Legal Ethics | Atty Razo | Wednesdays | 5:30 to 8:30 PM
CAYETANO vs. MONSOD in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings,
G.R. No. 100113, September 3, 1991
Facts: Respondent Christian Monsod was
nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino
to the position of chairman of the COMELEC.
Petitioner opposed the nomination because
allegedly Monsod does not possess required
qualification of having been engaged in the
practice of law for at least ten years. The 1987
constitution provides in Section 1, Article IX-
C: There shall be a Commission on Elections
composed of a Chairman and six
Commissioners who shall be natural-born
citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of
their appointment, at least thirty-five years of
age, holders of a college degree, and must
not have been candidates for any elective
position in the immediately preceding
elections. However, a majority thereof,
including the Chairman, shall be members of
the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in
the practice of law for at least ten years.
Issue: Whether the respondent does not
posses the required qualification of having
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten
years.
Held: In the case of Philippine Lawyers
Association vs. Agrava, stated: The practice of
law is not limited to the conduct of cases or
litigation in court; it embraces the
preparation of pleadings and other papers
incident to actions and special proceeding,
the management of such actions and
proceedings on behalf of clients before
judges and courts, and in addition,
conveying. In general, all advice to clients,
and all action taken for them in matters
connected with the law incorporation
services, assessment and condemnation
services, contemplating an appearance
before judicial body, the foreclosure of
mortgage, enforcement of a creditor’s claim
and conducting proceedings in attachment,
and in matters of estate and guardianship
have been held to constitute law practice.
Practice of law means any activity, in or out
court, which requires the application of law,
legal procedure, knowledge, training and
experience.
The contention that Atty. Monsod does not
possesses the required qualification of
having engaged in the practice of law for at
least ten years is incorrect since Atty.
Monsod’s past work experience as a lawyer-
economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-
entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator
of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both
rich and the poor – verily more than satisfy
the constitutional requirement for the
position of COMELEC chairman, The
respondent has been engaged in the practice
of law for at least ten years does In the view
of the foregoing, the petition is DISMISSED.
SECOND DIVISION [ A.C. No. 5737,
October 25, 2004]
FERDINAND A. CRUZ, COMPLAINANT,
VS.
ATTY. STANLEY CABRERA, RESPONDENT.
Facts: Complainant alleges that he is a fourth
year law student; since the latter part of 2001,
he instituted several actions against his
neighbors; he appeared for and in his behalf
in his own cases; he met respondent who
acted as the counsel of his neighbors; during
a hearing on January 14, 2002, in one case
before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 112,
Pasay City, presided by Judge Caridad
Cuerdo.
Respondent’s imputations were uncalled for
and the latter’s act of compelling the court to
ask complainant whether he is a lawyer or not
was intended to malign him before the
public, inasmuch as respondent knew that
complainant is not a lawyer, having appeared
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 Legal Ethics | Atty Razo | Wednesdays | 5:30 to 8:30 PM
for and in his behalf as a party litigant in prior
cases; respondent’s imputations of
complainant’s misrepresentation as a lawyer
was patently with malice to discredit his
honor, with the intention to threaten him not
to appear anymore in cases respondent was
handling; the manner, substance, tone of
voice and how the words “appear ka ng
appear, pumasa ka muna!” were uttered were
totally with the intention to annoy, vex and
humiliate, malign, ridicule, incriminate and
discredit complainant before the public.
Issue: Whether or not respondent violated
Rule 8.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility
Whether or not complainant is not precluded
from litigating personally his cases
Whether or not complainant is engaged in
the practice of law
Ruling: 1. We hold that respondent’s
outburst of “appear ka ng appear, pumasa ka
muna” does not amount to a violation of Rule
8.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Such single outburst, though
uncalled for, is not of such magnitude as to
warrant respondent’s suspension or reproof.
It is but a product of impulsiveness or the
heat of the moment in the course of an
argument between them. It has been said
that lawyers should not be held to too strict
an account for words said in the heat of the
moment, because of chagrin at losing cases,
and that the big way is for the court to
condone even contemptuous language.
2. Nonetheless, we remind respondent that
complainant is not precluded from litigating
personally his cases. A party’s right to
conduct litigation personally is recognized by
Section 34 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court:
SEC. 34. By whom litigation conducted. — In
the court of a justice of the peace a party may
conduct his litigation in person, with the aid
of an agent or friend appointed by him for
that purpose, or with the aid of an attorney.
In any other court, a party may conduct his
litigation personally or by aid of an attorney,
and his appearance must be either personal
or by a duly authorized member of the bar.
3. The practice of law, though impossible to
define exactly, involves the exercise of a
profession or vocation usually for gain,
mainly as attorney by acting in a
representative capacity and as counsel by
rendering legal advise to others. Private
practice has been defined by this Court as
follows:
x x x. Practice is more than an isolated
appearance, for it consists in frequent or
customary action, a succession of acts of the
same kind. In other words, it is frequent
habitual exercise. Practice of law to fall within
the prohibition of statute [referring to the
prohibition for judges and other officials or
employees of the superior courts or of the
Office of the Solicitor General from engaging
in private practice] has been interpreted as
customarily or habitually holding one’s self
out to the public, as a lawyer and demanding
payment for such services. x x x.
Clearly, in appearing for herself, complainant
was not customarily or habitually holding
herself out to the public as a lawyer. Neither
was she demanding payment for such
services. Hence, she cannot be said to be in
the practice of law.
On the other hand, all lawyers should take
heed that lawyers are licensed officers of the
courts who are empowered to appear,
prosecute and defend; and upon whom
peculiar duties, responsibilities and liabilities
are devolved by law as a consequence.
Membership in the bar imposes upon them
certain obligations. Mandated to maintain
the dignity of the legal profession, they must
conduct themselves honorably and fairly.
Though a lawyer’s language may be forceful
and emphatic, it should always be dignified
and respectful, befitting the dignity of the
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 Legal Ethics | Atty Razo | Wednesdays | 5:30 to 8:30 PM
legal profession. The use of intemperate
language and unkind ascriptions has no
place in the dignity of judicial forum.
A.C. No. 6705 March 31, 2006
RUTHIE LIM-SANTIAGO vsATTY. CARLOS
SAGUCIO
DOCTRINE: the law does not distinguish
between consultancy services and retainer
agreement. For as long as respondent
performed acts that are usually rendered by
lawyers with the use of their legal knowledge,
the same falls within the ambit of the term
"practice of law."
FACTS: 1. Ruthie Lim-Santiago
("complainant") is the daughter of Alfonso
Lim and Special Administratrix of his estate.
Alfonso Lim is a stockholder and the former
President of Taggat Industries, Inc, a
domestic corporation engaged in the
operation of timber concessions from the
government. PCGG sequestered it and its
operations ceased.
2. Atty. Carlos B. Sagucio ("respondent")
was the former Personnel Manager and
Retained Counsel of Taggat Industries, Inc.
until his appointment as Assistant Provincial
Prosecutor of Tuguegarao, Cagayan.
3. employees of Taggat ("Taggat
employees") filed a criminal complaint
entitled "Jesus Tagorda, Jr. et al. v. Ruthie
Lim-Santiago," docketed as I.S. No. 97-240
("criminal complaint"). Taggat employees
alleged that complainant, who took over the
management and control of Taggat after the
death of her father, withheld payment of
their salaries and wages without valid cause
4. Respondent, as Assistant Provincial
Prosecutor, was assigned to conduct the
preliminary investigation. He resolved the
criminal complaint by recommending the
filing of 651 Informations for violation of
Article 288 in relation to Article 116 of the
Labor Code of the Philippines.
5. Complainant now charges
respondent with the following violations:
a. Rule 15.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility- guilty of
representing conflicting interests.
Respondent, being the former Personnel
Manager and Retained Counsel of Taggat,
knew the operations of Taggat very well.
Respondent should have inhibited himself
from hearing, investigating and deciding the
case filed by Taggat employees.
b. Engaging in the private practice of
law while working as a government
prosecutor- Engaging in the private practice
of law while working as a government
prosecutor. He received retainer’s fees which
respondent claims to only consultation fees.
6. Complainant seeks the disbarment of
respondent for the violations committed.
7. Respondent claims that when the
criminal complaint was filed, respondent had
resigned from Taggat for more than five
years and refutes complainant’s allegations
and counters that complainant was merely
aggrieved by the resolution of the criminal
complaint which was adverse and contrary to
her expectation.
8. Respondent points out that
complainant did not file a motion to inhibit
respondent from hearing the criminal
complaint and states that complainant’s
reason in not filing a motion to inhibit was
her impression that respondent would
exonerate her from the charges filed
9. While this disbarment case was
pending, the Resolution and Order issued by
respondent to file 651 Informations against
complainant was reversed and set aside by
Regional State Prosecutor. Hence, the
criminal complaint was dismissed.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent was
engaged in private practice of law while
being a public official.
HELD: YES. Government prosecutors are
prohibited to engage in the private practice
of law. The act of being a legal consultant is
a practice of law. To engage in the practice of
law is to do any of those acts that are
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 Legal Ethics | Atty Razo | Wednesdays | 5:30 to 8:30 PM
characteristic of the legal profession. It
covers any activity, in or out of court, which
required the application of law, legal
principles, practice or procedures and calls
for legal knowledge, training and experience.
ISSUE: whether being a former lawyer of
Taggat conflicts with his role as Assistant
Provincial Prosecutor
HELD: YES. A lawyer owes something to a
former client. Herein Respondent owes to
Taggat, a former client, the duty to "maintain
inviolate the client’s confidence or to refrain
from doing anything which will injuriously
affect him in any matter in which he
previously represented him."
I.S. No. 97-240 was filed for "Violation of
Labor Code" (see Resolution of the Provincial
Prosecutors Office, Annex "B" of Complaint).
Herein Complainant, Ruthie Lim-Santiago,
was being accused as having the
"management and control" of Taggat.
Clearly, as a former Personnel Manager and
Legal Counsel of Taggat, herein Respondent
undoubtedly handled the personnel and
labor concerns of Taggat. Respondent,
undoubtedly dealt with and related with the
employees of Taggat. Therefore, Respondent
undoubtedly dealt with and related with
complainants in I.S. No. 97-240.
It should not be forgotten, however, that a
lawyer has an immutable duty to a former
client with respect to matters that he
previously handled for that former client. In
this case, matters relating to personnel, labor
policies, and labor relations that he
previously handled as Personnel Manager
and Legal Counsel of Taggat. I.S. No. 97-240
was for "Violation of the Labor Code." Here
lies the conflict. Perhaps it would have been
different had I.S. No. 97-240 not been labor-
related, or if Respondent had not been a
Personnel Manager concurrently as Legal
Counsel. But as it is, I.S. No. 97-240 is labor-
related and Respondent was a former
Personnel Manager of Taggat.
RULING. The Court exonerates respondent
from the charge of violation of Rule 15.03 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility
(conflicting interest.) In the present case, we
find no conflict of interests when respondent
handled the preliminary investigation of the
criminal complaint filed by Taggat
employees in 1997. The issue in the criminal
complaint pertains to non-payment of wages
that occurred from 1 April 1996 to 15 July
1997. Clearly, respondent was no longer
connected with Taggat during that period
since he resigned sometime in 1992.
However, the Court finds respondent liable
for violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility against
unlawful conduct. 42 Respondent committed
unlawful conduct when he violated Section
7(b)(2) of the Code of Conduct and Ethical
Standards for Public Officials and Employees
or Republic Act No. 6713 ("RA 6713").
Respondent is mandated under Rule 1.01 of
Canon 1 not to engage in "unlawful x x x
conduct." Unlawful conduct includes
violation of the statutory prohibition on a
government employee to "engage in the
private practice of [his] profession unless
authorized by the Constitution or law,
provided, that such practice will not conflict
or tend to conflict with [his] official
functions."
Dela Cruz v Paras
G.R. No. L-42571-72 July 25, 1983
Facts: 1. Assailed was the validity of an
ordinance which prohibit the operation of
night clubs. Petitioners contended that the
ordinance is invalid, tainted with nullity, the
municipality being devoid of power to
prohibit a lawful business, occupation or
calling. Petitioners at the same time alleging
that their rights to due process and equal
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 Legal Ethics | Atty Razo | Wednesdays | 5:30 to 8:30 PM
protection of the laws were violated as the
licenses previously given to them was in
effect withdrawn without judicial hearing.
2. RA 938, as amended, was originally
enacted on June 20, 1953. It is entitled: "An
Act Granting Municipal or City Boards and
Councils the Power to Regulate the
Establishments, Maintenance and Operation
of Certain Places of Amusement within Their
Respective Territorial Jurisdictions.'
The first section reads, "The municipal or city
board or council of each chartered city shall
have the power to regulate by ordinance the
establishment, maintenance and operation
of night clubs, cabarets, dancing schools,
pavilions, cockpits, bars, saloons, bowling
alleys, billiard pools, and other similar places
of amusement within its territorial
jurisdiction:
On May 21, 1954, the first section was
amended to include not merely "the power
to regulate, but likewise "Prohibit ... " The
title, however, remained the same. It is
worded exactly as RA 938.
3. As thus amended, if only the said portion
of the Act was considered, a municipal
council may go as far as to prohibit the
operation of night clubs. The title was not in
any way altered. It was not changed one bit.
The exact wording was followed. The power
granted remains that of regulation, not
prohibition.
4. Petitioners contended that RA 938 which
prohibits the operation of night clubs would
give rise to a constitutional question. The
lower court upheld the constitutionality and
validity of Ordinance No. 84 and dismissed
the cases. Hence this petition for certiorari by
way of appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not the ordinance is valid
NO. It is unconstitutional. It undoubtly
involves a measure not embraced within the
regulatory power but an exercise of an
assumed power to prohibit.
1. The Constitution mandates: "Every bill
shall embrace only one subject which shall be
expressed in the title thereof. "Since there is
no dispute as the title limits the power to
regulating, not prohibiting, it would result in
the statute being invalid if, as was done by
the Municipality of Bocaue, the operation of
a night club was prohibited. There is a wide
gap between the exercise of a regulatory
power "to provide for the health and safety,
promote the prosperity, and improve the
morals, in the language of the Administrative
Code, such competence extending to all "the
great public needs.
2. In accordance with the well-settled
principle of constitutional construction that
between two possible interpretations by one
of which it will be free from constitutional
infirmity and by the other tainted by such
grave defect, the former is to be preferred. A
construction that would save rather than one
that would affix the seal of doom certainly
commends itself.
3. Under the Local Govt Code, it is clear that
municipal corporations cannot prohibit the
operation of night clubs. They may be
regulated, but not prevented from carrying
on their business. It would be, therefore, an
exercise in futility if the decision under review
were sustained. All that petitioners would
have to do is to apply once more for licenses
to operate night clubs. A refusal to grant
licenses, because no such businesses could
legally open, would be subject to judicial
correction. That is to comply with the
legislative will to allow the operation and
continued existence of night clubs subject to
appropriate regulations. In the meanwhile, to
compel petitioners to close their
establishments, the necessary result of an
affirmance, would amount to no more than a
temporary termination of their business.
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 Legal Ethics | Atty Razo | Wednesdays | 5:30 to 8:30 PM
4. Herein what was involved is a measure not
embraced within the regulatory power but an
exercise of an assumed power to prohibit.
In the Matter of JAMES JOSEPH HAMM
Arizona Supreme Court No. SB-04-0079-
M211 Ariz 458, 123 p.3d 652, 2005
FACTS: - Hamm, the Petitioner, was
sentenced to life in prison for one-count of
first-degree murder to which he pled guilty.
Prior to serving his sentence, Hamm had
been separated from his wife with whom he
had a son and had supported himself by
selling and using marijuana, other drugs and
drinking alcohol.
- The crime for which Hamm was sentenced
to life imprisonment is for the murder of
Morley and Well,who were killed by Hamm
along with two accomplices, Garland Wells
and Bill Reeser. The three robbedand killed
Morley and Well by shooting them with a
gun and leaving their bodies lying in the
dessert.
- While in prison, Hamm exhibited good
conduct and became a model prisoner which
earned him aconditioned parole. Hamm was
released after serving nearly seventeen years
in prison. Fromconditioned parole, Hamm
absolutely discharged on December 2001.-
While on parole, Hamm graduated from the
Arizona State University College of Law. In
July 1999,Hamm passed the Arizona bar
examination and, in 2004, filed his Character
and Fitness Report with theCommittee.- In its
report, the Committee stated that, in
reaching its conclusions, it considered the
following:
 Hamm’s unlawful conduct, which
included the commission of two
violent “execution style” murders and
his testimony as to the facts
surrounding the murders
 Hamm’s omissions on his Application
and his testimony in explaining his
failure to disclose all required
information.
 Hamm’s neglect of his financial
responsibilities and/or violation of a
longstanding child support court
order and his testimony as to his
failure to comply with the court order.
 Hamm’s mental or emotional
instability impairing his ability to
perform the functions of an attorney
including his testimony as to any
diagnosis and treatment.
ISSUE: Whether or not Hamm can be
admitted to the Bar.
HELD: No, the Supreme Court decided that
Hamm failed to prove his burden that he is
of good moral character on the following
grounds:
 Hamm failed to show rehabilitation
from past criminal conduct by not
accepting full responsibility for
serious criminal misconduct -Staples’
murder although he accepted
responsibility for the death of Morley.
 Hamm was not completely up-front
in his testimony to the murder of
which he claims that he only intended
to rob and not to kill. This is contrary
to the facts he accepted the gun and
brings it with him in the car, shot
Morley without attempting robbery
and shot hit again to ensure he is
dead and shot Staples when he
attempted to escape.
 Hamm’s failure to fulfill his long
overdue obligation to support his
child who he was aware existed.
 Hamm’s failure to disclose the
incident involving him and his wife,
Donna, when he submitted his
application to the Committee. This
incident gave rise to Hamm being
questioned by the law enforcers
which should have been reflected by
Hamm in the application – Question
25.
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 Legal Ethics | Atty Razo | Wednesdays | 5:30 to 8:30 PM
 Hamm’s act of quoting lines from
Supreme Courts’ decision and use the
same in the introduction for his
petition.
PENTECOSTES VS MARASIGAN
SECOND DIVISION[ A.M. No. P-07-2337
(Formerly A.M. OCA IPI No. 04-2060-P),
August 03, 2007 ]
Facts: The administrative case against
respondent stemmed from a sworn affidavit-
complaint filed by Rolly Pentecostes, the
owner of a Kawasaki motorcycle, which was
recovered by members of the PNP of M’lang,
North Cotabato from suspected carnappers
against whom a criminal case for carnapping,
was lodged at RTC.
On the order of the trial court, the chief of
police of M’lang, North Cotabato turned over
the motorcycle to respondent who
acknowledged receipt thereof.
After the conduct of hearings to determine
the true owner of the motorcycle, the trial
court issued an Order for its release to
Pentecostes.
Pentecostes immediately asked respondent
to release the motorcycle to him.
Respondent, however, told him to wait and
come back repeatedly from 2001 up to the
filing of the complaint.
Issue: On the topic of good moral character
Ruling: Section 7 of Rule 136 of the Rules of
Court, provides:
SEC. 7. Safekeeping of property. – The clerk
shall safely keep all record, papers, files,
exhibits and public property committed to
his charge, including the library of the court,
and the seals and furniture belonging to his
office.
From the above provisions, it is clear that as
clerk of court of the RTC, Kabacan,
respondent was charged with the custody
and safekeeping of Pentecostes’ motorcycle,
and to keep it until the termination of the
case, barring circumstances that would justify
its safekeeping elsewhere, and upon the prior
authority of the trial court.
No explanation was offered by respondent,
however, for turning over the motorcycle. But
whatever the reason was, respondent was
mandated to secure prior consultations with
and approval of the trial court.
This Court has repeatedly emphasized that
clerks of court are essential and ranking
officers of our judicial system who perform
delicate functions vital to the prompt and
proper administration of justice. Their duties
include the efficient recording, filing and
management of court records and, as
previously pointed out, the safekeeping of
exhibits and public property committed to
their charge.
Misconduct is a transgression of some
established or definite rule of action; more
particularly, it is an unlawful behavior by the
public officer. The misconduct is grave if it
involves any of the additional elements of
corruption, willful intent to violate the law or
to disregard established rules, which must be
proved by substantial evidence. Otherwise,
the misconduct is only simple, as in this case.
Father Ranhilio Aquino vs Atty. Edwin
Pascua
539 SCRA 1, November 28, 2007
Facts: Father Aquino, Academic head of
Philippine Judicial Academy, filed a
complaint against Atty. Edwin Pascua, a
Notary Public for violation of the Notarial
Practice Law. He alleged that Atty. Pascua
falsified two documents wherein both
documents had “Doc. No. 1213, Page No.
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 Legal Ethics | Atty Razo | Wednesdays | 5:30 to 8:30 PM
243. Book III, Series of 1998” and both are
dated on December 10, 1998. It was shown
by the Clerk of Court of RTC-Tuguegarao that
none of these entries appear in the Notarial
Register of Atty. Pascua. In his comment,
Atty. Pascua admitted having notarized the
two documents on December 10, 1998, but
they were not entered in his Notarial Register
due to the oversight of his legal secretary.
Complainant maintains that Atty. Pascua’s
omission was not due to inadvertence but a
clear case of falsification.
Issue: Whether or not Atty. Pascua violated
the Notarial Practice Rule.
Ruling: Yes. Under the notarial law, “the
notary public shall enter in such register, in
chronological order, the nature of each
instrument executed, sworn to, or
acknowledged before him, the person
executing, swearing to, or acknowledging the
instrument. Failure of the notary to make the
proper entry or entries in his notarial
register touching his notarial acts in the
manner required by law is a ground for
revocation of his commission.”
Atty. Pascua claims that the omission was not
intentional but due to oversight of his staff.
Whichever is the case, Atty. Pascua cannot
escape liability. His failure to enter into his
notarial register the documents that he
admittedly notarized is a dereliction of duty
on his part as a notary public and he is bound
by the acts of his staff.
Furthermore, the claim of Atty. Pascua of
simple inadvertence is untenable. The
photocopy of his notarial register shows that
the last entry which he notarized on
December 28, 1998 is Document No. 1200 on
Page 240. On the other hand, the two
affidavit-complaints allegedly notarized on
December 10, 1998 are Document Nos. 1213
and 1214, respectively, under Page No. 243,
Book III. Thus, Fr. Ranhilio and the other
complainants are correct in maintaining that
Atty. Pascua falsely assigned fictitious
numbers to the questioned affidavit-
complaints, a clear dishonesty on his part not
only as a Notary Public, but also as a member
of the Bar.
A member of the Bar may be disciplined or
disbarred for any misconduct in his
professional or private capacity. The Court
has invariably imposed a penalty for
notaries public who were found guilty of
dishonesty or misconduct in the performance
of their duties.
Atty Pascua is declared guilty of misconduct
and is suspended from the practice of law for
3 months with a stern warning that a
repetition of the same act will be dealt with
more severely. His notarial commission is
revoked.
NON-DISCLOSURE BEFORE THE JUDICIAL
AND BAR COUNCIL OF THE
ADMINISTRATIVE CASE FILED AGAINST
JUDGE JAIME V. QUINTAIN
530 SCRA 729, August 22, 2007
FACTS: In May 17, 2003, Judge Jaime Vega
Quintain was appointed Presiding judge at
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) Branch 10,
Davao City. Subsequently thereto, the Office
of the Court Administrator Received a
confidential information that Administrative
and Criminal cases were filed against Judge
Quintain in his capacity as then Assistant
Regional Director of the National Police
Commission (NAPOLCOM) Regional Office
11, Davao City, as a result of which he was
dismissed from the service per
Administrative Order (A.O.) no. 183 dated
April 10, 1995.
To confirm the veracity of the information,
then Deputy Court Administrator (DCA)
Christopher O. Lock (now Court
Administrator) requested from the
Sandiganbayan certified copies of the Orders
dismissing the criminal cases. On even Date,
letter were sent to the NAPOLCOM
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 Legal Ethics | Atty Razo | Wednesdays | 5:30 to 8:30 PM
requesting for certified copies of documents
relative to the administrative complaints filed
against Judge Quintain, particularly A. O. 183
dated April 10, 1995 dismissing him from the
service.
In a letter dated November 28, 2003, the
NAPOLCOM furnished the office of the Court
Administrator a copy of A.O. No. 183
showing that respondent judge was indeed
dismissed from the service for Grave
Misconduct for falsifying or altering the
amounts reflected in disbursement vouchers
in support of his claim for reimbursement
expenses.
This fact did not appear in his Personal Data
Sheet when he submitted his application as
Judge. Quintain explained that he was not
aware of his administrative dismissal in
NAPOLCOM. However, there were articles in
some newspaper that even featured his
ouster and his subsequent appeal to clear his
name.
Thus the OCA recommended that:
a. The instant administrative case against
respondent be docket as administrative
matter
b. That he be dismissed from the service with
prejudice from his reappointment to any
government, including government owned
or controlled corporation and with forfeiture
of all retirement benefits except accrued
leave credits.
When the case reaches the Supreme Court,
Judge Quintain tendered his resignation
which was accepted without prejudice to the
decision of the Administrative case.
ISSUES: A. Does the resignation of Judge
Quintain renders that administrative case
moot and academic?
B. Whether or not Judge Quintain is liable for
his non-disclosure in the Personal Data Sheet
of the administrative case against him?
HELD: 1. The resignation of Judge Quintain
which was accepted by the court without
prejudice does not render moot and
academic in the instant of the administrative
case. The decision of the court had at the
time of the filling of the administrative
complaint is not lost by the mere fact that the
respondent judge by his resignation and its
consequent acceptance- without prejudice-
by this court, has ceased to be in office
during the pendency of the case. The court
retains its authority to pronounce
respondent judge either innocent or guilty of
the charges against him. A contrary rule
would be fraught with injustice, indeed, if
innocent, the respondent judge merits
vindication of his name and integrity as he
leaves the government; if guilty, he deserves
to receive the corresponding censure and
penalty which is proper and imposable under
the situation
2. Yes, Judge Quintain is Liable for his Non-
Disclosure if the administrative case in his
Personal Data sheet. On the strength of his
misinterpretation, Judge Quintain has misled
the Judicial and Bar Council by making it
appear that he had a clean record and was
qualified to join the judiciary. His prior to his
dismissal from the government service s a
blot on his record, which has gone worse and
has spread even more because of his
concealment of it. Had he not concealed the
said vital fact, it would have been taken into
consideration when the Council acted on his
application. His act of dishonesty renders him
unfit to join the judiciary, much less sitting as
a judge, and to remain in the Judiciary he has
tainted with his falsehood. It even appear
that he was dismissed by the NAPOLCOM for
misconduct and dishonesty.
The judiciary emphasized the need for
honesty and integrity on the part of all those
who are in its service. It is often stressed that
the conduct required, must always be
beyond reproach and circumscribed with the
heavy burden of responsibility as to let them
be free from any suspicion that may taint the
judiciary. The Court condemns and will never
countenance any conduct, act or omission on
the part of all those involved in the
administration of justice , which would
9 | Peejay Notes
 Legal Ethics | Atty Razo | Wednesdays | 5:30 to 8:30 PM
violate the norm of public accountability and
diminish or even just tend to diminish the
faith of the people on the judiciary.
Bernardo, Jr. vs. Mejia, 211 SCRA 852 ,
July 29, 1992
Attorneys; An attorney who appropriated
money entrusted by his client, and who
falsely gave assurances that he used the
money for the purposes intended, and who
issued bad checks to re-pay them is ordered
debarred.—A thoroughgoing review of the
affidavits, pleadings and other papers filed
by the parties convinces this Court of the
correctness of the foregoing conclusions of
the IBP Board of Governors. They are
consequently hereby adopted and approved.
WHEREFORE, the Court DECLARES the
respondent, Atty. Ismael F. Mejia, guilty of all
the charges against him and hereby imposes
on him the penalty of DISBARMENT. Pending
finality of this judgment, and effective
immediately, Atty. Ismael F. Mejia is hereby
SUSPENDED from the practice of law. Let a
copy of this Decision be spread in his record
in the Bar Confidant’s Office, and notice
thereof furnished the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, as well as the Court
Administrator who is DIRECTED to inform all
the Courts concerned of this Decision.
GSIS v. Pacquing
A.M. No. RTJ-04-1831, En Banc, Res.,
February 2, 2007, per Corona, J.
How may a judge be made
administratively liable for ignorance of
the law?
For a judge to be administratively liable for
ignorance of the law, the acts complained of
must be gross or patent.
What constitutes gross ignorance of the
law for a judge?
To constitute gross ignorance of the law,
such acts must not only be contrary to
existing law and jurisprudence but also
motivated by bad faith, fraud, malice or
dishonesty.
Does an honest divergence of opinion
constitute gross ignorance of the law?
NO, the honest divergence of opinion as to
the legal issues and applicable laws involved
does not constitute gross ignorance of the
law more so if there is no evidence that
respondent judge’s acts were imbued with
malice or bad faith.
Define bad faith.
Bad faith does not simply connote poor or
flawed judgment; it imports a dishonest
purpose, moral obliquity or conscious doing
of a wrong.
Will an administrative complaint against a
judge prosper when there still exists other
sufficient remedies for a party in a case?
NO, the filing of an administrative complaint
is not the proper remedy for correcting the
actions of a judge perceived to have gone
beyond the norms of propriety, where a
sufficient remedy exists. The actions against
judges should not be considered as
complementary or suppletory to, or
substitute for, the judicial remedies which
can be availed of by a party in a case.
Velez vs. De Vera,
496 SCRA 345 , July 25, 2006
Attorneys; Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP); The Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) By-Laws do not allow for preelection
disqualification proceedings—absent a final
judgment by the Supreme Court in a proper
case declaring otherwise, every lawyer
aspiring to hold the position of IBP Regional
Director is presumed morally fit.—The
distinctions between the two cases are far
from trivial. The previous case was resolved
on the basis of the parties’ rights and
obligations under the IBP By-laws. We held
therein that Atty. de Vera cannot be
disqualified from running as Regional
10 | Peejay Notes
 Legal Ethics | Atty Razo | Wednesdays | 5:30 to 8:30 PM
Governor as there is nothing in the present
IBP By-laws that sanctions the
disqualification of candidates for IBP
governors. Consequently, we stressed that
the petition had no firm ground to stand on.
Likewise, we held that the complainants
therein were not the proper parties to bring
the suit as the IBP By-laws prescribes that
only nominees—which the complainants
were not—can file with the IBP President a
written protest against the candidate. The
Court’s statement, therefore, that Atty. de
Vera cannot be disqualified on the ground
that he was not morally fit was mere obiter
dictum. Precisely, the IBP By-laws do not
allow for pre-election disqualification
proceedings; hence, Atty. de Vera cannot be
disqualified on the basis of the administrative
findings of a hearing officer of the State Bar
of California suspending him from the
practice of law for three years. We held in
that case that—There is nothing in the By-
Laws which explicitly provides that one must
be morally fit before he can run for IBP
governorship. For one, this is so because the
determination of moral fitness of a candidate
lies in the individual judgment of the
members of the House of Delegates. Indeed,
based on each member’s standard of
morality, he is free to nominate and elect any
member, so long as the latter possesses the
basic requirements under the law. For
another, basically the disqualification of a
candidate involving lack of moral fitness
should emanate from his disbarment or
suspension from the practice of law by this
Court, or conviction by final judgment of an
offense which involves moral turpitude. What
this simply means is that absent a final
judgment by the Supreme Court in a proper
case declaring otherwise, every lawyer
aspiring to hold the position of IBP Regional
Director is presumed morally fit. Any person
who begs to disagree will not be able to find
a receptive audience in the IBP through a
petition for disqualification but must first file
the necessary disbarment or suspension
proceeding against the lawyer concerned.
Disbarment; Conflict of Laws; Where there is
technically no foreign judgment to speak of,
the recommendation by the hearing officer
of the State Bar of another jurisdiction does
not constitute prima facie evidence of
unethical behavior by a Philippine lawyer
practicing in said jurisdiction.—In Philippine
Aluminum Wheels, Inc. v. Fasgi Enterprises,
Inc., 342 SCRA 722 (2000), we explained that
“[a] foreign judgment is presumed to be valid
and binding in the country from which it
comes, until a contrary showing, on the basis
of a presumption of regularity of
proceedings and the giving of due notice in
the foreign forum.”In herein case,
considering that there is technically no
foreign judgment to speak of, the
recommendation by the hearing officer of
the State Bar of California does not constitute
prima facie evidence of unethical behavior by
Atty. de Vera. Complainant must prove by
substantial evidence the facts upon which the
recommendation by the hearing officer was
based. If he is successful in this, he must then
prove that these acts are likewise unethical
under Philippine law.
Conflicts of Laws; The statutory enumeration
of the grounds for disbarment or suspension
is not to be taken as a limitation on the
general power of courts to suspend or disbar
a lawyer—the inherent power of the court
over its officers cannot be restricted.—
Disciplinary action against a lawyer is
intended to protect the court and the public
from the misconduct of officers of the court
and to protect the administration of justice
by requiring that those who exercise this
important function shall be competent,
honorable and reliable men in whom courts
and clients may repose confidence. The
statutory enumeration of the grounds for
disbarment or suspension is not to be taken
as a limitation on the general power of courts
to suspend or disbar a lawyer. The inherent
power of the court over its officers cannot be
restricted
11 | Peejay Notes
 Legal Ethics | Atty Razo | Wednesdays | 5:30 to 8:30 PM
Malpractice; Unprofessional Conduct; Words
and Phrases; Malpractice ordinarily refers to
any malfeasance or dereliction of duty
committed by a lawyer; Unprofessional
conduct in an attorney is that which violates
the rules on ethical code of his profession or
which is unbecoming a member of that
profession.—Malpractice ordinarily refers to
any malfeasance or dereliction of duty
committed by a lawyer. Section 27 gives a
special and technical meaning to the term
“Malpractice.” That meaning is in consonance
with the elementary notion that the practice
of law is a profession, not a business.
Unprofessional conduct in an attorney is that
which violates the rules on ethical code of his
profession or which is unbecoming a
member of that profession.
Burden of Proof; In cases filed before
administrative and quasijudicial bodies, a fact
may be deemed established if it is supported
by substantial evidence or that amount of
relevant evidence which a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to justify a
conclusion—it means such evidence which
affords a substantial basis from which the
fact in issue can be reasonably inferred.—In
fact, Atty. de Vera did not deny complainant’s
allegation in the latter’s memorandum that
he (de Vera) received US$12,000.00 intended
for his client and that he deposited said
amount in his personal account and not in a
separate trust account and that, finally, he
spent the amount for personal purposes. At
this point, it bears stressing that in cases filed
before administrative and quasi-judicial
bodies, a fact may be deemed established if
it is supported by substantial evidence or that
amount of relevant evidence which a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate
to justify a conclusion. It means such
evidence which affords a substantial basis
from which the fact in issue can be
reasonably inferred.
Unprofessional Conduct; Beyond doubt, the
unauthorized use by a lawyer of his client’s
funds is highly unethical.—Beyond doubt,
the unauthorized use by a lawyer of his
client’s funds is highly unethical. Canon 16 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility is
emphatic about this, thus: CANON 16. A
LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL
MONEYS AND PROPERTIES OF HIS CLIENT
THAT MAY COME TO HIS POSSESSION. Rule
16.01. A lawyer shall account for all money or
property collected or received for or from the
client. Rule 16.02. A lawyer shall keep the
funds of each client separate and apart from
his own and those of others kept by him.
Attorneys; When the integrity of a member of
the bar is challenged, it is not enough that he
denies the charges against him—he must
meet the issue and overcome the evidence
against him.—Aside from these self-serving
statements, however, we cannot find
anywhere in the records of this case proof
that indeed Atty. de Vera was duly authorized
to use the funds of his client. In Radjaie v.
Atty. Alovera, 337 SCRA 244 (2000), we
declared that—When the integrity of a
member of the bar is challenged, it is not
enough that he denies the charges against
him; he must meet the issue and overcome
the evidence against him. He must show
proof that he still maintains that degree of
morality and integrity which at all times is
expected of him. Atty. de Vera cannot rely on
the statement made by the hearing officer
that the elder Willis had indeed testified that
he “expected de Vera might use the money
for a few days.” As Atty. de Vera had
vigorously objected to the admissibility of
the document containing this statement, he
is now estopped from relying thereon.
Besides, that the elder Willis “expected de
Vera might use the money for a few days”
was not so much an acknowledgment of
consent to the use by Atty. de Vera of his
client’s funds as it was an acceptance of the
probability that Atty. de Vera might, indeed,
use his client’s funds, which by itself did not
12 | Peejay Notes
 Legal Ethics | Atty Razo | Wednesdays | 5:30 to 8:30 PM
speak well of the character of Atty. de Vera or
the way such character was perceived.
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP);
Transferring Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) membership to a chapter where the
lawyer is not a resident is not a ground for his
suspension or disbarment—the Code of
Professional Responsibility as well as the
Lawyer’s Oath do not prohibit nor punish
lawyers from aspiring to be IBP National
President and from doing perfectly legal acts
in accomplishing such goal.—As it was
perfectly within Atty. de Vera’s right to
transfer his membership, it cannot be said
that he is guilty of unethical conduct or
behavior. And while one may incessantly
argue that a legal act may not necessarily be
ethical, in herein case, we do not see
anything wrong in transferring to an IBP
chapter that—based on the rotation rule—
will produce the next IBP EVP who will
automatically succeed to the National
Presidency for the next term. Our Code of
Professional Responsibility as well as the
Lawyer’s Oath do not prohibit nor punish
lawyers from aspiring to be IBP National
President and from doing perfectly legal acts
in accomplishing such goal.
Same; Due Process; The position of Executive
Vice President (EVP) of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP) is not property within
the constitutional sense especially since
there is no right to security of tenure over
said position.—It needs stressing that the
constitutional provision on due process
safeguards life, liberty and property. It cannot
be said that the position of EVP of the IBP is
property within the constitutional sense
especially since there is no right to security of
tenure over said position as, in fact, all that is
required to remove any member of the board
of governors for cause is a resolution
adopted by 2/3 of the remaining members of
the board.
Due Process; Words and Phrases; The term
“due process of law” as used in the
Constitution has no fixed meaning for all
purposes due “to the very nature of the
doctrine which, asserting a fundamental
principle of justice rather than a specific rule
of law, is not susceptible of more than one
general statement”—the phrase is so elusive
of exact apprehension, because it depends
on circumstances and varies with the subject
matter and the necessities of the situation;
The due process clause guarantees no
particular form of procedure and its
requirements are not technical.—Even if the
right of due process could be rightfully
invoked, still, in administrative proceedings,
the essence of due process is simply the
opportunity to explain one’s side. At the
outset, it is here emphasized that the term
“due process of law” as used in the
Constitution has no fixed meaning for all
purposes due “to the very nature of the
doctrine which, asserting a fundamental
principle of justice rather than a specific rule
of law, is not susceptible of more than one
general statement.” The phrase is so elusive
of exact apprehension, because it depends
on circumstances and varies with the subject
matter and the necessities of the situation.
Due process of law in administrative cases is
not identical with “judicial process” for a trial
in court is not always essential to due
process. While a day in court is a matter of
right in judicial proceedings, it is otherwise in
administrative proceedings since they rest
upon different principles. The due process
clause guarantees no particular form of
procedure and its requirements are not
technical. Thus, in certain proceedings of
administrative character, the right to a notice
or hearing are not essential to due process of
law. The constitutional requirement of due
process is met by a fair hearing before a
regularly established administrative agency
or tribunal. It is not essential that hearings be
had before the making of a determination if
thereafter, there is available trial and tribunal
before which all objections and defenses to
13 | Peejay Notes
 Legal Ethics | Atty Razo | Wednesdays | 5:30 to 8:30 PM
the making of such determination may be
raised and considered. One adequate
hearing is all that due process requires. What
is required for “hearing” may differ as the
functions of the administrative bodies differ.
Same; The right to cross-examine is not an
indispensable aspect of due process.—The
right to cross-examine is not an
indispensable aspect of due process. Nor is
an actual hearing always essential especially
under the factual milieu of this case where
the members of the IBP Board—upon whose
shoulders the determination of the cause for
removal of an IBP governor is placed subject
to the approval of the Supreme Court—all
witnessed Atty. de Vera’s actuations in the
IBP National Convention in question. It is
undisputed that Atty. de Vera received a copy
of the complaint against him and that he was
present when the matter was taken up. From
the transcript of the stenographic notes of
the 13 May 2005 meeting wherein Atty. de
Vera was removed, it is patent that Atty. de
Vera was given fair opportunity to defend
himself against the accusations made by
Atty. Rivera.
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP); Words
and Phrases; The phrase “remaining
members” in Section 44 of the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines (IBP) By-Laws refers to the
members exclusive of the complainant
member and the respondent member.—
Under the rules, a resolution for expulsion of
an IBP Governor is done via a resolution
adopted by 2/3 of the remaining members.
The phrase “remaining members” refers to
the members exclusive of the complainant
member and the respondent member. The
reason therefore is that such members are
interested parties and are thus presumed to
be unable to resolve said motion impartially.
This being the case, the votes of Attys. Rivera
and de Vera should be stricken-off which
means that only the votes of the seven
remaining members are to be counted. Of
the seven remaining members, five voted for
expulsion while two voted against it which
still adds up to the 2/3 vote requirement for
expulsion.
Same; Doctrine of Majority Rule; Indubitably,
conflicts and disagreements of varying
degrees of intensity, if not animosity, are
inherent in the internal life of an
organization, but especially of the IBP since
lawyers are said to disagree before they
agree; The effectiveness of the IBP, like any
other organization, is diluted if the conflicts
are brought outside its governing body for
then there would be the impression that the
IBP, which speaks through a Board of
Governors, does not and cannot speak for its
members in an authoritative fashion; As a
means of self-preservation, internecine
conflicts must be adjusted within the
governing board itself so as to free it from
the stresses that invariably arise when
internal cleavages are made public.—After
weighing the arguments of the parties and in
keeping with the fundamental objective of
the IBP to discharge its public responsibility
more effectively, we hereby find that Atty. de
Vera’s removal from the IBP Board was not
capricious or arbitrary. Indubitably, conflicts
and disagreements of varying degrees of
intensity, if not animosity, are inherent in the
internal life of an organization, but especially
of the IBP since lawyers are said to disagree
before they agree. However, the
effectiveness of the IBP, like any other
organization, is diluted if the conflicts are
brought outside its governing body for then
there would be the impression that the IBP,
which speaks through the Board of
Governors, does not and cannot speak for its
members in an authoritative fashion. It would
accordingly diminish the IBP’s prestige and
repute with the lawyers as well as with the
general public. As a means of self-
preservation, internecine conflicts must thus
be adjusted within the governing board itself
so as to free it from the stresses that
invariably arise when internal cleavages are
made public.
14 | Peejay Notes
 Legal Ethics | Atty Razo | Wednesdays | 5:30 to 8:30 PM
Same; Same; The doctrine of majority rule is
almost universally used as a mechanism for
adjusting and resolving conflicts and
disagreements within the group after the
members have been given an opportunity to
be heard; When the IBP Board is not seen by
the bar and the public as a cohesive unit, it
cannot effectively perform its duty of helping
the Supreme Court enforce the code of legal
ethics and the standards of legal practice as
well as improve the administration of
justice.—The doctrine of majority rule is
almost universally used as a mechanism for
adjusting and resolving conflicts and
disagreements within the group after the
members have been given an opportunity to
be heard. While it does not efface conflicts,
nonetheless, once a decision on a
contentious matter is reached by a majority
vote, the dissenting minority is bound
thereby so that the board can speak with one
voice, for those elected to the governing
board are deemed to implicitly contract that
the will of the majority shall govern in
matters within the authority of the board. The
IBP Board, therefore, was well within its right
in removing Atty. de Vera as the latter’s
actuations during the 10th National IBP
Convention were detrimental to the role of
the IBP Board as the governing body of the
IBP. When the IBP Board is not seen by the
bar and the public as a cohesive unit, it
cannot effectively perform its duty of helping
the Supreme Court enforce the code of legal
ethics and the standards of legal practice as
well as improve the administration of justice.
In view of the importance of retaining group
cohesiveness and unity, the expulsion of a
member of the board who insists on bringing
to the public his disagreement with a
policy/resolution approved by the majority
after due discussion, cannot be faulted. The
effectiveness of the board as a governing
body will be negated if its pronouncements
are resisted in public by a board member.
Indeed, when a member of a governing body
cannot accept the voice of the majority, he
should resign therefrom so that he could
criticize in public the majority
opinion/decision to his heart’s content;
otherwise, he subjects himself to disciplinary
action by the body.
Same; To be Executive Vice President (EVP) of
the IBP, one must necessarily be a member of
the IBP Board of Governors, and a lawyer’s
removal from the Board of Governors
automatically disqualifies him from acting as
IBP EVP.—The removal of Atty. de Vera as
member of the Board of Governors ipso facto
meant his removal as EVP as well. Section 47,
Article VII of the By-Laws of the IBP provides:
SEC. 47. National Officers.—The Integrated
Bar of the Philippines shall have a President
and Executive Vice President to be chosen by
the Board of Governors from among nine (9)
regional governors, as much as practicable,
on a rotation basis. x x x Thus, to be EVP of
the IBP, one must necessarily be a member of
IBP Board of Governors. Atty. de Vera’s
removal from the Board of Governors,
automatically disqualified him from acting as
IBP EVP. To insist otherwise would be
contrary to Section 47 of the IBP ByLaws.
Same; Supreme Court; The power of
supervision of the Supreme Court over the
IBP should not preclude the IBP from
exercising its reasonable discretion especially
in the administration of its internal affairs
governed by the provisions of its By-Laws.—
While it is true that the Supreme Court has
been granted an extensive power of
supervision over the IBP, it is axiomatic that
such power should be exercised prudently.
The power of supervision of the Supreme
Court over the IBP should not preclude the
IBP from exercising its reason able discretion
especially in the administration of its internal
affairs governed by the provisions of its By-
Laws. The IBP By-Laws were precisely drafted
and promulgated so as to define the powers
and functions of the IBP and its officers,
establish its organizational structure, and
15 | Peejay Notes
 Legal Ethics | Atty Razo | Wednesdays | 5:30 to 8:30 PM
govern relations and transactions among its
officers and members. With these By-Laws in
place, the Supreme Court could be assured
that the IBP shall be able to carry on its day-
to-day affairs, without the Court’s
interference.
Same; Article VI, Section 41(g) of the IBP By-
Laws expressly grants to the Board the
authority to fill vacancies, however arising, in
the IBP positions.—With the removal of Atty.
de Vera from the Board, by virtue of the IBP
Board Resolution dated 13 May 2005, he was
also removed from his post as EVP; thus,
there was a resultant vacancy in the position
of IBP EVP. Article VI, Section 41(g) of the IBP
By-Laws expressly grants to the Board the
authority to fill vacancies, however arising, in
the IBP positions, subject to the provisions of
Section 8 of the Integration Rule, and Section
11 (Vacancies), Section 44 (Removal of
members), Section 47 (National officers),
Section 48 (other officers), and Section 49
(Terms of Office) of the By-Laws. The IBP
Board has specific and sufficient guidelines in
its Rules and By-Laws on how to fill-in the
vacancies after the removal of Atty. de Vera.
We have faith and confidence in the
intellectual, emotional and ethical
competencies of the remaining members of
the 2005-2007 Board in dealing with the
situation within the bounds of the IBP Rules
and By-Laws.
Same; Rotation Rule; Automatic Succession
Rule; The rotation rule pertains in particular
to the position of IBP EVP, while the
automatic succession rule pertains to the
Presidency—the rotation with respect to the
Presidency is but a consequence of the
automatic succession rule provided in
Section 47 of the IBP By-Laws.—In Bar Matter
491, it is clear that it is the position of IBP EVP
which is actually rotated among the nine
Regional Governors. The rotation with
respect to the Presidency is merely a result of
the automatic succession rule of the IBP EVP
to the Presidency. Thus, the rotation rule
pertains in particular to the position of IBP
EVP, while the automatic succession rule
pertains to the Presidency. The rotation with
respect to the Presidency is but a
consequence of the automatic succession
rule provided in Section 47 of the IBP By-
Laws. In the case at bar, the rotation rule was
duly complied with since upon the election of
Atty. De Vera as IBP EVP, each of the nine IBP
regions had already produced an EVP and,
thus, the rotation was completed. It is only
unfortunate that the supervening event of
Atty. de Vera’s removal as IBP Governor and
EVP rendered it impossible for him to assume
the IBP Presidency. The fact remains,
however, that the rotation rule had been
completed despite the non-assumption by
Atty. de Vera to the IBP Presidency.
Same; Same; The application of the rotation
rule is not a license to disregard the spirit and
purpose of the automatic succession rule, but
should be applied in harmony with the latter;
The automatic succession rule affords the IBP
leadership transition seamless and enables
the new IBP National President to attend to
pressing and urgent matters without having
to expend valuable time for the usual
adjustment and leadership consolidation
period.—The application of the rotation rule
is not a license to disregard the spirit and
purpose of the automatic succession rule, but
should be applied in harmony with the latter.
The automatic succession rule affords the IBP
leadership transition seamless and enables
the new IBP National President to attend to
pressing and urgent matters without having
to expend valuable time for the usual
adjustment and leadership consolidation
period. The time that an IBP EVP spends
assisting a sitting IBP President on matters
national in scope is in fact a valuable and
indispensable preparation for the eventual
succession. It should also be pointed out that
this wisdom is further underscored by the
fact that an IBP EVP is elected from among
the members of the IBP Board of Governors,
who are serving in a national capacity, and
16 | Peejay Notes
 Legal Ethics | Atty Razo | Wednesdays | 5:30 to 8:30 PM
not from the members at large. It is intrinsic
in the IBP ByLaws that one who is to assume
the highest position in the IBP must have
been exposed to the demands and
responsibilities of national leadership.
A.C. No. 7204 March 7, 2007
ADVINCULA vs. MACABATA
Facts: The case is a disbarment case against
respondent on the ground of gross
immorality. It was alleged that sometime in
December 2004, complainant seek for legal
advice from peitioner regarding her
collectibles from a travel company.
Respondent sent Demand Letter and
sometime in February 2005, they met at
Zensho Restaurant to discuss the possibility
of filing complaint against the travel
company because the latter failed to settle
the accounts. That after that said meeting,
the respondent "held her arm and kissed her
on the cheek while embracing her very
tightly."
The two met again to finalize the draft
for the complaint and while on their way
home after the said meeting, the respondent
suddenly stopped the car and things went
out of hand. Thus, she decided to refer the
case to another lawyer.
Issue: Whether or not the respondent
committed acts are grossly immoral which
would warrant the disbarment or suspension
from the practice of law.
Held: The Code of Professional
Responsibility provides:
CANON I – x x x
Rule 1.01-- A lawyer shall not engage in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.
CANON 7-- A lawyer shall at all times uphold
the integrity and dignity of the legal
profession and support the activities of the
Integrated Bar.
xxxx
Rule 7.03-- A lawyer shall not engage in
conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness
to practice law, nor shall he, whether in public
or private life, behave in a scandalous
manner to the discredit of the legal
profession.
The SC held that lawyers are expected
to abide the tenets of morality, not only upon
admission to the Bar but all throughtout their
legal career as lawyers belong to an exclusive
and honored fraternity. Lawyers are called
upon to safeguard the integrity of the legal
profession and should adhere to the
unwaveringly to the highest standard of
morality. The respondent admitted to the act
of kissing the complainant on the lips as
evidenced as well of his asking for apology
from complainant in his text message.
Regardless of the fact that the respondent
admitted that he kissed the complainant but
the Court held that this was not accompanied
by malice because the respondent
immediately asked for forgiveness after
sensing the annoyance of the respondent
after texting him. Thus the Court held that
this is not grossly immoral nor highly
reprehensible which will warrant disbarment
or suspension. But the Court reprimanded
respondent to be more prudent and
cautious.
Corazon Nevada vs Atty. Rodolfo
Casuga
In 2007, Corazon Nevada, filed a
disbarment case against Atty. Rodolfo
Casuga. Nevada alleged the following:
That Atty. Casuga acquired several
pieces of jewelry from her; the jewelries
include diamond earrings and diamond rings
amounting P300,000.00. and a Rolex gold
watch worth $12,000.00; that Casuga assured
her that he will sell them; but despite
repeated demands, Casuga never remitted
any money nor did he return said jewelries.
17 | Peejay Notes
 Legal Ethics | Atty Razo | Wednesdays | 5:30 to 8:30 PM
That in 2006, Casuga, taking
advantage of his close relationship with
Nevada (they belong to the same religious
sect), Casuga represented himself as the
hotel administrator of the hotel (Mt. Crest)
that Nevada own; that as such, Casuga was
able to enter into a contract of lease with one
Jung Chul; that he negotiated an office space
with Chul in said Hotel for P90,000.00; that
Casuga notarized said agreement; that he
forged the signature of Edwin Nevada
(husband); that he never remitted the P90k to
Nevada.
In his defense, Casuga said:
That Nevada actually pawned said
jewelries in a pawnshop; that she later
advised Casuga’s wife to redeem said
jewelries using Mrs. Casuga’s wife; that
Casuga can sell said jewelries and reimburse
herself from the proceeds; that he still has
possession of said jewelries.
That he never received the
P90,000.00; that it was received by a certain
Pastor Oh; that he was authorized as an
agent by Edwin Nevada to enter into said
contract of lease.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is merit
in Atty. Casuga’s defense.
HELD: No. Atty. Casuga is in violation
of the following:
1. Gross Misconduct: Casuga
misrepresented himself as a duly authorized
representative of Nevada when in fact he was
not. He never adduced evidence showing
that he was duly authorized either by Edwin
or Corazon. He also dialed to adduce
evidence proving that he never received the
P90k from Chul. On the contrary, a notarized
letter showed that Casuga did receive the
money. His misrepresentations constitute
gross misconduct and his mere denial does
not overcome the evidence presented
against him.
2. Violated Canon 16 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility: It is his duty as a
lawyer to account for all moneys and
property of his client that may come to his
possession. This is still applicable even
though said property/money did not come
to his possession by virtue of a lawyer-client
relationship. He failed to adduce evidence to
prove his claim that Nevada pawned said
jewelries. He never presented receipts.
Further, even assuming that Nevada did
pawn said items, Casuga was still duty bound
to return said jewelries upon demand by
Nevada.
3. Violation of Notarial Rules: He
signed a document (contract of lease) in
behalf of another person without
authorization. His forgery made him an
actual party to the contract. In effect he was
notarizing a document in which he is party in
violation of the notarial rules (Secs. 1 and 3,
Rule IV).
4. Malpractice of Law: As a
summation of all the above violations,
Casuga is guilty of Malpractice and
Misconduct. Such act is punishable under
Sec. 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.
However, the Supreme Court deemed that
disbarment is too severe a punishment
against Casuga. He was suspended for 4
years from the practice of law. His notarial
commission was likewise revoked and he is
disqualified to be a notary public while
serving his suspension. The Supreme Court
emphasized: the penalty of disbarment shall
be meted out only when the lawyer’s
misconduct borders on the criminal and/or is
committed under scandalous circumstance.
IN RE: ATTY. LEONARD DE VERA,
A.M. No. 01-12-03-SC. July 29, 2002
Quoted hereunder is a newspaper
article with contemptuous statements
attributed to Atty. Leonard De Vera
18 | Peejay Notes
 Legal Ethics | Atty Razo | Wednesdays | 5:30 to 8:30 PM
concerning the Plunder Law case while the
same was still pending before the Court.
“De Vera asked the Supreme Court to
dispel rumors that it would vote in favor of a
petition filed by Estrada’s lawyers to declare
the plunder law unconstitutional for its
supposed vagueness.”
PHILIPPINE DAILY INQUIRER
Monday, November 19, 2001
Atty. Leonard De Vera also argued
that he was merely exercising his
constitutionally guaranteed right tofreedom
of speech when he said that a decision by the
Court declaring the Plunder Law
unconstitutional
“would trigger mass actions, probably
more massive than those that led to People
Power II.” While Atty.
Leonard De Vera admitted to having
uttered the afore cited statements,
respondent denied having made the same to
degrade the Court, to destroy public
confidence in it and to bring it into disrepute.
Issue: WON Atty. Leonard De Vera is liable
for indirect contempt of court for uttering
statements aimed atinfluencing and
threatening the Court in deciding in favor of
the constitutionality of the Plunder Law.
Held: Yes, after a careful consideration of
respondent’s arguments, the Court finds his
explanation unsatisfactory and hereby finds
him guilty of indirect contempt of court for
uttering statements aimed at influencing and
threatening the Court in deciding in favor of
the constitutionality of the Plunder Law. Rule
71, Section 3 (d) of the Revised Rules of Court
authorizes the courts to hold liable for
criminal contempt a person guilty of conduct
that is directed against the dignity or
authority of the court, or of an act
obstructing the administration of justice
which tends to bring the court into disrepute
or disrespect.
Indeed, freedom of speech includes
the right to know and discuss judicial
proceedings, but such right does not cover
statements aimed at undermining the Court’s
integrity and authority, and interfering with
the administration of justice. Freedom of
speech is not absolute and must occasionally
be balanced with the requirements of equally
important public interests, such as the
maintenance of the integrity of the courts
and orderly functioning of the administration
of justice.
Thus, the making of contemptuous
statements directed against the Court is not
an exercise of free speech; rather, it is an
abuse of such right. Unwarranted attacks on
the dignity of the courts cannot be disguised
as free speech, for the exercise of said right
cannot be used to impair the independence
and efficiency of courts or public respect
therefore and confidence therein. In People
vs. Godoy, this Court explained that while a
citizen may comment upon the proceedings
and decisions of the court and discuss their
correctness, and even express his opinions
on the fitness or unfitness of the judges for
their stations, and the fidelity with which they
perform the important public trusts reposed
in them, he has no right to attempt to
degrade the court, destroy public confidence
in it, and encourage the people to disregard
and set naught its orders, judgments and
decrees. Such publications are said to be an
abuse of the liberty of speech and of the
press, for they tend to destroy the very
foundation of good order and well-being in
society by obstructing the course of justice.
Clearly, respondent’s utterances
pressuring the Court to rule in favor of the
constitutionality of the Plunder Law or
risk another series of mass actions by
the public cannot be construed as falling
within the ambit of constitutionally-
protected speech, because such statements
are not fair criticisms of any decision of the
Court, but obviously are threats made
against it to force the Court to decide the
19 | Peejay Notes
 Legal Ethics | Atty Razo | Wednesdays | 5:30 to 8:30 PM
issue in a particular manner, or risk earning
the ire of the public.
Such statements show disrespect not
only for the Court but also for the judicial
system as a whole, tend to promote distrust
and undermine public confidence in the
judiciary, by creating the impression that the
Court cannot be trusted to resolve cases
impartially and violate the right of the parties
to have their case tried fairly by an
independent tribunal, uninfluenced by public
clamor and other extraneous influences.
Soriano v. Dizon
A.C. No. 6792. January 25, 2006.
FACTS: While driving on his way home, a taxi
driver (herein complainant) overtook the car
driven by herein respondent. Incensed,
respondent tailed the taxi driver until the
latter stopped to make a turn. An altercation
resulted therefrom that got to the point that
the respondent fired and shot complainant
hitting him on the neck. He fell on the thigh
of the respondent so the latter pushed him
out and sped off.
ISSUE: WON respondent’s guilt warrants
disbarment.
RULING: Yes. Moral turpitude has been
defined as “everything which is done
contrary to justice, modesty, or good morals;
an act of baseness, vileness or depravity in
the private and social duties which a man
owes his fellowmen, or to society in general,
contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or
good morals.” It is also glaringly clear that
respondent seriously transgressed Canon 1
of the Code of Professional Responsibility
through his illegal possession of an
unlicensed firearm and his unjust refusal to
satisfy his civil liabilities.
AGUIRRE VS RANA (2003)
FACTS: Respondent Edwin L. Rana was
among those who passed the 2000 Bar
Examinations.
A day before the scheduled mass
oath-taking of successful bar examiners,
petitioner Donna Marie Aguirre filed a
complaint charging Rana of unauthorized
practice of law, grave misconduct, violation
of law, and grave misrepresentation.
The Court allowed respondent to take
his oath as a member of the Bar at the PICC,
however, the respondent cannot sign the Roll
of Attorneys pending the resolution of the
charge against him. Thus, respondent passed
the bar, took the lawyer’s oath on the
scheduled date but has not signed the Roll of
Attorneys.
Petitioner alleges that respondent,
while not yet a lawyer, appeared as counsel
of a political candidate, signed pleadings as
well as represent himself as counsel in
proceedings.
ISSUE: Whether Rana engaged in the
unauthorized practice of law and thus does
not deserve admission to the Philippine Bar.
HELD: Yes. In Cayetano v. Monsod, the Court
held that “practice of law” means any activity,
in or out of court, which requires the
application of law, legal procedure,
knowledge, training and experience. To
engage in the practice of law is to perform
acts which are usually performed by
members of the legal profession. Generally,
to practice law is to render any kind of service
which requires the use of legal knowledge or
skill.
The right to practice law is not a
natural or constitutional right but is a
privilege. It is limited to persons of good
moral character with special qualifications
duly ascertained and certified. The exercise of
this privilege presupposes possession of
integrity, legal knowledge, educational
20 | Peejay Notes
 Legal Ethics | Atty Razo | Wednesdays | 5:30 to 8:30 PM
attainment, and even public trust4 since a
lawyer is an officer of the court. A bar
candidate does not acquire the right to
practice law simply by passing the bar
examinations. The practice of law is a
privilege that can be withheld even from one
who has passed the bar examinations, if the
person seeking admission had practiced law
without a license.
It is true that the respondent passed
the 2000 Bar Examinations and took the
lawyer’s oath. However, it is the signing in the
Roll of Attorneys that finally makes one a full-
fledged lawyer. The fact that respondent
passed the bar examinations is immaterial.
Passing the bar is not the only qualification
to become an attorney-at-law. Respondent
should know that two essential requisites for
becoming a lawyer still had to be performed,
namely: his lawyer’s oath to be administered
by this Court and his signature in the Roll of
Attorneys.
Edwin Rana is denied Admission to
the Philippine Bar.
Cruz vs. Mina, 522 SCRA 382 ,
April 27, 2007
Criminal Procedure; Law Student
Practice Rule; As succinctly clarified in Bar
Matter No. 730, by virtue of Section 34, Rule
138, a law student may appear, as an agent
or a friend of a party litigant, without the
supervision of a lawyer before inferior
courts.—Section 34, Rule 138 is clear that
appearance before the inferior courts by a
non-lawyer is allowed, irrespective of
whether or not he is a law student. As
succinctly clarified in Bar Matter No. 730, by
virtue of Section 34, Rule 138, a law student
may appear, as an agent or a friend of a party
litigant, without the supervision of a lawyer
before inferior courts.
Same; Recovery of Civil Liability;
When a criminal action is instituted, the civil
action for the recovery of civil liability arising
from the offense charged shall be deemed
instituted with criminal action, unless the
offended party waives the civil action,
reserves the right to institute it separately or
institutes the civil action prior to the criminal
action.—Under Article 100 of the Revised
Penal Code, every person criminally liable for
a felony is also civilly liable except in
instances when no actual damage results
from an offense, such as espionage, violation
of neutrality, flight to an enemy country, and
crime against popular representation. The
basic rule applies in the instant case, such
that when a criminal action is instituted, the
civil action for the recovery of civil liability
arising from the offense charged shall be
deemed instituted with criminal action,
unless the offended party waives the civil
action, reserves the right to institute it
separately or institutes the civil action prior
to the criminal action.
Same; Same; Petitioner is correct in
stating that there being no reservation,
waiver nor prior institution of the civil aspect
in Criminal Case No. 00-1705, it follows that
the civil aspect arising from Grave Threats is
deemed instituted with criminal action;
Private prosecutor may rightfully intervene to
prosecute the civil aspect.—The petitioner is
correct in stating that there being no
reservation, waiver, nor prior institution of
the civil aspect in Criminal Case No. 00-1705,
it follows that the civil aspect arising from
Grave Threats is deemed instituted with the
criminal action, and, hence, the private
prosecutor may rightfully intervene to
prosecute the civil aspect.
In the case of FERDINAND A. CRUZ
vs. JUDGE PRISCILLA MIJARES, Presiding
Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 108,
Pasay City, Metro Manila, G.R. No. 154464,
September 11, 2008, the Supreme Court of
the Philippines upheld a litigant’s right to pro
se representation under Sec. 34, Rule 138,
Rules of Court and clarified its distinction in
relation to the Law Student Practice Rule
under Rule 138-A, Rules of Court.
21 | Peejay Notes
 Legal Ethics | Atty Razo | Wednesdays | 5:30 to 8:30 PM
On March 5, 2002, Ferdinand A. Cruz
(petitioner) sought permission to enter his
appearance for and on his behalf, before the
RTC, Branch 108, Pasay City, as the plaintiff in
Civil Case No. 01-0410, for Abatement of
Nuisance. Petitioner, a fourth year law
student, anchors his claim on Section 34 of
Rule 138 of the Rules of Court [3] that a non-
lawyer may appear before any court and
conduct his litigation personally.
During the pre-trial, Judge Priscilla
Mijares required the petitioner to secure a
written permission from the Court
Administrator before he could be allowed to
appear as counsel for himself, a party-
litigant. Atty. Stanley Cabrera, counsel for
Benjamin Mina, Jr., filed a Motion to Dismiss
instead of a pre-trial brief to which petitioner
Cruz vehemently objected alleging that a
Motion to Dismiss is not allowed after the
Answer had been filed. Judge Mijares then
remarked, “Hay naku, masama ‘yung
marunong pa sa Huwes. Ok?” and proceeded
to hear the pending Motion to Dismiss and
calendared the next hearing on May 2, 2002.
On March 6, 2002, petitioner Cruz
filed a Manifestation and Motion to Inhibit,
[4] praying for the voluntary inhibition of
Judge Mijares. The Motion alleged that
expected partiality on the part of the
respondent judge in the conduct of the trial
could be inferred from the contumacious
remarks of Judge Mijares during the pre-trial.
It asserts that the judge, in uttering an
uncalled for remark, reflects a negative frame
of mind, which engenders the belief that
justice will not be served. [5]
In an Order [6] dated April 19, 2002,
Judge Mijares denied the motion for
inhibition stating that throwing tenuous
allegations of partiality based on the said
remark is not enough to warrant her
voluntary inhibition, considering that it was
said even prior to the start of pre-trial.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration
[7] of the said order.
On May 10, 2002, Judge Mijares
denied the motion with finality. [8] In the
same Order, the trial court held that for the
failure of petitioner Cruz to submit the
promised document and jurisprudence, and
for his failure to satisfy the requirements or
conditions under Rule 138-A of the Rules of
Court, his appearance was denied.
In a motion for reconsideration, [9]
petitioner reiterated that the basis of his
appearance was not Rule 138-A, but Section
34 of Rule 138. He contended that the two
Rules were distinct and are applicable to
different circumstances, but the respondent
judge denied the same, still invoking Rule
138-A, in an Order [10] dated July 31, 2002.
On August 16, 2002, the petitioner
directly filed with this Court, the instant
petition.
The core issue raised before the Court
was whether the respondent court acted with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction when it denied the
appearance of the petitioner as party litigant
and when the judge refused to inhibit herself
from trying the case.
Rule 138-A, or the Law Student
Practice Rule, provides:
RULE 138-A
LAW STUDENT PRACTICE RULE
Section 1. Conditions for Student
Practice. – A law student who has successfully
completed his 3rd year of the regular four-
year prescribed law curriculum and is
enrolled in a recognized law school's clinical
legal education program approved by the
Supreme Court, may appear without
22 | Peejay Notes
 Legal Ethics | Atty Razo | Wednesdays | 5:30 to 8:30 PM
compensation in any civil, criminal or
administrative case before any trial court,
tribunal, board or officer, to represent
indigent clients accepted by the legal clinic of
the law school.
Sec. 2. Appearance. – The appearance
of the law student authorized by this rule,
shall be under the direct supervision and
control of a member of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines duly accredited by the law
school. Any and all pleadings, motions, briefs,
memoranda or other papers to be filed, must
be signed by the supervising attorney for and
in behalf of the legal clinic.
The respondent court held that the
petitioner could not appear for himself and
on his behalf because of his failure to comply
with Rule 138-A. In denying petitioner’s
appearance, the court a quo tersely finds
refuge in the fact that, on December 18,
1986, this Court issued Circular No. 19, which
eventually became Rule 138-A, and the
failure of Cruz to prove on record that he is
enrolled in a recognized school’s clinical legal
education program and is under supervision
of an attorney duly accredited by the law
school.
However, the petitioner insisted that
the basis of his appearance was Section 34 of
Rule 138, which provides:
Sec. 34. By whom litigation is
conducted. - In the court of a justice of the
peace, a party may conduct his litigation in
person, with the aid of an agent or friend
appointed by him for that purpose, or with
the aid of an attorney. In any other court, a
party may conduct his litigation personally or
by aid of an attorney, and his appearance
must be either personal or by a duly
authorized member of the bar.
and is a rule distinct from Rule 138-A.
From the clear language of this
provision of the Rules, it will have to be
conceded that the contention of the
petitioner has merit. It recognizes the right of
an individual to represent himself in any case
to which he is a party. The Rules state that a
party may conduct his litigation personally or
with the aid of an attorney, and that his
appearance must either be personal or by a
duly authorized member of the Bar. The
individual litigant may personally do
everything in the course of proceedings from
commencement to the termination of the
litigation. [14] Considering that a party
personally conducting his litigation is
restricted to the same rules of evidence and
procedure as those qualified to practice law,
[15] petitioner, not being a lawyer himself,
runs the risk of falling into the snares and
hazards of his own ignorance. Therefore,
Cruz as plaintiff, at his own instance, can
personally conduct the litigation of Civil Case
No. 01-0410. He would then be acting not as
a counsel or lawyer, but as a party exercising
his right to represent himself.
The trial court must have been misled
by the fact that the petitioner is a law student
and must, therefore, be subject to the
conditions of the Law Student Practice Rule.
It erred in applying Rule 138-A, when the
basis of the petitioner’s claim is Section 34 of
Rule 138. The former rule provides for
conditions when a law student may appear in
courts, while the latter rule allows the
appearance of a non-lawyer as a party
representing himself.
The conclusion of the trial court that
Rule 138-A superseded Rule 138 by virtue of
Circular No. 19 is misplaced. The Court never
intended to repeal Rule 138 when it released
the guidelines for limited law student
practice. In fact, it was intended as an
addendum to the instances when a non-
lawyer may appear in courts and was
23 | Peejay Notes
 Legal Ethics | Atty Razo | Wednesdays | 5:30 to 8:30 PM
incorporated to the Rules of Court through
Rule 138-A.
It may be relevant to recall that, in
respect to the constitutional right of an
accused to be heard by himself and counsel,
[16] this Court has held that during the trial,
the right to counsel cannot be waived. [17]
The rationale for this ruling was articulated in
People v. Holgado, [18] where we declared
that “even the most intelligent or educated
man may have no skill in the science of law,
particularly in the rules of procedure, and
without counsel, he may be convicted not
because he is guilty but because he does not
know how to establish his innocence.”
The case at bar involves a civil case,
with the petitioner as plaintiff therein. The
solicitous concern that the Constitution
accords the accused in a criminal prosecution
obviously does not obtain in a civil case.
Thus, a party litigant in a civil case, who insists
that he can, without a lawyer’s assistance,
effectively undertake the successful pursuit
of his claim, may be given the chance to do
so. In this case, petitioner alleges that he is a
law student and impliedly asserts that he has
the competence to litigate the case himself.
Evidently, he is aware of the perils incident to
this decision.
In addition, it was subsequently
clarified in Bar Matter 730, that by virtue of
Section 34, Rule 138, a law student may
appear as an agent or a friend of a party
litigant, without need of the supervision of a
lawyer, before inferior courts. Here, we have
a law student who, as party litigant, wishes to
represent himself in court. We should grant
his wish.
Additionally, however, petitioner
contends that the respondent judge
committed manifest bias and partiality by
ruling that there is no valid ground for her
voluntary inhibition despite her alleged
negative demeanor during the pre-trial when
she said: “Hay naku, masama ‘yung
marunong pa sa Huwes. Ok?” Petitioner avers
that by denying his motion, the respondent
judge already manifested conduct indicative
of arbitrariness and prejudice, causing
petitioner’s and his co-plaintiff’s loss of faith
and confidence in the respondent’s
impartiality.
We do not agree.
It must be noted that because of this
incident, the petitioner filed an
administrative case [19] against the
respondent for violation of the Canons of
Judicial Ethics, which we dismissed for lack of
merit on September 15, 2002. We now adopt
the Court’s findings of fact in the
administrative case and rule that there was
no grave abuse of discretion on the part of
Judge Mijares when she did not inhibit
herself from the trial of the case.
In a Motion for Inhibition, the movant
must prove the ground for bias and prejudice
by clear and convincing evidence to
disqualify a judge from participating in a
particular trial, [20] as voluntary inhibition is
primarily a matter of conscience and
addressed to the sound discretion of the
judge. The decision on whether she should
inhibit herself must be based on her rational
and logical assessment of the circumstances
prevailing in the case before her. [21] Absent
clear and convincing proof of grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the judge, this Court
will rule in favor of the presumption that
official duty has been regularly performed.
In fine, the Court PARTIALLY
GRANTED the petition, modified the assailed
Resolution and Order of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 108, Pasay City, and directed it
to ADMIT the Entry of Appearance of
petitioner in Civil Case No. 01-0410 as a party
litigant.
In re Atty. Marcial Edillon,
24 | Peejay Notes
 Legal Ethics | Atty Razo | Wednesdays | 5:30 to 8:30 PM
84 SCRA 554, August 03, 1978
Bar Integration; Attorneys;
Disbarment; Payment of membership dues;
Integration of the Bar, its concept and
purpose.—An “Integrated Bar” is a State-
organized Bar, to which every lawyer must
belong, as distinguished from bar
associations organized by individual lawyers
themselves, membership in which is
voluntary. Integration of the Bar is essentially
a process by which every member of the Bar
is afforded an opportunity to do his share in
carrying out the objectives of the Bar as well
as obliged to hear his portion of its
responsibilities. Organized by or under the
direction of the State, an Integrated Bar is an
official national body of which all lawyers are
required to be members. They are, therefore,
subject to all the rules prescribed for the
governance of the Bar, including the
requirement of payment of a reasonable
annual fee for the effective discharge of the
purposes of the Bar, and adherence to a code
of professional ethics or professional
responsibility breach of which constitutes
sufficient reason for investigation by the Bar
and, upon proper cause appearing, a
recommendation for discipline or
disbarment of the offending member. The
integration of the Philippine Bar was
obviously dictated by overriding
considerations of public interest and public
welfare to such an extent as more than
constitutionally and legally justifies the
restrictions that integration imposes upon
the personal interests and personal
convenience of individual lawyers.
Same; Same; Same; Police power;
Integration of the Bar is a valid exercise of
police power of the State; Practice of law,
nature of.—Apropos to the above, it must be
stressed that all legislation directing the
integration of the Bar have been uniformly
and universally sustained as a valid exercise
of the police power over an important
profession. The practice of law is not a vested
right but a privilege, a privilege moreover
clothed with public interest because a lawyer
owes substantial duties not only to his client,
but also to his brethren in the profession, to
the courts, and to the nation, and takes part
in one of the most important functions of the
State—the administration of justice—as an
officer of the court. The practice of law being
clothed with public interest, the holder of this
privilege must submit to a degree of control
for the common good, to the extent of the
interest he has created. As the U. S. Supreme
Court through Mr. Justice Roberts explained,
the expression “affected with a public
interest” is the equivalent of “subject to the
exercise of the police power”.
Same; Same; Same; Courts; Supreme
Court authorized to adopt rules of court to
effect integration of the Philippine Bar;
Purposes of integration of the Bar.—When,
therefore. Congress enacted Republic Act
No. 6397 authorizing the Supreme Court to
“adopt rules of court to effect the integration
of the Philippine Bar under such conditions
as it shall see fit,” it did so in the exercise of
the paramount-police power of the State.
The Act’s avowal is to “raise the standards of
the legal profession, improve the
administration of justice, and enable the Bar
to discharge its public responsibility more
effectively.” Hence, the Congress in enacting
such Act, the Court in ordaining the
integration of the Bar through its Resolution
promulgated on January 9, 1973, and the
President of the Philippines in decreeing the
constitution of the IBP into a body corporate
through Presidential Decree No. 181 dated
May 4, 1973, were prompted by fundamental
considerations of public welfare and
motivated by a desire to meet the demands
of pressing public necessity. The State, in
order to promote the general welfare, may
interfere with and regulate personal liberty,
property and occupations. Persons and
property may be subjected to restraints and
burdens in order to secure the general
prosperity and welfare of the State (U.S.
Gomez, Jesus, 31 Phil. 218), for, as the Latin
25 | Peejay Notes
 Legal Ethics | Atty Razo | Wednesdays | 5:30 to 8:30 PM
maxim goes, “Salus populi eat suprema lex.”
The public welfare is the supreme law. To this
fundamental principle of government the
rights of individuals are subordinated. Liberty
is a blessing without which life is a misery, but
liberty should not be made to prevail over
authority because then society will fall into
anarchy (Calalang vs. Williams, 70, Phil. 726).
It is an undoubted power of the State to
restrain some individuals from all freedom,
and all individuals from some freedom.
Same; Same; Same; Practice of law
and exercise of the legal profession clothed
with public interest and lawyers must be
bound by such regulations as might be
established by the proper authorities for the
common good; Reasons.—Thus, when the
respondent Edillon entered upon the legal
profession, his practice of law and his
exercise of the said profession, which affect
the society at large, were (and are) subject to
the power of the body politic to require him
to conform to such regulations as might be
established by the proper authorities for the
common good, even to the extent of
interfering with some of his liberties. If he did
not wish to submit himself to such
reasonable interference and regulation, he
should not have clothed the public with an
interest in his concerns.
Same; Same; Same; Constitutional
Law; Constitutionality and validity of Bar
integration sustained by explicit grant of
precise power to the Supreme Court under
Art. X of the 1973 Constitution resting the
Court with plenary power in all cases
regarding admistion to and supervision of
the practice of law.—But the most
compelling argument sustaining the
constitutionality and validity of Bar
Integration in the Philippines is the explicit
unequivocal grant of precise power to the
Supreme Court by Section 5 (5) of Article X of
the 1973 Constitution of the Philippines. xxx
Quite apart from the above, let it be stated
that even without the enabling Act (Republic
Act No. 6397), and looking solely to the
language of the provision of the Constitution
granting the Supreme Court the power “to
promulgate rules concerning pleading,
practice and procedure in all courts, and the
admission to the practice of law,” it at once
becomes indubitable that this constitutional
declaration vests the Supreme Court with
plenary power in all cases regarding the
admission to and supervision of the practice
of law.
Same; Same; Same; Same;
Membership dues; Effect of Bar integration
upon a lawyer’s freedom of association;
Compelling a lawyer to be a member of the
Integrated Bar not violative of the
constitutional freedom to associate but the
only compulsion a lawyer is subjected is the
payment of annual dues which is not
violation of the Constitution; Compulsion
upon a lawyer if any justified by exercise of
police power of the State; Reasons.—The first
objection posed by the respondent is that
the Court is without power to compel him to
become a member of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines, hence, Section 1 of the Court
Rule is unconstitutional for it impinges on his
constitutional right of freedom to associate
(and not to associate). Our answer is: To
compel a lawyer to be a member of the
Integrated Bar is no violative of his
constitution freedom to associate.
Integration does not make a lawyer a
member of any group of which he is not
already a member. He became a member of
the Bar when he passed the Bar
examinations. All that integration actually
does is to provide an official national
organization for the well-defined but
unorganized and incohesive group of which
every lawyer is already a member. Bar
Integration does not compel the lawyer to
associate with anyone. He is free to attend or
not attend the meetings of his Integrated Bar
Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its
elections as he chooses. The only compulsion
to which he is subjected is the payment of
26 | Peejay Notes
 Legal Ethics | Atty Razo | Wednesdays | 5:30 to 8:30 PM
annual dues. The Supreme Court, in order to
further the State’s legitimate interest in
elevating the quality of professional legal
services, may require that the cost of
improving the professional in his fashion be
shared by the subjects and beneficiaries of
the regulatory program—the lawyers.
Assuming that the questioned provision does
in a sense compel a lawyer to be member of
the Integrated Bar, such compulsion is
justified as an exercise of the police power of
the State.
Same; Same; Same: Same; Same;
Provisions of the Court Rule requiring
payment of membership dues by lawyers not
violative of the Constitution; The 1973
Constitution does not prohibit the Supreme
Court from requiring lawyers to pay
reasonable membership fees; Nature of
membership fees.—The second issue posed
by the respondent is that the provision of the
Court Rule repairing payment of a
membership fee is void. We see nothing in
the Constitution that prohibits the Court,
under its constitutional power and duty to
promulgate rules concerning the admission
to the practice of law and the integration of
the Philippine Bar (Article X, Section 5 of the
1973 Constitution)—which power the
respondent acknowledges—from requiring
members of a privileged class, such as
lawyers are, to pay a reasonable fee toward
defraying the expenses of regulation of the
profession to which they belong. It is quite
apparent that the fee is indeed imposed as a
regulatory measure, designed to raise funds
for carrying out the objectives and purposes
of integration.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same;
Penalties; Enforcement of penalty provisions
for non-payment of membership dues not a
deprivation of due process; Reasons; Practice
of law in the courts subject to regulation and
inquiry; Practice of law is not property right
but mere privilege.—That respondent further
argues that the enforcement of the penalty
provisions would amount to a deprivation of
property without due process and hence
infringes on one of his constitutional rights.
Whether the practice of law is property right,
in the sense of its being one that entitles the
holder of a license to practise of law is a
property right, in the sense of its being one
that entitles the holder of a license to practise
a profession, we do not here pause to
consider at length, as it is clear that under the
police power of the State, and under
necessary powers granted to the Court to
perpetuate its existence, the respondent’s
right to practise law before the courts of this
country should be and is a matter subject to
regulation and inquiry. And, if the power to
imposed the fee as regulatory measure is
recognized, then a penalty designed to
enforce its payment, which penalty may be
avoided altogether by payment, is not void
as unreasonable or arbitrary. But we must
here emphasize that the practice of law is not
a property right but a mere privilege, and as
such must bow to the inherent regulatory
power of the Court to exact compliance with
the lawyer’s public responsibilities.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same;
Supreme Court; Jurisdiction; The Supreme
Court has power and jurisdiction to strike the
name of a lawyer from its Roll of Attorneys;
Court’s jurisdiction provided for in the 1973
Constitution.—Relative to the issue of the
power and/or jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court to strike the name of a lawyer from its
Roll of Attorneys, it is sufficient to state that
the matters of admission, suspension,
disbarment and reinstatement of lawyers and
their regulation and supervision have been
and are indisputably recognized as inherent
judicial functions and responsibilities, and
the authorities holding such are legion. The
Court’s jurisdiction was greatly reinforced by
our 1973 Constitution when it explicitly
granted to the Court the power to
“promulgate rules concerning pleading,
practice . . . . . . . and the admission to the
practice of law and the integration of the Bar
27 | Peejay Notes
 Legal Ethics | Atty Razo | Wednesdays | 5:30 to 8:30 PM
. . . . .” (Article X, Sec. 5[5]) The power to pass
upon the fitness of the respondent to remain
a member of the legal profession is indeed
undoubtedly vested in the Court.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Rule
of Court 139-A and ByLaws of the Integrated
Bar providing for payment of membership
dues are neither unconstitutional nor illegal;
Respondent lawyer disbarred and his name
striken from the Roll of Attorneys in the
Supreme Court for repeated failure to pay
membership dues; Case at bar.—We thus
reach the conclusion that the provisions of
Rule of Court 139-A and of the By-Laws of
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
complained of are neither unconstitutional
nor illegal. x x x It is the unanimous sense of
the Court that the respondent Marcial A.
Edillon should be as he is hereby disbarred,
and his name is hereby ordered stricken from
the Roll of Attorneys of the Court.
Letter of Atty. Cecilio Y. Arevalo, Jr.,
Requesting Exemption from Payment of
IBP Dues, B.M. No. 1370. May 9, 2005
The Supreme Court shall have the following
powers:
xxx
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the
protection and enforcement of constitutional
rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in
all courts, the admission to the practice of
law, the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance
to the underprivileged. Such rules shall
provide a simplified and inexpensive
procedure for the speedy disposition of
cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the
same grade, and shall not diminish, increase,
or modify substantive rights. Rules of
procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial
bodies shall remain effective unless
disapproved by the Supreme Court. (Sec. 5,
Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution)
Facts:
Atty. Arevalo wrote a letter to the SC
requesting for exemption from payment of
his IBP dues from 1977-2005 in the amount
of P12,035.00. He contends that after
admission to the Bar he worked at the Civil
Service Commission then migrated to the US
until his retirement. His contention to be
exempt is that his employment with the CSC
prohibits him to practice his law profession
and he did not practice the same while in the
US. The compulsion that he pays his IBP
annual membership is oppressive since he
has an inactive status as a lawyer. His removal
from the profession because of non-payment
of the same constitutes to the deprivation of
his property rights bereft of due process of
the law.
Issues: 1. Is petitioner entitled to exemption
from payment of his dues during the time
that he was inactive in the practice of law that
is, when he was in the Civil Service from
1962-1986 and he was working abroad from
1986-2003?
2. Does the enforcement of the penalty of
removal amount to a deprivation of property
without due process?
Held: 1. No. A membership fee in the Bar
association is an exaction for regulation. If
the judiciary has inherent power to regulate
the Bar, it follows that as an incident to
regulation, it may impose a membership fee
for that purpose. It would not be possible to
put on an integrated Bar program without
means to defray the expenses. The doctrine
of implied powers necessarily carries with it
the power to impose such exaction.
The payment of dues is a necessary
consequence of membership in the IBP, of
which no one is exempt. This means that the
compulsory nature of payment of dues
subsists for as long as ones membership in
the IBP remains regardless of the lack of
practice of, or the type of practice, the
member is engaged in.
28 | Peejay Notes
 Legal Ethics | Atty Razo | Wednesdays | 5:30 to 8:30 PM
2. No. Whether the practice of law is a
property right, in the sense of its being one
that entitles the holder of a license to practice
a profession, we do not here pause to
consider at length, as it [is] clear that under
the police power of the State, and under the
necessary powers granted to the Court to
perpetuate its existence, the respondents
right to practice law before the courts of this
country should be and is a matter subject to
regulation and inquiry. And, if the power to
impose the fee as a regulatory measure is
recognize[d], then a penalty designed to
enforce its payment, which penalty may be
avoided altogether by payment, is not void
as unreasonable or arbitrary.
But we must here emphasize that the practice
of law is not a property right but a mere
privilege, and as such must bow to the
inherent regulatory power of the Court to
exact compliance with the lawyers public
responsibilities.
As a final note, it must be borne in mind that
membership in the bar is a privilege
burdened with conditions, one of which is the
payment of membership dues. Failure to
abide by any of them entails the loss of such
privilege if the gravity thereof warrants such
drastic move.
SANTOS JR. VS. ATTY LLAMAS (AC 4749
01/20/2000)
FACTS: This is a complaint for
misrepresentation and non-payment of bar
membership dues filed against respondent
Atty. Francisco R. Llamas who for a number
of years has not indicated the proper PTR and
IBP O.R. Nos. and data (date & palce of
issuance) in his pleadings. If at all, he only
indicated “IBP Rizal 259060” but he has been
using this for at least 3 years already, as
shown by the following attached sample
pleadings in various courts in 1995, 1996 &
1997. Respondent’s last payment of his IBP
dues was in 1991. Since then he has not paid
or remitted any amount to cover his
membership fees up to the present. He
likewise admit that as appearing in the
pleadings submitted by complainant to this
Court, he indicated "IBP-Rizal 259060" in the
pleadings he filed in court, at least for the
years 1995, 1996, and 1997, thus
misrepresenting that such was his IBP
chapter membership and receipt number for
the years in which those pleadings were filed.
He claims, however, that he is only engaged
in a "limited" practice and that he believes in
good faith that he is exempt from the
payment of taxes, such as income tax, under
R.A. No. 7432, as a senior citizen since 1992.
ISSUES: Whether or not the respondent has
misled the court about his standing in the IBP
by using the same IBP O.R. number in his
pleadings of at least 6 years and therefore
liable for his actions.
Whether or not the respondent is exempt
from paying his membership dues owing to
limited practice of law and for being a senior
citizen.
HELD: Yes. By indicating "IBP-Rizal 259060" in
his pleadings and thereby misrepresenting to
the public and the courts that he had paid his
IBP dues to the Rizal Chapter, respondent is
guilty of violating the Code of Professional
Responsibility which provides: Rule 1.01 – A
lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. His
act is also a violation of Rule 10.01 which
provides that: A lawyer shall not do any
falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in
court; nor mislead or allow the court to be
misled by any artifice.
No. Rule 139-A requires that every member
of the Integrated Bar shall pay annual dues
and default thereof for six months shall
29 | Peejay Notes
 Legal Ethics | Atty Razo | Wednesdays | 5:30 to 8:30 PM
warrant suspension of membership and if
nonpayment covers a period of 1-year,
default shall be a ground for removal of the
delinquent’s name from the Roll of Attorneys.
It does not matter whether or not respondent
is only engaged in “limited” practice of law.
Moreover, While it is true that R.A. No. 7432,
grants senior citizens "exemption from the
payment of individual income taxes:
provided, that their annual taxable income
does not exceed the poverty level as
determined by the National Economic and
Development Authority (NEDA) for that
year," the exemption however does not
include payment of membership or
association dues.
Respondent's failure to pay his IBP dues and
his misrepresentation in the pleadings he
filed in court indeed merit the most severe
penalty. However, in view of respondent's
advanced age, his express willingness to pay
his dues and plea for a more temperate
application of the law, we believe the penalty
of one year suspension from the practice of
law or until he has paid his IBP dues,
whichever is later, is appropriate. Respondent
Atty. Francisco R. Llamas is SUSPENDED from
the practice of law for ONE (1) YEAR, or until
he has paid his IBP dues, whichever is later.
Petition for Leave to Resume Practice of
Law, Benjamin Dacanay 540 SCRA 424
FACTS: Petitioner was admitted to the
Philippine bar in March 1960. He practiced
law until he migrated to Canada in December
1998 to seek medical attention for his
ailments. He subsequently applied for
Canadian citizenship to avail of Canada’s free
medical aid program. His application was
approved and he became a Canadian citizen
in May 2004.
In July 2006, pursuant to Republic Act (RA)
9225 (Citizenship Retention and Re-
Acquisition Act of 2003), petitioner
reacquired his Philippine citizenship. On that
day, he took his oath of allegiance as a
Filipino citizen before the Philippine
Consulate General in Toronto, Canada.
Thereafter, he returned to the Philippines and
now intends to resume his law practice.
ISSUE: Whether petitioner may still resume
practice?
RULING: Section 2, Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court provides an applicant for admission to
the bar be a citizen of the Philippines, at least
twenty-one years of age, of good moral
character and a resident of the Philippines.5
He must also produce before this Court
satisfactory evidence of good moral
character and that no charges against him,
involving moral turpitude, have been filed or
are pending in any court in the Philippines.
Since Filipino citizenship is a requirement for
admission to the bar, loss thereof terminates
membership in the Philippine bar and,
consequently, the privilege to engage in the
practice of law. In other words, the loss of
Filipino citizenship ipso jure terminates the
privilege to practice law in the Philippines.
The practice of law is a privilege denied to
foreigners.
The exception is when Filipino citizenship is
lost by reason of naturalization as a citizen of
another country but subsequently reacquired
pursuant to RA 9225. This is because “all
Philippine citizens who become citizens of
another country shall be deemed not to have
lost their Philippine citizenship under the
conditions of [RA 9225].” Therefore, a Filipino
lawyer who becomes a citizen of another
country is deemed never to have lost his
Philippine citizenship if he reacquires it in
accordance with RA 9225.
Before he can resume his law practice, he
must first secure from this Court the
authority to do so, conditioned on:
 the updating and payment of of IBP
membership dues;
 the payment of professional tax;
 the completion of at least 36 credit
hours of mandatory continuing legal
education; this is specially significant
to refresh the applicant/petitioner’s
knowledge of Philippine laws and
30 | Peejay Notes
 Legal Ethics | Atty Razo | Wednesdays | 5:30 to 8:30 PM
update him of legal developments
and
 the retaking of the lawyer’s oath.
Jocelyn De Leon v. Atty. Tyrone
Pedrena, A.C. No. 9401, October
22, 2013.
Attorney; Gross Immoral Conduct.
Respondent Pedreña, a Public Attorney, was
charged for sexual harassment. The Supreme
Court held that the records show that the
respondent rubbed the complainant’s right
leg with his hand; tried to insert his finger
into her firmly closed hand; grabbed her
hand and forcibly placed it on his crotch area;
and pressed his finger against her private
part. Given the circumstances in which he
committed them, his acts were not merely
offensive and undesirable but repulsive,
disgraceful and grossly immoral. They
constituted misconduct on the part of any
lawyer. In this regard, immoral conduct is
gross when it is so corrupt as to constitute a
criminal act, or so unprincipled as to be
reprehensible to a high degree, or when
committed under such scandalous or
revolting circumstances as to shock the
community’s sense of decency. Atty.
Pedreña’s misconduct was aggravated by the
fact that he was then a Public Attorney
mandated to provide free legal service to
indigent litigants, and by the fact that
complainant was then such a client. He also
disregarded his oath as a public officer to
serve others and to be accountable at all
times, because he thereby took advantage of
her vulnerability as a client then in desperate
need of his legal assistance. Thus, respondent
was meted out the penalty of suspension
from the practice of law for two (2) years.
A.C. No. 10783, October 14, 2015
ATTY. BENIGNO T. BARTOLOME VS.
ATTY. CHRISTOPHER A. BASILIO
This administrative case stems from a
complaint filed by complainant Atty. Benigno
T. Bartolome (Bartolome) on May 19, 2009
before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) against respondent Atty. Christopher A.
Basilio (Basilio) for violation of the 2004 Rules
on Notarial Practice[2] (Notarial Rules).
The Facts
In the complaint, Bartolome alleged that
Basilio, a notary public in Tarlac City,
notarized a document entitled "Joint
Affidavit of Non-Tenancy and Aggregate
Landholdings"[3] (Joint Affidavit) purportedly
subscribed and sworn to before him by
Loreto M. Tañedo (Tanedo) and Ramon T.
Lim on January 15, 2006, and supposedly
recorded as Doc. No. 375, Page No. 75, Book
No. X, Series of 2007 in his notarial
register,[4] despite the fact that Tañedo had
already passed away as early as December 1,
2003.[5]
In his Answer/Comment[6] dated June 24,
2009, Basilio admitted having notarized the
Joint Affidavit but claimed that, prior to the
notarization, he verified the identities of the
persons who appeared before him through
their respective Social Security System (SSS)
identification cards and driver's licenses. He
further denied any knowledge that the one
who appeared before him misrepresented
himself as Tañedo and that the latter was
already dead as of December 1, 2003.[7]
During the clarificatory hearing, Basilio, who
undisputedly notarized the Joint Affidavit,
admitted his failure to: (a) record the subject
document in his notarial book; (b) submit a
copy of the same to the Regional Trial Court
of Tarlac City (RTC); and (c) have the
notarization revoked or recalled.[8]
The IBP's Report and Recommendation
31 | Peejay Notes
 Legal Ethics | Atty Razo | Wednesdays | 5:30 to 8:30 PM
In a Report and Recommendation[9] dated
June 10, 2010 submitted by IBP Investigating
Commissioner Randall C. Tabayoyong
(Investigating Commissioner), Basilio was
found to have manifested gross negligence
and a complete disregard of the Notarial
Rules. The Investigating Commissioner
pointed out that contrary to Section 8, in
relation to Section 6, Rule II of the Notarial
Rules, Basilio failed to indicate in the Joint
Affidavit the details of the SSS identification
card and driver's license which were allegedly
shown as competent evidence of identity of
the persons who appeared before him. Thus,
his claim that he verified the identities of the
persons who subscribed the Joint Affidavit
could not be given credence. Basilio also
failed to record in his notarial register his
notarial act on the Joint Affidavit in violation
of Section 2 (a), Rule VI of the Notarial Rules.
Lastly, the Investigating Commissioner found
that Basilio failed to submit a copy of the
Joint Affidavit to the Clerk of Court of the
RTC, contrary to Section 2 (h), Rule VI of the
Notarial Rules.[10] Accordingly, he
recommended that Basilio's notarial
commission, if still existing, be revoked; he be
disqualified from obtaining a notarial
commission for a period of one (1) year and
suspended from the practice of law for six (6)
months.[11]
In a Resolution[12] dated December 29,
2012, the IBP Board of Governors adopted
and approved the Investigating
Commissioner's Report and
Recommendation. Dissatisfied, Basilio filed a
motion for reconsideration, which was
denied in a Resolution[13] dated September
27, 2014.
The Issue Before the Court
The sole issue for the Court's resolution is
whether or not the IBP correctly found Basilio
liable for violation of the Notarial Rules.
The Court's Ruling
The act of notarization is impressed with
public interest.[14] As such, a notary public
must observe the highest degree of care in
complying with the basic requirements in the
performance of his duties in order to
preserve the confidence of the public in the
integrity of the notarial system.[15]
In the present case, Basilio, as duly found by
the IBP, failed to faithfully comply with his
duties as a notary public.
Section 5 (b), Rule IV of the Notarial Rules
clearly states that:
SEC. 5. False or Incomplete Certificate. — A
notary public shall not:
xxxx
(b) affix an official signature or seal on a
notarial certificate that is incomplete.
(Emphases supplied)
A notarial certificate, as defined in Section 8,
Rule II of the Notarial Rules, requires a
statement of the facts attested to by the
notary public in a particular notarization, viz.:
SEC. 8. Notarial Certificate. — "Notarial
Certificate" refers to the part of, or
attachment to, a notarized instrument or
document that is completed by the notary
public, bears the notary's signature and seal,
and states the facts attested to by the notary
public in a particular notarization as provided
for by these Rules. (Emphasis supplied)
Meanwhile, a jurat is, among others, an
attestation that the person who presented
the instrument or document to be notarized
is personally known to the notary public or
identified by the notary public through
competent evidence of identity as defined by
the Notarial Rules:[16]
SEC. 6. Jurat. — "Jurat" refers to an act in
which an individual on a single occasion:
32 | Peejay Notes
 Legal Ethics | Atty Razo | Wednesdays | 5:30 to 8:30 PM
(a) appears in person before the notary
public and presents an instrument or
document;
(b) is personally known to the notary public
or identified by the notary public through
competent evidence of identity as defined by
these Rules;
(c) signs the instrument or document in the
presence of the notary; and
(d) takes an oath or affirmation before the
notary public as to such instrument or
document. (Emphasis supplied)
As the records bear out, Basilio affixed his
official signature and seal on the notarial
certificate of the Joint Affidavit without
properly identifying the person/s who signed
the same. His claim that he verified the
identities of the affiants through their
respective SSS identification cards and
driver's licenses cannot be given any
credence considering the ostensible lack of
their details on the face of the certificate.
Neither was he able to provide the fact of
identification in any way. On the other hand,
it has been established that one of the
named signatories to the Joint Affidavit was
already dead when he notarized the
aforesaid document. Hence, it is sufficiently
clear that Basilio had indeed affixed his
official signature and seal on an incomplete,
if not false, notarial certificate.
Moreover, by the same account, Basilio
violated Section 2 (b), Rule IV of the Notarial
Rules which prohibits the notarization of a
document if the person involved is not
personally known to the notary public or has
not identified himself through competent
evidence of identity:
SEC. 2. Prohibitions. - x x x
xxxx
(b) A person shall not perform a notarial act
if the person involved as signatory to the
instrument or document -
(1) is not in the notary's presence personally
at the time of the notarization; and
(2) is not personally known to the notary
public or otherwise identified by the notary
public through competent evidence of
identity as defined by these Rules. (Emphasis
supplied)
To add, Basilio himself admitted that he
failed to record his notarial act on the Joint
Affidavit in his notarial register, contrary to
Section 2 (a), Rule VI of the Notarial Rules,
which states:
SEC. 2. Entries in the Notarial Register. — (a)
For every notarial act, the notary shall record
in the notarial register at the time of
notarization the following:
(1) the entry number and page number;
(2) the date and time of day of the notarial
act;
(3) the type of notarial act;
(4) the title or description of the instrument,
document or proceeding;
(5) the name and address of each principal;
(6) the competent evidence of identity as
defined by these Rules if the signatory is not
personally known to the notary;
(7) the name and address of each credible
witness swearing to or affirming the person's
identity;
(8) the fee charged for the notarial act;
(9) the address where the notarization was
performed if not in the notary's regular place
of work or business; and
33 | Peejay Notes
 Legal Ethics | Atty Razo | Wednesdays | 5:30 to 8:30 PM
(10) any other circumstance the notary public
may deem of significance or relevance.
x x x x (Emphases supplied)
Since the notarial register is a record of the
notary public's official acts, he is charged
with recording therein the necessary
information regarding the document or
instrument notarized. If the document or
instrument does not appear in the notarial
records, doubt as to its nature arises so that
the alleged notarized document cannot be
considered a public document.[17]
Considering the evidentiary value given to
the notarized documents, the failure of the
notary public to record the document in his
notarial register is tantamount to falsely
making it appear that the document was
notarized when, in fact, it was not,[18] as in
this case.
It should be clarified, however, that while
Basilio had also failed to submit a copy of the
Joint Affidavit to the Clerk of Court of the
RTC, and to retain a copy thereof for his own
records, the requirement therefor, as stated
under Section 2 (h),[19] Rule VI of the
Notarial Rules, applies only to instruments
acknowledged before the notary public.
Documents like the Joint Affidavit which
contain a jurat and not an acknowledgment
are not required to be forwarded to the Clerk
of Court. Hence, there should be no
administrative infraction on this score.
Nevertheless, Basilio's afore-discussed
violations of the Notarial Rules are grave
enough to warrant sanctions from the Court.
A notary public exercises duties calling for
carefulness and faithfulness.[20] Notaries
must inform themselves of the facts they
certify to; most importantly, they should not
take part or allow themselves to be part of
illegal transactions.[21] In line with this
mandate, a notary public should not notarize
a document unless the person who signed
the same is the very person who executed
and personally appeared before him to attest
to the contents and the truth of what are
stated therein.[22] By failing in this regard,
the notary public permits a falsehood which
does not only transgress the Notarial Rules
but also Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, which provides
that "[a] lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct."[23]
Verily, a notarized document is, by law,
entitled to full faith and credit upon its face;
and it is for this reason that a notary public
must observe with utmost care the basic
requirements in the performance of his
duties; otherwise, the public's confidence in
the integrity of a notarized document would
be undermined.
As herein discussed, Basilio's failure to
properly perform his duty as a notary public
resulted not only in damage to those directly
affected by the notarized document, but also
in undermining the integrity of the office of a
notary public and in degrading the function
of notarization. In fine, he should be meted
out with the modified penalty of
disqualification from being commissioned as
notary public for a period of two (2) years and
suspension from the practice of law for one
(1) year. Although there is no showing that
Basilio prepared the document in question,
his utter disregard of the Notarial Rules as
exhibited during the proceedings before the
IBP, together with his admitted failure to
revoke or recall his notarization despite his
knowledge of its irregularity, warrants the
same treatment as the errant lawyer in
Agbulos v. Viray:[24]
[T]he Court finds the need to increase that
recommended by the IBP which is one month
suspension as a lawyer and six months
suspension as notary public, considering that
respondent himself prepared the document,
and he performed the notarial act without
the personal appearance of the affiant and
without identifying her with competent
evidence of her identity. With his
34 | Peejay Notes
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indiscretion, he allowed the use of a CTC by

someone who did not own it. Worse, he
allowed himself to be an instrument of fraud.
Based on existing jurisprudence, when a
lawyer commissioned as a notary public fails
to discharge his duties as such, he is meted
the penalties of revocation of his notarial
commission, disqualification from being
commissioned as a notary public for a period
of two years, and suspension from the
practice of law for one year.[25] (Emphasis
supplied)

WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent

Atty. Christopher A. Basilio GUILTY of
violating the 2004 Rules of Notarial Practice
and Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, the
Court hereby SUSPENDS him from the
practice of law for one (1) year; REVOKES his
incumbent commission as a notary public, if
any; and PROHIBITS him from being
commissioned as a notary public for two (2)
years, effective immediately. He is WARNED
that a repetition of the same offense or
similar acts in the future shall be dealt with
more severely.

35 | Peejay Notes