Quimen v.

CA
257 SCRA 163

DOCTRINE: Where the easement may be established on any of several tenements surrounding
the dominant estate, the one where the way is shortest and will cause the least damage should
be chosen. However, as elsewhere stated, if these two (2) circumstances do not concur in a
single tenement, the way which will cause the least damage should be used, even if it will not be
the shortest.

FACTS:
Petitioner Anastacia Quimen together with her brothers Sotero, Sulpicio, Antonio and sister
Rufina inherited a piece of property situated in Pandi, Bulacan. They agreed to subdivide the
property equally among themselves, as they did, with the shares of Anastacia, Sotero, Sulpicio
and Rufina abutting the municipal road. Located directly behind the lots of Anastacia and Sotero
is the share of their brother Antonio designated as Lot No. 1448-B-C which the latter divided into
two (2) equal parts, now Lots Nos. 1448-B-6-A and 1448-B-6-B. The latter Lot is behind the
property of Sotero, father of private respondent Yolanda Oliveros. Yolanda purchased Lot No.
1448-B-6-A from her uncle Antonio through her aunt Anastacia who was then acting as his
administratrix.

According to Yolanda, when petitioner offered her the property for sale she was hesitant to buy
as it had no access to a public road. But Anastacia prevailed upon her to buy the lot with the
assurance that she would give her a right of way on her adjoining property.

Thereafter, Yolanda constructed a house on the lot she bought using as her passageway to the
public highway a portion of Anastacia's property. But when Yolanda finally offered to pay for the
use of the pathway Anastacia refused to accept the payment. In fact she was thereafter barred
by Anastacia from passing through her property.

Later, Yolanda purchased the other lot of Antonio Quimen, Lot No. 1448-B-6-B, located directly
behind the property of her parents who provided her a pathway between their house from the lot
of Yolanda behind the sari sari store of Sotero, and Anastacia's perimeter fence. The store is
made of strong materials and occupies the entire frontage of the lot measuring four (4) meters
wide and nine meters (9) long. Although the pathway leads to the municipal road it is not
adequate for ingress and egress. The municipal road cannot be reached with facility because
the store itself obstructs the path so that one has to pass through the back entrance and the
facade of the store to reach the road.

Finally, Yolanda filed an action with the proper court praying for a right of way through
Anastacia's property. The report was that the proposed right of way was at the extreme right of
Anastacia's property facing the public highway, starting from the back of Sotero's sari-sari store
and extending inward by one (1) meter to her property and turning left for about five (5) meters
to avoid the store.

TC dismissed Yolanda’s complaint, but the CA reversed the decision declaring that she was
entitled to a right of way on petitioner’s property and that the way proposed by Yolanda would
cause the least damage and detriment to the servient estate.

ISSUE:
Whether or not passing through the property of Yolanda's parents is more accessible to the
public road than to make a detour to her property and cut down the avocado tree standing
thereon. -- YES

HELD:
The conditions sine quo non for a valid grant of an easement of right of way are: (a) the
dominant estate is surrounded by other immovables without an adequate outlet to a public
highway; (b) the dominant estate is willing to pay the proper indemnity; (c) the isolation was not
due to the acts of the dominant estate; and, (d) the right of way being claimed is at a point least
prejudicial to the servient estate.

The criterion of least prejudice to the servient estate must prevail over the criterion of shortest
distance although this is a matter of judicial appreciation. While shortest distance may ordinarily
imply least prejudice, it is not always so as when there are permanent structures obstructing the
shortest distance; while on the other hand, the longest distance may be free of obstructions and
the easiest or most convenient to pass through. In other words, where the easement may be
established on any of several tenements surrounding the dominant estate, the one where the
way is shortest and will cause the least damage should be chosen. However, as elsewhere
stated, if these two (2) circumstances do not concur in a single tenement, the way which will
cause the least damage should be used, even if it will not be the shortest.

As between a right of way that would demolish a store of strong materials to provide egress to a
public highway, and another right of way which although longer will only require an avocado tree
to be cut down, the second alternative should be preferred.

Ronquillo v. CA
195 SCRA 433

DOCTRINE: The rules of accretion do not apply where the drying-up of river is not due to a
“natural” change in the course of the waters. Herein, the change was man-made (pollution).
The dried-up portion belongs to the State as land of public domain.

FACTS:

Plaintiff Rosendo del Rosario was a registered owner of a certain Lot No. 34. Adjoining said lot
is a dried-up portion of the old Estero Calubcub occupied by the defendant since 1945.

Plaintiffs claim that long before the year 1930, when title was issued over the lot to his name,
Rosendo del Rosario had been in possession of this including the adjoining dried-up portion of
the old Estero Calubcub having bought the same from Arsenio Arzaga.

In the early part of 1945 defendant (Ronquillo) occupied the eastern portion of said titled lot as
well as the dried-up portion of the old Estero Calubcub which abuts plaintiffs' titled lot. After a
relocation survey of the land in question sometime in 1960, plaintiffs learned that defendant was
occupying a portion of their land and thus demanded defendant to vacate said land when the
latter refused to pay the reasonable rent for its occupancy. However, despite said demand
defendant refused to vacate.

Rosendo, Amparo and Florencia, all surnamed del Rosario (Del Rosarios), lodged a complaint
with the Court of First Instance of Manila praying, among others, that they be declared the
rightful owners of the dried-up portion of Estero Calubcub.
The trial court upheld the complaint. On appeal, respondent court, in affirming the decision of
the trial court, declared that since Estero Calubcub had already dried-up way back in 1930 due
to the natural change in the course of the waters, under Article 370 of the old Civil Code, the
abandoned river bed belongs to the Del Rosarios as riparian owners.

Hence, the petition before the SC.

Before the SC, the Director of Lands in his Comment stated:

We do not see our way clear to subscribe to the ruling of the Honorable Court of
Appeals on this point for Article 370 of the Old Civil Code, insofar as ownership
of abandoned river beds by the owners of riparian lands are concerned, speaks
only of a situation where such river beds were abandoned because of a natural
change in the course of the waters. Conversely, we submit that if the
abandonment was for some cause other than the natural change in the course of
the waters, Article 370 is not applicable and the abandoned bed does not lose its
character as a property of public dominion not susceptible to private ownership in
accordance with Article 502 (No. 1) of the New Civil Code. In the present case,
the drying up of the bed, as contended by the petitioner, is clearly caused by
human activity and undeniably not because of the natural change of the course
of the waters.

ISSUE:
Whether the dried-up portion of Estero Calubcub being claimed by herein petitioner was caused
by a natural change in the course of the waters; and, corollary thereto, is the issue of the
applicability of Article 370 of the old Civil Code.

HELD:
Caused by man. Article 370, thus, does not apply.

A careful perusal of the evidence presented by both parties in the case at bar will reveal that the
change in the course of Estero Calubcub was caused, not by natural forces, but due to the
dumping of garbage therein by the people of the surrounding neighborhood.

Private respondent Florencia del Rosario, in her testimony, made a categorical statement which
in effect admitted that Estero Calubcub changed its course because of the garbage dumped
therein, by the inhabitants of the locality.

In addition, the relocation plan which also formed the basis of respondent court's ruling, merely
reflects the change in the course of Estero Calubcub but it is not clear therefrom as to what
actually brought about such change. There is nothing in the testimony of lone witness Florencia
del Rosario nor in said relocation plan which would indicate that the change in the course of the
estero was due to the ebb and flow of the waters. On the contrary, the aforequoted testimony of
the witness belies such fact, while the relocation plan is absolutely silent on the matter. The
inescapable conclusion is that the dried-up portion of Estero Calubcub was occasioned, not by a
natural change in the course of the waters, but through the active intervention of man.

The foregoing facts and circumstances remove the instant case from the applicability of Article
370 of the old Civil Code which provides:

Art. 370. The beds of rivers, which are abandoned because of a natural change
 in the course of the waters, belong to the owners of the riparian lands throughout
the respective length of each. If the abandoned bed divided tenements belonging
to different owners the new dividing line shall be equidistant from one and the
other.

Hence, the Del Rosarios cannot be entitled thereto supposedly as riparian owners.

The dried-up portion of Estero Calubcub should thus be considered as forming part of the land
of the public domain which cannot be subject to acquisition by private ownership.

Cristobal v. CA
291 SCRA 122

DOCTRINE: To be entitled to a compulsory easement of right of way, the preconditions

provided under Arts. 649 and 650 of the Civil Code must be established. These are: (1) that the
dominant estate is surrounded by other immovables and has no adequate outlet to a public
highway; (2) that proper indemnity has been paid; (3) that the isolation was not due to acts of
the proprietor of the dominant estate; (4) that the right of way claimed is at a point least
prejudicial to the servient estate and, in so far as consistent with this rule, where the distance
from the dominant estate to a public highway may be the shortest. The burden of proving the
existence of these prerequisites lies on the owner of the dominant estate.

FACTS:
Petitioners own a house and lot situated at No. 10 Visayas Avenue Extension, Quezon City.
They have already been residing there since 1961.

Respondent Cesar Ledesma, Inc., on the other hand, is the owner of a subdivision at Barrio
Culiat along Visayas Avenue. It included the disputed residential lots, Lot 1 and Lot 2.

The said lots were originally part of a private road known as Road Lot 2 owned exclusively by
Cesar Ledesma, Inc. When Visayas Avenue became operational as a national road in 1979,
Cesar Ledesma Inc., filed a petition before the RTC of Quezon City to be allowed to convert
Road Lot 2 into residential lots.

The petition was granted. Road Lot 2 was converted into residential lots designated as Lot 1
and Lot 2. Subsequently, Cesar Ledesma, Inc. sold both lots to Macario Pacione in whose favor
Transfer Certificates of Title were correspondingly issued.

In turn, Macario Pacione conveyed the lots to his son and daughter-in-law, respondent spouses
Jesus and Lerma Pacione. When the Pacione spouses, who intended to build a house on Lot 1,
visited the property in 1987, they found out that the lot was occupied by a squatter named
Juanita Geronimo. A portion was being used as a passageway by petitioners to and from
Visayas Avenue. Accordingly, the spouses complained about the intrusion into their property to
the barangay office.

At the barangay conciliation proceeding, petitioners offered to pay for the use of a portion of Lot
1 as passageway but the Pacione spouses rejected the offer. When the parties failed to arrive at
an amicable settlement, the spouses started enclosing Lot 1 with a concrete fence. Petitioners
protested the enclosure alleging that their property was bounded on all sides by residential
houses belonging to different owners and had no adequate outlet and inlet to Visayas Avenue
except through the property of the Paciones.

As their protest went unheeded, petitioners instituted an action for easement of right of way with
prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO). The trial court issued a TRO
directing the Pacione spouses to cease and desist from fencing the disputed property.

The trial court dismissed the complaint holding that one essential requisite of a legal easement
of a right of way was not proved. Petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals. The appellate
court affirmed the findings of the trial court. Their motion for reconsideration having been
denied, petitioners filed the present petition together with the issue of legality or illegality of the
conversion of Road Lot 2 into two (2) residential lots by the Cesar Ledesma, Inc.

ISSUE:
Whether or not there was a compulsory easement of right of way.

HELD:
The Supreme Court denied the petition.

To be entitled to a compulsory easement of right of way, the preconditions provided under Arts.
649 and 650 of the Civil Code must be established. These are: (1) that the dominant estate is
surrounded by othe immovables and has no adequate outlet to a public highway; (2) that proper
indemnity has been paid; (3) that the isolation was not due to acts of the proprietor of the
dominant estate; (4) that the right of way claimed is at a point least prejudicial to the servient
estate and, in so far as consistent with this rule, where the distance from the dominant estate to
a public highway may be the shortest. The burden of proving the existence of these
prerequisites lies on the owner of the dominant estate.

In the present case, the first element is clearly absent. As found by the trial court and the Court
of Appeals, an outlet already exist, which is a path walk located at the left side of petitioners'
property and which is connected to a private road about five hundred (500) meters long. The
private road, in turn, leads to Ma. Elena Street which is about 2.5 meters wide and, finally, to
Visayas Avenue. This outlet was determined by the court a quo to be sufficient for the needs of
the dominants estate, hence petitioners have no cause to complain that they have no adequate
outlet to Visayas Avenue.

Further, no evidence was adduced by petitioners to prove that the easement they seek to
impose on private respondents' property is to be established at a point least prejudicial to the
servient estate. For emphasis, Lot 1 is only 164 square meters and an improvident imposition of
the easement on the lot may unjustly deprive private respondents of the optimum use and
enjoyment of their property, considering that its already small area will be reduced further by the
easement. Worse, it may even render the property useless for the purpose for which private
respondents purchased the same.

It must also be stressed that, by its very nature, and when considered with reference to the
obligations imposed on the servient estate, an easement involves an abnormal restriction on the
property rights of the servient owner and is regarded as a charge or encumbrance on the
servient estate. Thus, it is incumbent upon the owner of the dominant estate to establish by
clear and convincing evidence the presence of all the preconditions before his claim for
easement of right of way be granted. Petitioners miserably failed in this regard.

Sta. Maria v. CA
285 SCRA 163

DOCTRINE: The requirements for an estate to be entitled to a compulsory servitude of right of

way under the Civil Code are the ff.:

1. The dominant estate is surrounded by other immovables and has no adequate outlet to
a public highway;
2. There is payment of proper indemnity;
3. The isolation is not due to the acts of the proprietor of the dominant estate; and
4. The right of way claimed is at the point least prejudicial to the servient estate; and
insofar as consistent with this rule, where the distance from the dominant estate to a
public highway may be the shortest .

FACTS:
Respondent spouses Arsenio and Roslynn Fajardo are the registered owners of a piece of land
(Lot 124), containing an area of 1,043 sq. m in Obando Bulacan. They acquired said lot under a
Deed of Absolute Sale executed by the vendors Pedro M. Sanchez, et al.

Lot 124 is surrounded by Lot 1, a fishpond, on the northeast; by Lot 126, owned by Florentino
Cruz on the southeast; by Lot 6-A and a portion of Lot 6-B owned respectively by Sps Sta. Mr
and Florcerfida Sta. Maria (petitioners); on the southwest,; and by Lot 122 owned by the Jacinto
family on the northwest.

The respondents filed a complaint against the defendants for the establishment of an easement
of right of way, alleging that 1) Lot 124 is surrounded by properties belonging to other persons,
2) since they have no adequate outlet to the provincial road, an easement of a right of way
passing through either of the alternative petitioners’ properties which are directly abutting the
provincial road would be plaintiffs’ only convenient, direct and shortest access to and from the
provincial road, 3) respondents’ predecessors-in-interest have been passing through the
properties of petitioners in going to and from their lot, 4) petitioners’ mother even promised
respondents’ predecessors-in-interest to grant the latter an easement of right of way as she
acknowledged the absence of an access from their property to the road, and 5) despite
respondents’ request for a right of way and referral of the dispute to the barangay officials, the
petitioners refused to grant them an easement.

ISSUE:
Whether or not a compulsory right of way can be granted to the respondents who have two
other existing passageways other than that of petitioners’ and an alternative vacant lot fronting
the provincial road also adjacent to plaintiff’s property, which can be used in going to and from
respondents’ property?

HELD:
The Court held in the affirmative. The following are the requirements for an estate to be entitled
to a compulsory servitude of right of way under the Civil Code, to wit:
1. The dominant estate is surrounded by other immovables and has no adequate outlet to
a public highway (Art. 649, par. 1);
2. There is payment of proper indemnity (Art. 649, par. 1);
 3. The isolation is not due to the acts of the proprietor of the dominant estate (Art. 649, last
par.); and
4. The right of way claimed is at the point least prejudicial to the servient estate; and
insofar as consistent with this rule, where the distance from the dominant estate to a
public highway may be the shortest (Art. 650).

Anent the first requisite, there is no dispute that the respondents’ property is surrounded by
other immovables owned by different individuals and that the property is without adequate outlet
to a public highway.

The second requisite is also present since, as established through testimony, respondents are
willing to pay the corresponding damages provided for by law if granted the right of way.

As for the third requisite, the isolation of their lot is not due to plaintiffs’ acts. The property they
purchased was already surrounded by other immovables leaving them no adequate ingress or
egress to a public highway.

Lastly, as to the fourth requisite of “least prejudice” and “shortest distance,” the Court agreed
with the lower court that this twin elements have been complied with in establishing the
easement of right of way on defendants-appellants’ properties. Among the 3 possible servient
estates, it is clear that petitioners’ property would afford the shortest distance from defendants’
property to the provincial road. Moreover, it is the least prejudicial since as found by the lower
court, “it appears that there would be no significant structures to be injured in the defendants’
property and the right-of-way to be constructed thereon would be the shortest of all the
alternative routes pointed to by the defendants”

Dichoso v Marcos Digest

G.R. No. 180282, April 11, 2011
Nachura, J.:

Facts:
1. This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to
reverse and set aside the CA decision and resolution which reversed and set aside the RTC
decision on the civil case. The resolution denied the MR filed by the petitioners .

2. In 2002, petitioners filed a Complaint for Easement of Right of Way against the respondent
Patrocinio L. Marcos and alleged therein that they are the owners of Lot No. 21553; while
respondent is the owner another lot.

3. Since the petitioners had no access to a public road to and from their property, they
claimed to have used a portion of Lot No. 1 in accessing the road since 1970. Respondent,
however, blocked the passageway with piles of sand. Though petitioners have been granted
another passageway by Spouses Arce, the owners of another adjacent lot.

4. Hence the complaint before the RTC. Instead of filing an Answer, respondent filed a motion
to dismiss on the ground of lack of cause of action and noncompliance with the requisite
certificate of non-forum shopping.
5. The RTC denied respondent’s motion to dismiss.

6. Respondent denied that he allowed anybody to use Lot No. 1 as passageway and that
petitioners’ claim of right of way is only due to expediency and not necessity. He also
maintained that there is an existing easement of right of way available to petitioners granted by
the Spouses Arce. The RTC declared that respondent’s answer failed to tender an issue, and
opted to render judgment on the pleadings and thus deemed the case submitted for decision.

7. RTC rendered a decision in favor of the petitioners, granting a right of way over Lot 01
after finding that petitioners adequately established the requisites to justify an easement of
right of way in accordance with Articles 649 and 650 of the Civil Code.

8. On appeal, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC decision and dismissed petitioners’
complaint. It concluded that there is no need to establish an easement over respondent’s
property since the Arce spouses had already provided an access road which is adequate. It
emphasized that the convenience of the dominant estate is never the gauge for the grant of
compulsory right of way. Hence, this petition. Petitioners contend that respondent's lot is the
shortest route in going to and fro their property to a public street and where they used to pass.

ISSUE: W/N petitioners are entitled to a legal easement

NO. The petition is without merit. Petitioners failed to show sufficient factual evidence to
satisfy the enumerated requirements under Art. 650 (NCC).

1. By its very nature, an easement involves an abnormal restriction on the property rights of
the servient owner and is regarded as a charge or encumbrance on the servient estate. It is
incumbent upon the owner of the dominant estate to establish by clear and convincing
evidence the presence of all the preconditions before his claim for easement of right of way
may be granted.

2. Mere convenience for the dominant estate is not what is required by law as the basis of
setting up a compulsory easement. The convenience of the dominant estate has never been
the gauge for the grant of compulsory right of way. The true standard for the grant of the legal
right is "adequacy." In order to justify the imposition of an easement of right of way, there must
be real, not fictitious or artificial, necessity for it. As such, when there is already an existing
adequate outlet from the dominant estate to a public highway, as in this case, even when the
said outlet, for one reason or another, be inconvenient, the need to open up another servitude
is entirely unjustified.

3. Petitioners had already been granted a right of way through the other adjacent lot. There
is an existing outlet to and from the public road. Other lot owners use the said outlet in going to
and coming from the public highway.
Soriano Vs. Sternberg
Facts:
Oscar Sternberg owns a parcel of land with a two storey-house which was built in 1905.
The said house has windows overlooking the adjacent lot belonging to Soriano.
The windows were built on the wall of the house which has a 1.36 m. distance from the
dividing line between the two lots.
Thereafter, Soriano filed an action to compel Sternberg to close the windows because it is less
than 2 meters from the division line between the two lots and hence, a violation of Article 582
(now Article 670) of the Civil Code.
The law provides that "No windows or balconies or other similar projections which directly
overlook the adjoining property may be opened or built without leaving a distance of not less
than 2 meters between the wall in which they are built and such adjoining property.
Stenberg argues that the action of Soriano has already prescribed.
It must be noted that there is no annotation in the Torrens title of the parties involved. (No
easement of view in the title of Soriano and no right to easement on the title of Sternberg.)
Here, there is no question of easement.

Issue: WON a right of action to enforce Article 582 of the Civil code may be lost by failure to
prosecute within the prescriptive period fixed by the Code of Civil Procedure. YES

Held: Yes.

In this case, Sternberg has never prohibited Soriano from building any wall on his own land.
Soriano’s cause of action only arose in 1905 when Sternberg built the offending edifice
(building).

Nevertheless, the windows complained of were permitted to be open for thirteen years (1918)
without protest from Soriano. Soriano must, consequently, by reason of his own laches, be
considered to have waived any right which he may have had to compel the windows to be
closed.

It is our holding that plaintiff right of action under article 582 of the Civil Code accrued in 1905
when the windows in defendant's house were opened, and that, in accordance with Chapter III
of the Code of Civil Procedure, his action has prescribed.

The argument of Soriano that it was only in 1917, when he bought the land in question, that the
statute of limitations began to run, is not convincing, for the general rule is, that once the
statute begins to run, it never stops, and the transfer of the cause of action does not have the
effect of suspending its operation.

Art. 670. No windows, apertures, balconies, or other similar projections which afford a direct
view upon or towards an adjoining land or tenement can be made, without leaving a distance
of two meters between the wall in which they are made and such contiguous property. Neither
can side or oblique views upon or towards such conterminous property be had, unless there be
a distance of sixty centimeters. The nonobservance of these distances does not give rise to
prescription.

Hidalgo Enterprises v. Balandan

91 Phil. 488

DOCTRINE: Doctrine of Attractive Nuisance – One who maintains on his premises dangerous
instrumentalities or appliances of a character likely to attract children in play, and who fails to
exercise ordinary care to prevent children from playing therewith or resorting thereto, is liable to
a child of tender years who is injured thereby, even if the child is technically a trespasser in the
premises.

The attractive nuisance doctrine, generally, is not applicable to bodies of water, artificial as well
as natural, in the absence of some unusual condition or artificial feature other than the mere
water and its location.

FACTS: Petitioner Hidalgo Enterprises, Inc. was the owner of an ice-plant in San Pablo,
Laguna. Installed therein were two 9-feet-deep tanks full of water, with edges barely a foot high
from the surface of the ground. While the compound was fenced, the tanks themselves were
without any kind of fence or top cover. The plant had a wide gate entrance, usually left open for
motor vehicles, customers, and anyone else to pass and enter the premises. There was no
guard assigned on the gate. At about noon of April 16, 1948, plaintiff's son, Mario Balandan, an
8-year old boy, while playing with and in company of other boys of his age, entered the plant
through the gate to take a bath in one of said tanks. While bathing, Mario sank to the bottom of
the tank, only to be fished out later, already a cadaver, having died of "asphyxia secondary to
drowning."

Both the CFI of Laguna and the CA ruled in favor of Spouses Balandan. They both took the
view that the petitioner maintained an attractive nuisance (the tanks), and neglected to adopt
the necessary precautions to avoid accidents to persons entering its premises. It applied the
doctrine of attractive nuisance, of American origin, recognized in this jurisdiction in Taylor vs.
Manila Electric. The principle reason for the doctrine is that the condition or appliance in
question, although its danger is apparent to those of age, is so enticing or alluring to children of
tender years as to induce them to approach, get on or use it, and this attractiveness is an
implied invitation to such children.

ISSUE:
W/N a water tank is an instrumentality or appliance considered as an attractive nuisance. -- NO

HELD:
The great majority of American decisions say no. There are numerous cases in which the
attractive nuisance doctrine has not been held to be applicable to ponds or reservoirs, pools of
water, streams, canals, dams, ditches, culverts, drains, cesspools or sewer pools.
 The reason why a reservoir of water is not considered an attractive nuisance was lucidly
explained by the Indiana Appellate Court as follows:
“Nature has created streams, lakes and pools which attract children. Lurking in their waters is
always the danger of drowning. Against this danger children are early instructed so that they are
sufficiently presumed to know the danger; and if the owner of private property creates an
artificial pool on his own property, merely duplicating the work of nature without adding any new
danger… (he) is not liable because of having created an "attractive nuisance." Anderson vs.
Reith-Riley Const. Co.

Therefore, as petitioner's tanks are not classified as attractive nuisance, the question whether
the petitioner had taken reasonable precautions becomes immaterial. And the other issue
submitted by petitioner — that the parents of the boy were guilty of contributory negligence
precluding recovery, because they left for Manila on that unlucky day leaving their son under the
care of no responsible individual — needs no further discussion.