Can an association of lawyers and non-lawyers be formed as a professional partnership? Explain.

Partnership with non-lawyers is void. In the formation of partnership for the practice of law, no person
should be admitted or held out as a practitioner or member who is not a member of the legal profession
duly authorized to practice, and amenable to professional discipline.

A partnership for the practice of law cannot be likened to partnerships formed by other professionals or
for business. A partnership for the practice of law is not a legal entity. It is a mere relationship or
association for a particular purpose. It is not a partnership formed for the purpose of carrying on trade
or business or of holding property. Law prohibits those who are not members of the bar to engage in
partnerships for the practice of law since they do not possess the qualifications and requirements of a
lawyer and are not bound by the ethical rules of the legal profession.

May the director of patents bar a lawyer from appearing before such office without passing an
examination over patent law?

No, the director of patents may not bar a lawyer from appearing before such office even without passing
an examination over patent law because the practice of law includes such ppearance before the Patent
Office. Although the transaction of business in the Patent Office involves the use and application of
technical and scientific knowledge and training, still, all such business has to be rendered in accordance
with the Patent Law, as well as other laws, including the Rules and Regulations promulgated by the
Patent Office in accordance with law. The practice before the Patent Office also involves the
interpretation and application of other laws and legal principles, as well as the existence of facts to be
established in accordance with the law of evidence and procedure. The appearance in the patent office
call for legal knowledge, training and experience for which a member of the bar has been prepared. The
Philippine Patent Law does not give express authority to the Director of Patents to determine the
qualifications of persons allowed to practice before the Patent Office, but it merely gives the Director
the authority to promulgate all needful rules and regulations for the effective enforcement of the
provisions of the code (PHILIPPINE LAWYER'S ASSOCIATION v CELEDONIO AGRAVA).

Case 7: Phil. Lawyers Assn. v. Angara GR L-12426 1959

FACTS:
 This is a petition filed by the Philippine Lawyers Association for prohibition and injunction against
Celedonio Agrava, in his capacity as Director of the Philippines Patent Office.

On May 23, 1957, respondent Director issued a circular announcing that he had scheduled for June 27,
1957 an examination for the purpose of determining who are qualified to practice as patent attorneys
before the said office.

Petitioner contends that one who has passed the bar examinations, and is in good standing, is duly
qualified to practice before the Philippines Patent Office and that the respondent Director's holding an
examination for the purpo se is in excess of his jurisdiction and is in violation of the law.

The respondent, in reply, maintains that the prosecution of patent cases "does not involve entirely or
purely the practice of law but include the application of scientific and technical knowledge and training
as a matter of actual purpose so as to include engineers and other individuals who passed the
examination can practice before the Patent Office.

Furthermore, respondent contends that he has previously conducted such examinations and that this is
the first time that he is questioned formally.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not members of the bar should first take and pass an examination conducted by the
Patent Office before he would be allowed to practice law in said office;

2. Whether or not appearance before the Patent Office and the preparation of applications or patents,
etc. constitutes practice of law or is included in the practice of law; and,
3. Whether or not the Director of the Patent Office is authorized to conduct examinations for patent
attorneys.

HELD:

No, it is not required. Any member of the Philippine Bar in good standing may practice law anywhere
and before any entity, whether judicial or quasi-judicial or administrative, in the Philippines.

Under the present law, members of the Philippine Bar and in good standing, may practice their
profession before the Patent Office, for the reason that much of the business in said office involves the
interpretation and determination of the scope and application of the Patent Law and other laws
applicable, as well as the presentation of evidence to establish facts involved; that part of the functions
of the Patent Director are judicial or quasi-judicial, so much so that appeals from his orders and
decisions are, under the law, taken to the Supreme Court.

2. Yes, it is considered as practice of law. The practice of law includes such appearance before the
Patent Office, the representation of applicants, oppositors, and other persons, and the prosecution of
their applications for patent, their oppositions thereto, or the enforcement of their rights in patent
cases because it involves the determination by the trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and
conditions as manifested by activities such as the preparation and submission of pleadings and briefs.

Furthermore, the orders of the Director is appealable to the Supreme Court. Thus, if the transactions of
business in the Patent Office involved exclusively or mostly technical and scientific knowledge and
training, then logically, the appeal should be taken not to a court or judicial body, but rather to a board
of scientists, engineers or technical men, which is not the case.

3. No, because under the Constitution, The Supreme Court alone has the exclusive and constitutional
power with respect to admission to the practice of law in the Philippines and any member of the
Philippine Bar in good standing may practice law anywhere and before any entity, whether judicial or
quasi-judicial or administrative, in the Philippines.
Thus, the Director acted beyond his power, and the examination cannot be countenanced as valid.

What is the continuing basic duty of a lawyer? Case 8: A.M. No. 1928 August 3, 1978 In the Matter of IBP
Membership dues delinquency of Atty. Marcial A. Edilion.

FACTS:

Marcial A. Edilion is a duly licensed practicing attorney in the Philippines.

The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Board of Governors unanimously adopted Resolution
No. 75-65 in Administrative Case No. MDD-1 (In the Matter of the Membership Dues Delinquency of
Atty. Marcial A. Edilion) recommending to the Court the removal of the name Edilion from its Roll of
Attorneys for "stubborn refusal to pay his membership dues" to the IBP since the latter's constitution
notwithstanding due notice.

Edilion’s Contention: The provisions on payment of dues constitute an invasion of his constitutional
rights because he is being compelled, as a pre-condition to maintaining his status as a lawyer in good
standing, to be a member of the IBP is to pay the corresponding dues, and that as a consequence of this
compelled financial support of the said organization to which he is admittedly personally antagonistic,
he is being deprived of the rights to liberty and property guaranteed to him by the Constitution.

HELD:

An "Integrated Bar" is a State-organized Bar, to which every lawyer must belong, as

distinguished from bar associations organized by individual lawyers themselves, membership in which is
voluntary. Integration of the Bar is essentially a process by which every member of the Bar is afforded
an opportunity to do his share in carrying out the objectives of the Bar as well as obliged to bear his
portion of its responsibilities. Organized by or under the direction of the State, an integrated Bar is an
official national body of which all lawyers are required to be members. They are, therefore, subject to all
the rules prescribed for the governance of the Bar, including the requirement of payment of a
reasonable annual fee for the effective discharge of the purposes of the Bar, and adherence to a code of
professional ethics or professional responsibility breach of which constitutes sufficient reason for
investigation by the Bar and, upon proper cause appearing, a recommendation for discipline or
disbarment of the offending member.
 Integration does not make a lawyer a member of any group of which he is not already a
member. He became a member of the Bar when he passed the Bar examinations.

Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to attend or not
attend the meetings of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its elections as he
chooses. The only compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment of annual dues. It is quite
apparent that the fee is indeed imposed as a regulatory measure, designed to raise funds for carrying
out the objectives and purposes of integration.

Define Practice of Law? Case 9: Cayetano v. Monsaod, 201 SCRA 210, 1991

Practice of Law – any activity, in or out of court which requires the application of law, legal procedure,
knowledge, training and experience. To engage in the practice of law is to give notice or render any kind
of service, which or devise or service requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill (Cayetano
v. Monsod, 201 SCRA 210).

RENATO CAYETANO vs. CHRISTIAN MONSOD

G.R. No. 100113. September 3, 1991.

FACTS:

Monsod was nominated by President Aquino as Chairman of the Comelec. The Commission on
Appointments confirmed the appointment despite Cayetano's objection, based on Monsod's alleged
lack of the required qualification of 10 year law practice. Cayetano filed this certiorari and prohibition.
The 1987 constitution provides in Section 1, Article IX-C: There shall be a Commission on Elections
composed of a Chairman and six Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines
and, at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, holders of a college degree, and
must not have been candidates for any elective position in the immediately preceding
elections.However, a majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar
who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.

Issue: Whether the respondent does not posses the required qualification of having engaged in the
practice of law for at least ten years.
Held: In the case of Philippine Lawyers Association vs. Agrava, stated: The practice of law is not limited
to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers
incident to actions and special proceeding, the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf
of clients before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying. In general, all advice to clients, and all
action taken for them in matters connected with the law incorporation services, assessment and
condemnation services, contemplating an appearance before judicial body, the foreclosure of mortgage,
enforcement of a creditor’s claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting
proceedings in attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have been held to constitute law
practice. Practice of law means any activity, in or out court, which requires the application of law, legal
procedure, knowledge, training and experience.

Atty. Monsod’s past work experiences as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur

of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both the rich and the poor —
verily more than satisfy the constitutional requirement — that he has been engaged in the practice of
law for at least ten years.

What is the Nature of the Practice of Law? Burde vs. Atty. Magueta, A.C. No. 5713 2003

The practice of law is a profession and not a business. Lawyering is not primarily meant to be a money-
making venture, and law advocacy is not a capital that necessarily yields profits. The gaining of a
livelihood is not a professional but a secondary consideration. Duty to public service and to the
administration of justice should be the primary consideration of lawyers, who must subordinate their
personal interests or what they owe to themselves. The practice of law is a noble calling in which
emolument is a byproduct, and the highest eminence may be attained without making much money.

What is private practice? What are Sole Practitioners? What is a firm?

“Private practice means an individual or organization engaged in the business of delivering legal
services.

Lawyers who practice alone are often called sole practitioners.

Groups of lawyers are called "firms." The firm is usually a partnership and members of the firm are the
partners. Some firms may be organized as professional corporations and the members called
shareholders. In either case, the members of the firm are the experienced attorneys. In most firms,
there are younger or more inexperienced salaried attorneys called "associates."

**See Cayetano v. Monsod.

May a corporation be organized to engage in law practice?

No. A corporation cannot be formed for the practice of law, medicine, or other learned professionals in
the absence of express authority in the corporation law. (1 Fletcher, p. 339) The Corporation Code of the
Philippines provides no provision allowing a corporation to engage in law practice.

Further, the practice of law is accorded only to persons who meet the necessary qualifications provided
for by law. As held in the case of Acebedo Optical Company vs. Court of Appeals, such qualifications
cannot be possessed by a corporation which has a distinct and separate personality from the individual
stockholder or member. Thus, it cannot carry on the work of learned professionals, it cannot directly do
so, by employing, say lawyers to practice for it.

What is the best advertising available for lawyer?

“The canon of the profession tell us that the best advertising possible for a lawyer is a well-merited
reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust, which must be earned as the outcome of
character and conduct.

Good and efficient service to a client as well as to the community has a way of publicizing itself and
catching public attention. That publicity is a normal by-product of effective service which is right and
proper. A good and reputable lawyer needs no artificial stimulus to generate it and to magnify his
success. He easily sees the difference between a normal by-product of able service and the
unwholesome result of propaganda.” (Ulep v Legal Clinic)
What are the exception to the rule against solicitation and advertising?

The following are considered as permissible advertising or solicitation:

a. Engaging in business or other occupations except when such could be deemed improper, be seen as
indirect solicitation or would be the

equivalent of law practice;

b. Law lists, but only brief biographical and informative data;

c. Ordinary professional cards;

d. Notice to other local lawyers and publishing in a legal journal of one's availability to act as an
associate for them;

e. The offer of free legal services to the indigent, even when broadcasted over the radio or tendered
through circulation of printed matter to the

general public;

f. Seeking a public office, which can only be held by a lawyer or, in a dignified manner, a position as a full
time corporate counsel;

g. Simple announcement of the opening of a law firm or of changes in the partnership, associates, firm
name or office address, being for the

convenience of the profession;

h. Listing in a phone directory, but not under a designation of a special branch of law; and

i. Activity of an association for the purpose of legal representation.

Case 10: Ulep v. Legal Clinic Inc. 223 SCRA 378 June 17, 1993

FACTS:

Ulep, a member of the bar, filed a petition against the Legal Clinic because its advertisements are
unethical, demeaning of the law profession, and destructive of the confidence of the community in
the integrity of the members of the bar and that as a member of the bar, he is ashamed and offended by
the said advertisements.

The advertisement of the Legal Clinic includes “secret marriage” and “divorce” among others. In
an article published in the Starweek (Philippine Star) entitled “Rx for Legal Problems,” Atty.
Rogelio Nogales, proprietor of The Legal Clinic, explained the main purpose, structure, and
operations of the said corporation. In response, The Legal Clinic admits the fact of publication of the
advertisement but claims that it is not engaged in the practice of law but in the rendering of “legal
support services” through paralegals with the use of modern computers and electronic machines.

HELD:

1. Legal Support Services is considered to be the practice of law, which means any activity, in or out
of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedures, knowledge, training and
experience. Generally, to practice law is to give advice or render any kind of service that involves legal
knowledge or skill.

The activities of The Legal Clinic constitute practice of law. With its attorneys and so called paralegals, it
will necessarily have to explain to the client the intricacies of the law and advise him or her on the
proper course of action to be taken as may be provided for by said law. That is what its
advertisement represents and for which services it will consequently charge and be paid.
That activity falls squarely within the definition of “practice of law.

2. The standards of legal profession condemn the lawyer’s advertisement of his talents. A lawyer
cannot, without violating the ethics of his profession, advertise his talents or skill as in a manner
similar to a merchant advertising his goods. The canon of the profession states that the best
advertising possible for a lawyer is a well-merited reputation for profession capacity and fidelity to
trust, which must be earned as the outcome of character and conduct. A good and reputable
lawyer needs no artificial stimulus to generate it and to magnify his success. Note: Not all types of
advertisement is prohibited by the Canons.

Differentiate General from Special Retainer?

General retainer, is a fee for a specific period of time rather than for a specific project. While no specific
representation is contemplated, the client pays for the attorney’s availability during the time specified.

Special retainer, is a flat fee that the client pays for a specific case or project. Many states prohibit this
form of retainer because it may prevent the client from discharging the attorney at any time during the
representation.

What is contingency fee, suit in assumpsit, retaining lien, charging lien, champertous contract?
Explain the disputable assumption that a lawyer appearing in court for a client has the authority from
the client?

A lawyer is presumed to be properly authorized to represent any cause in which he appears, and no
written power of attorney is required to authorize him to appear in court for his client. Nevertheless,
although the authority of an attorney to appear for and on behalf of a party may be assumed, it can still
be questioned or alleged by the party concerned. The presumption established under Section 21, Rule
138 of the Revised Rules of Court is only disputable (Commissioner of Customs v KMK Gani, 182 SCRA
591, February 26, 1990).

Can a defendant in a suit file a counterclaim against the lawyer of the plaintiff? Why? Case 11: Chavez
vs. Sandiganbaya , 193 SCRA 282, January 24, 1991.

Doctrine: When a lawyer acts in the name of a client, he should not be sued on a counterclaim in the
very same case he has filed only as counsel and not as a party. Any claim for alleged damages or other
causes of action should be filed in an entirely separate and distinct civil action. A lawyer cannot properly
attend to his duties towards his client if, in the same case, he is kept busy defending himself.

Facts: The Republic of the Philippines, through the Presidential Commission on Good Government
(PCGG), with the assistance of SolGen Francisco Chavez, filed with the respondent Sandiganbayan a
complaint docketed as Civil Case No. 0033 against Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr. and Juan Ponce Enrile, among
others, for reconveyance, reversion and accounting, restitution and damages.

Enrile filed a counterclaim impleading SolGen Chavez and the PCGG officials as party defendants for
lodging this alleged "harassment suit" against him.

Issues:

1. Whether Enrile has right to file an action for damages against the Solicitor General.
2. Whether it is proper to file a counterclaim to pursue his right against the Solicitor General

Held: Enrile has a right to file an action for damages, but filing a counterclaim is not the appropriate
procedure. He should file a separate and distinct civil action for damages against the Solicitor General.

Where the petitioner exceeds his authority as Solicitor General acts in bad faith, or, as contended by the
private respondent, "maliciously conspir(es) with the PCGG commissioners in persecuting respondent
Enrile by filing against him an evidently baseless suit in derogation of the latter's constitutional rights
and liberties", there can be no question that a complaint for damages may be filed against him. High
position in government does not confer a license to persecute or recklessly injure another.

Even though Enrile has a right to file an action, the counterclaim cannot be sustained. To allow a
counterclaim against a lawyer who files a complaint for his clients, who is merely their representative in
court and not a plaintiff or complainant in the case would lead to mischievous consequences.

A lawyer owes his client entire devotion to his genuine interest, warm zeal in the maintenance and
defense of his rights and the exertion of his utmost learning and ability. A lawyer cannot properly attend
to his duties towards his client if, in the same case, he is kept busy defending himself. It is likewise
unreasonable to require Government Prosecutors to defend themselves against counterclaims in the
very same cases they are prosecuting.

May the solicitor general appear for a public official at any stage of a criminal case? Why? Case 12:
Urbano vs. Chavez, 183 SCRA 347, 1990

Attorney’s fee:

State the concept of attorney’s fees?

This was answered in PCL Shipping vs. NLRC, citing Reyes vs. CA.

The Supreme Court explained that there are two commonly accepted concepts of attorney's fees, the
so-called ordinary and extraordinary.
In its ordinary concept, an attorney's fee is the reasonable compensation paid to a lawyer by his client
for the legal services he has rendered to the latter. The basis of this compensation is the fact of his
employment by and his agreement with the client.

In its extraordinary concept, attorney's fees are deemed indemnity for damages ordered by the court to
be paid by the losing party in a litigation. The instances where these may be awarded are those
enumerated in Article 2208 of the Civil Code, specifically par. 7 thereof which pertains to actions for
recovery of wages, and is payable not to the lawyer but to the client, unless they have agreed that the
award shall pertain to the lawyer as additional compensation or as part thereof. The extraordinary
concept of attorney's fees is the one contemplated in Article 111 of the Labor Code, which provides:

Art. 111. Attorney's fees. – (a) In cases of unlawful withholding of wages, the culpable party may be
assessed attorney's fees equivalent to ten percent of the amount of wages recovered x x x

The afore-quoted Article 111 is an exception to the declared policy of strict construction in the awarding
of attorney's fees. Although an express finding of facts and law is still necessary to prove the merit of the
award, there need not be any showing that the employer acted maliciously or in bad faith when it
withheld the wages. There need only be a showing that the lawful wages were not paid accordingly, as
in this case.

Case 13: Rosario, jr. v. de Guzman, et al., G.R. No. 191247, July 10, 2013.

In August 1990, Spouses Pedro and Rosita de Guzman (Spouses de Guzman) engaged the legal services
of Atty. Francisco L. Rosario, Jr. (petitioner) as defense counsel in the complaint filed against them by
one Loreta A. Chong (Chong) for annulment of contract and recovery of possession with damages
involving a parcel of land in Parañaque City. Petitioner’s legal services commenced from the RTC and
ended up in the Supreme Court. Spouses de Guzman, represented by petitioner, won their case at all
levels. While the case was pending before the Supreme Court, Spouses de Guzman died in a vehicular
accident. Thereafter, they were substituted by their children.

On September 8, 2009, petitioner filed the Motion to Determine Attorney’s Fees before the RTC. He
alleged, among others, that he had a verbal agreement with the deceased Spouses de Guzman that he
would get 25% of the market value of the subject land if the complaint filed against them by Chong
would be dismissed. Despite the fact that he had successfully represented them, respondents refused
his written demand for payment of the contracted attorney’s fees.

For their part, respondents counter that the motion was belatedly filed and, as such, it could no longer
be granted. In addition, the RTC had already resolved the issue when it awarded the amount of
P10,000.00 as attorney's fees. Respondents further assert that the law, specifically Article 2208 of the
Civil Code, allows the recovery of attorney's fees under a written agreement. The alleged understanding
between their deceased parents and petitioner, however, was never put in writing. They also aver that
they did not have any knowledge or information about the existence of an oral contract, contrary to
petitioner's claims. At any rate, the respondents believe that the amount of 25% of the market value of
the lot is excessive and unconscionable.

Issue:

Is petitioner entitled to attorney’s fees?

If yes, how much?

Held:

Yes, he is is entitled to attorney’s fees.

In order to resolve the issues in this case, it is necessary to discuss the two concepts of attorney’s fees –
ordinary and extraordinary. In its ordinary sense, it is the reasonable compensation paid to a lawyer by
his client for legal services rendered. In its extraordinary concept, it is awarded by the court to the
successful litigant to be paid by the losing party as indemnity for damages.

In the case at bench, the attorney’s fees being claimed by the petitioner refers to the compensation for
professional services rendered, and not as indemnity for damages. He is demanding payment from
respondents for having successfully handled the civil case filed by Chong against Spouses de Guzman.
The award of attorney’s fees by the RTC in the amount of ₱10,000.00 in favor of Spouses de Guzman,
which was subsequently affirmed by the CA and this Court, is of no moment. The said award, made in its
extraordinary concept as indemnity for damages, forms part of the judgment recoverable against the
losing party and is to be paid directly to Spouses de Guzman (substituted by respondents) and not to
petitioner. Thus, to grant petitioner’s motion to determine attorney’s fees would not result in a double
award of attorney’s fees.
Quantum meruit – literally meaning as much as he deserves – is used as basis for determining an
attorney’s professional fees in the absence of an express agreement. n attorney must show that he is
entitled to reasonable compensation for the effort in pursuing the client’s cause, taking into account
certain factors in fixing the amount of legal fees.

Rule 20.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility lists the guidelines for determining the proper
amount of attorney fees, to wit:

Rule 20.1 – A lawyer shall be guided by the following factors in determining his fees:

a) The time spent and the extent of the services rendered or required;

b) The novelty and difficulty of the questions involved;

c) The importance of the subject matter;

d) The skill demanded;

e) The probability of losing other employment as a result of acceptance of the proffered case;

f) The customary charges for similar services and the schedule of fees of the IBP chapter to which he
belongs;

g) The amount involved in the controversy and the benefits resulting to the client from the service;

h) The contingency or certainty of compensation;

i) The character of the employment, whether occasional or established; and

j) The professional standing of the lawyer.

A fair and reasonable amount of attorney's fees should be 15% of the market value of the property.

Basis for attorney’s fee?

As provided under Rule 20.01 of Canon 20, the following are the factors in determining attorney’s fees:
The time spent and the extent of the service rendered or required;

The novelty and difficulty of the questions involved;

The importance of the subject matter;

The skill demanded;

The probability of losing other employment as a result of acceptance of the proffered case;

The customary charges for similar services and the schedule of fees of the IBP chapter to which he
belongs;

The amount involved in the controversy and the benefits resulting to the client from the service;

The contingency or certainty of compensation;

The character of the employment, whether occasional or established; and

The professional standing of the lawyer

In addition, the Supreme Court held in a line of cases that if there is no specific contract between the
lawyer and the client, the lawyer is paid on the basis of quantum meruit or what the lawyer deserves
for his services.

Is a written contract between lawyer and client a must entered into before payment of his fees?

While a written agreement for professional services is the best evidence to show the relation, formality
is not an essential element of the employment of an attorney. The absence of a written contract will not
preclude a finding that there is a professional relationship. Documentary formalism is not an essential
element in the employment of an attorney; the contract may be express or implied.

Is a lawyer entitled to full amount of his fees even if dismissed by a client?

Case 14: Camacho v. CA, November 24, 2989

FACTS:
On July 14, 1968, Aurora Camacho and respondent Atty. Angelino Banzon entered into a contract for
legal services denominated as a Contract of Attorneys Fee. One of the tasks he was assigned was the
drafting of a deed of donation of a parcel of land in favor of the Municipality of Balanga, which Banzon
complied with.

Within that same lot, a certain Silvestre Tuazon was tilling the land as an agricultural tenant.
Subsequently, Camacho and Tuazon would enter an Agreement with Voluntary Surrender where Tuazon
voluntarily surrendered his right as a tenant of the landholding. Despite the agreement, Tuazon refused
to vacate the premises. So, Camacho and the Municipality of Balanga filed a complaint for forcible entry
on November 18, 1969 before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Balanga, Bataan. The case was
eventually decided in favor of the plaintiffs and Tuazon was ordered to vacate the lot although a trial de
novo would ensue upon appeal due to the absence of the transcript of stenographic notes of the
proceedings before the MTC. Atty. Banzon was still the counsel representing them at this point.

And then, all of a sudden, Camacho terminated Atty. Banzon’s services without paying him. So Atty.
Banzon filed a complaint-in-intervention, alleging the payment of his attorney’s fees.

His complaint was predicated on an alleged contract of attorney's fees wherein petitioner was bound to
pay him 5,000 sq-m. of the lot in litigation for his legal services rendered in negotiating for the transfer
of the town's market site to petitioner's property.

He also claimed 1,000 square meters of the lot which petitioner allegedly orally bound herself to pay
him as attorney's fees in handling her seven (7) other cases. Banzon further asserted that he purchased
from petitioner eighty (80) square meters and from third parties eight hundred (800) square meters of
the lot in question. Thus, private respondent, as intervenor, joined petitioner in praying for the
ejectment of the defendant but, at the same time, asked the trial court to order petitioner to deliver to
him the aforestated portions of Lot No. 261, plus rentals, additional attorney's fees and expenses of
litigation.

In August 14, 1977, Camacho and Silvestre Tuazon signed a compromise agreement which became the
basis of a judgment on compromise, dated August 31, 1977, in Civil Case No. 3512, and on the basis of
this agreement, Camacho filed a motion to dismiss the complaint of Banzon on the ground that the trial
court had lost jurisdiction to hear and try the same as the principal case for forcible entry was already
terminated. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss in an order dated March 16, 1979

So, Camacho filed a Petition for Certiorari with the SC, which the SC referred to the CA. The CA ruled
that there was no final determination on the Civil Case where the complaint-in-intervention was based.

In labor cases, wherein the attorney’s fee is contingent is the 10% cannot be tempered? Case 15: D.M.
Consunji, inv. Vs. NLRC, 143 SCRA 212

Is this allowed, 50% share of the lawyer contingent to the winning of the case with the understanding
that all cost and expenses of litigation be shouldered by the lawyer? Case 16: Bautista v. Gonzales 182
SCRA 151 1990

If he files a suit in assumpsit will he be paying a filing fee?

May an executor or administrator Recover attorney’s fees for the services to the estate?

As a general rule, it is the executor or administrator who is primarily liable for attorneys fees due to the
lawyer who rendered legal services for the executor or administrator in relation to the settlement of the
estate. The executor or administrator may seek reimbursement from the estate for the sums paid in
attorneys fees if it can be shown that the services of the lawyer redounded to the benefit of the estate.

However, if the executor or administrator refuses to pay the attorneys fees, the lawyer has two modes
of recourse. First, the lawyer may file an action against the executor or administrator, but in his/her
personal capacity and not as administrator or executor. Second, the lawyer may file a petition in the
testate or intestate proceedings, asking the court to direct the payment of attorneys fees as an expense
of administration. If the second mode is resorted to, it is essential that notice to all the heirs and
interested parties be made so as to enable these persons to inquire into the value of the services of the
lawyer and on the necessity of his employment.

**See Allado v. Pascual, GR No. 127165, May 2, 2006.

Case 17: Lacson v. Reyes, 182 SCRA 729, Feb. 26, 1990
In every suit, should the court adjudged attorney’s fee? Case 18: Central Azucarera de Bais vs. CA, 188
SCRA 328 August 3, 1990.

No.

Case: CENTRAL AZUCARERA DE BAIS, v. CA, DAVID BAROT, ET AL., G.R. No. 87597 August 3, 1990. (Sorry
mej magulo sa facts yung case, konti lang on AF :D )

From SYLLABUS: ATTORNEY’S FEES; MAY BE AWARDED ONLY AS AN EXCEPTION; REASON THEREFOR
MUST BE STATED IN THE DECISION; — On the matter of attorney’s fees, it is an accepted doctrine that
the award thereof as an item of damages is the exception rather than the rule, and counsel’s fees are
not to be awarded every time a party wins a suit. The power of the court to award attorney’s fees under
Article 2208 of the Civil Code demands factual, legal and equitable justification, without which the
award is a conclusion without a premise, its basis being improperly left to speculation and conjecture. In
all events, the court must explicitly state in the text of the decision, and not only in the decretal portion
thereof, the legal reason for the award of attorney’s fees.

FACTS: David Barot and 180 others were all sugar cane planters in the milling district of Bais, Negros
Oriental, who have been milling their sugarcane with Central Azucarera de Bais since 1952, without any
written milling contracts or agreements. They filed a complaint for a sum of money against Central
Azucarera de Bais. They relied on Section 1 of RA 809, otherwise known as the Sugar Act of 1952 which
provided for increased participation (division/share in the unrefined sugar produced).

Central denied all the material allegations in the complaint and averred that the planters who milled
with the Central did not constitute the majority of the sugarcane planters without written milling
contracts arguing that it had written milling contracts with the majority of its planters during the crop
years in question, thus, Sec. 1 of R.A. 809 could not apply.

TC: Rendered a decision in favor of the planters finding that the majority of the planters did not have
milling contracts with Central. After determining the planters’ increased participation in the sugar,
molasses and bagasse and the money value thereof, the trial court held Central liable to pay the planters
for the increased participation of the planters in sugar for different crop years.
Central was also ordered to pay “25% of the total amount due the planters as for (sic) and attorney’s
fee.”

Central filed a MR, which was granted in part. The attorney’s fees was modified to “10% of the total
amount due the plaintiffs as and for attorney’s fees.”

Central appealed to the CA: The CA set aside the May 7, 1985 (10% Atty Fees) order of the TC and
reinstated the decision dated December 28, 1984 (25% Atty Fees).

DECISION: The applicability of Section 1 of Republic Act No. 809 and the entitlement of the planters to
the increased participation are unquestionable. Parenthetically, this increased participation should be
given in their entirety to the planters.

On the matter of attorney’s fees, it is an accepted doctrine that the award thereof as an item of
damages is the exception rather than the rule, and counsel’s fees are not to be awarded every time a
party wins a suit. The power of the court to award attorney’s fees under Article 2208 of the Civil Code
demands factual, legal and equitable justification, without which the award is a conclusion without a
premise, its basis being improperly left to speculation and conjecture. In all events, the court must
explicitly state in the text of the decision, and not only in the decretal portion thereof, the legal reason
for the award of attorney’s fees.

In this case, it is undeniable and evident that both the respondent appellate court and the trial court
completely violated the aforestated doctrinal rule. In awarding attorney’s fees as damages, no
justification therefor is advanced either in the decision of the trial court or of respondent appellate court
which affirmed the former. Even for this reason alone, the award must be deleted and any advertence
we would make herein to petitioner’s alleged bad faith or good faith, as discussed in the exchanges of
the parties but disregarded in the aforesaid decisions of both lower courts, would be unnecessary and
pointless.

The award of attorney’s fees is deleted.

Exceptions where the lawyer cannot recover reasonable compensation? Any exception to the
exception?
Who may not charge attorney’s fees?

State some acts of a lawyer that may negate the recovery of attorney’s fees?

Acts that will not negate recovery of attorney’s fees?

Can the court award a claim for attorney’s fee where the lawyer filed a petition as an incident of the
main action even if the amount of the attorney’s fee is outside of its jurisdiction? Case 19: Quirante v. Ca
GR 73886 1989

What is the nature of a charging lien? Where to file the lien? Is it enforceable by a writ of execution?
Can it attach a property in litigation? How about money claim can it be deducted to the award?
Preference of payment? Case 20: Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company vs. CA 181 SCRA 367 1990.

Is a GOCC represented by the office of the Government Corporate Counsel entitled to attorney’s fees?
Why? Case 21: Pacific Mills vs. CA 206 SCRA 317

CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY:

Recitation: Memorize Canon 1-6 including its rules

Questions:

Lawyer and the society:

Can a lawyer separate his private life from his professional life as a defense in violation of his code?
Case 22: Socorro T. Co vs. Atty. Godofredo Bernardino, AC No. 3919 1998

A was criminally charged, he tried to get the services of Atty. X but the latter presumed his non
innocence, can he decline, is that ethical?

Dishonest and Deceitful conduct:

Can a lawyer convicted of the crime of estafa be disbarred? Case 23: Victoriano Resurreccion vs. Atty.
Ciriaco Sayson, Adm. Case No. 1037 December 14, 1998.

FACTS: Complainant Victorino was accused of homicide thru reckless imprudence because of a vehicular
accident involving a boy resulting to the death of the latter. Respondent Atty. Sayson was the counsel
for the offended party. The parties agreed to settle the case. Pursuant to the amicable settlement
reached by the parties, Victorino gave P2,500 to the respondent who never gave the money to his client.
Thus, the complainant was compelled to give another P2,500 to the offended party. The complainant
then demanded the return of the money from respondent, to no avail.
Complainant filed a case of Estafa against Atty. Sayson for converting and appropriating the amount of
P2,500.00 for his own personal benefit. Atty. Sayson was convicted of estafa by the Regional Trial Court
of Quezon City. Such conviction was affirmed by the Court of Appeals and upheld by the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: Can a lawyer convicted of the crime of estafa be disbarred?

HELD: YES. Law is a noble profession, and the privilege to practice it is bestowed only upon individuals
who are competent intellectually, academically and, equally important, morally. Because they are
vanguards of the law and the legal system, lawyers must at all times conduct themselves, especially in
their dealings with their clients and the public at large, with honesty and integrity in a manner beyond
reproach.

Considering that of all classes and professions, lawyers are most sacredly bound to uphold the law, it is
imperative that they live by the law. Accordingly, lawyers who violate their oath and engage in deceitful
conduct have no place in the legal profession.

How about Issuing worthless checks? Violation of BP22? Case 24: Santos-Tan vs. Atty. Romero R. Robiso,
A.C. No. 6383, March 31, 2009

FACTS:

Complainant Santos-Tan charged respondent with malpractice for grossly neglecting his duties and
responsibilities as counsel for complainant and for issuing a bouncing check. Complainant found out that
her case had not progressed and that the only pleading that respondent had filed was his notice of
appearance.

ISSUES:

(1) Whether respondent was negligent in handling complainant’s case (NO);

and

(2) Whether respondent should be disciplined for issuing a bouncing check

(YES).
RULING:

On the issue of negligence on the part of respondent in handling complainant’s case, the Court agrees
that based on the facts presented there was nothing that he could have done to expedite the resolution
of the motion for reconsideration then pending before the RTC. The RTC had already ordered that the
motion for reconsideration be submitted for resolution. Respondent could not be faulted if the acting
presiding judge did not want to act on the motion until the regular presiding judge return.

Regarding the other issues, as a lawyer, respondent is deemed to know the law, especially Bouncing
Check Law. By issuing a check in violation of the provisions of this law, respondent is guilty of serious
misconduct. The act of a lawyer in issuing a check which is drawn against insufficient funds constitutes
deceitful conduct or conduct unbecoming an officer of the court. The Court has held that the issuance of
checks which were later dishonored for having been drawn against a closed account indicates a lawyer’s
unfitness for the trust and confidence reposed on him. It shows a lack of personal honesty and good
moral character as to render him unworthy of public confidence. As such, we have held that deliberate
failure to pay just debts and the issuance of worthless checks constitute gross misconduct, for which a
lawyer may be sanctioned with suspension from the practice of law. Respondent violated the Attorney’s
Oath that he will, among others, obey the laws. The Code of Professional Responsibility specifically
provides:

CANON 1 – A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND
PROMOTE RESPECT FOR THE LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, respondent Atty. Romeo R. Robiso is ORDEREDSUSPENDED from the practice of law
for a period of ONE (1) month.

Can a lawyer be disbarred after borrowing records from the case and stole some exhibits and by tearing
them? Case 25: Fernandez vs. Benjamin Garcia adm. Case no. 3694, June 17, 1993.

Cases on Dishonesty and Deceitful Conduct:

Case 26: Quiliban vs. Robinol, 171 SCRA 769

Case 27: Calo vs. Degano, 20 SCRA 447

Case 28: Imuido vs. Fidel Sor Mangonon, 4 SCRA 760

Case 29: In re: del Rosario, 52 Phil. 399

Case 30: Licianan vs. Melo, 170 SCRA 100

Case 31: In re: Quiambao, 102 Phil. 940

Immoral Conduct:
What degree of immoral conduct that warrants disbarment?

Cases of immorality: Case 32: Obusan v. Obusan, Jr. 128 SCRA 485

Case 33: Terre vs. Terre, 211 SCRA 6

Case 34: Barrientos vs. Daarol Adm. Matter No. 1512 January 29, 1993

Case 35: Almirez vs. Lopez, 27 SCRA 169

Case 36: Mortel vs. Aspiras, 100 Phil. 586

Case 37: Cabrera vs. Agustin 106 Phil. 256

Case 38: Cordova vs. Cordova, 179 SCRA 680

Case 39: Guevarra vs Eala A.C. 7136 Aug. 1, 2007

A filed a suit against B, they subsequently entered into a compromise agreement, but C the lawyer of A
objected because his attorney’s fee have not been paid? Case 40: Jesalva vs. Bautista, 105 Phil. 348

FACTS:

In a labor dispute, the employees involved (petitioners) have secured a judgment for reinstatement and
for the payment of back wages. The judgment was already in the process of execution. The Corporation
offered to enter a compromise settlement but the petitioners refused. One of the grounds of their
refusal is that the compromise is allegedly illegal because it would reduce the fees of their attorneys
which were previously determined by the same court upon a final judgment, against the attorneys’ will.

ISSUE: Can the counsel refuse to compromise on the ground that the right of the counsel to fees was
previously determined?

HELD: NO.

The rights of lawyers to the fees due them for services in a litigation cannot have a higher standing than
the rights of the clients or the parties themselves. Lawyers’ rights may not be invoked by some of the
parties as a ground for disapproving the compromise. The lawyer affected can enforce his rights in a
proper proceeding in accordance with the Rules, but said rights may not be used to prevent the
approval of the compromise.

Cases of Delay which can be considered condemnable:

Case 41: Gabriel vs. Ca 72 SCRA 273

Case 42: Macias vs. Uy Kim, 45 SCRA 251

Case 43: Masingin, et. al., vs. Hon. Ed Vincent S. Albano et. Al., G.R. No. 86421 1994

Explain the principle that the practice of law is a profession and not a money making trade?

What is the best form of advertisement for a lawyer? Case 44: Director of Religious Affairs vs. Bayot, 74
Phil. 579

What should a law firm do if a partner already died?

If a partner already died, the law firm **to be edited* A lawyer shall not divide or stipulate to divide a
fee for legal services with persons not licensed to practice law, except:

(a) Where there is a pre-existing agreement with a partner or associate that, upon the latter's death,
money shall be paid over a reasonable period of time to his estate or to persons specified in the
agreement...

Can the defense of proper support to his children be tenable when the lawyer entered into a
subsequent marriage while the first one still subsist? Case 45: Conjuango, jr. vs. Palma, 438 SCRA 306
2004

Case 46: Macarrubo vs. Macarrubo, 424 SCRA 42 2004

FLORENCE TEVES MACARRUBO vs. ATTY. EDMUNDO L. MACARRUBO A.C. No. 6148. February 27, 2004

FACTS: Florence Macarrubo filed a verified complaint for disbarment against Atty. Edmundo Macarubbo
with the IBP alleging that Macarubbo deceived her into marrying him despite his prior subsisting
marriage with Helen Esparza. Florence averred that Atty. Edmundo represented himself as a bachelor.
They eventually got married. Atty. Edmundo admitted to her that he was married to Helen Esparza but
convinced Florence, her family and her friends that his previous marriage was void. Atty. Edmundo also
entered into a third marriage with Josephine Constantino. Atty. Edmundo abandoned Florence and their
children without providing them any regular support.
Atty. Edmundo denied employing deception in his marriage to complainant. He insisted that Florence
was fully aware of his prior subsisting marriage to Helen Esparza, but she dragged him against his will to
a sham wedding to protect her and her family's reputation since she was then three-months pregnant.
He also denied ever abandoning the children since he provided them with support.

Atty. Edmundo submitted in evidence the decision of the different courts declaring his first and second
marriages void. Atty. Edmundo also raised the additional defense that the judicial decree of annulment
of his marriage to complainant is res judicata upon the present administrative case.

The IBP recommended Atty Edmundo to be suspended for 3 months for gross misconduct.

Decision: Atty. Edmundo is guilty of gross misconduct in his private affairs which warrant disciplinary
action by this Court as the guardian of the purity and integrity of the legal profession.

While the marriage to Florence has been annulled by final judgment, this does not cleanse his conduct
of every tinge of impropriety. He and Florence started living as husband and wife when his first marriage
was still subsisting, as it was only on August 21, 1998 that such first marriage was annulled, rendering
him liable for concubinage. Such conduct is inconsistent with the good moral character that is required
for the continued right to practice law as a member of the Philippine bar. It imports moral turpitude and
is a public assault upon the basic social institution of marriage.

Even assuming arguendo that respondent was coerced by complainant to marry her, the duress, by his
own admission, ceased after their wedding day, respondent having freely cohabited with her and even
begot a second child by her.

Atty. Edmundo cannot take refuge in the decision in the annulment case he filed against Florence.The
decision cannot serve as res judicata on the final resolution of the present case. As this Court held in In
re Almacen, a disbarment case is sui generis for it is neither purely civil nor purely criminal but is rather
an investigation by the Court into the conduct of its officers.

It is not easy to believe that a lawyer like respondent could easily be cowered to enter into any
marriage. One incident of a shotgun marriage is believable, but two such in succession would tax ones
credulity. And then, there is a third marriage to Josephine T. Constantino which is again the subject of
another annulment case. It would not come as a surprise if in that pending case, he would again put
blame on his third wife in order to send the marriage to oblivion.

The pattern of misconduct by Atty. Edmundo undermines the institutions of marriage and family,
institutions that this society looks to for the rearing of our children, for the development of values
essential to the survival and well-being of our communities, and for the strengthening of our nation as a
whole. This must be checked if not stopped.

As officers of the court, lawyers must not only in fact be of good moral character but must also be
perceived to be of good moral character and must lead a life in accordance with the highest moral
standards of the community. The moral delinquency that affects the fitness of a member of the bar to
continue as such, including that which makes a mockery of the inviolable social institution of
marriage,outrages the generally accepted moral standards of the community.

In sum, Atty. Edmundo has breached the following precepts of the CPR:

Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

CANON 7 A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession, and support
the activities of the Integrated Bar.

Rule 7.03 A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor
shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal
profession.

There can then be no other fate that awaits Atty Edmundo, as a consequence of his grossly immoral
conduct, than to be disbarred or suspended from the practice of law. The penalty of 3 months
suspension recommended by the IBP is, not commensurate to the gravity of his conduct.

PENALTY: Disbarment & his name was stricken off the Roll of Attorneys.
Can a lawyer be disciplined for unjustly refused to satisfy the civil aspect of the judgment in a crime of
frustrated murder?

Case 47: Soriano vs. Dizon 480 SCRA 1 2006

The lawyer and the Legal profession:

Memorize Canon 7 – 9 including the rules for recitation.

How should a lawyer act in relation to his peers? CFC

Case 48: Zaldivar vs. Gonzales 166 SCRA 316

When is a strong language against a judge justified?

Case 49: Fernandez vs. Hon. Bello, 107 Phil. 1140

May a lawyer encroach upon the employment of another lawyer?

Case 50: Laput vs Ramontique, 6 SCRA 45

Case 51: A.C. No. 6396 October 25, 2005 ROSALIE DALLONG-GALICINAO, Complainant, vs. ATTY. VIRGIL
CASTRO

FACTS:

Respondent Atty. Castro went to the office of the Complainant (Clerk of Court) to inquire whether the
complete records of a particular civil case had already been remanded to the court of origin. The
respondent was not the counsel of record of either party in such civil case.

Complainant informed the respondent that the record had not yet been transmitted since a certified
true copy of the decision of the Court of Appeals should first be presented to serve as basis for the
transmittal of the records to the court of origin. Because of this, the respondent scornfully asked various
questions. Respondent then banged the door and after a few minutes, respondent returned to the
office, still enraged, and pointed his finger at complainant and shouted, Ukinnam nga babai! (Vulva of
your mother, you woman!)
ISSUE: Whether or not the act of the respondent of constantly checking the transmittal of the records of
case which he is not the counsel unethical.

HELD: YES, THE ACT WAS UNETHICAL.

Rule 8.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states:

Rule 8.02A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, encroach upon the professional employment of
another lawyer; however, it is the right of any lawyer, without fear or favor, to give proper advice and
assistance to those seeking relief against unfaithful or neglectful counsel.

Through his acts of constantly checking the transmittal of the records of a particular civil case,
respondent deliberately encroached upon the legal functions of the counsel of record of that case. It
does not matter whether he did so in good faith.Had he been counsel of record, it would have been easy
for him to present the required certified true copy of the decision of the Court of Appeals.

His explanation that he will enter his appearance in the case when its records were already transmitted
to the MCTC is unacceptable. Not being the counsel of record and there being no authorization from
either the parties to represent them, respondent had no right to impose his will on the clerk of court.

Moreover, in the course of his questionable activities relating to such civil case, respondent acted rudely
towards an officer of the court. Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility demands that lawyers
conduct themselves with courtesy, fairness and candor toward their fellow lawyers. Lawyers are duty
bound to uphold the dignity of the legal profession. They must act honorably, fairly and candidly
towards each other and otherwise conduct themselves without reproach at all times.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent is hereby FINED in the amount of TEN THOUSAND
(P10,000.00) PESOS with a warning that any similar infraction with be dealt with more severely.
May a lawyer divide a fee for legal services with a non-lawyer?

Under Rule 9.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility:

A lawyer shall not divide or stipulate to divide a fee for legal services with persons not licensed to
practice law, except:

(a) Where there is a pre-existing agreement with a partner or associate that, upon the latter's death,
money shall be paid over a reasonable period of time to his estate or to persons specified in the
agreement; or

(b) Where a lawyer undertakes to complete unfinished legal business of a deceased lawyer; or

(c) Where a lawyer or law firm includes non-lawyer employees in a retirement plan even if the plan is
based in whole or in part, on a profit sharing agreement.

Exceptions?

Can a lawyer delegate his authority to none lawyer?

Case 52: A.C. No. 7269 November 23, 2011ATTY. EDITA NOE-LACSAMANA, vs. ATTY. YOLANDO F.
BUSMENTE,

May a lawyer be the subject of disciplinary action if he alleges unfounded accusations in his pleadings?
Case 53: Re: Letter Dated 21 February 2005 of Atty. Noel S. Sorredo 464 SCRA 32 2005 –(A.M. 05-3-04-
SC 11sept.2006

What proper action should be warranted for this: using false MCLE compliance number, performing
notarial act without commission?

Case 54: Mapalad Sr. v.Atty. Anselmo S. Echavez G.R. 10911 2017