ABERRATIO ICTUS

People v. Guillen GR No. L-1477, January 18, 1950

FACTS:
The accused Julio Guillen, was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of thecrime of murder and
multiple frustrated murder after his attempt to assassinate the Presidentof the Philippines, Manuel
Roxas on March 10, 1947.During the 1946 Presidential Elections, Guillen voted for the opposing
candidateof Manuel Roxas. According to the accused, he was disappointed with the latter for failing
toredeem and fulfill promises made by President Roxas during the elections. Consequently, theaccused
determined to assassinate the President and found the oppoturnity to do so on thenight of March 10,
1947 when the President attended a popular meeting by the Liberal Partyat Plaza de Miranda, Quiapo,
Manila. Guillen first intended to use a revolver to accomplish hisgoal but he had previously lost his
licensed firearm, so he thought of using two handgrenades which were given to him by an American
soldier in exchange for two bottles of whisky. The accused stood on the chair he had been sitting on and
hurled the grenade at thePresident when the latter had just closed his speech. A general who was on
the platform sawthe smoking grenade and kicked it away from the platform towards an open space
where hethought the grenade was likely to do the least harm. The grenade exploded in the middle of
agroup of persons standing close to the platform and grenade fragments seriously injuredSimeon
Varela, who died the next day due to the mortal wounds caused, and several other persons. Guillen was
arrested and he readily admitted his responsibility.

ISSUE:
WON the accused was guilty only of homicide through reckless imprudence in regard to thedeath of
Simeon Varela and of less serious physical injuries in regard to the other injuredpersons.

HELD:
The facts do not support the contention of the counsel for the appellant. In throwing the handgrenade
at the President with the intention of killing him, the appellant acted with malice andis therefore liable
for all the consequences of his wrongful act. As provided by Art. 4 of theRevised Penal Code, criminal
liability is incurred by any person committing a felony althoughthe wronful act done be different from
that which he intended. In criminal negligence, theinjury caused to another should be unintentional, it
being simply the incident of another actperformed without malice. As held by thie Court, a deliberate
intent to do an unlawful act isessentially inconsistent with the idea of reckless imprudence. Where such
unlawful act iswilfully done, a mistake in the identity of the intended victim cannot be considered
recklessimprudence.The sentence of the trial court is affirmed by unanimous vote and death sentence
shall beexecuted in accordance with article 81 of the Revised Penal Code.

PEOPLE V. HERMOGENES FLORA

G.R. NO. 125909

The 2 accused (Hermogenes and Edwin) were convicted for the murder of Emerita and
Ireneo and the attempted murder of Flor. The 2 were found to have conspired to kill
Ireneo. However, during the commission of the crime, Emerita was also killed and Flor hit
by a bullet.

HELD:
Co-conspirators are liable only for acts done pursuant to the conspiracy. For other acts
done outside the contemplation of the co-conspirators or which are not the necessary and
logical consequence of the intended crime, only the actual perpetrators are liable. Evidence
only shows conspiracy to kill Ireneo and no one else. Hence, both can be convicted for the
murder of Ireneo. However, only Hermogenes who fired at Emerita and Flor can be
convicted for the murder of Emerita and Flor respectively.

ERROR IN PERSONAE

Criminal Law: People v Sabalones

294 SCRA 751, August 31, 1998
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.ROLUSAPE SABALONES alias "Roling," ARTEMIO TIMOTEO BERONGA, TEODULO
ALEGARBES and EUFEMIO CABANERO, accused, ROLUSAPE SABALONES alias "Roling" and
ARTEMIO TIMOTEO BERONGA, accused-appellants.

Fact: Beronga, Sabalones, Alegarbes, and Cabanero were convicted after a shooting incident
in Cebu in 1985 which led to the death of Glenn Tiempo and Alfredo Nardo, and fatal
injuries of Nelson Tiempo, Rey Bolo and Rogelio Presores. The victims were asked to bring
the car of a certain Stephen Lim who also attended a wedding party. Nelson Tiempo drove
the car with Rogelio Presores. Alfredo Nardo drove the owner-type jeep along with Glenn
Tiempo and Rey Bolo to aid the group back to the party after parking the car at Lim’s
house. When they reached the gate, they were met with a sudden burst of gunfire. The
accused were identified as the gunmen. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the
trial court. Sabalones and Beronga appealed.

Crime Committed: Two counts of murder, and three counts of frustrated murder

Contention of the People: Prosecution witnesses Edwin Santos and Rogelio Presores
testified about the shooting and identified the faces of the accused. Presores was riding in
the car that is behind the jeep. He positively identified Sabalones as one of the gunmen.
When the gunmen fired at the car, driver Nelson Tiempo immediately maneuvered and
arrived at Major Juan Tiempo’s house from which they have escaped death.

Contention of the Accused: Accused-appellants Sabalones and Beronga denied their

presence during the commission of the crime. Sabalones presented numerous witnesses
who stated that he was sound asleep when the incident took place [since he got tired
watching over his brother’s wake]. While Beronga testified that he attended a cock-derby
in Cebu, and was fetched by his wife at 7 pm, arrived home by 10:30 pm to sleep. Sabalones
even escaped from place to place to flee from the wrath of Maj. Juan Tiempo, the father of
the two victims. The defense even pointed out errors from the testimonies of the witnesses
arguing that the place where the incident happened is dim and not lighted.

RULING: The appeal is DENIED. Costs against appellants.

Issue 1: Whether the prosecution witnesses and evidences are credible?

Yes. RTC findings were binding to court with appreciated testimonies of two witnesses.
There was positive identification by survivors who saw them when they peered during lulls
in gunfire. The place was well-lit, whether from post of car’s headlights. The extrajudicial
confession has no bearing because the conviction was based on positive identification. It is
binding though to the co-accused because it is used as cirmustancial evidence corroborated
by one witness. The inconcistencies are minor and inconsequential which strengthen
credibility of testimony. Furthermore, in aberratio ictus [mistake in blow], mistake does
not diminish culpability; same gravity applies, more proper to use error in personae. Alibi
cannot prevail over positive identification by the prosecution witnesses.

Issue 2: Whether the alibis are acceptable?

No. It was still quite near the crime scene. It is overruled by positive identification. Using
the case of People v. Nescio, Alibi is not credible when the accused-appellant is only a short
distance from the scene of the crime. Furthermore, flight indicates guilt.

Issue 3:Whether the correct penalty is imposed?

No. Under Article 248 of the RPC, the imposable penalty is reclusion temporal in its
maximum period, to death. There being no aggravating or mitigating circumstance, aside
from the qualifying circumstance of treachery, the appellate court correctly imposed
reclusion perpetua for murder. The CA erred in computing the penalty for each of the three
counts of frustrated murder. Under Article 50 of the RPC, the penalty for frustrated felony
is next lower in degree than that prescribed by law for the consummated felony. Because
there are no mitigating or aggravating conspiracy between the two accused. It does not
matter that the prosecution has failed to show who was between the two who actually
pulled the trigger that killed the child. They are liable as co-conspirators since the act of a
conspirator becomes the act of another regardless of the precise degree of participation in
the act.

Also there was a presence of treachery, because of the circumstances that the crime was
done at night time and that the accused hid themselves among the bamboo. Evident
premeditation is also an aggravating circumstance [the accused had planned to kill the
victim some days before].
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. L-37162 May 30, 1978

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
WARLITO PLATEROS Y CALATRAVA, alias BABIE, and MURILLO LAHOY Y BUENO,
alias BOY, defendants-appellants.

Paulino G. Clarin for appellants.

Office of the Solicitor General for appellee.

AQUINO, J.:

Warlito Plateros and Murillo Lahoy appealed from the decision of the Court of First
Instance. of Bohol dated May 17, 1973, finding them guilty of murder, sentencing each of
them to reclusion perpetua and ordering them to pay solidarity to the heirs of Pedro Candel
an indemnity of P12,000 (Criminal Case No. 566).

In that same decisions, the trial court convicted Lahoy of attempted murder (Plateros, his
co-accused, was acquitted) and sentenced him to an indeterminate penalty of two years,
four months and one day of prision correccional as minimum, to six years and one day
of prision mayor, as maximum and to pay Tomas Metucua's father the sum of P15 as
medical expenses (Criminal Case No. 567). From that part of the decision, Lahoy appealed
to the Court of appeals (CA-G. R. No. 15288-Cr.).

Acquittal of appellant Lahoy in the attempted murder case. — Before resolving the merits of
the appeal in the instant murder case, it is necessary to pass upon the incident regarding
the acquittal by the Court of Appeals of appellant Lahoy in the attempted murder case.

Lahoy's appeal ought to have been certified to this Court by the Court of Appeals because
the attempted murder imputed to Lahoy was committed on the same occasion and arose
out of the same occurrence as the murder imputed to him and Plateros in this case, as
contemplated in section 17(l), formerly section 17(4) of the Judiciary Law, which reads.

SEC. 17. Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court- ...

xxx xxx xxx

 The Supreme Court shall have exclusive jurisdiction to review, revise,
reverse, modify or affirm on appeal as the law or rules of court may provide,
final judgments and decrees of inferior courts herein provided, in —

(1) All criminal cases involving offenses for which the penalty imposed is
death or life imprisonment; and those involving other offenses which,
although not so punished, arose out of the same occurrence or which may
have been committed by the accused on the same occasion, as that giving rice
to the more serious offense, regardless of whether the accused are charged
as principals, accomplices or accessories, or whether have been tried jointly
or separately; ...

The attempted murder case, like the instant murder case, comes within the exclusive
appellate jurisdiction of this Court and should have been decided together with the instant
murder case (People vs. Sy Pio, 94 Phil. 885; People vs. Ricohermoso, L-30527-28, March
29, 1974, 56 SCRA 431, 438; People vs. Yu, L-29667, November 29, 1977; People vs.
Cuaresma, 94 Phil. 305; People vs. Almazora, 87 Phil. 596).

In fact, the trial court tried the two cases jointly and, as shown above, rendered only one
decision for the two cases. However, the Court of Appeals (whose attention was not called
by the Solicitor General to the necessity of elevating Lahoy's appeal to this Court) decided
the attempted murder case and acquitted Lahoy in a decision dated September 23, 1975.

We came to know of that decision when appellant Plateros in the instant murder case, in
his letter of January 20, 1977 to the Chief Justice, enclosed a photostatic copy of that
decision. In view of that development, the parties and the Court of Appeals were directed in
this Court's resolution of November 28, 1977 to state whether that above-mentioned
decision should be set aside for lack of appellate jurisdiction or as a "lawless thing" (Banco
Espanol-Filipino vs. Palanca, 37 Phil. 921, 949).

The Solicitor General believing that the said decision is void, recommended that the record
of the attempted murder case be elevated to this Court so that it could be decided anew
together with the instant murder case.

Two Justices of the Court of Appeals, who took part in that decision, stated in their
manifestation of March 20, 1978 that the attempted murder case was decided "in absolute
good faith, in the desire to expedite a detention prisoner's appeal based on the evidence on
record. They admitted that there was an oversight in the disposition of the appeal because
the jurisdictional angle was overlooked.

The rule in section 17(l) is designed to avoid conflicts between the decisions of this Court
and the Court of Appeals in cases involving offenses which arose from the same occurrence
or which were committed on the same occasion usually by the same accused.

That general rule has an exception. Where, by allowing the Court of Appeals to decide a
case involving an offense, which is not punishable by death or reclusion perpetua but which
arose out of the same occurrence or was committed on the same occasion, as the case
involving an offense punishable by death or reclusion perpetua pending in this Court, there
wig be no conflict between the decisions of this Court and the Court of Appeals, the former
case need not be elevated to this Court (People vs. Carillo, 101 Phil. 1206).

Thus, in the Cariño case, this Court rejected the certification made by the Court of Appeals
under section 17(4), now section 17(l), of a case appealed to it, involving an offense which
arose out of the same occurrence as the case for rebellion with multiple murder pending in
this Court because the issues raised in the case pending in the Court of Appeals were not
raised in this Court and, therefore, the decision of this Court could not affect the
determination of the case pending in the Court of Appeals.

The rationale of that exception to the general rule is found in the maxim: Cessante ratione
legis, cessat et ipsa lex (The reason for the law ceasing, the law itself also ceases).

The doctrine of the Cariño case may be applied in this case because here there can be no
conflict between the decision of the Court of Appeals and this Court's decision in the instant
murder case inasmuch as the victims in the two cases are different. The attempted murder
case decided by the Court of Appeals involved the wounding of a certain Tomas Metucua (C
Case No. 567) whereas, in the instant murder case the victim was Pedro Candel. The
acquittal of Lahoy in connection with the wounding of Metucua would not affect the
determination of his guilt or innocence in connection with the death of Pedro
Candel (Criminal Case No. 566).

Considering the peculiar circumstances of this incident and following the precedent
established in the Cariño case, we are disinclined to disturb the 1975 decision of the Court
of Appeals acquitting Lahoy in the attempted murder case. (See People vs. Pascua, 71 Phil.
235 and People vs. Berdida, L-20183, June 30,1966,17 SCRA 520.)

This holding does not in anyway emasculate the rule in section 17(l) that criminal cases
appealed to the Court of Appeals, involving offenses which arose out of the same
occurrence, or which were committed on the same occasion as the offense punished by
death or reclusion perpetua should be certified to this Court by the Court of Appeals. It is
this Court that would determine whether or not the cases appealed to the Court of Appeals
should be decided together with the case appealed to this Court.

Appeal in the instant murder case. — According to the prosecution, before midnight of July
30, 1972, Jacinto Piquero and Fernando Anora, both pedicab drivers, entered Inday's
Kitchenette located at El Filibusterismo Street, Tagbilaran City. They had parked their
pedicab near a closed door of the restaurant. They joined at the table other pedicab drivers
named Pedro Candel, Genaro Brunidor and a certain Ibong. They drank beer and, without
lady partners, they danced to the music from the jukebox.

Tomas Metucua, a second year college student and a friend of the pedicab drivers, was also
at the kitchenette. Seated at another table were Warlito Plateros and Murillo Lahoy who
also drank beer. (The house of Plateros was near the kitchenette.)
Metucua and Plateros were rivals for the affection of Estrella Silmaro, the cashier. When
Metucua was talking with Estrella, his alleged sweetheart, Plateros went near them and
refused to leave them, thereby annoying Metucua.

At about midnight, Piquero, Candel and Anora, accompanied by Metucua, left the
kitchenette and went to their pedicab while Brunidor and Ibong also went to their pedicab
which was parked at the opposite side of the street.

Candel was seated in the sidecar of the tricycle. Metucua sat on the driver's seat. Piquero
and Anora stood by the side of the pedicab's motorcycle. While the four were engaged in
conversation, Lahoy and Plateros came out of the kitchenette. Lahoy appeared to be angry,
hostile and menacing.

Without any seaming, he stabbed Candel two times. Plateros also stabbed Candel. Moved by
the instinct of self-preservation, Candel jumped out of the sidecar. He fell on the ground
face down. Lahoy allegedly stabbed Metucua and tried to assault Anora who was helping
Candel. Anora evaded the assault by running away. Plateros chased Piquero who was able
to elude him. Then, Plateros and Lahoy fled from the scene of the assault.

Candel was placed in the pedicab of Brunidor and was brought to the hospital, arriving
there at 12:35 in the morning of July 31. He died at 6:35 on that same morning.

The autopsy diclosed that the twenty-one year old Candel sustained (1) a stab wound in the
upper right arm, penetrating the thorax and right lung, (2) a stab wound in the chest be.
between the ninth and tenth ribs, penetrating the diaphragm and lacerating the right
kidney and (3) a stab wound in the sacral region. Blood had accummulated in the pleural
and peritoneal cavities (hemothorax and hemoperitoneum) of Candel. Death was due to
irreversible shock, brought about by the stab wounds.

According to Doctor Rosalinda L. Tima-an, the wounds sustained by Candel were fatal. She
testified that Candel told her that he was asleep in the sidecar when he was stabbed. The
holes in the clothes, which Candel was wearing when he was stabbed, conceded with the
location of the wounds in his body.

Evidently, the killing was motivated by jealousy on the part of Plateros against Metucua, a
companion of Candel, Lahoy took part in the killing as a comrade or co-conspirator
(barkada) of Plateros.

Piquero and Anora were investigated by the police in the early morning of July 31. They
pointed to Lahoy and Plateros as the assists. The information for murder against Plateros
and Lahoy was filed on August 23, 1972. As already stated, Plateros and Lahoy were
convicted of murder by the trial court.

Plateros contends in this appeal that the trial court erred in giving credence to the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, in finding that the wounds sustained by Candel
were inflicted by means of two weapons, "in totally disregarding the evidence of denial"
(whatever that means) and in convicting him "despite total absence of motive".

Lahoy contends that his guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt and that he had no
complicity in the killing of Candel. Although Lahoy's counsel, instead of filing a brief, filed a
memorandum, which does not contain any statement of facts and page references to the
record, we took pains to examine the evidence against him, his testimony and the
testimony of the defense witnesses.

Plateros, twenty-seven years old in 1972, single, jobless, a holder of the degrees of Bachelor
of Arts and Bachelor of Science in Education, obtained from the Rafael Palma College,
admitted that he was courting Estrella Silmaro. He denied that he stabbed Candel.

His version was that while he was inside the kitchenette on the night of July 30, 1972, he
heard a noise coming from the street. He was dragged by Minda, a waitress, to the door to
find out what was taking place in the street. He allegedly saw Candel. and Brunidor walking
to the pedicab. There was blood on the clothes of Candel.. The pedicab made a U-turn and
entered Carlos P. Garcia Avenue. Later, Plateros was fetched by his mother. They went
home.

Lahoy, twenty-six years old in 1972, married, jobless, a high school graduate, and a former
classmate of Plateros, denied that he stabbed Candel. Like Plateros, he testified that while
he was inside the kitchenette, he heard a commotion in El Filibusterismo Street, and when
he peered outside, he allegedly saw two men coming from Remolador Street, who were
walking to the pedicab parked in front of Amper's place in El Filibusterismo Street. The
tricycle proceeded to Carlos P. Garcia Avenue. Lahoy returned to the kitchenette. He
accompanied Plateros and his mother when they went home.

WE are of the opinion that the feeble denials of appellants Plateros and Lahoy (who
admittedly were near the scene of the crime, when it was perpetrated) cannot prevail over
the Positive and unequivocal declarations of the eyewitnesses, Anora and Piquero, that the
appellants were the authors of the stab wounds which caused Candel's death. Their guilt
was proven beyond reasonable doubt.

The trial court, in a 43-page decision, painstakingly analyzed the declarations of t anal he
witnesses. It characterized to the testimonies of Anora and Piquero as credible and
convincing. It regarded the defense of Lahoy and Plateros as an alibi which was flimsy and
unbelievable.

We have already touched upon the motive for the killing which is that Plateros was jealous
because Estrella Silmaro had chosen to bestow her affection upon Metucua. Now, it may be
asked: why did Plateros and Lahoy liquidate Candel, who had nothing to do with Estrella,
instead of Metucua, her boyfriend?

The only rational explanation for that lamentable aberratio ictus or error en la persona is
that, inasmuch as the stabbing was perpetrated at night, the inebriated a assailants
mistakenly assumed that Metucua, whom they had intended to kilt and who was not a
Pedicab driver, was the person inside the sidecar (for the passenger) and that Candel a
Pedicab driver, was the person on the driver's seat Of the pedicab. As previously recounted,
Candel, who must have been was the one in. side the sidecar while Metucua was on the
driver's seat.

There was a conspiracy between Plateros and Lahoy as shown in their concerted efforts
between Plateros and Lahoy, as boon companions, had been together since four o'clock in
the afternoon. They had gone to different places and repaired twice to the kitchenette. They
had gone to different places and repaired twice to the kitchenette. They were together
when they left the scene stabbing.

The Solicitor General believes that the killing was simple homicide allegedly because it was
made on the spur of the moment. That view is not correct because Lahoy and Plateros, who
could have stabbed Candel or Metucua inside the kitchenette did not do so. They waited for
Metucua and the pedicab drivers to leave the kitchenette. Their intention was to make a
surprise attack without any risk to themselves. The assault was deliberate, sudden and
unexpected. That is the characteristic manifestation of treachery (alevosia). Hence, the
killing was properly categorized as murder by the trial court (Art. 14[16], Revised Penal
Code).

The Solicitor General recommends that intoxication be appreciated as mitigating

circumstance. In Plateros' case it is not proper to consider intoxication as mitigating
because he repeatedly testified that he was not drunk; that he had drunk only soft drinks,
and that he did not even finish a bottle of beer at the kitchenette.

On the other hand, Lahoy's intoxication appears to be either intentional or habitual (See
art. 15, Revise Penal Code).

Reclusion perpetua the medium period of the penalty for murder, was properly imposed
because no modifying circumstances attended the commission of the assassination (Arts.
64[l] and 248, Revised Penal Code).

WHEREFORE, the trial courts judgment is affirmed with costs against the appellants. They
are entitled to credit for their preventive imprisonment under the conditions laid down in
article 29 of the Revised Penal Code

SO ORDERED.

Fernando (Chairman), Barredo, Concepcion, Jr., and Santos, JJ., concur.

Antonio, J., took no part.

PRAETER INTENTIONEM

PEOPLE VS ALBUQUERQUE

People vs Ortega (276 SCRA 166)

Facts:
In 1992, Benjamin Ortega, Jr., Manuel Garcia and a certain John Doe were charged with murder for
thekilling Andre Man Masangkay. As narrated by a witness, the victim answered the call of nature and
wentto the back portion of the house where they were having a drinking spree. Accused
Ortega followed himand later they heard the victim shouting for help and when they ran towards the
scene he saw theaccused on top of the victim and stabbing the latter with along
bladed weapon. Thereafter, Ortega andGarcia brought the victim to a well and dropped him
and placed stones into the well. The trial courtfound the accused guilty beyond reasonable
doubt. The accused appealed averring that the trial courterred in holding them criminally liable
because at the time the victim was dropped into the well, he wasstill alive.
Issue:
Whether or not the accused may be held criminally liable for the death of the victim which is
notattributable to the stab wounds but due to drowning?
Decision:
A person who commits a felony is criminally liable for the direct natural and logical
consequences of hiswrongful act even where the resulting crime is more serious than that intended.
The essential requisitesfor this criminal liability to attach are as follows:1. the intended act
is felonious.2. the resulting act is likewise a felony3. the unintended graven wrong was primarily
caused by the actor’s wrongful acts.

2. CONCURRENCE; RESULTING HARM; CAUSATION

Bataclan v. Medina
[G.R. No. L-10126, October 22, 1957]
MONTEMAYOR, J.

Facts:
 At about 2:00am of September 13, 1952, the bus, operated by its owner defendant
Mariano Medina and driven by its regular chauffeur, Conrado Saylon, left the town of
Amadeo, Cavite. While on its way to Pasay City, one of the front tires burst and the
vehicle began to zig-zag until it fell into a canal or ditch on the right side of the road and
turned turtle.
 Some of the passengers managed to leave the bus but the three passengers seated
beside the driver, named Bataclan, Lara and the Visayan and the woman behind them
named Natalia Villanueva, could not get out of the overturned bus. No evidence to show
that the freed passengers, including the driver and the conductor, made any attempt to
pull out or extricate and rescue the four passengers trapped inside the vehicle.
 After half an hour, came about ten men, one of them carrying a lighted torch,
approach the overturned bus, and almost immediately, a fierce fire started, burning and
all but consuming the bus, including the four passengers trapped inside it.
 That same day, the charred bodies of the four passengers inside the bus were
removed and duly identified that of Juan Bataclan. By reason of his death, his widow,
Salud Villanueva, in her name and in behalf of her five minor children, brought the
present suit to recover from Mariano Medina compensatory, moral, and exemplary
damages and attorney's fees in the total amount of P87,150.
 After trial, the CFI Cavite awarded P1,000 to the plaintiffs plus P600 as attorney's
fee, plus P100, the value of the merchandise being carried by Bataclan to Pasay City for
sale and which was lost in the fire. Both plaintiffs and defendants appealed the case to CA
which endorsed the case to SC.
Issue: W/N the proximate cause of the death of Bataclan was the overturning of the bus or
the fire that burned the bus, including the 4 passengers left inside.

Held:
 The Court held that the proximate cause was the overturning of the bus because
when the vehicle turned not only on its side but completely on its back, the leaking of the
gasoline from the tank was not unnatural or unexpected.
 The coming of the men with a lighted torch was in response to the call for help,
made not only by the passengers, but most probably, by the driver and the conductor
themselves, and that because it was dark (about 2:30 in the morning), the rescuers had
to carry a light with them, and coming as they did from a rural area where lanterns and
flashlights were not available.
 In other words, the coming of the men with a torch was to be expected and was a
natural sequence of the overturning of the bus, the trapping of some of its passengers
and the call for outside help.
 Moreover, the burning of the bus can also in part be attributed to the negligence
of the carrier, through its driver and its conductor. According to the witness, the driver
and the conductor were on the road walking back and forth. They, or at least, the driver
should and must have known that in the position in which the overturned bus was,
gasoline could and must have leaked from the gasoline tank and soaked the area in and
around the bus.
 The leaked gasoline can be smelt and directed even from a distance, and yet
neither the driver nor the conductor would appear to have cautioned or taken steps to
warn the rescuers not to bring the lighted torch too near the bus.
 In addition, the case involves a breach of contract of transportation because the
Medina Transportation failed to carry Bataclan safely to his destination, Pasay City.
There was likewise negligence on the part of the defendant, through his agent, the driver
Saylon. There is evidence to show that at the time of the blow out, the bus was speeding
and that the driver failed to changed the tires into new ones as instructed by Mariano
Medina.
 The driver had not been diligent and had not taken the necessary precautions to
insure the safety of his passengers. Had he changed the tires, specially those in front,
with new ones, as he had been instructed to do, probably, despite his speeding, the blow
out would not have occurred.
Ratio:
 Proximate cause is that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence,
unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the
result would not have occurred.
 Comprehensively, 'the proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the
injury, either immediately or by setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural
and continuous chain of events, each having a close causal connection with its immediate
predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural and
probable result of the cause which first acted, under such circumstances that the person
responsible for the first event should, as an ordinary prudent and intelligent person,
have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury to
some person might probably result therefrom.
 Result is different from what was intended
PEOPLE vs ILIGAN
FACTS:
At around 2 in the morning Esmeraldo Quinones and his companions Zaldy Asis
and Felix Lukban were walking home from barangay Sto. Domingo after attending a barrio
fiesta. On the way they met the accused Fernando Iligan and his nephew EdmundoAsis and
Juan Macandog. Edmundo Asis pushed them aside prompting Zaldy Asis to boxhim. Felix
quickly said that they had no desire to fight. Upon seeing his nephew fall, Fernando
Iligan drew from his back a bolo and hacked Zaldy but missed.Terrified the trio ran,
pursued by the three accused. They ran for a good while andeven passed the house of
Quinones, when they noticed that they were no longer being chase d t he t hre e
de ci de d t o he a d back to Qui n ones house. On t he wa y ba ck t he t hre e accused
suddenly emerged from the road side, Fernando Iligan then hacked Quinones Jr.on t he
fore hea d wi t h hi s bolo ca usi n g him t o fa ll down. Fe li x an d Z aldy ra n.
U pon returning they saw that Quinones Jr. was already dead with his head busted.The
postmortem examination report and the death certificate indicates that the victim
died of “ shock and massive cerebral hemorrhages due to vehicular accident.”
ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused are liable for the victim’s death given that it was dueto a
vehicular accident and not the hacking.
HELD: YES.
We are convinced beyond peradventure that indeed after Quinones, Jr. hadfallen from the
bolo hacking perpetrated by Iligan, he was run over by a vehicle. Thisfinding,
however, does not in any way exonerate Iligan from liability for the death
of Quinones Jr. This being under ART 4 of the RPC which states that criminal liability
shall b e in curre d b y a n y pe rson commi tt in g a fe lon y a lt hough t he wron gful
a ct don e be different from that which he intended.The essential requisites of Art 4
are: that an intentional felony has been committed and that the wrong done to the
aggrieved party be the direct natural and logical consequenceof the felony committed by
the offender
.
It i s held that t he esse nt ia l e le men ts are p re se nt i n this ca se. The
i nt ent iona l fe lon ycommitt e d was the ha cki n g of t he hea d of Qui none s the
fa ct t hat it wa s consi de re d superficial by the physician is immaterial. The location of
the wound intended to do awaywith
him.T h e h a c k i n g i n c i d e n t h a p p e n e d o n t h e n a t i o n a l h i g h w a y w h e r e v e
h i c l e s p a s s a n y moment, the hacking blow received by Quinones weakened him
and was run over by avehicle. The hacking by Iligan is thus deemed as the
proximate cause of the victim’sdeath.Iligan is held liable for homicide absent any
qualifying circumstances

Urbano vs. Intermediate Appellate Court

G.R. No. 72964, JANUARY 7, 1988
SULPICIO INTOD v. CA, GR No. 103119, 1992-10-21
Facts:
In the morning of February 4, 1979, Sulpicio Intod, Jorge Pangasian, Santos Tubio and
Avelino Daligdig went to Salvador Mandaya's house... and asked him to go with them to the
house of Bernardina Palangpangan.
Thereafter, Mandaya and
Intod, Pangasian, Tubio and Daligdig had a meeting with Aniceto Dumalagan. He told
Mandaya that he wanted Palangpangan to be killed because of a land dispute between them
and that Mandaya should accompany the four (4) men, otherwise, he would also be killed.
At about 10:00 o'clock in the evening of the same day,... Mandaya, Pangasian, Tubio and
Daligdig, all armed with firearms, arrived at Palangpangan's house
At the instance of his companions, Mandaya pointed the location... of Palangpangan's
bedroom. Thereafter, Petitioner, Pangasian, Tubio and Daligdig fired at said room. It turned
out; however, that Palangpangan was in another City and her home was then occupied by
her son-in-law and his family. No one was in the room when the accused fired the... shots.
No one was hit by the gun fire.
After trial, the Regional Trial Court convicted Intod of attempted murder.
Petitioner seeks from this Court a modification of the judgment by holding him liable only
for an impossible... crime
Issues:
Petitioner contends that, Palangpangan's absence from her room on the night he and his
companions riddled it with bullets made the crime inherently impossible.
Ruling:
The Revised Penal Code, inspired by the Positivist School, recognizes in the offender his
formidability,[7] and... now penalizes an act which were it not aimed at something quite
impossible or carried out with means which prove inadequate, would constitute a felony
against person or against property.[8] The rationale of Article 4(2) is to... punish such
criminal tendencies.
Under this article, the act performed by the offender cannot produce an offense against
persons or property because: (1) the commission of the offense is inherently impossible of
accomplishment; or (2) the means employed is either (a) inadequate or (b)... ineffectual.
To be impossible under this clause, the act intended by the offender must be by its nature
one impossible of... accomplishment.[11] There must be either (1) legal impossibility, or (2)
physical impossibility of accomplishing the intended act[12] in order to qualify the act as
an impossible... crime.
Legal impossibility occurs where the intended acts, even if completed, would not amount to
a crime.[13] Thus:
Legal impossibility would apply to those circumstances where (1) the motive, desire and
expectation is to perform an act in violation of the law; (2) there is intention to perform the
physical act; (3) there is a performance of the intended physical act; and (4) the...
consequence resulting from the intended act does not amount to a crime.
The impossibility of killing a person already dead[15] falls in this category.
On the other hand, factual impossibility occurs when extraneous circumstances unknown
to the actor or beyond his control prevent the consummation of the intended crime.[16]
One example is the man who puts his hand in the coat... pocket of another with the
intention to steal the latter's wallet and finds the pocket empty.
The case at bar belongs to this category. Petitioner shoots the place where he thought his
victim would be, although in reality, the victim was not present in said place and thus, the
petitioner failed to accomplish his end.
In the Philippines, the Revised Penal Code, in Article 4(2), expressly provided for
impossible crimes and made them punishable.
WE hereby hold Petitioner guilty of an impossible crime
Having in mind the social danger and degree of criminality shown by Petitioner, this Court
sentences him to suffer the penalty of six (6) months of arresto mayor, together with the
accessory penalties... provided by the law, and to pay the costs.
Principles:
The rationale of Article 4(2) is to... punish such criminal tendencies

INTOD VS CA
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. BARTOLO SALADINO and ANASTACIA ALEJOG.R. No. L-3634,
May 30, 1951Facts:
Bartolo Saladino and Anastacio Alejo have appealed from convicting them of the murderof
Luis Bernabe. They were grabted separate trials but were both guilty.In the night of June
23, 1948, Saladino and Alejo was resting in a house in Abucay,Paoay, Ilocos Norte with
policemen Melchor Quevedo, Wilfredo Osman, and George Plan. Theywere awakened by
the cry for help by Felix Pasion who reported that he had been robbed, one ofthe robbers
being Luis Bernabe. They brought Bernabe to the residence of Felix Pasion in BarrioSingao
for questioning. Bernabe denied the charge and was beaten. He was left hanging in the
airwhile being repeatedly beaten by Saladino. Alejo was called for his turn and reluctantly
whippedBernabe. Saladino continued the maltreatment in the belief that Bernabe would
soon confess.Plan intervened and said that it would be better to bring Bernabe to their
headquarters forquestioning but Saladino ignored it. Osman noticed that Bernabe seems to
be dead but Saladino believed it to be a pretend on the part of Bernabe. After realizing
his predicament, two civilianswere ordered to carry Bernabe down and told Alejo to shoot
Bernabe and say that the victim ranaway. Three days after the internment of Bernabe, June
24, Saladino swore before the fiscal anaffidavit stating that the death of Bernabe was
because the latter attempted to escape. This wascorroborated by the three policemen.
However, after a days, Quevedo was interviewed and gavea different story which accorded
with the accounts of the witnesses during trial. Quevedo, Osmanand Plan agreed that that
Bernabe was already dead even before A
lejo was told to shoot Bernabe.Saladino was firm in his version which was corroborated by
Felix Pasion.
Issue:
Whether or not Saladino and Alejo are liable to the death of Bernabe
Ruling:
 Yes. The defendant is guilty of having cruelly tortured and treacherously caused the
deathof Luis Bernabe. The trial court believed in the story of Osman and Quevedo, the two
eye-witnesses to be the manner on how the true case happened. Saladino must be declared
guilty ofassassination. Anastacio Alejo does not appear to have conspired with him, and is
not liableeither as principal or as accomplice of the murder. But he is guilty as accessory
after the fact for
having performed acts tending to conceal Saladino’s crime by making it appear that
Bernabe h
adrun away. Alejo was found guilty of accessory after admitting that he whipped the
Bernabe.Alejo is sentenced to imprisonment for not less than three years of prison
correctional nor morethan six years and two months, of
prison mayor ; and in the case of insolvency of Saladino toindemnify the heliable to a
penalty lower by two degrees than that prescribed by law for theconsummated felony of
murder, namely, prison correctional in its maximum period to prisionmayor in its medium
period (Art 53 in connection of the Revised Penal Code)

JACINTO vs PEOPLE

GEMMA JACINTO vs PEOPLE

G.R. NO. 162540 13July2009 592SCRA26

FACTS: In June 1997, Baby Aquino, handed petitioner -collector of Mega Foam, a post dated
checked worth P10,000 as payment for Baby’s purchases from Mega Foam International,
Inc. The said check was deposited to the account of Jacqueline Capitle’s husband-Generoso.
Rowena Recablanca, another employee of Mega Foam, received a phone call from an
employee of Land Bank, who was looking for Generoso to inform Capitle that the BDO
check deposited had been dishonored. Thereafter, Joseph Dyhenga talked to Baby to tell
that the BDO Check bounced. However, Baby said that she had already paid Mega Foam
P10,000 cash in August 1997 as replacement for the dishonored check.
Dyhengco filed a compliant with the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) and worked out
an entrapment operation with its agents. Thereafter, petitioner and Valencia were arrested.
The NBI filed a criminal case for qualified theft against the two (2) and Jacqueline Capitle.

RTC rendered a decision that Gemma, Anita and Jacqueline GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of QUALIFIED THEFT and each of the sentenced to suffer imprisonment
of Five (5) years, Five (5) months and Eleven (11) days to Six (6) years, Eight (8) months
and Twenty (20) days.

ISSUE: Whether or not the crime committed falls the definition of Impossible Crime.
HELD: Yes, Since the crime of theft is not a continuing offense, petitioner’s act of receiving
the cash replacement should not be considered as continuation of the Theft.
The requisites of an impossible crime are:

1. That the Act performed would be an offer against persons or property;

2. That the act was alone with evil intent; and
3. That the accomplishment was inherently impossible or the means employed was either
inadequate or ineffectual.
The time that petitioner took a possession of the check meant for Mega Foam, she had
performed all the acts to consummate that crime of theft had it not been impossible of
accomplishment in this case.

Therefore, the Supreme Court held that petitioner Gemma T. Jacinto is found GUILTY of an
impossible crime and suffer the penalty of Six (6) months of arresto mayor and pay
courts.

CRIME WITHOUT FRUSTRATED STAGEARISTOTEL VALENZUELA y NATIVIDAD,

petitioner,vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and HON. COURT OF APPEALS NACHURA,
respondents.
G. R. No. 160188 June 21, 2007
FACTS:

On 19 May 1994, at around 4:30 p.m., petitioner and Calderon were sighted outside the
Super Sale Club, asupermarket within the ShoeMart (SM) complex along North EDSA, by
Lorenzo Lago (Lago), a security guardwho was then manning his post at the open parking
area of the supermarket. Lago saw petitioner, who waswearing an identification card with
the mark "Receiving Dispatching Unit (RDU)," hauling a push cart with cases of detergent of
the well-known "Tide" brand. Petitioner unloaded these cases in an open parking space,
whereCalderon was waiting. Petitioner then returned inside the supermarket, and after
five (5) minutes, emerged withmore cartons of Tide Ultramatic and again unloaded these
boxes to the same area in the open parking space.

Thereafter, petitioner left the parking area and haled a taxi. He boarded the cab
and directed it towards theparking space where Calderon was waiting. Calderon loaded the
cartons of Tide Ultramatic inside the taxi, thenboarded the vehicle. All these acts were eyed
by Lago, who proceeded to stop the taxi as it was leaving the openparking area. When Lago
asked petitioner for a receipt of the merchandise, petitioner and Calderon reacted byfleeing
on foot, but Lago fired a warning shot to alert his fellow security guards of the incident.
Petitioner andCalderon were apprehended at the scene, and the stolen merchandise
recovered.

The filched items seized fromthe duo were four (4) cases of Tide Ultramatic, one (1) case of
Ultra 25 grams, and three (3) additional cases of detergent, the goods with an aggregate
value of P12,090.00.

In a Decision

promulgated on 1 February 2000, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch
90,convicted both petitioner and Calderon of the crime of consummated theft. They were
sentenced to anindeterminate prison term of two (2) years of prision correccional as
minimum to seven (7) years of prision mayor as maximum.

Valenzuela appealed before the Court of Appeals, arguing that he should only be convicted
of frustrated theftsince he was not able to freely dispose of the articles stolen.

Decision dated 19 June 2003,the Court of Appeals rejected this contention and affirmed
petitioner’s conviction
,thus the Petition for Review was filed before the Supreme Court.ISSUE: Whether or not
the crime committed has a frustrated stage.HELD: NO.

The petition was

DENIED
.

Article 6
of the Revised Penal Code provides that a felony is consummated when all
the elementsnecessary for its execution and accomplishment are present.

Article 308
states that, in the crime of theft, the following elements should be present: (1) that
there betaking of personal property; (2) that said property belongs to another; (3) that the
taking be done with intentto gain; (4) that the taking be done without the consent of the
owner; and (5) that the taking be accomplishedwithout the use of violence against
or intimidation of persons or force upon things.

The Court held that theft is produced when there is deprivation of personal property by
one with intent togain. Thus, it is immaterial that the offender is able or unable to freely
dispose the property stolen since hehas already committed all the acts of execution and the
deprivation from the owner has already ensued fromsuch acts. Therefore, theft cannot have
a frustrated stage, and can only be attempted or consummated

CASE DIGEST: Rivera v. People, G.R. No. 166326

Title: Rivera v. People, G.R. No. 166326

Subject Matter: Attempted v. Frustrated Murder, Art. 6 of the Revised Penal Code

Facts:
As Ruben Rodil went to a nearby store to buy food, Edgardo Rivera mocked him for being
jobless and dependent on his wife for support. Ruben resented the rebuke and thereafter, a
heated exchange of words ensued. In the following day, when Ruben and his three year old
daughter went to the store to buy food, Edgardo together with his brother Esmeraldo and
Ismael Rivera emerged from their house and ganged up on him. Esmeraldo and Ismael
mauled Ruben with fist blows. And as he fell to the ground, Edgardo hit him three times
with a hollow block on the parietal area. The Rivera brothers fled when policemen came.
The doctor declared that the wounds were slight and superficial, though the victim could
have been killed had the police not promptly intervened.

Issues:
(1) WON there was intent to kill.

(2) WON the Court of Appeals was correct in modifying the crime from frustrated to
attempted murder.

(3) WON the aggravating circumstance of treachery was properly applied.

Held:
(1) Yes. The Court held that there was intent to kill as Esmeraldo and Ismael pummeled the
victim with fist blows, while Edgardo hit him three times with a hollow block. Even though
the wounds sustained by the victim were merely superficial and could not have produced
his death, intent to kill is presumed.

(2) Yes. The Court of Appeals was correct since based on Art. 6 of the RPC, there is an
attempt when the offender commences the commission of the felony directly by overt acts
and does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony by reason
of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance.

(3) Yes. The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack, which gives no
opportunity for the victim to repel it or defend himself. In the present case, the sudden
attack to the victim caused him to be overwhelmed and had no chance to defend himself
and retaliate. Thus, there was treachery.