisa ng lay-off ay sa Lunes, Enero 27. Hindi na muna sila
papasok sa kumpanya. Makukuha nila ang suweldo nila sa Enero 30,
1992.
Hindi po natin matitiyak kung gaano katagal ang lay-off ngunit ang
aming tingin ay matatagalan bago magkaroon ng dagdag na
trabaho. Dahil dito, sinimulan na namin ang isang Redundancy
Program sa mga supervisors. Nabawasan ang mga puwesto para sa
kanila, kaya sila ay mawawalan ng trabaho at bibigyan na ng
redundancy pay.[16] (Italics ours.)
xxx xxx xxx.
We agree with the ruling of the Secretary of Labor, thus:
xxx xxx xxx.
. . .MII insists that the layoff in question is temporary not
permanent. It then cites International Hardware, Inc. vs. NLRC, 176
SCRA 256, in which the Supreme Court held that the 30-day notice
required under Article 283 of the Labor Code need not be complied
with if the employer has no intention to permanently severe (sic) the
employment relationship.
We are not convinced by this argument. International
Hardware involves a case where there had been a reduction of
workload. Precisely to avoid laying off the employees, the employer
therein opted to give them work on a rotating basis. Though on a
limited scale, work was available. This was the Supreme Courts basis
for holding that there was no intention to permanently severe (sic)
the employment relationship.
Here, there is no circumstance at all from which we can infer an
intention from MII not to sever the employment relationship
permanently. If there was such an intention, MII could have made it
very clear in the notices of layoff. But as it were, the notices are
couched in a language so uncertain that the only conclusion possible
is the permanent termination, not the continuation, of the
employment relationship.
MII also seeks to excuse itself from compliance with the 30-day
notice with a tautology. While insisting that there is really no best
time to announce a bad news, (sic) it also claims that it broke the
bad news only on 27 January 1992 because had it complied with the
30-day notice, it could have broken the bad news on 02 January
1992, the first working day of the year. If there is really no best time
to announce a bad news (sic), it wouldnt have mattered if the same
was announced at the first working day of the year. That way, MII
could have at least complied with the requirement of the law.[17]
The second issue raised by petitioner merits our consideration.
In the assailed Omnibus Resolution, Labor Secretary Confesor
clarified the CBA provisions on closed-shop and the scope of the
bargaining unit in this wise:
xxx xxx xxx.
Appropriateness of the bargaining unit.
xxx xxx xxx.
Exclusions. In our 14 April 1992 resolution, we ruled on the issue
of exclusion as follows:
These aside, we reconsider our denial of the modifications which the
Union proposes to introduce on the close shop provision. While we
note that the provision as presently worded has served the
relationship of the parties well under previous CBAs, the shift in
constitutional policy toward expanding the right of all workers to
self-organization should now be formally recognized by the parties,
subject to the following exclusions only:
1. Managerial employees; and
2. The executive secretaries of the President, Executive Vice-
President, Vice-President, Vice President for Sales, Personnel
Manager, and Director for Corporate Planning who may have access
to vital labor relations information or who may otherwise act in a
confidential capacity to persons who determine or formulate
management policies.
The provisions of Article I (b) and Attachment I of the 1988-1990
CBA shall thus be modified consistently with the foregoing.
Article I (b) of the 1988-1990 CBA provides:
b)Close Shop. - All Qualified Employees must join the Association
immediately upon regularization as a condition for continued
employment. This provision shall not apply to: (i) managerial
employees who are excluded from the scope of the bargaining unit;
(ii) the auditors and executive secretaries of senior executive
officers, such as, the President, Executive Vice-President, Vice-
President for Finance, Head of Legal, Vice-President for Sales, who
are excluded from membership in the Association; and (iii) those
employees who are referred to in Attachment I hereof, subject,
however, to the application of the provision of Article II, par. (b)
hereof. Consequently, the above-specified employees are not
required to join the Association as a condition for their continued
employment.
On the other hand, Attachment I provides:
Exclusion from the Scope of the Close Shop Provision
The following positions in the Bargaining Unit are not covered
by the Close Shop provision of the CBA (Article I, par. b):
1. Executive Secretaries of Vice-Presidents, or equivalent positions.
2. Executive Secretary of the Personnel Manager, or equivalent
positions.
3. Executive Secretary of the Director for Corporate Planning, or
equivalent positions.
4. Some personnel in the Personnel Department, EDP Staff at Head
Office, Payroll Staff at Head Office, Accounting Department at Head
Office, and Budget Staff, who because of the nature of their duties
and responsibilities need not join the Association as a condition for
their employment.
5. Newly-hired secretaries of Branch Managers and Regional
Managers.
Both MDD and MII read the exclusion of managerial employees
and executive secretaries in our 14 April 1992 resolution as exclusion
from the bargaining unit. They point out that managerial employees
are lumped under one classification with executive secretaries, so
that since the former are excluded from the bargaining unit, so must
the latter be likewise excluded.
This reading is obviously contrary to the intent of our 14 April
1992 resolution. By recognizing the expanded scope of the right to
self-organization, our intent was to delimit the types of employees
excluded from the close shop provision, not from the bargaining unit,
to executive secretaries only. Otherwise, the conversion of the
exclusionary provision to one that refers to the bargaining unit from
one that merely refers to the close shop provision would effectively
curtail all the organizational rights of executive secretaries.
The exclusion of managerial employees, in accordance with law,
must therefore still carry the qualifying phrase from the bargaining
unit in Article I (b)(i) of the 1988-1990 CBA. In the same manner, the
exclusion of executive secretaries should be read together with the
qualifying phrase are excluded from membership in the Association
of the same Article and with the heading of Attachment I. The latter
refers to Exclusions from Scope of Close Shop Provision and provides
that [t]he following positions in Bargaining Unit are not covered by
the close shop provision of the CBA.
The issue of exclusion has different dimension in the case of MII.
In an earlier motion for clarification, MII points out that it has done
away with the positions of Executive Vice-President, Vice-President
for Sales, and Director for Corporate Planning. Thus, the foregoing
group of exclusions is no longer appropriate in its present
organizational structure. Nevertheless, there remain MII officer
positions for which there may be executive secretaries. These include
the General Manager and members of the Management Committee,
specifically i) the Quality Assurance Manager; ii) the Product
Development Manager; iii) the Finance Director; iv) the Management
System Manager; v) the Human Resources Manager; vi) the
Marketing Director; vii) the Engineering Manager; viii) the Materials
Manager; and ix) the Production Manager.
xxx xxx xxx
The basis for the questioned exclusions, it should be noted, is
no other than the previous CBA between MII and the Union. If MII had
undergone an organizational restructuring since then, this is a fact to
which we have never been made privy. In any event, had this been
otherwise the result would have been the same. To repeat, we limited
the exclusions to recognize the expanded scope of the right to self-
organization as embodied in the Constitution.[18]
Metrolab, however, maintains that executive secretaries of the
General Manager and the executive secretaries of the Quality
Assurance Manager, Product Development Manager, Finance
Director, Management System Manager, Human Resources Manager,
Marketing Director, Engineering Manager, Materials Manager and
Production Manager, who are all members of the companys
Management Committee should not only be exempted from the
closed-shop provision but should be excluded from membership in
the bargaining unit of the rank and file employees as well on grounds
that their executive secretaries are confidential employees, having
access to vital labor information.[19]
We concur with Metrolab.
Although Article 245 of the Labor Code[20] limits the ineligibility
to join, form and assist any labor organization to managerial
employees, jurisprudence has extended this prohibition to
confidential employees or those who by reason of their positions or
nature of work are required to assist or act in a fiduciary manner to
managerial employees and hence, are likewise privy to sensitive and
highly confidential records.
The rationale behind the exclusion of confidential employees
from the bargaining unit of the rank and file employees and their
disqualification to join any labor organization was succinctly discussed
in Philips Industrial Development v. NLRC:[21]
xxx xxx xxx.
On the main issue raised before Us, it is quite obvious that
respondent NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in reversing
the decision of the Executive Labor Arbiter and in decreeing that
PIDIs Service Engineers, Sales Force, division secretaries, all Staff of
General Management, Personnel and Industrial Relations
Department, Secretaries of Audit, EDP and Financial Systems are
included within the rank and file bargaining unit.
In the first place, all these employees, with the exception of the
service engineers and the sales force personnel, are confidential
employees. Their classification as such is not seriously disputed by
PEO-FFW; the five (5) previous CBAs between PIDI and PEO-FFW
explicitly considered them as confidential employees. By the very
nature of their functions, they assist and act in a confidential
capacity to, or have access to confidential matters of, persons who
exercise managerial functions in the field of labor relations. As such,
the rationale behind the ineligibility of managerial employees to
form, assist or join a labor union equally applies to them.
In Bulletin Publishing Co., Inc. vs. Hon. Augusto Sanchez, this
Court elaborated on this rationale, thus:
x x x The rationale for this inhibition has been stated to be, because
if these managerial employees would belong to or be affiliated with
a Union, the latter might not be assured of their loyalty to the Union
in view of evident conflict of interests. The Union can also become
company-dominated with the presence of managerial employees in
Union membership.
In Golden Farms, Inc. vs. Ferrer-Calleja, this Court explicitly
made this rationale applicable to confidential employees:
This rationale holds true also for confidential employees such as
accounting personnel, radio and telegraph operators, who having
access to confidential information, may become the source of undue
advantage.Said employee(s) may act as a spy or spies of either party
to a collective bargaining agreement. This is specially true in the
present case where the petitioning Union is already the bargaining
agent of the rank-and-file employees in the establishment. To allow
the confidential employees to join the existing Union of the rank-
and-file would be in violation of the terms of the Collective
Bargaining Agreement wherein this kind of employees by the nature
of their functions/positions are expressly excluded.
xxx xxx xxx.
Similarly, in National Association of Trade Union - Republic
Planters Bank Supervisors Chapter v. Torres[22] we declared:
xxx xxx xxx.
. . . As regards the other claim of respondent Bank that Branch
Managers/OICs, Cashiers and Controllers are confidential
employees, having control, custody and/ or access to confidential
matters, e.g., the branchs cash position, statements of financial
condition, vault combination, cash codes for telegraphic transfers,
demand drafts and other negotiable instruments, pursuant to Sec.
1166.4 of the Central Bank Manual regarding joint custody, this
claim is not even disputed by petitioner. A confidential employee is
one entrusted with confidence on delicate matters, or with the
custody, handling, or care and protection of the employers
property. While Art. 245 of the Labor Code singles out managerial
employees as ineligible to join, assist or form any labor organization,
under the doctrine of necessary, implication, confidential employees
are similarly disqualified. . . .
xxx xxx xxx.
. . .(I)n the collective bargaining process, managerial employees are
supposed to be on the side of the employer, to act as its
representatives, and to see to it that its interest are well
protected. The employer is not assured of such protection if these
employees themselves are union members. Collective bargaining in
such a situation can become one-sided. It is the same reason that
impelled this Court to consider the position of confidential
employees as included in the disqualification found in Art. 245 as if
the disqualification of confidential employees were written in the
provision. If confidential employees could unionize in order to
bargain for advantages for themselves, then they could be governed
by their own motives rather than the interest of the
employers. Moreover, unionization of confidential employees for
the purpose of collective bargaining would mean the extension of
the law to persons or individuals who are supposed to act in the
interest of the employers. It is not farfetched that in the course of
collective bargaining, they might jeopardize that interest which they
are duty-bound to protect. . . .
xxx xxx xxx.
 And in the latest case of Pier 8 Arrastre & Stevedoring Services,
Inc. vs. Roldan-Confesor,[23] we ruled that:
xxx xxx xxx.
Upon the other hand, legal secretaries are neither managers nor
supervisors. Their work is basically routinary and clerical. However,
they should be differentiated from rank-and-file employees because
they are tasked with, among others, the typing of legal documents,
memoranda and correspondence, the keeping of records and files,
the giving of and receiving notices, and such other duties as required
by the legal personnel of the corporation. Legal secretaries therefore
fall under the category of confidential employees. . . .
xxx xxx xxx.
We thus hold that public respondent acted with grave abuse of
discretion in not excluding the four foremen and legal secretary
from the bargaining unit composed of rank-and-file employees.
xxx xxx xxx.
In the case at bench, the Union does not disagree with petitioner
that the executive secretaries are confidential employees. It
however, makes the following contentions:
xxx xxx xxx.
There would be no danger of company domination of the Union
since the confidential employees would not be members of and
would not participate in the decision making processes of the Union.
Neither would there be a danger of espionage since the confidential
employees would not have any conflict of interest, not being
members of the Union. In any case, there is always the danger that
any employee would leak management secrets to the Union out of
sympathy for his fellow rank and filer even if he were not a member
of the union nor the bargaining unit.
Confidential employees are rank and file employees and they, like all
the other rank and file employees, should be granted the benefits of
the Collective Bargaining Agreement. There is no valid basis for
discriminating against them. The mandate of the Constitution and
the Labor Code, primarily of protection to Labor, compels such
conclusion.[24]
xxx xxx xxx.
The Unions assurances fail to convince. The dangers sought to
be prevented, particularly the threat of conflict of interest and
espionage, are not eliminated by non-membership of Metrolabs
executive secretaries or confidential employees in the
Union. Forming part of the bargaining unit, the executive secretaries
stand to benefit from any agreement executed between the Union
and Metrolab. Such a scenario, thus, gives rise to a potential conflict
between personal interests and their duty as confidential employees
to act for and in behalf of Metrolab. They do not have to be union
members to affect or influence either side.
Finally, confidential employees cannot be classified as rank and
file. As previously discussed, the nature of employment of
confidential employees is quite distinct from the rank and file, thus,
warranting a separate category. Excluding confidential employees
from the rank and file bargaining unit, therefore, is not tantamount
to discrimination.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is partially
GRANTED. The resolutions of public respondent Secretary of Labor
dated 14 April 1992 and 25 January 1993 are hereby MODIFIED to the
extent that executive secretaries of petitioner Metrolabs General
Manager and the executive secretaries of the members of its
Management Committee are excluded from the bargaining unit of
petitioners rank and file employees.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 78755 July 19, 1989
GOLDEN FARMS, INC., petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE DIRECTOR PURA FERRER-CALLEJA, BUREAU OF
LABOR RELATIONS and NATIONAL FEDERATION OF
LABOR, respondents.
J. V. Yap Law Office for petitioner.
Beethoven L. Orcullo for private respondent.
PARAS, J.:
Petitioner Golden Farms, Inc., seeks a reversal of the resolution of
public respondent Department of Labor and Employment Director
Pura Ferrer-Calleja in BLR Case No. A-2-56-87 which affirmed on
appeal the decision of Labor Arbiter Conrado O. Macasa, Sr., in NLRC
Case No. R-418-ROXI-MED-UR-8886, issuing a directive as follows:
In view of the foregoing, the herein petition for
certification election filed by the National
Federation of Labor (NFL) is hereby DISMISSED;
whereas, its resultant and relevant consequence
of its recognized representation of the entire
rank-and-file employees of the bargaining unit
should be given life and meaning, as it is hereby
directed, and Employer Golden Farms,
Incorporated likewise enjoined to negotiate for a
supplementary collective bargaining agreement,
or for the inclusion of the herein monthly paid
rank-and- file employees at Luna, Kapalong,
Davao del Norte, and Lanang, Davao City in the
still existing negotiated contract, whichever the
parties may consider just and appropriate under
the circumstances.
SO ORDERED. (p. 29, Rollo)
The case originated as a Petition for Direct Certification Election or
Recognition filed by herein private respondent in behalf of certain
office employees and foremen before Regional Office No. XI, Davao
City of the Ministry of Labor and Employment. Petitioner herein
opposed said petition on the ground among others that a perusal of
the names allegedly supporting the said petition showed that said
persons by the nature of their jobs are performing managerial
functions and/or occupying confidential positions such that they
cannot validly constitute a separate or distinct group from the
existing collective bargaining unit also represented by private
respondent.
Petitioner is a corporation engaged in the production of bananas for
export. Private respondent Union represents the
employees/workers of petitioner corporation, who were the same
signatories to an earlier Petition for Certification Election filed in
1984 before the Ministry of Labor known as ROXI Case No. UR-70-
84, which was dismissed by a Resolution issued by Med-Arbiter
Conchita Martinez when it was established that a collective
bargaining unit (NFL) between the Corporation and the rank-and-file
employees was and is in existence at the time of the filing of the said
petition for certification election until the present filing. However, in
the order of dismissal, it was stated:
After taking into consideration the functions
exercised by the foremen as contained in their
joint affidavits (Annexes "A-1", "A-2" & "A-3",
Petitioner's Position Paper) apparently, they fall
within the classification of rank-and-file
employees. For, as consistently ruled in a long
line of decisions, mere supervisory designations
in the position titles, do not make the holders of
such positions any less rank and filers, without
the convincing proof that such supervisory
designations are coupled with actual
performance of managerial functions. In the
cases at bar, what was submitted by the
respondent companies are only lists of
employees holding the positions of foremen and
confidential positions and as such are not
covered by the bargaining unit. Such piece of
evidence alone does not constitute convincing
proof for us to adapt respondents' stance
(Annexes "A", "B", "C", & "D"). Comment on
Petition). (p. 13, Rollo)
Having had no opportunity to contest the abovementioned
statement in the order of dismissal, petitioner herein as private
respondent therein, filed a "Manifestation" stating among others:
2. That since the petitions were dismissed the
herein employees make clear for the record that
said view would run counter to the provision of
the pertinent Collective Bargaining Agreement
whereby the foremen were already
acknowledged and agreed upon to be
managerial employees and accordingly excluded
from the coverage of the said CBA;
3. That with respect to those employees holding
confidential positions, it is a basic principle that
they cannot be included in any bargaining unit,
the fact being that having access to confidential
informations, said employees may be the source
of undue advantage. Said employees may act as
spies for either parties to collective bargaining
agreement. This is especially true in this case
where the petitioning union is already the
bargaining agent of the rank-and-file employees
in the establishment. To allow confidential
employees to join existing bargaining unit will
defeat the very purpose for which an employee
holding confidential position was in the first
place excluded. (p. 68, Rollo)
Private respondent herein as petitioner therein appealed the order
of dismissal which was accordingly opposed (Annex "L" p. 69, Rollo)
by Golden Farms, Inc., reiterating the grounds and arguments set
forth in its Manifestation filed earlier. The appeal was dismissed and
subsequently the National Federation of Labor Union refiled the
Petition for Certification in NLRC Case No. R-418- ROX-MED-UR-88-
86 which was also dismissed. Said order of dismissal is now the
subject of this review for containing directives not within the power
of a Med-Arbiter to issue. Petitioner Golden Farms, Inc., now poses
the following questions:
I HAS A MED-ARBITER THE
POWER OR AUTHORITY TO
DIRECT MANAGEMENT TO
ENTER INTO A
SUPPLEMENTAL COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING AGREEMENT
WITH A CONTRACTING
UNION.
II MAY SUPERVISORS,
CASHIERS, FOREMEN, AND
EMPLOYEES HOLDING
CONFIDENTIAL/MANAGERIAL
FUNCTION COMPEL
MANAGEMENT TO ENTER
INTO A COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING AGREEMENT
WITH THEM. (p. 14, Rollo)
The petition merits Our consideration.
Respondents relied heavily on the alleged finding of Med-Arbiter
Martinez that the employees who were signatories to the petition
for certification election and represented by respondent Union are
actually rank-and-file workers not disqualified from entering into a
collective bargaining agreement with management. In said findings
of fact, Med-Arbiter Martinez singled out in her classification as
rank-and-file employees the foremen of Petitioner Corporation
considered from their joint affidavits and for lack of convincing proof
that their supervisory designations are coupled with the actual
performance of managerial functions.
Whether or not such finding is supported by the evidence is beside
the point. Respondents herein do not dispute that the signatories
(listed in Annex "A", page 30, Rollo) to the Petition for certification
election subject of this case, were holding the positions of cashier,
purchasers, personnel officers, foremen and employees having
access to confidential information such as accounting personnel,
radio and telegraph operators and head of various sections. It is also
a fact that respondent Union is the exclusive bargaining Unit of the
rank-and-file employees of petitioner corporation and that an
existing CBA between petitioner corporation and the Union
representing these rank-and-file employees was still enforced at the
time the Union filed a petition for certification election in behalf of
the aforementioned signatories. Under the terms of said CBA (Annex
"E", p. 40, Rollo) it is expressly provided that:
 Section 1. The COMPANY and the UNION hereby
agree that the recognized bargaining unit for
purposes of this agreement shall consist of
regular rank-and-file workers employed by the
COMPANY at the plantation presently situated at
Alejal, Carmen, Davao. Consequently, all
managerial personnel like, superintendents,
supervisor, foremen, administrative, professional
and confidential employees, and those
temporary, casual, contractual, and seasonal
workers are excluded from the bargaining unit
and therefore, not covered by this agreement.
(p. 41, Rollo)
Respondents do not dispute the existence of said collective
bargaining agreement. We must therefore respect this CBA which
was freely and voluntarily entered into as the law between the
parties for the duration of the period agreed upon. Until then no one
can be compelled to accept changes in the terms of the collective
bargaining agreement.
Furthermore, the signatories to the petition for certification election
are the very type of employees by the nature of their positions and
functions which We have decreed as disqualified from bargaining
with management in case of Bulletin Publishing Co. Inc. vs. Hon.
Augusto Sanchez, etc. (144 SCRA 628) reiterating herein the
rationale for such ruling as follows: if these managerial employees
would belong to or be affiliated with a Union, the latter might not be
assured of their loyalty to the Union in view of evident conflict of
interests or that the Union can be company- dominated with the
presence of managerial employees in Union membership. A
managerial employee is defined under Art. 212 (k) of the new Labor
Code as "one who is vested with powers or prerogatives to lay down
and execute management policies and/or to hire, transfer, suspend,
lay-off, recall, discharge, assign or discipline employees, or to
effectively recommend such managerial actions. All employees not
falling within this definitions are considered rank-and-file employees
for purposes of this Book."
This rationale holds true also for confidential employees such as
accounting personnel, radio and telegraph operators, who having
access to confidential information, may become the source of undue
advantage. Said employee(s) may act as a spy or spies of either party
to a collective bargaining agreement. This is specially true in the
present case where the petitioning Union is already the bargaining
agent of the rank-and-file employees in the establishment. To allow
the confidential employees to join the existing Union of the rank-
and-file would be in violation of the terms of the Collective
Bargaining Agreement wherein this kind of employees by the nature
of their functions/positions are expressly excluded.
As to the company foremen, while in the performance of
supervisory functions, they may be the extension or alter ego of the
management. Adversely, the foremen, by their actuation, may
influence the workers under their supervision to engage in slow
down commercial activities or similar activities detrimental to the
policy, interest or business objectives of the company or
corporation, hence they also cannot join.
WHEREFORE, finding the assailed directive of Med-Arbiter Conrado
O. Macasa, Sr. which was affirmed by Director Pura Ferrer-Calleja
reiterating the directive of Med- Arbiter Conchita Martinez "to
negotiate for a supplementary collective bargaining agreement, or
for the inclusion of the herein monthly paid rank-and- file
employees" to be erroneous as it is in complete disregard of the
terms of the collective bargaining agreement, the same is hereby
DECLARED to be without force and effect.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 110854 February 13, 1995
PIER 8 ARRASTRE & STEVEDORING SERVICES, INC., petitioner,
vs.
HON. MA. NIEVES ROLDAN-CONFESOR, in her capacity as Secretary
of Labor and Employment, and GENERAL MARITIME &
STEVEDORES UNION (GMSU), respondents.
PUNO, J.:
Petitioner corporation and private respondent labor union entered
into a three-year Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) with expiry
date on November 27, 1991. During the freedom period the National
Federation of Labor Unions (NAFLU) questioned the majority status
of Private respondent through a petition for certification election.
The election conducted on February 27, 1992 was won by private
respondent. On March 19, 1992, private respondent was certified as
the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of petitioner's rank-and-file
employees.
On June 22, 1992, private respondent's CBA proposals were received
by petitioner. Counter-proposals were made by petitioner.
Negotiations collapsed, and on August 24, 1992, private-respondent
filed a Notice of Strike with the National Conciliation and Mediation
Board (NCMB). The NCMB tried but failed to settle the parties'
controversy.
On September 30, 1992, public respondent Secretary of Labor
assumed jurisdiction over the dispute. She resolved the bargaining
deadlock between the parties through an Order, dated March 4,
1993, which reads, in part:
xxx xxx xxx
A. The non-economic issues
1. Scope/coverage of the CBA. Article I of the
1988 CBA provides:
The Company recognizes the
Union as the sole and
exclusive collective
bargaining representative of
all the stevedores,
dockworkers, gang bosses,
foremen, rank and file
employees working at Pier 8,
North Harbor and its offices
 and said positions are [sic]
listed in ANNEX "A" hereof.
As such representative the
UNION is designated as the
collective bargaining agent
with respect to and
concerning the terms and
conditions of employment
and the interpretations and
implementation of the
provisions and conditions of
this Agreement.
Annex "A" of the CBA is the listing of positions
covered thereby. These are:
1. Foremen;
2. Gang bosses;
3. Winchmen;
4. Signalmen;
5. Stevedores;
6. Dockworkers;
7. Tallymen;
8. Checkers;
9. Forklift and crane
operators;
10. Sweepers;
11. Mechanics;
12. Utilitymen;
13. Carpenters; and
14. Other rank and file
employees;
The company argues in the first instance that
under Article 212(m) in relation to Article 245 of
the Labor Code, supervisors are ineligible for.
membership in a labor organization of rank and
file. Being supervisors, foremen should be
excluded from the bargaining unit.
The Company likewise seeks the exclusion on the
ground of lack of community of interest and
divergence in functions, mode of compensation
and working conditions of the following:
1. Accounting clerk;
2. Audit clerk;
3. Collector;
4. Payroll clerk;
5. Nurse;
6. Chief biller;
7. Biller;
8. Teller/biller;
9. Personnel clerk;
10. Timekeeper;
11. Asst. timekeeper;
12. Legal secretary;
13. Telephone operator;
14. Janitor/Utility; and
15. Clerk
These positions, the Company argues, cannot be
lumped together with the stevedores or
dockworkers who mostly comprise the
bargaining unit. Further, notwithstanding the
check-off provisions of the CBA, the incumbents
in these positions have never paid union dues.
Finally, some of them occupy confidential
positions and therefore ought to be excluded
from the bargaining unit.
The Union generally argues that the Company's
proposed exclusions retrogressive. . . .
We see no compelling justification to order the
modification of Article I of the 1988 CBA as
worded. For by lumping together stevedores and
other rank and file employees, the obvious
intent of the parties was to treat all employees
not disqualified from union membership as
members of one bargaining unit. This is
regardless of working conditions, mode of
compensation, place of work, or other
considerations. In the absence of mutual
agreement of the parties or evidence that the
present compositions of the bargaining unit is
detrimental to the individual and organizational
rights either of the employees or of the
Company, this expressed intent cannot be set
aside.
It may well be that as a consequence of Republic
Act No. 6715, foremen are ineligible to join the
union of the rank and file. But this provision can
be invoked only upon proof that the foremen
sought to be excluded from the bargaining unit
are cloaked with effective recommendatory
powers such as to qualify them under the legal
definitions of supervisors.
xxx xxx xxx
7. Effectivity of the CBA. The Union demands that
the CBA should be fully retroactive to 28
November 1991. The Company is opposed on
the ground that under Article 253-A of the labor
code, the six-month period within which the
parties must come to an agreement so that the
same will be automatically retroactive is long
past.
The Union's demand for full retroactivity, we
note, will result in undue financial burden to the
Company. On the other hand, the Company's
reliance on Article 253-A is misplaced as this
applies only to the renegotiated terms of an
existing CBA. Here, the deadlock arose from
negotiations for a new CBA.
These considered, the CBA shall be effective
from the time we assumed jurisdiction over the
dispute, that is, on 22 September 1992, and shall
remain e effective for five (5) years thereafter. It
shall be understood that except for the
 representation
of a rotation worker, he aspect all other provisions rotation worker, he must have
thereof shall be renegotiated not later than
must havethree
work(3)
foryears
at after its effectivity, consistently worked for 140 days in a
with Article 253-A of the Labor Code.
least 160 days in a year calendar year as a condition
B. The economic issues
for availment for availment.

The comparative positions of the parties are:

Provided, further that in the

UNION
event a rotation worker fails

xxx xxx xxx to complete 140 days work in

a calendar year, he shall still

i) For all covered employees
be entitled to vacation and
and 17 days sick than gang
sick leave with pay, as follows:
gang bosses:
139 - 120 days worked: 90%

119 - 110 days worked: 50%

15 working days vacation and

15 working days sick leave

ii) For Gang bosses:
for those with at least 1 year
Same as the above schedule
of service
except that:

20 working days vacation and

1) the condition that a gang
20 working days sick leave
bosses must have worked for at
for those with more than one
least 120 days in a calendar
year of service up to 5 years
year shall be reduced to 110
of service
days; and

25 working days vacation and

2) where the above number of
25 working days sick leave
days worked is not met, the
for those with more than 5
gang boss shall still be entitled
years of service up to 10
to vacation and sick leave with
years of service
pay, as follows:

109 - 90 days worked: 90%

30 working days vacation and
89 - 75 days worked: 50%
30 working days sick leave

for those with more than 10

xxx xxx xxx
years of service
P1,500.00 to heirs P10,000.00 to heirs of covered

of covered employees employees

Provided that in the case of a
P5,000.00 assistance for death provided that the
gang boss must have
of immediate member of
worked for at least
covered employee's family 115 days in a
calendar year

xxx xxx xxx

12. xxx xxx xxx

Emergency
loan 8. Death aid P3,000.00 to the heirs of each
covered employee
a) amount of P700.00 but 30 days salary
damage payable through
xxx xxx xxx
entitlement to dwelling by payroll deduction in
fire shall twelve
12. Emergency loan 30 days pay, payable
be included monthly installments through payroll deductions of 1/12 of monthly
salary

b) cash bond None The company shall WHEREFORE, the Pier 8 Arrastre and Stevedoring
put up a cash Services and the General Maritime Services
for loss, bond of not less than Union are hereby ordered to execute new
damage P40,000.00 collective bargaining agreement the
incorporating the dispositions herein contained.
or accident for winchmen, crane These shall be in addition to all other existing
and forklift terms, conditions and benefits of employment,
operators. except those specifically deleted herein, which
have previously governed the relations of the
parties. All other disputed items not specifically
touched upon herein are deemed denied,
xxx xxx xxx without prejudice to such other agreements as
the parties may have reached in the meantime.
Balancing the right of the Company to remain The collective bargaining agreement so executed
viable and to just returns to its investments with shall be effective from 22 September 1992 and
right of the Union members to just rewards for up to five years thereafter, subject to
their labors, we find the following award to be renegotiation on the third year of its effectivity
fair and reasonable: pursuant to Article 253-A of the Labor Code.1

xxx xxx xxx Petitioner sought partial reconsideration of the Order. On June 8,
1993, public respondent affirmed her findings, except for the date of
effectivity of the Collective Bargaining Agreement which was
6.Vacation and Sick changed to September 30, 1992. This is the date when she assumed
Leave jurisdiction over the deadlock.
a) Non-rotation workers 17 days vacation/17
days sick leave Petitioner now assails the Order as follows:
for those with at
least 1 year of service I

THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF LABOR

b) Rotation workers 17 days vacation/17 COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN
other days sick leave, NOT EXCLUDING CERTAIN POSITIONS FROM THE
than gang boss provided that the BARGAINING AGREEMENT UNIT
covered worker
must have worked II
for at least 155 days
in a calendar year THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF LABOR
COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN
MAKING THE CBA EFFECTIVE ON SEPTEMBER 30,
1992 WHEN SHE ASSUMED JURISDICTION OVER
c) Gang bosses 17 days vacation/17 THE LABOR DISPUTE AND NOT MARCH 4, 1993
days sick leave,
 WHEN SHE RENDERED JUDGMENT OVER THE
DISPUTE
III
THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF LABOR
COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN
REDUCING THE NUMBER OF DAYS AN EMPLOYEE
SHOULD ACTUALLY WORK TO BE ENTITLED TO
VACATION AND SICK LEAVE BENEFITS
IV
THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF LABOR
COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN
INCREASING WITHOUT FACTUAL BASIS THE
DEATH AID AND EMERGENCY LOAN 2
The petition is partially meritorious.
Firstly, petitioner questions public respondent for not excluding four
(4) foremen, a legal secretary, a timekeeper and an assistant
timekeeper from the bargaining unit composed of rank-and-file
employees represented by private respondent. Petitioner argues
that: (1) the failure of private respondent to object when the
foremen and legal secretary were prohibited from voting in the
certification election constitutes an admission that such employees
holdsupervisory/confidential positions; and (2) the primary duty and
responsibility of the timekeeper and assistant timekeeper is "to
enforce company rules and regulations by reporting to petitioner . . .
those workers who committed infractions, such as those caught
abandoning their posts." and hence, they should not be considered
as rank-and-file employees.
The applicable law governing the proper composition of bargaining
unit is Article 245 of the labor Code, as amended, which provides as
follows:
Art. 245. Ineligibility of managerial employees to
join any labor organization; employees to join
any labor organization; right of supervisory
employees. — Managerial employees are not
eligible to join, assist or form any labor
organization. Supervisory employees shall not be
eligible for membership in a labor organization
of the rank-and-file employees but may join,
assist or form separate labor organizations of
their own.
Article 212(m) of the same Code, as well as Book V, Rule 1, Section
1(o) of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code, as
amended by the Rules and Regulations Implementing R.A.. 6715,
differentiate managerial, supervisory, and rank-and-file employees,
thus:
"Managerial Employee" is one who is vested
with powers or prerogatives to lay down and
execute management policies and/or to hire,
transfer, suspend, layoff recall, discharge, assign
or discipline employees. Supervisory employees
are those who, in the interest of the employer,
effectively recommend such managerial actions
if the exercise of such authority is not merely
routinary or clerical in nature but requires the
use of independent judgment. All employees not
falling within any of the above definitions are
considered rank-and-file employees for purposes
of the Book.
This Court has ruled on numerous occasions that the test of
supervisory or managerial status is whether an employee possesses
authority to act in the interest of his employer which authority is not
merely routinary or clerical in nature but requires use of
independent judgment. 3 What governs the determination of the
nature of employment is not the employee's title, but his job
description. If the nature of the employee's job does not fall under
the definition of "managerial" or "supervisory" in the Labor Code, he
is eligible to be a member of the rank-and-file bargaining unit. 4
Foremen are chief and often especially-trained workmen who work
with and commonly are in charge of a group of employees in an
industrial plant or in construction work. 5 They are the persons
designated by the employer-management to direct the work of
employees and to superintend and oversee them. 6 They
are representatives of the employer-management with authority
over particular groups of workers, processes, operations, or sections
of a plant or an entire organization. In the modern industrial plant,
they are at once a link in the chain of command and the bridge
between the management and labor. 7 In the performance their
work, foremen definitely use their independent judgment and are
empowered to make recommendations for managerial action with
respect to those employees under their control. Foremen fall
squarely under the category of supervisory employees, and cannot
be part of rank-and-file unions.
Upon the other hand, legal secretaries are neither managers nor
supervisors. Their work is basically routinary and clerical. However,
they should be differentiated from rank-and-file employees because
they, are tasked with, among others, the typing of legal documents,
memoranda and correspondence, the keeping of records and files,
the giving of and receiving notices and such other duties as required
by the legal personnel of the corporation. 8 Legal secretaries
therefore fall under the category of confidential employees. Thus, to
them applies our holding in the case of Philips Industrial
Development, Inv., v. NLRC, 210 SCRA 339 (1992), that:
. . . By the very functions, they assist confidential
capacity to, or have access to confidential.
matters of, persons to, exercise managerial
functions in the field of labor relations. As such,
the rationale behind the ineligibility of
managerial employees to form, assist or join a
labor union equally applies to them.
In Bulletin Publishing Co., Inc., vs. Hon. Augusto
Sanchez, this Court elaborated on this rationale,
thus:
. . . The rationale, for this
inhibition has been stated to
be, because if these
managerial employees would
belong to or be affiliated
with Union the latter might
not, be assured of their
 loyalty to the Union in view
of evident conflict of
interests. The Union can also
become company-dominated
with the presence of
managerial employees in
Union membership.
In Golden Farms, Inc., vs. Ferrer-Calleja, 9 this
court explicitly made this rationale applicable to
confidential employees:
This rationale holds true also
for confidential employees . .
., who having access to
confidential information,
may become the source of
undue advantage. Said
employee(s) may act as a spy
or spies of either party to a
collective bargaining
agreement. . . .
We thus hold that public respondent acted with grave abuse of
discretion in not excluding the four foremen and legal secretary
from the bargaining unit composed of rank-and-file employees.
As for the timekeeper and assistant timekeeper it is clear from
petitioner's own pleadings that they are, neither managerial nor
supervisory employees. They are merely tasked to report those who
commit infractions against company rules and regulations. This
reportorial function is routinary and clerical. They do not determine
the fate of those who violate company policy rules and regulations
function. It follows that they cannot be excluded from the subject
bargaining unit.
The next issue is the date when the new CBA of the parties should
be given effect. Public respondent fixed the effectivity date on
September 30, 1992. when she assumed jurisdiction over the
dispute. Petitioner maintains it should be March 4. 1993, when
public respondent rendered judgment over the dispute.
The applicable laws are Articles 253 and 253- A of the Labor Code,
thus:
Art. 253. Duty to bargain collectively when there
exists a collective bargaining agreement. —
When there is a collective bargaining agreement,
the duty to bargain collectively shall also mean
that neither party shall terminate nor modify
such agreement during its lifetime. However,
either party can serve a written notice to
terminate or modify the agreement at least sixty
(60) days prior to its expiration date. It shall be
the duty of both parties to keep the status
quo and to continue in full force and effect the
terms and conditions of the existing agreement
during the 60-day period and/or until a new
agreement is reached by the parties.
and;
Art. 253-A. Terms of a collective bargaining
agreement. — Any Collective Bargaining
Agreement that the parties may enter into shall,
insofar as the representation aspect is
concerned, be for a term of five (5) years. No
petition questioning the majority status of the
incumbent bargaining agent shall be entertained
and no certification election shall be conducted
by the Department of Labor and Employment
outside the sixty-day period immediately before
the date of expiry of such five year term of the
Collective Bargaining Agreement. All other
provisions of the Collective Bargaining
Agreement shall be renegotiated not later than
three (3) years after its execution. Any
agreement on such other provisions of the
Collective Bargaining Agreement entered into
within six (6) months from the date of expiry of
the term of such other provisions as fixed in such
Collective Bargaining Agreement, shall retroact
to the day immediately following such date. If
any such agreement is entered into beyond six
months, the parties shall agree on the duration
of collective bargaining agreement, the parties
may exercise their rights under this Code.
In Union of Filipino Employees v. NLRC, 192 SCRA 414 (1990), this
court interpreted the above law as follows:
In light of the foregoing, this Court upholds the
pronouncement of the NLRC holding the CBA to
be signed by the parties effective upon the
promulgation of the assailed resolution. It is
clear and explicit from Article 253-A that any
agreement on such other provisions of the CBA
shall be given retroactive effect only when it is
entered into within six (6) months from its expiry
date. If the agreement was entered into outside
the six (6) month period, then the parties shall
agree on the duration of the retroactivity
thereof.
The assailed resolution which incorporated the
CBA to be signed by the parties was promulgated
June 5, 1989, the expiry date of the past CBA.
Based on the provision of Section 253-A, its
retroactivity should be agreed upon. by the
parties. But since no agreement to that effect
was made, public respondent did not abuse its
discretion in giving the said CBA a prospective
effect. The action of the public respondent is
within the ambit of its authority vested by
existing law.
In the case of Lopez Sugar Corporation v. Federation of Free
Workers, 189 SCRA 179 (1991), this Court reiterated the rule that
although a CBA has expired, it continues to have legal effects as
between the parties until a new CBA has been entered into. It is the
duty of both parties to the to keep the status quo, and to continue in
full force and effect the terms and conditions of the existing
agreement during the 60-day freedom period and/or until a new
agreement is reached by the parties. 10 Applied to the case at bench,
the legal effects of the immediate past CBA between petitioner and
private respondent terminated, and the effectivity of the new CBA
began, only on March 4, 1993 when public respondent resolved of grave abuse of discretion, this Court cannot and will not interfere
their dispute. with the labor expertise of public respondent Secretary of Labor.

Finally, we find no need to discuss at length the merits of the third IN VIEW WHEREOF, public respondents Order, dated March 4, 1993,
and fourth assignments of error. The questioned Order relevantly and Resolution, dated June 8, 1993, are hereby MODIFIED to exclude
states: foremen and legal secretaries from the rank-and-file bargaining unit
represented by private respondent union, and to fix the date of
In the resolution of the economic issues, the effectivity of the five-year collective bargaining agreement between
Company urges us to consider among others, petitioner corporation and private respondent union on March 4,
present costs of living, its financial capacity, the 1993. No costs.
present wages being paid by the other cargo
handlers at the North Harbor, and the fact that SO ORDERED.
the present average wage of its workers is
P127.75 a day, which is higher than the statutory
minimum wage of P118.00 a day. The Company's
evidence, consisting of its financial statements
for the past three years, shows that its net
income was P743,423.45 for 1989,
P2,108,569.03 for 1990, and P1,479,671.84 for
1991, or an average of P1,443,885.10 over the
G.R. No. 79025. December 29, 1989.
three-year period. It argues that for just the first
year of effectivity of the CBA, the Company's
proposals on wages, effect thereof on overtime, BENGUET ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC., petitioner,
13th month pay, and vacation and sick leave vs.
commutation, will cost about P520,723,44, or HON. PURA FERRER-CALLEJA, Director of the Bureau of Labor
35.19% of its net income for 1991. The Company Relations, and BENECO EMPLOYEES LABOR UNION, respondents.
likewise urges us to consider the multiplier effect
of its proposals on the second and third years of E.L. Gayo & Associates for petitioner.
the CBA. As additional argument, the Company
manifests that a portion of its pier will undergo a
six-month to one-year renovation starting
January 1993.
CORTES, J.:

On the other hand, the Union's main line of

On June 21, 1985 Beneco Worker's Labor Union-Association of
argument — that is, aside from being within the
Democratic Labor Organizations (hereinafter referred to as BWLU-
financial capacity of the Company to grant, its
ADLO) filed a petition for direct certification as the sole and
demands are fair and reasonable — is not
exclusive bargaining representative of all the rank and file
supported by evidence controverting the
employees of Benguet Electric Cooperative, Inc. (hereinafter
Company's own presentation of its financial
referred to as BENECO) at Alapang, La Trinidad, Benguet alleging,
capacity. The Union in fact uses statements of
inter alia, that BENECO has in its employ two hundred and fourteen
the Company for 1989-1991, although it
(214) rank and file employees; that one hundred and ninety-eight
interprets these data as sufficient justification
(198) or 92.5% of these employees have supported the filing of the
for its own proposals. It also draws our attention
petition; that no certification election has been conducted for the
to the bargaining history of the parties,
last 12 months; that there is no existing collective bargaining
particularly the 1988 negotiations during which
representative of the rank and file employees sought to represented
the company was able to grant wage increases
by BWLU- ADLO; and, that there is no collective bargaining
despite operational losses.
agreement in the cooperative.

Balancing the right of the Company to remain

An opposition to the petition was filed by the Beneco Employees
viable and to just returns to its investments with
Labor Union (hereinafter referred to as BELU) contending that it was
right of the Union members to just
certified as the sole and exclusive bargaining representative of the
rewards for their labors, we find the following
subject workers pursuant to an order issued by the med-arbiter on
award to be fair and reasonable . . . . 11
October 20,1980; that pending resolution by the National Labor
Relations Commission are two cases it filed against BENECO
It is evident that the above portion of the impugned Order is based involving bargaining deadlock and unfair labor practice; and, that the
on well-studied evidence. The conclusions reached by public pendency of these cases bars any representation question.
respondent in the discharge of her statutory duty as compulsory
arbitrator, demand the high respect of this Court. The study and
BENECO, on the other hand, filed a motion to dismiss the petition
settlement of these disputes fall within public respondent's distinct
claiming that it is a non-profit electric cooperative engaged in
administrative expertise. She is especially trained for this delicate
providing electric services to its members and patron-consumers in
task, and she has within her cognizance such data and information
the City of Baguio and Benguet Province; and, that the employees
as will assist her in striking the equitable balance between the needs
sought to be represented by BWLU-ADLO are not eligible to form,
of management, labor and the public. Unless there is clear showing
join or assist labor organizations of their own choosing because they
are members and joint owners of the cooperative.
On September 2, 1985 the med-arbiter issued an order giving due
course to the petition for certification election. However, the med-
arbiter limited the election among the rank and file employees of
petitioner who are non-members thereof and without any
involvement in the actual ownership of the cooperative. Based on
the evidence during the hearing the med-arbiter found that there
are thirty-seven (37) employees who are not members and without
any involvement in the actual ownership of the cooperative. The
dispositive portion of the med-arbiter's order is as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, a
certification election should be as it is hereby
ordered to be conducted at the premises of
Benguet, Electric Cooperative, Inc., at Alapang,
La Trinidad, Benguet within twenty (20) days
from receipt hereof among all the rank and file
employees (non-members/consumers and
without any involvement in the actual ownership
of the cooperative) with the following choices:
1. BENECO WORKERS LABOR UNION-ADLO
2. BENECO EMPLOYEES LABOR UNION
3. NO UNION
The payroll for the month of June 1985 shall be
the basis in determining the qualified voters who
may participate in the certification election to be
conducted.
SO ORDERED. [Rollo, pp. 22-23.]
BELU and BENECO appealed from this order but the same was
dismissed for lack of merit on March 25,1986. Whereupon BENECO
filed with this Court a petition for certiorari with prayer for
preliminary injunction and /or restraining order, docketed as G.R.
No. 74209, which the Supreme Court dismissed for lack of merit in a
minute resolution dated April 28, 1986.
The ordered certification election was held on October 1, 1986. Prior
to the conduct thereof BENECO's counsel verbally manifested that
"the cooperative is protesting that employees who are members-
consumers are being allowed to vote when . . . they are not eligible
to be members of any labor union for purposes of collective
bargaining; much less, to vote in this certification election." [Rollo, p.
28]. Petitioner submitted a certification showing that only four (4)
employees are not members of BENECO and insisted that only these
employees are eligible to vote in the certification election. Canvass
of the votes showed that BELU garnered forty-nine (49) of the
eighty-three (83) "valid" votes cast.
Thereafter BENECO formalized its verbal manifestation by filing a
Protest. Finding, among others, that the issue as to whether or not
member-consumers who are employees of BENECO could form,
assist or join a labor union has been answered in the affirmative by
the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 74209, the med-arbiter dismissed the
protest on February 17, 1987. On June 23, 1987, Bureau of Labor
Relations (BLR) director Pura Ferrer-Calleja affirmed the med-
arbiter's order and certified BELU as the sole and exclusive
bargaining agent of all the rank and file employees of BENECO.
Alleging that the BLR director committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction BENECO filed the instant
petition for certiorari. In his Comment the Solicitor General agreed
with BENECO's stance and prayed that the petition be given due
course. In view of this respondent director herself was required by
the Court to file a Comment. On April 19, 1989 the Court gave due
course to the petition and required the parties to submit their
respective memoranda.
The main issue in this case is whether or not respondent director
committed grave abuse of discretion in certifying respondent BELU
as the sole and exclusive bargaining representtative of the rank and
file employees of BENECO.
Under Article 256 of the Labor Code [Pres. Decree 442] to have a
valid certification election, "at least a majority of all eligible voters in
the unit must have cast their votes. The labor union receiving the
majority of the valid votes cast shall be certified as the exclusive
bargaining agent of all workers in the unit." Petitioner BENECO
asserts that the certification election held on October 1, 1986 was
null and void since members-employees of petitioner cooperative
who are not eligible to form and join a labor union for purposes of
collective bargaining were allowed to vote therein.
Respondent director and private respondent BELU on the other
hand submit that members of a cooperative who are also rank and
file employees are eligible to form, assist or join a labor union
[Comment of Respondent Director, p. 4; Rollo, p. 125; Comment of
BELU, pp. 9-10; Rollo pp. 99-100].
The Court finds the present petition meritorious.
The issue of whether or not employees of a cooperative are qualified
to form or join a labor organization for purposes of collective
bargaining has already been resolved and clarified in the case
of Cooperative Rural Bank of Davao City, Inc. vs. Ferrer Calleja, et
al. [G.R. No. 7795, September 26,1988] and reiterated in the cases
of Batangas-Electric Cooperative Labor Union v. Young, et al. [G.R.
Nos. 62386, 70880 and 74560 November 9, 1988] and San Jose City
Electric Service Cooperative, Inc. v. Ministry of Labor and
Employment, et al. [G.R. No. 77231, May 31, 1989] wherein the
Court had stated that the right to collective bargaining is not
available to an employee of a cooperative who at the same time is a
member and co-owner thereof. With respect, however, to
employees who are neither members nor co-owners of the
cooperative they are entitled to exercise the rights to self-
organization, collective bargaining and negotiation as mandated by
the 1987 Constitution and applicable statutes.
Respondent director argues that to deny the members of petitioner
cooperative the right to form, assist or join a labor union of their
own choice for purposes of collective bargaining would amount to a
patent violation of their right to self-organization. She points out
that:
Albeit a person assumes a dual capacity as rank
and file employee and as member of a certain
cooperative does not militate, as in the instant
case, against his/her exercise of the right to self-
organization and to collective bargaining
 guaranteed by the Constitution and Labor Code
because, while so doing, he/she is acting in
his/her capacity as rank and file employee
thereof. It may be added that while the
employees concerned became members of
petitioner cooperative, their status employment
as rank and filers who are hired for fixed
compensation had not changed. They still do not
actually participate in the management of the
cooperative as said function is entrusted to the
Board of Directors and to the elected or
appointed officers thereof. They are not vested
with the powers and prerogatives to lay down
and execute managerial policies; to hire,
transfer, suspend, lay-off, recall, discharge,
assign or discipline employees; and/or to
effectively recommend such managerial
functions [Comment of Respondent Director, p.
4; Rollo, p. 125.]
Private respondent BELU concurs with the above contention of
respondent director and, additionally, claims that since membership
in petitioner cooperative is only nominal, the rank and file
employees who are members thereof should not be deprived of
their right to self-organization.
The above contentions are untenable. Contrary to respondents'
claim, the fact that the members-employees of petitioner do not
participate in the actual management of the cooperative does not
make them eligible to form, assist or join a labor organization for the
purpose of collective bargaining with petitioner. The Court's ruling in
the Davao City case that members of cooperative cannot join a labor
union for purposes of collective bargaining was based on the fact
that as members of the cooperative they are co-owners thereof. As
such, they cannot invoke the right to collective bargaining for
"certainly an owner cannot bargain with himself or his co-owners."
[Cooperative Rural Bank of Davao City, Inc. v. Ferrer-Calleja, et al.,
supra]. It is the fact of ownership of the cooperative, and not
involvement in the management thereof, which disqualifies a
member from joining any labor organization within the cooperative.
Thus, irrespective of the degree of their participation in the actual
management of the cooperative, all members thereof cannot form,
assist or join a labor organization for the purpose of collective
bargaining.
Respondent union further claims that if nominal ownership in a
cooperative is "enough to take away the constitutional protections
afforded to labor, then there would be no hindrance for employers
to grant, on a scheme of generous profit sharing, stock bonuses to
their employees and thereafter claim that since their employees are
not stockholders [of the corporation], albeit in a minimal and
involuntary manner, they are now also co-owners and thus
disqualified to form unions." To allow this, BELU argues, would be
"to allow the floodgates of destruction to be opened upon the rights
of labor which the Constitution endeavors to protect and which
welfare it promises to promote." [Comment of BELU, p. 10; Rollo, p.
100].
The above contention of respondent union is based on the
erroneous presumption that membership in a cooperative is the
same as ownership of stocks in ordinary corporations. While
cooperatives may exercise some of the rights and privileges given to
ordinary corporations provided under existing laws, such
cooperatives enjoy other privileges not granted to the latter [See
Sections 4, 5, 6, and 8, Pres. Decree No. 175; Cooperative Rural Bank
of Davao City v. Ferrer-Calleja, supra]. Similarly, members of
cooperatives have rights and obligations different from those of
stockholders of ordinary corporations. It was precisely because of
the special nature of cooperatives, that the Court held in the Davao
City case that members-employees thereof cannot form or join a
labor union for purposes of collective bargaining. The Court held
that:
A cooperative ... is by its nature different from an
ordinary business concern being run either by
persons, partnerships, or corporations. Its
owners and/or members are the ones who run
and operate the business while the others are its
employees. As above stated, irrespective of the
number of shares owned by each member they
are entitled to cast one vote each in deciding
upon the affairs of the cooperative. Their share
capital earn limited interest. They enjoy special
privileges as-exemption from income tax and
sales taxes, preferential right to supply their
products to State agencies and even exemption
from the minimum wage laws.
An employee therefore of such a cooperative
who is a member and co-owner thereof cannot
invoke the right to collective bargaining for
certainly an owner cannot bargain with himself
or his co-owners.
It is important to note that, in her order dated September 2, 1985,
med-arbiter Elnora V. Balleras made a specific finding that there are
only thirty-seven (37) employees of petitioner who are not members
of the cooperative and who are, therefore, the only employees of
petitioner cooperative eligible to form or join a labor union for
purposes of collective bargaining [Annex "A" of the Petition, p. 12;
Rollo, p. 22]. However, the minutes of the certification election
[Annex "C" of the Petition: Rollo, p. 28] show that a total of eighty-
three (83) employees were allowed to vote and of these, forty-nine
(49) voted for respondent union. Thus, even if We agree with
respondent union's contention that the thirty seven (37) employees
who were originally non-members of the cooperative can still vote in
the certification election since they were only "forced and compelled
to join the cooperative on pain of disciplinary action," the
certification election held on October 1, 1986 is still null and void
since even those who were already members of the cooperative at
the time of the issuance of the med-arbiter's order, and therefore
cannot claim that they were forced to join the union were allowed
to vote in the election.
Article 256 of the Labor Code provides, among others, that:
To have a valid, election, at least a majority of all
eligible voters in the unit must have cast their
votes. The labor union receiving the majority of
the valid votes cast shall be certified as the
exclusive bargaining agent of all workers in the
unit . . . [Italics supplied.]
In this case it cannot be determined whether or not respondent
union was duly elected by the eligible voters of the bargaining unit
since even employees who are ineligible to join a labor union within
the cooperative because of their membership therein were allowed
to vote in the certification election. Considering the foregoing, the
Court finds that respondent director committed grave abuse of
discretion in certifying respondent union as the sole and exclusive
bargaining representative of the rank and file employees of
petitioner cooperative.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED and the assailed
resolution of respondent director is ANNULLED. The certification
election conducted on October 1, 1986, is SET ASIDE. The Regional
Office No. 1 of San Fernando, La Union is hereby directed to
immediately conduct new certification election proceedings among
the rank and file employees of the petitioner who are not members
of the cooperative.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 85279 July 28, 1989
SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (SSSEA),
DIONISION T. BAYLON, RAMON MODESTO, JUANITO MADURA,
REUBEN ZAMORA, VIRGILIO DE ALDAY, SERGIO ARANETA, PLACIDO
AGUSTIN, VIRGILIO MAGPAYO, petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM (SSS), HON.
CEZAR C. PERALEJO, RTC, BRANCH 98, QUEZON CITY, respondents.
Vicente T. Ocampo & Associates for petitioners.
CORTES, J:
Primarily, the issue raised in this petition is whether or not the
Regional Trial Court can enjoin the Social Security System Employees
Association (SSSEA) from striking and order the striking employees
to return to work. Collaterally, it is whether or not employees of the
Social Security System (SSS) have the right to strike.
The antecedents are as follows:
On June 11, 1987, the SSS filed with the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City a complaint for damages with a prayer for a writ of
preliminary injunction against petitioners, alleging that on June 9,
1987, the officers and members of SSSEA staged an illegal strike and
baricaded the entrances to the SSS Building, preventing non-striking
employees from reporting for work and SSS members from
transacting business with the SSS; that the strike was reported to the
Public Sector Labor - Management Council, which ordered the
strikers to return to work; that the strikers refused to return to
work; and that the SSS suffered damages as a result of the strike.
The complaint prayed that a writ of preliminary injunction be issued
to enjoin the strike and that the strikers be ordered to return to
work; that the defendants (petitioners herein) be ordered to pay
damages; and that the strike be declared illegal.
It appears that the SSSEA went on strike after the SSS failed to act on
the union's demands, which included: implementation of the
provisions of the old SSS-SSSEA collective bargaining agreement
(CBA) on check-off of union dues; payment of accrued overtime pay,
night differential pay and holiday pay; conversion of temporary or
contractual employees with six (6) months or more of service into
regular and permanent employees and their entitlement to the
same salaries, allowances and benefits given to other regular
employees of the SSS; and payment of the children's allowance of
P30.00, and after the SSS deducted certain amounts from the
salaries of the employees and allegedly committed acts of
discrimination and unfair labor practices [Rollo, pp. 21-241].
The court a quo, on June 11, 1987, issued a temporary restraining
order pending resolution of the application for a writ of preliminary
injunction [Rollo, p. 71.] In the meantime, petitioners filed a motion
to dismiss alleging the trial court's lack of jurisdiction over the
subject matter [Rollo, pp. 72-82.] To this motion, the SSS filed an
opposition, reiterating its prayer for the issuance of a writ of
injunction [Rollo, pp. 209-222]. On July 22,1987, in a four-page
order, the court a quo denied the motion to dismiss and converted
the restraining order into an injunction upon posting of a bond, after
finding that the strike was illegal [Rollo, pp. 83- 86]. As petitioners'
motion for the reconsideration of the aforesaid order was also
denied on August 14, 1988 [Rollo, p. 94], petitioners filed a petition
for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction before this
Court. Their petition was docketed as G.R. No. 79577. In a resolution
dated October 21, 1987, the Court, through the Third Division,
resolved to refer the case to the Court of Appeals. Petitioners filed a
motion for reconsideration thereof, but during its pendency the
Court of Appeals on March 9,1988 promulgated its decision on the
referred case [Rollo, pp. 130-137]. Petitioners moved to recall the
Court of Appeals' decision. In the meantime, the Court on June
29,1988 denied the motion for reconsideration in G.R. No. 97577 for
being moot and academic. Petitioners' motion to recall the decision
of the Court of Appeals was also denied in view of this Court's denial
of the motion for reconsideration [Rollo, pp. 141- 143]. Hence, the
instant petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals [Rollo,
pp. 12-37].
Upon motion of the SSS on February 6,1989, the Court issued a
temporary restraining order enjoining the petitioners from staging
another strike or from pursuing the notice of strike they filed with
the Department of Labor and Employment on January 25, 1989 and
to maintain the status quo [Rollo, pp. 151-152].
The Court, taking the comment as answer, and noting the reply and
supplemental reply filed by petitioners, considered the issues joined
and the case submitted for decision.
The position of the petitioners is that the Regional Trial Court had no
jurisdiction to hear the case initiated by the SSS and to issue the
restraining order and the writ of preliminary injunction, as
jurisdiction lay with the Department of Labor and Employment or
the National Labor Relations Commission, since the case involves a
labor dispute.
On the other hand, the SSS advances the contrary view, on the
ground that the employees of the SSS are covered by civil service
laws and rules and regulations, not the Labor Code, therefore they
do not have the right to strike. Since neither the DOLE nor the NLRC
has jurisdiction over the dispute, the Regional Trial Court may enjoin
the employees from striking.
In dismissing the petition for certiorari and prohibition with
preliminary injunction filed by petitioners, the Court of Appeals held
that since the employees of the SSS, are government employees,
they are not allowed to strike, and may be enjoined by the Regional
Trial Court, which had jurisdiction over the SSS' complaint for
damages, from continuing with their strike.
Thus, the sequential questions to be resolved by the Court in
deciding whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in finding that
the Regional Trial Court did not act without or in excess of
jurisdiction when it took cognizance of the case and enjoined the
strike are as follows:
1. Do the employees of the SSS have the right to strike?
2. Does the Regional Trial Court have jurisdiction to hear the case
initiated by the SSS and to enjoin the strikers from continuing with
the strike and to order them to return to work?
These shall be discussed and resolved seriatim
I resolution, it carries with it the right to strike.
The 1987 Constitution, in the Article on Social Justice and Human
Rights, provides that the State "shall guarantee the rights of all
workers to self-organization, collective bargaining and negotiations,
and peaceful concerted activities, including the right to strike in
accordance with law" [Art. XIII, Sec. 31].
By itself, this provision would seem to recognize the right of all
workers and employees, including those in the public sector, to
strike. But the Constitution itself fails to expressly confirm this
impression, for in the Sub-Article on the Civil Service Commission, it
provides, after defining the scope of the civil service as "all branches,
subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government,
including government-owned or controlled corporations with
original charters," that "[t]he right to self-organization shall not be
denied to government employees" [Art. IX(B), Sec. 2(l) and (50)].
Parenthetically, the Bill of Rights also provides that "[tlhe right of the
people, including those employed in the public and private sectors,
to form unions, associations, or societies for purposes not contrary
to law shall not abridged" [Art. III, Sec. 8]. Thus, while there is no
question that the Constitution recognizes the right of government
employees to organize, it is silent as to whether such recognition
also includes the right to strike.
Resort to the intent of the framers of the organic law becomes
helpful in understanding the meaning of these provisions. A reading
of the proceedings of the Constitutional Commission that drafted
the 1987 Constitution would show that in recognizing the right of
government employees to organize, the commissioners intended to
limit the right to the formation of unions or associations only,
without including the right to strike.
Thus, Commissioner Eulogio R. Lerum, one of the sponsors of the
provision that "[tlhe right to self-organization shall not be denied to
government employees" [Art. IX(B), Sec. 2(5)], in answer to the
apprehensions expressed by Commissioner Ambrosio B. Padilla,
Vice-President of the Commission, explained:
MR. LERUM. I think what I will try to say will not
take that long. When we proposed this
amendment providing for self-organization of
government employees, it does not mean that
because they have the right to organize, they
also have the right to strike. That is a different
matter. We are only talking about organizing,
uniting as a union. With regard to the right to
strike, everyone will remember that in the Bill of
Rights, there is a provision that the right to form
associations or societies whose purpose is not
contrary to law shall not be abridged. Now then,
if the purpose of the state is to prohibit the
strikes coming from employees exercising
government functions, that could be done
because the moment that is prohibited, then the
union which will go on strike will be an illegal
union. And that provision is carried in Republic
Act 875. In Republic Act 875, workers, including
those from the government-owned and
controlled, are allowed to organize but they are
prohibited from striking. So, the fear of our
honorable Vice- President is unfounded. It does
not mean that because we approve this
That is a different matter. As a matter of fact,
that subject is now being discussed in the
Committee on Social Justice because we are
trying to find a solution to this problem. We
know that this problem exist; that the moment
we allow anybody in the government to strike,
then what will happen if the members of the
Armed Forces will go on strike? What will
happen to those people trying to protect us? So
that is a matter of discussion in the Committee
on Social Justice. But, I repeat, the right to form
an organization does not carry with it the right to
strike. [Record of the Constitutional Commission,
vol. 1, p. 569].
It will be recalled that the Industrial Peace Act (R.A. No. 875), which
was repealed by the Labor Code (P.D. 442) in 1974, expressly banned
strikes by employees in the Government, including instrumentalities
exercising governmental functions, but excluding entities entrusted
with proprietary functions:
.Sec. 11. Prohibition Against Strikes in the
Government. — The terms and conditions of
employment in the Government, including any
political subdivision or instrumentality thereof,
are governed by law and it is declared to be the
policy of this Act that employees therein shall
not strike for the purpose of securing changes or
modification in their terms and conditions of
employment. Such employees may belong to any
labor organization which does not impose the
obligation to strike or to join in strike: Provided,
however, That this section shall apply only to
employees employed in governmental functions
and not those employed in proprietary functions
of the Government including but not limited to
governmental corporations.
No similar provision is found in the Labor Code, although at one time
it recognized the right of employees of government corporations
established under the Corporation Code to organize and bargain
collectively and those in the civil service to "form organizations for
purposes not contrary to law" [Art. 244, before its amendment by
B.P. Blg. 70 in 1980], in the same breath it provided that "[t]he terms
and conditions of employment of all government employees,
including employees of government owned and controlled
corporations, shall be governed by the Civil Service Law, rules and
regulations" [now Art. 276]. Understandably, the Labor Code is silent
as to whether or not government employees may strike, for such are
excluded from its coverage [Ibid]. But then the Civil Service Decree
[P.D. No. 807], is equally silent on the matter.
On June 1, 1987, to implement the constitutional guarantee of the
right of government employees to organize, the President issued
E.O. No. 180 which provides guidelines for the exercise of the right
to organize of government employees. In Section 14 thereof, it is
provided that "[t]he Civil Service law and rules governing concerted
activities and strikes in the government service shall be observed,
subject to any legislation that may be enacted by Congress." The
President was apparently referring to Memorandum Circular No. 6,
s. 1987 of the Civil Service Commission under date April 21, 1987
which, "prior to the enactment by Congress of applicable laws
concerning strike by government employees ... enjoins under pain of
administrative sanctions, all government officers and employees
from staging strikes, demonstrations, mass leaves, walk-outs and
other forms of mass action which will result in temporary stoppage
or disruption of public service." The air was thus cleared of the
confusion. At present, in the absence of any legislation allowing
government employees to strike, recognizing their right to do so, or
regulating the exercise of the right, they are prohibited from striking,
by express provision of Memorandum Circular No. 6 and as implied
in E.O. No. 180. [At this juncture, it must be stated that the validity
of Memorandum Circular No. 6 is not at issue].
But are employees of the SSS covered by the prohibition against
strikes?
The Court is of the considered view that they are. Considering that
under the 1987 Constitution "[t]he civil service embraces all
branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the
Government, including government-owned or controlled
corporations with original charters" [Art. IX(B), Sec. .2(l) see also Sec.
1 of E.O. No. 180 where the employees in the civil service are
denominated as "government employees"] and that the SSS is one
such government-controlled corporation with an original charter,
having been created under R.A. No. 1161, its employees are part of
the civil service [NASECO v. NLRC, G.R. Nos. 69870 & 70295,
November 24,1988] and are covered by the Civil Service
Commission's memorandum prohibiting strikes. This being the case,
the strike staged by the employees of the SSS was illegal.
The statement of the Court in Alliance of Government Workers v.
Minister of Labor and Employment [G.R. No. 60403, August 3, 1:983,
124 SCRA 11 is relevant as it furnishes the rationale for
distinguishing between workers in the private sector and
government employees with regard to the right to strike:
The general rule in the past and up to the
present is that 'the terms and conditions of
employment in the Government, including any
political subdivision or instrumentality thereof
are governed by law" (Section 11, the Industrial
Peace Act, R.A. No. 875, as amended and Article
277, the Labor Code, P.D. No. 442, as
amended). Since the terms and conditions of
government employment are fixed by law,
government workers cannot use the same
weapons employed by workers in the private
sector to secure concessions from their
employers. The principle behind labor unionism
in private industry is that industrial peace cannot
be secured through compulsion by law. Relations
between private employers and their employees
rest on an essentially voluntary basis. Subject to
the minimum requirements of wage laws and
other labor and welfare legislation, the terms
and conditions of employment in the unionized
private sector are settled through the process of
collective bargaining. In government
employment, however, it is the legislature and,
where properly given delegated power, the
administrative heads of government which fix
the terms and conditions of employment. And
this is effected through statutes or
administrative circulars, rules, and regulations,
not through collective bargaining agreements.
[At p. 13; Emphasis supplied].
Apropos is the observation of the Acting Commissioner of Civil
Service, in his position paper submitted to the 1971 Constitutional
Convention, and quoted with approval by the Court in Alliance, to
wit:
It is the stand, therefore, of this Commission that
by reason of the nature of the public employer
and the peculiar character of the public service,
it must necessarily regard the right to strike
given to unions in private industry as not
applying to public employees and civil service
employees. It has been stated that the
Government, in contrast to the private
employer, protects the interest of all people in
the public service, and that accordingly, such
conflicting interests as are present in private
labor relations could not exist in the relations
between government and those whom they
employ. [At pp. 16-17; also quoted in National
Housing Corporation v. Juco, G.R. No. 64313,
January 17,1985,134 SCRA 172,178-179].
E.O. No. 180, which provides guidelines for the exercise of the right
to organize of government employees, while clinging to the same
philosophy, has, however, relaxed the rule to allow negotiation
where the terms and conditions of employment involved are not
among those fixed by law. Thus:
.SECTION 13. Terms and conditions of
employment or improvements thereof, except
those that are fixed by law, may be the subject
of negotiations between duly recognized
employees' organizations and appropriate
government authorities.
The same executive order has also provided for the general
mechanism for the settlement of labor disputes in the public sector
to wit:
.SECTION 16. The Civil Service and labor laws and
procedures, whenever applicable, shall be
followed in the resolution of complaints,
grievances and cases involving government
 employees. In case any dispute remains
unresolved after exhausting all the available
remedies under existing laws and procedures,
the parties may jointly refer the dispute to the
[Public Sector Labor- Management] Council for
appropriate action.
Government employees may, therefore, through their unions or
associations, either petition the Congress for the betterment of the
terms and conditions of employment which are within the ambit of
legislation or negotiate with the appropriate government agencies
for the improvement of those which are not fixed by law. If there be
any unresolved grievances, the dispute may be referred to the Public
Sector Labor - Management Council for appropriate action. But
employees in the civil service may not resort to strikes, walk-outs
and other temporary work stoppages, like workers in the private
sector, to pressure the Govemment to accede to their demands. As
now provided under Sec. 4, Rule III of the Rules and Regulations to
Govern the Exercise of the Right of Government- Employees to Self-
Organization, which took effect after the instant dispute arose,
"[t]he terms and conditions of employment in the government,
including any political subdivision or instrumentality thereof and
government- owned and controlled corporations with original
charters are governed by law and employees therein shall not strike
for the purpose of securing changes thereof."
II
The strike staged by the employees of the SSS belonging to
petitioner union being prohibited by law, an injunction may be
issued to restrain it.
It is futile for the petitioners to assert that the subject labor dispute
falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the NLRC and, hence, the
Regional Trial Court had no jurisdiction to issue a writ of injunction
enjoining the continuance of the strike. The Labor Code itself
provides that terms and conditions of employment of government
employees shall be governed by the Civil Service Law, rules and
regulations [Art. 276]. More importantly, E.O. No. 180 vests the
Public Sector Labor - Management Council with jurisdiction over
unresolved labor disputes involving government employees [Sec.
16]. Clearly, the NLRC has no jurisdiction over the dispute.
This being the case, the Regional Trial Court was not precluded, in
the exercise of its general jurisdiction under B.P. Blg. 129, as
amended, from assuming jurisdiction over the SSS's complaint for
damages and issuing the injunctive writ prayed for therein. Unlike
the NLRC, the Public Sector Labor - Management Council has not
been granted by law authority to issue writs of injunction in labor
disputes within its jurisdiction. Thus, since it is the Council, and not
the NLRC, that has jurisdiction over the instant labor dispute, resort
to the general courts of law for the issuance of a writ of injunction to
enjoin the strike is appropriate.
Neither could the court a quo be accused of imprudence or
overzealousness, for in fact it had proceeded with caution. Thus,
after issuing a writ of injunction enjoining the continuance of the
strike to prevent any further disruption of public service, the
respondent judge, in the same order, admonished the parties to
refer the unresolved controversies emanating from their employer-
employee relationship to the Public Sector Labor - Management
Council for appropriate action [Rollo, p. 86].
III
In their "Petition/Application for Preliminary and Mandatory
Injunction," and reiterated in their reply and supplemental reply,
petitioners allege that the SSS unlawfully withheld bonuses and
benefits due the individual petitioners and they pray that the Court
issue a writ of preliminary prohibitive and mandatory injunction to
restrain the SSS and its agents from withholding payment thereof
and to compel the SSS to pay them. In their supplemental reply,
petitioners annexed an order of the Civil Service Commission, dated
May 5, 1989, which ruled that the officers of the SSSEA who are not
preventively suspended and who are reporting for work pending the
resolution of the administrative cases against them are entitled to
their salaries, year-end bonuses and other fringe benefits and
affirmed the previous order of the Merit Systems Promotion Board.
The matter being extraneous to the issues elevated to this Court, it is
Our view that petitioners' remedy is not to petition this Court to
issue an injunction, but to cause the execution of the aforesaid
order, if it has already become final.
WHEREFORE, no reversible error having been committed by the
Court of Appeals, the instant petition for review is hereby DENIED
and the decision of the appellate court dated March 9, 1988 in CA-
G.R. SP No. 13192 is AFFIRMED. Petitioners' "Petition/Application for
Preliminary and Mandatory Injunction" dated December 13,1988 is
DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 95445 August 6, 1991
MANILA PUBLIC SCHOOL TEACHERS ASSOCIATION, FIDEL FABABIER
MERLIN ANONUEVO, MINDA GALANG and other teacher-members
so numerous similarly situated, petitioners-appellants,
vs.
THE HON. PERFECTO LAGUIO JR., in his capacity as Presiding Judge
of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 18, HON. ISIDRO
CARIÑO, in his capacity as Secretary of Education, Culture and
Sports and the HON. ERLINDA LOLARGA in her capacity as Manila
City Schools Superintendent, respondents-appellees.
G.R No. 95590 August 6, 1991
ALLIANCE OF CONCERNED TEACHERS (ACT), ENRIQUE D. TORRES,
RODRIGO G. NATIVIDAD, FRANCISCO A. NERECINA, EVA V. FERIA,
LUCIA R. CARRASCO, LEO R. RAMBOYONG, ZENEIDA PEREZ, MARIA
ACEJO AND OTHER SIMILARLY SITUATED PUBLIC SCHOOL
TEACHERS TOO NUMEROUS TO BE IMPLEADED, petitioners,
vs.
HON. ISIDRO CARIÑO in his capacity as Secretary of Education,
Culture and Sports and HON. GUILLERMO CARAGUE, in his capacity
as Secretary of Budget and Management, respondents.
Free Legal Assistance Group, Movement of Attorneys for
Brotherhood Integrity & Nationalism and Union of Lawyers and
Advocates for petitioners in G.R. No. 95590.
Gregorio Fabros for petitioners in G.R. No. 95445.

NARVASA, J.:
The series of events that touched off these cases started with the so-
called "mass action" undertaken by some 800 public school
teachers, among them members of the petitioning associations in
both cases, on September 17, 1990 to "dramatize and highlight"1 the
teachers' plight resulting from the alleged failure of the public
authorities to act upon grievances that had time and again been
brought to the latter's attention.
The petition in G.R. No. 95590 alleges in great detail the character
and origins of those grievances as perceived by the petitioners, and
the attempts to negotiate their correction;2 these are more briefly,
but quite adequately and with no sacrifice of relevant content, set
forth in the petition in G.R. No. 954451, portions of which are
quoted hereunder without necessarily affirming their objective truth
or correctness:
3. Together with other teachers embracing the Teachers
and Employees Consultative Council (TECC) and the
Alliance of Concerned Teachers, the petitioners, in
accordance with their Constitution and By-Laws, resolved
to engage in mass concerted actions, after peaceful
dialogues with the heads of the Department of the Budget
and Management, Senate and House of Representatives in
public hearings as well as after exhausting all
administrative remedies, to press for, among other things,
the immediate payment of due chalk, clothing allowances,
13th month pay for 1989 arising from the implementation
of the Salary Standardization Law, the recall of DECS Order
39 s. 1990 directing the oversizing of classes and
overloading of teachers pursuant to the cost-cutting
measures of the government, the hiring of 47,000 new
teachers to ease the overload of existing teachers, the
return of the additional 1% real property taxes collected by
local government units to education purposes to be
administered by the Local School Boards, and consequent
recall of DBM Circulars Nos. 904 and 9011 and local budget
circular No. 47 consistent with RA 5447 and the new
Constitution mandating that education shall enjoy the
highest budgetary priority in the national budget, and
other equally important demands; The dialogues and
conferences initiated by the petitioners and other teacher
organizations were as early as March 14, 1989, March 14,
1990, April 23, 1990, May 28, 1990, June 5, 1990,
September 3, 1990 and September 14, 1990 with the Civil
Service Commission, the Senate and House of
Representatives, Department of Budget and Management
and the Department of Education, Culture and Sports, but
all these did not result in the granting of the demands of
the petitioners, leaving them with no other recourse but to
take direct mass action such as the one they engaged in
three weeks ago.
4. On September 14, 1990, the petitioners and other
teachers in other cities and municipalities in Metro Manila,
staged a protest rally at the DECS premises without
disrupting classes as a last call for the government to
negotiate the granting of demands. No response was
made by the respondent Secretary of Education, despite
the demonstration, so the petitioners began the ongoing
protest mass actions on September, 17,1990. ...3
September 17, 1990 fell on a Monday, which was also a regular
school day. There is no question that the some 800 teachers who
joined the mass action did not conduct their classes on that day;
instead, as alleged in the petition in G.R. No. 95590,4 they converged
at the Liwasang Bonifacio in the morning whence they proceeded to
the National Office of the Department of Education, Culture and
Sport (DECS) for a whole-day assembly. At about 1:00 o'clock p.m.,
three representatives of the group were allowed to see the
respondent Secretary of Education who "brushed aside their
grievances," warned them that they would lose their jobs for going
on illegal and unauthorized mass leave. Upon leaving said
respondent's presence, they were handed an order directing all
participants in the mass action to return to work in 24 hours or face
dismissal, and a memorandum directing the DECS officials concerned
to initiate dismissal proceedings against those who did not comply
and to hire their replacements.5 Those directives notwithstanding,
the mass actions continued into the week, with more teachers
joining in the days that followed. In its issue of September 19, 1990,
the newspaper Manila Standard reported that the day previous, the
respondent Secretary of Education had relieved 292 teachers who
did not return to their classes. The next day, however, another daily,
Newsday, reported that the Secretary had revoked its dismissal
order and instead placed 56 of the 292 teachers under preventive
suspension, despite which the protesters' numbers had swelled to
4,000.6
On the record, what did happen was that, based on reports
submitted by the principals of the various public schools in Metro
Manila, the respondent Secretary of Education had filed motu
proprio administrative complaints against the teachers who had
taken part in the mass actions and defied the return-to-work order
on assorted charges like grave misconduct, gross neglect of duty,
gross violation of the Civil Service Law, absence without official
leave, etc., and placed them under 90-day preventive suspension.
The respondents were served copies of the charge sheets and given
five (5) days to submit answer or explanation. Later, on October 8,
1990, the respondent Secretary constituted an investigating
committee of four (4) to determine and take the appropriate course
of action on the formal charges and designated the special
prosecutors on detail with the DECS to handle their prosecution
during the formal hearings.7
On October 11, 1990, the respondent Secretary of Education
rendered the first of his now questioned decisions on the
administrative complaints. In Case No. DECS 90-002, he found
twenty (20) respondent teachers guilty of the charges preferred
against them and dismissed them from office, effective
immediately.8 In the other investigations that followed and as of
December 3, 1990, 658 teachers were dismissed, 40 were
suspended for one (1) year, 33 for nine (9) months, and 122 for six
(6) months; 398 were exonerated.9
Earlier, on September 19, 1990, the petitioners in G.R. No. 95445
had filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila Branch 18, a
petition10 for prohibition, declaratory relief and preliminary
mandatory injunction to restrain the implementation of the return-
to-work order of September 17, 1990 and the suspension or
dismissal of any teacher pursuant thereto and to declare said order
null and void. Issuance ex-parte of a temporary restraining order was
sought, but seeing no compelling reason therefor, the Regional Trial
Court instead set the application for preliminary injunction for
hearing, and heard the same, on September 24, 1990. Thereafter
and following the submission of memorandums by the parties, said
Court rendered judgment declaring the assailed return-to-work
order valid and binding, and dismissing the petition for lack of
merit.11
Review of said judgment is sought in G. R. No. 95445.
G.R. No. 95590 is a parallel original proceeding for prohibition,
mandamus and certiorari grounded on the same state of facts and
instituted for substantially the same purpose i.e., the invalidation of
the return-to-work order of the respondent Secretary of Education
and all orders of suspension and/or dismissal thereafter issued by
said respondent against the teachers who had taken part in the mass
actions of September 17, 1990 and the days that followed.
Both cases were ordered consolidated by Resolution issued on
October 25, 1990,12 and separate comments were filed by the
Solicitor General on behalf of the public respondents, in G.R. No.
95445 on October 31, 1990, and in G.R. No. 95590 on December 5,
1990.13 On November 20, 1990 the parties were heard in oral
argument on the petitioners' united pleas for a temporary
restraining order/mandatory injunction to restore the status quo
ante and enjoin the public respondents from continuing with the
issuance of suspension orders and proceeding with the
administrative cases against the teachers involved in the mass
actions.
Said pleas were denied by the Court in its Resolution of December
18, 1990,14 and a motion for reconsideration filed by the petitioners
in G.R. No. 95590 was likewise denied.
In two separate but identically-worded motions filed on their behalf
by Atty. Froilan M. Bacungan,15 the following persons, to wit: Florita
D. Guazon, Elisea G. Lazo, Gonzala G. Sioson, Esperanza Valero,
Nenita Pangilinan, Ramon David, Aurora Bosi, Encarnita David,
Socorro Sentin, Crispulo Santos, Rodriguez Bagana, Rodolfo D.
Bacsal, Ruben Bersamina, Rodolfo Arroyo, Irene Gadil, Rebecca
Roldan, Rosita Samson, Priscilla Avendia, Arturo Cabuhat, Rosalinda
Caoili, Angelina Corpuz, Purisima Lena, Elsie Somera, Dedaica Jusay,
Teresita Partoza, Gloria Salvador, Catherine San Agustin, Nestor
Aguirre, Lorenzo Real, Celia Ronquillo, Vicente Carranza, Jessie
Villanueva, Yolanda Alura, Clara Alvarez, Danilo Llamas, Ladera
Panita Myrna, Sena, Zenaida Ligon, Daisy S. Conti, Danilo Caballes,
Susan Maragat, Roberto Manlangit and Elizabeth T. Aguirre, seek
leave to withdraw as parties in G.R. No. 95590. These movants claim
that they are such parties although not individually so named in the
petition in said case, being among those referred to in its title as
"other similarly situated public school teachers too numerous to be
impleaded," who had been administratively charged, then
preventively suspended and/or dismissed in the wake of the mass
actions of September 1990. They assert that since this Court is not a
trier of facts, they have opted to appeal the questioned decisions or
actuations of the respondent Secretary of Education to the Civil
Service Commission where they believe they will have "... all the
opportunity to introduce evidence on how (Secretary) Cariño
violated their constitutional rights to due process of law ... security
of tenure and ... peaceably to assemble and petition the government
for redress of grievances ...."
An opposition to the first motion was filed16 which, briefly,
contended that, as this Court had already found that the petitioners
had gone on an unlawful strike and that public respondent Cariño's
acts were prima facie lawful, the motion was either an attempt at
forum-shopping or meant to avoid the "inevitable outcome" of
issues already pending final determination by the Court.
The Court's Resolution of December 18, 1990, supra, denying the
petitioners' plea for restoration of the status quo ante and to
restrain/enjoin further suspensions of, and the initiation or
continuation of, administrative proceedings against the teachers
involved, is based on the following postulates:
(1) the undenied indeed, the pleaded and admitted fact
that about 800 teachers, among them the individual
petitioners and other unnamed but "similarly situated"
members of the petitioning associations in both cases,
unauthorizedly absented themselves from their classes on
a regular schoolday, September 17, 1990, in order to
participate in a "mass action" to dramatize their grievances
concerning, in the main, the alleged failure of the public
authorities, either to implement at all or to implement in a
just and correct manner, certain laws and measures
intended to benefit them materially;
(2) the fact, too, that in the days that followed, more mass
actions for the same purpose were undertaken,
notwithstanding a return-to-work order issued by the
respondent Secretary of Education; more teachers joined
the so-called "peaceful assemblies" on September 18,
1990 and the number rising to 4,000 on September 19,
1990;17
(3) that from the pleaded and admitted facts, these "mass
actions" were to all intents and purposes a strike; they
constituted a concerted and unauthorized stoppage of, or
absence from, work which it was the teachers' duty to
perform, undertaken for essentially economic reasons;
(4) that this court had already definitively ruled that
employees in the public (civil) service, unlike those in the
private sector, do not have the right to strike, although
guaranteed the right to self-organization, to petition
Congress for the betterment of employment terms and
conditions and to negotiate with appropriate government
agencies for the improvement of such working conditions
as are not fixed by law;18
(5) that upon the foregoing premises, it was prima
facie lawful and within his statutory authority for the
respondent Secretary of Education to take the actions
complained of, to wit: issue a return-to-work order, prefer
administrative charges against, and place under preventive
suspension, those who failed to comply with said order,
and dismiss from the service those who failed to answer or
controvert the charges;19
The Court has not since been presented with any consideration of
law or established fact that would impair the validity of these
postulates or preclude continued reliance thereon for the purpose of
resolving the present petitions on their merits.
The underlying issue here is due process; not whether the
petitioners have a right to strike, which it is clear they do not,
however justifiable their reasons, nor whether or not there was in
fact such a strike, it being equally evident from the pleadings that
there was, and there being no dispute about this. What therefore, is
brought before the Court is the question of whether or not any
rights of the petitioners under the due process clause of the
Constitution as it applies to administrative proceedings were
violated in the initiation, conduct, or disposition of the investigations
complained of.
Indeed, what the petitioners in G.R. No. 95590 proclaim about denial
of due process being their "paramount complaint" ... "central to
their prayer for interlocutory relief'20 could as well be said of the
merits of their main cause as of their plea for a restraining order
pendente lite or a preliminary injunction.
There are, however, insuperable obstacles to the Court's taking up
that issue and resolving it in these cases. Said issue is not ripe for
adjudication by this Court in the exercise of its review jurisdiction;
and this, for the obvious reason that it is one of fact. The petitions
and subsequent pleadings of the petitioners allege facts and
circumstances which, it is claimed, show denial of due process, citing
as supposedly "representative samples"21among others: (a) that
teachers were dismissed on the sole basis of unsworn reports of
their principals and without evidence of their alleged failure to obey
the return-to-work order; (b) that the charge sheets failed to specify
the particular charges or offenses allegedly committed; (c) that
some teachers were not furnished sworn complaints, and others
were suspended without any formal charges; (d) that teachers who
attempted to return within a reasonable time after notice of the
return-to-work order were not accepted back; and similar
allegations.
These are however denied and disputed by the public respondents,
who set forth their own version, initially in their separate Comments
in both cases and, later and in greater detail, in their Consolidated
Memorandum of December 3, 1990, supra, from which the following
passages are quoted:
(6) Petitioners in G.R. No. 95545 and G.R. No. 95590 admit
engaging in a strike (referred by semantic interplay as
"concerted activity" or "mass action") directed against
public respondent Cariño beginning September 17, 1990,
MPSTA Petition, pp. 3, 9; ACT Petition, pp. 1516).
To avoid the disruption of classes, public respondent
Cariño, also on September 17, 1990, issued a 'return to
work order' reminding striking workers that in law, they
cannot engage in strike and warning them that dismissal
proceedings will be instituted against them if they do not
return to work with 24 hours from their walkout (MPSTA
Petition, p. 4; ACT Petition, p. 15) and a memorandum to
DECS officials instructing them to notify the striking
teachers to return to work within 24 hours from their
walkout and to initiate dismissal proceedings against those
who defy the return to work order as well as to hire
temporary replacements, MPSTA Petition, p. 4; ACT
Petition, pp. 15-16).
The striking teachers who did not heed the return-to-work
order were administratively charged and preventively
suspended for ninety days for grave misconduct, gross
neglect of duty, insubordination, refusal to perform official
duty, absence without leave beginning September 17,
1990 and other violations of Civil Service Law, rules and
regulations. All of striking teachers were served with the
suspension orders and the change sheets notifying them of
the charges and giving them five (5) days from receipt of
the charge sheets within which to file their respective
answers.
With the filing of the administrative complaints and the
receipt of the answers of some of the teachers involved,
public respondent Carino on October 8, 1990 issued a
Memorandum forming an Investigation Committee
composed of Atty, Reno Capinpin of DECS Administrative
Services as Chairman Dr. Alberto Mendoza, representing
the Division Supervisors, Atty. Evangeline de Castro,
representing the City Superintendent of Schools of Manila,
and Atty. Isaias Meleto representing the National PPSTA
Organization, as members. Copy of the aforesaid
Memorandum is hereto attached as Annex "I."
The committee was authorized to meet everyday, even as
Special Prosecutors from the Department of justice on
detail with the DECS were designated to handle the
prosecution during the formal hearings. (Ibid.)
Petitioners in GR No. 95545' and 'G.R. No. 95590' admit
having received the charge sheets and notices of
preventive suspension wherein they were given five days
from receipt of the charges within which to file their
answers (MPSTA Petition, p. 4-1 ACT Petition, p. 16,
Annexes x , to , AA ).
xxx xxx xxx
... Many striking teachers received their preventive
suspension orders and the charge sheets from their
respective principals when they visited their schools. Many
refused to receive and sign receipt therefor; others tore up
the preventive suspension orders and charge sheets in
front of their principals. Instead, they took the occasion to
belittle and insult the substitute teachers who took over
their classrooms temporarily.
The striking teachers were given a period of five days to
file their Answers in line with Sec. 8, Rule III of Rules on
Administrative Disciplinary Cases in CSC Memorandum
Circular No. 46, s. 1989. The motion for extension of time
to file Answer was denied by DECS Task Force because it
was dilatory the alleged reason being that Atty. Fabros is
handling 2,000 cases of teachers. The DECS was
constrained by Sec. 38(d) of P.D. 807 and Sec. 8 of the
Memorandum Circular mentioned which mandate that
administrative cases must be decided within 30 days from
the filing of the charges. Another reason was that many
refused to receive the notice of charges. Also, to delay the
resolution of the cases was to their disadvantage.
Moreover, another reason proferred was that the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Manila still had to act on the petition
before it. However, the Motion was filed AFTER the RTC
Manila had already dismissed the Petition.
Nevertheless, answers to the administrative complaints
started pouring in at the DECS, as prepared personally by
the striking teachers or by their lawyers.
After initial assessments of the reports coming in from the
principals of the schools concerned and the answers of the
striking teachers, the DECS Special Task Force prepared on
October 9, 1990 and submitted to respondent Secretary
Carino the Guidelines and Criteria as to the nature of the
evidence to be assessed and the corresponding penalty to
be imposed against the striking teachers, which was
approved by respondent Secretary Carino on the same
day. A copy of the aforesaid Guidelines and Criteria is
hereto attached as Annex "2." Thereafter, the DECS Special
Task Force proceeded with its task of investigating the
cases against the striking teachers.
Those who refused to sign the DECS return-to-work order,
the preventive suspension orders and the charge
sheets, some even tearing up the documents presented to
them by their principals were considered by the DECS
Special Task Force as having waived their right to be heard;
their cases had to be resolved on the basis of the records.
Nevertheless, the DECS Special Task Force summoned the
principals concerned, who then testified under oath
confirming their reports on the absences of the striking
teachers. Some clarificatory questions were asked of them
on the manner of the service of the DECS orders and the
situation obtaining in their schools.
For those who answered the charge sheets, the DECS
Special Task Force set the administrative cases for
hearing. Many of the striking teachers refused to appear at
the hearings but preferred to submit their case on the basis
of their answers.
With regard to those who attended the hearings, each of
the absent or striking teachers was investigated and asked
questions under oath on their answers and the reasons for
their absences and/or joining the teachers' strike. Some
teachers reiterated their answers to the charge sheets,
either giving justifiable reasons for their absences on the
days mentioned or maintaining their stubborn stand that
they have all the right to absent themselves from classes in
the exercise of their constitutional right to join mass action
to demand from the government what are supposedly due
them. Still the DECS Special Task Force was not satisfied
with their written answers and explanation during the
hearings. The principals of the striking teachers were
summoned and they confirmed under oath their reports of
absences and/or on teachers joining the strike.
After having conducted fully their investigations, the DECS
Special Task Force submitted in series their investigation
reports and recommendation for each category of striking
teachers to respondent Secretary Carino. The investigation
reports, together with their supporting documents,
submitted by the DECS Special Task Force indicated clearly
the manner and conduct of the administrative hearings,
the nature and weight of the evidence adduced, and the
correspondingly penalty or exoneration recommended.
were forwarded to the principals of the striking teachers
concerned. Those exonerated were allowed to resume
their duties and received their back salaries. Some of the
teachers either suspended or dismissed have already
received the copies of the decisions, either personally or
through mail.
xxx xxx x x x22
This copious citation is made, not to suggest that the Court finds
what is stated therein to be true and the contrary averments of the
petitions to be false, but precisely to stress that the facts upon which
the question of alleged denial of due process would turn are still in
issue, actively controverted, hence not yet established.
It is not for the Court, which is not a trier of facts, as the petitioners
who would now withdraw correctly put it, to make the crucial
determination of what in truth transpired concerning the disputed
incidents. Even if that were within its competence, it would be at
best a monumental task. At any rate, the petitioners cannot-as it
seems they have done lump together into what amounts to a class
action hundreds of individual cases, each with its own peculiar set of
facts, and expect a ruling that would justly and correctly resolve
each and everyone of those cases upon little more than general
allegations, frontally disputed as already pointed out, of incidents
supposedly "representative" of each case or group of cases.
This case illustrates the error of precipitate recourse to the Supreme
Court, especially when numerous parties desparately situated as far
as the facts are concerned gather under the umbrella of a common
plea, and generalization of what should be alleged with particularity
becomes unavoidable. The petitioners' obvious remedy was NOT to
halt the administrative proceedings but, on the contrary, to take
part, assert and vindicate their rights therein, see those proceedings
through to judgment and if adjudged guilty, appeal to the Civil
Service Commission; or if, pending said proceedings, immediate
recourse to judicial authority was believed necessary because the
respondent Secretary or those acting under him or on his
instructions were acting without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with
grave abuse of discretion, to apply, not directly to the Supreme
Court, but to the Regional Trial Court, where there would be an
opportunity to prove the relevant facts warranting corrective relief.
Parties-litigant are duty bound to observe the proper order of
recourse through the judicial hierarchy; they by-pass the rungs of
the judicial ladder at the peril of their own causes.23 This Court is a
court of last resort. Its review jurisdiction is limited to resolving
questions of law where there is no dispute of the facts or the facts
have already been determined by lower tribunals, except only in
criminal actions where capital penalties have been imposed.
WHEREFORE, both petitioners are DISMISSED, without prejudice to
any appeals, if still timely, that the individual petitioners may take to
the Civil Service Commission on the matters complained of. The
motions to withdraw, supra, are merely NOTED, this disposition
rendering any express ruling thereon unnecessary. No
pronouncement as to costs.

On the bases of the investigation reports and

SO ORDERED.
recommendations of the DECS Special Task Force, and
after evaluating the reports and its documents attached,
respondent Secretary Carino promulgated the decisions
either for exoneration, suspension or dismissal. Copies of
the DECS decisions of exoneration, suspension or dismissal