PRACTICE OF LAW

1 PRIETO VS CORPUZ- AC 6517, 12/6/2006

PURPOSE OF DISBARMENT/ SUSPENSION

2 ZAGUIRRE VS CASTILLO- AC 4921, 3/6/2003
3 CHAN VS PIZARRO- AC 5499, 8/16/2005

REQUIREMENTS OF DUE PROCESS

1 UYTENGSO III VS ATTY BADUEL-AC 5134, 12/4/2005

CONTINGENCY FEES
1 CORTEZ VS CORTES –AC 9119, 3/12/2018

SUPREME COURT JURISDICTION

1 TROVELA VS ROBLES- AC 11550, 6/4/18

BREACH OF CONFIDENTIALITY
1 GUANZON VS DOJILLO-AC 9850, 8/6/18
2 READY FORM INC. VS CASTILLON-AC 11774, 3/21/18
MARCOS V. PRIETO, A.C. No. 6517

Complainant,

Present:

PANGANIBAN, CJ

Chairperson,

YNARES-SANTIAGO,

- versus - AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,

CALLEJO, SR., and

CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ.

ATTY. OSCAR B. CORPUZ and

JUDGE FERDINAND A. FE,
Promulgated:
Respondents.

December 6, 2006

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

RESOLUTION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
 This is an administrative complaint filed by Atty. Marcos V. Prieto, against
respondent Judge Ferdinand A. Fe, both as a member of the bar and bench, and
respondent Atty. Oscar B. Corpuz as a member of the bar, for dishonesty, serious
misconduct prejudicial to the integrity and dignity of the Judiciary under Section
27, Rule 138 and Section 1, Rule 137 of the Revised Rules of Court relative to the
latters actuations in the handling of Civil Case No. 1081-BG entitled, Yolanda M.
Roque v. Atty. Marcos V. Prieto, et al. and Civil Case No. 1518-BG entitled,
Yolanda Marquez Roque v. Atty. Marcos V. Prieto, et al.

Complainant implies that not only did the respondent lawyer had free access
to the records of Civil Case No. 1081-BG through the help of respondent Judge, he
was also given the liberty to copy what perhaps would help him in his quest to win
the case.

Invoking the principle of res ipsa loquitor, complainant objects to the fact
that Civil Case No. 1518-BG was raffled to the respondent Judge, who was the
former counsel of the plaintiff therein in Civil Case No. 1081-BG. Another reason
for his objection is that, allegedly, some paragraphs in the complaint in Civil Case
No. 1518-BG were obviously copied from Civil Case No. 1081-BG wherein the
complaint was prepared by respondent Judge in his capacity as then lawyer of
herein complainant (plaintiff therein). Complainant claims that the foregoing
constitute misconduct which imply malice or wrongful intent, not just mere errors
of judgment. He insists that the fact that respondent Judge will try the case upon a
complaint in which the plaintiff was his former client and which complaint was
copied from the complaint he himself prepared does not speak well of his intention
as to the disposition of the case.
 Complainant maintains that the act of respondent Judge in allowing the
respondent lawyer to copy the complaint in Civil Case No. 1081-BG and to present
it to court as the latters work does violence to Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which provides that a judge should be the embodiment
of competence, integrity and independence. Complainant also asserts that in
placing his signature in the complaint not written by him, respondent lawyer
committed deceit, which serves as a ground for his disbarment.

In a Resolution dated 28 September 2005, the Second Division of this Court

referred the instant administrative case to Court of Appeals Justice Josefina G.
Salonga for investigation, report and recommendation within ninety (90) days from
receipt thereof.

Pursuant thereto, Justice Salonga set the case for hearing on 13 December
2005, and directed the complainant and the respondents, and their witnesses, if
any, to appear before her and to submit documents relevant to the complaint.

During the scheduled hearing, the complainant and the respondent Judge,
after the marking and offering of their respective documentary evidence,
manifested that they would not be adducing any further evidence. Upon their
motion, they were given a period of thirty (30) days within which to
simultaneously file their Memoranda, after which the case will be deemed
submitted for resolution.

On 13 December 2005, complainant filed his Memorandum. The respondent

judge, on the other hand, filed his Memorandum on 18 January 2006 while the
respondent lawyer filed his Memorandum on 20 January 2006.
In her report, Justice Salonga summarized the facts as follows:
In October 1992, Salud Andrada Marquez (Marquez) mortgaged six (6)
parcels of land to the Rural Bank of Luna, La Union, Inc., one of which is a parcel
of land with an area of Twenty Two Thousand Five Hundred Ninety Nine Square
Meters (22,599 sq. meters) located at Calumbaya, Bauang, La Union covered by
Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. FP-15344 under a Free Patent granted on
5 July 1989.

Failing to pay her debt, the bank foreclosed the mortgage. On 2 August
1993, the mortgaged properties were sold at public auction the highest bidder of
which was the petitioner. Consequently, OCT No. FP-15344 was cancelled and in
lieu thereof, Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-40223 was issued in the
name of the petitioner.

In the meantime, petitioner, through his attorneys-in-fact Antonio O.

Prieto and Monette O. Prieto, mortgaged the aforesaid properties to Far East Bank
and Trust Company.

Seeking the nullification of the mortgaged and the consequent transfer of

the mortgaged properties in the name of the petitioner, Roque, Marquez daughter,
filed a complaint docketed as Civil Case No. 1081-BG with the RTC Branch 67,
for Declaration of Nullity of Contracts with Damages against said petitioner, the
Rural Bank of Luna, La Union, Inc. and Far East Bank and Trust Company.
Respondent judge, then a practicing lawyer, was retained by Roque as her counsel
of record in said case and was the one who drafted said complaint.

On 18 August 2000, the RTC Branch 67, through then Presiding Judge
Jose G. Pineda, issued an order dismissing the case on the ground that Roque was
not a real party in interest since her right of action has still to ripen upon the death
of her mother.

On 8 November 2001, respondent judge was appointed as the presiding

judge of RTC Branch 67. By reason of his appointment, he completely severed all
his professional relationships with his clients, including Roque, and turned over or
relinquished all case records of his office to said clients.

Upon the demise of Marquez on 9 August 2002, Roque, who had now
acquired by way of succession her mothers right of action to pursue the
annulment of contracts executed over the property formerly covered by OCT No.
15344, engaged the legal services of respondent lawyer.

Thus, on 5 January 2004, respondent lawyer, as Roques counsel, filed a

complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Contracts, Reconveyance of Property, and
Damages against petitioner, his attorneys-in-fact Antonio O. Prieto and Monette
O. Prieto, the Rural Bank of Luna, La Union, Inc. and Far East Bank and Trust
Company, Inc., now merged with the Bank of the Philippine Islands, before the
Regional Trial Court of Bauang, La Union.

On 7 January 2004, the case, docketed as Civil Case No. 1518-BG, was
raffled to the respondent judge. On 8 January 2004, RTC Branch 67, through
Atty. Jeovannie C. Ordoo, its Branch Clerk of Court, issued summons to the
defendants. The summons and copy of the complaint was duly served upon the
petitioner on 20 January 2004.

Going over the individual case folders of the newly raffled cases to his
court, respondent judge came across Civil Case No. 1518-BG and discovered that
the plaintiff therein was Roque, his former client. Immediately, without going
over the allegations of the complaint, the respondent judge issued an Order dated
23 January 2004 inhibiting himself from the case and ordered that the record of
said case be transferred to the Regional Trial Court of Bauang, La Union, Branch
33 (RTC Branch 33).

On 27 January 2004, the Branch Clerk of Court of RTC Branch 67

transmitted the entire record of Civil Case No. 1518-BG to RTC Branch 33
through its Clerk of Court, Atty. Richard T. Domingo, which was duly received
by the latter.

On 30 January 2004, petitioner separately filed with the RTC Branch 67,
an Objection to Competency and his Answer to the Complaint. Since the records
thereof were already transmitted to RTC Branch 33, RTC Branch 67s Branch
Clerk of Court had said pleadings forwarded thereto. Since then, the proceedings
in Civil Case No. 1518-BG have been conducted by RTC Branch 33.

In an Order dated 22 April 2004, after the parties therein filed their
Answers and the issues having been joined, Presiding Judge Rose Mary R.
Molina-Alim of RTC Branch 33 set the case for pre-trial conference and ordered
the submission of the parties respective pre-trial briefs.

On 24 May 2004, petitioner filed with the RTC Branch 33 an Amended

Answer together with the Authority given by his co-defendants Antonio O. Prieto
and Monette O. Prieto, in his favor to appear for and in their behalf, and their Pre-
Trial Brief.

In a Resolution dated 28 September 2005, the Second Division of the

Supreme Court referred the instant administrative case to the undersigned for
investigation, report and recommendation within ninety (90) days from receipt
thereof. A copy of the said Resolution was received by the undersigned on 18
November 2005.

Pursuant thereto, in an Order promulgated on 21 November 2005, the

undersigned set the case for hearing on 13 December 2005 directing the petitioner
 and the respondents, and their witnesses, if any, to appear before her and to
submit documents relevant to the complaint.

During the scheduled hearing, the petitioner and the respondent judge,
after the marking and offering of their respective documentary evidence,
manifested that they will not be adducing any further evidence. Upon their
motion, they were given a period thirty (30) days within which to simultaneously
file their Memoranda, after which the case will be deemed submitted for
resolution.

On 13 December 2005, petitioner filed his Memorandum. The respondent

judge, on the other hand, filed his Memorandum on 18 January 2006 while the
respondent lawyer filed his Memorandum on 20 January 2006.

In her report, Justice Salonga recommended the dismissal of the complaint

against respondents, and that complainant be admonished for filing the frivolous
complaint.
A reading of the records of this case clearly shows that the present
administrative case is unfounded, as it is devoid of factual and legal basis.
Stripped of all its verbosity, petitioners allegations in support of his complaint
against the respondents should be treated for what they really are, mere
allegations founded on speculation and conjecture. In this connection, it must be
stressed that in administrative proceedings, the burden of proof that the
respondents committed the act complained of rests on the complainant. Failing in
this, the complaint must be dismissed.

First off, the allegation of the petitioner to the effect that the respondent
lawyer, through the intervention and assistance of the respondent judge, had free
access to the court records Civil Case No. 1081-BG fails to find evidentiary
support. Without more, petitioner deduced that the court records of Civil Case No.
1081-BG were made available to the respondent lawyer at the instance of the
respondent judge simply because relevant and substantial portions of the
complaint filed by the latter were re-written and adopted in Civil Case No. 1518-
BG. Bare and conclusory as it is, the said allegation deserves scant consideration.

Emphatically, the mere fact that respondent lawyer had adopted relevant
and substantial portions of the complaint filed by the respondent judge does not in
any way bespeak of any illegal or unethical practice on his part.

For one, the respondent lawyer could have easily read and gained access
to the case record of Civil Case No. 1081-BG. As can be gleaned from the
records, respondent judge had already turned over and relinquished his case
records of Civil Case No. 1081-BG to Roque after his appointment to the bench
on 8 November 2001. Since she intended to re-file the case against petitioner, it is
expected, if not necessary, for Roque to give the records of the previously
dismissed complaint to her newly retained counsel. What is more apparent is the
right of Roque and the respondent lawyer, as her retained counsel, to request
access to the court records for their reproduction or certification.

For another, a perusal of the complaints separately and successively filed

by the respondent judge and the respondent lawyer belies petitioners claim that
the latter merely copied, verbatim or otherwise, the original complaint. True,
some allegations contained therein were substantially retained by respondent
lawyer. However, these allegations are essential and crucial to the cause of action
of Roque against the petitioner. Aside from the fact that there is hardly a number
of ways to construct a sentence, petitioner cannot plausibly claim that respondent
lawyer is legally restrained from retaining or rewriting sentences earlier
constructed by the respondent judge.

More importantly, petitioners assertion that respondent judge allowed the

respondent lawyer to copy the complaint in Civil Case No. 1081-BG is
unfounded. Aside from the petitioners mere say so, there is not even an iota of
evidence to support this assertion. It is all too obvious that there is a dearth of
evidence that would in any way prove petitioners accusation against the
respondents.

In the same vein, petitioners inference that respondent judge intended to

try Civil Case No. 1518-BG is a blatant fabrication. The records of the case refute
this. Reading his petition, it is evident that petitioner cunningly attempted to
mislead this court to believe that respondent judge is still conducting the
proceedings in Civil Case No. 1518-BG and had refused to inhibit himself
therefrom. His intent to deceive this court to achieve his end to vex and harass the
respondents is undeniable.

As asserted by the respondent judge, petitioner cannot feign ignorance in

this regard. He is well aware that the respondent judge already issued an Order
dated 23 January 2004 inhibiting himself from the case and ordering the
transmission of the record of said case to the RTC Branch 33. In fact, petitioner
has been actively participating in the proceedings of said case before the RTC
Branch 33 prior to the institution of the instant administrative case as he had
already filed several pleadings therewith.

If truth be told, the allegations in the instant petition was ingeniously

written to deliberately and maliciously withhold and suppress the fact that the
respondent judge had already inhibited himself from taking cognizance of Civil
Case No. 1518-BG and that the records thereof had in fact been transmitted to
RTC Branch 33.
 All told, it cannot be gainsaid that the instant administrative case in itself
is frivolous, calculated merely to harass, annoy, and cast groundless suspicions on
the integrity and reputation of both the respondents. The only piece of evidence
that the petitioner has offered in support of his claim is his bare assertions, which
certainly deserves scant consideration. It must be emphasized that a mere charge
or allegation of wrongdoing does not suffice. Accusation is not synonymous with
guilt. There must always be sufficient evidence to support the charge. This brings
to the fore the application of the age-old but familiar rule that he who alleges must
prove his allegations.

Counter-Petition Against the Petitioner

Adopting the above-findings made in the petition against the respondents,

there is merit in the separate counter-petitions filed by the latter to hold the
petitioner administratively liable for filing an unfounded and frivolous suit.

As already stated, petitioners allegations in support of his complaint

against the respondents are baseless, as they are mere allegations founded on pure
speculation and conjecture. Sans evidence, his petition was purposely written to
mislead the Court and cast a doubt on the integrity and dignity of the respondents.
Petitioner made the said administrative case as a vehicle to unduly harass or
otherwise prejudice the respondents. Worse, in selfishly satisfying his own desire
to vex the respondents, he had tarnished the integrity of the entire judiciary and
the bar.

For this reason, the petitioner should be cited in contempt, as what the
Supreme Court had pronounced in the recent case of Galman Cruz vs. Alio-
Hormachuelos. Said the Court:

Verily, this Court is once again called upon to reiterate

that, although the Court will never tolerate or condone any act,
conduct or omission that would violate the norm of public
accountability or diminish the peoples faith in the judiciary,
neither will it hesitate to shield those under its employ from
unfounded suits that only serve to disrupt rather than promote the
orderly administration of justice.

The eloquent words of the late Justice Conrado V. Sanchez

in Rheem of the Philippines vs. Ferrer are enlightening:

By now, a lawyers duties to the Court have become

commonplace. Really, there could hardly be any valid excuse for
lapses in the observance thereof. Section 20(b), Rule 138 of the
Rules of Court, in categorical terms, spells out one such duty: To
observe and maintain the respect due to the courts of justice and
judicial officers. As explicit is the first canon of legal ethics which
 pronounces that it is the duty of the lawyer to maintain towards the
Court a respectful attitude, not for the sake of the temporary
incumbent of the judicial office, but for the maintenance of its
supreme importance. That same canon, as corollary, makes it
peculiarly incumbent upon lawyers to support the courts against
unjust criticism and clamor. And more, the attorneys oath solemnly
binds him to a conduct that should be with all good fidelityto the
courts. Worth remembering is that the duty of an attorney to the
courts can only be maintained by rendering no service involving
any disrespect to the judicial office which he is bound to uphold.

We concede that a lawyer may think highly of his

intellectual endowment. That is his privilege. And, he may suffer
frustration at what he feels is others lack of it. That is his
misfortune. Some such frame of mind, however, should not be
allowed to harden into a belief that he may attack a courts decision
in words calculated to jettison the time-honored aphorism that
courts are the temples of right. He should give due allowance to
the fact that judges are but men; and men are encompassed by
error, fettered by fallibility.

In Surigao Mineral Reservation Board vs. Cloribel, Justice

Sanchez further elucidated:

A lawyer is an officer of the courts; he is. like the court

itself, an instrument or agency to advance the ends of justice. His
duty is to uphold the dignity and authority of the courts to which he
owes fidelity, not to promote distrust in the administration of
justice. Faith in the courts a lawyer should seek to preserve. For,
to undermine the judicial edifice is disastrous to the continuity of
government and to the attainment of the liberties of the people.
Thus has it been said of a lawyer that as an officer of the court, it
is his sworn and moral duty to help build and not destroy
unnecessarily that high esteem and regard towards the courts so
essential to the proper administration of justice.

Petitioners unfounded imputations against respondents are malicious and

offend the dignity of the entire judiciary. Scandalous as his bare allegations are,
the fact that petitioner maliciously insinuated that the respondent judge allowed
access to and assisted the respondent lawyer in the filing of his complaint
desecrates and mocks the integrity of the judiciary. Equally insolent is petitioners
baseless postulations that the respondent judge refused to inhibit himself from
Civil Case No. 1518-BG purposely to give leverage to his former client and her
lawyer.
 Moreover, in filing a frivolous suit against his opposing counsel, petitioner
violated Canons 8 and 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which
mandates that all lawyers must conduct themselves with courtesy, fairness, and
candor towards their colleagues and should avoid harassing tactics against
opposing counsel and commands all lawyers to observe the rules of procedure
and shall not misuse them to defeat the ends of justice.

We have reviewed the records, and after careful consideration

thereof, we find the conclusions of fact and the recommendations of
the Investigator in the above-quoted report to be well-taken and fully
supported by the evidence on record, except for the penalty imposed
on complainant.

Atty. Marcos V. Prieto must be sanctioned for filing this unfounded

complaint. Although no person should be penalized for the exercise of the right to
litigate, however, this right must be exercised in good faith.1[1]

As officers of the court, lawyers have a responsibility to assist in the proper

administration of justice. They do not discharge this duty by filing frivolous
petitions that only add to the workload of the judiciary.

A lawyer is part of the machinery in the administration of justice. Like the

court itself, he is an instrument to advance its ends the speedy, efficient, impartial,
correct and inexpensive adjudication of cases and the prompt satisfaction of final
judgments. A lawyer should not only help attain these objectives but should
likewise avoid unethical or improper practices that impede, obstruct or prevent
their realization, charged as he is with the primary task of assisting in the speedy
and efficient administration of justice.2[2] Canon 123[3] of the Code of
Professional Responsibility promulgated on 21 June 1988 is very explicit that
lawyers must exert every effort and consider it their duty to assist in the speedy and
efficient administration of justice.

The practice of law is a sacred and noble profession. It is limited to persons

of good moral character with special qualifications duly ascertained and certified.
The right does not only presuppose in its possessor integrity, legal standing and
attainment, but also the exercise of a special privilege, highly personal and
partaking of the nature of a public trust.4[4] Thus, a lawyer should not use his
knowledge of law as an instrument to harass a party nor to misuse judicial
processes, as the same constitutes serious transgression of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.5[5] We cannot countenance complainants act of misleading this
Court into believing that respondent judge was still conducting the proceedings in
Civil Case No. 1518-BG. What is evident is that even complainant was well aware
of respondent judges inhibition therefrom. The respondent judge, in fact, issued an
Order dated 23 January 2004 inhibiting himself from the case.

In Retuya v. Gorduiz,6[6] respondent-lawyer was suspended for six (6)

months for filing a groundless suit against a former client in order to harass and
embarrass her. In the case of Arnaldo v. Suarin,7[7] complainant Atty. Arnaldo
was fined P5,000.00 for filing frivolous complaint. In this case, which we find
analogous to Arnaldo, we hold that a fine of P5,000.00 will suffice.

ACCORDINGLY, the above-quoted report of Justice Salonga is

APPROVED with modification as to the penalty imposed on complainant Atty.
Marcos V. Prieto. Respondents Judge Ferdinand A. Fe and Atty. Oscar B. Corpuz
are exonerated and the administrative complaint against them is DISMISSED.
Complainant Atty. Marcos V. Prieto is FINED P5,000.00 for filing frivolous suit
with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar act shall be
dealt with more severely.

EN BANC

[A.C. No. 4921. March 6, 2003]

CARMELITA I. ZAGUIRRE, complainant, vs. ATTY. ALFREDO CASTILLO,

respondent.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

Before this Court is a Petition for Disbarment filed by Carmelita I. Zaguirre against Atty.
Alfredo Castillo on the ground of Gross Immoral Conduct.

The facts as borne by the records are as follows:

Complainant and respondent met sometime in 1996 when the two became officemates at the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI).8[1] Respondent courted complainant and promised to
marry her while representing himself to be single.9[2] Soon they had an intimate relationship that
started sometime in 1996 and lasted until 1997.10[3] During their affair, respondent was preparing
for the bar examinations which he passed. On May 10, 1997, he was admitted as a member of the
Philippine Bar.11[4] It was only around the first week of May 1997 that complainant first learned
that respondent was already married when his wife went to her office and confronted her about
her relationship with respondent.12[5] On September 10, 1997, respondent, who by now is a
lawyer, executed an affidavit, admitting his relationship with the complainant and recognizing
the unborn child she was carrying as his.13[6] On December 09, 1997, complainant gave birth to a
baby girl, Aletha Jessa.14[7] By this time however, respondent had started to refuse recognizing
the child and giving her any form of support.15[8]

Respondent claims that: he never courted the complainant; what transpired between them was
nothing but mutual lust and desire; he never represented himself as single since it was known in
the NBI that he was already married and with children;16[9] complainant is almost 10 years older
than him and knew beforehand that he is already married;17[10] the child borne by complainant is
not his, because the complainant was seeing other men at the time they were having an
affair.18[11] He admits that he signed the affidavit dated September 10, 1997 but explains that he
only did so to save complainant from embarrassment. Also, he did not know at the time that
complainant was seeing other men.19[12]

After due hearing, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline found Atty. Alfredo Castillo guilty of
gross immoral conduct and recommends that he be meted the penalty of indefinite suspension
from the practice of law.

The Court agrees with the findings and recommendation of the IBP.

The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:

Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

xxx xxx xxx

CANON 7 - A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession,
and support the activities of the Integrated Bar.

xxx xxx xxx

Rule 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice
law, nor should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the
discredit of the legal profession.

Immoral conduct has been defined as:

xxx that conduct which is so willful, flagrant, or shameless as to show indifference to the opinion
of good and respectable members of the community. Furthermore, such conduct must not only be
immoral, but grossly immoral. That is, it must be so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act or so
unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree or committed under such scandalous or
revolting circumstances as to shock the common sense of decency.20[13]

In his affidavit dated September 10, 1997, duly acknowledged before a notary public, he
declared explicitly:

1. That I had a relationship with one Carmelita Zaguirre, my officemate;

2. That as a result of that relationship, she is presently pregnant with my child;

3. That I hereby voluntarily recognize the child now under (sic) her womb to be my own;

4. That I am willing to support the said child henceforth, including his/her personal and medical
needs, education, housing, food, clothing and other necessities for living, which I will give
through his/her mother, Carmelita Zaguirre, until he/she becomes of legal age and capable to live
on his/her own;

5. That I undertake to sign the birth certificate as an additional proof that he/she is my child;
however, my failure to sign does not negate the recognition and acknowledgement already done
herein;

6. That I am executing this affidavit without compulsion on my part and being a lawyer, I have
full knowledge of the consequence of such acknowledgment and recognition.21[14]

More incriminating is his handwritten letter dated March 12, 1998 which states in part:

Ayoko ng umabot tayo sa kung saan-saan pa. All your officemates, e.g., Ate Ging, Glo, Guy and
others (say) that I am the look like(sic) of your daughter.

Heres my bargain. I will help you in supporting your daughter, but I cannot promise fix amount
for monthly support of your daughter. However it shall not be less than P500 but not more than
P1,000.22[15]

In the recent case of Luguid vs. Judge Camano, Jr., the Court in castigating a judge stated that:
...even as an ordinary lawyer, respondent has to conform to the strict standard of conduct
demanded of members of the profession. Certainly, fathering children by a woman other than his
lawful wife fails to meet these standards.23[16]

Siring a child with a woman other than his wife is a conduct way below the standards of morality
required of every lawyer.24[17]

Moreover, the attempt of respondent to renege on his notarized statement recognizing and
undertaking to support his child by Carmelita demonstrates a certain unscrupulousness on his
part which is highly censurable, unbecoming a member of a noble profession, tantamount to self-
stultification.25[18]

This Court has repeatedly held:

as officers of the court, lawyers must not only in fact be of good moral character but must also be
seen to be of good moral character and leading lives in accordance with the highest moral
standards of the community. More specifically, a member of the Bar and officer of the court is
not only required to refrain from adulterous relationships or the keeping of mistresses but must
also so behave himself as to avoid scandalizing the public by creating the belief that he is
flouting those moral standards.26[19]

While respondent does not deny having an extra-marital affair with complainant he seeks
understanding from the Court, pointing out that men by nature are polygamous,27[20] and that
what happened between them was nothing but mutual lust and desire.28[21] The Court is not
convinced. In fact, it is appalled at the reprehensible, amoral attitude of the
respondent.Respondent claims that he did not use any deception to win her affection. Granting
arguendo that complainant entered into a relationship with him knowing full well his marital
status, still it does not absolve him of gross immorality for what is in question in a case like this
is respondents fitness to be a member of the legal profession. It is not dependent whether or not
the other party knowingly engaged in an immoral relationship with him.

We agree with the IBP that the defense of in pari delicto is not feasible. The Court held in Mortel
vs. Aspiras:

In a disbarment proceeding, it is immaterial that the complainant is in pari delicto because this is
not a proceeding to grant relief to the complainant, but one to purge the law profession of
unworthy members, to protect the public and the courts.29[22]

The illicit relationship with Carmelita took place while respondent was preparing to take the bar
examinations. Thus, it cannot be said that it is unknown to him that an applicant for admission to
membership in the bar must show that he is possessed of good moral character, a requirement
which is not dispensed with upon admission to membership of the bar.30[23] This qualification is
not only a condition precedent to admission to the legal profession, but its continued possession
is essential to maintain ones good standing in the profession;31[24] it is a continuing requirement
to the practice of law32[25] and therefore admission to the bar does not preclude a subsequent
judicial inquiry, upon proper complaint, into any question concerning his mental or moral fitness
before he became a lawyer. This is because his admission to practice merely creates a rebuttable
presumption that he has all the qualifications to become a lawyer.

The Court held:

The practice of law is not a right but a privilege bestowed by the State on those who show that
they possess, and continue to possess, the qualifications required by law for the conferment of
such privilege. We must stress that membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with
conditions. A lawyer has the privilege to practice law only during good behavior. He can be
deprived of his license for misconduct ascertained and declared by judgment of the court after
giving him the opportunity to be heard.33[26]

and in Dumadag vs. Lumaya:

The practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions. Adherence to the rigid standards of
mental fitness, maintenance of the highest degree of morality and faithful compliance with the
rules of the legal profession are the conditions required for remaining a member of good standing
of the bar and for enjoying the privilege to practice law.34[27]
Respondent repeatedly engaged in sexual congress with a woman not his wife and now refuses to
recognize and support a child whom he previously recognized and promised to support. Clearly
therefore, respondent violated the standards of morality required of the legal profession and
should be disciplined accordingly.

As consistently held by this Court, disbarment shall not be meted out if a lesser punishment
could be given.35[28] Records show that from the time he took his oath in 1997, he has severed his
ties with complainant and now lives with his wife and children in Mindoro. As of now, the Court
does not perceive this fact as an indication of respondents effort to mend his ways or that he
recognizes the impact of his offense on the noble profession of law. Nevertheless, the Court
deems it more appropriate under the circumstances that indefinite suspension should be meted
out than disbarment. The suspension shall last until such time that respondent is able to show, to
the full satisfaction of the Court, that he had instilled in himself a firm conviction of maintaining
moral integrity and uprightness required of every member of the profession.

The rule is settled that a lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for any misconduct, even if it
pertains to his private activities, as long as it shows him to be wanting in moral character,
honesty, probity or good demeanor.36[29]

ACCORDINGLY, in view of the foregoing, the Court finds respondent GUILTY of Gross
Immoral Conduct and ordered to suffer INDEFINITE SUSPENSION from the practice of law.

Let a copy of this Decision be attached to Atty. Castillos personal record in the Office of the Bar
Confidant and a copy thereof be furnished the IBP and all courts throughout the country.
THIRD DIVISION

[A.C. No. 5499. August 16, 2005]

WILSON PO CHAM, complainant, vs. ATTY. EDILBERTO D. PIZARRO, respondent.

DECISION

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

Before this Court is an administrative complaint for disbarment filed by Wilson Po Cham
(complainant) against Atty. Edilberto D. Pizarro (respondent) for commission of falsehood and
misrepresentations in violation of a lawyers oath.

Complainant gives the following account of the facts that spawned the filing of the present
administrative complaint.

Sometime in July 1995, Emelita Caete (Caete), Elenita Alipio (Alipio), and now deceased Mario
Navarro (Navarro) who was then the Municipal Assessor of Morong, Bataan, offered for sale to
him a parcel of land with an area of approximately forty (40) hectares, identified as Lot 1683 of
Cad. Case No. 262, situated at Sitio Gatao, Nagbalayong, Morong, Bataan (the property).

He having expressed interest in the offer, Caete and Navarro arranged a meeting between him
and respondent at the latters residence in Balanga, Bataan37[1] where respondent categorically
represented to him that the property being offered for sale was alienable and disposable.38[2]
Respondent in fact presented to him 1) Real Property Tax Order of Payment39[3] dated July 10,
1995 covering the property signed by Edna P. Pizarro as Municipal Treasurer and Navarro as
Municipal Assessor; 2) a Deed of Absolute Sale40[4] dated July 25, 1995 purportedly executed by
the alleged previous actual occupant of the property, one Jose R. Monzon (Monzon), transferring
all his rights, interest and possession thereover in favor of Virgilio Banzon (Banzon), Rolando B.
Zabala (Zabala) and respondent for an agreed consideration of P500,000.00; and 3) Special
Power of Attorney41[5] dated July 25, 1995 executed by Banzon and Zabala authorizing him
(respondent) to:

1. x x x offer to sell [their] rights over a certain parcel of land, which is more particularly
described as follows:

AREA: 40 has. more or less

situated at Pook Batangas, Nagbalayong, Morong, Bataan covered by Tax Declaration

No. 6066 PIN #108-08-044-05-126

2. x x x negotiate and enter into a contract for the consumation (sic) of sale of the subject
property; and to sign the same.

3. x x x receive proceeds thereof with obligation to distribute the corresponding share of

each co-owner;

x x x42[6] (Underscoring supplied)

On July 25, 1995, he as buyer and respondent as seller executed an Option to Buy,43[7] the
pertinent portions of which provide:
WHEREAS, the SELLER is the owner and Attorney-In-Fact of his co-owners of rights with
planted trees (improvements) containing an area of FORTY THREE (43) hectares, situated in
Pook Batangas, Nagbalayong, Morong, Bataan; (Portion of Lot 1683, Cad. 262, Morong
Cadastre), covered by Tax Declaration 6066.

WHEREAS, the BUYER is interested to buy the same for a total price of THREE MILLION
AND SEVEN HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P3,700,000.00) payable in two (2) gives (sic),
as follows:

a) Earnest money of P10,000.00 upon signing of this contract and the balance of full
payment within three (3) weeks from date hereof which offer the SELLER accepts;

NOW THEREFORE, for and in consideration of the foregoing premises and the terms and
conditions hereunder specified the parties have agreed on the following:

1) That the Buyer shall give an option money and earnest (sic) of P10,000.00 upon signing
of this contract, which shall form part of the contract price if and when the buyer comply (sic)
with his obligation to pay in full within three (3) weeks from date hereof, otherwise should the
BUYER fails (sic) to comply with his obligation to pay in full on the scheduled period the
P10,000.00 earnest money shall be forfeited in favor of the SELLER and the Option to Buy is
automatically cancelled.

2) That the SELLER upon full payment of the price shall execute a final Deed of Sale and
shall surrender all documents, plans and paper relative to the properties subject of sale;

3) That the SELLER shall warrants (sic) their rights and claims over the above stated
properties including the trees planted on it as against the rights of third party except that of the
government.44[8] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

In accordance with the terms of the Option to Buy, he paid respondent the amount of P10,000.00
for which respondent issued the corresponding Receipt45[9] reading:

Received the sum of TEN THOUSAND PESOS (P10,000.00) from MR. WILSON CHAM,
representing earnest/option money for Lot 1683 of Cad. Case No. 262 situated at Boundaries:

NORTH : Right of Catalino Agujo

SOUTH : National Road-Bagac-Morong
WEST : Right of Nicasio Canta
EAST : Sapang Batang Panao

including the trees and improvement situated thereon.

Full payment shall be paid within three (3) weeks from date hereof.46[10] (Underscoring supplied)

On August 21, 1995, respondent executed a Deed of Absolute Sale47[11] over the property in his
favor, the pertinent portions of which read as follows:

For and in consideration of the sum of THREE MILLION THREE HUNDRED SEVENTY
TWO THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED THIRTY THREE (P3,372,533.00), Philippine Currency,
the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged from the BUYER to the entire satisfaction of the
SELLERS, the said SELLERS do by these presents SELL, TRANSFER and CONVEY, in
manner absolute and irrevocable, in favor of the said BUYER, his heirs and assigns, all their
rights, interest and participation over that certain real estate destined for, and in actual use as
fruit land, situated at Pook Batangas, Nagbalayong, Morong, Bataan and more particularly
described as follows:

Location : Pook Batangas, Nagbalayong, Morong, Bataan

Area : That portion of Lot 1683, Cad. 262, Morong Cadastre, containing an area of 392,155
square meters more or less.

Boundaries : North : Right of Catalino Agujo

South : National Road, Bagac-Morong
West : Right of Nicasio Canta
East : Sapang Batang Panao

The SELLERS do hereby declare that the boundaries of the foregoing land are visible by means
of monuments, creeks and trees; that the land including the permanent improvements existing
thereon consist of fruit-bearing trees assessed for the current year at TWO HUNDRED SIXTY
TWO THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED P262,400.00 as per Tax Declaration No. 5010; and that
the property is presently in the possession of the SELLERS.

The SELLERS hereby agree with the BUYER that they are the absolute owners of the rights
over the said property; that they have the perfect right to convey the same; that they acquired
their rights over the said property by absolute deed of sale from Jose R. Monzon who acquired
his rights over the property from Marianito Holgado; that Marianito Holgado acquired his right
from Pedro de Leon who, in turn, acquired his right from Julian Agujo who was the original
owner who cleared the land and who was in possession of the same immediately after the Second
World War.

The SELLERS warrant their rights and claims over the aforedescribed real estate including the
trees planted thereon and they undertake to defend the same unto said Vendee, his heirs and
assigns against the claims of any third person whomsoever.48[12] (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)

Respondent thereafter furnished him with a copy of Tax Declaration No. 501049[13] with Property
Index No. 018-08-004-05-126 issued in his (respondents) name and his alleged co-owners, and
Real Property Tax Receipt No. 02520150[14] dated August 17, 1995 issued in his (respondents)
name.

He thus gave respondent two checks dated August 21, 1995 representing the purchase price of
the rights over the property, Asian Bank Corporation Check No. GA06321051[15] in the amount of
P168,627.00 payable to respondent, and Asian Bank Managers Check No. 004639GA52[16] in the
amount of P3,193,906.00 payable to respondent, Banzon and Zabala.

He subsequently took possession of the property and installed a barbed wire fence at its front
portion. Soon after, however, a forest guard approached him and informed him that the property
could not be fenced as it was part of the Bataan National Park.53[17]
Upon investigation, he discovered that the property is not an alienable or disposable land
susceptible of private ownership. He thus secured a Certification54[18] from the Community
Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENR) in Bagac, Bataan of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) dated July 2, 1998, signed by CENR Officer
Laurino D. Macadangdang, reading:

This pertains to your request for a certification as to the status of land claimed by spouses
Perfecto and Purificacion, Jose Monson, et. al, Virgilio Banzon and Edilberto Pizarro, all located
at Nagbalayong, Morong, Bataan.

Please be informed that per verification conducted by the personnel of this Office, said lands fall
within the Bataan Natural Park per L.C. Map/N.P. Map No. 34 as certified on December 1, 1945.
Under the Public Land Law, lands within this category are not subject for disposition.55[19]
(Underscoring supplied)

He also obtained a Letter-directive56[20] dated August 31, 1995 issued by Officer-in-Charge

Ricardo R. Alarcon of the Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Office (PENR) of
Balanga, Bataan to the Municipal Assessor, the pertinent portions of which read:

Please be informed that it comes to our attention that there are some forest occupants that are
securing land tax declarations from your office in (sic) the pretext that the area they
occupied (sic) were (sic) within alienable and disposable lands. Presently, this tax
declaration is being used in the illegal selling of right [of] possession within the Bataan
Natural Park which is prohibited under our laws.

xxx

In this regard, I would like to request for your assistance by way of informing us and in
controlling this land rush and massive selling and buying of rights of possession within
prohibited areas as stated above.57[21] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Upon his request, the PENR issued a Certification58[22] dated March 14, 1996 stating that those
named by respondent as prior owners of rights over the property from whom respondent and his
alleged co-owners acquired their alleged rights were not among those inventoried as occupants
per the PENRs 1978 to 1994 Forest Occupancy Census (IFO) Survey.

Despite repeated demands, respondent refused to return the purchase price of the rights over the
property.59[23]

In his present complaint60[24] dated September 10, 2001, complainant charges respondent to have
violated his oath as a member of the Bar in committing manifest falsehood and evident
misrepresentation by employing fraudulent means to lure him into buying rights over the
property which property he represented to be disposable and alienable.61[25]

In his Comment62[26] dated January 12, 2002, respondent denied having employed deceit or
having pretended to co-own rights over the property or having represented that it was alienable
and disposable. He claimed that complainant, being engaged in speculation in the purchase of
property, knew exactly the character and nature of the object of his purchase;63[27] and that
despite complainants awareness that he was merely buying rights to forest land, he just the same
voluntarily entered into the transaction because of the propertys proximity to the Subic Bay
Economic Zone.
Respondent surmised that complainant bought the rights over the property in the hope that lands
belonging to the public domain in Morong would be eventually declared alienable and
disposable to meet the rising demand for economic zones.64[28]

By Resolution65[29] of February 6, 2002, this Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation or decision within ninety (90)
days from notice.

On May 6, 2002, complainant filed before the IBP his Reply66[30] to respondents Comment,
maintaining that the sale of rights over the property was attended with deceit as respondent
deliberately did not disclose that the property was within the confines of the Bataan National
Park.67[31] And he denied being engaged in speculation, he claiming that with his purchase of the
property, he would venture into low-cost housing for the employees of the nearby Subic Bay
area.68[32]

To complainants Reply, respondent filed his Rejoinder on June 21, 2002.69[33]

Complainant later filed his Affidavit70[34] and Position Paper71[35] on June 21, 2002 and
September 17, 2001, respectively, reiterating his assertions in his previous pleadings.
The record shows that complainant filed a criminal complaint for estafa against respondent,
Banzon, Zabala, Caete, Alipio and Navarro in 199972[36] arising from the questioned sale of
rights. The complaint was twice dismissed by the City Prosecutor of Quezon City. On petition
for review, however, the Department of Justice, through then Secretary Hernando B. Perez, by
Resolution73[37] of March 6, 2002, reversed the dismissal of the complaint as it found probable
cause to indict respondent et al. in court. An information for estafa was thereupon filed against
respondent et al. before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, docketed as Criminal
Case No. Q-00-94232.

By Report and Recommendation of April 20, 2004, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline
(CBD), through Commissioner Lydia A. Navarro, finding respondent to have violated his oath as
a member of the Bar to do no falsehood and misrepresentations, recommended his suspension
from the practice of law for three (3) months, subject to the approval of the members of the
Board of Governors. Pertinent portions of the Report and Recommendation read:

. . . [I]t is evident that as early as of (sic) 1992, the Implementing Rules and Regulations of
NIPAS ACT74[38] prohibited the illegal selling of rights or possession of the areas occupied
within the Bataan Natural Park, the subject property not excluded as per letter of OIC CENRO
Laurino D. Mapadanig [illegible], Bagac, Bataan per L.C. map/N.P. Map No. 34 to the
Municipal Assessor therein and certified on December 1, 1945 that subject property which is
within this category was not subject for disposition; a fact supposed to be known by the
respondent being a resident of Balanga, Bataan and was in the practice of his profession also in
said area.

Aside from the fact that the alleged original owner Monzon was not among those inventoried
occupants as per Forest Occupancy (IFO) Survey since 1978 up to the latest census in 1994 from
whom respondent allegedly bought the subject property; the Absolute Deed of Sale executed
between the complainant Wilson Po Cham and the respondent relative to the same subject
property was not notarized which partook the nature of a private and not official document.
Although respondent furnished complainant the foregoing documents to prove their rights,
interest and possession to the subject property, respondent and his co-owners failed to show a
permit from the government conferring upon them rights or concessions over the subject
property, which formed part of the Bataan Natural Park classified as public and not subject to
disposition, therefore respondent and his co-owners have no rights and interests whatsoever over
the subject property and their representations to complainant were simply not true but a
falsehood.

Respondent being extensively conversant and knowledgeable about the law took advantage of
his versatility in the practice of law and committed misrepresentations that he and his co-owners
have irrevocable rights, interests and possession over the subject property which convinced
complainant into purchasing subject property unmindful that the same is not alienable or
disposable being a portion of the public domain; whereby respondent violated his solemn oath as
member of the Philippine Bar for having committed such falsehood and misrepresentations to the
complainant.75[39] (Underscoring supplied).

By CBD Resolution No. XVI-2004-407 of October 7, 2004, the IBP Board of Governors adopted
and approved the April 20, 2004 Committee Report and Recommendation.

The case was forwarded to this Court for final action pursuant to Rule 139-B of the Rules of
Court.76[40]

The IBP findings are well-taken.

The Bar is enjoined to maintain a high standard of not only legal proficiency but of honesty and
fair dealing.77[41] Thus, a member should refrain from doing any act which might lessen in any
degree the confidence and trust reposed by the public in the fidelity, honesty and integrity of the
legal profession.78[42]

The misconduct of a lawyer, whether in his professional or private capacity, which shows him to
be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity and good demeanor to thus render him unworthy
of the privileges which his license and the law confer upon him, may be sanctioned with
disbarment or suspension.79[43]

Thus, under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, a member of the Bar may be
disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney on the following grounds: 1) deceit; 2)
malpractice or other gross misconduct in office; 3) grossly immoral conduct; 4) conviction of a
crime involving moral turpitude; 5) violation of the lawyers oath; 6) willful disobedience to any
lawful order of a superior court; and 7) willfully appearing as an attorney for a party without
authority.

And he may be faulted under Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which
mandates a member of the Bar to obey the laws of the land and promote respect for the law. Rule
1.01 of the Code specifically enjoins him not to engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct. Conduct, as used in this rule, is not limited to conduct exhibited in connection
with the performance of professional duties.80[44]

In the case at bar, as reflected above, complainant presented certifications from the DENR that
the property is part of the public domain and not disposable as it is within the Bataan National
Park. Indeed, by virtue of Proclamation No. 2481[45] issued on December 1, 1945, all properties of
the public domain therein designated as part of the Bataan National Park were withdrawn from
sale, settlement or other disposition, subject to private rights.

On the other hand, respondent has utterly failed to substantiate his documented claim of having
irrevocable rights and interests over the property which he could have conveyed to complainant.
E.g., he could have presented any document issued by the government conferring upon him and
his alleged co-owners, or even upon his alleged predecessors-in-interest, with any such right or
interest, but he presented none. He merely presented a Deed of Absolute Sale purportedly
executed by a certain Jose R. Monzon in his, Banzons and Zabalas favor on July 25, 1995, a
month shy of the execution on August 21, 1995 of the Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of
complainant.

The tax declaration and receipt which respondent presented do not help his cause any as neither
tax receipts nor realty tax declarations are sufficient evidence of the right of possession over
realty unless supported by other effective proof.82[46] The presentation of a tax declaration must
indeed have been a pretext, as observed by the PENR in its earlier-quoted portion of its letter-
directive to the Balanga Municipal Assessor that the area occupied . . . [is] within alienable and
disposable land.

Respondent must thus be faulted for fraudulently inducing complainant to purchase, for
P3,372,533.00, non-existent irrevocable rights, interest and participation over an inalienable
property.

In Lizaso v. Amante83[47] where therein respondent lawyer enticed the therein complainant to
invest in the casino business with the proposition that her investment would yield her substantial
profit, but therein respondent not only failed to deliver the promised return on the investment but
also the principal thereof, this Court took occasion to expound on sanctioning lawyers for
committing fraud, deceit or falsehood in their private dealings:

It is true, of course, that there was no attorney-client relationship between respondent Amante
and complainant Cuyugan-Lizaso. The transaction that complainant entered into with respondent
did not require respondent to perform professional legal services for complainant nor did that
transaction relate to the rendition of professional services by respondent to any other person.

As early as 1923, however, the Court laid down in In Re Vicente Pelaez the principle that it can
exercise its power to discipline lawyers for causes which do not involve the relationship of an
attorney and client. x x x

x x x [A]s a general rule, a court will not assume jurisdiction to discipline one of its officers for
misconduct alleged to have been committed in his private capacity. But this is a general rule
with many exceptions. The courts sometimes stress the point that the attorney has shown,
through misconduct outside of his professional dealings, a want of such professional honesty as
render him unworthy of public confidence, and an unfit and unsafe person to manage the legal
business of others. The reason why such a distinction can be drawn is because it is the court
which admits an attorney to the bar, and the court requires for such admission the possession of a
good moral character.

xxx

The rationale of the rule that misconduct, indicative of moral unfitness, whether relating to
professional or non-professional matters, justifies suspension or disbarment, was expressed by
Mr. Chief Justice Prentice in In Re Disbarment of Peck, with eloquence and restraint:
As important as it is that an attorney be competent to deal with the oftentimes intricate matters
which may be intrusted to him, it is infinitely more so that he be upright and trustworthy.
Unfortunately, it is not easy to limit membership in the profession to those who satisfy the
standard of test of fitness. But scant progress in that direction can be hoped for if, in the
determination of the qualification of professional fitness, non-professional dishonor and
dishonesty in whatsoever path of life is to be ignored. Professional honesty and honor are not to
be expected as the accompaniment of dishonesty and dishonor in other relations. x x x
misconduct, indicative of moral unfitness for the profession, whether it be professional or non-
professional, justifies dismission as well as exclusion from the bar.

The rule in this jurisdiction was stated by Mr. Justice Malcolm in Piatt v. Abordo x xx:

The courts are not curators of the morals of the bar. At the same time the profession is not
compelled to harbor all persons whatever their character, who are fortunate enough to keep out
of prison. As good character is an essential qualification for admission of an attorney to practice,
when the attorneys character is bad in such respects as to show that he is unsafe and unfit to be
entrusted with the powers of an attorney, the courts retain the power to discipline him.84[48]
(Italics in the original)

This Lizaso ruling was reiterated in Co v. Bernardino85[49] and Lao v. Medel.86[50]

To be sure, complainant is not entirely blameless. Had he exhibited a modicum of prudence

before entering into the transaction with respondent, he would have spared himself from
respondents sham.

It is jurisprudentially established though that in a disbarment proceeding, it is immaterial that the

complainant is not blameless or is in pari delicto as this is not a proceeding to grant relief to the
complainant, but one to purge the law profession of unworthy members to protect the public and
the courts.87[51]
The record does not disclose the status of the estafa case against respondent. His conviction or
acquittal is not, however, essential insofar as the present administrative case against him is
concerned.88[52]

Administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class of their own. They are distinct from and
they may proceed independently of x x x criminal cases.

The burden of proof for these types of cases differ. In a criminal case, proof beyond reasonable
doubt is necessary; in an administrative case for disbarment or suspension, clearly preponderant
evidence is all that is required. Thus, a criminal prosecution will not constitute a prejudicial
question even if the same facts and circumstances are attendant in the administrative
proceedings.

It should be emphasized that a finding of guilt in the criminal case will not necessarily result
in a finding of liability in the administrative case. Conversely, respondents acquittal does
not necessarily exculpate him administratively.89[53] (Emphasis supplied)

It is not thus sound judicial policy to await the final resolution of a criminal case before a
complaint against a lawyer may be acted upon; otherwise, this Court will be rendered helpless
from vigorously applying the rules on admission to and continuing membership in the legal
profession during the whole period that the criminal case is pending final disposition when the
objectives of the two proceedings are vastly disparate.90[54]

While the facts and circumstances of the case do not warrant the imposition of so severe a
penalty as disbarment, the inherent power of this Court to discipline an errant member of the Bar
must, nonetheless, be exercised as it cannot be denied that respondent violated his solemn oath as
a lawyer not to engage in unlawful, dishonest or deceitful conduct.91[55]

The penalty of suspension for three (3) months recommended by the IBP is not, however,
commensurate to the gravity of the wrong committed by respondent. This Court finds that
respondents suspension from the practice of law for One (1) Year is warranted.
WHEREFORE, respondent, Atty. Edilberto D. Pizarro, is SUSPENDED from the practice of
law for One (1) Year and STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar offense
will merit a more severe penalty.

Let copies of this Decision be entered in the personal record of respondent as a member of the
Bar and furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and the
Court Administrator for circulation to all courts of the country.

SECOND DIVISION
TIRSO UYTENGSU III, ADM. CASE No. 5134

Complainant,

Present:

PUNO, J.,

Chairman,

- versus - AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,

CALLEJO, SR.,

TINGA, and

CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ.

ATTY. JOSEPH M. BADUEL,

Respondent.

Promulgated:
December 14, 2005

x-------------------------------------------------------------------x

RESOLUTION
TINGA, J.:

A sworn letter-complaint[1] dated 1 July 1999[2] was filed by Tirso Uytengsu III (complainant)

against Atty. Joseph M. Baduel (respondent) for violation of Rule 1.01[3] of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.

Complainant is one of the heirs of Tirso Uytengsu, Jr. He and his co-heirs had a pending patent
application. He alleges that sometime in December 1998 respondent requested him to sign a special
power of attorney (SPA) authorizing Luis Wee (Wee) and/or Thomas Jacobo (Jacobo) to claim, demand,
acknowledge and receive on his behalf the certificates of title from the Register of Deeds, General
Santos City, Department of Environment and Natural Resources and from any government office or
agency due to complainant and his co-heirs by reason of their application for Homestead Patent II.A. No.
37 142 (E 37 124) over Lot 924-A Cad. II-013120-D with an area of 5.3876 hectares and II.A. No. 116303
over Lot No. 924-B Cad. II-013120-D with an area of 5,1526 hectares, both situated in Lagao, General
Santos City.

Complainant refused to sign the SPA as he wanted to obtain the documents personally.
Subsequently though, before he could get the title and other documents, complainant learned that
respondent caused to have the SPA signed by Connie U. Kokseng (Kokseng), the former guardian of the
heirs of Tirso Uytengsu, Jr. Complainant maintains that the document signed by Kokseng was the same
SPA which was presented to him for signature by respondent in December 1998. As a result, the titles
and other documents were received and taken by other persons without his or his co-heirs knowledge
and consent.
 Complainant contends that the said SPA was prepared and notarized by the law office of
respondent and the latter stood as a witness to the public instrument. Complainant further avers that
respondent used to do some legal work for him and knew fully well that Kokseng has already ceased to
be his and his co-heirs guardian when the Regional Trial Court, Branch 19 of Cebu City terminated the
letters of guardianship over her youngest sibling on 30 August 1985 in the case entitled In the Matter of
Guardianship of Tirso M. Uytengsu III, Kathleen Anne M. Uytengsu, and Barbara Anne M. Uytengsu,
docketed as SP Proc. No. 3039-R.

In essence, complainant asserts that respondent caused Kokseng to execute an SPA in favor of
Wee and/or Jacobo to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of Tirso Uytengsu, Jr. even if he knew that
Kokseng had no authority to do so.

Respondent in his comment,[4] argues that the allegations of complainant are purely hearsay.
He stresses that complaint was instituted to harass him because he was the counsel of an opposing
litigant against complainants corporation in an ejectment case entitled General Milling Corporation v.
Cebu Autometic Motors, Inc. and Tirso Uytengsu III.

On 9 August 2000, this Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for

investigation, report and recommendation.[5]

Notices of hearing were sent to both parties between 11 January 2001 and 8 May 2001.
However, no actual hearings were conducted then due to the unavailability of either or both parties.
Finally, on 26 June 2001, both parties appeared before the investigating commissioner. They were then
directed to file their position papers and their respective replies thereto.

Investigating Commissioner Tyrone Cimafranca submitted his Report and Recommendation

dated 2 April 2002, recommending the dismissal of the case. The Commissioner characterized the
evidence against respondent as hearsay. Moreover, the Commissioner concluded that Kokseng had legal
basis to execute the SPA in favor of a substitute, the records showing that complainant and his co-heirs
have constituted Kokseng as their attorney-in-fact for the purpose of filing the homestead

application.[6]
 Thereafter, the IBP submitted their resolution dated 29 June 2002 approving and adopting the
report and recommendation of the investigating commissioner, dismissing the complaint against

respondent.[7] Complainant filed his motion for reconsideration[8] but was denied by the IBP in its
resolution dated 19 October 2002 on the ground that the IBP no longer had jurisdiction to consider and

resolve a matter already endorsed to this Court.[9] This notwithstanding, the Court remanded[10] the
administrative case for immediate resolution of the motion for reconsideration on the merits to the IBP

in the Courts resolution dated 20 January 2003.[11]

On 27 February 2004, the IBP filed its resolution adopting and approving the investigating

commissioners report and recommendation denying complainants motion for reconsideration.[12]

Subsequently, on 1 July 2004,[13] complainant filed a petition for review on certiorari[14]

assailing the resolution of the IBP dated 27 February 2004.

In his petition for review, complainant questions the findings of the IBP that complainants
allegations were based on hearsay and in finding that Kokseng had the authority to execute the special
power of attorney in favor of Wee and/or Jacobo.

We dismiss the complaint.

At the outset, the Court finds that herein respondent was in fact the counsel in the homestead

patent application of the heirs of Tirso Uytengsu, Jr. This can be deduced from the letters[15] dated 9
October 1991 and 15 January 1993, addressed to respondent by Victoria Villasor-Inong (Villasor-Inong),
Accounts Liquidation Officer III of the Board of Liquidators of General Santos City.

In said letters, Villasor-Inong communicated to respondent the requirements for the grant of the
homestead patent to herein complainant and his co-heirs. From the tenor of the letters, it would seem
that respondent actively participated in representing complainant and his co-heirs in their patent
application for the subject land. Apparently, he stood as counsel for the heirs of Tirso Uytengsu, Jr.
 With that ostensible representation and without any evidence to show that complainant or his
co-heirs withdrew such authority from respondent, the latter himself can even claim the certificates of
titles and other documents with regard to the homestead patents.

It should be remembered that the first letter of Villasor-Inong addressed to respondent was on

9 October 1991.[16] The addressees of the said letter were The Heirs of Tirso Uytengsu, Jr., Rep. by
Connie Uytengsu Kokseng, c/o Atty. Joseph Baduel.

Complainant also presented a letter[17] dated 23 September 1992 addressed to Villasor-Inong

by the general manager of the Board of Liquidators, directing the former to personally contact the heirs
of Tirso Uytengsu, Jr. to ascertain who among the persons giving conflicting directives as to the course of
the patent application is the true authorized representative of the heirs of Tirso Uytengsu, Jr.

After four (4) months, respondent received from Villasor Inong another letter,[18] dated 15
January 1993, also attached to complainants position paper and petition for review, furnishing
respondent the requirements needed for the homestead patent application of complainant and his co-
heirs.

Complainant himself submitted all the aforementioned letters clearly showing that respondent was
indeed the counsel or representative of complainant in the application for patent.

The relation of attorney and client is in many respects one of agency and the general rules of

ordinary agency apply to such relation.[19] The extent of authority of a lawyer, when acting on behalf
of his client outside of court, is measured by the same test as that which is applied to an ordinary

agent.[20]

Such being the case, even respondent himself can acquire the certificates of title and other
documents without need of an SPA from complainant and his co-heirs.

In addition, the Court agrees with the investigating commissioner that the allegations of
complainant constitutes mere hearsay evidence and may not be admissible in any proceeding.
 In Marcelo v. Javier,[21] it was held that:

In all cases the determination whether an attorney should be disbarred or

merely suspended for a period involves the exercise of a sound judicial discretion,
mindful always of the fact that disbarment is the most severe form of disciplinary action
and should be resorted to only in cases where the lawyer demonstrates an attitude or
course of conduct wholly inconsistent with approved professional standards. In cases of
lighter offenses or of first delinquency, an order of suspension, which is correctional in
nature, should be inflicted. In view of the nature and consequences of a disciplinary
proceedings, observance of due process, as in other judicial determination, is imperative
along with presumption of innocence in favor of the lawyer. Consequently, the burden
of proof is on the complainant to overcome such presumption and establish his charges
by clear preponderance of evidence.[22]

Procedural due process demands that respondent lawyer should be given an opportunity to
cross-examine the witnesses against him. He enjoys the legal presumption that he is innocent of the
charges against him until the contrary is proved. The case must be established by clear, convincing and

satisfactory proof.[23]

In the case at bar, other than the bare assertions of complainant, the evidence presented by the
latter does not suffice to tip the scale of justice to his side.

It should be stressed that in administrative proceedings, complainant has the burden of proving
the allegations in the complaint. We cannot depend on mere conjectures and speculations. There must

be substantial evidence to support respondents guilt.[24]

Complainant averred that: (1) the SPA which the respondent asked him to sign was the same
document that Kokseng executed; (2) the document was notarized by a notary public from the office of
the respondent; and (3) the respondent was a witness in the SPA.

As correctly observed by the investigating commissioner, all the aforementioned charges are not
based on his personal knowledge of the acts complained of but acquired from other sources.

Complainant charges that respondent committed an act meriting disbarment

when the latter caused to have a special power of attorney, which the former reused to
sign earlier, executed by Mrs. Connie Kokseng, former guardian of complainant and his
co-heirs, authorizing certain individuals to secure the release from the Register of Deeds
 and other government offices in General Santos City, titles and other documents
pertaining to complainants and his co-heirs homestead application. However, this
charge is not based on his own personal knowledge of the acts complained of but
acquired from another source. In other words, what he offered in evidence to prove his
charge is a second-hand version. Complainant identified his source but failed to present
any sworn statement or affidavit of said witness. In other words, what he presented in
evidence to prove his charge is hearsay.[25]

The hearsay rule provides that no assertion offered as testimony can be received unless it is or
has been open to test by cross-examination or an opportunity for cross-examination, except as provided
otherwise by the rules on evidence, by rules of court, or by statute. The chief reasons for the rule are
that out-of-court statements amounting to hearsay are not made under oath and are not subject to

cross-examination.[26]

He did not submit to this Court or to the IBP any witness or documentary evidence to support
his claim that respondent has indeed caused the execution of the disputed special power of attorney.

Furthermore, complainant in his reply[27] to respondents comment stated that he has a credible
witness in the person of Edward U. Kokseng, son of Kokseng, who has first hand knowledge of Koksengs
signing of the SPA. However, he failed to present his witness before the IBP or submitted an affidavit of
his witness to affirm his allegations. Neither did he present any witness, whether expert nor otherwise,
to attest to the genuiness of the signature of respondent which was allegedly found in the SPA, if that
was his objective.

This is not to say that complainant was not given any advice by the Court to make the proper
attachment to pleadings. As early as 21 July 1999, Atty. Erlinda C. Versoza, the then Deputy Clerk of
Court and Bar Confidant, sent word to complainant through a letter that

complainants letter-complaint must be verified and the supporting documents duly authenticated.[28]
 As a basic rule in evidence, the burden of proof lies on the party who makes the allegationsei
incumbit probatio, qui decit, non qui negat; cum per rerum naturam factum negantis probatio nulla

sit.[29]

It is also worth noting that complainants claim that he suffered damage and prejudice due to the
alleged unauthorized procurement of the certificates of titles and other documents was not
substantiated by independent evidence. Complainants silence as to the extent of the alleged damage
and the lack of material evidence to show that his rights were impaired by the acts of respondent would
lead this Court to believe that complainant has suffered no or minimal injury, should there be any.

As held in Metropolitan Bank and Trust Co. v. Tan,[30] no right of action is given where no
injury is sustained. A wrongful violation of a legal right is not a sufficient element of a cause of action
unless it has resulted in an injury causing loss or damage. There must be therefore, both wrongful

violation and damages. The one without the other is not sufficient.[31]

Complainant made no statement on whether or not, at present, other persons who procured
the certificates of title and other documents are still in possession of the same. He also has not stated
the direct injury that was produced by the acts of respondent.

With all the foregoing, the Court finds that complainant did not overcome the presumption of
innocence of respondent.

We need not dwell on the other factual issues of the case as it involves the presentation of
concrete evidence that, sadly, complainant was not able to offer.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant case against respondent is hereby DISMISSED for
lack of merit.

A.C. No. 9119

EUGENIO E. CORTEZ, Complaint

vs.
ATTY. HERNANDO P. CORTES, Respondent

DECISION
TIJAM, J.:

The instant controversy arose from a Complaint-Affidavit1 filed by complainant Eugenio E.

Cortez2 against respondent Atty. Hernando P. Cortes (Atty. Cortes) for grave misconduct, and
violation of the Lawyer's Oath and the Code for Professional Responsibility.

Complainant alleged that he engaged the services of Atty. Cortes as his counsel in an illegal
dismissal case against Philippine Explosives Corporation (PEC). He further alleged that he and
Atty. Cortes had a handshake agreement on a 12% contingency fee as and by way of attorney's
fees.3

Atty. Cortes prosecuted his claims for illegal dismissal which was decided in favor of
complainant. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the National Labor Relations
Commissions ordering PEC to pay complaint the total amount of One million One Hundred
Thousand Pesos (₱1, 100,000) m three staggered payments. PEC then issued City Bank Check
No. 1000003986 dated March 31, 2005 in the amount of Five Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos
(₱550,000), Check No. 1000003988 in the amount of Two Hundred Seventy-Five Thousand
Pesos (₱275,000) dated April 15, 2005, and Check No. 1000003989 also in the amount of Two
Hundred Seventy-Five Thousand Pesos (₱275,000) dated April 30, 2005, all payable in the name
of complainant.4

Complainant narrated that after the maturity of the first check, he went to China Bank, Southmall
Las Pinas with Atty. Cortes and his wife to open an account to deposit the said check. Atty.
Cortes asked complainant to wait outside the bank while he personally, for and in his behalf,
facilitated the opening of the account. After thirty minutes, he was asked to go inside and sign a
joint savings account with Atty. Cortes.5

On April 7, 2005, complainant alleged that when he was about to withdraw the amount of the
initial check deposited, Atty. Cortes arrived with his wife and ordered the bank teller to hold off
the transaction. When complainant asked why he did that, Atty. Cortes answered that 50% of the
total awarded claims belongs to him as attorney's fees. When complainant questioned him, Atty.
Cortes became hysterical and imposingly maintained that 50% of the total awarded claims
belongs to him.6

Complainant then tried to pacify Atty. Cortes and his wife and offered to pay ₱200,000, and
when Atty. Cortes rejected it, he offered the third check amounting to ₱275,000, but Atty. Cortes
still insisted on the 50% of the total award. Complainant was then forced to endorse the second
and third checks to Atty. Cortes, after which he was able to withdraw the proceeds of the first
check. With the help of the lawyers in the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), complainant
was able to have the drawer of the checks cancel one of the checks endorsed to Atty. Cortes
before he was able to encash the same.

Atty. Cortes, in his Answer, admitted that his services were engaged by complainant to pursue
the labor claims. He, however, denied that they agreed on a 12% contingency fee by way of
attorney's fees.7
Atty. Cortes claimed that complainant is a relative of his, but considering that the case was to be
filed in Pampanga and he resided in Las Piñas, he would only accept the case on a fifty-fifty
sharing arrangement.8

Atty. Cortes alleged that the checks were issued pursuant to the preexecution agreement reached
by the parties at the office of Labor Arbiter Herminio V. Suelo. He and complainant agreed that
the amount of the first check be divided fifty-fifty, the whole of the second check would be the
complainant's, and the third check would be his.9

Atty. Cortes further alleged that he had to assist complainant in the opening of an account to
deposit the checks. Atty. Cortes had to convince the bank manager to accept the checks issued in
the name of Eugene E. Cortez despite the fact that complainant's ID's are all in the name of
Eugenio E. Cortez.10 He claimed that anyone in his place would have demanded for the holding
off of the transaction because of the base ingratitude, patent deception and treachery of
complainant.11

Atty. Cortes posited that the check forms part and parcel of the judgment award to which he had
a lien corresponding to his attorney's fees and complainant should have at least invited him to
witness the "harvest of the fruits."12

Atty. Cortes insisted that the alleged 12% agreement is false, being merely a concoction of
Gomplainant’s fertile and unstable mind. He also pointed out that the fifty-fifty sharing
arrangement is not unconscionably high because the complainant was given the option to hire
other lawyers, but still he engaged his services.13

After hearing and submission of position papers, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, in a
Report and Recommendation dated April 11, 2007, recommended the six-month suspension of
Atty. Cortes. It ruled that a contingent fee arrangement should generally be in writing, and that
contingent fees depend upon an express contract without which the lawyer can only recover on
the basis of quantum meruit. It also pointed out that the Labor Code establishes a limit as to the
amount of attorney's fees that a lawyer may collect or charge his client in labor cases.

The report and recommendation was adopted and approved by the IBP Board of Governors in an
August 17, 2007 Resolution:

R E S O L U T I O N NO. XVIII-2007-74

CBD Case No. 05-1482

Eugenio E. Cortez vs.

Atty. Hernando P. Cortes

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED the Report
and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made
part of this Resolution as Annex "A"; and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the
evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and for violation of A1iicle 11 (b) of the
Labor Code, Atty. Hernando P. Cortes is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six
(6) months and Ordered to Return to complainant whatever amount he received in excess of the
10% allowable attorney's fees in labor case (sic).

TOMAS N. PRADO
National Secretary14

A motion for reconsideration15 was filed by Atty. Cortes, which was denied by the IBP Board of
Governors.16

The issue, plainly, is whether or not the acts complained of constitute misconduct on the part of
Atty. Cortes, which would subject him to disciplinary action.

We rule in the affirmative.

We have held that a contingent fee arrangement is valid in this jurisdiction. It is generally
recognized as valid and binding, but must be laid down in, an express contract.17 The case of
Rayos v. Atty. Hernandez18 discussed the same succinctly, thus:

A contingent fee arrangement is valid in this jurisdiction and is generally recognized as

valid and binding but must be laid down in an express contract. The amount of contingent
fee agreed upon by the parties is subject to the stipulation that counsel will be paid for his legal
services only if the suit or litigation prospers. A much higher compensation is allowed as
contingent fee in consideration of the risk that the lawyer may get nothing if the suit fails.
Contracts of this nature are permitted because they redound to the benefit of the poor client and
the lawyer especially in cases where the client has meritorious cause of action, but no means
with which to pay for legal services unless he can, with the sanction of law, make a contract for a
contingent fee to be paid out of the proceeds of the litigation. Oftentimes, the contingent fee
arrangement is the only means by which the poor and helpless can seek redress for injuries
sustained and have their rights vindicated.19 (Emphasis Ours)

In this case, We note that the parties did not have an express contract as regards the payment of
fees. Complainant alleges that the contingency fee was fixed at 12% via a handshake agreement,
while Atty. Cortes counters that the agreement was 50%.

The IBP Commission on Discipline pointed out that since what respondent handled was merely a
labor case, his attorney's foes should not exceed 10%, the rate allowed under Article 11120 of
the Labor Code.

Although we agree that the 50% contingency fee was excessive, We do not agree that the 10%
limitation as provided in Article 111 is automatically applicable.

The case of Masmud v. NLRC (First Division), et al., 21 discussed the matter of application of
Article 111 of the Labor Code on attorney's fees:
There are two concepts of attorney's fees. In the ordinary sense, attorney's fees represent the
reasonable compensation paid to a lawyer by his client for the legal services rendered to the
latter. On the other hand, in its extraordinary concept, attorney's fees may be awarded by
the court as indemnity for damages to be paid by the losing party to the prevailing party,
such that, in any of the cases provided by law where such award can be made, e.g., those
authorized in Article 2208 of the Civil Code, the amount is payable not to the lawyer but to the
client, unless they have agreed that the award shall pertain to the lawyer as additional
compensation or as part thereof.

xxxx

Contrary to Evangelina’s proposition, Article 111 of the Labor Code deals with the
extraordinary concept of attorneys fees.1âwphi1 It regulates the amount recoverable as
attorney's fees in the nature of damages sustained by and awarded to the prevailing party.
It may not be used as the standard in fixing the amount payable to the lawyer by his client
for the legal services he rendered.22 (Emphasis Ours)

It would then appear that the contingency fees that Atty. Cortes required is in the ordinary sense
as it represents reasonable compensation for legal services he rendered for complainant.
Necessarily, the 10% limitation of the Labor Code would not be applicable. Beyond the limit
fixed by Article 111, such as between the lawyer and the client, the attorney's fees may exceed
10% on the basis of quantum meriut.23 We, however, are hard-pressed to accept the justification
of the 50% contingency fee that Atty. Cortes is insisting on for being exorbitant.

Generally, the amount of attorney's fees due is that stipulated in the retainer Agreement which is
conclusive as to the amount of the lawyers compensation.1âwphi1 In the absence thereof, the
amount of attorney's fees is fixed on the basis of quantum meruit, i.e., the reasonable worth of
the attorneys services.24 Courts may ascertain also if the attorney's fees are found to be
excessive, what is reasonable under the circumstances. In no case, however, must a lawyer be
allowed to recover more than what is reasonable, pursuant to Section 24, Rule 13825 of the
Rules of Court.26

Canon 20 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states that "A lawyer shall charge only fair
and reasonable fees." Rule 20.01 of the same canon enumerates the following factors which
should guide a lawyer in determining his fees:

(a) The time spent and the extent of the services rendered or required;

(b) The novelty and difficulty of the questions involved;

(c) The importance of the subject matter;

(d) The skill demanded;

(e) The probability of losing other employment as a result of acceptance of the proffered case;
(f) The customary charges for similar services and the schedule of fees of the IBP Chapter to
which he belongs;

(g) The amount involved in the controversy and the benefits resulting to the client from the
service;

(h) The contingency or' certainty of compensation;

(i) The character of the employment, whether occasional or established; and

(j)The professional standing of the lawyer.

Here, as set out by Atty. Cortes himself, the complainant's case was merely grounded on
complainant's alleged absence without leave for the second time and challenging the plant
manager, the complainant's immediate superior, to a fist fight. He also claimed that the travel
from his home in Las Piñas City to San Fernando, Pampanga was costly and was an ordeal. We
likewise note that Atty. Cortes admitted that complainant was a close kin of his, and that
complainant appealed to his services because, since his separation from work, he had no visible
means of income and had so many mouths to feed. These circumstances cited by Atty. Cortes to
justify the fees; to Our mind, does not exculpate Atty. Cortes, but in fact, makes Us question all
the more, the reasonableness of it.

We believe and so hold that the contingent fee here claimed by Atty. Cortes was, under the facts
obtaining in this case, grossly excessive and unconscionable. The issues involved could hardly
be said to be novel and Atty. Cortes in fact already knew that complainant was already hard up.
We have held that lawyering is not a moneymaking venture and lawyers are not merchants.27
Law advocacy, it has been stressed, is not capital that yields profits.28 The returns it births are
simple rewards for a job done or service rendered. It is a calling that, unlike mercantile pursuits
which enjoy a greater deal of freedom from governmental interference, is impressed with a
public interest, for which it is subject to State regulation.29

Here, considering that complainant was amenable to a 12% contingency fee, and which we
likewise deem to be the reasonable worth of the attorney's services rendered by Atty. Cortes
under the circumstances, Atty. Cortes is hereby adjudged to return to complainant the amount he
received in excess of 12% of the total award. If the Law has to remain an honorable profession
and has to attain its basic ideal, those enrolled in its ranks should not only master its tenets and
principles but should also, by their lives, accord continuing fidelity to such tenets and
principles.30

We, however, find that the recommended suspension of six months is too harsh and considering
that Atty. Cortes is nearing ninety years old and that there was no question that Atty. Cortes was
able to get a favorable outcome, a reduction of the suspension is proper. We then reduce and
sanction Atty. Cortes to a three-month suspension from the practice of law.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent Atty. Hernando P. Cortes is found GUILTY

of violation of Canon 20 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and is hereby SUSPENDED
from the practice of law for three (3) months, and is ordered to return to complainant Eugenio E.
Cortez the amount he received in excess of the 12% allowable attorney's fees.

A.C. No. 11550, June 04, 2018

MANUEL B. TROVELA, Complainant, v. MICHAEL B. ROBLES, ASSISTANT CITY

PROSECUTOR; EMMANUEL L. OBUNGEN, PROSECUTOR II; JACINTO G. ANG,
CITY PROSECUTOR; CLARO A. ARELLANO, PROSECUTOR GENERAL; AND
LEILA M. DE LIMA, FORMER SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
Respondents.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) has no jurisdiction to investigate government lawyers
charged with administrative offenses involving the performance of their official duties.

The Case

The complainant initiated this disbarment complaint against Pasig City Assistant Prosecutor
Michael B. Robles (Robles) of Pasig City for issuing a resolution dated September 29, 2011
recommending the dismissal of his complaint for estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of the
Revised Penal Code against Carlo L. Katigbak (Katigbak), Carlos Pedro C. Salonga (Salonga)
and Barbara B. Reyes (Reyes) for insufficiency of evidence; and against Prosecutor II Emmanuel
L. Obuñgen (Obuñgen) and City Prosecutor Jacinto G. Ang (Ang), both of Pasig City, for
approving the recommendation of dismissal.

The complainant also seeks the disbarment of former Prosecutor General Claro A. Arellano
(Arellano) and former Secretary of Justice Leila M. De Lima (De Lima) for allegedly incurring
inordinate delay in issuing their resolutions resolving his petition for review and motion for
reconsideration before the Department of Justice (DOJ).

Antecedents

On May 25, 2011, the complainant criminally charged Katigbak, Salonga and Reyes with estafa
under Article 315(1)(b) of the Revised Penal Code.

In his complaint-affidavit, the complainant stated that he became the Employee Relation Director
of Sky Cable on November 1, 2004; that he later on received a termination letter dated July 6,
2006 signed by Salonga informing him of his relief from work and of his compensation being
paid until the effective date of his termination; that his payslips for the periods from July 16,
2006 to July 31, 2006 and from August 1, 2006 to August 15, 2006 still reflected deductions of
his savings contributions to the Meralco Employees Savings and Loan Association (MESALA)
amounting to P2,520.00 per payday period; that withholding taxes of P4,509.45 and P4,235.70,
respectively, were also deducted from his compensation; that he discovered that such deductions
were not remitted to MESALA when he closed his account on September 6, 2006; and that Sky
Cable did not reimburse the amounts of his unremitted deductions despite demand.1

In his resolution dated September 29, 2011,2 Robles recommended the dismissal of the complaint
for insufficiency of evidence.

Obuñgen and Ang approved the recommendation of dismissal on October 11, 2011.

The complainant filed his petition for review dated November 3, 2011 to appeal the dismissal of
his complaint.3

On February 12, 2013, Arellano issued his resolution finding no reversible error in the
September 29, 2011 resolution of Robles, hence, affirming the dismissal of the complaint.4

The complainant moved for reconsideration, but his motion was denied by Secretary De Lima on
April 21, 2015.5

Consequently, the complainant initiated disbarment proceedings against the respondents,

insisting thusly:

I.
THE PREMISES CONSIDERED BY THE OPCP IN NOT FINDING PROBABLE CAUSE IN
THE CASE ARE VERY MUCH CONTRARY TO LONG STANDING JURISPRUDENCE
HOLDING THAT DEMAND IS NOT A CONDITION PRECEDENT TO THE EXISTENCE
OF THE CRIME OF EMBEZZLEMENT WHICH MAY BE ESTABLISHED BY OTHER
PROOF AND THAT FAILURE TO ACCOUNT, UPON DEMAND, FOR FUNDS OR
PROPERTY HELD IN TRUST IS CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE OF
MISAPPROPRIATION.6

II.
BUT WHILE THE APPLICATION OF THESE RULINGS HAS BEEN CONSISTENTLY,
REPEATEDLY AND UNEQUIVOCABLY MADE IN MORE RECENT CASES, IN ACTING
ON MY 3 NOVEMBER 2011 PETITION FOR REVIEW AND ON MY 13 MARCH 2013
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION, RESPECTIVELY, RESPONDENTS ARELLANO
AND DE LIMA STILL SUSTAINED THE WRONG PRESUMPTIONS MADE BY THE
OPCP, ONE WAY OR THE OTHER.7

III.
TOGETHER WITH SUCH OMISSIONS, THE INORDINATE DELAYS ON THE PART OF
RESPONDENTS ARELLANO AND DE LIMA IN COMING OUT WITH THEIR
SEPARATE RESOLUTIONS THAT ARE MERELY ANCHORED ON THE GROSSLY
ERRONEOUS FINDINGS OF THE OPCP NEGATE THEIR ALLEGATIONS THAT THEY
ACTUALLY EXAMINED THE RECORDS OF THE CASE AND THE EVIDENCE THAT I
HAVE PRESENTED AND INDICATED THEIR LACK OF RESOLVE TO SEE THAT
JUSTICE IS DONE.8

IV.
WHILE THE PRESENCE OF THE PRIMA FACIE EVIDENCE OF CORRUPTION AND
OTHER ANOMALOUS CIRCUMSTANCES IN THE PERJURY AND UNJUST JUDGMENT
CASES, THE MANIPULATIVE SCHEMES EMPLOYED BY SKY CABLE IN CERTAIN
OF ITS PLEADINGS (sic) AND THE INORDINATE DELAYS IN ALL THE RELATED
CASES ARE VERY OBVIOUS, RESPONDENT DE LIMA, DESPITE BEING THE
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE THEN, TOTALLY IGNORED THE SAME.9

V.
ABOVE ALL, RESPONDENT DE LIMA TOOK ACTION ON THE ESTAFA CASE AHEAD
OF THE OTHER CASES WITHOUT CONSOLIDATING THEM DESPITE THE FACT
THAT ALL INDICATIONS CLEARLY POINT TO SUCH CONSOLIDATION.10

VI.
THAT SAID, IT IS QUITE OBVIOUS THAT ALL OF THE RESPONDENTS HAD NOT
ONLY RENEGED ON THEIR SWORN DUTY TO UPHOLD THE LAWS OF THE LAND,
BASICALLY AS LAWYERS AND AS PROSECUTORS OR DISPENSERS OF JUSTICE,
WHICH COMPROMISED THE EFFICIENT ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, BUT
THEY ALSO COMMITTED GROSS VIOLATIONS OF CERTAIN LAWS THEMSELVES.11

Should the respondents be administratively disciplined based on the allegations of the

complainant?

Ruling of the Court

We dismiss the administrative case against the respondents for lack of jurisdiction.

In his complaint-affidavit, the complainant has posited that Robles, Obuñgen and Ang committed
grave errors of facts and law that require an inquiry into their mental and moral fitness as
members of the Bar; and that Arellano and Secretary De Lima be declared guilty of dereliction of
duty or gross inexcusable negligence for belatedly resolving his petition for review and motion
for reconsideration. He specifically prays that the Court grants the following reliefs, namely:

xxxx

1. Finding prima facie cases against them for violation of Art. 208 of the RPC and R.A. No. 3019,
as amended, a.k.a. the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, and referring the matter to the
appropriate governmental agency for the prosecution thereof;

2. Imposing appropriate disciplinary action against them, including their disbarment and/or
removal from office, for gross violation of the canons of the legal profession or for
unprofessional conduct that casts serious doubt upon their mental and moral fitness as members
of the Bar and as prosecutors;

3. Awarding costs of suit hereof in such amounts as may be commensurate with the extent and
degree of misconduct committed by each of them and recommending that I be awarded
corresponding actual, as well as moral, exemplary and compensatory damages; and

4. Providing such other reliefs as this Honorable Court may deem just and equitable under the
premises.12

xxxx

The acts complained of undoubtedly arose from the respondents' performance or discharge of
official duties as prosecutors of the Department of Justice. Hence, the authority to discipline
respondents Robles, Obuñgen, Ang and Arellano exclusively pertained to their superior, the
Secretary of Justice. In the case of Secretary De Lima, the authority to discipline pertained to the
President. In either case, the authority may also pertain to the Office of the Ombudsman, which
similarly exercises disciplinary jurisdiction over them as public officials pursuant to Section 15,
paragraph 1, of Republic Act No. 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989). Indeed, the accountability of
respondents as officials performing or discharging their official duties as lawyers of the
Government is always to be differentiated from their accountability as members of the Philippine
Bar. The IBP has no jurisdiction to investigate them as such lawyers.

The Court has recently made this clear in Alicias, Jr. v. Macatangay13 by holding as follows:

Republic Act No. 6770 (R.A. No. 6770), otherwise known as "The Ombudsman Act of 1989,"
prescribes the jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman. Section 15, paragraph 1 of R.A. No.
6770 provides:

Section 15. Powers, Functions and Duties. — The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the
following powers, functions and duties:

(1) Investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of
any public officer or employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal,
unjust, improper or inefficient. It has primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of his primary jurisdiction, it may take over, at any stage,
from any investigatory agency of Government, the investigation of such cases.

The 1987 Constitution clothes the Office of the Ombudsman with the administrative disciplinary
authority to investigate and prosecute any act or omission of any government official when such
act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient. The Office of the
Ombudsman is the government agency responsible for enforcing administrative, civil, and
criminal liability of government officials "in every case where the evidence warrants in order to
promote efficient service by the Government to the people." In Samson v. Restrivera, the
Court ruled that the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman encompasses all kinds of malfeasance,
misfeasance, and non-feasance committed by any public officer or employee during his or her
tenure. Consequently, acts or omissions of public officials relating to the performance of their
functions as government officials are within the administrative disciplinary jurisdiction of the
Office of the Ombudsman.

In Spouses Buffe v. Secretary Gonzales, the Court held that the IBP has no jurisdiction over
government lawyers who are charged with administrative offenses involving their official duties.
In the present case, the allegations in Alicias' complaint against Atty. Macatangay, Atty. Zema,
Atty. Ronquillo, and Atty. Buenaflor, which include their (1) failure to evaluate CSC records; (2)
failure to evaluate documentary evidence presented to the CSC; and (3) non-service of CSC
Orders and Resolutions, all relate to their misconduct in the discharge of their official duties as
government lawyers working in the CSC. Hence, the IBP has no jurisdiction over Alicias'
complaint. These are acts or omissions connected with their duties as government lawyers
exercising official functions in the CSC and within the administrative disciplinary jurisdiction of
their superior or the Office of the Ombudsman.

WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the disbarment complaint filed against all the
respondents for lack of jurisdiction.

.C. No. 9850, August 06, 2018

ATTY. MA. ROWENA AMELIA V. GUANZON, Complainant, v. ATTY. JOEL G.

DOJILLO, Respondent.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Before us is a Complaint for Disbarment1 dated September 25, 2007, filed by Atty. Ma. Rowena
Amelia V. Guanzon (Atty. Guanzon) against Atty. Joel G. Dojillo (Atty. Dojillo), for violation of
the Code of Professional Responsibility and the Rules of Court on confidentiality of documents
and proceedings, gross misconduct, discourtesy, unfairness, malicious and unethical conduct
towards a fellow lawyer.

The facts are as follows:

Complainant Atty. Guanzon was the counsel of Rosalie Jaype-Garcia (Rosalie) and her minor
children when they filed a Petition for Temporary Protection Order under R.A. No. 9262,
otherwise known as the Anti-Violence against Women and their Children Act of 2004 against
Jesus Chua Garcia (Garcia), Rosalie's husband. Later, the Regional Trial Court (RTC),Branch 41
of Bacolod City granted the temporary protection order (TPO) and financial support in favor of
the clients of Atty. Guanzon.

Subsequently, before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), Garcia then filed a disbarment
complaint against herein complainant Atty. Guanzon docketed as CBD Case No. 06-1710 and
Administrative Case No. 7176 for immorality, grave misconduct and conduct unbecoming of a
member of the Bar. In the said disbarment complaint, Garcia submitted the affidavits of Sheryl
Jamola, former "yaya" of their child and a certain Bernadette Yap (subject documents), who both
alleged that Atty. Guanzon has "romantic and pecuniary interest" on Rosalie and the financial
support which was ordered by the court.

On June 13, 2006, Atty. Guanzon filed a case for Damages against Garcia and docketed as Civil
Case No. 802-C before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 60, Cadiz City. On September
27, 2006, Atty. Guanzon filed anew a case for Unjust Vexation against Garcia and docketed as
Criminal Case No. 06-10-12695 before the MTCC, Branch 6, Bacolod City. On October 12,
2006, Atty. Guanzon filed a case for Grave Oral Defamation against Garcia and docketed as
Criminal Case No. 06-10-12696 before the MTCC, Branch 5, Bacolod City.

In Garcia's Answer and Counter-Affidavits in the aforesaid three (3) complaints, respondent
Atty. Dojillo as counsel of Garcia, attached the documents in the disbarment case, i.e., the
affidavits of Sheryl Jamola and Bernadette Yap against Atty. Guanzon. Thus, the filing of
disbarment complaint against Atty. Dojillo for violating the Code of Professional Responsibility
and Section 18, Rule 139 on the confidentiality of disbarment proceedings and documents.

Atty. Guanzon lamented that Atty. Dojillo knew that there was a disbarment suit filed by his
client against her, yet, with malice and bad faith, he submitted the subject documents as part of
Garcia's Answer and Counter-Affidavits. By doing so, Atty. Dojillo caused the exposure of
confidential records in the disbarment case which damaged her good reputation.

On September 27, 2007, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines-Commission on Bar Discipline
(IBP-CBD) resolved to require Atty. Dojillo to submit his answer on the charges against him.2

In his Answer3 dated October 26, 2007, Atty. Dojillo averred that he was compelled to attach the
subject documents as part of Garcia's Answer and Counter-Affidavit to establish Atty. Guanzon's
motive since he surmised that the three (3) cases filed by the latter against his client was merely
an afterthought and her way of revenge for filing the disbarment complaint against her.

Atty. Dojillo further argued that Atty. Guanzon herself attached the very same subject documents
in her Complaint for Contempt against him and his client Garcia, docketed as Civil Case No.
824-C before the RTC, Branch 60, Cadiz City. Atty. Dojillo asserted that if Atty. Guanzon's act
of attaching the subject documents in the said contempt case is not a violation of the
confidentiality rule, then he has not violated the same rule also when he attached the same
subject documents in Garcia's defense. Finally, Atty. Dojillo maintained that there was neither
malice nor willful violation of the Rules of Court on the confidentiality of disbarment
proceedings and the Code of Professional Responsibility when he submitted the subject
documents to the courts.

In its Report and Recommendation,4 the IBP-CBD recommended that the instant disbarment
complaint against Atty. Dojillo be dismissed for insufficiency of evidence.

Upon investigation, the IBP-CBD was unconvinced that Atty. Dojillo is liable for violation of the
Code of Professional Responsibility and the Rules of Court on confidentiality of disbarment
proceedings. It observed that Atty. Dojillo, as counsel, merely found it necessary to submit said
subject documents in order to defend his client by establishing Atty. Guanzon's real motive in
filing the civil and criminal cases against Garcia.

The IBP-CBD also opined that Atty. Guanzon's successive filing of cases against Garcia gives
the impression that she merely wanted to overwhelm Garcia with several cases and exhaust his
resources in order to get back at him for filing the disbarment case against her.

It likewise noted that in the unjust vexation case which Atty. Guanzon filed against Garcia,
entitled People of the Philippines v. Jesus Chua Garcia, docketed as Criminal Case No. 06-10-
12695, the MTCC, Branch 6, Bacolod City, similarly believed that Atty. Guanzon filed several
cases against Garcia merely in retaliation for the latter's filing of disbarment case against her.
The IBP-CBD, thus, further recommended that Atty. Guanzon be censured for filing harassment
and baseless suits.

In Resolution No. XVIII-2008-645 5 dated December 11, 2008, the IBP-Board of Governors
adopted and approved with modification the report and recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner to dismiss complaint against Atty. Dojillo due to insufficiency of evidence. It
further resolved to warn Atty. Guanzon to refrain from filing groundless complaints.

Atty. Guanzon moved for reconsideration, but the same was denied by the IBP-Board of
Governors in Resolution No. :XX-2013-126 dated January 3, 2013. It likewise affirmed the
Resolution No. XVIII-2008-645 dated December 11, 2008.7

Thus, on April 10, 2013, Atty. Guanzon filed the instant petition for review of IBP Resolution
No. XX-2013-12.8

RULING

The Court adopts the findings and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner and the
IBP Board of Governors.

In the instant case, we find that Atty. Guanzon failed to provide clear and convincing evidentiary
support to his allegations against Atty. Dojillo. As the IBP aptly concluded, Atty. Dojillo cannot
be faulted in attaching the disbarment records in his client's Answer and Counter-Affidavit in the
three cases which Atty. Guanzon filed against his client as he found it necessary to establish
factual basis on the motive of Atty. Guanzon in filing said cases against his client. In effect, Atty.
Dojillo's act of attaching said subject documents to his client's Answer was to defend his client's
cause which is his duty as counsel. In the absence of proof that Atty. Dojillo was motivated by
malice or bad faith, or intent to harass or damage Atty. Guanzon's reputation, the instant
disbarment complaint deserves no merit.

As a rule, an attorney enjoys the legal presumption that he is innocent of the charges against him
until the contrary is proved. The burden of proof in disbarment and suspension proceedings
always rests on the complainant. Considering the serious consequence of disbarment or
suspension of a member of the Bar, this Court has consistently held that clear preponderant
evidence is necessary to justify the imposition of administrative penalty. Preponderance of
evidence means that the evidence adduced by one side is, as a whole, superior to or has greater
weight than that of the other. Thus, not only does the burden of proof that the respondent
committed the act complained of rests on complainant, but the burden is not satisfied when
complainant relies on mere assumptions and suspicions as evidence.9

It must also be pointed out that the confidentiality in disciplinary actions for lawyers is not
absolute. It is not to be applied, under any circumstance, to all disclosures of any nature.10 The
confidentiality rule requires only that proceedings against attorneys be kept private and
confidential. The rule does not extend so far that it covers the mere existence or pendency of
disciplinary actions.11 Thus, Atty. Dojillo, in attaching the subject documents to his client's
Answer, did not per se violate the confidentiality rule as the purpose was to inform the court of
its existence.

Moreover, the subject documents become part of court records which are protected by A.M. No.
03-06-13-SC,12 to wit:

CANON II

CONFIDENTIALITY

SECTION 1. Court personnel shall not disclose to any unauthorized person any confidential
information acquired by them while employed in the Judiciary, whether such information came
from authorized or unauthorized sources.

Confidential information means information not yet made a matter of public record relating to
pending cases, as well as information not yet made public concerning the work of any justice
or judge relating to pending cases, including notes, drafts, research papers, internal
discussions, internal memoranda, records of internal deliberations, and similar papers.

The notes, drafts, research papers, internal discussions, internal memoranda, records of
internal deliberations and similar papers that a justice or judge uses in preparing a decision,
resolution or order shall remain confidential even after the decision, resolution or order is
made public.

SEC. 2. Confidential information available to specific individuals by reason of statute, court rule
or administrative policy shall be disclosed only by persons authorized to do so.

SEC. 3. Unless expressly authorized by the designated authority, court personnel shall not
disclose confidential information given by litigants, witnesses or attorneys to justices, judges or
any other person.

SEC. 4. Former court personnel shall not disclose confidential information acquired by them
during their employment in the Judiciary when disclosure by current court personnel of the same
information would constitute a breach of confidentiality. Any disclosure in violation of this
provision shall constitute indirect contempt of court.13
Thus, in view of the above-quoted policies, even if Atty. Dojillo attached said subject documents
to Garcia's Answer and Counter-Affidavit filed before the courts, the same remains private and
confidential. In fact, even after the decision, resolution, or order is made public, such information
that a justice or judge uses in preparing a decision, resolution, or order shall remain
confidential.14

In fine, since Atty. Guanzon failed to discharge the onus of proving her charges against Atty.
Dojillo by clear, convincing and satisfactory evidence, her present petition for review of the
IBP's dismissal of her complaint must fail.

This Court will not hesitate to mete out proper disciplinary punishment upon lawyers who are
shown to have failed to live up to their sworn duties, but neither will it hesitate to extend its
protective arm to them when the accusation against them is not indubitably proven.15

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review is DENIED for lack of merit.

SECOND DIVISION

[ A.C. No. 11774 (Formerly CBD Case No. 14-4186), March 21, 2018 ]
READY FORM INCORPORATED, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. EGMEDIO J. CASTILLON, JR.,
RESPONDENT.

DECISION

CAGUIOA, J:

Before this Court is an administrative complaint[1] filed with the Commission on Bar Discipline of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (CBD-IBP) by Complainant Ready Form, Inc. (Ready Form) against
Respondent Atty. Egmedio J. Castillon, Jr. (Atty. Castillon), for his alleged violation of Rules 1.01, 1.02,
and 1.03 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility when he allegedly used Ready Form's
Income Tax Return (ITR) in filing a Petition for Suspension and Blacklisting[2] (Petition for Blacklisting)
against Ready Form before the National Printing Office (NPO).

The Factual Antecedents

Ready Form was one of the companies who participated in a public bidding conducted by the NPO on
October 17, 2008. Thereafter, the NPO Bids and Awards Committee (NPO-BAC) required all bidders to
re-submit their eligibility documents, which includes the bidders' past ITRs and financial documents
stamp received by the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR).[3] After reviewing these submissions, the NPO-
BAC imposed a suspension of one (1) year against Ready Form effective from December 22, 2008 to
December 21, 2009[4] due to the supposed misrepresentation and misdeclaration it committed when it
submitted alleged false ITRs and financial statements for the calendar year 2007.
Subsequently, on September 18, 2009, Eastland Printink Corporation (Eastland) filed a Petition for
Blacklisting with the NPO against Ready Form, wherein Eastland alleged that Ready Form had committed
other violations, such as (1) misrepresentation, when it also filed with the NPO false ITRs for the year
2006, (2) unlawfully soliciting printing jobs and services from various local government offices or
agencies, and (3) undermining the authority and jurisdiction of the NPO by disseminating letters which
suggested that the NPO no longer has exclusive jurisdiction over printing services.[5] As Eastland's
counsel, Atty. Castillon signed the Petition on behalf of his client.

The NPO then asked both parties to file position papers in relation to the Petition for Blacklisting.
Eastland filed a position paper[6] which stated that:

The figures declared by respondent in its financial statement submitted to the Securities and Exchange
Commission indicate that (sic) a total net sale of P78,639,134.73, but respondent net sales with NPO
alone yielded P80,063.932, (sic) or a discrepancy of P1,424,797.27. The figures speak for themselves
where false statements and/or information were clearly resorted to by the respondent. These
documents are material for eligibility requirements which bespeak of respondent's deliberate act of
misrepresentation.

The respondent has intentionally and consciously falsified its Financial Statement and Income Tax
Return for 2006 by stating and declaring the reduced and wrong amount of annual net sales to gainfully
reduce payment of taxes due the government.

It has been a pattern of respondent in reporting the reduced and incorrect net sales for two (2) years in
a row. It did in 2006 and 2007. In fact, it was duly reflected in its 2006 and 2007 falsified Financial
Statements submitted before the Securities and Exchange Commission.[7]

On December 1, 2009, the NPO issued a Resolution[8] suspending and blacklisting Ready Form for a
period of five (5) years after finding, among others, that:

Respondent (sic) 2006 Financial Statement contains false information; hence, it is a falsified document.
As part of its eligibility requirements, respondent submitted to NPO its 2006 Financial Statement (earlier
submitted to the Securities and Exchange Commission in compliance with its reportorial requirements)
which contains false information. Evidently, the same is (sic) fictitious, false and falsified document.

Respondent intentionally reported the reduced amount of its net sales for 2006 in its Financial
Statement by declaring only Seventy Eight Million Six Hundred Thirty Nine Thousand One Hundred
Thirty Four and Seventy Three Centavos (P78,639,134.73). However, its net sales alone in NPO reached
Eighty Million Sixty Three Thousand Nine Hundred Thirty Two and Twenty Nine Centavos
(P80,063,932.29). The under declaration was not only conscious and deliberate but also it was purposely
done by respondent two (2) years in a row solely intended to evade payment of correct taxes due to
government.
Its (sic) worth recalling that in 2007, respondent also under declared its nets (sic) sales by stating in its
2007 Financial Statement the amount of Seventy Four Million Three Hundred Seventy Seven Thousand
Five Hundred Ninety Three Pesos and Twenty Three Centavos (P74,377,593.23). But in truth and in
fact, its net sales for NPO alone hit One Hundred Seven Million Three Hundred One Thousand Twelve
Pesos and Ninety Four Centavos (P107,301,012.94). In fact, the respondent was suspended for one (1)
year from 22 December 2008 up to 22 December 2009 for that reason. An appeal was filed by
respondent to the Office of the Press Secretary. However, the appeal was dismissed and the imposition
of administrative sanction of one (1) year was affirmed. The same has already become final and
executory since respondent neither filed a motion for reconsideration nor a Petition for Review to the
Court of Appeals timely filed.[9] (Emphasis and underscoring in the original)

On April 4, 2014, Ready Form filed a Complaint-Affidavit (Complaint) before the CBD-IBP praying that
Atty. Castillon be disbarred due to allegedly violating Rules 1.01, 1.02, and 1.03 of Canon 1 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility, alleging as a ground therefor Atty. Castillon's supposed unlawful use of
Ready Form's ITRs. Complainant alleges that this is in violation of Sections 4 and 278 of Republic Act No.
8424,[10] otherwise known as the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC), which state that:

SEC. 4. Power of the Commissioner to Interpret Tax Laws and to Decide Tax Cases. - The power to
interpret the provisions of this Code and other tax laws shall be under the exclusive and original
jurisdiction of the Commissioner, subject to review by the Secretary of Finance.

The power to decide disputed assessments, refunds of internal revenue taxes, fees or other charges,
penalties imposed in relation thereto, or other matters arising under this Code or other laws or portions
thereof administered by the Bureau of Internal Revenue is vested in the Commissioner, subject to the
exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Tax Appeals.

xxxx

SEC. 278. Procuring Unlawful Divulgence of Trade Secrets. Any person who causes or procures an
officer or employee of the Bureau of Internal Revenue to divulge any confidential information regarding
the business, income or inheritance of any taxpayer, knowledge of which was acquired by him in the
discharge of his official duties, and which it is unlawful for him to reveal, and any person who publishes
or prints in any manner whatever, not provided by law, any income, profit, loss or expenditure
appearing in any income tax return, shall be punished by a fine of not more than Two thousand pesos
(P2,000), or suffer imprisonment of not less than six (6) months nor more than five (5) years, or both.
(Emphasis and italics in the original)

Complainant further alleges that Atty. Castillon's supposed act was in violation of Section 30.1 of the
Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No. 9184[11] or the Government Procurement
Reform Act which mandates that the Bids and Awards Committee concerned shall use a non
discretionary "pass/fail" criterion in determining the eligibility of bidding documents submitted to it. The
said section states that:
 The BAC shall open the first bid envelopes in public to determine each bidder's compliance with
the documents required to be submitted for eligibility and for the technical requirements, as
prescribed in this IRR. For this purpose, the BAC shall check the submitted documents of each
bidder against a checklist of required documents to ascertain if they are all present, using a non
30.1.
discretionary "pass/fail" criterion, as stated in the Instructions to Bidders. If a bidder submits the
required document, it shall be rated "passed" for that particular requirement. In this regard, bids
that fail to include any requirement or are incomplete or patently insufficient shall be considered
as "failed." Otherwise, the BAC shall rate the said first bid envelope as "passed."

During the mandatory conference of the case before the CBD-IBP, the parties agreed to limit the issue
on whether or not Atty. Castillon's act of attaching Ready Form's audited financial statements in the
Petition for Blacklisting he filed with the NPO constitutes a violation of Sections 4 and 238 of the NIRC.[12]
Consequently, the answer to the said question also determines whether Atty. Castillon violated Rules
1.01, 1.02, and 1.03 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Atty. Castillon, in his position paper submitted to the CBD-IBP, stressed that what was submitted in
support of the Petition for Blacklisting with the NPO was Ready Form's audited financial statements
which were acquired from the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Atty. Castillon categorically
denied that he acquired, much less attached, an ITR of complainant Ready Form.[13]

After due proceedings, Commissioner Maria Editha A. Go-Biñas (Commissioner Go-Biñas) rendered a
Report and Recommendation[14] on July 21, 2016, absolving Atty. Castillon from the charges filed by
Ready Form. Commissioner Go-Biñas found that Ready Form's claims were unfounded, as there is no
proof that Atty. Castillon procured Ready Form's ITR, or that he used it in the Petition for Blacklisting.
The dispositive portion of Commissioner Go-Biñas' Report and Recommendation reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, it is most respectfully recommended that the instant case
be dismissed for utter lack of merit.[15]

On September 23, 2016, the IBP Board of Governors passed a Resolution adopting the findings of fact
and recommendation of Commissioner Go-Biñas and resolved to dismiss the complaint, thus:

RESOLVED to ADOPT the findings of fact and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner
dismissing the complaint.[16]

The Court's Ruling

After a judicious examination of the records and submission of the parties, the Court finds no compelling
reason to diverge from the factual findings of Commissioner Go-Biñas as adopted by IBP Board of
Governors.

Ready Form's central issue against Atty. Castillon is that he allegedly violated the law, particularly the
NIRC, when he supposedly attached a copy of its ITR for 2006 when he filed the Petition for Blacklisting.
A perusal of the records will reveal, however, that what Atty. Castillon attached in the Petition for
Blacklisting is Ready Form's audited financial statement for the year 2006 and not the latter's ITR. Ready
Form harps on the fact that the following paragraphs, which mentions Ready Form's ITR, were in the
Petition for Blacklisting signed by Atty. Castillon:[17]

4. The aforecited suspension was brought about by the misrepresentation and misdeclaration
committed by herein respondent on its Income Tax Return and Financial Statement and other
documents submitted before this Office covering the period 2007;

5. Previous to the said violation, respondent had committed acts of similar nature in their Income Tax
Returns and Financial Statements and other documents submitted before this office covering the year
2006, among other things, which underscores a deliberate scheme of submitting false declarations. A
photocopy of the 2006 Financial Statement is hereto attached and marked as Annexes "B" and made
integral part hereof.[18]

Ready Form repeatedly made an issue out of the fact that its ITR was mentioned in the Petition for
Blacklisting, and later on in the Position Paper filed by Eastland, both signed by Atty. Castillon. They did
not, however, offer proof to substantiate its claims that its ITR was attached to the Petition for
Blacklisting despite the clear and express statement therein that only its audited financial statement,
which is available to the public through the SEC, was attached thereto. During the mandatory
conference, it was clear that only an audited financial statement was attached by Atty. Castillon. Ready
Form only wants the IBP, and consequently this Court, to hold that Atty. Castillon used confidential
information by doing such act:

ATTY. MISON [counsel for Ready Form]:

This is Annex "G" to the complaint. Also paragraph 5 if I may mention, previous to this a photocopy
of the 2006 Financial Statement is hereto attached and marked as Annex "B" so that is admitted?

ATTY. CASTILLON:

That Financial Statement no ITR as mentioned previously.

ATTY. MISON:

But the premise of the paragraph it made mentioned (sic) of that.

ATTY. CASTILLON:

There is that phrase, Your Honor, but meaning attaching ITR there really was none, Your Honor.

xxxx

COMM. BINAS:
 If any of these pleadings that you have there and the cases, I'm sure you have the files, right?

ATTY. MISON:

Yes.

COMM. BINAS:

Did you notice any attachment about the ITR as submitted by the respondent? Because I'm sure it
should have been an annexed (sic) there or ........

ATTY. MISON:

Well, Your Honor, if the Commission should take somehow judicial notice that the financial
statement is attached to the ITR, the ITR merely contains the summary, the total amount but the
details of the total amount appearing in the Income Tax Return, they are all reflected in the
Financial Statement. Meaning, the Financial Statements contains the details while the ITR itself is
just a summary. So, you cannot say, o (sic) I just filed the financial statement I did not file the ITR.
But all the information appearing on the Financial Statement necessarily appears in the ITR.

xxxx

COMM. BINAS:

So, as of now the complainant is pounding on the fact that there was this use of confidential data.

ATTY. MISON:

Yes, Your Honor.

COMM. BINAS:

That is the meat of the complaint.

ATTY. MISON:

Yes, Your Honor. Violation and not only that, Section 4, Your Honor, where no person has the
power to interpret even to make allegations that base (sic) on financial statements falsified, they
have usurp (sic) the power exclusively vested to the BIR and the Court of Tax Appeals, Section 4 of
R.A. 8424 and Section 278 of R.A. 8424.

COMM. BINAS:

So, insofar as the complainant is concerned the act of using the confidential tax data emanated
from the fact that he submitted the financial statement.

ATTY. MISON:
 Yes, Your Honor. And we contend, Your Honor, that the financial statement contains a more
detailed figures vis-a-vis the income tax return.[19]

Clearly, therefore, the complainant wants this Court to penalize the respondent for using a publicly-
available document to support allegations in a pleading signed by him. This, the Court refuses to do.

The Court takes judicial notice[20] of the fact that audited financial statements submitted by
corporations, as required by Section 141 of the Corporation Code, are made available to the public by
the SEC. Hence, the Court fails to see how Atty. Castillon violated any law when he attached a copy of
Ready Form's audited financial statements in the Petition for Blacklisting he filed with the NPO.

Thus, the Court agrees with Commissioner Go-Biñas when she correctly said:

He who alleges should prove his case in a very clear and convincing manner.

An individual should not be allowed to claim relief just because a lawyer is aiding or was hired by an
opponent. To do so would create more injustice and lead to an even more erroneous practice.

"While courts will not hesitate to mete out proper disciplinary punishment upon lawyers who fail to live
up to their sworn duties, they will on the other hand, protect them from the unjust accusations of
dissatisfied litigants. The success of a lawyer in his profession depends most entirely on his reputation.
Anything which will harm his good name is to be deplored. Private persons and particularly disgruntled
opponents, may not, therefore, be permitted to use the courts as vehicles through which to vent their
rancor on members of the Bar" (Santos vs. Dichoso, Adm. Case No. 1825, August 22, 1978).[21]
(Emphasis in the original)

All told, the Court finds that the evidence adduced is wholly insufficient to support the allegations
against Atty. Castillon. As such, the Court fails to see how Atty. Castillon had violated Rules 1.01, 1.02,
and 1.03 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Hence, the Court affirms the IBP's
recommendation to dismiss the Complaint.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Complaint filed by Ready Form, Inc. against Atty. Egmedio J.
Castillon, Jr. is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.