Code of Professional Responsibility Cases Until Rule 1.04 Only

CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
Case number 1:
A.C. No. 4148 July 30, 1998
REMEDIOS RAMIREZ TAPUCAR, complainant,

vs.
Atty. LAURO L. TAPUCAR, respondent.
PER CURIAM:
In a letter-complaint dated November 22, 1993, complainant Remedios Ramirez Tapucar sought the
disbarment of her husband, Atty. Lauro L. Tapucar, on the ground of continuing grossly immoral
conduct for cohabiting with a certain Elena (Helen) Peña under scandalous circumstances. 1
Prior to this complaint, respondent was already administratively charged four times for conduct
unbecoming an officer of the court. In Administrative Matter No. 1740, resolved on April 11, 1980,
respondent, at that time the Judge of Butuan City, was meted the penalty of six months suspension
without pay, 2 while in Administrative Matters Nos. 1720, 1911 and 2300-CFI, which were
consolidated, 3 this Court on January 31, 1981 ordered the separation from the service of
respondent. 4
Now he faces disbarment.
The records reveal the following facts:
From the Report and Recommendation of the Commission on Bar Discipline, it appears that
complainant and respo ndent married on October 29, 1953 at the Sacred Heart Roman
Catholic Church in Quezon City. They established their residence in Antipolo, Rizal, where
eight of their eleven children were born. In 1962 respondent relocated his family to
Dadiangas, Cotabato (now Gen. Santos City), where his last three children were born and
where he practiced his profession until his appointment as a CFI Judge in Butuan City on
January 30, 1976.
In August, 1976, shortly after being appointed as CFI Judge, respondent began cohabiting
with a certain Elena (Helen) Peña, in Nasipit, Agusan del Norte. On December 28, 1977, Elena
gave birth to their first child, named Ofelia Sembrano Peña.
In view of this cohabitation, a certain Atty. Tranquilino Calo filed an administrative complaint
against respondent for immorality. After investigation, the penalty of suspension from office
for a period of six months without pay was meted by this Court upon respondent. 5
Despite this penalty, respondent still continued to cohabit with Elena, giving rise to another
charge of immorality and other administrative cases, such as: conduct unbecoming an officer
of the court, and grossly immoral conduct. These cases were consolidated and after
investigation, this Court ordered his dismissal and separation from the service. 6
But his dismissal as a judge did not impel respondent to mend his ways. He continued living
with Elena, which resulted in the birth on September 20, 1989, of their second child named
Laella Peña Tapucar. Moreover, he completely abandoned complainant and his children by
her.
Respondent later moved from Nasipit, Agusan del Norte back to Antipolo, Rizal, bringing
along Elena and their two children. And on March 5, 1992, respondent contracted marriage
with Elena in a ceremony solemnized by MTC Judge Isagani A. Geronimo of Antipolo, Rizal.
This was done while the respondent's marriage to complainant subsists, as nothing on
record shows the dissolution thereof.
Complainant, in the meanwhile, had migrated to United States of America upon her retirement
from the government service in 1990. However, her children, who remained in Antipolo, kept
her posted of the misery they allegedly suffered because of their father's acts, including
deception and intrigues against them. Thus, despite having previously withdrawn a similar
case which she filed in 1976, complainant was forced to file the present petition for
disbarment under the compulsion of the maternal impulse to shield and protect her children
from the despotic and cruel acts of their own father. Complainant secured the assistance of
her eldest daughter, Atty. Ma. Susana Tapucar-Baua, to represent her in this case.
Consistent with Section 20, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, the matter was referred to the
Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for investigation,
report and recommendation. After conducting a thorough investigation, the Commission
through Commissioner Victor C. Fernandez recommended that respondent be disbarred, and
his name be stricken off the roll of attorneys. Mainly, this was premised on the ground that,
notwithstanding sanctions previously imposed upon him by the Honorable Supreme Court,
respondent continued the illicit liaison with Elena. 7
In his report Commissioner Fernandez noted that, instead of contradicting the charges
against him, respondent displayed arrogance, and even made a mockery of the law and the
Court, as when he said:
I have been ordered suspended by Supreme Court for two months without pay
in 1980 for having a mistress, the same girl Ms. Elena (Helen) Peña, now my
wife. Being ordered separated in later administrative case constitute double
jeopardy. If now disbarred for marrying Ms. Elena Peña will constitute triple
jeopardy. If that's the law so be it. 8
Based on said report, the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, passed
on May 17, 1997, a Resolution adopting the Commissioner's recommendation, as follows:
RESOLUTION NO. XII-97-97
Adm. Case No. 4148
Remedios Ramirez Tapucar vs.
Atty. Lauro L. Tapucar
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and

APPROVED, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made part of the
Resolution/Decision as Annex "A"; and, finding the recommendation therein to
be fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and
rules, Respondent Atty. Lauro L. Tapucar is hereby DISBARRED and that his
name be stricken off the roll of attorneys.
We find the Report and Recommendation of Commissioner Fernandez, as approved and

adopted by the Board of Governors of IBP, more than sufficient to justify and support the
foregoing Resolution, herein considered as the recommendation to this Court by said Board
pursuant to Rule 139-B, Sec. 12 (b), of the Rules of Court. * We are in agreement that
respondent's actuations merit the penalty of disbarment.
Well settled is the rule that good moral character is not only a condition precedent for
admission to the legal profession, but it must also remain intact in order to maintain one's
good standing in that exclusive and honored fraternity.9 There is perhaps no profession after
that of the sacred ministry in which a high-toned morality is more imperative than that of
law. 10 The Code of Professional Responsibility mandates that:
Rule 1.01. A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or

deceitful conduct.
Rule 7.03 . A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his
fitness to practice law, nor should he, whether in public or private life, behave
in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession. (Emphasis
supplied.)
As this Court often reminds members of the Bar, they must live up to the standards and
norms expected of the legal profession, by upholding the ideals and tenets embodied in the
Code of Professional Responsibility always. Lawyers must maintain a high standard of legal
proficiency, as well as morality including honesty, integrity and fair dealing. For they are at all
times subject to the scrutinizing eye of public opinion and community approbation. Needless
to state, those whose conduct — both public and private — fails this scrutiny would have to
be disciplined and, after appropriate proceedings, penalized accordingly.
Moreover, it should be recalled that respondent here was once a member of the judiciary, a
fact that aggravates his professional infractions. For having occupied that place of honor in
the Bench, he knew a judge's actuations ought to be free from any appearance of
impropriety. 11 For a judge is the visible representation of the law and, more importantly, of
justice. Ordinary citizens consider him as a source of strength that fortifies their will to obey
the law. 12 Indeed, a judge should avoid the slightest infraction of the law in all of his
actuations, lest it be a demoralizing example to others. 13 Surely, respondent could not have
forgotten the Code of Judicial Conduct entirely as to lose its moral imperatives. 14
Like a judge who is held to a high standard of integrity and ethical conduct, 15 an attorney-at-
law is also invested with public trust. Judges and lawyers serve in the administration of
justice. Admittedly, as officers of the court, lawyers must ensure the faith and confidence of
the public that justice is administered with dignity and civility. A high degree of moral
integrity is expected of a lawyer in the community where he resides. He must maintain due
regard for public decency in an orderly society.
A lawyer is expected at all times to uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession by
faithfully performing his duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and to his
clients. 16 Exacted from him, as a member of the profession charged with the responsibility to
stand as a shield in the defense of what is right, are such positive qualities of decency,
truthfulness and responsibility that have been compendiously described as "moral
character." To achieve such end, every lawyer needs to strive at all times to honor and
maintain the dignity of his profession, and thus improve not only the public regard for the Bar
but also the administration of justice.
On these considerations, the Court may disbar or suspend a lawyer for misconduct, whether
in his professional or private capacity, which shows him to be wanting in moral character, in
honesty, probity, and good demeanor, thus proving unworthy to continue as an officer of the
court. 17
The power to disbar, however, is one to be exercised with great caution, and only in a clear
case of misconduct which seriously affects the standing and character of the lawyer as an
officer of the Court and member of the bar. 18 For disbarment proceedings are intended to
afford the parties thereto full opportunity to vindicate their cause before disciplinary action is
taken, to assure the general public that those who are tasked with the duty of administering
justice are competent, honorable, trustworthy men and women in whom the Courts and the
clients may repose full confidence.
In the case of Obusan vs. Obusan, Jr., 19 a complaint for disbarment was filed against a
member of the bar by his wife. She was able to prove that he had abandoned his wife and
their son; and that he had adulterous relations with a married but separated woman.
Respondent was not able to overcome the evidence presented by his wife that he was guilty
of grossly immoral conduct. In another case, 20 a lawyer was disbarred when he abandoned
his lawful wife and cohabited with another woman who had borne him a child. The Court held
that respondent failed to maintain the highest degree of morality expected and required of a
member of the bar.
In the present case, the record shows that despite previous sanctions imposed upon him by
this Court, respondent continued his illicit liaison with a woman other than his lawfully-
wedded wife. The report of the Commissioner assigned to investigate thoroughly the
complaint found respondent far from contrite; on the contrary, he exhibited a cavalier
attitude, even arrogance, in the face of charges against him. The IBP Board of Governors,
tasked to determine whether he still merited the privileges extended to a member of the legal
profession, resolved the matter against him. For indeed, evidence of grossly immoral
conduct abounds against him and could not be explained away. Keeping a mistress, entering
into another marriage while a prior one still subsists, as well as abandoning and/or
mistreating complainant and their children, show his disregard of family obligations, morality
and decency, the law and the lawyer's oath. Such gross misbehavior over a long period of
time clearly shows a serious flaw in respondent's character, his moral indifference to scandal
in the community, and his outright defiance of established norms. All these could not but put
the legal profession in disrepute and place the integrity of the administration of justice in
peril, hence the need for strict but appropriate disciplinary action.
IN VIEW THEREOF, respondent Atty. Lauro L. Tapucar is hereby DISBARRED. The Clerk of
Court is directed to strike out his name from the Roll of Attorneys.
SO ORDERED.
Case number 2:
G.R. No. 156643 June 27, 2006
FRANCISCO SALVADOR B. ACEJAS III, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
x--------------------------------x
G.R. No. 156891 June 27, 2006
VLADIMIR S. HERNANDEZ, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, CJ:
This Court defers to the Sandiganbayan’s evaluation of the factual issues. Not having heard any
cogent reasons to justify an exception to this rule, the Court adopts the anti-graft court’s findings. In
any event, after meticulously reviewing the records, we find no ground to reverse the
Sandiganbayan.
The Case
Before us are consolidated Petitions for Review1 assailing the March 8, 2002 Decision,2 and the
January 33 and 14, 20034 Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 20194. Francisco
SB. Acejas III and Vladimir S. Hernandez were found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of direct
bribery penalized under Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code.
Vladimir S. Hernandez, Victor D. Conanan, SPO3 Expedito S. Perlas, Francisco SB. Acejas III and
Jose P. Victoriano were charged on February 8, 1994, in an Information that reads thus:
"That on or about January 12, 1994, or sometime prior thereto in the City of Manila, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused VLADIMIR S.
HERNANDEZ and VICTOR CONANAN, being then employed both as Immigration officers of the
Bureau of Immigration and Deportation, Intramuros, Manila, hence are public officers, taking
advantage of their official positions and committing the offense in relation to office, conspiring and
confederating with Senior Police Officer 3 EXPEDITO S. PERLAS of the Western Police District
Command, Manila, together with co-accused Atty. FRANCISCO SB. ACEJAS III, of the
LUCENARIO, MARGATE, MOGPO, TIONGCO & ACEJAS LAW OFFICES, and co-accused JOSE
P. VICTORIANO, a private individual, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
demand, ask, and/or extort One Million (P1,000,000.00) PESOS from the spouses BETHEL GRACE
PELINGON and Japanese TAKAO AOYAGI and FILOMENO PELINGON, JR., in exchange for the
return of the passport of said Japanese Takao Aoyagi confiscated earlier by co-accused Vladimir S.
Hernandez and out of said demand, the complainants Bethel Grace Pelingon, Takao Aoyagi and
Filomeno Pelingon, Jr. produced, gave and delivered the sum of Twenty Five Thousand
(P25,000.00) Pesos in marked money to the above-named accused at a designated place at the
Coffee Shop, Ground Floor, Diamond Hotel, Ermita, Manila, causing damage to the said
complainants in the aforesaid amount of P25,000.00, and to the prejudice of government service."5
After trial, all the accused -- except Victoriano -- were convicted. The challenged Decision disposed
as follows:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, accused Vladimir S. Hernandez, Victor D. Conanan, Expedito

S. Perlas and Francisco SB. Acejas III are hereby found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Direct Bribery, and are sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years, nine
(9) months and ten (10) days of prision correccional, as minimum, to seven (7) years and four (4)
months of prision mayor, as maximum, and to pay a fine of three million pesos (P3,000,000.00).
Accused Vladimir S. Hernandez and Victor D. Conanan shall also suffer the penalty of special
temporary disqualification. Costs against the accused.
"On ground of reasonable doubt, accused Jose P. Victoriano is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime
charged. The surety bond he posted for his provisional liberty is cancelled. The Hold Departure
Order against him embodied in this Court’s Order dated July 24, 2000 is recalled."6
The first Resolution acquitted Conanan and denied reconsideration of the other accused. The
second Resolution denied Petitioner Acejas’ Motion for New Trial.
Hence, petitioners now seek recourse in this Court.7
The Facts
The facts8 are narrated by the Sandiganbayan as follows:
"At around 4:00 to 5:00 p.m. of December 17, 1993, accused Bureau of Immigration and Deportation
(BID) Intelligence Agent Vladimir Hernandez, together with a reporter, went to the house of Takao
Aoyagi and Bethel Grace Pelingon-Aoyagi at 27 Pacific Drive, Grand Villa, Sto. Niño, Parañaque,
Metro Manila. His purpose was to serve Mission Order No. 93-04-12 dated December 13, 1993,
issued by BID Commissioner Zafiro Respicio against Takao Aoyagi, a Japanese national.
Hernandez told Takao Aoyagi, through his wife, Bethel Grace, that there were complaints against
him in Japan and that he was suspected to be a Yakuza big boss, a drug dependent and an
overstaying alien.
"To prove that he had done nothing wrong, Takao Aoyagi showed his passport to Hernandez who
issued an undertaking (Exh. ‘B’) which Aoyagi signed. The undertaking stated that Takao Aoyagi
promised to appear in an investigation at the BID on December 20, 1993, and that as a guarantee
for his appearance, he was entrusting his passport to Hernandez. Hernandez acknowledged receipt
of the passport.
"On December 18, 1993, Bethel Grace Aoyagi called accused Expedito ‘Dick’ Perlas9 and informed
him about the taking of her husband’s passport by Hernandez. Perlas told her he would refer their
problem to his brother-in-law, Atty. Danton Lucenario of the Lucenario, Margate, Mogpo, Tiongco
and Acejas III Law Firm. It was at the Sheraton Hotel that Perlas introduced the Aoyagis to Atty.
Lucenario. They discussed the problem and Atty. Lucenario told the Aoyagis not to appear before
the BID on December 20, 1993.
"As advised by Atty. Lucenario, Takao Aoyagi did not appear before the BID. Instead, Atty. Rufino M.
Margate of the Lucenario Law Firm filed with the BID an Entry of Appearance (Exh. ‘6’ – Acejas).
Atty. Margate requested for copies of any complaint-affidavit against Takao Aoyagi and asked what
the ground was for the confiscation of x x x Aoyagi’s passport.
"Hernandez prepared a Progress Report (Exh. ‘5’ – Hernandez) which was submitted to Ponciano
M. Ortiz, the Chief of Operations and Intelligence Division of the BID. Ortiz recommended that Takao
Aoyagi, who was reportedly a Yakuza and a drug dependent, be placed under custodial
investigation.
"In the evening of December 22, 1993 at the Diamond Hotel, the Aoyagis met accused Atty.
Francisco Acejas III who was then accompanied by Perlas. Atty. Acejas informed them that it would
be he who would handle their case. A Contract for Legal Services (Exh. ‘D’) dated December 22,
1993 was entered into by Takao Aoyagi and Atty. Acejas, who represented the Lucenario Law Firm.
"In the morning of December 23, 1993, Perlas and Atty. Acejas accompanied the Aoyagis to the
Domestic Airport as the latter were going to Davao. It was here that Takao Aoyagi paid Atty. Acejas
P40,000.00, P25,000 of which is 50% of the acceptance fee, and the P15,000.00 is for filing/docket
fee (Exh. ‘O’). The Aoyagis were able to leave only in the afternoon as the morning flight was
postponed.
"On December 24, 1993, while attending a family reunion, Bethel Grace Pelingon-Aoyagi informed
her brother, Filomeno ‘Jun’ Pelingon, Jr., about her husband’s passport.
"On January 2, 1994, Jun Pelingon talked to BID Commissioner Zafiro Respicio in Davao and told
the latter of Takao Aoyagi’s problem with the BID. Respicio gave Pelingon his calling card and told
Pelingon to call him up in his office. That same day, Jun Pelingon and Mr. and Mrs. Aoyagi flew back
to Manila.
"On January 5, 1994, Jun Pelingon, Dick Perlas, Atty. Acejas, Vladimir Hernandez, Vic Conanan and
Akira Nemoto met at the Aristocrat Restaurant in Roxas Boulevard.
"Another meeting was arranged at the Manila Nikko Hotel in Makati on January 8, 1994 with Jun
Pelingon, Perlas, Atty. Acejas and Hernandez attending.
"On January 11, 1994, on account of the alleged demand of P1 million for the return of Takao
Aoyagi’s passport, Jun Pelingon called up Commissioner Respicio. The latter referred him to Atty.
Angelica Somera, an NBI Agent detailed at the BID. It was Atty. Carlos Saunar, also of the NBI, and
Atty. Somera who arranged the entrapment operation.
"On January 12, 1994, Vladimir Hernandez returned the passport to Takao Aoyagi at the Coffee
Shop of the Diamond Hotel. The NBI Team headed by Attorneys Saunar and Somera arrested Dick
Perlas, Atty. Acejas and Jose Victoriano after the latter picked up the brown envelope containing
marked money representing the amount being allegedly demanded. Only Perlas, Acejas and
Victoriano were brought to the NBI Headquarters."10
Version of the Prosecution
Testifying for the prosecution were Bethel Grace Pelingon Aoyagi, Filomeno "Jun" Basaca Pelingon,
Jr., and Carlos Romero Saunar.11
The prosecution evidence showed that it was during a meeting on January 5, 1994, when P1 million
as consideration for the passport was demanded. Conanan averred that Aoyagi was a drug trafficker
and Yakuza member. The money was to be used to settle the alleged "problem" and to facilitate the
processing of a permanent visa. When Pelingon negotiated to lower the amount demanded,
Conanan stated that there were many of them in the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (BID).12
During the second meeting held at Hotel Nikko, Pelingon was informed that the press and
government enforcers were after Aoyagi. Hernandez asked for a partial payment of P300,000, but
Pelingon said that the whole amount would be given at just one time to avoid another meeting.13
After talking to Commissioner Respicio on January 11, 1994,14 Pelingon called up Dick Perlas to
schedule the exchange.
Regarding the involvement of Petitioner Acejas, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) adds the
following facts:
"1.2. On 5 January 1994, [Acejas] and Perlas met Pelingon at the Aristocrat Restaurant.
[Acejas] informed Pelingon that he would file a P1 million lawsuit against the BID agents who
confiscated the passport of Takao Aoyagi. [Acejas] showed Pelingon several papers, which
allegedly were in connection with the intended lawsuit. However, when Hernandez and
Conanan arrived at the Aristocrat Restaurant, [Acejas] never mentioned to the BID agents
the P1 million lawsuit. [Acejas] just hid the papers he earlier showed to Pelingon inside his
[Acejas’] bag.
"1.3. [Acejas] was present when Hernandez proposed that Takao Aoyagi pay the amount of
P1 million in exchange for the help he would extend to him (Takao) in securing a permanent
visa in the Philippines. [Acejas], who was Aoyagi’s lawyer, did nothing.
"1.4. On 10 January 1994, [Acejas], Pelingon, Perlas and Hernandez met at the Hotel Nikko.
Thereat, Hernandez informed the group that certain government officials and even the press
were after Takao Aoyagi. Hernandez said that Takao Aoyagi can make a partial payment of
P300,000.00. Pelingon however, assured the group that Takao Aoyagi would pay in full the
amount of P1 million so as not to set another meeting date. [Acejas] kept quiet throughout
the negotiations.
xxx xxx xxx
"1.5.a. [Acejas] was present during the entrapment that took place at the Diamond Hotel.
Hernandez handed the passport to [Acejas], who handed it then to Perlas and thereafter to
Takao Aoyagi. After Takao Aoyagi went over his confiscated passport, Bethel Grace handed
to Hernandez the envelope15 containing the supposed P1 million. Hernandez refused and
motioned that [Acejas] be the one to receive it. [Acejas] willingly got the envelope and placed
it beside him and Perlas.
x x x before Hernandez handed out Aoyagi’s passport, he reminded the group of their earlier
agreement of ‘kaliwaan’, i.e., that after the passport is released, the Aoyagis should give the P1
million."16
Version of the Defense
Vladimir S. Hernandez, Expedito S. Perlas, Francisco SB. Acejas III, Victor D. Conanan and
Ponciano M. Ortiz testified for the defense.17
To the Sandiganbayan’s narration, Hernandez adds:
"6. x x x [Hernandez], an intelligence agent of the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (BID), went
to the house of Private Respondents Takao and Bethel Grace Aoyagi to enforce and serve a Mission
Order issued and assigned to him by BID Commissioner Zafiro Respicio on December 13, 1993, for
the arrest of Takao Aoyagi.
"7. When Bethel Grace showed [Hernandez] her husband’s passport, [Hernandez] found out that the
latter’s [authority] to stay had already been duly extended. He invited private respondents to go with
him to the BID office. They declined, but made a written undertaking to appear at the BID office for
investigation on December 20, 1993. As security for said undertaking, Bethel Grace Aoyagi
entrusted to [Hernandez] her husband’s passport, receipt of which [Hernandez], in return,
acknowledge[d] in the same instrument.
"8. On January 19, 1994, [Hernandez] signified that the record of Aoyagi has been cleared and that
he can pick up his passport at the BID office. In connection therewith, [Hernandez] was invited by
Perlas to make the return at a lunchtime meeting to be held at the Diamond Hotel Coffee Shop.
Upon arrival thereat, [Hernandez] gave the passport to Atty. Acejas, Aoyagi’s counsel, and within
less than ten minutes, he left the coffee shop."18
In his Petition, Acejas narrates some more occurrences as follows:
"1. 18th December 1993 – The law firm of Lucenario Margate Mogpo Tiongco & Acejas was
engaged by the spouses Takao Aoyagi and Bethel Grace Pelingon Aoyagi. x x x.
xxx xxx xxx
"3. 22nd December 1993 –
"a) The managing partner of the law firm, Atty. Lucenario, briefed [Acejas] about the
facts regarding the confiscation by agents of the BID of the passport belonging to a
Japanese client. x x x.
"b) Thereafter, [Acejas] was tasked by Atty. Lucenario to ‘meet his brother-in-law Mr.
Expedito Perlas, who happened to be a policeman and a friend of Mr. Takao Aoyagi.’
Thus, [Acejas] ‘met Mr. Perlas for the first time in the afternoon’ of this date.
"c) Also, for the first time, [Acejas] met the clients, spouses Aoyagis, at the Diamond
Hotel, where they were staying. x x x [Acejas] advised them that the law firm decided
that the clients ‘can file an action for Replevin plus Damages for the recovery of the
Japanese passport.’
"d) The CONTRACT FOR LEGAL SERVICES was signed between the client and the
law firm, thru [Acejas] as partner thereof. x x x The amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos
(Php.50,000.00) was agreed to be paid by way of ‘Case Retainer’s/Acceptance
Fees’, which was supposed to be payable ‘upon (the) signing (t)hereof’, and the sum
of Php.2,000.00 by way of appearance fee. However, the client proposed to pay half
only of the acceptance fee (Php.25,000.00), plus the estimated judicial expenses for
the filing or docket fees (Php.15,000.00). x x x It was then further agreed that the
‘balance of Php.25,000.00 was supposed to be given upon the successful recovery
of the Japanese passport’.
"e) The clients informed [Acejas] that ‘they are supposed to leave for Davao the
following day on the 23rd because they will spend their Christmas in Davao City; but
they promised that they will be back on the 26th, which is a Sunday, so that on the
27th, which is a Monday, the complaint against the BID officers will have to be filed in
Court’.
xxx xxx xxx
"6. 27th December 1993 – ‘(T)he law office received word from Mr. Perlas that the Japanese
did not come back on the 26th (December), x x x so that the case cannot be filed on the 27th
instead (it has) to wait for client’s instruction.’
"7. 4th January 1994 – ‘In the late afternoon, the law firm received a telephone call from Mr.
Perlas informing (it) that the Japanese is already in Manila and he was requesting for an
appointment with any of the lawyer of the law firm on January 5, 1994’.
"8. 5th January 1994 – [Acejas] ‘met for the first time Mr. Filomeno Pelingon Jr.’ including a
certain Nimoto Akira.
x x x.
"b) [Acejas] ‘told Mr. Pelingon Jr. that all the pleadings are ready for filing but, of
course, the Japanese client and the wife should first read the complaint and sign if
they want to pursue the filing of the complaint against the BID agents’.
"c) For the first time, ‘Mr. Pelingon advised against the intended filing of the case’. x x
x He ‘instead suggested that he wants to directly negotiate with the BID agents.’
"d) Thereafter, ‘Mr. Pelingon instructed Mr. Dick Perlas to contact the BID agent who
confiscated the Japanese passport.’ ‘Mr. Perlas and Mr. Pelingon were able to
contact the BID agent’.
"e) For the ‘first time [Acejas] saw Mr. Hernandez’, when the latter arrived and also
accused Victor Conanan. In the course of the meeting, a confrontation ensued
between [Acejas] and [Hernandez] concerning the legal basis for the confiscation of
the passport. [Acejas] demanded for the return of the Japanese passport x x x. Mr.
Hernandez ‘said that if there are no further derogatory report concerning the
Japanese client, then in a matter of week (from January 5 to 12), he will return the
passport’.
"f) [Acejas] ‘gave an ultimatum to Mr. Hernandez that if the Japanese passport will
not be returned in one (1) week’s time, then (the law firm) will pursue the filing of the
replevin case plus the damage suit against him including the other BID agents’.
"g) ‘x x x Mr. Pelingon Jr. for the second time advised against the filing thereof saying
that his Japanese brother-in-law would like to negotiate or in his own words
‘magbibigay naman [i.e. will give money anyway].’
"9. 8th January 1994 –

"a) Again, ‘Mr. Perlas called the law office and informed x x x that the Japanese client
is now in Manila.’ Petitioner attended the meeting they arranged in ‘(Makati) and
meet Dick Perlas, Vladimir Hernandez and Pelingon Jr. x x x.
"b) x x x according to Pelingon Jr., the Japanese does not want to meet with anybody
because anyway they are willing to pay or negotiate.
"c) [Hernandez was also] present at the meeting and [Acejas] ‘met him for the
second time. x x x [Acejas] said that if [Hernandez] will not be able to return the
passport on or before January 12, 1994, then the law firm will have no choice but to
file the case against him x x x. Again, for the third time Mr. Pelingon warned against
the filing of the case because he said that he would directly negotiate with the BID
agents.’
"d) The Makati meeting ended up ‘with the understanding that Mr. Hernandez will
have to undertake the return [of] the Japanese passport on or before January 12,
1994.’
"10. 12th January 1994 –
"a) Mr. Perlas called up the law office informing that the Japanese client was already
in Manila and was requesting for an appointment with the lawyers at lunchtime of
January 12 at the Diamond Hotel where he was billeted.
xxx xxx xxx
"c) x x x x x x x x x
"At this meeting, ‘the Japanese was inquiring on the status of the case and he was
wondering why the Japanese passport is not yet recovered when according to him
he has already paid for the attorney fees. And so, [Acejas] explained to him that the
case has to be filed and they still have to sign the complaint, the Special Power of
Attorney and the affidavit relative to the filing of replevin case. But the Japanese
would not fully understand. So, Pelingon Jr. again advised against the filing of the
case saying that since there is no derogatory record of Mr. Aoyagi at the BID office,
then the BID agents should return the Japanese passport.’
xxx xxx xxx
"e) Thereafter, ‘Pelingon, Jr. and Dick Perlas x x x tried to contact Mr. Hernandez.’
Since, they were able to contact the latter, ‘we waited until around 2:00 p.m.’. ‘When
Mr. Hernandez came, he said that the Japanese client is cleared at the BID office
and so, he can return the Japanese passport and he gave it to [Acejas]. x x x ‘When
[Acejas] received the Japanese passport, (he) checked the authenticity of the
documents and finding that it was in good order, (he) attempted to give it to the
Japanese client.’
"‘Very strangely when [Acejas] tried to hand-over the Japanese passport to the Japanese across the
table, the Japanese was motioning and wanted to get the passport under the table. x x x [Acejas]
found it strange. (He) x x x thought that it was a Japanese custom to receive things like that under
the table. But nonetheless, [Acejas] did not give it under the table and instead passed it on to Mr.
Dick Perlas who was seated at (his) right. And so, it was Mr. Dick Perlas who took the passport from
[Acejas] and finally handed it over to Mr. Aoyagi.’ x x x. ‘After that, there was a little chat between Mr.
Hernandez and the client, and Mr. Hernandez did not stay for so long and left.’
"Still, thereafter, ‘(w)hen the Japanese passport was received, Bethel Grace Aoyagi and [Acejas]
were talking and she said since the Japanese passport had been recovered, they are now willing to
pay the Php.25,000.00 balance of the acceptance fee.’
"‘Mrs. Aoyagi was giving [Acejas] a brown envelope but she want[ed] Mr. Hernandez to receive it
while Mr. Hernandez was still around standing. But Mr. Hernandez did not receive it.
"Since, the payment is due to the law firm, [Acejas] received the brown envelope.
xxx xxx xxx
"Not long after, [Acejas] saw his companion, accused Mr. Victoriano, who was ‘signaling something’
as if there was a sense of urgency. [Acejas] immediately stood up and left hurriedly. When [Acejas]
approached Mr. Victoriano, he ‘said that the car which [Acejas] parked in front of the Diamond Hotel
gate, somebody took the car’. [Acejas] ‘went out and checked and realized that it was valet parking
so it was the parking attendant who took the car and transferred the car to the parking area’. [Acejas]
requested ‘Mr. Victoriano to get (the) envelope and the coat’, at the table.
"g) ‘When [Acejas] went out, [Acejas] already looked for the parking attendant to get the car. When
the car arrived, [Acejas] just saw from the doors of the Diamond Hotel Mr. Jose Victoriano and Mr.
Dick Perlas coming out already in handcuffs and collared by the NBI agents." They then ‘were taken
to the NBI’, except the accused Vladimir Hernandez."19
Ruling of the Sandiganbayan
The Sandiganbayan ruled that the elements of direct bribery,20 as well as conspiracy in the
commission of the crime,21 had been proven. Hernandez and Conanan demanded money;22 Perlas
negotiated and dealt with the complainants;23 and Acejas accepted the payoff and gave it to Perlas.24
Victoriano was acquitted on reasonable doubt.25 Although he had picked up the envelope containing
the payoff, this act did not sufficiently show that he had conspired with the other accused.26
The Sandiganbayan did not give credence to the alleged belief of Acejas that the money was the
balance of the law firm’s legal fees.27 If he had indeed believed that the money was payable to him,
he should have kept and retained it. The court then inferred that he had merely been pretending to
protect his client’s rights when he threatened to file a suit against Hernandez.28
The January 3, 2003 Resolution acquitted Conanan and denied the Motions for Reconsideration of
Hernandez, Acejas and Perlas. According to the Sandiganbayan, Conanan was not shown to be
present during the meetings on January 8 and 12, 1994.29 His presence during one of those
meetings, on January 5, 1994, did not conclusively show his participation as a co-conspirator.
The January 14, 2003 Resolution denied Acejas’ Supplemental Motion, which prayed for a new trial.
The Issues
Petitioner Hernandez raises the following issues:

"I. Whether or not respondent court erred in ruling that [Hernandez] was part of the
conspiracy to extort money from private respondents, despite lack of clear and convincing
evidence.
"II. Whether or not the Honorable Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion when it
overlooked the fact that the legal requisites of the crime are not completely present as to
warrant [Hernandez’] complicity in the crime charged.
"III. Whether or not respondent Sandiganbayan, 5th Division, ruled erroneously when it relied
solely on the naked and uncorroborated testimonies of the late Filomeno ‘Jun’ Pelingon, Jr.
in order to declare the existence of a conspiracy to commit bribery, as well as the guilt of the
accused.
"IV. Whether or not [respondent] court’s acquittal of co-accused Victor Conanan and its
conviction of [Hernandez] for the offense as charged effectively belies the existence of a
conspiracy.
"V. Whether or not the respondent Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of, or in excess of jurisdiction when it found [Hernandez] guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of direct bribery."30
On the other hand, Petitioner Acejas simply enumerates the following points:
"1. The Conspiracy Theory
2. The presence of lawyer-client relationship; duty to client’s cause; lawful performance of

duties
3. ‘Instigation’ not ‘entrapment’
4. Credibility of witness and testimony
5. Affidavit of desistance; effect: creates serious doubts as to the liability of the accused
6. Elements of ‘bad faith’
7. Elements of the crime (direct bribery)
8. Non-presentation of complaining victim tantamount to suppression of evidence"31
In the main, petitioners are challenging the finding of guilt against them. The points they raised are
therefore intertwined and will be discussed jointly.
The Court’s Ruling
The Petitions have no merit.
Main Issue:
Finding of Guilt
The crime of direct bribery exists when a public officer 1)
agrees to perform an act that constitutes a crime in consideration of any offer, promise, gift or
present; 2) accepts the gift in consideration of the execution of an act that does not constitute a
crime; or 3) abstains from the performance of official duties.32
Petitioners were convicted under the second kind of direct bribery, which contained the following
elements: 1) the offender was a public officer, 2) who received the gifts or presents personally or
through another, 3) in consideration of an act that did not constitute a crime, and 4) that act related
to the exercise of official duties.33
Hernandez claims that the prosecution failed to show his involvement in the crime. Allegedly, he was
merely implementing Mission Order No. 93-04-12, which required him to investigate Takao
Aoyagi.34 The passport was supposed to have been voluntarily given to him as a guarantee to
appear at the BID office, but he returned it upon the instruction of his superior.35
The chain of circumstances, however, contradicts the contention of Hernandez. It was he who had
taken the passport of Takao Aoyagi.36 On various dates,37 he met with Takao and Bethel Grace
Aoyagi, and also Pelingon, regarding the return of the passport. Hernandez then asked for a down
payment on the payoff,38 during which he directed Bethel Grace to deliver the money to Acejas.39
Bethel Grace Aoyagi’s testimony, which was confirmed by the other witnesses, proceeded as
follows:
"PROSECUTOR MONTEMAYOR:
"Q: When Vlademir Hernandez arrived, what happened?
"A: He got the passport from his pocket and passed it on to Atty. Acejas, sir.
"Q: What happened after he gave the passport to Atty. Acejas?
"A: [Acejas] gave the passport to Mr. Expedito Perlas, sir.
"Q: After that, what happened?
"A: Then, [Perlas] gave it to Mr. Aoyagi, sir.
"Q: The passport?
"A: Yes, sir.
"Q: And when Mr. Aoyagi received the passport, what did you do or what did Mr. Aoyagi do?
"A: He checked all the pages and he kept it, sir.
xxxxxxxxx
"Q: What did you do with that money after Mr. Aoyagi received the passport?
"A: Because our agreement is that after giving the passport we would give the money so when Mr.
Perlas handed to my husband the passport, I gave the money placed on my lap to my husband and
he passed it to Mr. Hernandez who refused the same.
"ATTY. ACEJAS:
"Your Honor, please, may I just make a clarification that when the witness referred to the money it
pertains to the brown envelope which allegedly contains the money x x x .
"AJ ESCAREAL:
"Noted.
"Q: Did Mr. Hernandez got hold or touched the envelope?
"A: No, sir.
"Q: When he [did] not want to receive the envelope, what did your husband do?
"A: When Mr. Vlademir Hernandez refused to receive the money, he pointed to Atty. Acejas so my
husband handed it to Atty. Acejas who received the same and later on passed it to Mr. Perlas.
"Q: When Mr. Hernandez pointed to Atty. Acejas, did he say anything?
"A: None, sir, he just motioned like this.
"INTERPRETER:
"Witness motioning by [waving] her two (2) hands, left and right.
"Q: And at the same time pointed to Atty. Acejas?
"A: Yes, sir.
"Q: And your husband gave the envelope to Atty. Acejas?
"A: Yes, sir.
"Q: And Atty. Acejas, in turn, handed the said envelope to whom?
"A: Expedito Perlas, sir.
"Q: Did Expedito Perlas [receive] that envelope?
"A: Yes, sir.

"A: Mr. Perlas put the money on his side in between him and Atty. Acejas, sir.
"Q: And then, what happened?
"A: After the money was placed where it was, we were surprised, I think, it happened in just
seconds[.] Mr. Vlademir Hernandez immediately left and then all of a sudden somebody came and
picked up the envelope, sir."40
Significantly, Hernandez does not address the lingering questions about why Takao Aoyagi or his
representatives had to negotiate for the retrieval of the passport during the meetings held outside the
BID. Ponciano Ortiz, chief of the Operation and Intelligence Division of the BID, testified that it was
not a standard operating procedure to officially return withheld passports in such locations.41 It can
readily be inferred that Hernandez had an ulterior motive for withholding the passport for some time
despite the absence of any legal purpose.
Also, Hernandez cannot claim innocence based on Conanan’s acquittal.42 While the testimony of
Pelingon was the only evidence linking Conanan to the conspiracy,43 there was an abundance of
evidence showing Hernandez’s involvement.
Acejas, on the other hand, belies his involvement in the conspiracy. He attacks the prosecution’s
version that he was silent during the negotiations for the return of the passport.44 According to him,
he kept giving Hernandez an ultimatum to return the passport, with threats to file a court case.
Acejas testified that he had wanted to file a case against Hernandez, but was prevented by Spouses
Aoyagi. His supposed preparedness to file a case against Hernandez might have just been a
charade and was in fact belied by Pelingon’s testimony regarding the January 5, 1994 meeting:
"ATTY. VALMONTE:
"Q: Who arrived first at Aristocrat Restaurant, you or Acejas?
"A: Acejas arrived together with Dick Perlas[. T]hey arrived ahead of me, sir.
xxxxxxxxx
"Q: When the three (3) of you were talking that was the time that Atty. Acejas was showing you
documents that he was going to file [a] P1 million damage suit against Hernandez?
"A: Yes, sir.
"Q: Now, is it not that when Hernandez and Cunanan arrived and you were talking with each other,
Atty. Acejas also threatened, reiterated his threat to Hernandez that he would file [a] P1 million
damage suit should Hernandez [fails] to return the passport?
"A: When the group [was] already there, the P1 million [damage suit] was not [anymore] mentioned,
sir."45
Even assuming that Acejas negotiated for the return of the passport on his client’s behalf, he still
failed to justify his actions during the entrapment operation. The witnesses all testified that he had
received the purported payoff. On this point, we recount the testimony of Bethel Grace Aoyagi:
"Prosecutor Montemayor:
xxxxxxxxx
"Q: When he [did] not want to receive the envelope, what did your husband do?
"A: When Mr. Vlademir Hernandez refused to receive the money, he pointed to Atty. Acejas so my
husband handed it to Atty. Acejas who received the same and later on passed it to Mr. Perlas.
"Q: When Mr. Hernandez pointed to Atty. Acejas, did he say anything?
"A: None, sir, he just motioned like this.
"Interpreter:
"Witness motioning by [waving] her two (2) hands, left and right.
"Q: And at the same time pointed to Atty. Acejas?
"A: Yes, sir.
"Q: And your husband gave the envelope to Atty. Acejas?
"A: Yes, sir.
"Q: And Atty. Acejas, in turn, handed the said envelope to whom?
"A: Expedito Perlas, sir.
"x x x x x x x x x
"A: Mr. Perlas put the money on his side in between him and Atty. Acejas, sir.
"Q: And then, what happened?
"WITNESS:
"A: After the money was placed where it was, we were surprised, I think, it happened in just
seconds[.] Mr. Vladimir Hernandez immediately left and then all of a sudden somebody came and
picked up the envelope, sir.
"Q: Do you know the identity of that somebody who picked up the envelope?
xxxxxxxxx
"A: Victoriano, sir."46
Acejas failed to justify why he received the payoff money. It would be illogical to sustain his
contention that the envelope represented the balance of his firm’s legal fees. That it was given to
Hernandez immediately after the return of the passport leads to the inescapable conclusion that the
money was a consideration for the return. Moreover, Acejas should have kept the amount if he
believed it to be his. The Court agrees with the Sandiganbayan’s pronouncement on this point:
"x x x. If he believed that the brown envelope contained the balance of the acceptance fee, how
come he passed it to Perlas? His passing the brown envelope to Perlas only proves that the same
did not contain the balance of the acceptance fee; otherwise, he should have kept and retained it.
Moreover, the three prosecution witnesses testified that the brown envelope was being given to
Hernandez who refused to accept the same. This further shows that the brown envelope was not for
the balance of the acceptance fee because, if it were, why was it given to Hernandez.
xxxxxxxxx
"Acejas’ defense was further weakened by the fact that his testimony as to why he left immediately
after the brown envelope was given to him was uncorroborated. He should have presented accused
Victoriano to corroborate his testimony since it was the latter who allegedly called him and caused
him to leave their table. This, he did not do. The ineluctable conclusion is that he was, indeed, in
cahoots with his co-accused."47
Lawyer’s Duty
Acejas alleges that the Sandiganbayan failed to appreciate his lawyer-client relationship with the
complainants. He was supposedly only acting in their best interest48 and had the right to be present
when the passport was to be returned.49
True, as a lawyer, it was his duty to represent his clients in dealing with other people. His presence
at Diamond Hotel for the scheduled return of the passport was justified. This fact, however, does not
support his innocence
Acejas, however, failed to act for or represent the interests of his clients. He knew of the payoff, but
did nothing to assist or protect their rights, a fact that strongly indicated that he was to get a share.
Thus, he received the money purporting to be the payoff,
even if he was not involved in the entrapment operation. The facts revealed that he was a
conspirator.
The Court reminds lawyers to follow legal ethics50 when confronted by public officers who extort
money. Lawyers must decline and report the matter to the authorities.51 If the extortion is directed at
the client, they must advise the client not to perform any illegal act. Moreover, they must report it to
the authorities, without having to violate the attorney-client privilege.52 Naturally, they must not
participate in the illegal act.53
Acejas did not follow these guidelines. Worse, he conspired with the extortionists.
Instigation
Also futile is the contention of petitioners that Pelingon instigated the situation to frame them into
accepting the payoff.54 Instigation is the employment of ways and means to lure persons into the
commission of an offense in order to prosecute them.55 As opposed to entrapment, criminal intent
originates in the mind of the instigator.56
There was no instigation in the present case, because the chain of circumstances showed an
extortion attempt. In other words, the criminal intent originated from petitioners, who had arranged
for the payoff.
During the cross-examination of Bethel Grace Aoyagi, pertinent was Associate Justice Escareal
clarifying question as follows:
"AJ ESCAREAL:
"[Q:] Did Mr. Hernandez say anything when he returned the passport to your husband?
"A: He did not say anything except that he instructed [the] group to abide with the agreement that
upon handing of the passport, the money would also be given immediately (‘magkaliwaan’)."57
Alleged Discrepancies
According to Acejas, Pelingon’s testimonies given in his Complaint-Affidavit, Supplemental-Affidavit,

inquest testimony, testimony in court, and two Affidavits of Desistance were contradictory.58 He cites
these particular portions of Pelingon’s Affidavit:
"5. That having been enlightened of the case, and conscious that I might be prosecuting innocent
men, I have decided on my own disposition, not to further testify against any of the accused in the
Sandiganbayan or in any court or tribunal, regarding the same cause of action.
"6. That this affidavit of desistance to further prosecute is voluntarily executed, and that no reward,
promise, consideration, influence, force or threat was executed to secure this affidavit."59
Pelingon testified that he had executed the Affidavit of Desistance because of a threat to his
life.60 He did not prepare the Affidavit; neither was it explained to him. Allegedly, his true testimony
was in the first Complaint-Affidavit that he had executed.61
By appearing and testifying during the trial, he effectively repudiated his Affidavit of Desistance. An
affidavit of desistance must be ignored when pitted against positive evidence given on the witness
stand.62
Acejas has failed to identify the other material points that were allegedly inconsistent. The Court
therefore adopts the Sandiganbayan’s finding that these were minor details that were not indicative
of the lack of credibility of the prosecution witnesses.63 People v. Eligino64 is in point:
"x x x. While witnesses may differ in their recollections of an incident, it does not necessarily follow
from their disagreement that all of them should be disbelieved as liars and their testimony completely
discarded as worthless. As long as the mass of testimony jibes on material points, the slight clashing
statements neither dilute the witnesses’ credibility nor the veracity of their testimony. Thus,
inconsistencies and contradictions referring to minor details do not, in any way, destroy the credibility
of witnesses, for indeed, such inconsistencies are but natural and even enhance credibility as these
discrepancies indicate that the responses are honest and unrehearsed."65
Suppression of Evidence
Acejas further raises the issue of suppression of evidence. Aoyagi, from whom the money was
supposedly demanded, should have been presented by the prosecution as a witness.66
The discretion on whom to present as prosecution witnesses falls on the People.67 The freedom to
devise a strategy to convict the accused belongs to the prosecution.68 Necessarily, its decision on
which evidence, including which witnesses, to present cannot be dictated by the accused or even by
the trial court.69 If petitioners believed that Takao Aoyagi’s testimony was important to their case,
they should have presented him as their witness.70
Finally, Acejas claims that his Comment/Objection to the prosecution’s Formal Offer of Evidence
was not resolved by the Sandiganbayan.71 In that Comment/Objection, he had noted the lateness in
the filing of the Formal Offer of Evidence.
It may readily be assumed that the Sandiganbayan admitted the prosecution’s Formal Offer of
Evidence upon the promulgation of its Decision. In effect, Acejas’ Comment/Objection was deemed
immaterial. It could not overrule the finding of guilt. Further, it showed no prayer that the
Sandiganbayan needed to act upon.72
Finally we reiterate that, as a rule, factual findings of the Sandiganbayan are conclusive upon this
Court.73 We are convinced that these were clearly based on the evidence adduced in this case.
In sum, we find that the prosecution proved the elements of direct bribery. First, there is no question
that the offense was committed by a public officer. BID Agent Hernandez extorted money from the
Aoyagi spouses for the return of the passport and the promise of assistance in procuring a visa.
Petitioner Acejas was his co-conspirator. Second, the offenders received the money as payoff, which
Acejas received for the group and then gave to Perlas. Third, the money was given in consideration
of the return of the passport, an act that did not constitute a crime. Fourth, both the confiscation and
the return of the passport were made in the exercise of official duties.
For taking direct part in the execution of the crime, Hernandez and Acejas are liable as
principals.74 The evidence shows that the
parties conspired to extort money from Spouses Aoyagi. A conspiracy exists even if all the parties
did not commit the same act, if the participants performed specific acts that indicated unity of
purpose in accomplishing a criminal design.75 The act of one is the act of all.
WHEREFORE, the Petitions are DENIED, and the assailed Decision and Resolutions AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Case Number 3:
A.C. NO. 10050 December 3, 2013
VICTORIA C. HEENAN, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. ERLINA ESPEJO, Respondent.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
This resolves the administrative complaint filed by Victoria Heenan (Victoria) against Atty. Erlina
Espejo (Atty. Espejo) before the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for violation of lawyer’s oath, docketed as CBD Case No. 10-2631.
The Facts
Sometime in January 2009, Victoria met Atty. Espejo through her godmother, Corazon Eusebio
(Corazon). Following the introduction, Corazon told Victoria that Atty. Espejo was her lawyer in need
of money and wanted to borrow two hundred fifty thousand pesos (PhP 250,000) from her (Victoria).
Shortly thereafter, Victoria went to the house of Corazon for a meeting with Atty. Espejo where they
discussed the terms of the loan. Since Atty. Espejo was introduced to her as her godmother’s
lawyer, Victoria found no reason to distrust the former. Hence, during the same meeting, Victoria
agreed to accomodate Atty. Espejo and there and then handed to the latter the amount of PhP
250,000. To secure the payment of the loan, Atty. Espejo simultaneously issued and turned over to
Victoria a check1dated February 2, 2009 for two hundred seventy-five thousand pesos (PhP
275,000) covering the loan amount and agreed interest. On due date, Atty. Espejo requested
Victoria to delay the deposit of the check for the reason that she was still waiting for the release of
the proceeds of a bank loan to fund the check. However, after a couple of months of waiting, Victoria
received no word from Atty. Espejo as to whether or not the check was already funded enough. In
July 2009, Victoria received an Espejo-issued check dated July 10, 2009 in the amount of fifty
thousand pesos (PhP 50,000)2 representing the interest which accrued due to the late payment of
the principal obligation. Victoria deposited the said check but, to her dismay, the check bounced due
to insufficiency of funds. Atty. Espejo failed to pay despite Victoria’s repeated demands. Worried that
she would not be able to recover the amount thus lent, Victoria decided to deposit to her account the
first check in the amount of PhP 275,000, but without notifying Atty. Espejo of the fact. However, the
said check was also dishonored due to insufficiency of funds. Victoria thereafter became more
aggressive in her efforts to recover her money. She, for instance, personally handed to Atty. Espejo
a demand letter dated August 3, 2009.3
When Atty. Espejo still refused to pay, Victoria filed a criminal complaint against Atty. Espejo on
August 18, 2009 for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 and Estafa under Article 315 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended, before the Quezon City Prosecutor’s Office.4
Atty. Espejo disregarded the notices and subpoenas issued by the Quezon City Prosecutor’s Office
which she personally received and continued to ignore Victoria’s demands. She attended only one
(1) scheduled preliminary investigation where she promised to pay her loan obligation.5
In November 2009, Atty. Espejo issued another check dated December 8, 2009 in the amount of two
hundred seventy five thousand pesos (PhP 275,000.). However, to Victoria’s chagrin, the said check
was again dishonored due to insufficiency of funds.6 Atty. Espejo did not file any counter-affidavit or
pleading to answer the charges against her. On November 17, 2009, the case was submitted for
resolution without Atty. Espejo’s participation.7Victoria thereafter filed the instant administrative case
against Atty. Espejo before the CBD. On March 1, 2010, the CBD, through Director for Bar Discipline
Alicia A. Risos-Vidal, issued an Order8 directing Atty. Espejo to submit her Answer to Victoria’s
administrative complaint failing which would render her in default. The warning, notwithstanding,
Atty. Espejo did not submit any Answer. On May 5, 2010, IBP Commissioner Rebecca Villanueva-
Malala (Commissioner Villanueva-Malala) notified the parties to appear for a mandatory conference
set on June 2, 2010. The notice stated that non-appearance of either of the parties shall be deemed
a waiver of her right to participate in further proceedings.9
At the mandatory conference, only Victoria appeared.10
Thus, Commissioner Villanueva-Malala issued an Order11 noting Atty. Espejo’s failure to appear
during the mandatory conference and her failure to file an Answer. Accordingly, Atty. Espejo was
declared in default. Victoria, on the other hand, was directed to file her verified position paper, which
she filed on June 11, 2010.12
Findings and Recommendation of the IBP
In its Report and Recommendation13 dated July 15, 2010, the CBD recommended the suspension of
Atty. Espejo from the practice of law and as a member of the Bar for a period of five (5) years.
The CBD reasoned:
The failure of a lawyer to answer the complaint for disbarment despite due notice and to appear on
the scheduled hearings set, shows his flouting resistance to lawful orders of the court and illustrates
his deficiency for his oath of office as a lawyer, which deserves disciplinary sanction.
Moreover, respondent[’s] acts of issuing checks with insufficient funds and despite repeated
demands [she] failed to comply with her obligation and her disregard and failure to appear for
preliminary investigation and to submit her counter-affidavit to answer the charges against her for
Estafa and Violation of BP 22, constitute grave misconduct that also warrant disciplinary action
against respondent.
On December 14, 2012, the Board of Governors passed a Resolution14 adopting the Report and
Recommendation of the CBD with the modification lowering Atty. Espejo’s suspension from five (5)
years to two (2) years. Atty. Espejo was also ordered to return to Victoria the amount of PhP
250,000 within thirty (30) days from receipt of notice with legal interest reckoned from the time the
demand was made. The Resolution reads:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED and APPROVED,

with modification, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-
entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A", and finding the recommendation
fully supported by the evidence on record and applicable laws and rules, and considering
respondent’s grave misconduct, Atty. Erlinda Espejo is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of
law for two (2) years and Ordered to Return to complainant the amount of Two Hundred Fifty
Thousand (₱250,000.00) Pesos within thirty (30) days from receipt of notice with legal interest
reckoned from the time the demand was made.
On August 8, 2013, the CBD transmitted to this Court the Notice of the Resolution pertaining to
Resolution No. XX-2012-419 along with the records of this case.15
The Court’s Ruling
We sustain the findings of the IBP and adopt its recommendation in part. Atty. Espejo did not deny
1âw phi1
obtaining a loan from Victoria or traverse allegations that she issued unfunded checks to pay her
obligation. It has already been settled that the deliberate failure to pay just debts and the issuance of
worthless checks constitute gross misconduct, for which a lawyer may be sanctioned.16
Verily, lawyers must at all times faithfully perform their duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and
to their clients. In Tomlin II v. Moya II, We explained that the prompt payment of financial obligations
is one of the duties of a lawyer, thus:
In the present case, respondent admitted his monetary obligations to the complaint but offered no
justifiable reason for his continued refusal to pay. Complainant made several demands, both verbal
and written, but respondent just ignored them and even made himself scarce. Although he
acknowledged his financial obligations to complainant, respondent never offered nor made
arrangements to pay his debt. On the contrary, he refused to recognize any wrong doing nor shown
remorse for issuing worthless checks, an act constituting gross misconduct. Respondent must be
reminded that it is his duty as a lawyer to faithfully perform at all times his duties to society, to the
bar, to the courts and to his clients. As part of his duties, he must promptly pay his financial
obligations.17
The fact that Atty. Espejo obtained the loan and issued the worthless checks in her private capacity
and not as an attorney of Victoria is of no moment. As We have held in several cases, a lawyer may
be disciplined not only for malpractice and dishonesty in his profession but also for gross misconduct
outside of his professional capacity. While the Court may not ordinarily discipline a lawyer for
misconduct committed in his non- professional or private capacity, the Court may be justified in
suspending or removing him as an attorney where his misconduct outside of the lawyer’s
professional dealings is so gross in character as to show him morally unfit and unworthy of the
privilege which his licenses and the law confer.18
In Wilkie v. Limos, We reiterated that the issuance of a series of worthless checks, which is exactly
what Atty. Espejo committed in this case, manifests a lawyer’s low regard for her commitment to her
oath, for which she may be disciplined. Thus:
We have held that the issuance of checks which were later dishonored for having been drawn
against a closed account indicates a lawyer’s unfitness for the trust and confidence reposed on her.
It shows a lack of personal honesty and good moral character as to render her unworthy of public
confidence. The issuance of a series of worthless checks also shows the remorseless attitude of
respondent, unmindful to the deleterious effects of such act to the public interest and public order. It
also manifests a lawyer’s low regard to her commitment to the oath she has taken when she joined
her peers, seriously and irreparably tarnishing the image of the profession she should hold in high
esteem.
xxxx
In Barrios v. Martinez, we disbarred the respondent who issued worthless checks for which he was
convicted in the criminal case filed against him. In Lao v. Medel, we held that the deliberate failure to
pay just debts and the issuance of worthless checks constitute gross misconduct, for which a lawyer
may be sanctioned with one-year suspension from the practice of law. The same sanction was
imposed on the respondent-lawyer in Rangwani v. Dino having been found guilty of gross
misconduct for issuing bad checks in payment of a piece of property the title of which was only
entrusted to him by the complainant.19
Further, the misconduct of Atty. Espejo is aggravated by her unjustified refusal to obey the orders of
the IBP directing her to file an answer to the complaint of Victoria and to appear at the scheduled
mandatory conference. This constitutes blatant disrespect for the IBP which amounts to conduct
unbecoming a lawyer. In Almendarez, Jr. v. Langit, We held that a lawyer must maintain respect not
only for the courts, but also for judicial officers and other duly constituted authorities, including the
IBP:
The misconduct of respondent is aggravated by his unjustified refusal to heed the orders of the IBP
requiring him to file an answer to the complaint-affidavit and, afterwards, to appear at the mandatory
conference. Although respondent did not appear at the conference, the IBP gave him another
chance to defend himself through a position paper. Still, respondent ignored this directive, exhibiting
a blatant disrespect for authority. Indeed, he is justly charged with conduct unbecoming a lawyer, for
a lawyer is expected to uphold the law and promote respect for legal processes. Further, a lawyer
must observe and maintain respect not only to the courts, but also to judicial officers and other duly
constituted authorities, including the IBP. Under Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, the Court has
empowered the IBP to conduct proceedings for the disbarment, suspension, or discipline of
attorneys.20
Undoubtedly, Atty. Espejo’s issuance of worthless checks and her blatant refusal to heed the
directives of the Quezon City Prosecutor’s Office and the IBP contravene Canon 1, Rule 1.01;
Canon 7, Rule 7.03; and Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provide:
CANON 1 – A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND
AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR THE LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES. Rule 1.01. – A lawyer shall
not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. CANON 7 – A LAWYER SHALL AT
ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND
SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR. Rule 7.03 – A lawyer shall not engage in
conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private
life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession. CANON 11 – A
LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE AND MAINTAIN THE RESPECT DUE TO THE COURTS AND TO
JUDICIAL OFFICES AND SHOULD INSIST ON SIMILAR CONDUCT BY OTHERS.
We find the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for two (2) years, as recommended by the
IBP, commensurate under the circumstances. We, however, cannot sustain the IBP’s
recommendation ordering Atty. Espejo to return the money she borrowed from Victoria. In
disciplinary proceedings against lawyers, the only issue is whether the officer of the court is still fit to
be allowed to continue as a member of the Bar. Our only concern is the determination of
respondent’s administrative liability. Our findings have no material bearing on other judicial action
which the parties may to choose me against each other. Furthermore, disciplinary proceedings
against lawyers do not involve a trial of an action, but rather investigations by the Court into the
conduct of one of its officers. The only question for determination in these proceedings is whether or
not the attorney is still fit to be allowed to continue as a member of the Bar. Thus, this Court cannot
rule on the issue of the amount of money that should be returned to the complainant.22
WHEREFORE, We find Atty. Erlinda B. Espejo GUILTY of gross misconduct and violating Canons 1,
7 and 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. We SUSPEND respondent from the practice of
law for two (2) years affective immediately.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Court Administrator for dissemination to all
courts, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Bar Confidant and recorded in the
personal files of respondent.
SO ORDERED.
Case number 4:
A.C. No. 7434 August 23, 2007
SPS. AMADOR and ROSITA TEJADA, Petitioners,

vs.
ATTY. ANTONIUTTI K. PALAÑA, Respondent.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
Petitioners-spouses Rosita and Amador Tejada filed a Complaint Affidavit before the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines (IBP) to initiate disbarment proceedings against respondent Atty. Antoniutti K.
Palaña for his continued refusal to settle his long overdue loan obligation to the complainants, in
violation of his sworn duty as a lawyer to do justice to every man and Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility.
More specifically, the complaint alleges that:
3. Sometime on January, 2001, respondent lawyer Antoniutti K. Palana taking advantage of

his special knowledge as a lawyer represented to the petitioners that he has an alleged
parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. (73196) 16789 and that he needs
an amount of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) so that he could reconstitute the
torrens title on the same;
4. Respondent then induced by sweet promises and assurances petitioners spouses to

finance such undertaking with a solemn commitment on his part that after he has already
reconstituted such torrens title, he will deliver the same to the petitioners spouses as security
for the amount they had financed;
Thereafter, petitioner spouses shall earn an amount of P70,000.00 from the P100,000.00
they had financed or all and [sic] all, respondent lawyer shall pay petitioner spouses a total
amount of P170,000.00;
5. The agreement between the petitioner spouses and respondent lawyer, Antoniutti K.
Palana in this regard is being partly evidenced by their written agreement thereon dated
January 12, 2001, a xerox copy of which is hereto attached as Annex "A". Likewise, the
receipt by the respondent of the P100,000.00 is being evidenced in the bottom part of page 1
of the agreement;
6. Under the clear terms of their agreement, respondent lawyer Antoniutti K. Palana solemnly
assured petitioner spouses that he will reconstitute, deliver the reconstituted title and give the
P170,000.00 to the petitioners spouses all within a period of three months reckoned from
their execution of their written agreement dated January 12, 2001;
7. However, after respondent lawyer, Antoniutti K. Palana had gotten the P100,000.00
amount from the petitioner spouses, respondent from that time on up to the present had
intentionally evaded the performance of his due, just, legal and demandable obligations to
petitioner spouses.
It turned out that all his assurances that he had a torrens title, he will reconstitute the same
and deliver an amount of P170,000.00 to petitioner spouses were all fraudulent
representations on his part or else were only fictitious in character to defraud petitioner
spouses of their hard owned monies;
xxxx
9. Legal demands had already been made to respondent lawyer to fulfill all his moral and
legal responsibilities to petitioner spouses but all of said demands simply went unheeded. A
xerox copy of the two legal demand letters to respondent lawyer in this regard is hereto
attached as Annex "B" and "C."1
Despite due notice, respondent failed to file his answer to the complaint as required by the
Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP. Respondent likewise failed to appear on the scheduled
date of the mandatory conference despite due notice.
Thus, on March 10, 2005, the IBP declared respondent to have waived his right to submit evidence
and to participate further in the proceedings of the case.
After a careful consideration of the pleadings and evidence submitted by the complainants ex parte,
Investigating Commissioner Elpidio G. Soriano III submitted his February 1, 2006 Report to the IBP
Board of Governors, recommending respondent's suspension from the practice of law for three (3)
months.
Based on said Report, petitioners were able to satisfactorily prove the following: that Rosita Tejada
and respondent and his companion executed a written agreement (Annex "A"); that respondent
received the amount of one hundred thousand pesos (PhP 100,000) from Rosita Tejada pursuant to
said agreement; and that petitioners sent a demand letter to respondent (Annex "C"), but, until now,
respondent has failed to settle his obligation. Petitioners, however, failed to present evidence to
show that respondent fraudulently represented himself to be the owner of the aforesaid lot. Noting
respondent’s indifference to the proceedings of the case, the Investigating Commissioner cited
Ngayan v. Tugade,2 where the Supreme Court considered respondent’s failure to answer the
complaint and his failure to appear in four hearings below as evidence of his flouting resistance to a
lawful order of the court, and illustrate his despiciency to his oath of office in violation of Section 3,
Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.
Thus, for respondent’s misconduct, the Investigating Commissioner recommended respondent’s

suspension for a period of three (3) months, guided by Supreme Court rulings in analogous cases,
viz: Sanchez v. Somoso,3 where the lawyer was suspended for six (6) months for having issued
personal checks from a closed bank account and subsequently refused to pay for his medical
expenses despite demand after the checks were dishonored; Constantino v. Saludares,4 where the
lawyer was suspended for three (3) months for his unwarranted refusal to pay a personal loan
despite demand; and Lizaso v. Amante,5 where the lawyer was suspended indefinitely for his failure
to return and account for the money delivered to him for investment purposes.6
In its November 18, 2006 Resolution, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved said report
and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, "considering Respondent's continued
refusal to settle his obligation to the complainants and for his failure to participate in the proceedings
before the Commission of Bar Discipline."7
After a review of the records and especially sans the submittal of any response or evidence from
respondent, we find no reason to disturb the findings of Commissioner Soriano.
Respondent, like all other members of the bar, is expected to always live up to the standards
embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility, particularly the following Canons, viz:
CANON 1 — A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect
for law and for legal processes.
Rule 1.01 — A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
Rule 1.02 — A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening
confidence in the legal system.
CANON 7 — A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession, and
support the activities of the Integrated Bar.
Rule 7.03 — A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice
law, nor should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit
of the legal profession.
Membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. A high sense of morality, honesty,
and fair dealing is expected and required of a member of the bar. Rule 1.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility provides that "a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral
or deceitful conduct." The nature of the office of a lawyer requires that s/he shall be of good moral
character. This qualification is not only a condition precedent to the admission to the legal
profession, but its continued possession is essential to maintain one’s good standing in the
profession.8
Indeed, the strength of the legal profession lies in the dignity and integrity of its members. As
previously explained in Sipin-Nabor v. Baterina:
A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession. The trust and
1av vphi1
confidence necessarily reposed by clients requires in the attorney a high standard and appreciation
of his duty to his clients, his profession, the courts and the public. The bar must maintain a high
standard of legal proficiency as well as of honesty and fair dealing. Generally speaking, a lawyer can
do honor to the legal profession by faithfully performing his duties to society, to the bar, to the courts
and to his clients. To this end, members of the legal fraternity can do nothing that might tend to
lessen in any degree the confidence of the public in the fidelity, honesty and integrity of the
profession.9
In the instant case, respondent’s unjustified withholding of petitioners’ money years after it became
due and demandable demonstrates his lack of integrity and fairness, and this is further highlighted
by his lack of regard for the charges brought against him. Instead of meeting the charges head on,
respondent did not bother to file an answer nor did he participate in the proceedings to offer a valid
explanation for his conduct.
The Court has emphatically stated that when the integrity of a member of the bar is challenged, it is
not enough that s/he denies the charges against him; s/he must meet the issue and overcome the
evidence against him/her. S/he must show proof that s/he still maintains that degree of morality and
integrity which at all times is expected of him/her.10
Finally, respondent’s acts, which violated the Lawyer's Oath "to delay no man for money or malice"
as well as the Code of Professional Responsibility, warrant the imposition of disciplinary sanctions
against him.
With respect to the recommendation to suspend respondent Palaña for three (3) months, we find
that the sanction is not commensurate to the breach committed and disrespect to the Court exhibited
by the erring member of the bar. We increase the suspension to six (6) months in view of our ruling
in Barrientos v. Libiran-Meteoro.11
We find that the complainants could not have been defrauded without the representations of
respondent that he can easily have the torrens title of his lot reconstituted with his special knowledge
as a legal practitioner as long as he is provided PhP 100,000 to finance the reconstitution.
Respondent knew that his representations were false since the filing fee for a petition for
reconstitution in 2001 was only PhP 3,145, and other expenses including the publication of the filing
of the petition could not have cost more than PhP 20,000. It is clear that he employed deceit in
convincing complainants to part with their hard earned money and the latter could not have been
easily swayed to lend the money were it not for his misrepresentations and failed promises as a
member of the bar. Moreover, when he failed to pay his just and legal obligation, he disobeyed the
provisions of the Civil Code which is one of the substantive laws he vowed to uphold when he took
his oath as a lawyer. Lastly, to aggravate his misconduct, he totally ignored the directives of the IBP
to answer the complaint when he fully knew as a lawyer that the compulsory bar organization was
merely deputized by this Court to undertake the investigation of complaints against lawyers, among
which is the instant complaint. In short, his disobedience to the IBP is in reality a gross and blatant
disrespect to the Court. Lawyers fully know, as respondent is aware or at least is assumed to know,
that lawyers like him cannot disobey the orders and resolutions of the Court. Failing in this duty as a
member of the bar which is being supervised by the Court under the Constitution, we find that a
heavier sanction should fall on respondent.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Antoniutti K. Palaña is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of
law for a period of six (6) months and is ordered to settle his loan obligation to petitioners-spouses
Amador and Rosita Tejada within two (2) months from the date of this Decision’s promulgation.
This Decision is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
Case number 5:
A.C. No. 7399 August 25, 2009
ANTERO J. POBRE, Complainant,

vs.
Sen. MIRIAM DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO, Respondent.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
In his sworn letter/complaint dated December 22, 2006, with enclosures, Antero J. Pobre invites the
Court’s attention to the following excerpts of Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago’s speech delivered
on the Senate floor:
x x x I am not angry. I am irate. I am foaming in the mouth. I am homicidal. I am suicidal. I am

humiliated, debased, degraded. And I am not only that, I feel like throwing up to be living my middle
years in a country of this nature. I am nauseated. I spit on the face of Chief Justice Artemio
Panganiban and his cohorts in the Supreme Court, I am no longer interested in the position [of Chief
Justice] if I was to be surrounded by idiots. I would rather be in another environment but not in the
Supreme Court of idiots x x x.
To Pobre, the foregoing statements reflected a total disrespect on the part of the speaker towards
then Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban and the other members of the Court and constituted direct
contempt of court. Accordingly, Pobre asks that disbarment proceedings or other disciplinary actions
be taken against the lady senator.
In her comment on the complaint dated April 25, 2007, Senator Santiago, through counsel, does not
deny making the aforequoted statements. She, however, explained that those statements were
covered by the constitutional provision on parliamentary immunity, being part of a speech she
delivered in the discharge of her duty as member of Congress or its committee. The purpose of her
speech, according to her, was to bring out in the open controversial anomalies in governance with a
view to future remedial legislation. She averred that she wanted to expose what she believed "to be
an unjust act of the Judicial Bar Council [JBC]," which, after sending out public invitations for
nomination to the soon to-be vacated position of Chief Justice, would eventually inform applicants
that only incumbent justices of the Supreme Court would qualify for nomination. She felt that the JBC
should have at least given an advanced advisory that non-sitting members of the Court, like her,
would not be considered for the position of Chief Justice.
The immunity Senator Santiago claims is rooted primarily on the provision of Article VI, Section 11 of
the Constitution, which provides: "A Senator or Member of the House of Representative shall, in all
offenses punishable by not more than six years imprisonment, be privileged from arrest while the
Congress is in session. No member shall be questioned nor be held liable in any other place for
any speech or debate in the Congress or in any committee thereof." Explaining the import of the
underscored portion of the provision, the Court, in Osmeña, Jr. v. Pendatun, said:
Our Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity which is a fundamental privilege cherished in

every legislative assembly of the democratic world. As old as the English Parliament, its purpose "is
to enable and encourage a representative of the public to discharge his public trust with firmness
and success" for "it is indispensably necessary that he should enjoy the fullest liberty of speech and
that he should be protected from resentment of every one, however, powerful, to whom the exercise
of that liberty may occasion offense."1
As American jurisprudence puts it, this legislative privilege is founded upon long experience and
arises as a means of perpetuating inviolate the functioning process of the legislative department.
Without parliamentary immunity, parliament, or its equivalent, would degenerate into a polite and
ineffective debating forum. Legislators are immune from deterrents to the uninhibited discharge of
their legislative duties, not for their private indulgence, but for the public good. The privilege would
be of little value if they could be subjected to the cost and inconvenience and distractions of a trial
upon a conclusion of the pleader, or to the hazard of a judgment against them based upon a judge’s
speculation as to the motives.2
This Court is aware of the need and has in fact been in the forefront in upholding the institution of
parliamentary immunity and promotion of free speech. Neither has the Court lost sight of the
importance of the legislative and oversight functions of the Congress that enable this representative
body to look diligently into every affair of government, investigate and denounce anomalies, and talk
about how the country and its citizens are being served. Courts do not interfere with the legislature
or its members in the manner they perform their functions in the legislative floor or in committee
rooms. Any claim of an unworthy purpose or of the falsity and mala fides of the statement uttered by
the member of the Congress does not destroy the privilege.3 The disciplinary authority of the
assembly4 and the voters, not the courts, can properly discourage or correct such abuses committed
in the name of parliamentary immunity.5
For the above reasons, the plea of Senator Santiago for the dismissal of the complaint for
disbarment or disciplinary action is well taken. Indeed, her privilege speech is not actionable
criminally or in a disciplinary proceeding under the Rules of Court. It is felt, however, that this could
not be the last word on the matter.
The Court wishes to express its deep concern about the language Senator Santiago, a member of
the Bar, used in her speech and its effect on the administration of justice. To the Court, the lady
senator has undoubtedly crossed the limits of decency and good professional conduct. It is at once
apparent that her statements in question were intemperate and highly improper in substance. To
reiterate, she was quoted as stating that she wanted "to spit on the face of Chief Justice Artemio
Panganiban and his cohorts in the Supreme Court," and calling the Court a "Supreme Court of
idiots."
The lady senator alluded to In Re: Vicente Sotto.6 We draw her attention to the ensuing passage
in Sotto that she should have taken to heart in the first place:
x x x [I]f the people lose their confidence in the honesty and integrity of this Court and believe that
they cannot expect justice therefrom, they might be driven to take the law into their own hands, and
disorder and perhaps chaos would be the result. 1avv phi 1
No lawyer who has taken an oath to maintain the respect due to the courts should be allowed to
erode the people’s faith in the judiciary. In this case, the lady senator clearly violated Canon 8, Rule
8.01 and Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which respectively provide:
Canon 8, Rule 8.01.––A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is
abusive, offensive or otherwise improper.
Canon 11.––A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to the judicial
officers and should insist on similar conduct by others.
Senator/Atty. Santiago is a cut higher than most lawyers. Her achievements speak for themselves.
She was a former Regional Trial Court judge, a law professor, an oft-cited authority on constitutional
and international law, an author of numerous law textbooks, and an elected senator of the land.
Needless to stress, Senator Santiago, as a member of the Bar and officer of the court, like any other,
is duty-bound to uphold the dignity and authority of this Court and to maintain the respect due its
members. Lawyers in public service are keepers of public faith and are burdened with the higher
degree of social responsibility, perhaps higher than their brethren in private practice.7Senator
Santiago should have known, as any perceptive individual, the impact her statements would make
on the people’s faith in the integrity of the courts.
As Senator Santiago alleged, she delivered her privilege speech as a prelude to crafting remedial
legislation on the JBC. This allegation strikes the Court as an afterthought in light of the insulting
tenor of what she said. We quote the passage once more:
x x x I am not angry. I am irate. I am foaming in the mouth. I am homicidal. I am suicidal. I am

humiliated, debased, degraded. And I am not only that, I feel like throwing up to be living my middle
years in a country of this nature. I am nauseated. I spit on the face of Chief Justice Artemio
Panganiban and his cohorts in the Supreme Court, I am no longer interested in the position [of Chief
Justice] if I was to be surrounded by idiots. I would rather be in another environment but not in the
Supreme Court of idiots x x x. (Emphasis ours.)
A careful re-reading of her utterances would readily show that her statements were expressions of
personal anger and frustration at not being considered for the post of Chief Justice. In a sense,
therefore, her remarks were outside the pale of her official parliamentary functions. Even
parliamentary immunity must not be allowed to be used as a vehicle to ridicule, demean, and destroy
the reputation of the Court and its magistrates, nor as armor for personal wrath and disgust.
Authorities are agreed that parliamentary immunity is not an individual privilege accorded the
individual members of the Parliament or Congress for their personal benefit, but rather a privilege for
the benefit of the people and the institution that represents them.
To be sure, Senator Santiago could have given vent to her anger without indulging in insulting
rhetoric and offensive personalities.
Lest it be overlooked, Senator Santiago’s outburst was directly traceable to what she considered as
an "unjust act" the JBC had taken in connection with her application for the position of Chief Justice.
But while the JBC functions under the Court’s supervision, its individual members, save perhaps for
the Chief Justice who sits as the JBC’s ex-officio chairperson,8 have no official duty to nominate
candidates for appointment to the position of Chief Justice. The Court is, thus, at a loss to
understand Senator Santiago’s wholesale and indiscriminate assault on the members of the Court
and her choice of critical and defamatory words against all of them.
At any event, equally important as the speech and debate clause of Art. VI, Sec. 11 of the
Constitution is Sec. 5(5) of Art. VIII of the Constitution that provides:
Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
xxxx
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading,
practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of the law, the Integrated Bar,
and legal assistance to the underprivileged. (Emphasis ours.)
The Court, besides being authorized to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and
procedure in all courts, exercises specific authority to promulgate rules governing the Integrated Bar
with the end in view that the integration of the Bar will, among other things:
(4) Shield the judiciary, which traditionally cannot defend itself except within its own forum, from the
assaults that politics and self interest may level at it, and assist it to maintain its integrity, impartiality
and independence;
xxxx
(11) Enforce rigid ethical standards x x x.9
In Re: Letter Dated 21 February 2005 of Atty. Noel S. Sorreda,10 we reiterated our pronouncement in
Rheem of the Philippines v. Ferrer11 that the duty of attorneys to the courts can only be maintained
by rendering no service involving any disrespect to the judicial office which they are bound to uphold.
The Court wrote in Rheem of the Philippines:
x x x As explicit is the first canon of legal ethics which pronounces that "[i]t is the duty of a lawyer to
maintain towards the Courts a respectful attitude, not for the sake of the temporary incumbent of the
judicial office, but for the maintenance of its supreme importance." That same canon, as a corollary,
makes it peculiarly incumbent upon lawyers to support the courts against "unjust criticism and
clamor." And more. The attorney’s oath solemnly binds him to a conduct that should be "with all
good fidelity x x x to the courts."
Also, in Sorreda, the Court revisited its holding in Surigao Mineral Reservation Board v.
Cloribel12 that:
A lawyer is an officer of the courts; he is, "like the court itself, an instrument or agency to advance
the ends of justice." His duty is to uphold the dignity and authority of the courts to which he owes
fidelity, "not to promote distrust in the administration of justice." Faith in the courts, a lawyer should
seek to preserve. For, to undermine the judicial edifice "is disastrous to the continuity of government
and to the attainment of the liberties of the people." Thus has it been said of a lawyer that "[a]s an
officer of the court, it is his sworn and moral duty to help build and not destroy unnecessarily that
high esteem and regard towards the courts so essential to the proper administration of justice."13
The lady senator belongs to the legal profession bound by the exacting injunction of a strict Code.
Society has entrusted that profession with the administration of the law and dispensation of justice.
Generally speaking, a lawyer holding a government office may not be disciplined as a member of the
Bar for misconduct committed while in the discharge of official duties, unless said misconduct also
constitutes a violation of his/her oath as a lawyer.14
Lawyers may be disciplined even for any conduct committed in their private capacity, as long as their
misconduct reflects their want of probity or good demeanor,15 a good character being an essential
qualification for the admission to the practice of law and for continuance of such privilege. When the
Code of Professional Responsibility or the Rules of Court speaks of "conduct" or "misconduct," the
reference is not confined to one’s behavior exhibited in connection with the performance of lawyers’
professional duties, but also covers any misconduct, which––albeit unrelated to the actual practice of
their profession––would show them to be unfit for the office and unworthy of the privileges which
their license and the law invest in them.16
This Court, in its unceasing quest to promote the people’s faith in courts and trust in the rule of law,
has consistently exercised its disciplinary authority on lawyers who, for malevolent purpose or
personal malice, attempt to obstruct the orderly administration of justice, trifle with the integrity of
courts, and embarrass or, worse, malign the men and women who compose them. We have done it
in the case of former Senator Vicente Sotto in Sotto, in the case of Atty. Noel Sorreda in Sorreda,
and in the case of Atty. Francisco B. Cruz in Tacordan v. Ang17 who repeatedly insulted and
threatened the Court in a most insolent manner.
The Court is not hesitant to impose some form of disciplinary sanctions on Senator/Atty. Santiago for
what otherwise would have constituted an act of utter disrespect on her part towards the Court and
its members. The factual and legal circumstances of this case, however, deter the Court from doing
so, even without any sign of remorse from her. Basic constitutional consideration dictates this kind of
disposition.
We, however, would be remiss in our duty if we let the Senator’s offensive and disrespectful
language that definitely tended to denigrate the institution pass by. It is imperative on our part to re-
instill in Senator/Atty. Santiago her duty to respect courts of justice, especially this Tribunal, and
remind her anew that the parliamentary non-accountability thus granted to members of Congress is
not to protect them against prosecutions for their own benefit, but to enable them, as the people’s
representatives, to perform the functions of their office without fear of being made responsible before
the courts or other forums outside the congressional hall.18 It is intended to protect members of
Congress against government pressure and intimidation aimed at influencing the decision-making
prerogatives of Congress and its members.
The Rules of the Senate itself contains a provision on Unparliamentary Acts and Language that
enjoins a Senator from using, under any circumstance, "offensive or improper language against
another Senator or against any public institution."19 But as to Senator Santiago’s unparliamentary
remarks, the Senate President had not apparently called her to order, let alone referred the matter to
the Senate Ethics Committee for appropriate disciplinary action, as the Rules dictates under such
circumstance.20 The lady senator clearly violated the rules of her own chamber. It is unfortunate that
her peers bent backwards and avoided imposing their own rules on her.
Finally, the lady senator questions Pobre’s motives in filing his complaint, stating that disciplinary
proceedings must be undertaken solely for the public welfare. We cannot agree with her more. We
cannot overstress that the senator’s use of intemperate language to demean and denigrate the
highest court of the land is a clear violation of the duty of respect lawyers owe to the courts.21
Finally, the Senator asserts that complainant Pobre has failed to prove that she in fact made the
statements in question. Suffice it to say in this regard that, although she has not categorically denied
making such statements, she has unequivocally said making them as part of her privilege speech.
Her implied admission is good enough for the Court.
WHEREFORE, the letter-complaint of Antero J. Pobre against Senator/Atty. Miriam Defensor-

Santiago is, conformably to Art. VI, Sec. 11 of the Constitution, DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Case number 6: (***)
A.C. No. 4955 September 12, 2011
ANTONIO CONLU, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. IRENEO AREDONIA, JR., Respondent.
RESOLUTION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
Before the Court is a complaint1 for disbarment with a prayer for damages instituted by Antonio
Conlu (Antonio) against Atty. Ireneo Aredonia, Jr. (Atty. Ireneo) on grounds of gross negligence and
dereliction of sworn duty.
Antonio was the defendant in Civil Case No. 1048, a suit for Quieting of Title and Recovery of a
Parcel of Land commenced before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Silay City, Negros
Occidental.2 He engaged the services of Atty. Ireneo to represent him in the case. On March 16,
1995, the RTC rendered judgment3 adverse to Antonio. Therefrom, Atty. Ireneo, for Antonio,
appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA) whereat the recourse was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No.
50075.
The CA, per its Resolution of February 10, 1997, eventually dismissed the appeal for non-filing of the
appellant’s brief within the reglementary period. Antonio got wind of the dismissal from his wife who
verified the status of the case when she happened to be in Manila. When confronted about the
dismissal action, Atty. Ireneo promised to seek reconsideration, which he did, but which the
appellate court later denied for belated filing of the motion.
In that motion4 he prepared and filed, Atty. Ireneo averred receiving the adverted February 10, 1997
CA Resolution5only on April 25, 1997, adding in this regard that the person in the law office who
initially received a copy of said resolution was not so authorized. However, the CA denied the motion
for having been filed out of time. As the CA would declare in a subsequent resolution dated
December 3, 1997, there was a valid receipt by Atty. Ireneo, as shown by the registry return card
with his signature, of a copy of the CA’s February 10, 1997 Resolution. Accordingly, as the CA
wrote, the motion for reconsideration of the February resolution which bore the mailing date May 8,
1997 cannot but be considered as filed way out of time.
In light of these successive setbacks, a disgusted Antonio got the case records back from Atty.
Ireneo and personally filed on October 13, 1997 another motion for reconsideration. By Resolution of
December 3, 1997, the CA again denied6 this motion for the reason that the prejudicial impact of the
belated filing by his former counsel of the first motion for reconsideration binds Antonio.
Forthwith, Antonio elevated his case to the Court on a petition for certiorari but the Court would later
dismiss the petition and his subsequent motion to reconsider the denial.
Such was the state of things when Antonio lodged this instant administrative case for disbarment
with a prayer for damages. To support his claim for damages, Antonio asserts having suffered
sleepless nights, mental torture and anguish as a result of Atty. Ireneo’s erring ways, besides which
Antonio also lost a valuable real property subject of Civil Case No. 1048.
Following Atty. Ireneo’s repeated failure to submit, as ordered, his comment, a number of extensions
of time given notwithstanding,7 the Court referred the instant case, docketed as Administrative Case
No. 4955, to its Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) for evaluation, report and recommendation.
Acting on OBC’s Report and Recommendation8 dated November 23, 2000, the Court, by Resolution
of January 31, 2001, directed Atty. Ireneo to show cause within ten (10) days from notice—later
successively extended via Resolutions dated July 16 and 29, 2002—why he should not be
disciplinarily dealt with or held in contempt for failing to file his comment and to comply with the filing
of it.
In separate resolutions, the Court (a) imposed on Atty. Ireneo a fine of PhP 2,000;9 (b) ordered his
arrest but which the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) cannot effect for the reason:
"whereabouts unknown";10 (c) considered him as having waived his right to file comment; and (d)
referred the administrative case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for report, investigation
and recommendation.11
At the IBP, Atty. Ireneo desisted from addressing his administrative case, his desistance expressed
by not attending the mandatory conference or filing the required position paper. On the basis of the
pleadings, the IBP-Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) found Ireneo liable for violating Canon 1,
Rules 1.01 and 1.03 and Canon 18, Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and
recommended his suspension from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months, with warning.
The salient portions of the investigating commissioner’s Report and Recommendation12 read as
follows:
Uncontroverted and uncontested are respondent’s inability to file appellant’s Brief, his futile attempts
to mislead the Court of Appeals that he did not personally received [sic] the resolution of dismissal.
His filing of the Motion for Reconsideration five (5) months late. [sic]
Aggravated by his failure to file his comment in the instant administrative complaint despite his
numerous motions for extension to file the same. [sic]
He is even adamant to comply with the show cause order of the bar confidant. The series of
snobbish actuations in several resolution of the Supreme Court enjoining him to make the necessary
pleading. [sic]
By Resolution No. XVIII-2008-523, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved said report
and recommendation of the CBD.13
We agree with the inculpatory findings of the IBP but not as to the level of the penalty it
recommended.
Res ipsa loquitur. Atty. Ireneo had doubtless been languid in the performance of his duty as
Antonio’s counsel. He neglected, without reason, to file the appellant’s brief before the CA. He failed,
in short, to exert his utmost ability and to give his full commitment to maintain and defend Antonio’s
right. Antonio, by choosing Atty. Ireneo to represent him, relied upon and reposed his trust and
confidence on the latter, as his counsel, to do whatsoever was legally necessary to protect Antonio’s
interest, if not to secure a favorable judgment. Once they agree to take up the cause of a client,
lawyers, regardless of the importance of the subject matter litigated or financial arrangements
agreed upon, owe fidelity to such cause and should always be mindful of the trust and confidence
reposed on them.14 And to add insult to injury, Atty. Ireneo appeared not to have taken any effort to
personally apprise Antonio of the dismissal of the appeal, however personally embarrassing the
cause for the dismissal might have been. As mentioned earlier, Antonio came to know about the
outcome of his appeal only after his wife took the trouble of verifying the case status when she came
to Manila. By then, all remedies had been lost.
It must be remembered that a retained counsel is expected to serve the client with competence and
diligence. This duty includes not merely reviewing the cases entrusted to the counsel’s care and
giving the client sound legal advice, but also properly representing the client in court, attending
scheduled hearings, preparing and filing required pleadings, prosecuting the handled cases with
reasonable dispatch, and urging their termination without waiting for the client or the court to prod
him or her to do so. The lawyer should not be sitting idly by and leave the rights of the client in a
state of uncertainty.15
The failure to file a brief resulting in the dismissal of an appeal constitutes inexcusable
negligence.16 This default translates to a violation of the injunction of Canon 18, Rules 18.03 and
18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, respectively providing:
CANON 18 — A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE.
xxxx
Rule 18.03 — A lawyer shall not neglect a matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection
therewith shall render him liable.
Rule 18.04 — A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond
within a reasonable time to the client’s request for information.
As if his lack of candor in his professional relationship with Antonio was not abhorrent enough, Atty.
Ireneo tried to mislead the appellate court about the receipt of a copy of its February 10, 1997
Resolution dismissing the appeal in CA-G.R. CV No. 50075. He denied personally receiving such
copy, but the CA found and declared that he himself received said copy. The CA arrived at this
conclusion thru the process of comparing Atty. Ireneo’s signature appearing in the pleadings with
that in the registry return card. Both signatures belong to one and the same person. Needless to
stress, Atty. Ireneo had under the premises indulged in deliberate falsehood, contrary to the self-
explanatory prescriptions of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 10, Rule 10.01, which provide:
CANON 1 — A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE
LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCEDURES.
Rule 1.01 — A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
xxxx
CANON 10 — A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT.
Rule 10.01 — A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; nor shall
he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice. (Emphasis supplied.)
We cannot write finis to this case without delving into and addressing Atty. Ireneo’s defiant stance
against the Court as demonstrated by his repetitive disregard of its resolution to file his comment on
the basic complaint. After requesting and securing no less than three (3) extensions of time to file his
comment, he simply closed, so to speak, communication lines. And when ordered to give an
explanation through a show-cause directive for not complying, he asked for and was granted a 30-
day extension. But the required comment never came. When the Court eventually directed the NBI
to arrest him, he just left his last known address and could not be located.
The Court’s patience has been tested to the limit by what in hindsight amounts to a lawyer’s
impudence and disrespectful bent. At the minimum, members of the legal fraternity owe courts of
justice respect, courtesy and such other becoming conduct so essential in the promotion of orderly,
impartial and speedy justice. What Atty. Ireneo has done was the exact opposite. What is clear to
the Court by now is that Ireneo was determined all along not to submit a comment and, in the
process, delay the resolution of the instant case. By asking several extensions of time to submit one,
but without the intention to so submit, Ireneo has effectively trifled with the Court’s processes, if not
its liberality. This cannot be tolerated. It cannot be allowed to go unpunished, if the integrity and
orderly functioning of the administration of justice is to be maintained. And to be sure, Atty. Ireneo
can neither defeat this Court’s jurisdiction over him as a member of the bar nor evade administrative
liability by the mere ruse of concealing his whereabouts.17 Manifestly, he has fallen short of the
diligence required of every member of the Bar. The pertinent Canon of the Code of Professional
Responsibility provides:
CANON 12 — A LAWYER SHALL EXERT EVERY EFFORT AND CONSIDER HIS DUTY TO
ASSIST IN THE SPEEDY AND EFFICIENT ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE.
xxxx
Rule 12.03 — A lawyer shall not, after obtaining extensions of time to file pleadings, memoranda or
briefs, let the period lapse without submitting the same or offering an explanation for his failure to do
so.
Rule 12.04 — A lawyer shall not unduly delay a case, impede the execution of a judgment or misuse
Court processes. (Emphasis supplied.) 1avv phil
A lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for gross misconduct or for transgressions defined by the
rules as grounds to strip a lawyer of professional license.18 Considering, however, the serious
consequences of either penalty, the Court will exercise its power to disbar or suspend only upon a
clear, convincing, and satisfactory proof of misconduct that seriously affects the standing of a lawyer
as an officer of the court and as member of the bar.
In Heirs of Tiburcio F. Ballesteros, Sr. v. Apiag,19 the Court penalized a lawyer who failed to file a
pre-trial brief and other pleadings, such as position papers, leading to the dismissal of the case with
six months suspension. In Soriano v. Reyes,20 We meted a one-year suspension on a lawyer for
inexcusable negligence, the latter having failed to file a pre-trial brief leading to the dismissal of the
case and failure to prosecute in another case, and omitting to apprise complainant of the status of
the two cases with assurance of his diligent attention to them.
In this case, Atty. Ireneo should be called to task for the interplay of the following: his inexcusable
negligence that resulted in the dismissal of Antonio’s appeal, coupled by his lack of candor in not
apprising Antonio of the status of his appealed case; his attempt to mislead the CA in a vain bid to
evade the consequence of the belated filing of a motion for reconsideration; and, last but not least,
his cavalier disregard of the Court’s directives primarily issued to resolve the charges brought
against him by Antonio. We deem it fitting that Atty. Ireneo be suspended from the practice of law for
a period of one year, up from the penalty recommended by the IBP Board of Governors. This should
serve as a constant reminder of his duty to respect courts of justice and to observe that degree of
diligence required by the practice of the legal profession. His being a first offender dictates to large
degree this leniency.
The prayer for damages cannot be granted. Let alone the fact that Antonio chose not to file his
position paper before the IBP-CBD and, therefore, was unable to satisfactorily prove his claim for
damages, a proceeding for disbarment or suspension is not in any sense a civil action; it is
undertaken and prosecuted for public welfare. It does not involve private interest and affords no
redress for private grievance.21
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Ireneo Aredonia, Jr. is declared GUILTY of inexcusable negligence,
attempting to mislead the appellate court, misuse of Court processes, and willful disobedience to
lawful orders of the Court. He is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of one (1)
year effective upon his receipt of this Resolution, with WARNING that a repetition of the same or
similar acts will be dealt with more severely. Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of the
Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and all courts throughout the country.
SO ORDERED.
Case number 7:
A.C. No. 8261 March 11, 2015
JESSIE T. CAMPUGAN and ROBERT C. TORRES, Complainants,

vs.
ATTY. FEDERICO S. TOLENTINO, JR., ATTY. RENATO G. CUNANAN, ATTY. DANIEL F.
VICTORIO, JR., and ATTY. ELBERT T. QUILALA, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
A.C. No. 8725
JESSIE T. CAMPUGAN and ROBERT C. TORRES, Complainants,

vs.
ATTY. CONSTANTE P. CALUYA, JR. and ATTY. ELBERT T. QUILALA, Respondents.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
In this consolidated administrative case, complainants Jessie T. Campugan and Robert C. Torres
seek the disbarment of respondents Atty. Federico S. Tolentino, Jr., Atty. Daniel F. Victorio, Jr., Atty.
Renato G. Cunanan, Atty. Elbert T. Quilala and Atty. Constante P. Caluya, Jr. for allegedly falsifying
a court order that became the basis for the cancellation of their annotation of the notice ofadverse
claim and the notice of lis pendens in the Registry of Deeds in Quezon City.
Antecedents
Atty. Victorio, Jr. had replaced Atty. Edgardo Abad as counsel of the complainants in a civil action
they brought to seek the annulment of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. N-290546 of the
Registry of Deeds of Quezon City in the first week of January 2007 in the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
in Quezon City (Civil Case No. Q-07-59598). They impleaded as defendants Ramon and Josefina
Ricafort, Juliet Vargas and the Register of Deeds of Quezon City. They caused to be annotated on
TCT No. N-290546 their affidavit of adverse claim, as well as the notice of lis pendens.1 Atty.
Tolentino, Jr. was the counsel of defendant Ramon and Josefina Ricafort.
In their sworn complaint for disbarment dated April 23, 2009 (later docketed as A.C. No. 8261),2 the
complainants narrated that as the surviving children of the late Spouses Antonio and Nemesia
Torres, they inherited upon the deaths of their parents a residential lot located at No. 251 Boni
Serrano Street, Murphy, Cubao, Quezon City registered under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No.
RT-64333(35652) of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City;3that on August 24, 2006, they discovered
that TCT No. RT-64333(35652) had been unlawfully cancelled and replaced by TCT No. N-290546
of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City under the names of Ramon and Josefina Ricafort;4 and that,
accordingly, they immediately caused the annotation of their affidavit of adverse claim on TCT No.
N-290546.
It appears that the parties entered into an amicable settlement during the pendency of Civil Case No.
Q-07-59598 in order to end their dispute,5 whereby the complainants agreed to sell the property and
the proceeds thereof would be equally divided between the parties, and the complaint and
counterclaim would be withdrawn respectively by the complainants (as the plaintiffs) and the
defendants. Pursuant to the terms of the amicable settlement, Atty. Victorio, Jr. filed a Motion to
Withdraw Complaint dated February 26, 2008,6 which the RTC granted in its order dated May 16,
2008 upon noting the defendants’ lack of objection thereto and the defendants’ willingness to
similarly withdraw their counterclaim.7
The complainants alleged that from the time of the issuance by the RTC of the order dated May 16,
2008, they could no longer locate or contact Atty. Victorio, Jr. despite making several phone calls
and visits to his office; that they found out upon verification at the Register of Deeds of Quezon City
that new annotations were made on TCT No. N-290546, specifically: (1) the annotation of the letter-
request appearing to be filed by Atty. Tolentino, Jr.8 seeking the cancellation of the affidavit of
adverse claim and the notice of lis pendens annotated on TCT No. N-290546; and (2) the annotation
of the decision dated May 16, 2008 rendered in Civil Case No. Q-07-59598 by the RTC, Branch 95,
in Quezon City, granting the complainants’ Motion to Withdraw Complaint;9 and that a copy of the
letter request dated June 30, 2008 addressed to Atty. Quilala, Registrar of Deeds of Quezon City,
disclosed that it was defendant Ramon Ricafort who had signed the letter.
Feeling aggrieved by their discovery, the complainants filed an appeal en consulta with the Land
Registration Authority (LRA), docketed as Consulta No. 4707, assailing the unlawful cancellation of
their notice of adverse claim and their notice of lis pendens under primary entries PE-2742 and PE-
3828-9, respectively. The LRA set Consulta No. 4707 for hearing on March 30, 2009, and directed
the parties to submit their respective memoranda and/or supporting documents on or beforesuch
scheduled hearing.10 However, the records do not disclose whether Consulta No. 4707 was already
resolved, or remained pending at the LRA.
Unable to receive any response or assistance from Atty. Victorio, Jr. despite their having paid him for
his professional services, the complainants felt that said counsel had abandoned their case. They
submitted that the cancellation of their notice of adverse claim and their notice of lis pendens without
a court order specifically allowing such cancellation resulted from the connivance and conspiracy
between Atty. Victorio, Jr. and Atty. Tolentino, Jr., and from the taking advantage of their positions
as officials in the Registry of Deeds by respondents Atty. Quilala, the Chief Registrar, and Atty.
Cunanan, the acting Registrar and signatory of the new annotations. Thus, they claimed to be
thereby prejudiced.
On July 6, 2009, the Court required the respondents to comment on the verified complaint.11 Atty.
Victorio, Jr. asserted in his Comment dated August 17, 200912 that complainant Robert Torres had
been actively involved in the proceedings in Civil Case No. Q-07-59598, which included the
mediation process; that the complainants, after having aggressively participated in the drafting of the
amicable settlement, could not now claim that they had been deceived into entering the agreement
in the same way that they could not feign ignorance of the conditions contained therein; that he did
not commit any abandonment as alleged, but had performed in good faith his duties as the counsel
for the complainants in Civil Case No. Q-07-59598; that he should not be held responsible for their
representation in other proceedings, such as that before the LRA, which required a separate
engagement; and that the only payment he had received from the complainants were those for his
appearance fees of ₱1,000.00 for every hearing in the RTC.
In his Comment dated August 24, 2009,13 Atty. Tolentino, Jr. refuted the charge of conspiracy,
stressing that he was not acquainted with the other respondents, except Atty. Victorio, Jr. whom he
had met during the hearings in Civil Case No. Q-07-59598; that although he had notarized the letter
request dated June 30, 2008 of Ramon Ricafort to the Register of Deeds, he had no knowledge
about how said letter-request had been disposed of by the Register of Deeds; and that the present
complaint was the second disbarment case filed by the complainants against him with no other
motive except to harass and intimidate him.
Atty. Quilala stated in his Comment dated September 1, 200914 that it was Atty. Caluya, Jr., another
Deputy Register of Deeds, who was the actual signing authority of the annotations that resulted in
the cancellation of the affidavit of adverse claim and the notice of lis pendens on TCT No. N-290546;
that the cancellation of the annotations was undertaken in the regular course of official duty and in
the exercise of the ministerial duty of the Register of Deeds; that no irregularity occurred or was
performed in the cancellation of the annotations; and that the Register of Deeds was impleaded in
Civil Case No. Q-07-59598 only as a nominal party, thereby discounting any involvement in the
proceedings in the case.
Atty. Cunanan did not file any comment.15
As the result of Atty. Quilala’s allegation in his Comment in A.C. No. 8261 that it had been Atty.
Caluya, Jr.’s signature that appeared below the cancelled entries, the complainants filed another
sworn disbarment complaint dated August 26, 2010 alleging that Atty. Caluya, Jr. had forged the
signature of Atty. Cunanan.16 This disbarment complaint was docketed as A.C. No. 8725, and was
later on consolidated with A.C. No. 826117 because the complaints involved the same parties and
rested on similar allegations against the respondents.
Atty. Quilala filed his Comment in A.C. No. 8725 to belie the allegation of forgery and to reiterate the
arguments he had made in A.C. No. 8261.18 On his part, Atty. Caluya, Jr. manifested that he adopted
Atty. Quilala’s Comment.19
Ruling
We dismiss the complaints for disbarment for being bereft of merit.
Well entrenched in this jurisdiction is the rule that a lawyer may be disciplined for misconduct
committed either in his professional or private capacity. The test is whether his conduct shows him to
be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity, and good demeanor, or whether his conduct renders
him unworthy to continue as an officer of the Court.20 Verily, Canon 7 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility mandates all lawyers to uphold at all times the dignity and integrity of the Legal
Profession. Lawyers are similarly required under Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the same Code not to
engage in any unlawful, dishonest and immoral or deceitful conduct. Failure to observe these tenets
of the Code of Professional Responsibility exposes the lawyer to disciplinary sanctions as provided
in Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, as amended, viz.:
Section 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefor. — A

member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court
for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by
reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he
is required to take before the admission to practice, or for a wilful disobedience appearing as an
attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the
purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.
The complainants’ allegations of the respondents’ acts and omissions are insufficient to establish
any censurable conduct against them.
Section 10 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 (Property Registration Decree) enumerates the general
duties of the Register of Deeds, as follows:
Section 10. General functions of Registers of Deeds. – x x x

It shall be the duty of the Register of Deeds to immediately register an instrument presented for
registration dealing with real or personal property which complies with all the requisites for
registration. He shall see to it that said instrument bears the proper documentary science stamps
and that the same are properly canceled. If the instrument is not registrable, he shall forthwith deny
registration thereof and inform the present or of such denial in writing, stating the ground or reason
therefor, and advising him of his right to appeal by consulta in accordance with Section 117 of this
Decree. (Emphasis supplied)
The aforementioned duty of the Register of Deeds is ministerial in nature.21 A purely ministerial act or
duty is one that an officer or tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in
obedience to the mandate of a legal authority, without regard to or the exercise of his own judgment
upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done. If the law imposes a duty upon a public officer and
gives him the right to decide how or when the duty shall be performed, such duty is discretionary, not
ministerial. The duty is ministerial only when its discharge requires neither the exercise of official
discretion nor the exercise of judgment.22
In Gabriel v. Register of Deeds of Rizal,23 the Court underscores that registration is a merely
ministerial act of the Register of Deeds, explaining:
x x x [W]hether the document is invalid, frivolous or intended to harass, is not the duty of a Register
of Deeds to decide, but a court of competent jurisdiction, and that it is his concern to see whether the
documents sought to be registered conform with the formal and legal requirements for such
documents.
In view of the foregoing, we find no abuse of authority or irregularity committed by Atty. Quilala, Atty.
Cunanan, and Atty. Caluya, Jr. with respect to the cancellation of the notice of adverse claim and the
notice of lis pendens annotated on TCT No. N-290546. Whether or not the RTC order dated May 16,
2008 or the letter-request dated June 30,2008 had been falsified, fraudulent or invalid was not for
them to determine inasmuch as their duty to examine documents presented for registration was
limited only to what appears on the face of the documents. If, upon their evaluation of the letter-
request and the RTC order, they found the same to be sufficient in law and to be in conformity with
existing requirements, it became obligatory for them to perform their ministerial duty without
unnecessary delay.24
Should they be aggrieved by said respondents’ performance of duty, the complainants were not
bereft of any remedy because they could challenge the performance of duty by bringing the matter
by way of consulta with the LRA, as provided by Section 11725 of Presidential Decree No. 1529. But,
as enunciated in Gabriel v. Register of Deeds of Rizal,26 it was ultimately within the province of a
court of competent jurisdiction to resolve issues concerning the validity or invalidity of a document
registered by the Register of Deeds.
The complainants charge Atty. Victorio, Jr. and Atty. Tolentino, Jr. with having conspired with each
other to guarantee that the parties in Civil Case No. Q-59598 would enter into the amicable
settlement, and then to cause the cancellation of the affidavit of adverse claim and notice of lis
pendens annotated on TCT No. N-290546. The complainants further fault Atty. Victorio, Jr. with
having abandoned their cause since the issuance of the RTC of its order dated May 16, 2008. The
complainants’ charges are devoid of substance.
Although it is not necessary to prove a formal agreement in order to establish conspiracy because
conspiracy may be inferred from the circumstances attending the commission of an act, it is
nonetheless essential that conspiracy be established by clear and convincing evidence.27 The
complainants failed in this regard. Outside of their bare assertions that Atty. Victorio, Jr. and Atty.
Tolentino, Jr. had conspired with each other in order to cause the dismissal of the complaint and
then discharge of the annotations, they presented no evidence to support their allegation of
conspiracy. On the contrary, the records indicated their own active participation in arriving at the
amicable settlement with the defendants in Civil Case No. Q-07-59598. Hence, they could not now
turn their backs on the amicable settlement that they had themselves entered into.
Even assuming that Atty. Victorio, Jr. and Atty. Tolentino, Jr. initiated and participated in the
settlement of the case, there was nothing wrong in their doing so. It was actually their obligation as
lawyers to do so, pursuant to Rule 1.04, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, viz.:
RULE 1.04 – A lawyer shall encourage his clients to avoid, end or settle a controversy if it will admit
of a fair settlement.
1âwphi1
In fine, the presumption of the validity of the amicable settlement of the complainants and the
defendants in Civil Case No. Q-07-59598 subsisted.28
Anent the complainants’ charge of abandonment against Atty. Victorio, Jr., Rule 18.03 and Rule
18.04, Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility are applicable, to wit:
CANON 18 – A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence.
Rule 18.03 – A lawyer shall not neglecta legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in
connection therewith shall render him liable.
Rule 18.04 – A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond
within a reasonable time to the client’s request for information.
There is no issue that the complainants engaged the services of Atty. Victorio, Jr. as their counsel in
Civil Case No. Q-07-59598. Atty. Victorio, Jr. served as such counsel. With Atty. Victorio, Jr.
assistance, the complainants obtained a fair settlement consisting in receiving half of the proceeds
of the sale of the property in litis, without any portion of the proceeds accruing to counsel as his legal
fees. The complainants did not competently and persuasively show any unfaithfulness on the part of
Atty. Victorio, Jr. as far as their interest in the litigation was concerned. Hence, Atty. Victorio, Jr. was
not liable for abandonment.
Atty. Victorio, Jr. could not be faulted for the perceived inattention to any other matters subsequent
to the termination of Civil Case No. Q-07-59598. Unless otherwise expressly stipulated between
them at any time during the engagement, the complainants had no right to assume that Atty.
Victorio, Jr.’s legal representation was indefinite as to extend to his representation of them in the
LRA. The Law Profession did not burden its members with the responsibility of indefinite service to
the clients; hence, the rendition of professional services depends on the agreement between the
attorney and the client. Atty. Victorio, Jr.’s alleged failure to respond to the complainants’ calls or
visits, or to provide them with his whereabouts to enable them to have access to him despite the
termination of his engagement in Civil Case No. Q-07-59598 did not equate to abandonment without
the credible showing that he continued to come under the professional obligation towards them after
the termination of Civil Case No. Q-07-59598.
WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the baseless disbarment complaints against Atty. Federico S.
Tolentino, Jr., Atty. Renato G. Cunanan, Atty. Daniel F. Victoria, Jr., Atty. Elbert T. Quilala and Atty.
Constante P. Caluya, Jr. ----SO ORDERED.
Case number 8:
A.C. No. 6732 October 22, 2013
ATTY. OSCAR L. EMBIDO, REGIONAL DIRECTOR, NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION,

WESTERN VISA YAS, REGIONAL OFFICE NBI-WEVRO), FOR SAN PEDRO, ILOILO
CITY, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. SALVADOR N. PE, JR., ASSISTANT PROVINCIAL PROSECUTOR, SAN JOSE,
ANTIQUE, Respondent.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
A lawyer who forges a court decision and represents it as that of a court of law is guilty of the
gravest misconduct and deserves the supreme penalty of disbarment.
The Case
Before this Court is the complaint for disbarment against Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Atty.
Salvador N Pe, Jr. respondent) of San Jose, Antique for his having allegedly falsified an in existent
decision of Branch 64 of the Regional Trial Court stationed in Bugasong, Antique (RTC) instituted by
the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), Western Visayas Regional Office, represented by
Regional Director Atty. Oscar L. Embido.
Antecedent
On July 7, 2004, Atty. Ronel F. Sustituya, Clerk of Court of the RTC, received a written
communication from Mr. Ballam Delaney Hunt, a Solicitor in the United Kingdom (UK). The letter
requested a copy of the decision dated February 12, 1997 rendered by Judge Rafael O. Penuela in
Special Proceedings Case No. 084 entitled In the Matter of the Declaration of Presumptive Death of
Rey Laserna, whose petitioner was one Shirley Quioyo.1
On September 9, 2004, the RTC received another letter from Mr. Hunt, reiterating the request for a
copy of the decision in Special Proceedings Case No. 084 entitled In the Matter of the Declaration of
Presumptive Death of Rey Laserna.2
Judge Penuela instructed the civil docket clerk to retrieve the records of Special Proceedings Case
No. 084 entitled In the Matter of the Declaration of Presumptive Death of Rey Laserna. It was then
discovered that the RTC had no record of Special Proceedings No. 084 wherein Shirley Quioyo was
the petitioner. Instead, the court files revealed that Judge Penuela had decided Special Proceedings
No. 084 entitled In the Matter of the Declaration of Presumptive Death of Rolando Austria, whose
petitioner was one Serena Catin Austria.
Informed that the requested decision and case records did not exist,3 Mr. Hunt sent a letter dated
October 12, 2004 attaching a machine copy of the purported decision in Special Proceedings No.
084 entitled In the Matter of the Declaration of Presumptive Death of Rey Laserna that had been
presented by Shirley Quioyo in court proceedings in the UK.4
After comparing the two documents and ascertaining that the document attached to the October 12,
2004 letter was a falsified court document, Judge Penuela wrote Mr. Hunt to apprise him of the
situation.5
The discovery of the falsified decision prompted the Clerk of Court to communicate on the situation
in writing to the NBI, triggering the investigation of the falsification.6
In the meanwhile, Dy Quioyo, a brother of Shirley Quioyo, executed an affidavit on March 4,

2005,7 wherein he stated that it was the respondent who had facilitated the issuance of the falsified
decision in Special Proceedings No. 084 entitled In the Matter of the Declaration of Presumptive
Death of Rey Laserna for a fee of ₱60,000.00. The allegations against the respondent were
substantially corroborated by Mary Rose Quioyo, a sister of Shirley Quioyo, in an affidavit dated
March 20, 2005.8
The NBI invited the respondent to explain his side,9 but he invoked his constitutional right to remain
silent. The NBI also issued subpoenas to Shirley Quioyo and Dy Quioyo but only the latter appeared
and gave his sworn statement.
After conducting its investigation, the NBI forwarded to the Office of the Ombudsman for Visayas the
records of the investigation, with a recommendation that the respondent be prosecuted for
falsification of public document under Article 171, 1 and 2, of the Revised Penal Code, and for
violation of Section 3(a) of Republic Act 3019 (The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act).10 The NBI
likewise recommended to the Office of the Court Administrator that disbarment proceedings be
commenced against the respondent.11 Then Court Administrator Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. (now a
Member of the Court) officially endorsed the recommendation to the Office of the Bar Confidant.12
Upon being required by the Court, the respondent submitted his counter-affidavit,13 whereby he
denied any participation in the falsification. He insisted that Dy Quioyo had sought his opinion on
Shirley’s petition for the annulment of her marriage; that he had given advice on the pertinent laws
involved and the different grounds for the annulment of marriage; that in June 2004, Dy Quioyo had
gone back to him to present a copy of what appeared to be a court decision;14 that Dy Quioyo had
then admitted to him that he had caused the falsification of the decision; that he had advised Dy
Quioyo that the falsified decision would not hold up in an investigation; that Dy Quioyo, an overseas
Filipino worker (OFW), had previously resorted to people on Recto Avenue in Manila to solve his
documentation problems as an OFW; and that he had also learned from Atty. Angeles Orquia, Jr.
that one Mrs. Florencia Jalipa, a resident of Igbalangao, Bugasong, Antique, had executed a sworn
statement before Police Investigator Herminio Dayrit with the assistance of Atty. Orquia, Jr. to the
effect that her late husband, Manuel Jalipa, had been responsible for making the falsified document
at the instance of Dy Quioyo.15
Thereafter, the Court issued its resolution16 treating the respondent’s counter-affidavit as his
comment, and referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report
and recommendation.
The IBP’s Report and Recommendation
In a report and recommendation dated June 14, 2006,17 Atty. Lolita A. Quisumbing, the IBP
Investigating Commissioner, found the respondent guilty of serious misconduct and violations of the
Attorney’s Oath and Code of Professional Responsibility , and recommended his suspension from
the practice of law for one year. She concluded that the respondent had forged the purported
decision of Judge Penuela by making it appear that Special Proceedings No. 084 concerned a
petition for declaration of presumptive death of Rey Laserna, with Shirley Quioyo as the petitioner,
when in truth and in fact the proceedings related to the petition for declaration of presumptive death
of Rolando Austria, with Serena Catin Austria as the petitioner;18 and that the respondent had
received ₱60,000.00 from Dy Quioyo for the falsified decision. She rationalized her conclusions
thusly:
Respondent’s denials are not worthy of merit. Respondent contends that it was one Manuel Jalipa
(deceased) who facilitated the issuance and as proof thereof, he presented the sworn statement of
the widow of Florencia Jalipa (sic). Such a contention is hard to believe. In the first place, if the
decision was obtained in Recto, Manila, why was it an almost verbatim reproduction of the authentic
decision on file in Judge Penuela’s branch except for the names and dates? Respondent failed to
explain this. Secondly, respondent did not attend the NBI investigation and merely invoked his right
to remain silent. If his side of the story were true, he should have made this known in the
investigation. His story therefore appears to have been a mere afterthought. Finally, there is no
plausible reason why Dy Quioyo and his sister, Mary Rose Quioyo would falsely implicate him in this
incident.19
In its Resolution No. XVII-2007-063 dated February 1, 200,20 the IBP Board of Governors adopted
and approved, with modification, the report and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner
by suspending the respondent from the practice of law for six years.
On December 11, 2008, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XVIII-2008-
70921 denying the respondent’s motion for reconsideration and affirming Resolution No. XVII-2007-
063. The IBP Board of Governors then forwarded the case to the Court in accordance with Section
12(b), Rule 139-B22 of the Rules of Court.
On January 11, 2011, the Court resolved: (1) to treat the respondent’s comment/opposition as his
appeal by petition for review; (2) to consider the complainant’s reply as his comment on the petition
for review; (3) to require the respondent to file a reply to the complainant’s comment within 10 days
from notice; and (4) to direct the IBP to transmit the original records of the case within 15 days from
notice.
Ruling
We affirm the findings of the IBP Board of Governors. Indeed, the respondent was guilty of grave
misconduct for falsifying a court decision in consideration of a sum of money.
The respondent’s main defense consisted in blanket denial of the imputation. He insisted that he had
had no hand in the falsification, and claimed that the falsification had been the handiwork of Dy
Quioyo. He implied that Dy Quioyo had resorted to the shady characters in Recto Avenue in Manila
to resolve the problems he had encountered as an OFW, hinting that Dy Quioyo had a history of
employing unscrupulous means to achieve his ends.
However, the respondent’s denial and his implication against Dy Quioyo in the illicit generation of the
falsified decision are not persuasive. Dy Quioyo’s categorical declaration on the respondent’s
personal responsibility for the falsified decision, which by nature was positive evidence, was not
overcome by the respondent’s blanket denial, which by nature was negative evidence.23
Also, the imputation of wrongdoing against Dy Quioyo lacked credible specifics and did not
command credence. It is worthy to note, too, that the respondent filed his counter-affidavit only after
1âwphi 1
the Court, through the en banc resolution of May 10, 2005, had required him to comment.24 The
belatedness of his response exposed his blanket denial as nothing more than an after thought.
The respondent relied on the sworn statement supposedly executed by Mrs. Jalipa that declared that
her deceased husband had been instrumental in the falsification of the forged decision. But such
reliance was outrightly worthless, for the sworn statement of the wife was rendered unreliable due to
its patently hearsay character. In addition, the unworthiness of the sworn statement as proof of
authorship of the falsification by the husband is immediately exposed and betrayed by the falsified
decision being an almost verbatim reproduction of the authentic decision penned by Judge Penuela
in the real Special Proceedings Case No. 084.
In light of the established circumstances, the respondent was guilty of grave misconduct for having
authored the falsification of the decision in a non-existent court proceeding. Canon 7 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility demands that all lawyers should uphold at all times the dignity and
integrity of the Legal Profession. Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states that "a
lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he
whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal
profession." Lawyers are further required by Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility not
to engage in any unlawful, dishonest and immoral or deceitful conduct.
Gross immorality, conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or fraudulent transactions can
justify a lawyer’s disbarment or suspension from the practice of law.25 Specifically, the deliberate
falsification of the court decision by the respondent was an act that reflected a high degree of moral
turpitude on his part. Worse, the act made a mockery of the administration of justice in this country,
given the purpose of the falsification, which was to mislead a foreign tribunal on the personal status
of a person. He thereby became unworthy of continuing as a member of the Bar.
It then becomes timely to remind all members of the Philippine Bar that they should do nothing that
may in any way or degree lessen the confidence of the public in their professional fidelity and
integrity.26 The Court will not hesitate to wield its heavy hand of discipline on those among them who
wittingly and willingly fail to meet the enduring demands of their Attorney’s Oath for them to:
x x x support the Constitution and obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted
authorities therein; xxx do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; x x x not wittingly or
willingly promote or sue on groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor give aid nor consent to the same; x
x x delay no man for money or malice, and x x x conduct themselves as lawyers according to the
best of their knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to their clients x x
x.
No lawyer should ever lose sight of the verity that the practice of the legal profession is always a
privilege that the Court extends only to the deserving, and that the Court may withdraw or deny the
privilege to him who fails to observe and respect the Lawyer’s Oath and the canons of ethical
conduct in his professional and private capacities. He may be disbarred or suspended from the
practice of law not only for acts and omissions of malpractice and for dishonesty in his professional
dealings, but also for gross misconduct not directly connected with his professional duties that reveal
his unfitness for the office and his unworthiness of the principles that the privilege to practice law
confers upon him.27 Verily, no lawyer is immune from the disciplinary authority of the Court whose
duty and obligation are to investigate and punish lawyer misconduct committed either in a
professional or private capacity.28The test is whether the conduct shows the lawyer to be wanting in
moral character, honesty, probity, and good demeanor, and whether the conduct renders the lawyer
unworthy to continue as an officer of the Court.29WHEREFORE, the Court FINDS AND
PRONOUNCES ASST. PROVINCIAL PROSECUTOR SALVADOR N. PE, JR. guilty of violating
Rule 1.01 of Canon 1, and Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and
DISBARS him effective upon receipt of this decision.
The Court DIRECTS the Bar Confidant to remove the name of ASST. PROVINCIAL PROSECUTOR
SALVADOR N. PE, JR. from the Roll of Attorneys.
This decision is without prejudice to any pending or contemplated proceedings to be initiated against
ASST. PROVINCIAL PROSECUTOR SALVADOR N. PE, JR.
Let copies of this decision be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant the Office of the Court
Administrator for dissemination to all courts of the country and to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines.
SO ORDERED.
RULE 1.02----
Case number 9:
A.C. No. 6057 June 27, 2006
PETER T. DONTON, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. EMMANUEL O. TANSINGCO, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a disbarment complaint against respondent Atty. Emmanuel O. Tansingco ("respondent") for
serious misconduct and deliberate violation of Canon 1,1 Rules 1.012 and 1.023 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility ("Code").
The Facts
In his Complaint dated 20 May 2003, Peter T. Donton ("complainant") stated that he filed a criminal
complaint for estafa thru falsification of a public document4 against Duane O. Stier ("Stier"), Emelyn
A. Maggay ("Maggay") and respondent, as the notary public who notarized the Occupancy
Agreement.
The disbarment complaint arose when respondent filed a counter-charge for perjury5 against
complainant. Respondent, in his affidavit-complaint, stated that:
5. The OCCUPANCY AGREEMENT dated September 11, 1995 was prepared and notarized by
me under the following circumstances:
A. Mr. Duane O. Stier is the owner and long-time resident of a real property located at No. 33
Don Jose Street, Bgy. San Roque, Murphy, Cubao, Quezon City.
B. Sometime in September 1995, Mr. Stier – a U.S. citizen and thereby disqualified to
own real property in his name – agreed that the property be transferred in the name of Mr.
Donton, a Filipino.
C. Mr. Stier, in the presence of Mr. Donton, requested me to prepare several documents that
would guarantee recognition of him being the actual owner of the property despite the
transfer of title in the name of Mr. Donton.
D. For this purpose, I prepared, among others, the OCCUPANCY AGREEMENT,

recognizing Mr. Stier’s free and undisturbed use of the property for his residence and
business operations. The OCCUPANCY AGREEMENT was tied up with a loan which Mr.
Stier had extended to Mr. Donton.6
Complainant averred that respondent’s act of preparing the Occupancy Agreement, despite
knowledge that Stier, being a foreign national, is disqualified to own real property in his name,
constitutes serious misconduct and is a deliberate violation of the Code. Complainant prayed that
respondent be disbarred for advising Stier to do something in violation of law and assisting Stier in
carrying out a dishonest scheme.
In his Comment dated 19 August 2003, respondent claimed that complainant filed the disbarment
case against him upon the instigation of complainant’s counsel, Atty. Bonifacio A.
Alentajan,7 because respondent refused to act as complainant’s witness in the criminal case against
Stier and Maggay. Respondent admitted that he "prepared and notarized" the Occupancy
Agreement and asserted its genuineness and due execution.
In a Resolution dated 1 October 2003, the Court referred the matter to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.
The IBP’s Report and Recommendation
In her Report dated 26 February 2004 ("Report"), Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan
("Commissioner San Juan") of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline found respondent liable for
taking part in a "scheme to circumvent the constitutional prohibition against foreign ownership of land
in the Philippines." Commissioner San Juan recommended respondent’s suspension from the
practice of law for two years and the cancellation of his commission as Notary Public.
In Resolution No. XVI-2004-222 dated 16 April 2004, the IBP Board of Governors adopted, with
modification, the Report and recommended respondent’s suspension from the practice of law for six
months.
On 28 June 2004, the IBP Board of Governors forwarded the Report to the Court as provided under
Section 12(b), Rule 139-B8 of the Rules of Court.
On 28 July 2004, respondent filed a motion for reconsideration before the IBP. Respondent stated
that he was already 76 years old and would already retire by 2005 after the termination of his
pending cases. He also said that his practice of law is his only means of support for his family and
his six minor children.
In a Resolution dated 7 October 2004, the IBP denied the motion for reconsideration because the
IBP had no more jurisdiction on the case as the matter had already been referred to the Court.
The Ruling of the Court
The Court finds respondent liable for violation of Canon 1 and Rule 1.02 of the Code.
A lawyer should not render any service or give advice to any client which will involve defiance of the
laws which he is bound to uphold and obey.9 A lawyer who assists a client in a dishonest scheme or
who connives in violating the law commits an act which justifies disciplinary action against the
lawyer.10
By his own admission, respondent admitted that Stier, a U.S. citizen, was disqualified from owning
real property.11Yet, in his motion for reconsideration,12 respondent admitted that he caused the
transfer of ownership to the parcel of land to Stier. Respondent, however, aware of the prohibition,
quickly rectified his act and transferred the title in complainant’s name. But respondent provided
"some safeguards" by preparing several documents,13 including the Occupancy Agreement, that
would guarantee Stier’s recognition as the actual owner of the property despite its transfer in
complainant’s name. In effect, respondent advised and aided Stier in circumventing the
constitutional prohibition against foreign ownership of lands14 by preparing said documents.
Respondent had sworn to uphold the Constitution. Thus, he violated his oath and the Code when he
prepared and notarized the Occupancy Agreement to evade the law against foreign ownership of
lands. Respondent used his knowledge of the law to achieve an unlawful end. Such an act amounts
to malpractice in his office, for which he may be suspended.15
In Balinon v. De Leon,16 respondent Atty. De Leon was suspended from the practice of law for three
years for preparing an affidavit that virtually permitted him to commit concubinage. In In re:
Santiago,17 respondent Atty. Santiago was suspended from the practice of law for one year for
preparing a contract which declared the spouses to be single again after nine years of separation
and allowed them to contract separately subsequent marriages.
WHEREFORE, we find respondent Atty. Emmanuel O. Tansingco GUILTY of violation of Canon 1

and Rule 1.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, we SUSPEND respondent
Atty. Emmanuel O. Tansingco from the practice of law for SIX MONTHS effective upon finality of this
Decision.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant to be appended to
respondent’s personal record as an attorney, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Department
of Justice, and all courts in the country for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
RULE 1.03 ----
Case number 10:
A.C. No. 6672 September 4, 2009
PEDRO L. LINSANGAN, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. NICOMEDES TOLENTINO, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
CORONA, J.:
This is a complaint for disbarment1 filed by Pedro Linsangan of the Linsangan Linsangan &
Linsangan Law Office against Atty. Nicomedes Tolentino for solicitation of clients and encroachment
of professional services.
Complainant alleged that respondent, with the help of paralegal Fe Marie Labiano, convinced his
clients2 to transfer legal representation. Respondent promised them financial assistance3 and
expeditious collection on their claims.4To induce them to hire his services, he persistently called
them and sent them text messages.
To support his allegations, complainant presented the sworn affidavit5 of James Gregorio attesting
that Labiano tried to prevail upon him to sever his lawyer-client relations with complainant and utilize
respondent’s services instead, in exchange for a loan of ₱50,000. Complainant also attached
"respondent’s" calling card:6
Front
NICOMEDES TOLENTINO
LAW OFFFICE
CONSULTANCY & MARITIME SERVICES

W/ FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE
Fe Marie L. Labiano
Paralegal
Tel: 362-7820
1st MIJI Mansion, 2nd Flr. Rm. M-
Fax: (632) 362-
01
7821
6th Ave., cor M.H. Del Pilar
Cel.: (0926)
Grace Park, Caloocan City
2701719
Back
SERVICES OFFERED:
CONSULTATION AND ASSISTANCE

TO OVERSEAS SEAMEN
REPATRIATED DUE TO ACCIDENT,
INJURY, ILLNESS, SICKNESS, DEATH
AND INSURANCE BENEFIT CLAIMS
ABROAD.
1av vphi1
(emphasis supplied)
Hence, this complaint.
Respondent, in his defense, denied knowing Labiano and authorizing the printing and circulation of
the said calling card.7
The complaint was referred to the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.8
Based on testimonial and documentary evidence, the CBD, in its report and recommendation,9 found
that respondent had encroached on the professional practice of complainant, violating Rule
8.0210 and other canons11of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR). Moreover, he
contravened the rule against soliciting cases for gain, personally or through paid agents or brokers
as stated in Section 27, Rule 13812 of the Rules of Court. Hence, the CBD recommended that
respondent be reprimanded with a stern warning that any repetition would merit a heavier penalty.
We adopt the findings of the IBP on the unethical conduct of respondent but we modify the
recommended penalty.
The complaint before us is rooted on the alleged intrusion by respondent into complainant’s
professional practice in violation of Rule 8.02 of the CPR. And the means employed by respondent
in furtherance of the said misconduct themselves constituted distinct violations of ethical rules.
Canons of the CPR are rules of conduct all lawyers must adhere to, including the manner by which a
lawyer’s services are to be made known. Thus, Canon 3 of the CPR provides:
CANON 3 - A lawyer in making known his legal services shall use only true, honest, fair, dignified
and objective information or statement of facts.
Time and time again, lawyers are reminded that the practice of law is a profession and not a
business; lawyers should not advertise their talents as merchants advertise their wares.13 To allow a
lawyer to advertise his talent or skill is to commercialize the practice of law, degrade the profession
in the public’s estimation and impair its ability to efficiently render that high character of service to
which every member of the bar is called.14
Rule 2.03 of the CPR provides:
RULE 2.03. A lawyer shall not do or permit to be done any act designed primarily to solicit legal
business.
Hence, lawyers are prohibited from soliciting cases for the purpose of gain, either personally or
through paid agents or brokers.15 Such actuation constitutes malpractice, a ground for disbarment.16
Rule 2.03 should be read in connection with Rule 1.03 of the CPR which provides:
RULE 1.03. A lawyer shall not, for any corrupt motive or interest, encourage any suit or proceeding
or delay any man’s cause.
This rule proscribes "ambulance chasing" (the solicitation of almost any kind of legal business by
an attorney, personally or through an agent in order to gain employment)17 as a measure to protect
the community from barratry and champerty.18
Complainant presented substantial evidence19 (consisting of the sworn statements of the very same
persons coaxed by Labiano and referred to respondent’s office) to prove that respondent indeed
solicited legal business as well as profited from referrals’ suits.
Although respondent initially denied knowing Labiano in his answer, he later admitted it during the
mandatory hearing.
Through Labiano’s actions, respondent’s law practice was benefited. Hapless seamen were enticed
to transfer representation on the strength of Labiano’s word that respondent could produce a more
favorable result.
Based on the foregoing, respondent clearly solicited employment violating Rule 2.03, and Rule 1.03
and Canon 3 of the CPR and Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. 1avv phi1
With regard to respondent’s violation of Rule 8.02 of the CPR, settled is the rule that a lawyer should
not steal another lawyer’s client nor induce the latter to retain him by a promise of better service,
good result or reduced fees for his services.20 Again the Court notes that respondent never denied
having these seafarers in his client list nor receiving benefits from Labiano’s "referrals." Furthermore,
he never denied Labiano’s connection to his office.21Respondent committed an unethical, predatory
overstep into another’s legal practice. He cannot escape liability under Rule 8.02 of the CPR.
Moreover, by engaging in a money-lending venture with his clients as borrowers, respondent

violated Rule 16.04:
Rule 16.04 – A lawyer shall not borrow money from his client unless the client’s interests are fully
protected by the nature of the case or by independent advice. Neither shall a lawyer lend money to a
client except, when in the interest of justice, he has to advance necessary expenses in a legal matter
he is handling for the client.
The rule is that a lawyer shall not lend money to his client. The only exception is, when in the interest
of justice, he has to advance necessary expenses (such as filing fees, stenographer’s fees for
transcript of stenographic notes, cash bond or premium for surety bond, etc.) for a matter that he is
handling for the client.
The rule is intended to safeguard the lawyer’s independence of mind so that the free exercise of his
judgment may not be adversely affected.22 It seeks to ensure his undivided attention to the case he
is handling as well as his entire devotion and fidelity to the client’s cause. If the lawyer lends money
to the client in connection with the client’s case, the lawyer in effect acquires an interest in the
subject matter of the case or an additional stake in its outcome.23Either of these circumstances may
lead the lawyer to consider his own recovery rather than that of his client, or to accept a settlement
which may take care of his interest in the verdict to the prejudice of the client in violation of his duty
of undivided fidelity to the client’s cause.24
As previously mentioned, any act of solicitation constitutes malpractice25 which calls for the exercise
of the Court’s disciplinary powers. Violation of anti-solicitation statutes warrants serious sanctions for
initiating contact with a prospective client for the purpose of obtaining employment.26 Thus, in this
jurisdiction, we adhere to the rule to protect the public from the Machiavellian machinations of
unscrupulous lawyers and to uphold the nobility of the legal profession.
Considering the myriad infractions of respondent (including violation of the prohibition on lending
money to clients), the sanction recommended by the IBP, a mere reprimand, is a wimpy slap on the
wrist. The proposed penalty is grossly incommensurate to its findings.
A final word regarding the calling card presented in evidence by petitioner. A lawyer’s best
advertisement is a well-merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust based on his
character and conduct.27 For this reason, lawyers are only allowed to announce their services by
publication in reputable law lists or use of simple professional cards.
Professional calling cards may only contain the following details:
(a) lawyer’s name;
(b) name of the law firm with which he is connected;
(c) address;
(d) telephone number and
(e) special branch of law practiced.28
Labiano’s calling card contained the phrase "with financial assistance." The phrase was clearly used
to entice clients (who already had representation) to change counsels with a promise of loans to
finance their legal actions. Money was dangled to lure clients away from their original lawyers,
thereby taking advantage of their financial distress and emotional vulnerability. This crass
commercialism degraded the integrity of the bar and deserved no place in the legal profession.
However, in the absence of substantial evidence to prove his culpability, the Court is not prepared to
rule that respondent was personally and directly responsible for the printing and distribution of
Labiano’s calling cards.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Nicomedes Tolentino for violating Rules 1.03, 2.03, 8.02 and 16.04
and Canon 3 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court is hereby SUSPENDEDfrom the practice of law for a period of one year effective
immediately from receipt of this resolution. He is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same
or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely.
Let a copy of this Resolution be made part of his records in the Office of the Bar Confidant, Supreme
Court of the Philippines, and be furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of
the Court Administrator to be circulated to all courts.
SO ORDERED.
Case number 11:
A.C. No. 4984 April 1, 2003
ATTY. JULITO D. VITRIOLO, PRECILLANA J. HONORICA, ARLEEN J. RAMOS, DR. ROGER

PEREZ, DR. IMELDA DARAUG, DR. REMIGIA NATHANIELZ, CELEDONIA CORONACION, and
JOSE RABALO,complainants,
vs.
ATTY. FELINA DASIG, respondent.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
This is an administrative case for disbarment filed against Atty. Felina S. Dasig,1 an official of the
Commission on Higher Education (CHED). The charge involves gross misconduct of respondent in
violation of the Attorney’s Oath for having used her public office to secure financial spoils to the
detriment of the dignity and reputation of the CHED.
Almost all complainants in the instant case are high-ranking officers of the CHED. In their sworn
Complaint-Affidavit filed with this Court on December 4, 1998, complainants allege that respondent,
while she was OIC of Legal Affairs Service, CHED, committed acts that are grounds for disbarment
under Section 27,2 Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, to wit:
a) Sometime in August 1998 and during the effectivity of Respondent’s designation as

Officer-in-Charge of Legal Affairs Service, CHED, she demanded from Betty C. Mangohon, a
teacher of Our Lady of Mariazel Educational Center in Novaliches, Quezon City, the amount
of P20,000.00 and later reduced to P5,000.00 for the facilitation of her application for
correction of name then pending before the Legal Affairs Service, CHED...
b) Likewise, sometime in July to August 1998 and during the effectivity of Respondent’s
designation as Officer-in-Charge of Legal Affairs Service, CHED, she demanded from
Rosalie B. Dela Torre, a student, the amount of P18,000.00 to P20,000.00 for facilitation of
her application for correction of name then pending before the Legal Affairs Service,
CHED…
c) Likewise, sometime in September 1998 and during the effectivity of Respondent’s

designation as Officer-in-Charge of Legal Affairs Service, CHED, she demanded from
Rocella G. Eje, a student, the amount of P5,000.00 for facilitation of her application for
correction of name then pending before the Legal Affairs Service, CHED. . . In addition,
Respondent even suggested to Ms. Eje to register her birth anew with full knowledge of the
existence of a prior registration…
d) Likewise, sometime in August to September 1998 and during the effectivity of

Respondent’s designation as Officer-in-Charge of Legal Affairs Service, CHED, she
demanded from Jacqueline N. Ng, a student, a considerable amount which was
subsequently confirmed to be P15,000.00 and initial fee of P5,000.00 more or less for
facilitation of her application for correction of name then pending before the Legal Affairs
Service, CHED... In addition, the Respondent even suggested to Ms. Ng to hire a lawyer who
shall be chosen by Respondent Dasig to facilitate the application for correction of name.3
Complainants likewise aver that respondent violated her oath as attorney-at-law by filing eleven (11)
baseless, groundless, and unfounded suits before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City,
which were subsequently dismissed.4
Further, complainants charge respondent of transgressing subparagraph b (22), Section 365 of

Presidential Decree No. 807, for her willful failure to pay just debts owing to "Borela Tire Supply" and
"Nova’s Lining Brake & Clutch" as evidenced by the dishonored checks she issued,6 the complaint
sheet, and the subpoena issued to respondent.7
Complainants also allege that respondent instigated the commission of a crime against complainant
Celedonia R. Coronacion and Rodrigo Coronacion, Jr., when she encouraged and ordered her son,
Jonathan Dasig, a guard of the Bureau of Jail Management and Penology, to draw his gun and
shoot the Coronacions on the evening of May 14, 1997. As a result of this incident, a complaint for
grave threats against the respondent and her son, docketed as Criminal Case No. 86052, was
lodged with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 36.8
Finally, complainants allege that respondent authored and sent to then President Joseph Estrada a
libelous and unfair report, which maligned the good names and reputation of no less than eleven
(11) CHED Directors calculated to justify her ill motive of preventing their re-appointment and with
the end view of securing an appointment for herself.9
In our resolution of February 3, 1999, we required respondent to file a Comment on the charges.10 A
copy of said resolution was sent to the respondent at her address at Blk. 4, Lot 12, Hobart II
Subdivision, Novaliches, Quezon City, only to be returned to this Court with the notation
"Unclaimed."11
On July 5, 1999, we directed that a copy of the resolution of February 3, 1999, be served by
registered mail to respondent at her office address in CHED.
In a letter dated August 28, 2000, the Postmaster of the Ortigas Center Post Office informed the
Court that the said mail matter had been delivered to, received by, and signed for by one Antonio
Molon, an authorized agent of respondent on August 27, 1999.12
On November 22, 2000, we granted complainant’s motion to refer the complaint to the Commission
on Bar Discipline, Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report, and
recommendation.
In its order dated February 6, 2001, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline directed respondent to
submit her Answer to the Complaint, failing which she would be considered in default and the case
heard ex parte. Respondent failed to heed said order and on January 8, 2002, the Commission
directed her anew to file her Answer, but again she failed to comply with the directive. As a result,
the Commission ruled that she had waived her right to file her Comment or Answer to the Complaint
and the case was mainly resolved on the basis of the documents submitted and on record.
In its report and recommendation, dated April 5, 2002, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline stated
as follows:
From the foregoing evidence on record, it can be concluded that respondent in violation of
her oath as a government official and as a member of the Bar, indeed made unlawful
demands or attempted to extort money from certain people who had pending
applications/requests before her office in exchange for her promise to act favorably on said
applications/requests. Clearly, respondent unlawfully used her public office in order to secure
financial spoils to the detriment of the dignity and reputation of the Commission on Higher
Education.
For the foregoing reasons, it is recommended that respondent be suspended from the
practice of law for the maximum period allowable of three (3) years with a further warning
that similar action in the future will be a ground for disbarment of respondent.
On August 3, 2002, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XV-2002-393, the full text of
which reads as follows:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the

Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case,
herein made part of this Resolution/Decision as Annex "A:; and, finding the recommendation
fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules; and considering
that respondent unlawfully used her public office in order to secure financial spoils to the
detriment of the dignity and reputation of the Commission on Higher Education, Respondent
is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three (3) years.13
At the threshold is the query of whether respondent attorney-at-law, as Officer-in-Charge (OIC) of

Legal Services, CHED, may be disciplined by this Court for her malfeasance, considering that her
position, at the time of filing of the complaint, was "Chief Education Program Specialist, Standards
Development Division, Office of Programs and Standards, CHED."
Generally speaking, a lawyer who holds a government office may not be disciplined as a member of
the Bar for misconduct in the discharge of his duties as a government official.14 However, if said
misconduct as a government official also constitutes a violation of his oath as a lawyer, then he may
be disciplined by this Court as a member of the Bar.15
In this case, the record shows that the respondent, on various occasions, during her tenure as OIC,
Legal Services, CHED, attempted to extort from Betty C. Mangohon, Rosalie B. Dela Torre, Rocella
G. Eje, and Jacqueline N. Ng sums of money as consideration for her favorable action on their
pending applications or requests before her office. The evidence remains unrefuted, given the
respondent’s failure, despite the opportunities afforded her by this Court and the IBP Commission on
Bar Discipline to comment on the charges. We find that respondent’s misconduct as a lawyer of the
CHED is of such a character as to affect her qualification as a member of the Bar, for as a lawyer,
she ought to have known that it was patently unethical and illegal for her to demand sums of money
as consideration for the approval of applications and requests awaiting action by her office.
The Attorney’s Oath is the source of the obligations and duties of every lawyer and any violation
thereof is a ground for disbarment, suspension, or other disciplinary action. The Attorney’s Oath
imposes upon every member of the bar the duty to delay no man for money or malice. Said duty is
further stressed in Rule 1.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.16 Respondent’s demands for
sums of money to facilitate the processing of pending applications or requests before her office
violates such duty, and runs afoul of the oath she took when admitted to the Bar. Such actions
likewise run contrary to Rule 1.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
A member of the Bar who assumes public office does not shed his professional obligations. Hence,
the Code of Professional Responsibility, promulgated on June 21, 1988, was not meant to govern
the conduct of private practitioners alone, but of all lawyers including those in government service.
This is clear from Canon 617 of said Code. Lawyers in government are public servants who owe the
utmost fidelity to the public service. Thus, they should be more sensitive in the performance of their
professional obligations, as their conduct is subject to the ever-constant scrutiny of the public.
Respondent’s attempts to extort money from persons with applications or requests pending before
her office are violative of Rule 1.0118 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which prohibits
members of the Bar from engaging or participating in any unlawful, dishonest, or deceitful acts.
Moreover, said acts constitute a breach of Rule 6.0219 of the Code which bars lawyers in government
service from promoting their private interests. Promotion of private interests includes soliciting gifts
or anything of monetary value in any transaction requiring the approval of his office or which may be
affected by the functions of his office. Respondent’s conduct in office falls short of the integrity and
good moral character required from all lawyers, specially from one occupying a high public office.
For a lawyer in public office is expected not only to refrain from any act or omission which might tend
to lessen the trust and confidence of the citizenry in government, she must also uphold the dignity of
the legal profession at all times and observe a high standard of honesty and fair dealing. Otherwise
said, a lawyer in government service is a keeper of the public faith and is burdened with high degree
of social responsibility, perhaps higher than her brethren in private practice.
For her violation of the Attorney’s Oath as well as of Rule 1.01 and Rule 1.03 of Canon 120 and Rule
6.02 of Canon 6 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, particularly for acts of dishonesty as well
as gross misconduct as OIC, Legal Services, CHED, we find that respondent deserves not just the
penalty of three years’ suspension from membership in the Bar as well as the practice of law, as
recommended by the IBP Board of Governors, but outright disbarment. Her name shall be stricken
off the list of attorneys upon finality of this decision.
WHEREFORE, respondent Arty. Felina S. Dasig is found liable for gross misconduct and dishonesty
in violation of the Attorney’s Oath as well as the Code of Professional Responsibility, and is hereby
ordered DISBARRED.
Let copies of this Resolution be furnished to the Bar Confidant to be spread on the records of the
respondent, as well as to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for distribution to all its chapters, and
the Office of the Court Administrator for dissemination to all courts throughout the country.
SO ORDERED.
RULE 1.04 ----
Case Number 12:
G.R. No. 104599 March 11, 1994
JON DE YSASI III, petitioner,

vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (FOURTH DIVISION), CEBU CITY, and JON DE
YSASI, respondents.
F.B. Santiago, Nalus & Associates for petitioner.
Ismael A. Serfino for private respondent.
REGALADO, J.:
The adage that blood is thicker than water obviously stood for naught in this case, notwithstanding
the vinculum of paternity and filiation between the parties. It would indeed have been the better part
of reason if herein petitioner and private respondent had reconciled their differences in an
extrajudicial atmosphere of familial amity and with the grace of reciprocal concessions. Father and
son opted instead for judicial intervention despite the inevitable acrimony and negative publicity.
Albeit with distaste, the Court cannot proceed elsewise but to resolve their dispute with the same
reasoned detachment accorded any judicial proceeding before it.
The records of this case reveal that petitioner was employed by his father, herein private
respondent, as farm administrator of Hacienda Manucao in Hinigaran, Negros Occidental sometime
in April, 1980. Prior thereto, he was successively employed as sales manager of Triumph
International (Phil.), Inc. and later as operations manager of Top Form Manufacturing (Phil.), Inc. His
employment as farm administrator was on a fixed salary, with other allowances covering housing,
food, light, power, telephone, gasoline, medical and dental expenses.
As farm administrator, petitioner was responsible for the supervision of daily activities and operations
of the sugarcane farm such as land preparation, planting, weeding, fertilizing, harvesting, dealing
with third persons in all matters relating to the hacienda and attending to such other tasks as may be
assigned to him by private respondent. For this purpose, he lived on the farm, occupying the upper
floor of the house there.
Following his marriage on June 6, 1982, petitioner moved to Bacolod City with his wife and
commuted to work daily. He suffered various ailments and was hospitalized on two separate
occasions in June and August, 1982. In November, 1982, he underwent fistulectomy, or the surgical
removal of the fistula, a deep sinuous ulcer. During his recuperation which lasted over four months,
he was under the care of Dr. Patricio Tan. In June, 1983, he was confined for acute gastroenteritis
and, thereafter, for infectious hepatitis from December, 1983 to January, 1984.
During the entire periods of petitioner's illnesses, private respondent took care of his medical
expenses and petitioner continued to receive compensation. However, in April, 1984, without due
notice, private respondent ceased to pay the latter's salary. Petitioner made oral and written
demands for an explanation for the sudden withholding of his salary from Atty. Apolonio Sumbingco,
private respondent's auditor and legal adviser, as well as for the remittance of his salary. Both
demands, however, were not acted upon.
Petitioner then filed an action with the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC, for brevity),
Regional Arbitration Branch No. VI, Bacolod City, on October 17, 1984, docketed therein as RAB
Case No. 0452-84, against private respondent for illegal dismissal with prayer for reinstatement
without loss of seniority rights and payment of full back wages, thirteenth month pay for 1983,
consequential, moral and exemplary damages, as well as attorney's fees.
On July 31, 1991, said complaint for illegal dismissal was dismissed by the NLRC,1 holding that
petitioner abandoned his work and that the termination of his employment was for a valid cause, but
ordering private respondent to pay petitioner the amount of P5,000.00 as penalty for his failure to
serve notice of said termination of employment to the Department of Labor and Employment as
required by Batas Pambansa Blg. 130 and consonant with this Court's ruling in Wenphil Corporation
vs. National Labor Relations Commission, et al.2 On appeal to the Fourth Division of the NLRC,
Cebu City, said decision was affirmed in toto.3
His motion for reconsideration4 of said decision having been denied for lack of merit,5 petitioner filed
this petition presenting the following issues for resolution: (1) whether or not the petitioner was
illegally dismissed; (2) whether or not he is entitled to reinstatement, payment of back wages,
thirteenth month pay and other benefits; and (3) whether or not he is entitled to payment of moral
and exemplary damages and attorney's fees because of illegal dismissal. The discussion of these
issues will necessarily subsume the corollary questions presented by private respondent, such as
the exact date when petitioner ceased to function as farm administrator, the character of the
pecuniary amounts received by petitioner from private respondent, that is, whether the same are in
the nature of salaries or pensions, and whether or not there was abandonment by petitioner of his
functions as farm administrator.
In his manifestation dated September 14, 1992, the Solicitor General recommended a modification
of the decision of herein public respondent sustaining the findings and conclusions of the Executive
Labor Arbiter in RAB Case No. 0452-84,6 for which reason the NLRC was required to submit its own
comment on the petition. In compliance with the Court's resolution of November 16, 1992,7 NLRC
filed its comment on February 12, 1992 largely reiterating its earlier position in support of the findings
of the Executive Labor Arbiter.8
Before proceeding with a discussion of the issues, the observation of the labor arbiter is worth
noting:
This case is truly unique. What makes this case unique is the fact that because of the
special relationship of the parties and the nature of the action involved, this case
could very well go down (in) the annals of the Commission as perhaps the first of its
kind. For this case is an action filed by an only son, his father's namesake, the only
child and therefore the only heir against his own father.9
Additionally, the Solicitor General remarked:
. . . After an exhaustive reading of the records, two (2) observations were noted that
may justify why this labor case deserves special considerations. First, most of the
complaints that petitioner and private respondent had with each other, were personal
matters affecting father and son relationship. And secondly, if any of the complaints
pertain to their work, they allow their personal relationship to come in the way.10
I. Petitioner maintains that his dismissal from employment was illegal because of want of just cause
therefor and non-observance of the requirements of due process. He also charges the NLRC with
grave abuse of discretion in relying upon the findings of the executive labor arbiter who decided the
case but did not conduct the hearings thereof.
Private respondent, in refutation, avers that there was abandonment by petitioner of his functions as
farm administrator, thereby arming private respondent with a ground to terminate his employment at
Hacienda Manucao. It is also contended that it is wrong for petitioner to question the factual findings
of the executive labor arbiter and the NLRC as only questions of law may be appealed for resolution
by this Court. Furthermore, in seeking the dismissal of the instant petition, private respondent faults
herein petitioner for failure to refer to the corresponding pages of the transcripts of stenographic
notes, erroneously citing Sections 15(d) and 16(d), Rule 44 (should be Section 16[c] and [d],
Rule 46 and Section 1[g], Rule 50) of the Rules of Court, which provide that want of page references
to the records is a ground for dismissal of an appeal.
Prefatorily, we take advertence of the provisions of Article 221 of the Labor Code that technical rules
of evidence prevailing in courts of law and equity shall not be controlling, and that every and all
reasonable means to speedily and objectively ascertain the facts in each case shall be availed of,
without regard to technicalities of law or procedure in the interest of due process.
It is settled that it is not procedurally objectionable for the decision in a case to be rendered by a
judge, or a labor arbiter for that matter, other than the one who conducted the hearing. The fact that
the judge who heard the case was not the judge who penned the decision does not impair the
validity of the judgment,11 provided that he draws up his decision and resolution with due care and
makes certain that they truly and accurately reflect conclusions and final dispositions on the bases of
the facts of and evidence submitted in the case.12
Thus, the mere fact that the case was initially assigned to Labor Arbiter Ricardo T. Octavio, who
conducted the hearings therein from December 5, 1984 to July 11, 1985, and was later transferred
to Executive Labor Arbiter Oscar S. Uy, who eventually decided the case, presents no procedural
infirmity, especially considering that there is a presumption of regularity in the performance of a
public officer's functions,13 which petitioner has not successfully rebutted.
We are constrained to heed the underlying policy in the Labor Code relaxing the application of
technical rules of procedure in labor cases in the interest of due process, ever mindful of the long-
standing legal precept that rules of procedure must be interpreted to help secure, not defeat, justice.
For this reason, we cannot indulge private respondent in his tendency to nitpick on trivial
technicalities to boost his arguments. The strength of one's position cannot be hinged on mere
procedural niceties but on solid bases in law and jurisprudence.
The fundamental guarantees of security of tenure and due process dictate that no worker shall be
dismissed except for just and authorized cause provided by law and after due process.14 Article 282
of the Labor Code enumerates the causes for which an employer may validly terminate an
employment, to wit:
(a) serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of the lawful orders of his employer
or representative in connection with his work; (b) gross and habitual neglect by the employee of his
duties; (c) fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by his employer or duly
authorized representative; (d) commission of a crime or offense by the employee against the person
of his employer or any immediate member of his family or his duly authorized representative; and (e)
other causes analogous to the foregoing.
The employer may also terminate the services of any employee due to the installation of labor
saving devices, redundancy, retrenchment to prevent losses or the closing or cessation of operation
of the establishment or undertaking, unless the closing is for the purpose of circumventing the
pertinent provisions of the Labor Code, by serving a written notice on the workers and the
Department of Labor and Employment at least one (1) month before the intended date thereof, with
due entitlement to the corresponding separation pay rates provided by law.15Suffering from a disease
by reason whereof the continued employment of the employee is prohibited by law or is prejudicial to
his and his co-employee's health, is also a ground for termination of his services provided he
receives the prescribed separation pay.16 On the other hand, it is well-settled that abandonment by
an employee of his work authorizes the employer to effect the former's dismissal from employment.17
After a careful review of the records of this case, we find that public respondent gravely erred in
affirming the decision of the executive labor arbiter holding that petitioner abandoned his
employment and was not illegally dismissed from such employment. For want of substantial bases,
in fact or
in law, we cannot give the stamp of finality and conclusiveness normally accorded to the factual
findings of an administrative agency, such as herein public respondent NLRC,18 as even decisions of
administrative agencies which are declared "final" by law are not exempt from judicial review when
so warranted. 19
The following perceptive disquisitions of the Solicitor General on this point deserve acceptance:
It is submitted that the absences of petitioner in his work from October 1982 to
December 1982, cannot be construed as abandonment of work because he has a
justifiable excuse. Petitioner was suffering from perennial abscess in the peri-anal
around the anus and fistula under the medical attention of Dr. Patricio Tan of
Riverside Medical Center, Inc., Bacolod City (Tsn, Vol. III, Dr. Tan, February 19,
1986 at 20-44).
This fact (was) duly communicated to private respondent by medical bills sent to
Hacienda Manucao (Tsn, Vol. III, Dr. Tan, January 22, 1987 at 49-50).
During the period of his illness and recovery, petitioner stayed in Bacolod City upon
the instruction(s) of private respondent to recuperate thereat and to handle only
administrative matters of the hacienda in that city. As a manager, petitioner is not
really obliged to live and stay 24 hours a day inside Hacienda Manucao.
xxx xxx xxx
After evaluating the evidence within the context of the special circumstances involved
and basic human experience, petitioner's illness and strained family relation with
respondent Jon de Ysasi II may be considered as justifiable reason for petitioner Jon
de Ysasi III's absence from work during the period of October 1982 to December
1982. In any event, such absence does not warrant outright dismissal without notice
and hearing.
xxx xxx xxx
The elements of abandonment as a ground for dismissal of an employee are as

follows:
(1) failure to report for work or absence without valid or justifiable
reason; and (2) clear intention to sever the employer-employee tie
(Samson Alcantara, Reviewer in Labor and Social Legislation, 1989
edition, p. 133).
This Honorable Court, in several cases, illustrates what constitute abandonment.

In Dagupan Bus Company v. NLRC (191 SCRA 328), the Court rules that for
abandonment to arise, there must be a concurrence of the intention to abandon and
some overt act from which it may be inferred that the employee has no more interest
to work. Similarly, in Nueva Ecija I Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. NLRC (184 SCRA
25), for abandonment to constitute a valid cause for termination of employment, there
must be a deliberate, unjustified refusal of the employee to resume his employment. .
. Mere absence is not sufficient; it must be accompanied by overt acts unerringly
pointing to the fact that the employee simply does not want to work anymore.
There are significant indications in this case, that there is no abandonment. First,
petitioner's absence and his decision to leave his residence inside Hacienda
Manucao, is justified by his illness and strained family relations. Second he has some
medical certificates to show his frail health. Third, once able to work, petitioner wrote
a letter (Annex "J") informing private respondent of his intention to assume again his
employment. Last, but not the least, he at once instituted a complaint for illegal
dismissal when he realized he was unjustly dismissed. All these are indications that
petitioner had no intention to abandon his employment.20
The records show that the parties herein do not dispute the fact of petitioner's confinement in the
hospital for his various afflictions which required medical treatment. Neither can it be denied that
private respondent was well aware of petitioner's state of health as the former admittedly shouldered
part of the medical and hospital bills and even advised the latter to stay in Bacolod City until he was
fit to work again. The disagreement as to whether or not petitioner's ailments were so serious as to
necessitate hospitalization and corresponding periods for recuperation is beside the point. The fact
remains that on account of said illnesses, the details of which were amply substantiated by the
attending physician,21 and as the records are bereft of any suggestion of malingering on the part of
petitioner, there was justifiable cause for petitioner's absence from work. We repeat, it is clear,
deliberate and unjustified refusal to resume employment and not mere absence that is required to
constitute abandonment as a valid ground for termination of employment.22
With his position as farm administrator of Hacienda Manucao, petitioner unmistakably may be
classified as a managerial employee23 to whom the law grants an amount of discretion in the
discharge of his duties. This is why when petitioner stated that "I assigned myself where I want to
go,"24 he was simply being candid about what he could do within the sphere of his authority. His
duties as farm administrator did not strictly require him to keep regular hours or to be at the office
premises at all times, or to be subjected to specific control from his employer in every aspect of his
work. What is essential only is that he runs the farm as efficiently and effectively as possible and,
while petitioner may definitely not qualify as a model employee, in this regard he proved to be quite
successful, as there was at least a showing of increased production during the time that petitioner
was in charge of farm operations.
If, as private respondent contends, he had no control over petitioner during the years 1983 to 1984,
this is because that was the period when petitioner was recuperating from illness and on account of
which his attendance and direct involvement in farm operations were irregular and minimal, hence
the supervision and control exercisable by private respondent as employer was necessarily limited. It
goes without saying that the control contemplated refers only to matters relating to his functions as
farm administrator and could not extend to petitioner's personal affairs and activities.
While it was taken for granted that for purposes of discharging his duties as farm administrator,
petitioner would be staying at the house in the farm, there really was no explicit contractual
stipulation (as there was no formal employment contract to begin with) requiring him to stay therein
for the duration of his employment or that any transfer of residence would justify the termination of
his employment. That petitioner changed his residence should not be taken against him, as this is
undeniably among his basic rights, nor can such fact of transfer of residence per se be a valid
ground to terminate an employer-employee relationship.
Private respondent, in his pleadings, asserted that as he was yet uncertain of his son's intention of
returning to work after his confinement in the hospital, he kept petitioner on the payroll, reported him
as an employee of the haciendafor social security purposes, and paid his salaries and benefits with
the mandated deductions therefrom until the end of December, 1982. It was only in January, 1983
when he became convinced that petitioner would no longer return to work that he considered the
latter to have abandoned his work and, for this reason, no longer listed him as an employee.
According to private respondent, whatever amount of money was given to petitioner from that time
until
April, 1984 was in the nature of a pension or an allowance or mere gratuitous doles from a father to
a son, and not salaries as, in fact, none of the usual deductions were made therefrom. It was only in
April, 1984 that private respondent completely stopped giving said pension or allowance when he
was angered by what he heard petitioner had been saying about sending him to jail.
Private respondent capitalizes on the testimony of one Manolo Gomez taken on oral deposition
regarding petitioner's alleged statement to him, "(h)e quemado los (p)ue(n)tes de Manucao" ("I have
burned my bridges with Manucao") as expressive of petitioner's intention to abandon his job. In
addition to insinuations of sinister motives on the part of petitioner in working at the farm and
thereafter abandoning the job upon accomplishment of his objectives, private respondent takes the
novel position that the agreement to support his son after the latter abandoned the administration of
the farm legally converts the initial abandonment to implied voluntary resignation.25
As earlier mentioned, petitioner ripostes that private respondent undoubtedly knew about petitioner's
illness and even paid for his hospital and other medical bills. The assertion regarding abandonment
of work, petitioner argues, is further belied by his continued performance of various services related
to the operations of the farm from May to the last quarter of 1983, his persistent inquiries from his
father's accountant and legal adviser about the reason why his pension or allowance was
discontinued since April, 1984, and his indication of having recovered and his willingness and
capability to resume his work at the farm as expressed in a letter dated September 14, 1984.26 With
these, petitioner contends that it is immaterial how the monthly pecuniary amounts are designated,
whether as salary, pension or allowance, with or without deductions, as he was entitled thereto in
view of his continued service as farm administrator.27
To stress what was earlier mentioned, in order that a finding of abandonment may justly be made
there must be a concurrence of two elements, viz.: (1) the failure to report for work or absence
without valid or justifiable reason, and (2) a clear intention to sever the employer-employee
relationship, with the second element as the more determinative factor and being manifested by
some overt acts. Such intent we find dismally wanting in this case.
It will be recalled that private respondent himself admitted being unsure of his son's plans of
returning to work. The absence of petitioner from work since mid-1982, prolonged though it may
have been, was not without valid causes of which private respondent had full knowledge. As to what
convinced or led him to believe that petitioner was no longer returning to work, private respondent
neither explains nor substantiates by any reasonable basis how he arrived at such a conclusion.
Moreover, private respondent's claim of abandonment cannot be given credence as even after
January, 1983, when private respondent supposedly "became convinced" that petitioner would no
longer work at the farm, the latter continued to perform services directly required by his position as
farm administrator. These are duly and correspondingly evidenced by such acts as picking up some
farm machinery/equipment from G.A. Machineries, Inc.,28 claiming and paying for additional farm
equipment and machinery shipped by said firm from Manila to Bacolod through Zip
Forwarders,29 getting the payment of the additional cash advances for molasses for crop year 1983-
1984 from Agrotex Commodities, Inc.,30 and remitting to private respondent through
Atty. Sumbingco the sums collected along with receipts for medicine and oil.31
It will be observed that all of these chores, which petitioner took care of, relate to the normal
activities and operations of the farm. True, it is a father's prerogative to request or even command
his child to run errands for him. In the present case, however, considering the nature of these
transactions, as well as the property values and monetary sums involved, it is unlikely that private
respondent would leave the matter to just anyone. Prudence dictates that these matters be handled
by someone who can be trusted or at least be held accountable therefor, and who is familiar with the
terms, specifications and other details relative thereto, such as an employee. If indeed petitioner had
abandoned his job or was considered to have done so by private respondent, it would be awkward,
or even out of place, to expect or to oblige petitioner to concern himself with matters relating to or
expected of him with respect to what would then be his past and terminated employment. It is hard
to imagine what further authority an employer can have over a dismissed employee so as to compel
him to continue to perform work-related tasks:
It is also significant that the special power of attorney32 executed

by private respondent on June 26, 1980 in favor of petitioner, specifically stating —
xxx xxx xxx
That I, JON de YSASI, Filipino, of legal age, married, and a resident of Hda.
Manucao, hereinafter called and referred to as PRINCIPAL, am a sugarcane planter,
BISCOM Mill District, and a duly accredited planter-member of the BINALBAGAN-
ISABELA PLANTERS' ASSOCIATION, INC.;
That as such planter-member of BIPA, I have check/checks with BIPA representing

payment for all checks and papers to which I am entitled to (sic) as such planter-
member;
That I have named, appointed and constituted as by these presents

I HEREBY NAME, APPOINT AND CONSTITUTE as my true and lawful ATTORNEY-
IN-FACT
JON de YSASI III
whose specimen signature is hereunder affixed, TO GET FOR ME and in my name,

place and stead, my check/checks aforementioned, said ATTORNEY-IN-FACT being
herein given the power and authority to sign for me and in my name, place and
stead, the receipt or receipts or payroll for the said check/checks. PROVIDED,
HOWEVER, that my said ATTORNEY-IN-FACT cannot cash the said check/checks,
but to turn the same over to me for my proper disposition.
That I HEREBY RATIFY AND CONFIRM the acts of my
Attorney-in-Fact in getting the said check/checks and signing the receipts therefor.
That I further request that my said check/checks be made a "CROSSED CHECK".
xxx xxx xxx
remained in force even after petitioner's employment was supposed to have been terminated by
reason of abandonment. Furthermore, petitioner's numerous requests for an explanation regarding
the stoppage of his salaries and benefits,33 the issuance of withholding tax reports,34 as well as
correspondence reporting his full recovery and readiness to go back to work,35 and, specifically, his
filing of the complaint for illegal dismissal are hardly the acts of one who has abandoned his work.
We are likewise not impressed by the deposition of Manolo Gomez, as witness for private
respondent, ascribing statements to petitioner supposedly indicative of the latter's intention to
abandon his work. We perceive the irregularity in the taking of such deposition without the presence
of petitioner's counsel, and the failure of private respondent to serve reasonably advance notice of
its taking to said counsel, thereby foreclosing his opportunity to
cross-examine the deponent. Private respondent also failed to serve notice thereof on the Regional
Arbitration Branch No. VI of the NLRC, as certified to by Administrative Assistant Celestina G.
Ovejera of said office.36 Fair play dictates that at such an important stage of the proceedings, which
involves the taking of testimony, both parties must be afforded equal opportunity to examine and
cross-examine a witness.
As to the monthly monetary amounts given to petitioner, whether denominated as salary, pension,
allowance or ex gratia handout, there is no question as to petitioner's entitlement thereto inasmuch
as he continued to perform services in his capacity as farm administrator. The change in description
of said amounts contained in the pay slips or in the receipts prepared by private respondent cannot
be deemed to be determinative of petitioner's employment status in view of the peculiar
circumstances above set out. Besides, if such amounts were truly in the nature of allowances given
by a parent out of concern for his child's welfare, it is rather unusual that receipts therefor37 should be
necessary and required as if they were ordinary business expenditures.
Neither can we subscribe to private respondent's theory that petitioner's alleged abandonment was
converted into an implied voluntary resignation on account of the father's agreement to support his
son after the latter abandoned his work. As we have determined that no abandonment took place in
this case, the monthly sums received by petitioner, regardless of designation, were in consideration
for services rendered emanating from an employer-employee relationship and were not of a
character that can qualify them as mere civil support given out of parental duty and solicitude. We
are also hard put to imagine how abandonment can be impliedly converted into a voluntary
resignation without any positive act on the part of the employee conveying a desire to terminate his
employment. The very concept of resignation as a ground for termination by the employee of his
employment38 does not square with the elements constitutive of abandonment.
On procedural considerations, petitioner posits that there was a violation by private respondent of
the due process requirements under the Labor Code for want of notice and hearing.39 Private
respondent, in opposition, argues that Section 2, Rule XIV, Book V of the Omnibus Rules
Implementing the Labor Code applies only to cases where the employer seeks to terminate the
services of an employee on any of the grounds enumerated under Article 282 of the Labor Code, but
not to the situation obtaining in this case where private respondent did not dismiss petitioner on any
ground since it was petitioner who allegedly abandoned his employment.40
The due process requirements of notice and hearing applicable to labor cases are set out in Rule
XIV, Book V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code in this wise:
Sec. 2. Notice of Dismissal. — Any employer who seeks to dismiss a worker shall
furnish him a written notice stating the particular acts or omission(s) constituting the
grounds for his dismissal. In cases of abandonment of work, notice shall be served at
the worker's last known address.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 5. Answer and hearing. — The worker may answer the allegations as stated
against him in the notice of dismissal within a reasonable period from receipt of such
notice. The employer shall afford the worker ample opportunity to be heard and to
defend himself with the assistance of his representative, if he so desires.
Sec. 6. Decision to dismiss. — The employer shall immediately notify a worker in

writing of a decision to dismiss him stating clearly the reasons therefor.
Sec. 7. Right to contest dismissal. — Any decision taken by the employer shall be
without prejudice to the right of the worker to contest the validity or legality of his
dismissal by filing a complaint with the Regional Branch of the Commission.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 11. Report of dismissal. — The employer shall submit a monthly report to the
Regional Office having jurisdiction over the place of work at all dismissals effected by
him during the month, specifying therein the names of the dismissed workers, the
reasons for their dismissal, the dates of commencement and termination of
employment, the positions last held by them and such other information as may be
required by the Ministry for policy guidance and statistical purposes.
Private respondent's argument is without merit as there can be no question that petitioner was
denied his right to due process since he was never given any notice about his impending dismissal
and the grounds therefor, much less a chance to be heard. Even as private respondent controverts
the applicability of the mandatory twin requirements of procedural due process in this particular
case, he in effect admits that no notice was served by him on petitioner. This fact is corroborated by
the certification issued on September 5, 1984 by the Regional Director for Region VI of the
Department of Labor that no notice of termination of the employment of petitioner was submitted
thereto.41
Granting arguendo that there was abandonment in this case, it nonetheless cannot be denied that
notice still had to be served upon the employee sought to be dismissed, as the second sentence of
Section 2 of the pertinent implementing rules explicitly requires service thereof at the employee's last
known address, by way of substantial compliance. While it is conceded that it is the employer's
prerogative to terminate an employee, especially when there is just cause therefor, the requirements
of due process cannot be lightly taken. The law does not countenance the arbitrary exercise of such
a power or prerogative when it has the effect of undermining the fundamental guarantee of security
of tenure in favor of the employee.42
On the executive labor arbiter's misplaced reliance on the Wenphil case, the Solicitor General rejoins
as follows:
The Labor Arbiter held thus:
While we are in full agreement with the respondent as to his defense

of implied resignation and/or abandonment, records somehow
showed that he failed to notify the Department of
Labor and Employment for his sons' (sic)/complainants' (sic)
aba(n)donment as required by BP 130. And for this failure, the other
requisite for a valid termination by an employer was not complied
with. This however, would not work to invalidate the otherwise (sic)
existence of a valid cause for dismissal. The validity of the cause of
dismissal must be upheld at all times provided however that
sanctions must be imposed on the respondent for his failure to
observe the notice on due process requirement. (Wenphil Corp. v.
NLRC, G.R. No. 80587). (Decision Labor Arbiter, at 11-12, Annex "C"
Petition), . . .
This is thus a very different case from Wenphil Corporation v. NLRC, 170 SCRA 69.
In Wenphil, the rule applied to the facts is: once an employee is dismissed for just
cause, he must not be rewarded
re-employment and backwages for failure of his employer to observe procedural due
process. The public policy behind this is that, it may encourage the employee to do
even worse and render a mockery of the rules of discipline required to be observed.
However, the employer must be penalized for his infraction of due process. In the
present case, however, not only was petitioner dismissed without due process, but
his dismissal is without just cause. Petitioner did not abandon his employment
because he has a justifiable excuse.43
II. Petitioner avers that the executive labor arbiter erred in disregarding the mandatory provisions of
Article 279 of the Labor Code which entitles an illegally dismissed employee to reinstatement and
back wages and, instead, affirmed the imposition of the penalty of P5,000.00 on private respondent
for violation of the due process requirements. Private respondent, for his part, maintains that there
was error in imposing the fine because that penalty contemplates the failure to submit the employer's
report on dismissed employees to the DOLE regional office, as required under Section 5 (now,
Section 11), Rule XIV of the implementing rules, and not the failure to serve notice upon the
employee sought to be dismissed by the employer.
Both the Constitution and the Labor Code enunciate in no uncertain terms the right of every worker
to security of tenure.44 To give teeth to this constitutional and statutory mandates, the Labor Code
spells out the relief available to an employee in case of its denial:
Art. 279. Security of Tenure. — In cases of regular employment, the employer shall
not terminate the services of an employee except for a just cause or when authorized
by this Title. An employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to
reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and to his full
backwages, inclusive of allowances, and to his other benefits of their monetary
equivalent computed from the time his compensation was withheld from him up to
the time of actual reinstatement.
Clearly, therefore, an employee is entitled to reinstatement with full back wages in the absence of
just cause for dismissal.45 The Court, however, on numerous occasions has tempered the rigid
application of said provision of the Labor Code, recognizing that in some cases certain events may
have transpired as would militate against the practicability of granting the relief thereunder provided,
and declares that where there are strained relations between the employer and the employee,
payment of back wages and severance pay may be awarded instead of reinstatement,46 and more
particularly when managerial employees are concerned.47 Thus, where reinstatement is no longer
possible, it is therefore appropriate that the dismissed employee be given his fair and just share of
what the law accords him.48
We note with favor and give our imprimatur to the Solicitor General's ratiocination, to wit:
As a general rule, an employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled
to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and to his backwages computed from
the time his compensation was withheld up to the time of his reinstatement. (Morales
vs. NLRC, 188 SCRA 295). But in Pacific Cement Company, Inc. vs. NLRC, 173
SCRA 192, this Honorable Court held that when it comes to reinstatement,
differences should be made between managers and the ordinary workingmen. The
Court concluded that a company which no longer trusts its managers cannot operate
freely in a competitive and profitable manner. The NLRC should know the difference
between managers and ordinary workingmen. It cannot imprudently order the
reinstatement of managers with the same ease and liberality as that of rank and file
workers who had been terminated. Similarly, a reinstatement may not be appropriate
or feasible in case of antipathy or antagonism between the parties (Morales, vs.
NLRC, 188 SCRA 295).
In the present case, it is submitted that petitioner should not be reinstated as farm
administrator of Hacienda Manucao. The present relationship of petitioner and
private respondent (is) so strained that a harmonious and peaceful employee-
employer relationship is hardly possible.49
III. Finally, petitioner insists on an award of moral damages, arguing that his dismissal from
employment was attended by bad faith or fraud, or constituted oppression, or was contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy. He further prays for exemplary damages to serve as a
deterrent against similar acts of unjust dismissal by other employers.
Moral damages, under Article 2217 of the Civil Code, may be awarded to compensate one for
diverse injuries such as mental anguish, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, and social
humiliation, provided that such injuries spring from a wrongful act or omission of the defendant which
was the proximate cause thereof.50 Exemplary damages, under Article 2229, are imposed by way of
example or correction for the public good, in addition to moral, temperate, liquidated or
compensatory damages. They are not recoverable as a matter of right, it being left to the court to
decide whether or not they should be adjudicated.51
We are well aware of the Court's rulings in a number of cases in the past allowing recovery of moral
damages where the dismissal of the employee was attended by bad faith or fraud, or constituted an
act oppressive to labor, or was done in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or public
policy,52 and of exemplary damages if the dismissal was effected in a wanton, oppressive or
malevolent manner.53 We do not feel, however, that an award of the damages prayed for in this
petition would be proper even if, seemingly, the facts of the case justify their allowance. In the
aforestated cases of illegal dismissal where moral and exemplary damages were awarded, the
dismissed employees were genuinely without fault and were undoubtedly victims of the erring
employers' capricious exercise of power.
In the present case, we find that both petitioner and private respondent can equally be faulted for
fanning the flames which gave rise to and ultimately aggravated this controversy, instead of
sincerely negotiating a peaceful settlement of their disparate claims. The records reveal how their
actuations seethed with mutual antagonism and the undeniable enmity between them negates the
likelihood that either of them acted in good faith. It is apparent that each one has a cause for
damages against the other. For this reason, we hold that no moral or exemplary damages can
rightfully be awarded to petitioner.
On this score, we are once again persuaded by the validity of the following recommendation of the
Solicitor General:
The Labor Arbiter's decision in RAB Case No. 0452-84 should be modified. There
was no voluntary abandonment in this case because petitioner has a justifiable
excuse for his absence, or such absence does not warrant outright dismissal without
notice and hearing. Private respondent, therefore, is guilty of illegal dismissal. He
should be ordered to pay backwages for a period not exceeding three years from
date of dismissal. And in lieu of reinstatement, petitioner may be paid separation pay
equivalent to one (1) month('s) salary for every year of service, a fraction of six
months being considered as one (1) year in accordance with recent jurisprudence
(Tan, Jr. vs. NLRC, 183 SCRA 651). But all claims for damages should be
dismissed, for both parties are equally at fault.54
The conduct of the respective counsel of the parties, as revealed by the records, sorely disappoints
the Court and invites reproof. Both counsel may well be reminded that their ethical duty as lawyers
to represent their clients with
zeal55 goes beyond merely presenting their clients' respective causes in court. It is just as much their
responsibility, if not more importantly, to exert all reasonable efforts to smooth over legal conflicts,
preferably out of court and especially in consideration of the direct and immediate consanguineous
ties between their clients. Once again, we reiterate that the useful function of a lawyer is not only to
conduct litigation but to avoid it whenever possible by advising settlement or withholding suit. He is
often called upon less for dramatic forensic exploits than for wise counsel in every phase of life. He
should be a mediator for concord and a conciliator for compromise, rather than a virtuoso of
technicality in the conduct of litigation.56
Rule 1.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility explicitly provides that "(a) lawyer shall
encourage his client to avoid, end or settle the controversy if it will admit of a fair settlement." On this
point, we find that both counsel herein fell short of what was expected of them, despite their avowed
duties as officers of the court. The records do not show that they took pains to initiate steps geared
toward effecting a rapprochement between their clients. On the contrary, their acerbic and protracted
exchanges could not but have exacerbated the situation even as they may have found favor in the
equally hostile eyes of their respective clients.
In the same manner, we find that the labor arbiter who handled this regrettable case has been less
than faithful to the letter and spirit of the Labor Code mandating that a labor arbiter "shall exert all
efforts towards the amicable settlement of a labor dispute within his jurisdiction."57 If he ever did so,
or at least entertained the thought, the copious records of the proceedings in this controversy are
barren of any reflection of the same.
One final word. This is one decision we do not particularly relish having been obliged to make. The
task of resolving cases involving disputes among members of a family leaves a bad taste in the
mouth and an aversion in the mind, for no truly meaningful and enduring resolution is really achieved
in such situations. While we are convinced that we have adjudicated the legal issues herein squarely
on the bases of law and jurisprudence, sans sentimentality, we are saddened by the thought that we
may have failed to bring about the reconciliation of the father and son who figured as parties to this
dispute, and that our adherence here to law and duty may unwittingly contribute to the breaking,
instead of the strengthening, of familial bonds. In fine, neither of the parties herein actually emerges
victorious. It is the Court's earnest hope, therefore, that with the impartial exposition and extended
explanation of their respective rights in this decision, the parties may eventually see their way clear
to an ultimate resolution of their differences on more convivial terms.
WHEREFORE, the decision of respondent National Labor Relations Commission is hereby SET
ASIDE. Private respondent is ORDERED to pay petitioner back wages for a period not exceeding
three (3) years, without qualification or deduction,58 and, in lieu of reinstatement, separation pay
equivalent to one (1) month for every year of service, a fraction of six (6) months being considered
as one (1) whole year.
SO ORDERED.
Case Number 13;

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CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY

A.C. No. 4148 July 30, 1998

REMEDIOS RAMIREZ TAPUCAR, complainant,

Now he faces disbarment.

The records reveal the following facts:

RESOLUTION NO. XII-97-97

Adm. Case No. 4148

Remedios Ramirez Tapucar vs.

Atty. Lauro L. Tapucar

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and

We find the Report and Recommendation of Commissioner Fernandez, as approved and

Rule 1.01. A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or

G.R. No. 156643 June 27, 2006

FRANCISCO SALVADOR B. ACEJAS III, Petitioner,

G.R. No. 156891 June 27, 2006

VLADIMIR S. HERNANDEZ, Petitioner,

"WHEREFORE, premises considered, accused Vladimir S. Hernandez, Victor D. Conanan, Expedito

Hence, petitioners now seek recourse in this Court.7

The facts8 are narrated by the Sandiganbayan as follows:

Version of the Prosecution

xxx xxx xxx

Version of the Defense

In his Petition, Acejas narrates some more occurrences as follows:

xxx xxx xxx

"3. 22nd December 1993 –

xxx xxx xxx

"9. 8th January 1994 –

"10. 12th January 1994 –

xxx xxx xxx

xxx xxx xxx

xxx xxx xxx

Ruling of the Sandiganbayan

Petitioner Hernandez raises the following issues:

"1. The Conspiracy Theory

2. The presence of lawyer-client relationship; duty to client’s cause; lawful performance of

3. ‘Instigation’ not ‘entrapment’

4. Credibility of witness and testimony

6. Elements of ‘bad faith’

7. Elements of the crime (direct bribery)

8. Non-presentation of complaining victim tantamount to suppression of evidence"31

The Court’s Ruling

The Petitions have no merit.

"Q: When Vlademir Hernandez arrived, what happened?

"Q: What happened after he gave the passport to Atty. Acejas?

"A: [Acejas] gave the passport to Mr. Expedito Perlas, sir.

"Q: After that, what happened?

"A: Then, [Perlas] gave it to Mr. Aoyagi, sir.

"Q: The passport?

"A: Yes, sir.

"A: He checked all the pages and he kept it, sir.

"Q: Did Mr. Hernandez got hold or touched the envelope?

"A: No, sir.

"A: None, sir, he just motioned like this.

"Q: And at the same time pointed to Atty. Acejas?

"A: Yes, sir.

"Q: And your husband gave the envelope to Atty. Acejas?

"A: Yes, sir.

"A: Expedito Perlas, sir.

"Q: Did Expedito Perlas [receive] that envelope?

"A: Yes, sir.

"Q: And then, what happened?

"Q: Who arrived first at Aristocrat Restaurant, you or Acejas?

"A: Yes, sir.

"A: None, sir, he just motioned like this.