Anonymous Letter-Complaint against
Was there consented warrantless search in
Atty. Miguel Morales, Clerk of Court,
MeTC Manila
Facts: Atty. Morales, Branch Clerk of Court of
MeTC, Branch 67, Manila was investigated on
the basis of an anonymous letter alleging
that he was consuming his working hours
filing and attending to personal cases, using
office supplies, equipment and utilities. The
OCA conducted a spot investigation aided by
NBI agents. The team was able to access Atty.
Morales personal computer and print two
documents stored in its hard drive, which
turned out to be two pleadings, one filed in
the CA and another in the RTC of Manila,
both in the name of another lawyer. Atty.
Morales computer was seized and taken in
custody of the OCA but was later ordered
released on his motion, but with order to the
MISO to first retrieve the files stored therein.
Atty. Morales, in defense, argues that since
the pleadings were acquired from his
personal computer which was confiscated
without any valid search and seizure order,
such evidence should be considered as the
fruits of a poisonous tree as it violated his
right to privacy.
The OCA disagreed with the report of the
Investigating Judge that there was no
evidence to support the charge against Atty.
Morales as no one from the OCC personnel
who were interviewed would give a
categorical and positive statement affirming
the charges against Atty. Morales, along with
other court personnel also charged in the
same case. The OCA recommended that Atty.
Morales should be found guilty of gross
misconduct.
Issues:
1. Are the pleadings found in Atty. Morales's
personal computer admissible in the present
administrative case against him?
2. May the right against unreasonable
searches and seizures be invoked in an
administrative case?
3.
this case?
4. Is there a ground to hold Atty. Morales
liable of the charge?
Held:
1. While Atty. Morales may have fallen short
of the exacting standards required of every
court employee, the Court cannot use the
evidence obtained from his personal
computer against him for it violated his
constitutional right against unreasonable
searches and seizures.
2. As expounded in Zulueta v. Court of
Appeals, any violation of the aforestated
constitutional right renders the evidence
obtained inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding.
3. Consent to a search is not to be lightly
inferred and must be shown by clear and
convincing evidence. It must be voluntary in
order to validate an otherwise illegal search;
that is, the consent must be unequivocal,
specific, intelligently given and
uncontaminated by any duress or coercion.
The burden of proving, by clear and positive
testimony, that the necessary consent was
obtained and that it was freely and
voluntarily given lies with the State.
Acquiescence in the loss of fundamental
rights is not to be presumed and courts
indulge every reasonable presumption
against waiver of fundamental constitutional
rights. To constitute a valid consent or waiver
of the constitutional guarantee against
obtrusive searches, it must be shown that (1)
the right exists; (2) that the person involved
had knowledge, either actual or constructive,
of the existence of such right; and (3) the said
person had an actual intention to relinquish
the right.
In this case, what is missing is a showing that
Atty. Morales had an actual intention to
relinquish his right. While he may have
agreed to the opening of his personal
computer and the printing of files therefrom
during the spot investigation, it is also of
record that Atty. Morales immediately filed
an administrative case against said persons
questioning the validity of the investigation,
specifically invoking his constitutional right
against unreasonable search and seizure.
4. And as there is no other evidence, apart
from the pleadings, retrieved from the
unduly confiscated personal computer of
Atty. Morales, to hold him administratively
liable, the Court had no choice but to dismiss
the charges against him for insufficiency of
evidence.
PEOPLE vs NUÑEZ
FACTS: In a search and seizure conducted
based on reports of drug possession, the
appellant’s room was surveyed in his
presence while his family, PO2 Ortega and
the two barangay officials remained in the
living room. 31 packets of shabu, lighters,
improvised burners, tooters, and aluminum
foil with shabu residue and a lady’s wallet
containing P 4,610 inside appellant’s dresser
were found.
The group also confiscated a component,
camera, electric planer, grinder, drill, jigsaw,
electric tester, and assorted carpentry tools
on suspicion that they were acquired in
exchange for shabu. Following the search,
SPO1 Ilagan issued a Receipt for Property
Seized and a Certification of Orderly Search
which appellant signed. The RTC convicted
appellant guilty, beyond reasonable doubt
for Violation of Republic Act 6425, as
amended. Appellant elevated the case to this
Court on appeal, but the case was transferred
to the Court of Appeals where the Court of
Appeals rendered its decision affirming
appellant’s conviction.
ISSUE: WON there was an irregularity in the
seizure of personal property conducted.
RULING:
SEC. 3. (Rule 126 of the Rules of Court)
Personal property to be seized.
- A search warrant may be issued for
the search and seizure of personal
property: (a) Subject of the offense;
(b) Stolen or embezzled and other
proceeds, or fruits of the offense; or
(c) Used or intended to be used as the
means of committing an offense. As
a rule, only the personal properties
described in the search warrant may
be seized by the authorities. In the
case at bar,
Search Warrant No. 42 specifically authorized
the taking of methamphetamine
hydrochloride (shabu) and paraphernalia(s)
only.
Thus, we are here constrained to point out an
irregularity in the search conducted.
Certainly, the lady’s wallet, cash, grinder,
camera, component, speakers, electric
planer, jigsaw, electric tester, saws, hammer,
drill, and bolo were not encompassed by the
word paraphernalia as they bear no relation
to the use or manufacture of drugs. In seizing
the said items then, the police officers
exercised their own discretion and
determined for themselves which items in
appellant’s residence they believed were
"proceeds of the crime" or "means of
committing the offense." This is, in our view,
absolutely impermissible. The purpose of the
constitutional requirement that the articles to
be seized be particularly described in the
warrant is to limit the things to be taken to
those, and only those particularly described
in the search warrant --to leave the officers
of the law with no discretion regarding what
articles they should seize.
A search warrant is not a sweeping authority
empowering a raiding party to undertake a
fishing expedition to confiscate any and all
kinds of evidence or articles relating to a
crime.
Accordingly, the objects taken which were
not specified in the search warrant should be
restored to appellant.
People vs Olive MamarilG.R. No. 171980
October 6, 2010
Facts:
During the search in accused-appellant’s
house, SPO4 Gotidoc found on the top cover
of the refrigerator one (1)plastic sachet
containing white crystalline substance.
Thereafter he prepared a Certificate of Good
Search and Confiscation Receipt which the
appellant refused to sign. The plastic sachet
was brought to the Tarlac Provincial Crime
Laboratory located at Tarlac Provincial
Hospital for qualitative examination. The
examination conducted by Engr. Marcene G.
Agala, the Forensic Chemist who tested the
white crystalline substance, yielded positive
results for 0.055gram of Methamphetamine
Hydrochloride, commonly known as shabu, a
dangerous drug.
The trial court found the accused-appellant
guilty of violation of Section 11, Article II, of
R.A. 9165 and so did the CA. In this appeal,
accused-appellant, through her new counsel
from the Public Attorney’s Office, goes
further back, presenting new arguments, that
(1) the search warrant was not based on
probable cause, hence, the evidence
allegedly obtained through it may not be
admitted to support the accused-appellant’s
conviction; and the presumption of regularity
in the performance of official functions by
public officers cannot prevail over the
presumption of innocence.
Issue:
Whether or not, in this case, said
presumption of regularity in the performance
of official functions by public officers cannot
prevail over the presumption of innocence
Held:
No. The repeated contentions of frame-up of
the accused-appellant and that the
dangerous drug of methamphetamine
hydrochloride was planted by the police
officers do not deserve further
considerations by this Court. While We are
aware that in some cases, law enforcers
resort to the practice of planting evidence in
order that to, inter alia, harass, nevertheless
the defense of frame-up in drug cases
requires strong and convincing evidence
because of the presumption that the police
officers performed their duties regularly and
that they acted within the bounds of their
authority.
Frame-up, like alibi, is generally viewed with
caution by the Court because it is easy to
contrive and difficult to disprove. It is a
common and standard line of defense in
prosecutions of violations of the Dangerous
Drugs Act.
And so is the likewise repeated referral to the
primacy of the constitutional presumption of
innocence over the presumption of regularity
in the performance of public functions, the
contention being that the frame-up
argument is supported by the constitutional
presumption of innocence.
The argument is without merit. Indeed it is a
constitutional mandate that in all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed
innocent until the contrary is proved and that
on the other hand, it is in the Rules of Court
that. – “The following presumptions are
satisfactory if uncontradicted, but may be
contradicted and overcome by other
evidence:“ xxx That official duty has been
regularly performed; xxx” In the case at hand,
the so-called frame-up was virtually pure
allegation bereft of credible proof. The
narration of the police officer who
implemented the search warrant, was found
after trial and appellate review as the true
story. It is on firmer ground than the self-
serving statement of the accused-appellant
of frame-up.
The defense cannot solely rely upon the
constitutional presumption of innocence for,
while it is constitutional, the presumption is
not conclusive. Notably, the accused-
appellant herself stated in her brief that
“no proof was proffered by the accused-
appellant of the police officers’ alleged ill
motive.” Stated otherwise, the narration of
the incident by law enforcers, buttressed by
the presumption that they have regularly
performed their duties in the absence of
convincing proof to the contrary, must be
given weight.
Romer Sy Tan vs Sy Tiong Gue, et al.
Facts:
Petitioner (Romer Sy Tan) filed a criminal case
against respondents (Tiong Gue, et al.). The
Respondents moved for the withdrawal of
the information which was subsequently
granted by the RTC on the ground that the
information for robbery did not contain the
essential elements of robbery as decided
upon by the Court of Appeals on an prior
complaint. Hence the case was dismissed.
Now the petitioner, seeking shelter from the
Supreme Court contended that he filed
information for qualified theft based on the
same subject matter of the dismissed
robbery and would like to use the item seized
in the previously conducted search for the
new information of qualified theft.
Issue:
Whether or not the items seized in the
previously conducted search warrant issued
by the court for robbery be included and
used for the filing of for an information for
qualified theft.
Ruling:
No, petitioner cannot iclude the seized items
as part of the evidence in the new
information. Sec. 4 of Rule 126 of the Rules
of Court provides:
Section 4. Requisites for issuing search
warrant. — A search warrant shall not issue
except upon probable cause in connection
with one specific offense to be determined
personally by the judge after examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant
and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be
searched and the things to be seized which
may be anywhere in the Philippines.
Thus, as search warrant may be issued only if
there is probable cause in connection with
only one specific offense alleged in an
application on the basis of the applicant's
personal knowledge and his or her witnesses.
Therefore, petitioner cannot utilize the
evidence seized by virtue of the search
warrant issued in connection with the case of
robbery in a separate case of qualified theft,
even if both cases emanated form the same
incident. Also, the withdrawal of the
information was justifiable, since there was
no probable cause as to indict respondents
of the crime of robbery since unlawful taking
which is an essential element for Robbery
and likewise for Qualified Theft is not
present.
Ty vs. NBI Supervising Agent De Jemil
Facts: Petitioners are stockholders of Omni
Gas Corporation ("Omni"). They are being
suspected of engaging in illegal trading of
petroleum products and underfilling of
branded LPG cylinders in violation of B.P. 33,
as amended by P.D. 1865. NBI Agents Marvin
De Jemil and Edgardo Kawada conducted
surveillance operations on Omni. On 15 April
2004, the NBI Agents carried out a test-buy.
Using eight branded LPG cylinders from
Shell, Petron and Total, they went to Omni for
refilling. Omni refilled the cylinders. The NBI
agents paid more than P1500. LPG Inspector
Noel Navio found that the LPG cylinders were
without LPG valve seals and one of the
cylinders was actually underfilled.
On 28 April 2004, Agent De Jemil obtained a
search warrant from Pasig RTC branch 167.
The NBI seized several items from Omni's
premises. Subsequently, Agent De Jemil filed
his Complaint-Affidavit before the DOJ. The
Assistant City Prosecutor of Pasig found
probable cause for violation of BP 33. This
was later approved by Chief State Prosecutor
Jovencito Zuno.
Petitioners appealed the decision to the
Secretary of Justice, who later reversed the
decision of the Office of the Chief State
Prosecutor. NBI Agent De Jemil moved for
reconsideration. Denied. He thus filed a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 with the branded cylinders without authorization.
Court of Appeals. Omni’s unauthorized refilling of branded LPG
cylinders, contrary to Sec. 2 (a) in relation to
The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of
Sec. 3 (c) of BP 33, as amended.
Secretary of Justice. It later reversed itself and
reinstated the Resolution of the Chief State
Prosecutor.
Granting arguendo that the customers
Issues: already owned the LPG cylinders, such fact
does give Omni authority to refill the
(1) Whether the petition for certiorari with
cylinders without authorization from the
the Court of Appeals was proper even if
brand owners. Only the duly authorized
Agent De Jemil did not appeal to the Office
dealers and refillers of the brand owners may
of the President?
refill the branded LPG cylinders. The offense
(2) Whether probable cause exists against of refilling a branded LPG cylinder without
petitioners for violations of Sec. 2 (a) and (c) the written consent of the brand owner
of BP 33, as amended? constitutes the offense regardless of the
buyer or possessor of the branded LPG
(3) Whether petitioners can be held liable
cylinder.
therefor?
Petitioner's contention that they are not
Held:
liable because the underfilling that took
(1) YES. The determination of probable cause place during the test-buy is an isolated event
by the public prosecutor, and, later on, by the is UNTENABLE. A single underfilling under BP
Secretary of Justice, is subject to judicial 33 is already a criminal act.
review where it is established that grave
(3) Only Arnel Ty, as President of Omni, is
abuse of discretion tainted the
liable. The other petitioners, who are
determination. The aggrieved party need not
members of Omni's Board of Directors, are
resort to the Office of the President before
not liable. Sec. 4 of BP 33 enumerates the
availing of judicial remedies because the
persons who may be held liable, viz: (1) the
Secretary of Justice is an alter ego of the
president, (2) general manager, (3) managing
President who may opt to exercise or not to
partner, (4) such other officer charged with
exercise his or her power of review over the
the management of the business affairs of
former’s determination in criminal
the corporation or juridical entity, or (5) the
investigation cases. Also, under the doctrine
employee responsible for such violation. The
of qualified political agency, the
Board of Directors is primarily a policy-
determination of probable cause by the
making body of the Corporation who doesn't
Secretary of Justice is presumably that of the
concern itself with day-to-day operations.
Chief Executive unless disapproved or
reprobated by the latter.

(2) YES. The test-buy conducted on 15 April

2004 tends to show that Omni illegally
refilled the eight branded cylinders. Such act
is a clear violation of Sec. 2 (a), in relation to
Secs. 3 (c) and 4 of BP 33, as amended.

Omni has no authority to refill LPG cylinders

as shown by the certifications provided by
Shell, Petron and Total. The seized items also
show that Omni has no authority to refill the
cylinders. It shows that Omni really refilled