Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 172204 July 2, 2014

CATHAY METAL CORPORATION, Petitioner,

vs.
LAGUNA WEST MULTI-PURPOSE COOPERATIVE, INC., Respondent.

DECISION

LEONEN, J.:

DOCTRINE: The Rules of Court governs court procedures, including the rules on service of notices and
summons. The Cooperative Code provisions on notices cannot replace the rules on summons under the
Rules of Court. Rule 14, Section 11 of the Rules of Court provides an-exclusive enumeration of the
persons authorized to receive summons for juridical entities. These persons are the juridical entity's
president, managing partner, general manager, corporate secretary, treasurer, or in-house counsel.

FACTS:

Respondent Laguna West Multi-Purpose Cooperative allegedly entered into a joint venture agreement with
farmer-beneficiaries through Certificates of Land Ownership Award (CLOA) in Silang, Cavite. 2 While
respondent was negotiating with the farmer-beneficiaries, petitioner Cathay Metal Corporation entered into
Irrevocable Exclusive Right to Buy (IERB) contracts with the same farmerbeneficiaries. 3 Under the IERB, the
farmer-beneficiaries committed themselves to sell to petitioner their agricultural properties upon conversion
to industrial or commercial properties or upon expiration of the period of prohibition from transferring title
to the properties.4

In 1996, respondent Laguna West caused the annotation of its adverse claim on the 39 TCTs of the farmer-
beneficiaries alarmed with the possibility that it could lose the deal to a big and moneyed corporation.

In 1999, after the Department of Agrarian Reform issued an order converting the properties from agricultural
to mixed use, petitioner and the farmer-beneficiaries executed contracts of sale of the properties.7 TCTs were
transferred to the petitioner’s name together with the annotations in the original titles

Upon knowing this by the Respondent, Respondent’s Vice-President, Orlando dela Peña, sent two letters in
2000 to petitioner, informing it of respondent’s claim to the properties. 10 But instead of responding to
respondent dela Peña, petitioner filed a consolidated petition for cancellation of adverse claims on its TCTs
with the RTC of Tagaytay City.12 It served a copy of the petition by registered mail and personally to
respondent's alleged official address at "Barangay Mayapa, Calamba, Laguna." 13 However the copy was
returned to the petitioner because the respondent could not be found at that address.14 The postman issued a
certification stating that the reason for the return was that the "cooperative was not existing."

Since no one received the summons, petitioner insisted that the trial court issue an order to effect substituted
service, the Regional Trial Court issued an order declaring petitioner’s substituted service, apparently by
registered mail,18 to have been effected. Because of still failure to reply by the respondent, the petitioner was
later allowed to present its evidence ex parte.21
Upon learning of the case involving its adverse claim was pending, respondent, through Mr. dela Peña, filed a
manifestation and motion, alleging that respondent never received a copy of the summons and the
petition.22 It moved for the service of the summons and for a copy of the petition to be sent to No. 160, Narra
Avenue, Looc, Calamba, Laguna. He also claimed that the two letters he earlier sent to petitioner bear the new
address.

However, Petitioner argued that summons could only be validly served to respondent’s official address as
indicated in its registration with the Cooperative Development Authority Moreover, because respondent was
already in default, a manifestation and motion, without allegations of grounds for a motion to lift order of
default, would not give it personality to participate in the proceedings.

Respondent argued that since petitioner’s ex parte presentation of evidence was secured through extrinsic
fraud, there should be a new trial to give respondent a fair day in court. Also another representative of
respondent Mr. Dragon alleged that respondent’s address was at No. 167, Barangay Looc, Calamba, Laguna.

After several MRs by the respondent and petitioner, RTC granted the petitioner’ cancellation of
annotations..29

Respondent appealed to the CA

1) Petitioner-appellee secured the favorable orders of the lower court in fraud of appellant Laguna
West by sending the petition, all other pleadings, and notices to its former address, thus, denying its
day in court; and

2) The trial court erred in applying the rule on substituted service, thus, it did not validly acquire
jurisdiction over the appellant.55

The Court of Appeals granted respondent's appeal and remanded the case to the RTC ruling that there was no
valid service of summons upon respondent.

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent was properly served with summons or notices of the hearing on the petition for
cancellation of annotations of adverse claim on the properties.

RULING:

NO. SC ruled that respondent was not validly served with summons or notice of the hearing. However, its
annotations of adverse claims should be cancelled for being based on a future claim.

Respondent was not validly served with summons. Despite the cooperative code provision requiring
cooperatives to have an official address to which all notices and communications shall be sent, it cannot
cannot take the place of the rules on summons under the Rules of Court concerning a court proceeding.

Section 11, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court provides the rule on service of summons upon a juridical entity. It
provides that summons may be served upon a juridical entity only through its officers. Thus:

Sec. 11. Service upon domestic private juridical entity. – When the defendant is a corporation, partnership or
association organized under the laws of the Philippines with a juridical personality, service may be made on
the president, managing partner, general manager, corporate secretary, treasurer, or in-house counsel.
These enumerations are exclusive. This provision of the rule does not limit service to the officers’ places of
residence or offices. If summons may not be served upon these persons personally at their residences or
offices, summons may be served upon any of the officers wherever they may be found.

Petitioner failed to do serve notice to any of the enumerated officers.

Respondent was, therefore, not validly served with summons.

Other issues:

Rights still under negotiations are not adverse claims and the contracts executed between farmer-
beneficiaries and petitioner during the period of prohibition and before the properties' conversion from
agricultural to mixed use intend to circumvent the law thus declared illegal and void.

Hence, this decision is without prejudice to the right of interested parties. to seek the cancellation of
petitioner's certificates of title obtained in violation of the law.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Register of Deeds of Cavite is ORDERED to cancel the annotations
of adverse claims on the transfer certificates· of title.
THIRD DIVISION

PARAMOUNT INSURANCE CORP., G.R. No. 175109

Petitioner,
Present:
Ynares-Santiago, J. (Chairperson),
- versus - Austria-Martinez,
Chico-Nazario,
Nachura, and
Reyes, JJ.
A.C. ORDOEZ CORPORATION
and FRANKLIN SUSPINE, Promulgated:
Respondents.
August 6, 2008
x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

DOCTRINE: Rule 14, Section 11 of the Rules of Court provides an-exclusive enumeration of the persons
authorized to receive summons for juridical entities. These persons are the juridical entity's president,
managing partner, general manager, corporate secretary, treasurer, or in-house counsel.

FACTS:
A vehicular accident occurred between the Honda City sedan which is insured to the Petitioner
Paramount Insurance Corp. and driven by Maximo Mata and a truck mixer respondent corporation and
driven by Franklin Suspine.

Petitioner Paramount as a subrogee of Mata filed before the MTC, a complaint for damages against
respondents. Based on the Sheriffs Return of Service, summons remained unserved on respondent
Suspine,[5] while it was served on respondent corporation and received by Samuel D. Marcoleta of its
Receiving Section on April 3, 2000.[6]

On May 19, 2000, petitioner filed a Motion to Declare Defendants in Default; however, on June 28, 2000,
respondent corporation filed an Omnibus Motion (And Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion to Declare Defendant
in Default) alleging that summons was improperly served upon it because it was made to a secretarial staff
who was unfamiliar with court processes; and that the summons was received by Mr. Armando C. Ordoez,
President and General Manager of respondent corporation only on June 24, 2000. Respondent corporation
asked for an extension of 15 days within which to file an Answer.

Pending resolution of its first motion to declare respondents in default, petitioner filed on June 30, 2000 a
Second Motion to Declare Defendants in Default.

On July 26, 2000, respondent corporation filed a Motion to Admit Answer alleging honest mistake and
business reverses that prevented them from hiring a lawyer until July 10, 2000, as well as justice and equity.

MTC granted the respondent’s Answer and set the case for pre-trial. The Petitioner filed a petition for
certiorari (Rule 65) with prayer for preliminary injunction and TRO before the RTC because of alleged MTC
grave abuse of discretion in admitting the answer which did not contain a notice of hearing,
RTC granted the petitioner but on appeal, the CA reversed RTC’s ruling and reinstated MTC decision.

Hence, the petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there was a valid service of summons on respondent AC Ordonz Constuction Corporation

RULING:

NO. The service of summons to respondent corporations Receiving Section through Samuel D.
Marcoleta is defective and not binding to said corporation.

Section 11, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court provides:

SEC. 11. Service upon domestic private juridical entity. When the defendant is a
corporation, partnership or association organized under the laws of the Philippines with a
juridical personality, service may be made on the president, managing partner, general
manager, corporate secretary, treasurer, or in-house counsel.

Section 11, Rule 14 sets out an exclusive enumeration of the officers who can receive summons on
behalf of a corporation. Service of summons to someone other than the corporations president, managing
partner, general manager, corporate secretary, treasurer, and in-house counsel, is not valid.

The designation of persons or officers who are authorized to receive summons for a domestic
corporation or partnership is limited and more clearly specified in the new rule. The phrase agent, or any of
its directors has been conspicuously deleted.[8] Moreover, the argument of substantial compliance is no longer
compelling. We have ruled that the new rule, as opposed to Section 13, Rule 14 of the 1964 Rules of Court, is
restricted, limited and exclusive.

On its face, the return shows that the summons was received by an employee who is not among the
responsible officers enumerated by law. Such being invalid, petitioner should have sought the issuance and
proper service of new summons instead of moving for a declaration of default.

Moreoever, the motions for declaration of default filed on May 19, 2000 and June 30, 2000 were both
premature. There was no grave abuse of discretion when the Metropolitan Trial Court admitted respondent
corporations Answer. Although it was filed beyond the extension period requested by respondent
corporation, however, Sec. 11, Rule 11 grants discretion to the trial court to allow an answer or other
pleading to be filed after the reglementary period, upon motion and on such terms as may be just. An answer
should be admitted where it had been filed before the defendant was declared in default and no prejudice is
caused to plaintiff. The hornbook rule is that default judgments are generally disfavored.[10]

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The MTC decision is affirmed.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-38974 March 25, 1975

OMICO MINING AND INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION and FREDERICK G. WEBBER, petitioners,

vs.
JUDGE AMADOR T. VALLEJOS, in his capacity as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Cavite, ALFREDO
CATOLICO, and LEONARDO ALCID, in his capacity as City Sheriff of Manila, respondents.

ANTONIO, J.

DOCTRINE: The period for filing responsive pleading commences to run all over again from the time the
defendant receives notice of the denial or deferment of his motion to dismiss. Without receiving of such
denial then he cannot be declared in default.

FACTS

On June 1, 1973, Alfredo Catolico (herein private respondent), then a judge of the CFI of Cavite, filed a
complaint alleging two causes of actions before the CFI of Cavite against petitioner Omico Mining and
Industrial Corporation and Frederick Webber, President and Chairman of Corporation, as follows:

1. For the return of ten (10) certificates of stock of the corporation borrowed from him by the
defendants

Under the first cause of action, respondent Catolico is a stockholder of the defendant Omico Mining
and Industrial Corporation holding thirty (30) certificates of stock. Out of these, 10 certificates of stock were
borrowed by the petitioner corporation, thru petitioner Webber, to serve as collateral to its DBP loan and
later on to the purchase of Bunning and Company. Despite the demand from respondent Catolico to return
the certificates of stocks because of failure of the two transactions mentioned, petitioners failed to return the
same.

2. For the payment of his services as legal counsel for the corporation.

Under the second cause of action, respondent Catolico was employed as head of the legal department
of petitioner Omico Mining & Industrial Corporation but after the severance of their ties, he is claiming for his
unpaid commissions and payment for legal services he rendered.

Petitioners were served with the corresponding summons and copies of the complaint and filed a motion to
dismiss the complaint on two grounds: namely (1) improper venue, in that the case was filed in Cavite
where plaintiff is not a resident, but he is a resident of Quezon City and, as to the second cause of action, the
contract of personal and professional services between plaintiff and defendants was entered into in the City
of Manila, and, therefore, the case should have been filed in Manila and (2) lack of cause of action, in that
with regard to the stock certificates the same are in the name of Vicente Resonda; and, with respect to the
contract of personal and professional services wherein it was agreed that the plaintiff shall head the legal
department of defendant Omico Mining & Industrial Corporation, the same is illegal, void and unenforceable,
plaintiff being a judge of the Court of First Instance who is prohibited by Section 35 of Rule 138 of the Revised
Rules of Court from engaging in private practice as a member of the Bar.

On June 16, 1973, the date set for the hearing of the motion to dismiss, neither the parties nor their respective
counsels appeared in court. The court ordered on June 18, 1973 the postponement of the hearing of the
motion to dismiss filed by the petitioner Webber until showing satisfaction that he has furnished the
respondent of his motion to dismiss.

Respondents contend that the motion to dismiss the complaint is a "useless piece of paper" because the
notice of hearing incorporated therein is addressed to the Clerk of Court, not to the party concerned, that is,
the plaintiff or his counsel, as required by the rules. On this basis, Respondent Catolico filed a petition to
declare the defendants in default and to allow him to present his evidence ex parte.

Respondent CFI Judge Vallejos granted the respondent and directed the petitioners to return the certificates
of stocks and payment of his legal services.

Pending the MR of the petitioners because they had not filed yet their reply to the opposition as they had not
received a copy thereof, the respondent filed a motion for immediate execution of judgment, alleging, among
other things, that said judgment had already become final and executory because the defendants failed to
have the order of default lifted.

Respondent CFI Judge Vallejos granted again Respondent Catolico.

Now, the petitioner filed their notice of appeal to the SC because of the absence of the respondent Judge from
his station.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the respondent Judge acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion in declaring the defendants in default, in receiving plaintiff's evidence ex
parte and in rendering judgment thereon.

2. Whether ordinary appeal, not certiorari and prohibition, is the proper remedy available to
petitioners.

RULING:

1. YES. With regard to the first issue, respondents contend that the motion to dismiss the complaint is a
"useless piece of paper" because the notice of hearing incorporated therein is addressed to the Clerk of Court,
not to the party concerned, that is, the plaintiff or his counsel, as required by the rules. The SC held that the
respondent had sufficient notice of the time and place of the hearing of the motion to dismiss because the
copy of motion to dismiss was received by respondent’s counsel.

The case at bar is such an instance, because private respondent had sufficient notice of the place, time and
date when the motion to dismiss was to be heard. It is, therefore, evident from the foregoing that the
respondent Judge acted with grave abuse of discretion when he declared the petitioners in default. The
motion to dismiss was pending before the court when such declaration was made, and it is generally irregular
to enter an order of default while a motion to dismiss remains pending and undisposed of. 22 The irregularity
of the order of default is evident from the fact that when the petitioners were declared in default, their time
for filing an answer had not yet commenced to run anew because on said date, their counsel had not yet
received any notice of the action taken by the court on their motion to dismiss.
Under Section 4 of Rule 16 of the Revised Rules of Court, if the motion to dismiss is denied or if the
determination thereof is deferred, the movant shall file his answer within the period prescribed by Rule 11,
computed from the time he received notice of the denial or deferment, unless the court provides a different
period. In other words, the period for filing responsive pleading commences to run all over again from the
time the defendant receives notice of the denial or deferment of his motion to dismiss. Inasmuch as
petitioners were declared in default while their motion to dismiss was still pending resolution, they were,
therefore, incorrectly declared in default, and the holding of the trial of the case on the merits, in their
absence, without due notice to them of the date of hearing, was a denial of due process. 23 Consequently, the
order of default, the judgment and the order of execution are patent nullities.

Anent the issue on payment for Respondent Catolico’s legal services, he should have known or ought to know,
that when he was elevated to the Bench of the Court of First Instance as a judge thereof, his right to practice
law as an attorney was suspended and continued to be suspended as long as he occupied the judicial
position. It is evident, therefore, that the aforesaid contract is void because a contract, whose cause, object or
purpose is contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy, is considered inexistent and
void from the beginning. 26

2. Petition for certiorari is a proper remedy.

WHEREFORE, certiorari is granted and the default order, judgment and writ of execution rendered by the
respondent Judge are hereby set aside, and the respondent Judge is ordered to hear and decide the motion to
dismiss the complaint.
Republic of the Philippines
Supreme Court
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

PHILIPPINE TOURISM G.R. No. 176628

AUTHORITY,
Petitioner,
Present:

CARPIO, J., Chairperson,

BRION,
- versus - PEREZ,
SERENO, and
REYES, JJ.

Promulgated:

PHILIPPINE GOLF DEVELOPMENT

& EQUIPMENT, INC., March 19, 2012
Respondent.
x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

RESOLUTION

BRION, J.:

DOCTRINE: Extrinsic fraud as a ground to order defendant in default

FACTS:

PTA, an agency of the Department of Tourism entered into a contract with Atlantic Erectors, Inc. (AEI) for the
construction of the Intramuros Golf Course Expansion Projects for P57.9Million.

AEI entered into a sub-contract agreement with PHILGOLF, a duly organized domestic corporation, since the
former was incapable of constructing the golf course aspect of the project amounting to P27Million. The sub-
contract agreement also provides that PHILGOLF shall submit its progress billings directly to PTA and, in
turn, PTA shall directly pay PHILGOLF.

PHILGOLF filed a collection suit against PTA amounting P11.8Million, plus interest, for the construction of the
golf course. Within the period to file a responsive pleading, PTA filed a motion for extension of time to file an
answer.

The RTC granted the motion for extension of time. PTA filed another motion for extension of time to file an
answer. The RTC again granted the motion.

Despite the RTCs liberality of granting two successive motions for extension of time, PTA failed to answer the
complaint. Hence, the RTC rendered a judgment of default ordering PTA to pay the PHILGOLF.
PTA seasonably appealed the case to the CA. But before the appeal of PTA could be perfected, PHILGOLF
already filed a motion for execution pending appeal with the RTC. The RTC granted the motion and a writ of
execution pending appeal was issued against PTA. A notice of garnishment was issued against PTAs bank
account at the Land Bank of the Philippines, NAIA-BOC Branch to fully satisfy the judgment.

PTA filed a petition for certiorari with the CA. CA granted PTA’s petition and set aside the order granting the
motion for execution pending appeal. However, PTA withdrew its appeal of the RTC decision and, instead,
filed a petition[5] for annulment of judgment under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court. The petition for annulment
of judgment was premised on the argument that the gross negligence of PTAs counsel prevented the
presentation of evidence before the RTC.

The CA dismissed the petition for annulment of judgment for lack of merit. PTA questions this CA action in the
present petition for certiorari.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the negligence of PTAs counsel amounted to an extrinsic fraud warranting an
annulment of judgment
2. Whether or not, PTA as a government entity, should not be bound by the inactions or negligence of
its counsel;
3. Whether or not there were no other available remedies left for PTA but a petition for annulment of
judgment.

RULING:

1. NO. There was no extrinsic fraud. Extrinsic fraud refers to any fraudulent act of the prevailing
party in the litigation which is committed outside of the trial of the case, whereby the
unsuccessful party has been prevented from exhibiting fully his case, by fraud or deception
practiced on him by his opponent.[9] Under the doctrine of this cited case, we do not see the
acts of PTAs counsel to be constitutive of extrinsic fraud.

The records reveal that the judgment of default[10] was sent via registered mail to PTAs counsel.
However, PTA never availed of the remedy of a motion to lift the order of default.[11] Since the failure
of PTA to present its evidence was not a product of any fraudulent acts committed outside trial, the
RTC did not err in declaring PTA in default.

It is not disputed that the summons together with a copy of the complaint was personally served
upon, and received by PTA through its Corporate Legal Services Department. Thus, in failing to
submit a responsive pleading within the required time despite sufficient notice, the RTC was correct
in declaring PTA in default.

PTA cannot escape these legal technicalities by simply invoking the negligence of its counsel. The rule
is that a client is bound by the acts, even mistakes, of his counsel in the realm of procedural
technique[,]and unless such acts involve gross negligence that the claiming party can prove, the acts
of a counsel bind the client as if it had been the latters acts.[6]

2. PTA was acting in a proprietary character hence it cannot invoke state immunity simply because it is
a government entity
3. Annulment of judgment is not the proper remedy. PTAs appropriate remedy was only to appeal the
RTC decision

WHEREFORE, petition is DISMISSED.

THIRD DIVISION

BETTY B. LACBAYAN, G.R. No. 165427

Petitioner, Present:

CARPIO MORALES, J.,

Chairperson,
BRION,
- versus - BERSAMIN,
VILLARAMA, JR., and
SERENO, JJ.

BAYANI S. SAMOY, JR., Promulgated:

Respondent.
March 21, 2011
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

DECISION

VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

DOCTRINE: An admission is any statement of fact made by a party against his interest or unfavorable to the
conclusion for which he contends or is inconsistent with the facts alleged by him. It must involve matters of
facts, not of law.

FACTS:

Respondent Samoy, a married man, had an illicit relationship with Petitioner Lacbayan and their relationship
bears a son. During their illicit relationship, petitioner and respondent, together with three more
incorporators, were able to establish a manpower services company. [4] Five parcels of land were also
acquired during the said period and were registered in petitioner and respondents names, ostensibly as
husband and wife. When their relationship turned sour, they both agreed to divide their properties and
terminate their business partnership by executing a Partition Agreement.

Initially, respondent agreed to petitioners proposal that the properties in Malvar St. and Don Enrique Heights be
assigned to the latter, while the ownership over the three other properties will go to respondent.[12] However,
when petitioner wanted additional demands to be included in the partition agreement, respondent
refused.[13] Feeling aggrieved, petitioner filed a complaint for judicial partition[14] of the said properties before
the RTC.

Petitioner averred that they cohabit together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage and worked
together as business partners, acquiring real properties amounting to P15.5Million.

Respondent denied petitioners claim of cohabitation and said that the properties were acquired out of his own
personal funds without any contribution from petitioner. He contended that he the properties were registered
under his name and petitioner’s because respondent’s wife is a heavy gambler.

The RTC dismissed the complaint and declared that the properties were acquired not from petitioner’s own
personal funds but from the income of the manpower services company over which she owns a measly 3.33%
share. Petitioner averred that she is pro indiviso owner of one-half of the properties in dispute. But the CA also
denied her claim and ruled that the court the determination as to the existence of co-ownership on co-
ownership must first be established before issuing an order to divide the property.

Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Respondent Samoy initial admission on the Partition Agreement deemed to have admitted
the existence of co-ownership over the disputed properties?

RULING:

No. An admission is any statement of fact made by a party against his interest or unfavorable to the
conclusion for which he contends or is inconsistent with the facts alleged by him. [38]

Admission against interest is governed by Section 26 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, which provides:

Sec. 26. Admissions of a party. The act, declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant fact
may be given in evidence against him.

To be admissible, an admission must (a) involve matters of fact, and not of law; (b) be categorical and
definite; (c) be knowingly and voluntarily made; and (d) be adverse to the admitters interests, otherwise it
would be self-serving and inadmissible.[39]

A careful perusal of the contents of the so-called Partition Agreement indicates that the document
involves matters which necessitate prior settlement of questions of law, basic of which is a
determination as to whether the parties have the right to freely divide among themselves the subject
properties. Moreover, to follow petitioners argument would be to allow respondent not only to admit against
his own interest but that of his legal spouse as well, who may also be lawfully entitled co-ownership over the
said properties. Respondent is not allowed by law to waive whatever share his lawful spouse may have on the
disputed properties. Basic is the rule that rights may be waived, unless the waiver is contrary to law, public
order, public policy, morals, good customs or prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law. [40]

The determination as to the existence of co-ownership is necessary in the resolution of an action for
partition. While it is true that the complaint involved here is one for partition, the same is premised on the
existence or non-existence of co-ownership between the parties.

Curiously, petitioner herself admitted that she did not assent to the Partition Agreement after seeing the need
to amend the same to include other matters. Petitioner does not have any right to insist on the contents of an
agreement she intentionally refused to sign.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.