Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

January 9, 1973

IN THE MATTER OF THE INTEGRATION OF THE BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES.

RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:

On December 1, 1972, the Commission on Bar Integration1 submitted its Report dated
November 30, 1972, with the "earnest recommendation" — on the basis of the
said Report and the proceedings had in Administrative Case No. 5262 of the Court, and
"consistently with the views and counsel received from its [the Commission's] Board of
Consultants, as well as the overwhelming nationwide sentiment of the Philippine Bench
and Bar" — that "this Honorable Court ordain the integration of the Philippine Bar as
soon as possible through the adoption and promulgation of an appropriate Court Rule."

The petition in Adm. Case No. 526 formally prays the Court to order the integration of
the Philippine Bar, after due hearing, giving recognition as far as possible and
practicable to existing provincial and other local Bar associations. On August 16, 1962,
arguments in favor of as well as in opposition to the petition were orally expounded
before the Court. Written oppositions were admitted,3 and all parties were thereafter
granted leave to file written memoranda.4

Since then, the Court has closely observed and followed significant developments
relative to the matter of the integration of the Bar in this jurisdiction.

In 1970, convinced from preliminary surveys that there had grown a strong nationwide
sentiment in favor of Bar integration, the Court created the Commission on Bar
Integration for the purpose of ascertaining the advisability of unifying the Philippine Bar.

In September, 1971, Congress passed House Bill No. 3277 entitled "An Act Providing
for the Integration of the Philippine Bar, and Appropriating Funds Therefor." The
measure was signed by President Ferdinand E. Marcos on September 17, 1971 and
took effect on the same day as Rep. Act 6397. This law provides as follows:
 SECTION 1. Within two years from the approval of this Act, the Supreme
Court may adopt rules of court to effect the integration of the Philippine
Bar under such conditions as it shall see fit in order to raise the standards
of the legal profession, improve the administration of justice, and enable
the Bar to discharge its public responsibility more effectively.

SEC. 2. The sum of five hundred thousand pesos is hereby appropriated,

out of any funds in the National Treasury not otherwise appropriated, to
carry out the purposes of this Act. Thereafter, such sums as may be
necessary for the same purpose shall be included in the annual
appropriations for the Supreme Court.

SEC. 3. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.

The Report of the Commission abounds with argument on the constitutionality of Bar
integration and contains all necessary factual data bearing on the advisability
(practicability and necessity) of Bar integration. Also embodied therein are the views,
opinions, sentiments, comments and observations of the rank and file of the Philippine
lawyer population relative to Bar integration, as well as a proposed integration Court
Rule drafted by the Commission and presented to them by that body in a national Bar
plebiscite. There is thus sufficient basis as well as ample material upon which the Court
may decide whether or not to integrate the Philippine Bar at this time.

The following are the pertinent issues:

(1) Does the Court have the power to integrate the Philippine Bar?

(2) Would the integration of the Bar be constitutional?

(3) Should the Court ordain the integration of the Bar at this time?

A resolution of these issues requires, at the outset, a statement of the meaning of Bar
integration. It will suffice, for this purpose, to adopt the concept given by the
Commission on Bar Integration on pages 3 to 5 of its Report, thus:

Integration of the Philippine Bar means the official unification of the entire
lawyer population of the Philippines. This
requires membership and financial support (in reasonable amount) of
every attorney as conditions sine qua non to the practice of law and the
retention of his name in the Roll of Attorneys of the Supreme Court.

The term "Bar" refers to the collectivity of all persons whose names
appear in the Roll of Attorneys. An Integrated Bar (or Unified Bar) perforce
must include all lawyers.
Complete unification is not possible unless it is decreed by an entity with
power to do so: the State. Bar integration, therefore, signifies the setting
up by Government authority of a national organization of the legal
profession based on the recognition of the lawyer as an officer of the
court.

Designed to improve the position of the Bar as an instrumentality of justice

and the Rule of Law, integration fosters cohesion among lawyers, and
ensures, through their own organized action and participation, the
promotion of the objectives of the legal profession, pursuant to the
principle of maximum Bar autonomy with minimum supervision and
regulation by the Supreme Court.

The purposes of an integrated Bar, in general, are:

(1) Assist in the administration of justice;

(2) Foster and maintain on the part of its members high ideals of integrity,
learning, professional competence, public service and conduct;

(3) Safeguard the professional interests of its members;

(4) Cultivate among its members a spirit of cordiality and brotherhood;

(5) Provide a forum for the discussion of law, jurisprudence, law reform,
pleading, practice and procedure, and the relations of the Bar to the
Bench and to the public, and publish information relating thereto;

(6) Encourage and foster legal education;

(7) Promote a continuing program of legal research in substantive and

adjective law, and make reports and recommendations thereon; and

(8) Enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility effectively.

Integration of the Bar will, among other things, make it possible for the
legal profession to:

(1) Render more effective assistance in maintaining the Rule of Law;

(2) Protect lawyers and litigants against the abuse of tyrannical judges and
prosecuting officers;

(3) Discharge, fully and properly, its responsibility in the disciplining and/or
removal of incompetent and unworthy judges and prosecuting officers;
 (4) Shield the judiciary, which traditionally cannot defend itself except
within its own forum, from the assaults that politics and self-interest may
level at it, and assist it to maintain its integrity, impartiality and
independence;

(5) Have an effective voice in the selection of judges and prosecuting

officers;

(6) Prevent the unauthorized practice of law, and break up any monopoly
of local practice maintained through influence or position;

(7) Establish welfare funds for families of disabled and deceased lawyers;

(8) Provide placement services, and establish legal aid offices and set up
lawyer reference services throughout the country so that the poor may not
lack competent legal service;

(9) Distribute educational and informational materials that are difficult to

obtain in many of our provinces;

(10) Devise and maintain a program of continuing legal education for

practising attorneys in order to elevate the standards of the profession
throughout the country;

(11) Enforce rigid ethical standards, and promulgate minimum fees

schedules;

(12) Create law centers and establish law libraries for legal research;

(13) Conduct campaigns to educate the people on their legal rights and
obligations, on the importance of preventive legal advice, and on the
functions and duties of the Filipino lawyer; and

(14) Generate and maintain pervasive and meaningful country-wide

involvement of the lawyer population in the solution of the multifarious
problems that afflict the nation.

Anent the first issue, the Court is of the view that it may integrate the Philippine Bar in
the exercise of its power, under Article VIII, Sec. 13 of the Constitution, "to promulgate
rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, and the admission to
the practice of law." Indeed, the power to integrate is an inherent part of the Court's
constitutional authority over the Bar. In providing that "the Supreme Court may adopt
rules of court to effect the integration of the Philippine Bar," Republic Act 6397 neither
confers a new power nor restricts the Court's inherent power, but is a mere legislative
declaration that the integration of the Bar will promote public interest or, more
specifically, will "raise the standards of the legal profession, improve the administration
of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility more effectively."

Resolution of the second issue — whether the unification of the Bar would be
constitutional — hinges on the effects of Bar integration on the lawyer's constitutional
rights of freedom of association and freedom of speech, and on the nature of the dues
exacted from him.

The Court approvingly quotes the following pertinent discussion made by the
Commission on Bar Integration pages 44 to 49 of its Report:

Constitutionality of Bar Integration

Judicial Pronouncements.

In all cases where the validity of Bar integration measures has been put in
issue, the Courts have upheld their constitutionality.

The judicial pronouncements support this reasoning:

— Courts have inherent power to supervise and regulate the practice of

law.

— The practice of law is not a vested right but a privilege; a privilege,

moreover, clothed with public interest, because a lawyer owes duties not
only to his client, but also to his brethren in the profession, to the courts,
and to the nation; and takes part in one of the most important functions of
the State, the administration of justice, as an officer of the court.

— Because the practice of law is privilege clothed with public interest, it is

far and just that the exercise of that privilege be regulated to assure
compliance with the lawyer's public responsibilities.

— These public responsibilities can best be discharged through collective

action; but there can be no collective action without an organized body; no
organized body can operate effectively without incurring expenses;
therefore, it is fair and just that all attorneys be required to contribute to
the support of such organized body; and, given existing Bar conditions,
the most efficient means of doing so is by integrating the Bar through a
rule of court that requires all lawyers to pay annual dues to the Integrated
Bar.

1. Freedom of Association.
To compel a lawyer to be a member of an integrated Bar is not violative of
his constitutional freedom to associate (or the corollary right not to
associate).

Integration does not make a lawyer a member of any group of which he is

not already a member. He became a member of the Bar when he passed
the Bar examinations. All that integration actually does is to provide an
official national organization for the well-defined but unorganized and
incohesive group of which every lawyer is already a member.

Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He
is free to attend or not attend the meetings of his Integrated Bar Chapter
or vote or refuse to vote in its elections as he chooses. The body
compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment of annual dues.

Otherwise stated, membership in the Unified Bar imposes only the duty to
pay dues in reasonable amount. The issue therefore, is a question of
compelled financial support of group activities, not involuntary
membership in any other aspect.

The greater part of Unified Bar activities serves the function of elevating
the educational and ethical standards of the Bar to the end of improving
the quality of the legal service available to the people. The Supreme
Court, in order to further the State's legitimate interest in elevating the
quality of professional services, may require that the cost of improving the
profession in this fashion be shared by the subjects and beneficiaries of
the regulatory program — the lawyers.

Assuming that Bar integration does compel a lawyer to be a member of

the Integrated Bar, such compulsion is justified as an exercise of the
police power of the State. The legal profession has long been regarded as
a proper subject of legislative regulation and control. Moreover, the
inherent power of the Supreme Court to regulate the Bar includes the
authority to integrate the Bar.

2. Regulatory Fee.

For the Court to prescribe dues to be paid by the members does not mean
that the Court levies a tax.

A membership fee in the Integrated Bar is an exaction for regulation, while

the purpose of a tax is revenue. If the Court has inherent power to
regulate the Bar, it follows that as an incident to regulation, it may impose
a membership fee for that purpose. It would not be possible to push
through an Integrated Bar program without means to defray the
concomitant expenses. The doctrine of implied powers necessarily
includes the power to impose such an exaction.

The only limitation upon the State's power to regulate the Bar is that the
regulation does not impose an unconstitutional burden. The public interest
promoted by the integration of the Bar far outweighs the inconsequential
inconvenience to a member that might result from his required payment of
annual dues.

3. Freedom of Speech.

A lawyer is free, as he has always been, to voice his views on any subject
in any manner he wishes, even though such views be opposed to
positions taken by the Unified Bar.

For the Integrated Bar to use a member's due to promote measures to

which said member is opposed, would not nullify or adversely affect his
freedom of speech.

Since a State may constitutionally condition the right to practice law upon
membership in the Integrated Bar, it is difficult to understand why it should
become unconstitutional for the Bar to use the member's dues to fulfill the
very purposes for which it was established.

The objection would make every Governmental exaction the material of a

"free speech" issue. Even the income tax would be suspect. The objection
would carry us to lengths that have never been dreamed of. The
conscientious objector, if his liberties were to be thus extended, might
refuse to contribute taxes in furtherance of war or of any other end
condemned by his conscience as irreligious or immoral. The right of
private judgment has never yet been exalted above the powers and the
compulsion of the agencies of Government.

4. Fair to All Lawyers.

Bar integration is not unfair to lawyers already practising because

although the requirement to pay annual dues is a new regulation, it will
give the members of the Bar a new system which they hitherto have not
had and through which, by proper work, they will receive benefits they
have not heretofore enjoyed, and discharge their public responsibilities in
a more effective manner than they have been able to do in the past.
Because the requirement to pay dues is a valid exercise of regulatory
power by the Court, because it will apply equally to all lawyers, young and
old, at the time Bar integration takes effect, and because it is a new
regulation in exchange for new benefits, it is not retroactive, it is not
unequal, it is not unfair.
To resolve the third and final issue — whether the Court should ordain the integration of
the Bar at this time — requires a careful overview of the practicability and necessity as
well as the advantages and disadvantages of Bar integration.

In many other jurisdictions, notably in England, Canada and the United States, Bar
integration has yielded the following benefits: (1) improved discipline among the
members of the Bar; (2) greater influence and ascendancy of the Bar; (3) better and
more meaningful participation of the individual lawyer in the activities of the Integrated
Bar; (4) greater Bar facilities and services; (5) elimination of unauthorized practice; (6)
avoidance of costly membership campaigns; (7) establishment of an official status for
the Bar; (8) more cohesive profession; and (9) better and more effective discharge by
the Bar of its obligations and responsibilities to its members, to the courts, and to the
public. No less than these salutary consequences are envisioned and in fact expected
from the unification of the Philippine Bar.

Upon the other hand, it has been variously argued that in the event of integration,
Government authority will dominate the Bar; local Bar associations will be weakened;
cliquism will be the inevitable result; effective lobbying will not be possible; the Bar will
become an impersonal Bar; and politics will intrude into its affairs.

It is noteworthy, however, that these and other evils prophesied by opponents of Bar
integration have failed to materialize in over fifty years of Bar integration experience in
England, Canada and the United States. In all the jurisdictions where the Integrated Bar
has been tried, none of the abuses or evils feared has arisen; on the other hand, it has
restored public confidence in the Bar, enlarged professional consciousness, energized
the Bar's responsibilities to the public, and vastly improved the administration of justice.

How do the Filipino lawyers themselves regard Bar integration? The official statistics
compiled by the Commission on Bar integration show that in the national poll recently
conducted by the Commission in the matter of the integration of the Philippine Bar, of a
total of 15,090 lawyers from all over the archipelago who have turned in their individual
responses, 14,555 (or 96.45 per cent) voted in favor of Bar integration, while only 378
(or 2.51 per cent) voted against it, and 157 (or 1.04 per cent) are non-commital. In
addition, a total of eighty (80) local Bar association and lawyers' groups all over the
Philippines have submitted resolutions and other expressions of unqualified
endorsement and/or support for Bar integration, while not a single local Bar association
or lawyers' group has expressed opposed position thereto. Finally, of the 13,802
individual lawyers who cast their plebiscite ballots on the proposed integration Court
Rule drafted by the Commission, 12,855 (or 93.14 per cent) voted in favor thereof, 662
(or 4.80 per cent) vote against it, and 285 (or 2.06 per cent) are non-committal.5 All
these clearly indicate an overwhelming nationwide demand for Bar integration at this
time.

The Court is fully convinced, after a thoroughgoing conscientious study of all the
arguments adduced in Adm. Case No. 526 and the authoritative materials and the mass
of factual data contained in the exhaustive Report of the Commission on Bar
Integration, that the integration of the Philippine Bar is "perfectly constitutional and
legally unobjectionable," within the context of contemporary conditions in the
Philippines, has become an imperative means to raise the standards of the legal
profession, improve the administration of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its
public responsibility fully and effectively.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court, by virtue of the power vested in it by Section 13 of Article

VIII of the Constitution, hereby ordains the integration of the Bar of the Philippines in
accordance with the attached COURT RULE, effective on January 16, 1973.

Concepcion, C.J., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castillo, Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo,

Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra, JJ., concur.

Cayetano vs. Monsod

201 SCRA 210

September 1991

Facts: Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino

to the position of chairman of the COMELEC. Petitioner opposed the nomination
because allegedly Monsod does not posses required qualification of having been
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. The 1987 constitution provides in
Section 1, Article IX-C: There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a
Chairman and six Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines
and, at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, holders of a
college degree, and must not have been candidates for any elective position in the
immediately preceding elections. However, a majority thereof, including the Chairman,
shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law
for at least ten years.

Issue: Whether the respondent does not posses the required qualification of having
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.

Held: In the case of Philippine Lawyers Association vs. Agrava, stated: The practice of
law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the
preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special proceeding,
the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients before judges
and courts, and in addition, conveying. In general, all advice to clients, and all action
taken for them in matters connected with the law incorporation services, assessment
and condemnation services, contemplating an appearance before judicial body, the
foreclosure of mortgage, enforcement of a creditor’s claim in bankruptcy and insolvency
proceedings, and conducting proceedings in attachment, and in matters of estate and
guardianship have been held to constitute law practice. Practice of law means any
activity, in or out court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure,
knowledge, training and experience.

The contention that Atty. Monsod does not posses the required qualification of having
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years is incorrect since Atty. Monsod’s
past work experience as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur
of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both rich and the
poor – verily more than satisfy the constitutional requirement for the position of
COMELEC chairman, The respondent has been engaged in the practice of law for at
least ten years does In the view of the foregoing, the petition is DISMISSED.

PADILLA, J., dissenting:

The records of this case will show that when the Court first deliberated on the Petition at
bar, I voted not only to require the respondents to comment on the Petition, but I was
the sole vote for the issuance of a temporary restraining order to enjoin respondent
Monsod from assuming the position of COMELEC Chairman, while the Court
deliberated on his constitutional qualification for the office. My purpose in voting for a
TRO was to prevent the inconvenience and even embarrassment to all parties
concerned were the Court to finally decide for respondent Monsod's disqualification.
Moreover, a reading of the Petition then in relation to established jurisprudence already
showed prima facie that respondent Monsod did not possess the needed qualification,
that is, he had not engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10) years prior to his
appointment as COMELEC Chairman.

After considering carefully respondent Monsod's comment, I am even more convinced

that the constitutional requirement of "practice of law for at least ten (10) years" has not
been met.

The procedural barriers interposed by respondents deserve scant consideration

because, ultimately, the core issue to be resolved in this petition is the proper construal
of the constitutional provision requiring a majority of the membership of COMELEC,
including the Chairman thereof to "have been engaged in the practice of law for at least
ten (10) years." (Art. IX(C), Section 1(1), 1987 Constitution). Questions involving the
construction of constitutional provisions are best left to judicial resolution. As declared
in Angara v. Electoral Commission, (63 Phil. 139) "upon the judicial department is
thrown the solemn and inescapable obligation of interpreting the Constitution and
defining constitutional boundaries."

The Constitution has imposed clear and specific standards for a COMELEC Chairman.
Among these are that he must have been "engaged in the practice of law for at least ten
(10) years." It is the bounden duty of this Court to ensure that such standard is met and
complied with.

What constitutes practice of law? As commonly understood, "practice" refers to

the actual performance or application of knowledge as distinguished from mere
possession of knowledge; it connotes an active, habitual, repeated or customary
action.1 To "practice" law, or any profession for that matter, means, to exercise or
pursue an employment or profession actively, habitually, repeatedly or customarily.

Therefore, a doctor of medicine who is employed and is habitually performing the tasks
of a nursing aide, cannot be said to be in the "practice of medicine." A certified public
accountant who works as a clerk, cannot be said to practice his profession as an
accountant. In the same way, a lawyer who is employed as a business executive or a
corporate manager, other than as head or attorney of a Legal Department of a
corporation or a governmental agency, cannot be said to be in the practice of law.

As aptly held by this Court in the case of People vs. Villanueva:2

Practice is more than an isolated appearance for it consists in frequent or

customary actions, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is
frequent habitual exercise (State vs- Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan. 864, 42 LRA,
M.S. 768). Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of statute has been
interpreted as customarily or habitually holding one's self out to the public as a
lawyer and demanding payment for such services (State vs. Bryan, 4 S.E. 522,
98 N.C. 644,647.) ... (emphasis supplied).

It is worth mentioning that the respondent Commission on Appointments in a

Memorandum it prepared, enumerated several factors determinative of whether a
particular activity constitutes "practice of law." It states:

1. Habituality. The term "practice of law" implies customarily or habitually holding

one's self out to the public as a lawyer (People vs. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109
citing State v. Boyen, 4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644) such as when one sends a
circular announcing the establishment of a law office for the general practice of
law (U.S. v. Ney Bosque, 8 Phil. 146), or when one takes the oath of office as a
lawyer before a notary public, and files a manifestation with the Supreme Court
informing it of his intention to practice law in all courts in the country (People v.
De Luna, 102 Phil. 968).

Practice is more than an isolated appearance for it consists in frequent or

customary action, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is a
habitual exercise (People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109 citing State v. Cotner, 127,
p. 1, 87 Kan, 864).

2. Compensation. Practice of law implies that one must have presented himself
to be in the active and continued practice of the legal profession and that his
professional services are available to the public for compensation, as a service of
his livelihood or in consideration of his said services. (People v. Villanueva,
supra). Hence, charging for services such as preparation of documents involving
the use of legal knowledge and skill is within the term "practice of law" (Ernani
Paño, Bar Reviewer in Legal and Judicial Ethics, 1988 ed., p. 8 citing People v.
 People's Stockyards State Bank, 176 N.B. 901) and, one who renders an opinion
as to the proper interpretation of a statute, and receives pay for it, is to that
extent, practicing law (Martin, supra, p. 806 citing Mendelaun v. Gilbert and
Barket Mfg. Co., 290 N.Y.S. 462) If compensation is expected, all advice to
clients and all action taken for them in matters connected with the law; are
practicing law. (Elwood Fitchette et al., v. Arthur C. Taylor, 94A-L.R. 356-359)

3. Application of law legal principle practice or procedure which calls for legal
knowledge, training and experience is within the term "practice of law".
(Martin supra)

4. Attorney-client relationship. Engaging in the practice of law presupposes the

existence of lawyer-client relationship. Hence, where a lawyer undertakes an
activity which requires knowledge of law but involves no attorney-client
relationship, such as teaching law or writing law books or articles, he cannot be
said to be engaged in the practice of his profession or a lawyer (Agpalo, Legal
Ethics, 1989 ed., p. 30).3

The above-enumerated factors would, I believe, be useful aids in determining whether

or not respondent Monsod meets the constitutional qualification of practice of law for at
least ten (10) years at the time of his appointment as COMELEC Chairman.

The following relevant questions may be asked:

1. Did respondent Monsod perform any of the tasks which are peculiar to the practice of
law?

2. Did respondent perform such tasks customarily or habitually?

3. Assuming that he performed any of such tasks habitually, did he do so HABITUALLY

FOR AT LEAST TEN (10) YEARS prior to his appointment as COMELEC Chairman?

Given the employment or job history of respondent Monsod as appears from the
records, I am persuaded that if ever he did perform any of the tasks which constitute the
practice of law, he did not do so HABITUALLY for at least ten (10) years prior to his
appointment as COMELEC Chairman.

While it may be granted that he performed tasks and activities which could be
latitudinarianly considered activities peculiar to the practice of law, like the drafting of
legal documents and the rendering of legal opinion or advice, such were isolated
transactions or activities which do not qualify his past endeavors as "practice of law." To
become engaged in the practice of law, there must be a continuity, or a succession of
acts. As observed by the Solicitor General in People vs. Villanueva:4

Essentially, the word private practice of law implies that one must have
presented himself to be in the activeand continued practice of the legal
 profession and that his professional services are available to the public for a
compensation, as a source of his livelihood or in consideration of his said
services.

ACCORDINGLY, my vote is to GRANT the petition and to declare respondent Monsod

as not qualified for the position of COMELEC Chairman for not having engaged in the
practice of law for at least ten (10) years prior to his appointment to such position.

Mauricio C. Ulep vs. The Legal Clinic, Inc.

B.M. No. 553. June 17, 1993

Facts:
Mauricio C. Ulep, petitioner, prays this Court "to order the respondent, The Legal Clinic,
Inc.,to cease and desist from issuing advertisements similar to or of the same tenor as
that of Annexes `A' and `B' (of said petition) and to perpetually prohibit persons or
entities from making advertisements pertaining to the exercise of the law profession
other than those allowed by law.” The advertisements complained of by herein petitioner
are as follows:
Annex A
SECRET MARRIAGE?
 P560.00 for a valid marriage.
 Info on DIVORCE.
ABSENCE.
 ANNULMENT. VISA.
THEPlease call: 521-0767,
 LEGAL5217232, 5222041
 CLINIC, INC.8:30 am-6:00
pm
 7-Flr. Victoria Bldg. UN Ave., Mla.
Annex B
GUAM DIVORCE
DON PARKINSON
an Attorney in Guam, is giving FREE BOOKS on Guam Divorce through The Legal
Clinic beginning Monday to Friday during office hours.
Guam divorce. Annulment of Marriage. Immigration Problems, Visa Ext. Quota/Non-
quota Res. & Special Retiree's Visa. Declaration of Absence. Remarriage to Filipina
Fiancees. Adoption. Investment in the Phil. US/Foreign Visa for Filipina
Spouse/Children. Call Marivic.
THE 7 F Victoria Bldg. 429 UN Ave.
 LEGALErmita, Manila nr. US Embassy
 CLINIC,
INC. Tel. 521-7232521-7251
 522-2041; 521-0767

It is the submission of petitioner that the advertisements above reproduced are

champertous, unethical, demeaning of the law profession, and destructive of the
confidence of the community in the integrity of the members of the bar and that, as a
member of the legal profession, he is ashamed and offended by the said
advertisements, hence the reliefs sought in his petition as herein before quoted.

In its answer to the petition, respondent admits the fact of publication of said
advertisements at its instance, but claims that it is not engaged in the practice of law but
in the rendering of "legal support services" through paralegals with the use of modern
computers and electronic machines. Respondent further argues that assuming that the
services advertised are legal services, the act of advertising these services should be
allowed supposedly in the light of the case of John R. Bates and Van O'Steen vs. State
Bar of Arizona, reportedly decided by the United States Supreme Court on June 7,
1977.

Issue:
Whether or not the services offered by respondent, The Legal Clinic, Inc., as
advertised by it constitutes practice of law and, in either case, whether the same can
properly be the subject of the advertisements herein complained of.

Held:
Yes. The Supreme Court held that the services offered by the respondent
constitute practice of law. The definition of “practice of law” is laid down in the case of
Cayetano vs. Monsod, as defined:
Black defines "practice of law" as:
"The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the application of legal principles
and technique to serve the interest of another with his consent. It is not limited to
appearing in court, or advising and assisting in the conduct of litigation, but embraces
the preparation of pleadings, and other papers incident to actions and special
proceedings, conveyancing, the preparation of legal instruments of all kinds, and the
giving of all legal advice to clients. It embraces all advice to clients and all actions taken
for them in matters connected with the law."

The contention of respondent that it merely offers legal support services can neither be
seriously considered nor sustained. Said proposition is belied by respondent's own
description of the services it has been offering. While some of the services being offered
by respondent corporation merely involve mechanical and technical know-how, such as
the installation of computer systems and programs for the efficient management of law
offices, or the computerization of research aids and materials, these will not suffice to
justify an exception to the general rule. What is palpably clear is that respondent
corporation gives out legal information to laymen and lawyers. Its contention that such
function is non-advisory and non-diagnostic is more apparent than real. In providing
information, for example, about foreign laws on marriage, divorce and adoption, it
strains the credulity of this Court that all that respondent corporation will simply do is
look for the law, furnish a copy thereof to the client, and stop there as if it were merely a
bookstore. With its attorneys and so called paralegals, it will necessarily have to explain
to the client the intricacies of the law and advise him or her on the proper course of
action to be taken as may be provided for by said law. That is what its advertisements
represent and for which services it will consequently charge and be paid. That activity
falls squarely within the jurisprudential definition of "practice of law." Such a conclusion
will not be altered by the fact that respondent corporation does not represent clients in
court since law practice, as the weight of authority holds, is not limited merely to court
appearances but extends to legal research, giving legal advice, contract drafting, and so
forth.
That fact that the corporation employs paralegals to carry out its services is not
controlling. What is important is that it is engaged in the practice of law by virtue of the
nature of the services it renders which thereby brings it within the ambit of the statutory
prohibitions against the advertisements which it has caused to be published and are
now assailed in this proceeding. The standards of the legal profession condemn the
lawyer's advertisement of his talents. A lawyer cannot, without violating the ethics of his
profession, advertise his talents or skills as in a manner similar to a merchant
advertising his goods. The proscription against advertising of legal services or
solicitation of legal business rests on the fundamental postulate that the practice of law
is a profession. The canons of the profession tell us that the best advertising possible
for a lawyer is a well-merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust,
which must be earned as the outcome of character and conduct. Good and efficient
service to a client as well as to the community has a way of publicizing itself and
catching public attention. That publicity is a normal by-product of effective service which
is right and proper. A good and reputable lawyer needs no artificial stimulus to generate
it and to magnify his success. He easily sees the difference between a normal by-
product of able service and the unwholesome result of propaganda.

RULE 138

Attorneys and Admission to Bar

Section 1. Who may practice law. — Any person heretofore duly admitted as a member of the bar,
or hereafter admitted as such in accordance with the provisions of this rule, and who is in good and
regular standing, is entitled to practice law.

Re: Almacen, 31 SCRA 562

19
JUL
FACTS:
Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen filed a “Petition to Surrender the Lawyer’s Certificate of
Title” to the Supreme Court as a sign of his protest as against to what he call a
tribunal “peopled by people who are calloused to our pleas for justice…”. He also
expressed strong words as against the judiciary like “justice… is not only blind, but also
deaf and dumb.” . The petition rooted from the case he lost due to the absence of time
and place in his motion in the trial court. His appeal was dismissed in the Court of
Appeals by reason of jurisprudence. In a petition for certiorari in the Supreme Court, it
was again dismissed thru a minute resolution. With the disappointments, he thought of
this sacrificial move. He claimed that this petition to surrender his title is only in trust,
and that he may obtain the title again as soon as he regained confidence in the justice
system.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Almacen should be given disciplinary actions for his acts.
HELD:
YES. Indefinite suspension imposed.
RATIO:
It has been pointed out by the Supreme Court that there is no one to blame but Atty.
Almacen himself because of his negligence. Even if the intentions of his accusations are
so noble, in speaking of the truth and alleged injustices,so as not to condemn the
sinners but the sin, it has already caused enough damage and disrepute to the judiciary.
Since this particular case is sui generis in its nature, a number of foreign and local
jurisprudence in analogous cases were cited as benchmarks and references. Between
disbarment and suspension, the latter was imposed. Indefinite suspension may only be
lifted until further orders, after Atty. Almacen may be able to prove that he is again fit to
resume the practice of law.

In Re Cunanan
18March1954

FACTS OF THE CASE:

In the manner of the petitions for Admission to the Bar of unsuccessful candidates of
1946 to 1953; Albino Cunanan et. al petitioners.

In recent years few controversial issues have aroused so much public interest and
concern as R.A. 972 popularly known as the “Bar Flunkers’ Act of 1953.” Generally a
candidate is deemed passed if he obtains a general ave of 75% in all subjects w/o
falling below 50% in any subject, although for the past few exams the passing grades
were changed depending on the strictness of the correcting of the bar examinations
(1946- 72%, 1947- 69%, 1948- 70% 1949-74%, 1950-1953 – 75%).

Believing themselves to be fully qualified to practice law as those reconsidered and

passed by the S.C., and feeling that they have been discriminated against, unsuccessful
candidates who obtained averages of a few percentages lower than those admitted to
the bar went to congress for, and secured in 1951 Senate Bill no. 12, but was vetoed by
the president after he was given advise adverse to it. Not overriding the veto, the senate
then approved senate bill no. 372 embodying substantially the provisions of the vetoed
bill. The bill then became law on June 21, 1953

Republic Act 972 has for its object, according to its author, to admit to the Bar those
candidates who suffered from insufficiency of reading materials and inadequate
preparations. By and large, the law is contrary to public interest since it qualifies 1,094
law graduates who had inadequate preparation for the practice of law profession, as
evidenced by their failure in the exams.

ISSUES OF THE CASE:

Due to the far reaching effects that this law would have on the legal profession and the
administration of justice, the S.C. would seek to know if it is CONSTITUTIONAL.
An adequate legal preparation is one of the vital requisites for the practice of the law
that should be developed constantly and maintained firmly.
The Judicial system from which ours has been derived, the act of admitting,
suspending, disbarring, and reinstating attorneys at law in the practice of the profession
is concededly judicial.
The Constitution, has not conferred on Congress and the S.C. equal responsibilities
concerning the admission to the practice of law. The primary power and responsibility
which the constitution recognizes continue to reside in this court.
Its retroactivity is invalid in such a way, that what the law seeks to “cure” are not the
rules set in place by the S.C. but the lack of will or the defect in judgment of the court,
and this power is not included in the power granted by the Const. to Congress, it lies
exclusively w/in the judiciary.
Reasons for Unconstitutionality:
1. There was a manifest encroachment on the constitutional responsibility of the
Supreme Court.
2. It is in effect a judgment revoking the resolution of the court, and only the S.C. may
revise or alter them, in attempting to do so R.A. 972 violated the Constitution.
3. That congress has exceeded its power to repeal, alter, and supplement the rules on
admission to the bar (since the rules made by congress must elevate the profession,
and those rules promulgated are considered the bare minimum.)
4. It is a class legislation
5. Art. 2 of R.A. 972 is not embraced in the title of the law, contrary to what the
constitution enjoins, and being inseparable from the provisions of art. 1, the entire law is
void.
HELD:

Under the authority of the court:

1. That the portion of art. 1 of R.A. 972 referring to the examinations of 1946 to 1952
and all of art. 2 of the said law are unconstitutional and therefore void and w/o force and
effect.
2. The part of ART 1 that refers to the examinations subsequent to the approval of the
law (1953- 1955) is valid and shall continue in force. (those petitions by the candidates
who failed the bar from 1946 to 1952 are denied, and all the candidates who in the
examination of 1953 obtained a GEN Ave. of 71.5% w/o getting a grade of below 50%
in any subject are considered as having passed whether they have filed petitions for
admissions or not.)

AR MATTER NO. 702 May 12, 1994

Gentlemen:
Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a Resolution of the Court En Banc dated May
12, 1994.

Bar Matter No. 702 (In the Matter of Petition to authorize Sharia'h District Court Judges
to Appoint Shari'a Lawyers as Notaries Public, Atty. Royo M. Gampong, petitioner)

Petitioner Royo M. Gampong, a Bachelor of Laws (LIB) graduate of Notre Dame

University who was admitted to the Philippine Shari'a Bar on October 7, 1991, filed the
instant petition praying that this Court, after due notice and hearing, issue an order
authorizing all Shari'a District Court Judges to appoint Shari'a Lawyers who possess the
qualifications and none of the disqualifications as notaries public within their respective
jurisdictions.

On the theory that Shari'a District Courts are co-equal with the regular Regional Trial
Courts in the hierarchy of the Philippine Judicial System, petitioner claims that by
analogy, Shari'a District Court Judges may be authorized to appoint the members of the
Philippine Shari'a Bar. Petitioner further argues that, being a special member of the
Philippine Bar and a practicing Shari'a lawyer, notarial work is indispensable and
imperative in the exercise of his profession; therefore, he is qualified to be appointed as
notary public by Shari'a District Judge. Petitioner likewise claims that Shari'a lawyers
cannot be appointed as notaries public in their places of residence and in cities and
other pilot centers where Shari'a courts are established because the RTC Executive
Judges in Cotabato and Maguindanao require them to secure certifications from the IBP
Secretary that there are no practicing lawyers in the place where they are applying.
Thus, Shari'a lawyers lose their chance to be appointed as notaries public because of
the policy of the IBP chapters in Region 12 to appoint regular IBP members practically
in all municipalities and provinces.

The petition is denied.

The appointment, qualification, jurisdiction and powers of notaries public are governed
by the provisions of the Notarial Law embodied in Sections 231 to Section 241, Chapter
11 of the Revised Administrative Code, Section 232 of the Revised Administrative Code
as amended by Executive Order No. 41, May 11, 1945 provides:

Sec. 232. Appointment of notaries public. — Judges of Court of

First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) in the respective may
appoint as many notaries public as the public good requires, and
there shall be at least one for every municipality in each province.
Notaries public in the City of Manila shall be appointed by one of
the judges of the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court)
of Manila to be chosen by the judges of the branches of said court"
(Words in parenthesis supplied)

Strictly speaking, Shari'a District Courts do not form part of the integrated judicial
system of the Philippines. Section 2 of the Judiciary Reorganization Acts of 1980 (B.P.
Blg. 129) enumerates the courts covered by the Act, comprising the integrated judicial
system. Shari'a Courts are not included in the enumeration notwithstanding that, when
said B.P. Blg. 129 took effect on August 14, 1981, P.D. No. 1083 (otherwise known as
"Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines") was already in force. The Shari'a
Courts are mentioned in Section 45 of the Act only for the purpose of including them "in
the funding appropriations."

The fact that judges thereof are required by law to possess the same qualifications as
those of Regional Trial Courts does not signify that the Shari'a Court is a regular court
like the Regional Trial Court. The latter is a court of general jurisdiction, i.e., competent
to decide all cases, civil and criminal, within its jurisdiction. A Shari'a District Court,
created pursuant to Article 137 of Presidential Decree No. 1083, is a court of limited
jurisdiction, exercising original only over cases specifically enumerated in Article 143
thereof. In other words, a Shari'a District Court is not a regular court exercising general
jurisdiction within the meaning of Section 232 of the Notarial Law.

The fact, too, that Shari'a Courts are called "courts" does not imply that they are on
equal footing or are identical with regular courts, for the word "court" may be applied to
tribunals which are not actually judicial in character, but are quasi-judicial agencies, like
the Securities and Exchange Commission, Land Registration Authority, Social Security
Commission, Civil Aeronautics Boards, Bureau of Patents, Trademark and Technology,
Energy Regulatory Board, etc. 1

Moreover, decisions of the Shari'a District Courts are not elevated to this Court by
appeal under Rule 41, or by petition for review under Rule 45, of the Rules of Court.
Their decisions are final "whether on appeal from the Shari'a Circuit Court or not" 2 and
hence, may reach this Court only by way of a special civil action under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court, similar to those of the National Labor Relations Commission, or the
Central Board of Assessment Appeals. 3

Furthermore, the qualifications for appointment as a judge of a Shari'a District Court are
different from those required of a judge of a Regional Trial Court under Section 15 of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 which provides:

Sec. 15. Qualifications — No person shall be appointed Regional

trial Court Judge unless he is a natural born citizen of the
Philippines, at least thirty-five years of age, and, for at least ten
years, has been engaged in the practice of law in the Philippines
requiring admission to the practice of law as an indispensable
requirement.

In case of Shari'a Court judges, on the other hand, a Special Bar Examination for
Shari'a Courts was authorized by the Supreme Court in its En Banc resolution dated
September 20, 1983. Those who pass said examination are qualified for appointment
for Shari'a court judges and for admission to special membership in the Philippine Bar to
practice law in the Shari'a courts pursuant to Article 152, in relation to Articles 148 and
158 of P.D. No. 1083. Said Article 152, P.D. No. 1083 provides, thus:

Art. 152. Qualifications. — No person shall be appointed judge of

the Shari'a Circuit Court unless he is a natural born citizen of the
Philippines, at least twenty-five years of age, and has passed an
examination in the Sharia' and Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh) to be
given by the Supreme Court for admission to special membership
in the Philippine Bar to practice law in the Shari'a courts.

The authority thus conferred by the Notarial Law upon judges of the Court of First
Instance, now the Regional Trial Court, in their respective provinces to appoint notaries
public cannot be expanded to cloth the judges of the Shari'a District Court with the same
statutory authority. The authority to appoint notaries public contemplated under Section
232 of the Notarial Law and the corresponding supervising authority over them
authorized under Section 248 thereof require the qualifications and experience of an
RTC Judge.

It must be made clear in this regard that since a person who has passed the Shari'a Bar
Examination does not automatically become a regular member of the Philippine Bar, he
lacks the necessary qualification to be appointed a notary public. Section 233 of the
Notarial Law provides for the qualifications for appointment as notary public, thus:

Sec. 233. Qualifications for Appointment. — To be eligible for

appointment as notary public, a person must be a citizen of the
Philippines (or of the United States) and over twenty-one years of
age. He must, furthermore, be a person who has been admitted to
the practice of law or who has completed and passed in the studies
of law in a reputable university or school of law, or has passed the
examination for the office of the peace or clerk or deputy clerk of
court, or be a person who had qualified for the office of notary
public under the Spanish sovereignty.

In the chartered cities and in the capitals of the provinces, where

there are two or more lawyers appointed as notaries public, no
person other than a lawyer or a person who had qualified to hold
the office of notary public under the Spanish sovereignty shall hold
said office.

In municipalities or municipal districts where no person resides

having the qualifications herein before specified or having them,
refuses to hold such office, judges of first instance may appoint
other persons temporarily to exercise the office of notary public who
have the requisite qualifications or fitness and morality.
In an En Banc resolution of the Court dated August 5, 1993, in Bar Matter No. 681 "Re:
Petition to Allow Shari'a Lawyers to exercise their profession at the regular courts," this
Court categorically stated that a person who has passed the Shari'a Bar Examination is
only a special member of the Philippine Bar and not a full-fledged member thereof even
if he is a Bachelor of Laws degree holder. As such, he is authorized to practice only in
the Shari'a courts.

Only a person duly admitted as members of the Philippine Bar in accordance with the
Rules of Court are entitled to practice law before the regular courts. Section 1, Rule 138
of the Revised Rules of Court provides:

Sec. 1. Who may practice law. — Any person heretofore duly

admitted as a member of the bar, or hereafter admitted as such in
accordance with the provisions of this rule, and who is in good and
regular standing, is entitled to practice law.

This Court further emphasized in its resolution in Bar Matter 681, that:

In order to be admitted as member of the Philippine Bar, the

candidate must pass an examination for admission covering the
following subjects: Political and International Law; Labor and Social
Legislation; Civil Law and Taxation; Mercantile Law; Criminal Law;
Remedial Law; and Legal Ethics and Practical Exercises (Sec. 11,
Rule 138) Further, in order that a candidate may be deemed to
have passed the bar examination, he must have obtained a general
average of 75% in all the aforementioned subjects without failing
below 50% in any subject (Sec. 14, Rule 138). On the other hand,
the subjects covered by the special bar examination for Shari'a
courts are: (1) Jurisprudence (Fiqh) and Customary laws (Adat); (2)
Persons, Family Relations and Property; (3) Successions,
Wills/Adjudication and Settlement of Property; (4) Procedure in
Shari'a Courts (See Resolution dated September 20, 1983).

It is quite obvious that the subject matter of the two examinations

are different. The Philippine Bar Examination covers the entire
range of the Philippine Laws and jurisprudence, while the Shari'a
Bar Examination covers Muslim personal laws and jurisprudence
only. Hence, a person who has passed the Shari'a Bar
Examination, who is not a lawyer, is not qualified to practice law
before the regular courts because he has not passed the requisite
examinations for admission as a member of the Philippine Bar.
However, the Shari'a bar lawyer may appear before the Municipal
Trial Courts as agent or friend of a litigant, if appointed by the latter
for the purpose but not before the Regional Trial Courts as only
duly authorized members of the Bar may conduct litigations in the
latter court (Sec. 34, Rule 138).
Considering, therefore that a person who has passed the Shari'a Bar Examination is
only a special member of the Philippine Bar and not a full-fledged member thereof even
if he holds a Bachelor of Laws Degree, he is not qualified to practice to qualified to
practice law before the regular courts. As a general rule, a Shari'a Lawyer is not
possessed of the basic requisite of "practice of law" in order to be appointed as a notary
public under Section 233 of the Notarial Law in relation to Section 1, Rule 138 of the
Revised Rules of Court.

WHEREFORE, the petition to authorize Shari'a District Court Judges to appoint Shari'a
Lawyers as notaries public in their respective jurisdiction is DENIED.

Very Truly Yours,

LUZVIMINDA D. PUNO

Clerk of Court

By:

(Sgd.) MA. LUISA D. VILLARAMA

Assistant Clerk of Court

Alawi v Alauya
January 31, 2016Fahima Abobakar

Facts:

Sophia Alawi was a sales representative of E.B. Villarosa & Partners Co., Ltd. of Davao
City, a real estate and housing company. Ashari M. Alauya is the incumbent executive
clerk of court of the 4th Judicial Shari’a District in Marawi City, They were classmates,
and used to be friends.

Through Alawi’s agency, a contract was executed for the purchase on installments by
Alauya of one of the housing units of Villarosa. In connection, a housing loan was also
granted to Alauya by the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC).

Not long afterwards, Alauya addressed a letter to the President of Villarosa & Co.
advising of the termination of his contract with the company. He claimed that his
consent was vitiated because Alawi had resorted to gross misrepresentation, deceit,
fraud, dishonesty and abuse of confidence. He laso wrote similar letters to the Vice
President of Villarosa and the Vice President of NHMFC.
On learning of Alauya’s letters, Alawi filed an administrative complaint against him. One
of her grounds was Alauya’s usurpation of the title of “attorney,” which only regular
members of the Philippine Bar may properly use.

Alauya justified his use of the title, “attorney,” by the assertion that it is “lexically
synonymous” with “Counsellors-at-law.” a title to which Shari’a lawyers have a rightful
claim, adding that he prefers the title of “attorney” because “counsellor” is often
mistaken for “councilor,” “konsehal” or the Maranao term “consial,” connoting a local
legislator beholden to the mayor. Withal, he does not consider himself a lawyer.

Issue:

Whether or not Alauya, a member of the Shari’a bar, can use the title of Attorney

Held:

He can’t. The title is only reserved to those who pass the regular Philippine bar.

As regards Alauya’s use of the title of “Attorney,” this Court has already had occasion to
declare that persons who pass the Shari’a Bar are not full-fledged members of the
Philippine Bar, hence may only practice law before Shari’a courts. While one who has
been admitted to the Shari’a Bar, and one who has been admitted to the Philippine Bar,
may both be considered “counsellors,” in the sense that they give counsel or advice in a
professional capacity, only the latter is an “attorney.” The title of “attorney” is reserved to
those who, having obtained the necessary degree in the study of law and successfully
taken the Bar Examinations, have been admitted to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
and remain members thereof in good standing; and it is they only who are authorized to
practice law in this jurisdiction

Cui v Cui
January 31, 2016Fahima Abobakar

Facts:

The Hospicio de San Jose de Barili, is a charitable institution established by the

spouses Don Pedro Cui and Dona Benigna Cui for the care and support, free of charge,
of indigent invalids, and incapacitated and helpless persons.” It acquired corporate
existence by legislation (Act No. 3239). Sec. 2 of the Act gave the initial management to
the founders jointly and, in case of their incapacity or death, to “such persons as they
may nominate or designate, in the order prescribed to them. (embodied in Sec. 2 of the
spouses deed of donation)”

Plaintiff Jesus Ma. Cui and defendant Antonio Ma. Cui are brothers, being the sons of
Mariano Cui, one of the nephews of the spouses Don Pedro and Dona Benigna Cui. In
1960, the then incumbent administrator of the Hospicio, resigned in favor of Antonio Cui
pursuant to a “convenio” entered into between them that was embodied on a notarial
document. Jesus Cui, however had no prior notice of either the “convenio” or of his
brother’s assumption of the position.

Upon the death of Dr. Teodoro Cui, Jesus Cui wrote a letter to his brother Antonio,
demanding that the office be turned over to him. When the demand was not complied,
Jesus filed this case. Lower court ruled in favor of Jesus.

ISSUE
Who is best qualified as administrator for the Hospicio?

HELD
Antonio should be the Hospicio’s administrator.

Jesus is the older of the two and under equal circumstances would be preferred
pursuant to sec.2 of the deed of donation. However, before the test of age may be,
applied the deed gives preference to the one, among the legitimate descendants of the
nephews named, who if not a lawyer (titulo de abogado), should be a doctor or a civil
engineer or a pharmacist, in that order; or if failing all theses, should be the one who
pays the highest taxes among those otherwise qualified.

Jesus Ma. Cui holds the degree of Bachelor of laws but is not a member of the Bar, not
having passed the examinations. Antonio Ma. Cui, on the other hand, is a member of
the Bar and although disbarred in 1957, was reinstated by resolution, about two weeks
before he assumed the position of administrator of the Hospicio.

The term “titulo de abogado” means not mere possession of the academic degree of
Bachelor of Laws but membership in the Bar after due admission thereto, qualifying one
for the practice of law. A Bachelor’s degree alone, conferred by a law school upon
completion of certain academic requirements, does not entitle its holder to exercise the
legal profession. By itself, the degree merely serves as evidence of compliance with the
requirements that an applicant to the examinations has “successfully completed all the
prescribed courses, in a law school or university, officially approved by the Secretary of
Education.

The founders of the Hospicio provided for a lwayer, first of all, because in all of the
works of an administrator, it is presumed, a working knowledge of the law and a license
to practice the profession would be a distinct asset.

Under this criterion, the plaintiff Jesus is not entitled as against defendant, to the office
of administrator. Reference is made to the fact that the defendant Antonio was
disbarred (for immorality and unprofessional conduct). However, it is also a fact, that he
was reinstated before he assumed the office of administrator. His reinstatement is
recognition of his moral rehabilitation, upon proof no less than that required for his
admission to the Bar in the first place. Also, when defendant was restored to the roll of
lawyers the restrictions and disabilities resulting from his previous disbarment were
wiped out.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

B.M. No. 1678 December 17, 2007

PETITION FOR LEAVE TO RESUME PRACTICE OF LAW,

BENJAMIN M. DACANAY, petitioner.

RESOLUTION

CORONA, J.:

This bar matter concerns the petition of petitioner Benjamin M. Dacanay for leave to
resume the practice of law.

Petitioner was admitted to the Philippine bar in March 1960. He practiced law until he
migrated to Canada in December 1998 to seek medical attention for his ailments. He
subsequently applied for Canadian citizenship to avail of Canada’s free medical aid
program. His application was approved and he became a Canadian citizen in May 2004.

On July 14, 2006, pursuant to Republic Act (RA) 9225 (Citizenship Retention and Re-
Acquisition Act of 2003), petitioner reacquired his Philippine citizenship.1 On that day,
he took his oath of allegiance as a Filipino citizen before the Philippine Consulate
General in Toronto, Canada. Thereafter, he returned to the Philippines and now intends
to resume his law practice. There is a question, however, whether petitioner Benjamin
M. Dacanay lost his membership in the Philippine bar when he gave up his Philippine
citizenship in May 2004. Thus, this petition.

In a report dated October 16, 2007, the Office of the Bar Confidant cites Section 2, Rule
138 (Attorneys and Admission to Bar) of the Rules of Court:

SECTION 2. Requirements for all applicants for admission to the bar. – Every
applicant for admission as a member of the bar must be a citizen of the
Philippines, at least twenty-one years of age, of good moral character, and a
resident of the Philippines; and must produce before the Supreme Court
satisfactory evidence of good moral character, and that no charges against him,
involving moral turpitude, have been filed or are pending in any court in the
Philippines.

Applying the provision, the Office of the Bar Confidant opines that, by virtue of his
reacquisition of Philippine citizenship, in 2006, petitioner has again met all the
qualifications and has none of the disqualifications for membership in the bar. It
recommends that he be allowed to resume the practice of law in the Philippines,
conditioned on his retaking the lawyer’s oath to remind him of his duties and
responsibilities as a member of the Philippine bar.

We approve the recommendation of the Office of the Bar Confidant with certain
modifications.

The practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions.2 It is so delicately affected

with public interest that it is both a power and a duty of the State (through this Court) to
control and regulate it in order to protect and promote the public welfare.3

Adherence to rigid standards of mental fitness, maintenance of the highest degree of

morality, faithful observance of the rules of the legal profession, compliance with the
mandatory continuing legal education requirement and payment of membership fees to
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) are the conditions required for membership in
good standing in the bar and for enjoying the privilege to practice law. Any breach by a
lawyer of any of these conditions makes him unworthy of the trust and confidence which
the courts and clients repose in him for the continued exercise of his professional
privilege.4

Section 1, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides:

SECTION 1. Who may practice law. – Any person heretofore duly admitted as a
member of the bar, or thereafter admitted as such in accordance with the
provisions of this Rule, and who is in good and regular standing, is entitled to
practice law.
Pursuant thereto, any person admitted as a member of the Philippine bar in accordance
with the statutory requirements and who is in good and regular standing is entitled to
practice law.

Admission to the bar requires certain qualifications. The Rules of Court mandates that
an applicant for admission to the bar be a citizen of the Philippines, at least twenty-one
years of age, of good moral character and a resident of the Philippines.5 He must also
produce before this Court satisfactory evidence of good moral character and that no
charges against him, involving moral turpitude, have been filed or are pending in any
court in the Philippines.6

Moreover, admission to the bar involves various phases such as furnishing satisfactory
proof of educational, moral and other qualifications;7 passing the bar
examinations;8 taking the lawyer’s oath9 and signing the roll of attorneys and receiving
from the clerk of court of this Court a certificate of the license to practice.10

The second requisite for the practice of law ― membership in good standing ― is a
continuing requirement. This means continued membership and, concomitantly,
payment of annual membership dues in the IBP;11 payment of the annual professional
tax;12 compliance with the mandatory continuing legal education requirement; 13 faithful
observance of the rules and ethics of the legal profession and being continually subject
to judicial disciplinary control.14

Given the foregoing, may a lawyer who has lost his Filipino citizenship still practice law
in the Philippines? No.

The Constitution provides that the practice of all professions in the Philippines shall be
limited to Filipino citizens save in cases prescribed by law.15 Since Filipino citizenship is
a requirement for admission to the bar, loss thereof terminates membership in the
Philippine bar and, consequently, the privilege to engage in the practice of law. In other
words, the loss of Filipino citizenship ipso jure terminates the privilege to practice law in
the Philippines. The practice of law is a privilege denied to foreigners.16

The exception is when Filipino citizenship is lost by reason of naturalization as a citizen

of another country but subsequently reacquired pursuant to RA 9225. This is because
"all Philippine citizens who become citizens of another country shall be deemed not to
have lost their Philippine citizenship under the conditions of [RA 9225]."17Therefore, a
Filipino lawyer who becomes a citizen of another country is deemed never to have lost
his Philippine citizenship if he reacquires it in accordance with RA 9225. Although he
is also deemed never to have terminated his membership in the Philippine bar, no
automatic right to resume law practice accrues.

Under RA 9225, if a person intends to practice the legal profession in the Philippines
and he reacquires his Filipino citizenship pursuant to its provisions "(he) shall apply with
the proper authority for a license or permit to engage in such practice." 18 Stated
otherwise, before a lawyer who reacquires Filipino citizenship pursuant to RA 9225 can
resume his law practice, he must first secure from this Court the authority to do so,
conditioned on:

(a) the updating and payment in full of the annual membership dues in the IBP;

(b) the payment of professional tax;

(c) the completion of at least 36 credit hours of mandatory continuing legal

education; this is specially significant to refresh the applicant/petitioner’s
knowledge of Philippine laws and update him of legal developments and

(d) the retaking of the lawyer’s oath which will not only remind him of his duties
and responsibilities as a lawyer and as an officer of the Court, but also renew his
pledge to maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines.

Compliance with these conditions will restore his good standing as a member of the
Philippine bar.

WHEREFORE, the petition of Attorney Benjamin M. Dacanay is hereby GRANTED,

subject to compliance with the conditions stated above and submission of proof of such
compliance to the Bar Confidant, after which he may retake his oath as a member of the
Philippine bar.

SO ORDERED.

Puno, C.J., Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Carpio-

Morales, Azcuna, Tinga, Chico-Nazario, Velasco, Jr., Nachura, Reyes, Leonardo-de
Castro, JJ., concur.
Quisumbing, J., on leave.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

B.M. No. 2112 July 24, 2012

IN RE: PETITION RE-ACQUIRE THE PRIVILEGE TO PRACTICE LAW IN THE

PHILIPPINES, EPIFANIO B. MUNESES, Petitioner,

RESOLUTION

REYES, J.:
On June 8, 2009, a petition was filed by Epifanio B. Muneses (petitioner) with the Office
of the Bar Confidant (OBC) praying that he be granted the privilege to practice law in
the Philippines.

The petitioner alleged that he became a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) on March 21, 1966; that he lost his privilege to practice law when he became a
citizen of the United States of America (USA) on August 28, 1981; that on September
15, 2006, he re-acquired his Philippine citizenship pursuant to Republic Act (R.A.) No.
9225 or the "Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003" by taking his oath of
allegiance as a Filipino citizen before the Philippine Consulate General in Washington,
D.C., USA; that he intends to retire in the Philippines and if granted, to resume the
practice of law. Attached to the petition were several documents in support of his
petition, albeit mere photocopies thereof, to wit:

1. Oath of Allegiance dated September 15, 2006 before Consul General Domingo P.
Nolasco;

2. Petition for Re-Acquisition of Philippine Citizenship of same date;

3. Order for Re-Acquisition of Philippine Citizenship also of same date;

4. Letter dated March 13, 2008 evidencing payment of membership dues with the IBP;

5. Attendance Forms from the Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE).

In Bar Matter No. 1678, dated December 17, 2007, the Court was confronted with a
similar petition filed by Benjamin M. Dacanay (Dacanay) who requested leave to
resume his practice of law after availing the benefits of R.A. No. 9225. Dacanay was
admitted to the Philippine Bar in March 1960. In December 1998, he migrated to
Canada to seek medical attention for his ailments and eventually became a Canadian
citizen in May 2004. On July 14, 2006, Dacanay re-acquired his Philippine citizenship
pursuant to R.A. No. 9225 after taking his oath of allegiance before the Philippine
Consulate General in Toronto, Canada. He returned to the Philippines and intended to
resume his practice of law.

The Court reiterates that Filipino citizenship is a requirement for admission to the bar
and is, in fact, a continuing requirement for the practice of law. The loss thereof means
termination of the petitioner’s membership in the bar;ipso jure the privilege to engage in
the practice of law. Under R.A. No. 9225, natural-born citizens who have lost their
Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country
are deemed to have re-acquired their Philippine citizenship upon taking the oath of
allegiance to the Republic.1 Thus, a Filipino lawyer who becomes a citizen of another
country and later re-acquires his Philippine citizenship under R.A. No. 9225, remains to
be a member of the Philippine Bar. However, as stated in Dacanay, the right to resume
the practice of law is not automatic.2 R.A. No. 9225 provides that a person who intends
to practice his profession in the Philippines must apply with the proper authority for a
license or permit to engage in such practice.3

It can not be overstressed that:

The practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions.1âwphi1 It is so delicately

affected with public interest that it is both the power and duty of the State (through this
Court) to control and regulate it in order to protect and promote the public welfare.

Adherence to rigid standards of mental fitness, maintenance of the highest degree of

morality, faithful observance of the legal profession, compliance with the mandatory
continuing legal education requirement and payment of membership fees to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) are the conditions required for membership in
good standing in the bar and for enjoying the privilege to practice law. Any breach by a
lawyer of any of these conditions makes him unworthy of the trust and confidence which
the courts and clients repose in him for the continued exercise of his professional
privilege.4

Thus, in pursuance to the qualifications laid down by the Court for the practice of law,
the OBC required the herein petitioner to submit the original or certified true copies of
the following documents in relation to his petition:

1. Petition for Re-Acquisition of Philippine Citizenship;

2. Order (for Re-Acquisition of Philippine citizenship);

3. Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines;

4. Identification Certificate (IC) issued by the Bureau of Immigration;

5. Certificate of Good Standing issued by the IBP;

6. Certification from the IBP indicating updated payments of annual membership dues;

7. Proof of payment of professional tax; and

8. Certificate of compliance issued by the MCLE Office.

In compliance thereof, the petitioner submitted the following:

1. Petition for Re-Acquisition of Philippine Citizenship;

2. Order (for Re-Acquisition of Philippine citizenship);

3. Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines;

 4. Certificate of Re-Acquisition/Retention of Philippine Citizenship issued by the
Bureau of Immigration, in lieu of the IC;

5. Certification dated May 19, 2010 of the IBP-Surigao City Chapter attesting to
his good moral character as well as his updated payment of annual membership
dues;

6. Professional Tax Receipt (PTR) for the year 2010;

7. Certificate of Compliance with the MCLE for the 2nd compliance period; and

8. Certification dated December 5, 2008 of Atty. Gloria Estenzo-Ramos,

Coordinator, UC-MCLE Program, University of Cebu, College of Law attesting to
his compliance with the MCLE.

The OBC further required the petitioner to update his compliance, particularly with the
MCLE. After all the requirements were satisfactorily complied with and finding that the
petitioner has met all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications for membership
in the bar, the OBC recommended that the petitioner be allowed to resume his practice
of law.

Upon this favorable recommendation of the OBC, the Court adopts the same and sees
no bar to the petitioner's resumption to the practice of law in the Philippines.

WHEREFORE, the petition of Attorney Epifanio B. Muneses is hereby GRANTED,

subject to the condition that he shall re-take the Lawyer's Oath on a date to be set by
the Court and subject to the payment of appropriate fees.

Furthermore, the Office of the Bar Confidant is directed to draft the necessary
guidelines for the re-acquisition of the privilege to resume the practice of law for the
guidance of the Bench and Bar.

SO ORDERED.

BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Senior Associate Justice
(Per Section 12, R.A. 296, The Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended)
 TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
CASTRO
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

(On Leave)
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
ARTURO D. BRION*
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate justice Associate Justice

ROBERTO A. ABAD MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice Associate Justice

(On Leave)
JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA**
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE

Associate Justice Associate Justice

Narag vs. Narag, 291 SCRA 451

FACTS:
Atty. Dominador Narag was alleged to have abandoned his family for his paramour who
was once his student in tertiary level. The administrative complaint of disbarment was
filed by her wife, Mrs. Julieta Narag. Respondent filed motion to dismiss because
allegedly the complainant fabricated the story as well as the love letters while under
extreme emotional confusion arising from jealousy. The case took an unexpected turn
when another complaint was filed, the wife as again the complainant but now together
with their seven children as co-signatories. After several hearings, the facts became
clear, that the respondent indeed abandoned his family as against morals, based on
testimonial evidences. In addition, the assailed relationship bore two children.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent is guilty of gross immorality and for having violated and the
Code of Ethics for Lawyers culpable for disbarment.
HELD:
YES. Respondent disbarred.
RATIO:
The complainant was able to establish, by clear and convincing evidence, that the
respondent breached the high and exacting moral standards set for the members of the
law profession.
Good moral character is not only a condition precedent to the practice of law, but
a continuing qualification for all members of the bar.
CANON 7 — A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal
profession, and support the activities of the Integrated Bar.
Rule 7.03 — A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness
to practice law, nor should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous
manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
Undoubtedly, the canons of law practice were violated.

SPOUSES FRANKLIN AND LOURDES OLBES VS. ATTY VICTOR V DECIEMBRE

(April 27,2005)

FACTS:
Complainants were government employees. Through respondent, Lourdes
renewed a loan application from Rodela Loans Inc., in the amount of P10,000.00. She
issued and delivered 5 PNB blank checks, which served as collateral for the approved
loan as well as for the future loans. Lourdes paid respondent P14,874.37 intended to the
loan plus surcharges, penalties, and interests, for which the latter issued a receipt.
Notwithstanding the full payment of the loan, respondent filled up the blank checks
entrusted to him by writing on those checks amounts that had not been agreed upon at
all and deposited the same checks which were dishonored upon presentment because
the account is already closed. Thereafter, he filed a criminal case against complainants
for estafa and for violation of B.P. 22. Thus, complainants filed a verified petition for the
disbarment of Atty. Deciembre and charged the respondent with willful and deliberate acts
of dishonesty, falsification and conduct unbecoming a member of the Bar.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent lawyer is guilty of gross misconduct and violation of
Rules 1.01 and 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

HELD: YES.

Respondent lawyer violated Rules 1.01 and 7.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility for he seriously transgressed by his malevolent act of filling up the blank
checks by indicating amounts that had not been agreed upon at all and despite full
knowledge that the loan supposed to be secured by the checks had already been paid.
His was a brazen act of falsification of a commercial document, resorted to for his material
gain. Respondent is clearly guilty of serious dishonesty and professional misconduct. He
committed an act indicative of moral depravity not expected from, and highly unbecoming
a member of the bar. His propensity for employing deceit and misrepresentation is
reprehensible. His misuse of the filled-up checks that led to the detention of one petitioner
is loathsome.
 EN BANC

[BAR MATTER No. 712. March 19, 1997]

RE: PETITION OF AL ARGOSINO TO TAKE THE LAWYER'S OATH

RESOLUTION
PADILLA, J.:

Petitioner Al Caparros Argosino passed the bar examinations held in 1993. The Court
however deferred his oath-taking due to his previous conviction for Reckless Imprudence
Resulting In Homicide.
The criminal case which resulted in petitioner' s conviction, arose from the death of a
neophyte during fraternity initiation rites sometime in September 1991. Petitioner and
seven (7) other accused initially entered pleas of not guilty to homicide charges. The eight
(8) accused later withdrew their initial pleas and upon re-arraignment all pleaded guilty to
reckless imprudence resulting in homicide.
On the basis of such pleas, the trial court rendered judgment dated 11 February 1993
imposing on each of the accused a sentence of imprisonment of from two (2) years four
(4) months and one (1) day to four (4) years.
On 18 June 1993, the trial court granted herein petitioner's application for probation.
On 11 April 1994, the trial court issued an order approving a report dated 6 April 1994
submitted by the Probation Officer recommending petitioner's discharge from probation
On 14 April 1994, petitioner filed before this Court a petition to be allowed to take the
lawyer's oath based on the order of his discharge from probation.
On 13 July 1995, the Court through then Senior Associate Justice Florentino P.
Feliciano issued a resolution requiring petitioner Al C. Argosino to submit to the Court
evidence that he may now be regarded as complying with the requirement of good moral
character imposed upon those seeking admission to the bar.
In compliance with the above resolution, petitioner submitted no less than fifteen (15)
certifications/letters executed by among others two (2) senators, five (5) trial court judges,
and six (6) members of religious orders. Petitioner likewise submitted evidence that a
scholarship foundation had been established in honor of Raul Camaligan, the hazing
victim, through joint efforts of the latter's family and the eight (8) accused in the criminal
case.
On 26 September 1995, the Court required Atty Gilbert Camaligan, father of Raul, to
comment on petitioner's prayer to be allowed to take the lawyer's oath.
In his comment dated 4 December 1995, Atty. Camaligan states that:
 a. He still believes that the infliction of severe physical injuries which led to the
death of his son was deliberate rather than accidental. The offense therefore was not
only homicide but murder since the accused took advantage of the neophyte's
helplessness implying abuse of confidence, taking advantage of superior strength
and treachery.
b. He consented to the accused's plea of guilt to the lesser offense of reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide only out of pity for the mothers of the accused and
a pregnant wife of one of the accused who went to their house on Christmas day
1991 and Maundy Thursday 1992, literally on their knees, crying and begging for
forgiveness and compassion. They also told him that the father of one of the accused
had died of a heart attack upon learning of his son's involvement in the incident.
c. As a Christian, he has forgiven petitioner and his co-accused for the death of
his son. However, as a loving father who had lost a son whom he had hoped would
succeed him in his law practice, he still feels the pain of an untimely demise and the
stigma of the gruesome manner of his death.
d. He is not in a position to say whether petitioner is now morally fit for admission
to the bar. He therefore submits the matter to the sound discretion of the Court.
The practice of law is a privilege granted only to those who possess the strict
intellectual and moral qualifications required of lawyers who are instruments in the
effective and efficient administration o f justice. It is the sworn duty of this Court not only
to "weed out" lawyers who have become a disgrace to the noble profession of the law
but, also of equal importance, to prevent "misfits" from taking the lawyer' s oath, thereby
further tarnishing the public image of lawyers which in recent years has undoubtedly
become less than irreproachable.
The resolution of the issue before us required a weighing and re-weighing of the
reasons for allowing or disallowing petitioner's admission to the practice of law. The
senseless beatings inf1icted upon Raul Camaligan constituted evident absence of that
moral fitness required for admission to the bar since they were totally irresponsible,
irrelevant and uncalled for.
In the 13 July 1995 resolution in this case we stated:

"x x x participation in the prolonged and mindless physical behavior, [which] makes
impossible a finding that the participant [herein petitioner] was then possessed of good
moral character."[1]

In the same resolution, however, we stated that the Court is prepared to consider de
novo the question of whether petitioner has purged himself of the obvious deficiency in
moral character referred to above.
Before anything else, the Court understands and shares the sentiment of Atty. Gilbert
Camaligan. The death of one's child is, for a parent, a most traumatic experience. The
suffering becomes even more pronounced and profound in cases where the death is due
to causes other than natural or accidental but due to the reckless imprudence of third
 parties. The feeling then becomes a struggle between grief and anger directed at the
cause of death.
Atty. Camaligan's statement before the Court manifesting his having forgiven the
accused is no less than praiseworthy and commendable. It is exceptional for a parent,
given the circumstances in this cases, to find room for forgiveness.
However, Atty. Camaligan admits that he is still not in a position to state if petitioner
is now morally fit to be a lawyer.
After a very careful evaluation of this case, we resolve to allow petitioner Al Caparros
Argosino to take the lawyer's oath, sign the Roll of Attorneys and practice the legal
profession with the following admonition:
In allowing Mr. Argosino to take the lawyer's oath, the Court recognizes that Mr.
Argosino is not inherently of bad moral fiber. On the contrary, the various certifications
show that he is a devout Catholic with a genuine concern for civic duties and public
service.
The Court is persuaded that Mr. Argosino has exerted all efforts to atone for the death
of Raul Camaligan. We are prepared to give him the benefit of the doubt, taking judicial
notice of the general tendency of youth to be rash, temerarious and uncalculating.
We stress to Mr. Argosino that the lawyer's oath is NOT a mere ceremony or formality
for practicing law. Every lawyer should at ALL TIMES weigh his actions according to the
sworn promises he makes when taking the lawyer's oath. If all lawyers conducted
themselves strictly according to the lawyer's oath and the Code of Professional
Responsibility, the administration of justice will undoubtedly be faster, fairer and easier
for everyone concerned.
The Court sincerely hopes that Mr. Argosino will continue with the assistance he has
been giving to his community. As a lawyer he will now be in a better position to render
legal and other services to the more unfortunate members of society.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, petitioner Al Caparros Argosino is hereby ALLOWED to
take the lawyer's oath on a date to be set by the Court, to sign the Roll of Attorneys and,
thereafter, to practice the legal profession.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., (Chairman), Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno,
Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Francisco, Hermosisima, Jr., Panganiban, and Torres, Jr.,
JJ., concur.

In the matter of the Petition for Disbarment of Telesforo Diao vs. Severino Martinez

FACTS:
1. DIAO was admitted to the Bar.
1. 2 years later, Martinez charged him with having falsely represented in his application for
the Bar examination, that he had the requisite academic qualifications.
2. Solicitor General investigated and recommended that Diao's name be erased from the
roll of attorneys
i. DIAO did not complete pre-law subjects:
1. Did not complete his high school training
2. Never attended Quisumbing College
3. Never obtained a diploma.
2. DIAO admitting first charge but claims that although he had left high school in his third
year, he entered the service of the U.S. Army, passed the General Classification Test
given therein, which (according to him) is equivalent to a high school diploma
1. Upon return to civilian life, the educational authorities considered his army service as the
equivalent of 3rd and 4th year high school.
2. No certification. However, it is unnecessary to dwell on this, since the second charge is
clearly meritorious:
i. Never obtained his diploma. from Quisumbing College; and yet his
application for examination represented him as an A.A. graduate.
ii. Now, asserting he had obtained his A.A. title from the Arellano University in
April, 1949
1. He said erroneously certified, due to confusion, as a graduate of Quisumbing College, in
his school records.

ISSUE:
WON DIAO still continue admission to the Bar, for passing the Bar despite not completing
pre-law requirements? NO.

HELD:
STRIKE OUT NME OF DIAO IN ROLL OF ATTORNEYS. DIAO REQUIRED TO RETURN
HIS LAWYER’S DIPLOMA WITHIN 30 DAYS.
1. Explanation of error or confusion is not acceptable.
1. Had his application disclosed his having obtained A.A. from Arellano University, it would
also have disclosed that he got it in April, 1949, thereby showing that he began his law
studies (2nd semester of 1948-1949) six months before obtaining his Associate in Arts
degree.
2. He would not have been permitted to take the bar tests:
i. Bar applicant must affirm under oath, "That previous to the study of law, he
had successfully and satisfactorily completed the required pre-legal education (A.A.).
ii. Therefore, Diao was not qualified to take the bar examinations
iii. Such admission having been obtained under false pretenses must be, and is
hereby revoked.
2. Passing such examinations is not the only qualification to become an attorney-at-law;
taking the prescribed courses of legal study in the regular manner is equally essential.

Case Digest: In Re: Application of Adriano Hernandez

Facts: Adriano Hernandez, a Filipino citizen, a degree holder of Juris Doctor from
Columbia Law School in New York and a bar passer in NY in year 1990 took bar
subjects in Ateneo Law School and 5-month bar review course there. He sought the
Supreme Court and prayed to allow him to take the bar exam in the Philippines

Issue; Whether or not Hernandez should be allowed to take the bar examination even if
he is umable to present requirements under Sec. 5 and 6 of Rule 138

Held: The Supreme Court ruled to allow the applicant to take the 1993 Bar
Examinations with high regard of Filipinos with same case in which the court allowed to
take the bar examination. Non-graduates of Philippine law schools have also been
allowed to take the bar examination. However, the court held in this resolution that in
the following year, all applicants for the bar must comply with the requirements
stipulated in Sec. 5 and 6 of Rule 138 including the completion to studying law in any of
the Philippine law schools.

AGUIRRE VS RANA

EN BANC[ B.M. No. 1036, June 10, 2003 ]

DONNA MARIE S. AGUIRRE, COMPLAINANT,
VS.
EDWIN L. RANA, RESPONDENT

Facts:

Rana was among those who passed the 2000 Bar Examinations. before the scheduled
mass oath-taking, complainant Aguirre filed against respondent a Petition for Denial of
Admission to the Bar.

The Court allowed respondent to take his oath. Respondent took the lawyer’s oath on
the scheduled date but has not signed the Roll of Attorneys up to now.

Complainant alleges that respondent, while not yet a lawyer, appeared as counsel for a
candidate in an election.
 On the charge of violation of law, complainant claims that respondent is a municipal
government employee, being a secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan of Mandaon,
Masbate. As such, respondent is not allowed by law to act as counsel for a client in any
court or administrative body.

On the charge of grave misconduct and misrepresentation, complainant accuses

respondent of acting as counsel for vice mayoralty candidate George Bunan without the
latter engaging respondent’s services. Complainant claims that respondent filed the
pleading as a ploy to prevent the proclamation of the winning vice mayoralty candidate.

Issue:

Whether or not respondent engaged in the unauthorized practice of law and thus does
not deserve admission to the Philippine Bar

Ruling:

the Court held that “practice of law” means any activity, in or out of court, which
requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. To
engage in the practice of law is to perform acts which are usually performed by
members of the legal profession. Generally, to practice law is to render any kind of
service which requires the use of legal knowledge or skill.

The right to practice law is not a natural or constitutional right but is a privilege. It is
limited to persons of good moral character with special qualifications duly ascertained
and certified. The exercise of this privilege presupposes possession of integrity, legal
knowledge, educational attainment, and even public trust since a lawyer is an officer of
the court. A bar candidate does not acquire the right to practice law simply by passing
the bar examinations. The practice of law is a privilege that can be withheld even from
one who has passed the bar examinations, if the person seeking admission had
practiced law without a license.

True, respondent here passed the 2000 Bar Examinations and took the lawyer’s oath.
However, it is the signing in the Roll of Attorneys that finally makes one a full-fledged
lawyer. The fact that respondent passed the bar examinations is immaterial. Passing
the bar is not the only qualification to become an attorney-at-law. Respondent should
know that two essential requisites for becoming a lawyer still had to be performed,
namely: his lawyer’s oath to be administered by this Court and his signature in the Roll
of Attorneys.
121 Phil. 894

PAREDES, J.:
On September 4, 1959, the Chief of Police of Alaminos, Laguna,
charged Simplicio Villanueva with the crime of Malicious Mischief, before the Justice of
the Peace Court of said municipality. Said accused was represented by counsel
de oficio, but later on replaced by counsel de parte. The complainant in the same case
was represented by City Attorney Ariston Fule of San Pablo City, having entered his
appearance as private-prosecutor, after securing the permission of the Secretary of
Justice. The condition of his appearance as such, was that every time he would appear
at the trial of the case, he would be considered on official leave of absence, and that he
would not receive any payment for his services. The appearance of City
Attorney Fule as private prosecutor was questioned by the counsel for the accused,
invoking the case of Aquino, et al. vs. Blanco, et al, 79 Phil. 647 wherein it was ruled
that "when an attorney had been appointed to the position of Assistant Provincial Fiscal
or City Fiscal and therein qualified, by operation of law, he ceased to engage in private
law practice." Counsel then argued that the JP Court in entertaining the appearance of
City Attorney Fule in the case is a violation of the above ruling, On December 17, 1960
the JP issued an order sustaining the legality of the appearance of City Attorney Fule.
Under date of January 4, 1961, counsel for the accused presented a "Motion to Inhibit
Fiscal Fule from Acting as Private Prosecutor in this Case," this time invoking Section
32, Rule 127, now Sec. 35, Rule 138, Revised Rules, which bars certain attorneys from
practicing. Counsel claims that City Attorney Fule falls under (his limitation. The JP
Court ruled on the motion by upholding the right of Fule to appear and further stating
that he (Fule) was not actually engaged in private law practice. This Order was
appealed to the CFI of Laguna, presided by the Hon. Hilarion U. Jarencio, which
rendered judgment on December 20, 1961, the pertinent portions of which read:
"The present case is one for malicious mischief. There being no reservation by the
offended party of the civil liability, the civil action was deemed impliedly instituted with
the criminal action. The offended party had, therefore, the right to intervene in the case
and lie represented by a legal counsel because of her interest in the civil liability of the
accused.
"Sec. 31, Rule 127 of the Rules of Court provides that in the court of a justice of the
peace a party may conduct his litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend
appointed by him for that purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. Assistant City
Attorney Fule appeared in the Justice of the Peace Court as ah agent or friend of the
offended party. It does not appear that he was being paid for his services or that his
appearance was in a professional capacity. As Assistant City Attorney of Sail Pablo he
had no control or intervention whatsoever in the prosecution of crimes committed in the
municipality of Alaminos, Laguna, because the prosecution of criminal cases coming
from Alaminos are handled by the Office of the Provincial Fiscal and not by the City
Attorney of San Pablo. There could be no possible conflict in the duties of Assistant City
Attorney Fule us Assistant City Attorney of San Pablo and as private prosecutor in this
criminal case. On the other hand, us already pointed out, the offended party in this
criminal case had a right to be represented by an agent or a friend to protect her rights
in the civil action which was impliedly instituted together with the criminal action.
"In view of the foregoing, this Court holds that Asst. City Attorney Ariston D. Fule may
appear before the Justice of the Peace Court in Alaminos, Lagunu as private prosecutor
in this criminal case as an agent or a friend of the offended party.
"Wherefore, the appeal from the order of the Justice of the Peace Court of Alaminos,
Laguna, allowing the appearance of Ariston D. Fule as private prosecutor is dismissed,
without costs."
The above decision is the subject of the instant proceedings.
The appeal should be dismissed, for patently being without merits.
Aside from the considerations advanced by the learned trial judge, heretofore
reproduced, and which We consider plausible, the fallacy of the theory of defense
counsel lies in his confused interpretation of Section 32 of Rule 127 (now Sec. 35, Rule
138, Revised Rules), which provides that "no judge or other official or employee of the
superior courts or of the office of the Solicitor General, shall engage in private practice
as a member of the bar or give professional advice to clients." he claims that City
Attorney Fule, in appearing as private prosecutor in the case was engaging in private
practice. We believe that the isolated appearance of City Attorney Fule did not
constitute private practice, within the meaning and contemplation of the Rules. Practice
is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary action, a
succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual exercise
(State vs. Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan. 864, 42 LRA, N.S. 768). Practice of law to fall
within the prohibition of statute has been interpreted as customarily or habitually holding
one's self out to the public, as a lawyer and demanding payment for such services
(State vs. Bryan, 4 S. E. 522, 98 N. C. 644, 647). The appearance as counsel on
one occasion, is not conclusive as determinative of engagement in the private practice
of law. The following observation of the Solicitor General is noteworthy:
"Essentially, the word private practice of law implies that one must have presented
himself to be in the active and continued Practice of the legal profession and that his
professional services available to the public for a compensation, as a source of
livelihood or in consideration of his said services."
For one thing, it has never been refuted that City Attorney Fule had been given
permission by his immediate superior, the Secretary of Justice, to represent the
complainant in the case at bar, who is a relative.
Conformably with all the foregoing, the decision appealed from should be, as it is
hereby affirmed, in all respects, with costs against appellant.
Bengzon, C. J., Concepcion, Reyes, J, B. L.,
Barrera, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J. P. and Zaldivar, JJ., concur.