PAL v. NLRC / G.R. No.

85985 / August 13, 1993

Facts:
 PAL completely revised its 1966 Code of Discipline.
The Code was circulated among the employees and was
immediately implemented, and some employees were forthwith
subjected to the disciplinary measures embodied therein.
 The Philippine Airlines Employees Association
(PALEA) filed a complaint before the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC). PALEA contended that PAL, by its
unilateral implementation of the Code, was guilty of unfair labor
practice, specifically Paragraphs E and G of Article 249 and
Article 253 of the Labor Code.
 PALEA alleged that copies of the Code had been
circulated in limited numbers; that being penal in nature the
Code must conform to the requirements of sufficient
publication, and that the Code was arbitrary, oppressive, and
prejudicial to the rights of the employees.
 It prayed that implementation of the Code be held in
abeyance; that PAL should discuss the substance of the Code
with PALEA; that employees dismissed under the Code be
reinstated and their cases subjected to further hearing; and that
PAL be declared guilty of unfair labor practice and be ordered
to pay damages PAL asserted its prerogative as an employer to
prescribe rules and regulations regarding employees' conduct
in carrying out their duties and functions, and alleging that by
implementing the Code, it had not violated the collective
bargaining agreement (CBA) or any provision of the Labor
Code. Assailing the complaint as unsupported by evidence,
PAL maintained that Article 253 of the Labor Code cited by
PALEA referred to the requirements for negotiating a CBA
which was inapplicable as indeed the current CBA had been
negotiated.

Issue:
W/N the formulation of a Code of Discipline among
employees is a shared responsibility of the employer and the
employees.

Ruling: YES
Petitioner's assertion that it needed the implementation
of a new Code of Discipline considering the nature of its
business cannot be overemphasized. In fact, it’s being a local
monopoly in the business demands the most stringent of
measuresto attain safe travel for its patrons. Nonetheless,
whatever disciplinary measures are adopted cannot be properly
implemented in the absence of full cooperation of the
employees. Such cooperation cannot be attained if the
employees are restive on account, of their being left out in the
determination of cardinal and fundamental matters affecting
their employment.

2. Carag vs. NLRC / April 2, 2007

Facts:
National Federation of Labor Unions and Mariveles Apparel
Corporation Labor Union filed a complaint against Mariveles
Apparel Corp. for illegal dismissal of its employees brought
about by its closure of business. Atty. Carag and David were
owners of the corporation. The unions moved to implead them
to satisfy any judgment award under of Article 212(c) of the
Labor Code. The Labor Arbiter granted the motion to implead
them and declared them and the corporation solidarily liable to
the complainants. This decision was affirmed by the NLRC and
CA. Carag questioned the appellate courts’ decision before the
Court.
Issue:
Whether or not Atty. Carag is liable as an employer to the
complainants
Held:
No. Article 212(e) of the Labor Code does not state that
corporate officers are personally liable for the unpaid salaries or
separation pay of employees of the corporation. The liability of
corporate directors, trustees or officers is governed Section 31
of the Corporation Code whereby it attaches only when they
assent to a patently unlawful act of the corporation, or when
they are guilty of bad faith or gross negligence in directing its
affairs.

SAMAHANG MANGGAGAWA NG RIZAL PARK and

DOMINGO ENRIQUEZ, vs. NLRC and NATIONAL PARK
DEVELOPMENT COMMITTEE

Facts:
 The petitioners were dismissed by the National Park
Development Committee, private respondent herein, on the
supercilious ground that their continued employment was "not
compatible with the rules of the New Society."
 The petitioners complained to the Department of Labor,
their dismissal was sustained by the Labor Arbiter.
 When his decision was appealed to the NLRC, the
public respondent also affirmed the dismissal albeit on a
different ground that the New Society had been banished and
discredited.
 The petitioners were employees of the private
respondent, then under the chairmanship of Imelda Marcos and
the vice-chairmanship of the late Teodoro F. Valencia.
 The petitioner union proposed negotiations for the
adoption of a collective bargaining agreement but the proposal
was ignored.
 The union then filed a notice of strike with the Bureau
of Labor Relations on the grounds of refusal of management to
bargain collectively, refusal to recognize the union, and
discrimination of union members.
 The proceedings were delayed when the private
respondent submitted that the complaint should be resolved by
the Office of the President.
 The case was returned to the public respondent on the
finding that it fell under the jurisdiction of the NLRC pursuant to
P.D. No. 2
 The Labor Arbiter dismissed the case, holding that P.D.
No. 21 was not applicable, the dismissals having been made
before its effectivity date.
 NLRC still saw fit to sustain the dismissals made by the
private respondent

Issue:

W/N NPDC validly dismissed petitioner on the ground that their

employment was not compatible with the new rules of New
Society

Ruling:
 No. A mere reading of the termination notice will readily
show that the dismissals were not for cause and that the reason
given was prima facie invalid. The general statement that the
employment of the petitioners was not consonant with the rules
of the New Society was a preposterous justification. There was
no indication of the specific rules supposedly violated nor was
there a showing, assuming the said rules had been pinpointed,
of how or when they had been breached by the dismissed
employees. Neither was it established that the employees were
informed of the charges against them or that they were given
an opportunity to be heard in their defense.
 By simply saying that the continued employment of the
petitioners was not consistent with the rules of the New Society,
the private respondent failed to discharge the burden of proving
that the employees deserved to be dismissed. In sustaining the
dismissals despite their undisguised arbitrariness, the NLRC
committed grave abuse of discretion

SAN MIGUEL FOODS, INC.-CEBU B-MEG FEED PLANT, vs.

HON. BIENVENIDO E. LAGUESMA, Undersecretary of
DOLE and ILAW AT BUKLOD NG MANGGAGAWA (IBM)

Facts:
 Petition for certification election among the monthly-
paid employees of the San Miguel Foods, Inc.-Cebu B-Meg
Feeds Plant was filed by private respondent labor federation
Ilaw at Buklod ng Manggagawa (IBM, for brevity) before Med-
Arbiter Achilles V. Manit, alleging, inter alia, that it is a
legitimate labor organization duly registered with the
Department of labor and Employment (DOLE) under the
Registration Certificate No. 5369-IP. SMFI-Cebu B-Meg Feeds
 Plant (SMFI, for brevity), herein petitioner, is a business
entity duly organized and existing underthe laws of the
Philippines which employs roughly seventy-five (75) monthly
paid employees, almost all of whom support the present
petition.
 It was submitted in said petition that there has been no
certification election conducted in SMFI to determine the sole
and exclusive bargaining agent thereat for the past two years
and that the proposed bargaining unit, which is SMFIs monthly
paid employees, is an unorganized one.
 It was also stated therein that petitioner IBM (herein
private respondent) has already complied with the mandatory
requirements for the creation of its local or affiliate in SMFIs
establishment.
 IBMs first petition for certification election was denied
mainly due to IBMs failure to comply with certain mandatory
requirements of the law. This denial was affirmed by the Med-
Arbiter.
 Thus, IBM argues that there having been no similar
petition pending before Med-Arbiter Manit, another petition for
certification election may be refiled as soon as the said
requirements are met. These requirements were finally satisfied
before the second petition for certification election was brought.
Med-Arbiter Manit, this time, granted the second petition for
certification election of private respondent IBM. Secretary of
Labor and Employment affirmed the order of the Med-Arbiter.

ISSUE:
Whether or not IBM is legitimate labor organization?

HELD:
 Yes. Article 212(h) of the Labor Code defines a
legitimate labor organization as any labor organization duly
registered with the Department of Labor and Employment, and
includes any branch or local thereof. When does a labor
organization acquire legitimacy? Ordinarily, a labor organization
attains the status of legitimacy only upon the issuance in its
name of a Certificate of Registration by the Bureau of Labor
Relations pursuant to Articles 234and 235 of the Labor Code.
 It is important to determine whether or not a particular
labor organization is legitimate since legitimate labor
organizations have exclusive rights under the law which cannot
be exercised by non-legitimate unions, one of which is the right
to be certified as the exclusive representative of all the
employees in an appropriate collective bargaining unit for
purposes of collective bargaining. These rights are found under
Article 242 of the Labor Code

Solidbank Corporation v. Gamier

November 15, 2010 | J. Villarama Jr.

G.R. No.159460
Petitioner: Solidbank Corporation (now known as First Metro
Investment Corp.)
Respondents: Ernesto U. Gamier, Elena R. Condevillamar,
Janice L. Arriola & Ophelia C. De Guzman [RESPONDENTS 1]

G.R. No.159461
Petitioners: Solidbank Corporation and/or its successor-in-
interest, First Metro Investment Corporation, Deogracias N.
Vistan & Edgardo Mendoza, Jr.
Respondents: Solidbank Union & Its Dismissed Officers and
Members (129 names) [RESPONDENTS 2]

FACTS:
 Solidbank and Solidbank Employees’ Union (Union) were
set to renegotiate the economic provisions of their 1997-
2001 CBA to cover the remaining 2 years (2000-2001).
Negotiations commenced but seeing that an agreement
was unlikely, the Union declared a deadlock and filed a
Notice of Strike on December 29, 1999.
 In view of the impending actual strike, then DOLE Sec.
Laguesma assumed jurisdiction over the labor dispute and
in an Assumption Order dated January 18, 2000 directed
the parties “to cease and desist from committing any and all
acts that might exacerbate the situation”. In another Order
dated March 24, 2000, Sec. Laguesma resolved all
economic and non-economic issues submitted by the
parties.
 Dissatisfied with the ruling, the Union held a rally in front of
the DOLE Office in Intramuros, Manila, simultaneous with
the filing of their MR. On April 3, 2000, an overwhelming
majority of employees, Union officers and members, joined
the “mass leave” and “protest action” while the bank’s
provincial branches in Cebu, Iloilo, Bacolod and Naga
followed suit and “boycotted regular work.” The union
members also picketed the bank’s Head Office in Binondo
on April 6, 2000, and Paseo de Roxas branch on April 7,
2000.
 The employees’ work abandonment/boycott lasted for 3
days (April 3 to 5). On the 3rd day, President of Solidbank
Vistan issued a memorandum declaring that the bank is
prepared to take back employees who will report for work
starting April 6, 2000 “provided these employees were/are
not part of those who led or instigated or coerced their co-
employees into participating in this illegal act.” Out of the
712 employees, 513 returned to work and were accepted
by the bank. The remaining 199 employees insisted on
defying Vistan’s directive (which includes the 3 respondents
in the 1st GR No. and the 129 individual respondents in the
2nd GR No.) They then filed separate complaints for illegal
 dismissal, ULP and damages, which were then
consolidated.
 Labor Arbiter: Dismissed the complaints of
RESPONDENTS 1. But decided in favor of
RESPONDENTS 2.
 NLRC: Reversed both.
 CA: Decided that the dismissal of ALL respondents were
illegal. REASON: the mass action was a legitimate exercise
of their right to free expression, and not a strike proscribed
when the Secretary of Labor assumed jurisdiction over the
impassé between Solidbank and the Union in the collective
bargaining negotiations.

MAIN ISSUE: WON the protest rally and concerted work

abandonment/boycott is equivalent to a strike. (my own words)
– YES.
RATIO:
 Art. 212 LC defines strike as any temporary stoppage of
work by the concerted action of employees as a result of an
industrial or labor dispute. A labor dispute includes any
controversy or matter concerning terms and conditions of
employment or the association or representation of persons
in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing or arranging
the terms and conditions of employment, regardless of
whether or not the disputants stand in the proximate
relation of employers and employees. The term “strike”
shall comprise not only concerted work stoppages, but also
slowdowns, mass leaves, sitdowns, attempts to damage,
destroy or sabotage plant equipment and facilities and
similar activities. The substance of the situation, and not its
appearance, will be deemed to be controlling.
 In the case at bar, considering that the mass actions
stemmed from a bargaining deadlock and an order of
assumption of jurisdiction had already been issued by the
Secretary of Labor to avert an impending strike, there is no
doubt that the concerted work abandonment/boycott was
the result of a labor dispute.
 Toyota Motor Phils. Corp. Workers Association (TMPCWA)
v. National Labor Relations Commission  Union contends
that the protests conducted are not within the ambit of
strikes as defined in the LC, since they were legitimate
exercises of their right to peaceably assemble and petition
the government for redress of grievances relying on the
 doctrine laid down in the case of Philippine Blooming Mills
Employees Organization. However, the Union fails to
realize one major difference [in the factual antecedents]:
there was no labor dispute in Philippine Blooming Mills. In
the present case, there was an on-going labor dispute
arising from Toyota’s refusal to recognize and negotiate
with the Union, which was the subject of the notice of strike
filed by the Union. Thus, the Union’s reliance on Philippine
Blooming Mills is misplaced. (applicable in here as well)
 Moreover, Sec. Laguesma in his 1st order already directed
that the Union and its members should refrain from
committing “any and all acts that might exacerbate the
situation which certainly includes concerted actions. For all
intents and purposes, therefore, the respondents staged a
strike ultimately aimed at realizing their economic
demands.
 Note that a strike that is undertaken despite the issuance
by the Secretary of Labor of an assumption order and/or
certification is a prohibited activity under Art. 264(a) of the
LC and thus illegal.

Court’s Other Decision:

 Only the Union officers who participated in an illegal strike
may be validly terminated from employment. It is only when
a worker commits illegal acts during a strike that he may be
declared to have lost employment status. (Art. 264(a) of
LC) Hence, with respect to respondents who are union
officers, the validity of their termination by Solidbank cannot
be questioned. But for the rest who are union members,
since there was no proof that he or she committed illegal
acts during a strike, they are entitled to reinstatement
without backwages. But since reinstatement is no longer
possible given the lapse of considerable time from the
occurrence of the strike, not to mention the fact that
Solidbank had long ceased its banking operations, the
award of separation pay of 1 month salary for each year of
service, in lieu of reinstatement, is in order.

Complex Electronics Employees Association vs. NLRC

G.R. No. 121315. July 19, 1999
G.R. No. 122136. July 19, 1999
KAPUNAN, J.:
FACTS:
 Complex Electronics Corporation (Complex) was
engaged in the manufacture of electronic products. It was
actually a subcontractor of electronic products where its
customers gave their job orders, sent their own materials and
consigned their equipment to it. The rank and file workers of
Complex were organized into a union known as the Complex
Electronics Employees Association (Union).
 Subsequently, Complex received a facsimile message
from Lite-On Philippines Electronics Co., requiring it to lower its
price by 10%. Complex informed its Lite-On personnel that
such request of lowering their selling price by 10% was not
feasible as they were already incurring losses at the present
prices of their products. Complex regretfully informed the
employees that it was left with no alternative but to close down
the operations of the Lite-On Line. According to Complex,
retrenchment will not take place until after 1 month, it’ll try to
prolong the work for as many people as possible for as long as
it can and it’ll provide retrenchment pay as provided for by law.
Complex filed a notice of closure of the Lite-On Line with the
Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) and the
retrenchment of the ninety-seven (97) affected employees.
 The Union then filed a notice of strike with the National
Conciliation and Mediation Board. In the evening of April 6,
1992, the machinery, equipment and materials being used for
production at Complex were pulled-out from the company
premises and transferred to the premises of Ionics Circuit, Inc.
(Ionics) at Cabuyao, Laguna. The following day, a total closure
of company operation was effected at Complex.
 A complaint was, thereafter, filed with the Labor
Arbitration Branch of the NLRC for unfair labor practice, illegal
closure/illegal lockout, money claims for vacation leave, sick
leave, unpaid wages, 13th month pay, damages and attorney’s
fees. The Union alleged that the pull-out of the machinery,
equipment and materials from the company premises, which
resulted to the sudden closure of the company was in violation
of Section 3 and 8, Rule XIII, Book V of the Labor Code of the
Philippines and the existing CBA. Ionics was impleaded as a
party defendant because the officers and management
personnel of Complex were also holding office at Ionics with
Lawrence Qua as the President of both companies. The Union
anchors its position on the fact that Lawrence Qua is both the
president of Complex and Ionics and that both companies have
the same set of Board of Directors. It claims that business has
not ceased at Complex but was merely transferred to Ionics, a
runaway shop.
 Ionics contended that it was an entity separate and
distinct from Complex and had been in existence since July 5,
1984 or eight (8) years before the labor dispute arose at
Complex. Like Complex, it was also engaged in the semi-
conductor business where the machinery, equipment and
materials were consigned to them by their customers. Ionics
further argued that the hiring of some displaced workers of
Complex was an exercise of management prerogatives. The
Labor Arbiter decided in favor of the Union and ordered
Complex, Ionics and Qua to solidarily reinstate the 531
employees to their former positions or pay the separation pay.
 On their appeal to the NLRC, Complex was the only
one made liable. Thus, they filed for a motion for
reconsideration which however was denied. Hence, this
petition. The Union anchors its position on the fact that
Lawrence Qua is both the president of Complex and Ionics and
that both companies have the same set of Board of Directors. It
claims that business has not ceased at Complex but was
merely transferred to Ionics, a runaway shop.

ISSUE:
WON there were unfair labor practices on the part of Complex?

RULING: No, there were no unfair labor practices on the part of

Complex.
 The Court held that the contentions of the Union are
unmeritorious. A “runaway shop” is defined as an industrial
plant moved by its owners from one location to another to
escape union labor regulations or state laws, but the term is
also used to describe a plant removed to a new location in
order to discriminate against employees at the old plant
because of their union activities. It is one wherein the employer
moves its business to another location or it temporarily closes
its business for anti-union purposes. A “runaway shop” in this
sense, is a relocation motivated by anti-union animus rather
than for business reasons. In this case, however, Ionics was
not set up merely for the purpose of transferring the business of
Complex. At the time the labor dispute arose at Complex, Ionics
was already existing as an independent company. Also, the
Union failed to show that the primary reason for the closure of
the establishment was due to the union activities of the
employees.
 Further, the Court likewise, disagree with the Union that
there was in this case an illegal lockout/illegal dismissal.
Lockout is the temporary refusal of employer to furnish work as
a result of an industrial or labor dispute. It may be manifested
by the employer’s act of excluding employees who are union
members. In the present case, there was a complete cessation
of the business operations at Complex not because of the labor
dispute. The closure was not motivated by the union activities
of the employees, but rather by necessity since it can no longer
engage in production without the much needed materials,
equipment and machinery.

EMPLOYEES UNION OF BAYER PHILS., FFW and JUANITO

S. FACUNDO, in his capacity as President,
VS BAYER PHILIPPINES, INC., DIETER J. LONISHEN
(President), ASUNCION AMISTOSO (HRD Manager),
AVELINA REMIGIO AND ANASTACIA VILLAREAL,

FACTS:
1. Petitioner Employees Union of Bayer Philippines
(Union) is the exclusive bargaining agent of all rank-and-file
employees of Bayer Philippines, and is an affiliate of the
Federation of Free Workers (FFW).
2. In 1997, the Union, headed by its president Juanito
S. Facundo, negotiated with Bayer for the signing of a CBA.
During the negotiations, the Union rejected Bayer’s 9.9% wage-
increase proposal resulting in a bargaining deadlock.
Subsequently, the Union staged a strike, prompting the
Secretary of DOLE to assume jurisdiction over the dispute.
3. Pending the resolution of the dispute, respondent
Avelina Remigio and 27 other union members, without any
authority from their union leaders, accepted Bayers wage-
increase proposal. The DOLE Secretary issued an arbitral
award ordering EUBP and Bayer to execute a CBA.
4. Meanwhile, the rift between Facundo’s leadership
and Remigio’s group broadened. Six months from the signing of
the new CBA, Remigio solicited signatures from union
members in support of a resolution containing the decision of
the signatories to: (1) disaffiliate from FFW, (2) rename the
union as Reformed Employees Union of Bayer Philippines
(Reformed Union), (3) adopt a new constitution and by-laws for
the union, (4) abolish all existing officer positions in the union
and elect a new set of interim officers, and (5) authorize
Reformed Union to administer the CBA between the Union and
Bayer. The said resolution was signed by 147 of the 257 local
union members.
5. Both groups sought recognition from Bayer and
demanded remittance of the union dues collected from its rank-
and-file members. Bayer responded by deciding not to deal with
either of the two groups, and by placing the union dues
collected in a trust account until the conflict between the two
groups is resolved.
6. The Union filed a complaint for unfair labor practice
(first unfair labor practice case) against Bayer for non-
remittance of union dues. While the case was still pending and
despite the Union’s repeated request for a grievance
conference, Bayer decided to turn over the collected union
dues to Reformed Union.
7. Consequently, the Union lodged a complaint against
Remigio’s group before the Industrial Relations Division of the
DOLE praying for their expulsion from the Union for
commission of "acts that threaten the life of the union."
8. Labor Arbiter dismissed this complaint for lack of
jurisdiction.
9. Petitioners filed the second unfair labor practice
complaint against herein respondents. Petitioners complained
that Bayer refused to remit the collected union dues to EUBP
despite several demands sent to the management and that the
latter opted to negotiate instead with Remigio’s group.
10. Reformed Union and Bayer agreed to sign a new
CBA. In response, petitioners immediately filed an urgent
motion for the issuance of a restraining order/injunction before
the NLRC and the Labor Arbiter against respondents.
11. Labor Arbiter: dismissed the Union’s second unfair
labor practice complaint for lack of jurisdiction.
12. NLRC: denied the Union’s appeal
13. CA: sustained both the Labor Arbiter and the
NLRCs rulings.

Issue: W/N the company committed an act of unfair labor

practice
Ruling:
 Yes, the acts of the company constituted an unfair
labor practice. When an employer proceeds to negotiate with a
splinter union despite the existence of its valid CBA with the
duly certified and exclusive bargaining agent, the former
indubitably abandons its recognition of the latter and terminates
the entire CBA.
 DISPOSITIVE: Bayer is liable for unfair labor practice
and they are ordered to remit to petitioners the collected union
dues previously turned over to Remegio. The unfair labor
practice complaint against Remegio is dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction of LA and NLRC.
 DOCTRINE: An intra-union dispute refers to any
conflict between and among union members, including
grievances arising from any violation of the rights and
conditions of membership, violation of or disagreement over
any provision of the union’s constitution and by-laws, or
disputes arising from chartering or disaffiliation of the union.
 It must be remembered that a CBA is entered into in
order to foster stability and mutual cooperation between labor
and capital. An employer should not be allowed to rescind
unilaterally its CBA with the duly certified bargaining agent it
had previously contracted with, and decide to bargain anew
with a different group if there is no legitimate reason for doing
so and without first following the proper procedure. If such
behavior would be tolerated, bargaining and negotiations
between the employer and the union will never be truthful and
meaningful, and no CBA forged after arduous negotiations will
ever be honored or be relied upon.

SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION EMPLOYEES UNION-PTGWO

VS HON. JESUS G. BERSAMIRA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS
PRESIDING JUDGE OF BRANCH 166, RTC, PASIG, and
SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION
FACTS: San Miguel Corporation entered into contracts for
merchandising services with Lipercon and D’Rite companies,
both independent contractors duly licensed by DOLE, to
maintain its competitive position, and in keeping with the
imperatives of efficiency, business expansion and diversity of
operation. In the contracts, it was expressly agreed that the
workers employed by the contractors were not to be deemed
employees or agents of San Miguel. Thus, no employer-
employee relationship.
Later on, San Miguel executed a CBA which specifically
provides that “temporary, probationary, or contract employees
and workers are excluded from the bargaining unit and
therefore, outside the scope of this Agreement.” The Union,
petitioner, advised San Miguel that some of the workers of
Lipercon and D’Rite had signed up for union membership and
sought regularization. The Union alleged that some the workers
have been continuously working for San Miguel for a period
ranging from 6 months to 15 years, and that the nature of their
work is neither casual nor seasonal. Strikes were held and a
series of pickets were held for the reason that the Union failed
to receive any favorable response from San Miguel. Thereafter,
San Miguel filed a complaint for Injunction and Damages before
the RTC of Pasig to enjoin the Union to prevent the peaceful
and normal operations of the former. The Union filed a Motion
to Dismiss but was subsequently denied by the RTC reasoning
that the absence of employer-employee relationship negates
the existence of labor dispute. Thus, the RTC issued Orders
enjoining the Union from committing acts that disrupt the
operations of San Miguel.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is a labor dispute between San
Miguel and the Union?
HELD: A labor dispute includes any controversy or matter
concerning terms and conditions of employment or the
association or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing,
maintaining, changing, or arranging the terms and conditions or
employment, regardless of whether the disputants stand in the
proximate relation of employer and employee. What the Union
seeks is to regularize the status of the employees contracted by
Liparcon and D’Rite and that they be absorbed into the working
unit of San Miguel. In this wise, the matter dwells on the
working relationship between the said employees and San
Miguel. Terms, tenure and conditions of their employment and
the arrangement of those terms are thus involved bringing the
matter within the purview of a labor dispute. Further, the Union
also seeks to represent the workers, who have signed for union
membership, for the purpose of collecting bargaining. Obvious
then is that representation and association, for the purpose of
negotiating the conditions of employment are also involved. In
fact, the injunction sought by San Miguel was precisely also to
prevent such representation. Again, the matter of
representation falls squarely within the ambit of a labor dispute.
As the case is indisputably linked with a labor dispute,
jurisdiction belongs to labor tribunals.
MALAYANG SAMAHAN VS RAMOS
FACTS: Petitioner MSMS, (local union) is an affiliate of
ULGWP (federation). A local union election was held under the
action of the federation.
The defeated candidates filed a petition for impeachment. The
local union held a general membership meeting. Several union
members failed to attend the meeting.
The local union requested the company to deduct the union
fines from the wage of those union members who failed to
attend the general membership meeting.
The Secretary General of the federation disapproved the
resolution imposing the Php50 fine.
The company then sent a reply to petitioner’s request stating it
cannot deduct fines without going against certain laws.
The imposition of the fine became the subject of a bitter
disagreement between the Federation and the local union
culminating to the latter’s declaration of general autonomy from
the former.
The federation asked the company to stop the remittance of the
local union’s share in the education funds. The company led a
complaint of interpleader with the DOLE.
The federation called a meeting placing the local union under
trusteeship and appointing an administrator.
Petitioner union officers received letters from the administrator
requiring them to explain why they should not be removed from
the office and expelled from union membership. The officers
were expelled from the federation.
The federation advised the company of the expulsion of the 30
union officers and demanded their separation pursuant to the
Union Security Clause in the CBA.
The Federation filed a notice of strike with the NCMB to compel
the company to effect the immediate termination of the expelled
union officers.
Under the pressure of a strike, the company terminated the 30
union officers from employment.
The petitioners filed a notice of strike on the grounds of
discrimination; interference; mass dismissal of union officers
and shop stewards; threats, coercion and intimidation ; and
union busting.
The petitioners prayed for the suspension of the effects of their
termination. Secretary Drilon dismissed the petition stating it
was an intra-union matter.
Later, 78 union shop stewards were placed under preventive
suspension. The union members staged a walk-out and
officially declared a strike that afternoon. The strike was
attended by violence.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the company was illegal dismissal.
2. Whether or not the strike was illegal.
3. Whether or not petitioners can be deemed to have
abandoned their work.

HELD:
1. Yes. The charges against respondent company proceeds
from one main issue – the termination of several employees
upon the demand of the federation pursuant to the union
security clause. Although the union security clause may be
validly enforced, such must comply with due process. In this
case, petitioner union officers were expelled for allegedly
committing acts of disloyalty to the federation. The company did
not inquire into the cause of the expulsion and merely relied
upon the federation’s allegations. The issue is not a purely
intra-union matter as it was later on converted into a termination
dispute when the company dismissed the petitioners from work
without the benefit of a separate notice and hearing. Although it
started as an intra-union dispute within the exclusive jurisdiction
of the BLR, to remand the same to the BLR would intolerably
delay the case and the Labor Arbiter could rule upon it. As to
the act of disaffiliation by the local union; it is settled that a local
union has the right to disaffiliate from its mother union in the
absence of specific provisions in the federation’s constitution
prohibiting such. There was no such provision in federation
ULGWP’s constitution.

2. No. As to the legally of the strike; it was based on the

termination dispute and petitioners believed in good faith in
dismissing them, the company was guilty of ULP. A no-strike,
no lockout provision in the CBA can only be invoked when the
strike is economic. As to the violence, the parties agreed that
the violence was not attributed to the striking employees alone
as the company itself hired men to pacify the strikers. Such
violence cannot be a ground for declaring the strike illegal.

3. As to the dismissal of the petitioners; respondents failed to

prove that there was abandonment absent any proof of
petitioner’s intention to sever the employee-employer
relationship.

Regalado vs Go
Facts:
 The present controversy stemmed from the complaint
of illegal dismissal filed before the Labor Arbiter by herein
respondent Antonio S. Go against Eurotech Hair Systems, Inc.
(EHSI) and its President Lutz Kunack and General Manager
Jose E. Barin.
 The Labor Arbiter ruled that respondent Go, as illegally
dismissed from employment. The NLRC rendered a
decision reversing the Labor Arbiter’s decision and declaring
that respondent Go’s separation from employment, as legal for
it was attended by a just cause and was validly effected by
EHSI, Kunack and Barin. Aggrieved, respondent Go elevated
the adverse decision to the Court of Appeals.
 The Court of Appeals promulgated a decision setting
aside the ruling of the NLRC and reinstating the decision of the
Labor Arbiter adjudging EHSI Kunack and Barin guilty of illegal
dismissal.
 EHSI Kunack and Barin, were able to receive a copy of
the decision through registered mail on 17 July 2003 while
respondent Go received his copy on 21 July 2003.
 On 16 July 2003, after the promulgation of the Court of
Appeals decision but prior to the receipt of the parties of their
respective copies, the parties decided to settle the case
and signed a Release Waiver and Quitclaim, with the approval
of the Labor Arbiter.
 In view, of the amicable settlement, the Labor Arbiter,
on the same day, issued an order dismissing the illegal
dismissal case with prejudice.
 After the receipt of a copy of the Court of Appeals
decision, respondent Go, through counsel, filed a Manifestation
with Omnibus Motion seeking to nullify the Release Waiver and
Quitclaim on the ground of fraud mistake or undue influence.
Acting on the motions, the appellate court issued a Resolution
annulling the order of the Labor Arbiter dated 16 July 2003
for lack of jurisdiction.
Held:
 Indirect contempt proceedings may be initiated only in
two ways: (1) motu proprio by the court; or (2) through a
verified petition and upon compliance, with the requirements for
initiatory pleadings. Procedural requirements as outlined must
be complied with.
 In the instant case, the indirect contempt proceedings,
as initiated by respondent Go through a Manifestation with
Omnibus Motion.
 It was based on the aforesaid Motion that the appellate
court issued a Resolution dated 19 November 2003, requiring
petitioner Atty. Regalado to show, cause why she should not be
cited for contempt.
 Clearly, respondent Go’s Manifestation with Omnibus
Motion was the catalyst which set everything in motion and
led to the eventual conviction of Atty. Regalado. It was
respondent Go who brought to the attention of the appellate
court the alleged misbehavior committed by petitioner Atty.
Regalado.
 Without such positive act on the part of respondent Go,
no indirect contempt charge could have been initiated at all.
 We cannot, therefore, argue that the Court of Appeals
on its own initiated the indirect contempt charge without
contradicting the factual findings made by the very same court
which rendered the questioned resolution.
 In the present case, the appellate court could not
have acquired knowledge of petitioner Atty. Regalado’s
misbehavior without respondent Go’s Manifestation with
Omnibus Motion reiterating the alleged deceitful conduct
committed by the former. Thus, the instant case was not
initiated by the court motu proprio.
 The manner upon which the case at bar was
commenced is clearly in contravention with the categorical
mandate of the Rules (a verified petition which has complied
with the requirements of initiatory pleadings must be filed).
 Respondent Go filed a Manifestation with Omnibus
Motion, which was unverified and without any supporting
particulars and documents. Such procedural flaw
notwithstanding, the appellate court granted the motion and
directed petitioner Atty. Regalado to show cause why she
should not be cited for contempt.
 Upon petitioner Atty. Regalado’s compliance with the
appellate court’s directive, the tribunal proceeded in adjudging
her guilty of indirect contempt and imposing a penalty of fine,
completely ignoring the procedural infirmities in the
commencement of the indirect contempt action. Evidently,
the proceedings attendant to the conviction of petitioner Atty.
Regalado for indirect contempt suffered a serious procedural
defect to which this Court cannot close its eyes without
offending the fundamental principles enunciated in the Rules
that we, ourselves, had promulgated.

FEDERICO S. ROBOSA vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS

COMMISSION G.R. No. 176085, February 8, 2012

FACTS:
 The NLRC issued a TRO and directed CTMI, De
Luzuriaga and other company executives to cease and desist
from dismissing any member of the union and from
implementing memorandum terminating the services of the
sales drivers, and to immediately reinstate them if the
dismissals have been effected.
 Allegedly, the respondents did not comply with the
NLRC’s resolution. They instead moved to dissolve the TRO
and opposed the union’s petition for preliminary injunction.
Then, the NLRC upgraded the TRO to a writ of preliminary
injunction. The respondents moved for reconsideration.
The union opposed the motion and urgently moved to cite the
responsible CTMI officers in contempt of court.
 Meanwhile, the NLRC heard the contempt charge and
issued a resolution dismissing the charge. It ordered the labor
arbiter to proceed hearing the main case on the merits.
ISSUE: Whether or not the NLRC has contempt powers.
HELD:
 Yes. Under Article 218 the Labor Code, the NLRC (and
the labor arbiters) may hold any offending party in contempt,
directly or indirectly, and impose appropriate penalties in
accordance with law.
 The penalty for direct contempt consists of either
imprisonment or fine, the degree or amount depends on
whether the contempt is against the Commission or the labor
arbiter.
 The Labor Code, however, requires the labor arbiter or
the Commission to deal with indirect contempt in the manner
prescribed under Rule 71 of the Rules of Court. Rule 71 of the
Rules of Court does not require the labor arbiter or the NLRC to
initiate indirect contempt proceedings before the trial court.
 This mode is to be observed only when there is no law
granting them contempt powers.
 As is clear under Article 218(d) of the Labor Code, the
labor arbiter or the Commission is empowered or has
jurisdiction to hold the offending party or parties in direct or
indirect contempt. Robosa, et al., therefore, have not improperly
brought the indirect contempt charges against the
respondents before the NLRC.
De leon vs Knitcraft Co.
FACTS:
Respondents is a domestic corporation engaged in a garments
business while the petitioner Weesan is allegedly engaged in a
labor only contractor of the respondent fairland, during their
labor dispute regarding Labor only contracting in the NLRC aA
note of hearing was sent to Weesan and then the complaints
included charges also against fairland. Atty. Geronimo
appeared as counsel for weesan and then later on filed two
separate position paper one for fairland and another for weesan
which was signed by their managers and owners respectively.
Eventually the action against them did not prosper in the NLRC
that resulted fairland to file a separate motion for
reconsideration contending that L.A. and NLRC had no
jurisdiction over them because they were never summoned to
appear, attend nor participate in all proceedings and they
denied the services of Atty. Geronimo.

ISSUE: W/n Atty. Geronimo is deemed counsel for fairland and

thus L.A. and NLRC has jurisdiction over them?
HELD:
 Yes, Records shows that the said counsel filed
pleadings to the respondent’s position paper and fairland
consolidate replied. The manager of fairland also signed the
verification attached to a position paper.
 The court further ruled that for strange credibility that a
counsel has no personal interest in a case would fight for and
defend a case with persistence and vigor if he has not been
authorized or employed by the party concerned.
 Furthermore, a mere denial by a party that he
authorized an attorney to appear for him, in the absence of a
compelling reason, is insufficient to overcome the presumption.

SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. NATIONAL

LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, Second Division, ILAW
AT BUKLOD NG MANGGAGAWA (IBM), respondents

FACTS:
1. Petitioner San Miguel Corporation (SMC) and respondent
Ilaw at Buklod ng Manggagawa (IBM), exclusive bargaining
agent of petitioner’s daily-paid rank and file employees,
executed a Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) under
which they agreed to submit all disputes to grievance and
arbitration proceedings.
2. The CBA also included a mutually enforceable no-strike no-
lockout agreement.
3. On April 11, 1994, IBM, through its vice-president Alfredo
Colomeda, filed with the National Conciliation and
Mediation Board (NCMB) a notice of strike against
petitioner for allegedly committing: (1) illegal dismissal of
union members, (2) illegal transfer, (3) violation of CBA, (4)
contracting out of jobs being performed by union members,
(5) labor-only contracting, (6) harassment of union officers
and members, (7) non-recognition of duly-elected union
officers, and (8) other acts of unfair labor practice.
4. The next day, IBM filed another notice of strike, this time
through its president Edilberto Galvez, raising similar
grounds: (1) illegal transfer, (2) labor-only contracting, (3)
violation of CBA, (4) dismissal of union officers and
members, and (5) other acts of unfair labor practice.
5. The Galvez group subsequently requested the NCMB to
consolidate its notice of strike with that of the Colomeda
group, to which the latter opposed, alleging Galvez’s lack of
authority in filing the same.
6. Petitioner thereafter filed a Motion for Severance of Notices
of Strike with Motion to Dismiss, on the grounds that the
notices raised non-strikeable issues and that they affected
 four corporations which are separate and distinct from each
other.
7. After several conciliation meetings, NCMB Director
Reynaldo Ubaldo found that the real issues involved are
non-strikeable (illegal dismissal, labor only contracting and
internal union disputes).
8. Hence on May 2, 1994, he issued separate letter-orders to
both union groups, converting their notices of strike into
preventive mediation.
9. while separate preventive mediation conferences were
ongoing, the Colomeda group filed with the NCMB a notice
of holding a strike vote.
10. Petitioner opposed by filing a Manifestation and Motion to
Declare Notice of Strike Vote Illegal, invoking the case
of PAL v. Drilon, which held that no strike could be legally
declared during the pendency of preventive mediation.
11. NCMB Director Ubaldo in response issued another letter to
the Colomeda Group reiterating the conversion of the
notice of strike into a case of preventive mediation and
emphasizing the findings that the grounds raised center
only on an intra-union conflict, which is not strikeable.
12. Colomeda group notified the NCMB of the results of their
strike vote, which favored the holding of a strike.
13. In reply, NCMB issued a letter again advising them that by
virtue of the PAL v. Drilon ruling, their notice of strike is
deemed not to have been filed, consequently invalidating
any subsequent strike for lack of compliance with the notice
requirement.
14. Despite this and the pendency of the preventive mediation
proceedings, IBM went on strike. The strike paralyzed the
operations of petitioner, causing it losses allegedly worth
P29.98 million in daily lost production.
15. petitioner filed with public respondent NLRC an amended
Petition for Injunction with Prayer for the Issuance of
Temporary Restraining Order, Free Ingress and Egress
Order and Deputization Order.

NLRC: resolved to issue a TRO directing free ingress to and

egress from petitioner’s plants, without prejudice to the union’s
right to peaceful picketing and continuous hearings on the
injunction case.
A Memorandum Of Agreement was signed calling for a lifting of
the picket lines and resumption of work in exchange of “good
faith talks” between the management and the labor
management committees.

Respondent moved to reconsider the issuance of TRO and

sought to dismiss the injunction case in view of the cessation of
its picketing activities as a result of the signed MOA.

NLRC issued the challenged decision, denying the petition for

injunction for lack of factual basis. NLRC issued the challenged
decision, denying the petition for injunction for lack of factual
basis.

ISSUE#1: Whether there was violation of the no-strike

provision in the CBA?
HELD. NO. Jurisprudence has enunciated that such clauses
only bar strikes which are economic in nature, but not strikes
grounded on unfair labor practices. The notices filed in the case
at bar alleged unfair labor practices, the initial determination of
which would entail fact-finding that is best left for the labor
arbiters. Nevertheless, our finding herein (as discussed below)
of the invalidity of the notices of strike dispenses with the need
to discuss this issue.

ISSUE#2: Whether NLRC gravely abused its discretion

when it failed to enforce, by injunction, the parties’
reciprocal obligations to submit to arbitration and not to
strike.

HELD: YES.
Article 218 (e) of the Labor Code expressly confers upon the
NLRC the power to “enjoin or restrain actual and threatened
commission of any or all prohibited or unlawful acts, or to
require the performance of a particular act in any labor dispute
which, if not restrained or performed forthwith, may cause grave
or irreparable damage to any party or render ineffectual any
decision in favor of such party x x x.”

Pursuant to Article 218 (e), the coercive measure of injunction

may also be used to restrain an actual or threatened unlawful
strike. In the case ofSan Miguel Corporation v. NLRC, where
the same issue of NLRC’s duty to enjoin an unlawful strike was
raised, we ruled that the NLRC committed grave abuse of
discretion when it denied the petition for injunction to restrain
the union from declaring a strike based on non-strikeable
grounds. Further, in IBM v. NLRC, we held that it is the “legal
duty and obligation” of the NLRC to enjoin a partial strike
staged in violation of the law. Failure promptly to issue an
injunction by the public respondent was likewise held therein to
be an abuse of discretion.

In the case at bar, petitioner sought a permanent injunction to

enjoin the respondent’s strike. A strike is considered as the
most effective weapon in protecting the rights of the employees
to improve the terms and conditions of their employment.
However, to be valid, a strike must be pursued within legal
bounds. One of the procedural requisites that Article 263 of the
Labor Code and its Implementing Rules prescribe is the filing of
a valid notice of strike with the NCMB. Imposed for the purpose
of encouraging the voluntary settlement of disputes, this
requirement has been held to be mandatory, the lack of which
shall render a strike illegal.

In the present case, NCMB converted IBM’s notices into

preventive mediation as it found that the real issues raised are
non-strikeable. Such order is in pursuance of the NCMB’s duty
to exert “all efforts at mediation and conciliation to enable the
parties to settle the dispute amicably,” and in line with the state
policy of favoring voluntary modes of settling labor disputes. In
accordance with the Implementing Rules of the Labor Code, the
said conversion has the effect of dismissing the notices of strike
filed by respondent. A case in point is PAL v. Drilon, where we
declared a strike illegal for lack of a valid notice of strike, in
view of the NCMB’s conversion of the notice therein into a
preventive mediation case.

Clearly, therefore, applying the aforecited ruling to the

case at bar, when the NCMB ordered the preventive
mediation on May 2, 1994, respondent had thereupon lost
the notices of strike it had filed. Subsequently, however, it
still defiantly proceeded with the strike while mediation
was ongoing, and notwithstanding the letter-advisories of
NCMB warning it of its lack of notice of strike.
Such disregard of the mediation proceedings was a blatant
violation of the Implementing Rules, which explicitly oblige the
parties to bargain collectivelyin good faith and prohibit them
from impeding or disrupting the proceedings.

The NCMB having no coercive powers of injunction, petitioner

sought recourse from the public respondent. The NLRC issued
a TRO only for free ingress to and egress from petitioner’s
plants, but did not enjoin the unlawful strike itself. It ignored the
fatal lack of notice of strike, and five months after came out with
a decision summarily rejecting petitioner’s cited jurisprudence.

ISSUE#3: whether there was lack of factual basis in issuing

the injunction.

HELD: NO.

Contrary to the NLRC’s finding, we find that at the time the

injunction was being sought, there existed a threat to revive the
unlawful strike as evidenced by the flyers then being circulated
by the IBM-NCR Council which led the union. These flyers
categorically declared: “Ipaalala n’yo sa management na hindi
iniaatras ang ating Notice of Strike (NOS) at anumang oras ay
pwede nating muling itirik ang picket line.” These flyers were
not denied by respondent, and were dated June 19, 1994, just
a day after the union’s manifestation with the NLRC that there
existed no threat of commission of prohibited activities.

Moreover, it bears stressing that Article 264(a) of the Labor

Code explicitly states that a declaration of strike without first
having filed the required notice is a prohibited activity, which
may be prevented through an injunction in accordance with
Article 254. Clearly, public respondent should have granted the
injunctive relief to prevent the grave damage brought about by
the unlawful strike.
Also noteworthy is public respondent’s disregard of petitioner’s
argument pointing out the union’s failure to observe the CBA
provisions on grievance and arbitration. In the case of San
Miguel Corp. v. NLRC, we ruled that the union therein violated
the mandatory provisions of the CBA when it filed a notice of
strike without availing of the remedies prescribed therein.