FOREST OR TIMBER LANDS
885 executed by them in favor of the Heirs of
A. CONCEPT
HEIRS OF JOSE AMUNATEGUI vs. DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY
G.R. No. L-27873. November 29, 1983 public domain, public
forest land, Revised Administrative Code
OCTOBER 6, 2017
FACTS:
These are two petitions for review on certiorari questioning
the decision of the CA which declared the disputed property
as forest land, not subject to titling in favor of private
persons. These petitions have their genesis in an application
for confirmation of imperfect title and its registration filed
with the Court of First Instance of Capiz. The parcel of land
sought to be registered is known as Lot No. 885 of the
Cadastral Survey of Pilar, Capiz, and has an area of 645,703
square meters.
Petitioners Roque Borre and Melquiades Borre, filed the
application for registration. In due time, the heirs of Jose
Amunategui filed an opposition to the application of Roque
and Melquiades Borre. At the same time, they prayed that
the title to a portion of Lot No. 885 of Pilar Cadastre
containing 527,747 square meters be confirmed and
registered in the names of said Heirs of Jose Amunategui.
The Director of Forestry, through the Prov. Fiscal of Capiz,
also filed an opposition to the application for registration of
title claiming that the land was mangrove swamp which was
still classified as forest land and part of the public domain.
Another oppositor, Emeterio Bereber filed his opposition
insofar as a portion of Lot No. 885 containing 117,956 square
meters was concerned. Applicant-petitioner Roque Borre
sold whatever rights and interests he may have on Lot No.
885 to Angel Alpasan. The latter also filed an opposition,
claiming that he is entitled to have said lot registered in his
name.
After trial, the Court of First Instance of Capiz adjudicated
117,956 square meters to Emeterio Bereber and the rest of
the land containing 527,747 square meters was adjudicated
in the proportion of 5/6 share to Angel Alpasan and 1/6
share to Melquiades Borre.
A petition for review on certiorari was filed by the Heirs of
Jose Amunategui contending that the disputed lot had been
in the possession of private persons for over 30 years and
therefore in accordance with Republic Act No. 1942, said lot
could still be the subject of registration and confirmation of
title in the name of a private person in accordance with Act
No. 496 known as the Land Registration Act. Another
petition for review on certiorari was filed by Roque Borre
and Encarnacion Delfin, contending that the trial court
committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing their
complaint against the Heirs of Jose Amunategui. The Borre
complaint was for the annulment of the deed of absolute
1
sale of Lot No.
Amunategui. The complaint was dismissed on the basis of
the CA’s decision that the disputed lot is part of the public
domain. The petitioners also question the jurisdiction of the
CA in passing upon the relative rights of the parties over the
disputed lot when its final decision after all is to declare said
lot a part of the public domain classified as forest land.
The Heirs of Jose Amunategui maintain that Lot No. 885
cannot be classified as forest land because it is not thickly
forested but is a “mangrove swamp”.
ISSUE: Whether or not Lot No. 885 is public forest land, not
capable of registration in the names of the private
applicants.
RULING: A forested area classified as forest land of the public
domain does not lose such classification simply because
loggers or settlers may have stripped it of its forest cover.
Parcels of land classified as forest land may actually be
covered with grass or planted to crops by kaingin cultivators
or other farmers. “Forest lands” do not have to be on
mountains or in out of the way places. Swampy areas
covered by mangrove trees, nipa palms, and other trees
growing in brackish or sea water may also be classified as
forest land. The classification is descriptive of its legal nature
or status and does not have to be descriptive of what the
land actually looks like. Unless and until the land classified as
“forest” is released in an official proclamation to that effect
so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural lands
of the public domain, the rules on confirmation of imperfect
title do not apply. Possession of forest lands, no matter how
long, cannot ripen into private ownership. It bears
emphasizing that a positive act of Government is needed to
declassify land which is classified as forest and to convert it
into alienable or disposable land for agricultural or other
purposes.
The fact that no trees enumerated in Section 1821 of the
Revised Administrative Code are found in Lot No. 885 does
not divest such land of its being classified as forest land,
much less as land of the public domain. The appellate court
found that in 1912, the land must have been a virgin forest
as stated by Emeterio Bereber’s witness Deogracias
Gavacao, and that as late as 1926, it must have been a thickly
forested area as testified by Jaime Bertolde. The opposition
of the Director of Forestry was strengthened by the
appellate court’s finding that timber licenses had to be
issued to certain licensees and even Jose Amunategui
himself took the trouble to ask for a license to cut timber
within the area. It was only sometime in 1950 that the
property was converted into fishpond but only after a
previous warning from the District Forester that the same
could not be done because it was classified as “public
forest.”
The court affirmed the finding that property Lot No. 885 is
part of the public domain, classified as public forest land.
Petitions were DISMISSED.
TONGSON vs. DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY
September 27, 1977
G.R. No. L-34463
The sole appellant in this application for registration of title
for Lot 855 of the cadastral survey of Pilar is the Director of
Forestry, one of the oppositors. It smiled the lower court
decision in favor of another oppositor, Macario Bermejo. 1
The question raised is one of law, whether or not a parcel of
land, in the possession of the predecessors- in-interest and
the oppositor Bermejo as far back as 1905, asserted to have
originally been mangrove swamps, thereafter converted into
a fishpond, may still be considered as part of the timber
domain which is not disposable. As the sole issue is one of
law, the Court of Appeals, where the matter was first
elevated, certified the case to this Tribunal. the decision
must be affirmed, the facts as found by the lower court being
entitled to respect. As noted in the decision: "After
examining very closely the testimonial and documentary
evidence presented by Macario Bermejo in his capacity as
judicial administrator of the estate of the late Santiago M.
Bermejo, the Court arrives at the conclusions that the claims
of possession and ownership of the heirs of said Santiago M.
Bermejo are clearly supported by the evidence." 2
The facts as found by the lower court follow: "The
testimonial evidence shows that as early as the year 1905
the parcel of land which later became Lot 855 of the
cadastral survey of Pilar, was under the exclusive possession
of Francisco Boria who cut trees therefrom and converted
them into firewood. He also established a salt factory and
that he sold the firewood and the salt without having been
disturbed by anybody. After the death of Francisco. Boria, his
son Arturo Borja took possession of the land, continued to
cut trees and converted them into firewood without giving
share of the products to anybody, up to the year 1910. On
May 1, 1917 Antero Borja sold the land to Deogracias
Gayacao as evidenced by a private document over thirty
years of age, marked Exhibit '15-A-Bermejo.' The English
translation is marked Exhibit '15-A-Bermejo Deogracias
Gayacao took possession of the land and made use of the
trees and the improvements therein. On January 4, 1940,
Deogracias Gayacao sold five parcels of land to Santiago M.
Bermejo and one of the parcels known as parcel No. 4 is
cadastral Lot No. 855. The sale is evidenced by the notarial
instrument marked Exhibit '14- Bermejo.' During his lifetime,
Santiago M. Bermejo possessed said parcel of land, cut trees
2
for the firewood purposes and also had a salt factory. Upon
the death of Santiago M. Bermejo in 1951, his children took
possession of this parcel of land and when Macario Bermejo
was appointed judicial administrator by the Court of First
Instance of Capiz, in Special Proceedings No. V689, this lot
appeared in the Revised Inventory of the estate of the late
Santiago M. Bermejo (Exhibit '13-Bermejo'). Paragraph 21 of
said Inventory (Exhibit '13-A- Bermejo') is Lot 855. During his
lifetime, Santiago M. Bermejo declared this land for taxation
purposes as shown by tax declaration No. 10190, Exhibits
'19-Bermejo,' '20-Bermejo', '21-Bermejo,' '23-Bermejo,' and
'25-Bermejo.' During the cadastral survey of the land in the
municipality of Pilar, Santiago M. Bermejo claimed Lot 855,
and presented a cadastral survey of the land in the
municipality of Pilar, Santiago M. Bermejo claimed Lot 855,
and presented a cadastral answer, a copy of which is marked
Exhibit '29-Bermejo.' This cadastral answer was subscribed
on March 6, 1951. 3 It was stated further: "At present Lot
855 is a completed and producing fishpond. When Macario
Bermejo took possession of the land in 1953 he converted it
into a fishpond and started to construct fishpond dikes.
However, due to lack of funds, the construction of the
fishpond was not completed. On May 30, 1956, Macario
Bermejo, in his capacity as administrator of the estate of the
late Santiago M. Bermejo, leased the land to Leopoldo L.
Somes with the approval of the Court of First Instance of
Capiz. Said lease contract is marked Exhibit Bermejo At
present Leopoldo L. Somes is in actual possession of Lot 855
by virtue of said lease contract (Exhibit Bermejo) ... The
possession of Francisco Borja Antero Borja, Deogracias
Gayacao, and Santiago Bermejo was peaceful, continuous,
open, and adverse under claim of ownership. The possession
of the children of the late Santiago M. Bermejo, represented
by judicial administrator Macario Bermejo, started after the
death of Santiago Bermejo on April 1951. Nobody molested
them. Consequently, the possession of the heirs of Santiago
M. Bermejo together with that of their predecessors-in-
interest was likewise peaceful, continuous, open, adverse
and in concept of owners for a period of not less than fifty
years." 4
As set forth at the outset, the appeal lacks merit, and the
affirmance of the decision is called for.
1. It is admitted in the brief of appellant Director of
Forestry that the lower court, in its decision, relied on
Montano v. Insular Government, 5 Jocson v. Director of
Forestry 6 and Garchitorena Vda. de Contrera v. Obias. 7 It is
contended, however, that after the Administrative Code of
1917 took effect, mangrove swamps were included in the
category of public forest. 8 The Administrative Code became
effective on October 1, 1917. Jocson v. Director of Forestry
was decided in 1919. This Court, in the opinion of Justice
Moir was quite categorical: "In the case of Mapa v. Insular
Government ..., this court said that the phrase 'agricultural
lands' as used in Act No. 926 means those public lands
acquired from Spain which are not timber or mineral lands.
Whatever may have been the meaning of the term 'forestry'
under the Spanish law, the Act of Congress of July Ist 1902,
classifies the public lands in the Philippine Islands as timber,
mineral or agricultural lands, and all public lands that are not
timber or mineral lands are necessarily agricultural public
lands, whether they are used as nipa swamps, manglare,
fisheries or ordinary farm lands. The definition of forestry as
including manglares found in the Administrative Code of
1917 cannot affect rights which vested prior to its The Director of Forestry vs. Villareal
enactment," 9 What is even more persuasive as to the GR No. L-32266
correctness of the decision reached by the lower court is that February 27, 1989
in the Garchitorena decision, this Court, through Justice
Ostrand who was famed for his authoritative opinions on Cruz, J.
public land controversies, promulgated in 1933, more than
fifteen years after the effectivity of the revised Facts: The petitioner, Director of Forestry was one of
Administrative Code, was equally explicit: 'The opposition
the several persons who opposed the application for
rests mainly upon the proposition that in the land covered
by the application there are mangrove lands as shown in this registration of a parcel land classified as mangrove
opponent's Exhibit 1, but we think this opposition of the swamps in the municipality of Sapian, Capiz with an
Director of Forestry is untenable, inasmuch as it has been
area of 178,113 square meters of mangrove swamps,
definitely decided that mangrove lands are not forests lands
in the sense in which this phrase is used in the Act of to the applicant Ruperto Villareal. He alleged that he
Congress ... 10 It could be said, therefore, that even on the and his predecessors-in-interests had been in
assumptions that the parcel of land in question could be
possession of the said parcel of land for more than forty
characterized as mangrove swamps, the conclusion reached
by the lower court is not without support in the applicable years (40). Both parties agreed in one point that the
authorities. disputed land was a mangrove swamp. The respondent
argued that mangrove swamp are agricultural land but
the petitioner contended that it is a forestall land
2. ctually, it cannot be said with certainty that there
was a finding in the appealed decision that to the disputed therefore not disposable.The Court of the First Instance
lot was originally mangrove swamps. As stated therein: of Capiz however grants the application of the
"Mangrove swamsp where only trees of mangrove species
respondent. The decision of the lower court was later
grow, where the trees are small and sparse fit only for
firewood purposes and the trees growing are not of affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Hence the Director of
commercial value as lumber, do not convert the land into Forestry elevated the case to the Supreme Court for
public land. Such lands are not forest in character. They do review on certiorari.
not form part of the public domain." 11 Based on such a
finding which must be accorded due weight and is control
the sole question raised on appeal is one of law, the decision Issue: Whether or not, mangrove swamps are
arrived at by the lower court is not open to any valid agricultural land or forest land.
objection.

Held: The Supreme Court held that mangrove swamps

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of April 5, 1962 is as forest lands is descriptive of its legal nature or status
affirmed. No costs. and does not have to be descriptive of what the land
actually looks like. Furthermore the legislative definition
embodied in section 1820 of the Revised Administrative
Code of 1917 which declares that mangrove swamps or
manglares form part of the public forests of the
Philippines hence they are not alienable. The evidence
3
presented by the respondent in its claim were not
sufficient to prove its possession and ownership of the
land, he only presented tax declaration. Wherefore the
decision of the Court of Appeals was set aside and the
application for registration of title by the respondent is
dismissed by the Supreme Court.
DENR et al VS. YAP et al
G.R. No. 167707
October 8, 2008
FACTS: On November 10, 1978, then President Marcos
issued Proc. No. 1801 declaring Boracay Island, among
other islands, caves and peninsulas in the Philippines,
as tourist zones and marine reserves under the
administration of the Philippine Tourism Authority
(PTA). President Marcos later approved the issuance
of PTA Circular 3-82 dated September 3, 1982, to
implement Proclamation No. 1801.
Claiming that Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular
No 3-82 precluded them from filing an application for
judicial confirmation of imperfect title or survey of land
for titling purposes, respondents-claimants Mayor .
Yap, Jr., and others filed a petition for declaratory relief
with the RTC in Kalibo, Aklan
In their petition, respondents-claimants alleged that
Proc. No. 1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-82 raised doubts
on their right to secure titles over their occupied lands.
They declared that they themselves, or through their
predecessors-in-interest, had been in open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation in
Boracay since June 12, 1945, or earlier since time
immemorial. They declared their lands for tax purposes
and paid realty taxes on them. Respondents-claimants
posited that Proclamation No. 1801 and its
implementing Circular did not place Boracay beyond the
commerce of man. Since the Island was classified as a
tourist zone, it was susceptible of private ownership.
4
Under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, they had
the right to have the lots registered in their names
through judicial confirmation of imperfect titles.
The Republic, through the OSG, opposed the petition
for declaratory relief. The OSG countered that Boracay
Island was an unclassified land of the public domain. It
formed part of the mass of lands classified as “public
forest,” which was not available for disposition pursuant
to Section 3(a) of the Revised Forestry Code, as
amended. The OSG maintained that respondents-
claimants’ reliance on PD No. 1801 and PTA Circular
No. 3-82 was misplaced. Their right to judicial
confirmation of title was governed by Public Land Act
and Revised Forestry Code, as amended. Since
Boracay Island had not been classified as alienable and
disposable, whatever possession they had cannot ripen
into ownership.
On July 14, 1999, the RTC rendered a decision in favor
of respondents-claimants, declaring that, “PD 1810 and
PTA Circular No. 3-82 Revised Forestry Code, as
amended.
The OSG moved for reconsideration but its motion was
denied. The Republic then appealed to the CA. On In
2004, the appellate court affirmed in toto the RTC
decision. Again, the OSG sought reconsideration but it
was similarly denied. Hence, the present petition under
Rule 45.
On May 22, 2006, during the pendency the petition in
the trial court, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
issued Proclamation No. 1064 classifying Boracay
Island partly reserved forest land (protection purposes)
and partly agricultural land (alienable and disposable).
On August 10, 2006, petitioners-claimants Sacay,and
other landowners in Boracay filed with this Court an
original petition for prohibition, mandamus, and
nullification of Proclamation No. 1064. They allege that
the Proclamation infringed on their “prior vested rights”
over portions of Boracay. They have been in continued
possession of their respective lots in Boracay since time
immemorial.
On November 21, 2006, this Court ordered the
consolidation of the two petitions
ISSUE: the main issue is whether private claimants
have a right to secure titles over their occupied
portions in Boracay.
HELD: petitions DENIED. The CA decision is
reversed.
Except for lands already covered by existing titles,
Boracay was an unclassified land of the public domain
prior to Proclamation No. 1064. Such unclassified lands
are considered public forest under PD No. 705.
PD No. 705 issued by President Marcos categorized all
unclassified lands of the public domain as public forest.
Section 3(a) of PD No. 705 defines a public forest as “a
mass of lands of the public domain which has not been
the subject of the present system of classification for the
determination of which lands are needed for forest
purpose and which are not.” Applying PD No. 705, all
unclassified lands, including those in Boracay Island,
are ipso facto considered public forests. PD No. 705,
however, respects titles already existing prior to its
effectivity.
The 1935 Constitution classified lands of the public
domain into agricultural, forest or timber, such
classification modified by the 1973 Constitution. The
1987 Constitution reverted to the 1935 Constitution
classification with one addition: national parks. Of these,
only agricultural lands may be alienated. Prior to
Proclamation No. 1064 of May 22, 2006, Boracay Island
had never been expressly and administratively
classified under any of these grand divisions. Boracay
was an unclassified land of the public domain.
A positive act declaring land as alienable and
disposable is required. In keeping with the presumption
of State ownership, the Court has time and again
emphasized that there must be a positive act of the
government, such as a presidential proclamation or an
executive order; an administrative action; investigation
reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a
legislative act or a statute. The applicant may also
5
secure a certification from the government that the land
claimed to have been possessed for the required
number of years is alienable and disposable. The
burden of proof in overcoming such presumption is on
the person applying for registration (or claiming
ownership), who must prove that the land subject of the
application is alienable or disposable.
In the case at bar, no such proclamation, executive
order, administrative action, report, statute, or
certification was presented to the Court. The records
are bereft of evidence showing that, prior to 2006, the
portions of Boracay occupied by private claimants were
subject of a government proclamation that the land is
alienable and disposable. Matters of land classification
or reclassification cannot be assumed. They call for
proof.
Proc. No. 1801 cannot be deemed the positive act
needed to classify Boracay Island as alienable and
disposable land. If President Marcos intended to
classify the island as alienable and disposable or forest,
or both, he would have identified the specific limits of
each, as President Arroyo did in Proclamation No. 1064.
This was not done in Proclamation No. 1801.
NOTES:
1. Private claimants’ reliance on Ankron and De
Aldecoa is misplaced. Ankron and De Aldecoa were
decided at a time when the President of the Philippines
had no power to classify lands of the public domain into
mineral, timber, and agricultural. At that time, the courts
were free to make corresponding classifications in
justiciable cases, or were vested with implicit power to
do so, depending upon the preponderance of the
evidence. Act No. 2874, promulgated in 1919 and
reproduced in Section 6 of Public Land Act, gave the
Executive Department, through the President, the
exclusive prerogative to classify or reclassify public
lands into alienable or disposable, mineral or forest.
Since then, courts no longer had the authority, whether
express or implied, to determine the classification of
lands of the public domain.
2. Each case must be decided upon the proof in that
particular case, having regard for its present or future
There is a big difference between “forest” as defined in
value for one or the other purposes. We believe,
a dictionary and “forest or timber land” as a
however, considering the fact that it is a matter of public
classification of lands of the public domain as appearing
knowledge that a majority of the lands in the Philippine
in our statutes. One is descriptive of what appears on
Islands are agricultural lands that the courts have a right
the land while the other is a legal status, a classification
to presume, in the absence of evidence to the contrary,
for legal purposes. At any rate, the Court is tasked to
that in each case the lands are agricultural lands until
determine the legal status of Boracay Island, and not
the contrary is shown. Whatever the land involved in a
look into its physical layout. Hence, even if its forest
particular land registration case is forestry or mineral
cover has been replaced by beach resorts, restaurants
land must, therefore, be a matter of proof. Its superior
and other commercial establishments, it has not been
value for one purpose or the other is a question of fact
automatically converted from public forest to alienable
to be settled by the proof in each particular case
agricultural land.

Forests, in the context of both the Public Land Act and

3. All is not lost, however, for private claimants. While
the Constitution classifying lands of the public domain
they may not be eligible to apply for judicial
into “agricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands, and
confirmation of imperfect title under Section 48(b) of CA
national parks,” do not necessarily refer to large tracts
No. 141, as amended, this does not denote their
of wooded land or expanses covered by dense growths
automatic ouster from the residential, commercial, and
of trees and underbrushes. The discussion in Heirs of
other areas they possess now classified as agricultural.
Amunategui v. Director of Forestry is particularly
Neither will this mean the loss of their substantial
instructive:
investments on their occupied alienable lands. Lack of
title does not necessarily mean lack of right to possess.

A forested area classified as forest land of the public

domain does not lose such classification simply
For one thing, those with lawful possession may claim
because loggers or settlers may have stripped it of its
good faith as builders of improvements. They can take
forest cover. Parcels of land classified as forest land
steps to preserve or protect their possession. For
may actually be covered with grass or planted to crops
another, they may look into other modes of applying for
by kaingin cultivators or other farmers. “Forest lands”
original registration of title, such as by homestead or
do not have to be on mountains or in out of the way
sales patent, subject to the conditions imposed by law.
places. Swampy areas covered by mangrove trees,
nipa palms, and other trees growing in brackish or sea
water may also be classified as forest land. The
More realistically, Congress may enact a law to entitle
classification is descriptive of its legal nature or status
private claimants to acquire title to their occupied lots or
and does not have to be descriptive of what the land
to exempt them from certain requirements under the
actually looks like. Unless and until the land classified
present land laws. There is one such bill now pending
as “forest” is released in an official proclamation to that
in the House of Representatives
effect so that it may form part of the disposable
agricultural lands of the public domain, the rules on
confirmation of imperfect title do not apply.

6

B. IMPRESCRIPTIBILITY
DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY, ET AL. v. MUÑOZ
Examples of Rule-Making in Various Agencies |
June 28, 1968 | Sanchez, J.
This involves 2 cases:
Case #1: (certiorari and prohibition) – Government
officials filed petition to annul CFI ruling allowing
Pinagcamaligan Indo-agro Development Corporation,
Inc (Piadeco) to haul its logs in the area.
Case #2: (injunction and prohibition) – Piadeco filed
petition to ask that respondent government officials are
without authority and jurisdiction to stop logging
operations, construction of the roads, cutting, gathering
and removing of timber and other forest products from
Piadeco’s private woodland area.
FACTS:
•Piadeco claims to be the owner of some 72,000ha of
land, evidenced by a Titulo de Propiedad and a deed of
absolute sale in its favor. Piadeco applied for
registration as private woodland some 10,000ha of the
land. The Bureau of Forestry issued in Piadeco’s name
7
Certificate of Private Woodland Registration No. PWR
2065-New, to expire on December 31, 1964.
•Piadeco conducted logging operations. Acting Director
of Forestry Rivera issued an order cancelling the CPWR
on the ground that Piadeco violated forestry rules and
regulations for cutting trees within the Angat and
Marikina Watershed Reservations, expressly excluded
from the certificate; and required Piadeco to surrender
the original certificate. Forest Station Warden Marquez
wrote Piadeco requesting the latter to desist from
conducting operations and to refrain from removing logs
already cut unless they have been sealed and properly
invoiced.
Nawasa BOD advised Piadeco of the revocation of the
1964 grant to Piadeco of a right of way from a barrio in
Antipolo to Rizal, as an access road to its logging
concession.
Piadeco filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition
upon the averment that the acts of Rivera, Marquez and
Nawasa were all precipitate, arbitrary, whimsical and
capricious. A writ of preliminary injunction restraining
was issued.
Piadeco moved to declare the forestry officials in default
for failure to answer its petition on time. Unaware,
forestry officials filed a MTD on the ground that the court
had no jurisdiction over their persons or the subject
matter of the petitioner, and that administrative
remedies have not yet been exhausted. Forestry
officials were declared in default.
Piadeco entered into an amicable settlement with
Nawasa; CFI approved. It was held that Piadeco was
the owner of the land in question; that its operation was
not in violation of forestry rules and regulations; that
aside from its registration certificate, Piadeco was
permitted by Nawasa thru the latter’s Resolution 1050,
Section of 1963, to conduct selective logging within the
Angat-Marikina Watershed upon payment. CFI made
the writ of preliminary injunction permanent.
Santiago vs. Basilan Lumber Co., L-15532, October 31,
1963, even if Piadeco’s private woodland was
unregistered, it still retains its inherent “rights of
ownership, among which are (its) rights to the fruits of
the land and to exclude any person from the enjoyment
and disposal thereof,” its only liability being the payment
of surcharges on the timber severed from the land.
Piadeco applied for the renewal of its CPWR; denied.
Despite the expiration of its registration certificate and
the non-renewal thereof notwithstanding, Piadeco
continued logging operations. It was about this time that
illegal logging was denounced by some members of
Congress thereby attracting national attention. This led
to a directive by the President of the Philippines on
March 8, 1965 to stop all illegal logging operations.
Piadeco filed an ex parte writ of execution; granted.
Forestry officials refused to permit Piadeco to haul its
logs. Piadeco asked the court to declare them in
contempt.
Forestry officials filed Case #1. Piadeco filed a motion
to dissolve; blocked by SolGen. SolGen filed a
manifestation praying that forestry officials be
authorized to turn the logs over for the construction of
prefabricated schoolhouses. Piadeco objected on the
ground that said logs are still its private ownership and
no law empowers the state to seize, confiscate and turn
over the cut logs. Both Piadeco motions were denied.
Piadeco wrote to Rivera a request to grant it
“AUTHORITY to cut, gather and remove timber” from its
alleged private woodland. In the absence of such
authority or permit, it shall cut, gather and remove
timber from the said area subject to the payment of
regular forest charge and 300% surcharge for unlawful
cutting in accordance with the penal provisions” of
Section 266 of the Tax Code.
ISSUE/s:
1.WoN Piadeco can claim ownership over the parcels
of land– NO.
•Sec 1829 does not describe with particularity titles that
may be registered with the Bureau of Forestry.
Administrative authority in the past considered as
8
registrable, titles issued during the Spanish period. But
when Forestry AO 12-2 came intro effect on Jan 1,
1963, that order should be deemed to have repealed all
such previous administrative determinations.
Forestry AO 12-2 has the force and effect of law,
promulgated pursuant to law (Sec 1817 Revised Admin
Code). It was recommended by the Director of Forestry
and approved by the Secretary of Agricultural and
Natural Resources.
It is an administrative regulation germane to the objects
and purposes of the law. A rule shaped out by
jurisprudence is that when Congress authorizes the
promulgation of administrative rules and regulations to
implement a given legislation, “[a]ll that is required is
that the regulation should be germane to the objects
and purposes of the law; that the regulation be not in
contradiction with it, but conform to the standards that
the law prescribes.”
Geu-keko vs. Araneta, 102 Phil. 706, 712, we
pronounced that the necessity for vesting administrative
authorities with power to make rules and regulations for
various and varying details of management has been
recognized and upheld by the courts.
The exception is the Torrens title.
If a Spanish title covering forest land is found to be
invalid, that land is public forest land, is part of the public
domain, and cannot be appropriated. Before private
interests have intervened, the government may decide
for itself what portions of the public domain shall be set
aside and reserved as forest land. Possession of forest
lands, however long, cannot ripen into private
ownership.
Purpose of the registration required in Sec 1829: to
exempt the titled owner of the land from the payment of
forestry charges as provided for under Sec 266 of the
NIRC. If an owner fails to so register, he shall be obliged
to pay forest charges, as prescribed in Sections 264 and
265. However, as provided in Section 266 above-
quoted, if an owner does not register his title, but he
desires to cut, gather and remove timber and other
forest products from his land, he may “secure a license
from the Director of Forestry in accordance with the
Forest Law and regulations.”
•Piadeco’s Titulo appears to be an adjustment title.
•Types of titles granted by the Spanish crown: (1) the
“titulo real” or royal grant; (2) the “concession especial”
or special grant; (3) the “composición con el estado” title
or adjustment title; (4) the “titulo de compra” or title by
purchase; and (5) the “informacion posesoria” or
possessory information title, which could become a
“titulogratuito”.
•Royal Decree of August 31, 1888 classified public
lands subject to adjustment into two groups:
First. Those bounded at any point thereof by other lands
belonging to the State, and those which, though entirely
encircled by private lands, had a total area of more than
30 hectares.
Second. Those with an area of less than 30 hectares
and entirely bounded by private lands. The presumption
is that land pertains to the State, and any person
seeking to establish ownership over land must
conclusively show that he is the owner.
Piadeco’s ownership of the land suffers from
vagueness, fatal at least in these proceedings. It
asserts that Don Mariano acquired it by prescription.
Don Mariano mortgaged the land under pacto de retro
but did not redeem it, so the only heir of mortgagee
adjudicated the land to herself and later conveyed it to
Piadeco. A mere statement by the judge below that
Piadeco appears to be the owner of the land cannot
wipe out the objectionable features of its title.
Even on the assumption that Piadeco’s alleged title is
registrable, said corporation cannot complain against
the cancellation thereof. By Forestry Administrative
Order 12–2, [t]he Director of Forestry may cancel a
certificate of registration for any violation of the
provision of this Order or of the forest and internal
revenue laws and regulations or of the terms and
conditions embodied in the certificate, or when found
9
that the area is no longer covered with forest, or upon
failure of the landowner thereof, or of his
representatives, to obey, follow or implement
instructions of the said Director of Forestry.
Piadeco’s registration certificate should remain
cancelled and cannot be heard to protest further. The
certificate could be stricken down anytime. They could
not be permitted to remove from the premises those
logs that have already been cut before the expiry date
of its registration certificate because such certificate is
a nullity. Seizure made by the government authorities
cannot be branded as illegal (BIR Circular V-37, Sec 3).
The Court cannot justifiably order the delivery to
Piadeco of the logs impounded right there on the land
because a contrary posture is tantamount to abetting a
wrong. The logs belong to the State.
RULING:
Case #1: Petition for certiorari and prohibition granted.
Case #2: Petition for injunction and prohibition denied.
DIRECTOR OF LAND MANAGEMENT VS. COURT OF
APPEALS (1989)
GUTIERREZ, J.:
DOCTRINE: There can be no imperfect title to be
confirmed over lands not yet classified as disposable or
alienable. Declassification of forest land is an express
and positive act of Government. It cannot be presumed.
Neither should it be ignored nor deemed waived.
FACTS:
Private Respondent Mino Hilario filed an application for
registration, claiming ownership in fee simple over a
parcel of land purchased from his father Hilario Molang
on April 17, 1972.
The land was within the Central Cordillera Forest
Reserve, the Ambuklao-Binga Watershed, and the
Upper Agno River Basin Multiple Use of Forest
Management District. The applicant seeks to register
the title to the subject land under the Land Registration
Act (Act 496). However, as an alternative, the applicant
invokes the benefits of Chapter VIII of Act No. 2874 as
superseded by Commonwealth Act 141, as well as the
provisions of Republic Act 1942 and Republic Act 3872
because the applicant is a member of the cultural
minorities.
Answer of Director Lands: The land was not acquired
by any of the various types of title issued by the Spanish
Government, or have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of
the land in question for at least thirty (30) years
immediately preceding the filing of the present
application, and that the aforesaid property is a portion
of the public domain belonging to the Republic of the
Philippines and is not subject to private appropriation.
Answer of Director of Bureau of Forest Development:
Opposed because the area applied for is within the
"Central Cordillera Forest Reserve", aside from the fact
that it is a part of the Ambuklao-Binga Watershed
evidenced by the letter-report of Forest Ranger Antonio
Chagyo, and Engineer Carlito Banac; that the area
sought to be registered is not in the entire possession
of applicant Mino Hilario in the concept of an owner
considering that there are several houses built by
different individuals within the area in question; that the
applicant does not have any registrable title either in law
or in fact over the property; and that the area is not
classified as alienable or disposable land.
• LOWER COURT: Decreed the confirmation
and registration of the subject land in the name of
applicant Mino Hilario
o Applicant and his predecessors successively,
continuously, publicly and adversely occupied,
possessed and worked on the land in the concept of
absolute owners since before the First World War,
building supporting walls, rice paddies where they
planted rice.
o The preponderance of evidence clearly shows
that the applicant, and his predecessors-in-interest
before him, all of whom are members of the national
cultural minorities, have been in actual, open, public,
10
peaceful, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of the land subject hereof
which is suitable to agriculture, under a bona fide claim
of ownership since before the First World War up to the
present or at least more than sixty (60) years.
Issue: Whether or not the applicant Hilario acquired a
private right to the land despite the the fact that it is
within the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve
Ratio:
• There can be no imperfect title to be confirmed
over lands not yet classified as disposable or alienable.
Declassification of forest land is an express and positive
act of Government. It cannot be presumed. Neither
should it be ignored nor deemed waived.
• The Court cited Republic v. Court of Appeals
(previously discussed case in the syllabus), where the
Court ruled: It is already a settled rule that forest lands
or forest reserves are not capable of private
appropriation and possession thereof, however long,
cannot convert them into private property. unless such
lands are reclassified and considered disposable and
alienable by the Director of Forestry, but even then,
possession of the land prior to the reclassification of the
land as disposable and alienable cannot be credited as
part of the thirty-year requirement under Section 48 (b)
of the Public Land Act. In this case, there is no showing
that the land in question is disposable or alienable. This
is a matter which cannot be assumed. It calls for proof.
• Although Section 48 (c) of CA No. 141 states
that members of the national cultural minorities who by
themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest
have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of lands of the public
domain suitable to agriculture, whether disposable or
not, under a bona fide claim of ownership for at least 30
years shall be entitled to the rights granted in subsection
(b) hereof. (as amended by RA. No. 3872, section 1,
approved June 18, 1964) may apply to the Court of First
Instance for confirmation of their claims and the
issuance of a certificate of title therefore does not apply
in this case.
o Respondent Hilario contends that the phrase
"whether disposable or not" should be construed to
mean that a parcel of land situated in an inalienable land
may be privately-owned by a member of the cultural
minorities.
o Republic Act No. 3872 is only amendatory to
Commonwealth Act No. 141, otherwise known as the
Public Land Act. The Public Land Act applies to
agricultural public lands and to no other type of land
borne out by the explicit terms of Section 2, Chapter I
and Section 2, Chapter II, both under Title I of the Public
Land Act. Chapter I is subtitled "Short title of the Act,
lands to which it applies, and officers charged with its
execution." Section 2 clearly states that the "provisions
of this Act apply to the lands of the public domain; but
timber and mineral lands shall be governed by special
laws ... Section 10 provides that the words "alienation",
"disposition", or "concession" as used in this Act, shall
mean any of the methods authorized by this Act for the
acquisition, lease, use, or benefit of the lands of the
public domain other than timber or mineral lands.
o The new sub-section (c) of Section 48 of the
Public Land Act should be read together with the
provision of the preceding subsection (b) which
expressly refers to "agricultural lands of the public
domain."
o For, both the 1973 and 1987 Constitution,
petitions do not include timber or forest lands as
alienable. Section 8, Article XIV of 1973 Constitution
states that 'with the exception of agricultural, industrial
or commercial, residential and resettlement lands of the
public domain, natural resources shall not be alienated."
The new Constitution, in its Article XII, Section 2, also
expressly states that "with the exception of agricultural
lands, all other natural resources shall not be alienated."
o What the law contemplates are lands that are
agricultural although not disposable, such
agricultural lands within a reservation for
experiments (as the one in Baguio City administered by
the Bureau of Plant Industry, or agricultural lands
reserved for the Camarines Sur Agricultural School in
Pili, Camarines Sur), or those reserved for a specific
purpose, but certainly not a forest reserve, a timber
land, which the Constitution, the Public Land Act itself,
and jurisprudence have excluded from alienation.
HEIRS OF MOLINTAS VS CA\
Can a part of a forest reservation be titled in a land
registration proceeding? This is the controversy in this
petition for review of a decision and resolution of the
Court of Appeals.
On October 3, 1975, the Heirs of Gumangan,
represented by Victoria G. Amistad, filed with the then
Court of First Instance of Baguio (now Regional Trial
Court) an application for original land registration (Land
Registration Case No. N-396) covering Lots "C" and
"K", as shown in plan II-13973 (RS-985), with a
combined area of 14.3884 hectares (143,884 sq.
meters) and both situated in Res. Sec. "D", City of
Baguio.
On November 13, 1975, the Heirs of MOLINTAS,
represented by Josephine M. ABANAG also filed with
the Court of First Instance of Baguio an application for
original land registration (Land Registration Case No. N-
400) coveting Lots "A-2", "B", and "C", as shown on plan
II-11935, with a total area of 23.3253 hectares (233,253
sq. meters) and all of which are situated in Res. Sec.
"D", City of Baguio.
On May 5, 1977, the Director of Lands, represented by
the Solicitor General, filed Identical motions to dismiss
in Land Registration Cases Nos. N-396 and N-400 and
several other land registration cases covering lands
within the City of Baguio, alleging that the Court of First
Instance of Baguio has no jurisdiction over the said
applications inasmuch as the parcels of land applied for
have been declared public lands, the disposition of
which is the concern of the Director of Lands with the
prior approval of the Secretary of Natural Resources. It
is also alleged therein that whatever registrable rights
and/or claims the applicants may have over the subject
lands are barred by the Statute of Limitations and by
prior judgment (the Decision dated November 13, 1922
in Civil Reservation Case No. 1, G.L.R.O. Record No.
211.).
Both applicants in LRC-N-396 and LRC-N-400, now
petitioners, filed their oppositions to the said motion to
as dismiss on the following grounds: the parcels of land
applied for cannot be disposed of by the Director of
fruit
Lands under the Public Land Act; that the parcels of
11
land applied for, although classified as residential, fall
under the term "agricultural lands," hence there is no
valid reason to exclude them from the coverage of
Section 48 of the Public Land Act; that the applicants
whose predecessors were not served with notices in
Civil Reservation Case No. 1, G.L.R.O. Record No. 211,
as required by Section 3 of Act No. 627, are not barred
from applying for registration of their titles to the lands
applied for; that the declaration of the subject lands as
public lands in the townsite proceedings did not disturb
their possessory titles or foreclose their right to apply for
the benefits under Section 48 of the Public Land Act.
On February 15, 1978, the trial court issued an order
dismissing Cases Nos. N-396 and N-400, the
dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, finding merit in the present motions to
dismiss, the same are hereby granted and the
applications in the three above-entitled cases are
dismissed, without costs.
On March 29, 1978, petitioners filed their motions for
reconsideration of the dismissal order, anchored on the
following grounds:
a. That the parcels of land covered by LRC-N-396
and LRC-N-400 are included within the boundary lines
of Busol Forest Reservation, which reservation was
excluded from the proceedings in Civil Reservation
Case No. 1, G.L.R.O. Record
No. 211;
b. That the parcels of land subject matter of the said
land registration cases are not among those declared
as public land in the Decision dated November 13, 1922
in the said reservation proceedings;
c. That the applicants-petitioners are not barred by the
said Decision dated November 13, 1922 from applying
for the registration of their titles under Act No. 496, as
amended.
On June 13, 1978, the Director of Lands filed his
opposition to the motion for reconsideration, alleging
that:
... the Court of First Instance of Baguio has no
jurisdiction over the parcels of land subjects of land
registration cases in question; and that the claims of the
Heirs of Gumangan and the Heirs of Molintas in LRC-
396 and LRC-400 have already been settled in previous
proceedings.
On April 28, 1981, the trial court issued another order
denying the motion for reconsideration.
On June 11, 1981, petitioners filed their notices of
appeal in both LRC-N-396 and LRC-N-400 with the
Intermediate Appellate Court (now Court of Appeals).
On May 8, 1985, the Director of Lands, through the
Solicitor General, filed a motion to dismiss the appeal,
alleging therein as follows —
12
On November 29, 1984, the Supreme Court
promulgated its Decision in G.R. Nos. 57112-21,
entitled "Republic of the Philippines, represented by the
Director of Lands, petitioner vs. Judge Sinfroso
Fangonil, et al., respondents," holding that lands within
the Baguio Townsite reservation may not be the subject
of original registration proceedings; that said lots may
only be disposed of by the Director of Lands under the
townsite provisions of the Public Land Act and that
claims for private lands not presented in Civil
Reservation Case No. 1 are concluded or barred forever
by the decision in said case.
On July 1, 1985, petitioners opposed the motion to
dismiss filed by the Director of Lands on the following
grounds —
1. That the lands applied for in Land Registration
Case Nos. N-396 and N- 400 are admittedly within the
physical boundaries of Busol Forest Reservation, which
is outside the Baguio Townsite, hence the Regional
Trial Court of Baguio City has jurisdiction to hear the
cases;
2. That the parcels of land applied for in Land
Registration Cases Nos.
N-396 and N-400, are not among those declared public
lands in the Decision dated November 13, 1922 in Civil
Reservation Case No, 1, G.L.R.O. Record No. 211,
hence trial of said cases are (sic) not barred by res
judicata;
3. That there is a necessity for the Regional Trial Court
of Baguio City to conduct a regular hearing of Land
Registration Cases Nos. N-396 and N-400 to determine
if petitioners, by themselves and through their
predecessor have acquired registerable titles to the
lands claimed by them before the establishment of the
Busol Reservation on April 27, 1922.
On November 6, 1985, petitioners submitted to
respondent Court of Appeals a memorandum of
evidence with documentary exhibits to prove the
grounds of their opposition to the motion to dismiss filed
by the Director of Lands.
On January 13, 1986, the Third Civil Cases Division of
the Intermediate Appellate Court promulgated its
Decision 1 in AC-G.R. CV Nos. 69847 and 69848, the
dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, considering the foregoing, the motion to
dismiss the appeal filed by the Office of the Solicitor
General has to be, as it is hereby, granted, without the
necessity of presentation of evidence.
SO ORDERED. 2
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but the
same was denied on July 28, 1986. 3
Hence, these two petitions for certiorari to review the
decision of the respondent appellate court. This Court
gave due course to the petition on February 23, 1987. 4
The petition is devoid of merit.
Petitioners admit that the property subject of their
applications are within the Baguio Townsite
Reservation that was established on April 12, 1912. In
a decision in Civil Reservation Case No. 1 dated
November 13, 1922, it was held that all lands within the
Reservation are public lands with the exception of (1)
lands reserved specific public uses and (2) lands
claimed and adjudicated as private property. It was also
held in said case that claims for private lands by all
persons not presented for registration within the period
fixed in Act No. 627, in relation to the first Public Land
Law, Act No. 926, are barred forever. 5
Of course petitioners claim lack of notice in the
aforesaid case so that they may not be barred by the
former judgment. This issue was squarely disposed of
by this Court in a case of other applicants similarly
situated as petitioners. In Republic vs. Fangonil, 6 this
Court held as follows:
That 1922 decision established the rule that lots of the
Baguio Townsite Reservation, being public domain, are
not registerable under Act No. 496. As held by Judge
Belmonte in a 1973 case the Baguio Court of First
Instance "has no jurisdiction to entertain any land
registration proceedings" under Act No. 496 and the
Public Land Law, covering any lot within the Baguio
Townsite Reservation which was terminated in 1932
(Camdas vs. Director of Lands, L-37782, Resolution of
this Court of March 8, 1974, dismissing petition for
review of Judge Belmonte's ruling).
In the instant cases, after more than half a century from
the 1922 decision declaring the townsite public domain,
or during the years 1972 to 1976, Modesta Paris, Lagya
Paris, Samuel Baliwan, Pablo Ramos, Jr., Josephine
Abanag, Menita T. Victor, Emiliano Bautista and Odi
Dianson filed with the Court of First Instance of Baguio
applications for the registration of lots (with
considerable areas) inside the Baguio Townsite
Reservation.
xxx xxx xxx
As already noted, the fact is that the notice in Case No.
211 was issued on
July 22, 1915. The clerk of court certified that 134
persons living upon or in visible possession of any part
of the reservation were personally served with notice of
the reservation. Section 3 of Act No. 627 provides that
the certificate of the clerk of court is "conclusive proof of
service." (Zarate case, pp. 158, 162).
xxx xxx xxx
We hold that the trial court erred in requiring the
presentation of evidence as to the notice required under
Act No. 627. Such evidence cannot be produced at this
13
time because the court record of Case No. 211 was
completely destroyed during the last war.
xxx xxx xxx
The period of more than fifty years completely bars the
applicants from securing relief due to the alleged lack of
personal notice to their predecessors. The law helps the
vigilant but not those who sleep on their rights. "For time
is a means of destroying obligations and actions,
because time runs against the slothful and contemners
of their own rights."
Thus, inasmuch as the said properties applied for by
petitioners are part of the public domain, it is the
Director of Lands who has jurisdiction in the disposition
of the same (subject to the approval of the Secretary of
Natural Resources and Environment), and not the
courts.
Petitioners nevertheless contend that said properties
are within the Busol Forest Reservation which was
established on April 27, 1922 under Proclamation No.
15 and that they had the same surveyed in their behalf
even before the creation of the said reservation. They
cite the aforestated decision of November 13, 1922 to
the effect:
... , The Court, in order of October 7, 1922, ordered
that this file of reserve be included in the calendar
of sessions of the Tribunal, corresponding to
October 27, 1922, this hearing was held, and on
this day the Court has also been given a hearing.
of the motion presented by the Prosecutor
requesting that the sequientes forest reserves,
administered by the Monte Office, be excluded
from this reserve file.
xxx xxx xxx
The Court, in order of October 7, 1922, ordered that this
file of reserve be included in the calendar of sessions of
the Tribunal, corresponding to October 27, 1922, this
hearing was held, and on this day the Court has also
been given a hearing. of the motion presented by the
Prosecutor requesting that the sequientes forest
reserves, administered by the Monte Office, be
excluded from this reserve file
Even assuming that petitioners did have the said
properties surveyed even before the same was
declared to be part of the Busol Forest Reservation, the
fact remains that it was so converted into a forest
reservation, thus it is with more reason that this action
must fail. Forest lands are inalienable 8 and possession
thereof, no matter how long, cannot convert the same
into private property. 9 And the courts are without
jurisdiction to adjudicate lands within the forest zone. 10
WHEREFORE, the petitions are DISMISSED for lack of
merit, with costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
 3.Mineral
4. National parks

Of the four, it is only the agricultural lands may be

disposed in accordance with law.

Classification of Lands Under the Public Land Act

1. Alienable or disposable lands

2. Timber lands
3. Mineral lands

The President may at any time and in a like manner

transfer such lands from one class to another, for the
purposes of their administration and disposition.

Classification of Public Lands Open to Disposition

1.Agricultural
2.Residential, commercial, industrial, or for similar
productive purposes
3.educational, charitable, or other similar purposes
4. Reservations for town sites for public and quasi-
public uses.

MINERAL LAND

Republic v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-43938 (April

15, 1988) Case Digest
Surface Rights of Landowner (Article 437)

Facts:

Jose dela Rosa filed an application for registration of a

parcel of land on his own behalf and on behalf of his
children. This application was separately opposed by
Benguet Consolidated, Inc. (Benguet) and Atok Big
Wedge Corporation (Atok).

The petitioners claimed that they have acquired the land

from their parents and that they have been in
possession of the land ever since. Benguet and Atok
opposed on the ground that they have mineral claims
covering the property and had been in actual,
continuous and exclusive possession of the land in
concept of owner.

The trial court denied the application while the Court of

Under the Civil Code, government lands can either be:
1. Properties of the public dominion – those intended for
public use.
2. Patrimonial properties of the State – not or no longer
intended for public use.
Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court and
recognized the claims of the applicant but subject to the
rights of Benguet and Atok respecting their mining
claims. In other words, the Court of Appeals affirmed
the surface rights of the de la Rosas over the land while
at the same time reserving the sub-surface rights of
Benguet and Atok by virtue of their mining claims.
Issue:

Under the 1987 Constitution, lands of public domain are Whether or not the CA's ruling was correct.
classified into four (4) categories:
Held:
1. Agricultural
2. Forest or timber No, the CA was incorrect.
14

Art. 437. The owner of a parcel of land is the owner of
its surface and of everything under it, and he can
construct thereon any works or make any plantations
and excavations which he may deem proper, without
detriment to servitudes and subject to special laws and
ordinances. He cannot complain of the reasonable
requirements of aerial navigation.
Under the theory of the respondent court, the surface
owner will be planting on the land while the mining
locator will be boring tunnels underneath. The farmer
cannot dig a well because he may interfere with the
operations below and the miner cannot blast a tunnel
lest he destroy the crops above. How deep can the
farmer, and how high can the miner, go without
encroaching on each other's rights? Where is the
dividing line between the surface and the sub-surface
rights?
It is a well-known principle that the owner of piece of
land has rights not only to its surface but also to
everything underneath and the airspace above it up to
a reasonable height.
The rights over the land are indivisible and that the land
itself cannot be half agricultural and half mineral. The
classification must be categorical; the land must be
either completely mineral or completely agricultural.
In the instant case, as already observed, the land which
was originally classified as forest land ceased to be so
and became mineral — and completely mineral — once
the mining claims were perfected. As long as mining
operations were being undertaken thereon, or
underneath, it did not cease to be so and become
agricultural, even if only partly so, because it was
enclosed with a fence and was cultivated by those who
were unlawfully occupying the surface.
NATURAL PARKS
G.R. No. L-35644 September 30, 1975
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the
DIRECTOR OF THE COMMISSION OF PARKS AND
WILD LIFE, petitioner,
vs.
HON. RAFAEL DE LA CRUZ, in his capacity as Judge
of CFI Camarines Sur, Naga City, Branch III, ELVIRA
C. MEDUA and the REGISTER OF DEEDS OF
CAMARINES SUR, respondents.
Office of the Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza,
Assistant Solicitor General Bernardo P. Pardo,
Assistant Solicitor General Santiago M. Kapunan,
Solicitor Patricio M. Patajo and Solicitor Rosario
Quetulio-Losa for petitioner.
15
Ablan, Santiago and Associates and Augusta A.
Pardalis for respondents.
TEEHANKEE, J.:
The Court sets aside as patently erroneous respondent
court's order of dismissal, for alleged want of cause of
action, of petitioner's complaint for annulment of
cadastral decree and reversion of a 1,839-hectare lot
claimed by the Republic to be inalienable land of the
public domain and a part of the Mt. Isarog National Park
and remands the case for proper proceedings and trial
and determination on the merits.
The land involved in the case at bar is designated as
Lot 920 of the Pili Cadastre with a huge area of
18,394,083 square meters, more or less, or 1,839.4083
hectares. According to the complaint filed on October
14, 1971 by the petitioner Republic of the Philippines (at
the instance of the Director of the Commission on Parks
and Wildlife) against private respondent Elvira C.
Medua as principal defendant in respondent court of
first instance of Camarines Sur at Naga City presided
by respondent judge for annulment of decree and
reversion with preliminary injunction, the said land is the
property actually and officially designated and
technically identified in the plans and survey of the
cadastral case as Lot 920-IR-317-D Forest Reserve. It
is within the area of the Mt. Isarog National Park and
includes the spring sources of the Naga City Water
System, the Pili Waterworks, the Relay Station of the
Bureau of Telecommunications, wood lands with falls,
creeks and streams and other tributaries of the Anayan,
Himaao and Binasagan Rivers which supply potable as
well as irrigation waters to thousands of farms and
farmers in the valley below.
Petitioner Republic's submittal in its complaint is that
said Lot 920 (which was inadvertently included as a lot
in the Pili cadastral proceedings initiated in 1968 by the
Director of Lands,1 although it was and still is part of the
forest reserve) was and is inalienable and indisposable,
being a part of a national park (the Mt. Isarog National
Park) under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Commission
of Parks and Wildlife, and as such could not be the
subject matter of cadastral proceedings nor be the
subject of acquisition by, and award or decree by the
cadastral court in favor of, private individuals such as
respondent Medua.
The Republic therefore prayed in its complaint that the
decision rendered by the cadastral court and the
corresponding decree issued on March 1, 19712 (as
well as any certificate of title which may be issued
although in fact none has been issued due to the
Republic's timely action) be declared null and void ab
initio, on grounds of lack of jurisdiction of the cadastral
court over the land, fraud and lack of authority on the
part of the Assistant Commissioner of Land Registration
under the law, Republic Act No. 1151, to issue the
decree in question (No. N-133673).3
Respondent Medua filed in November, 1971 a Motion
to Dismiss on the ground that petitioner's complaint
states no cause of action, contending inter alia that the
supposed fraud which led to the issuance of the
decision and decree in her favor did not constitute
extrinsic but intrinsic fraud.
Respondent court, after receiving the parties'
arguments, issued its Order of July 7, 1972 wherein it
found respondent's Motion to Dismiss to be
"meritorious" and ordered that "the complaint for want
of cause should be as it is hereby dismissed."
Hence, the present petition. At petitioner's instance,
who complained that respondent and others claiming
under her were entering into possession and seeking to
exercise dominical acts over the said land alleged to be
of the public domain, the Court issued on October 27,
1972 a writ of preliminary injunction without bond
"enjoining private respondent Elvira C. Medua and all
persons claiming rights or interest under her from
performing acts of occupation, dominion and
possession of the parcel of land involved, and its
disposition to innocent purchasers for value, including
acts of kaingin, gathering of firewoods and other minor
forest products and logging activities therein and
likewise enjoining the respondent Register of Deeds of
Camarines Sur from issuing any Original Certificate of
Title pursuant to Decree No. N-133673 dated March 1,
1972 and otherwise registering any document
evidencing transfer, assignment or other disposition of
any portion of the land involved, or issuing any transfer
of certificate of title corresponding thereto, until further
orders from this Court."4
The Court finds respondent court's dismissal order of
the Republic's complaint (for annulment of decree and
reversion on grounds of nullity ab initio and lack of
jurisdiction) to be manifestly erroneous and therefore
sets aside the same.
1. Respondent court found in its dismissal order of
July 7, 1972 that the Republic (as well as the City of
Naga and Municipality of Pili) had filed petitions for the
reopening or review of the cadastral proceedings
awarding the 1,839-hectare lot (No. 920) to respondent
Medua "well within the period prescribed by law" to
which respondent court acting as a cadastral court
properly gave due course per its Order dated June 22,
1971; but that the Republic through the Solicitor
General and Provincial Fiscal filed on October 29, 1971
a motion to withdrawal the petition for review since it
had decided to file instead on October 19, 1971 its
separate compliant at bar for annulment of decree and
reversion, which withdrawal was granted per its order of
December 17, 1971.5
Respondent court, reasoning that
Without attempting to decide the case on its merits, this
court, acting as a court of ordinary jurisdiction cannot
pass upon questions where a remedy is still available
and open in the land or cadastral court. Neither can the
alleged lack of jurisdiction of the said court which
16
decided the case be raised here in this court although
admittedly, the question of jurisdiction can be raised at
any stage of the proceedings even for the first time on
appeal," and
The complaint also prays that any certificate of title
issued be so declared void ab initio. The complaint
admittedly shows that no certificate of title has yet been
issued. Therefore, there is nothing to impugn, cancel or
declare void in the name of Elvira C. Medua. The action
is pre-mature by seeking the cancellation of a non-
existent certificate of title.
When this case was filed, the one year period given by
Act 496 for the review of the decision in the land
registration case has not yet lapsed.
thus issued its order of July 7, 19726 dismissing the
Republic's complaint for prematurity and for want of
cause of action.
Since respondent court obviously believed that the
Republic's recourse was to continue with its petition for
reopening of the decree in the cadastral proceedings
and that the filing of the separate action with it for
annulment of the decree and reversion was not proper
and premature, then to be consistent, it should not have
issued its earlier order of December 17, 1971 granting
the Republic's withdrawal of its petition for reopening —
and instead it should have heard and determined the
Republic's petition for reopening and setting aside of the
decree in the cadastral proceedings.
In effect, what respondent court has done is
unwarrantedly to completely box out the Republic's
petition for any recourse for the recovery or reversion of
the 1,839-hectare lot that it claims as an inalienable part
of a national park "being part of Mt. Isarog National Park
situated in the municipalities of Naga, Calabanga,
Tinambec, Goa, Tigaon and Pili, Camarines Sur and
includes the spring sources of Naga City Water system,
the Pili Waterworks, the relay station of the Bureau of
Telecommunications, standing woodland with falls and
creeks and streams, and other tributaries of the Anaya,
Himaao and Binasaya rivers which supply potable as
well as irrigation waters to the thousands of farmers in
the valley below."
In its dismissal order, respondent court dismisses the
Republic's separate action as improper and having
been prematurely filed since "the one-year period given
by Act 496 for the review of the decision in the land
registration case has not yet lapsed," yet it knows full
well that the petition for review or reopening previously
filed by the Republic can no longer be prosecuted due
to its having granted the Republic's motion for
withdrawal thereof precisely by virtue of its filing of the
present separate action.
Such inconsistent actions on the part of respondent
court which would totally frustrate the Republic's action
for recovery of land alleged to be of the public domain
cannot receive the sanction of this Court.
2. The factual allegations of petitioner Republic's
complaint, as above stated in substance, plainly state a
valid cause of action for the reversion of the 1,839-
hectare lot, as inalienable land of the public domain,
being part of the Mt. Isarog National Park. Since
respondent's motion to dismiss was grounded on the
contention that the Republic's complaint "states no
cause of action," respondent court's granting of the
dismissal "for want of cause (of action)" was patent
error. Respondent court utterly disregarded the
elementary rule that in a motion to dismiss for alleged
failure to state a cause of action, the movant is deemed
hypothetically to adult the truth of the facts alleged in the
complaint and the alleged want of cause of action must
appear on the face of the complaint since the movant
cannot traverse its factual allegations.7
As the motion to dismiss must be deemed hypothetically
to admit the truth of the complaint's basic allegation that
the 1,839-hectare lot is inalienable land of the public
domain and a part of the Mt. Isarog National Park, it is
obvious that the complaint states a cause of valid cause
of action on the basis of which respondent court could
render a valid judgment for annulment of the decree and
reversion of the lot to the Government, as prayed for in
the complaint.
There is no justification, therefore, for respondent
court's peremptory dismissal of the complaint "for want
of cause (of action.)"
3. The right of the Republic to revert and recover
inalienable land of the public domain to which a person
has obtained a decree or title by mistake or oversight
since such a decree or title is void ab initio is a settled
matter. This doctrine was once more reiterated in
Republic vs. Animas8 where the Court held that "(T)he
defense of indefeasibility of a certificate of title issued
pursuant to a free patent does not lie against the state
in an action for reversion of the land covered thereby
when such land is a part of a public forest or of a forest
reservation. As a general rule, timber or forest lands are
not alienable or disposable under either the Constitution
of 1935 or the Constitution of 1973. Although the
Director of Lands has jurisdiction over public lands
classified as agricultural under the constitution, or
alienable or disposable under the Public Land Act, and
is charged with the administration of all laws relative
thereto, mineral and timber lands are beyond his
jurisdiction. It is the Bureau of Forestry that has
jurisdiction and authority over the demarcation,
protection, management, reproduction, occupancy and
use of all public forests and forest reservations and over
the granting of licenses for the taking of products
therefrom, including stone and earth (Section 1816 of
the Revised Administrative Code). That the area in
question is a forest or timber land is clearly established
by the certification made by the Bureau of Forest
Development that it is within the portion of the area
which was reverted to the category of forest land,
approved by the President on March 7, 1958. When the
defendant Isagani Du Timbol filed his application for
free patent over the land in question on June 3, 1969,
the area in question was not a disposable or alienable
17
public land but a public forest. Titles issued to private
parties by the Bureau of Lands when the land covered
thereby is not disposable public land but forest land are
void ab initio."
The Court stressed therein that "(A) patent is void at law
if the officer who issued the patent had no authority to
do so ... . If a person obtains a title under the Public
Land Act which includes, by mistake or oversight, lands
which cannot be registered under the Torrens System,
or when the Director of Lands did not have jurisdiction
over the same because it is public forest, the grantee
does not, by virtue of said certificate of title alone,
become the owner of the land illegally included."
The Republic is therefore clearly entitled to a trial and if
it substantiates its factual allegations at the trial, it would
be duly entitled to a judgment that the decision and
decree issued in the cadastral proceeding over Lot 920,
which is part of a national park and inalienable land of
the public domain, are null and void ab initio.
ACCORDINGLY, respondent court's order of dismissal
of the petitioner's action in Civil Case No. 7201 is set
aside and the case is ordered remanded to respondent
court for proper proceedings and trial and determination
on the merits in consonance with the Court's opinion.
The writ of preliminary injunction issued by the Court
shall continue in full force and effect until and unless the
case is adversely disposed of by final judgment against
petitioner Republic as plaintiff. SO ORDERED.
C. POWER TO CLASSIFY LANDS OF PUBLIC
DOMAIN
Section3. The Secretary of Agriculture and
Commerce shall be the executive officer charged
with carrying out the provisions of this Act through
the Director of Lands, who shall act under his
immediate control.
Section4. Subject to said control, the Director of
Lands shall have direct executive control of the
survey, classification, lease, sale or any other form
of concession or disposition and management of
the lands of the public domain, and his decisions as
to questions of fact shall be conclusive when
approved by the Secretary of Agriculture and
Commerce.
Section5. The Director of Lands, with the approval
of the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce shall
prepare and issue such forms, instructions, rules,
and regulations consistent with this Act, as may be
necessary and proper to carry into effect the
provisions thereof and for the conduct of
proceedings arising under such provisions.
CHAPTER II
CLASSIFICATION, DELIMITATION, AND
SURVEY OF LANDS OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN,
FOR THE CONCESSION THEREOF
Section6. The President, upon the recommendation
of the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, shall
from time to time classify the lands of the public
domain into —
(a) Alienable or disposable;
(b) Timber, and
(c) Mineral lands,
and may at any time and in a like manner transfer
such lands from one class to another, for the
purposes of their administration and disposition.
Section7. For the purposes of the administration
and disposition of alienable or disposable public
lands, the President, upon recommendation by the
Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, shall from
time to time declare what lands are open to
disposition or concession under this Act.
Title I
POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT
Sec. 14. Power to Reserve Lands of the Public and
Private Domain of the Government. - (1) The
President shall have the power to reserve for
settlement or public use, and for specific public
purposes, any of the lands of the public domain, the
use of which is not otherwise directed by law. The
reserved land shall thereafter remain subject to the
specific public purpose indicated until otherwise
provided by law or proclamation;
(2) He shall also have the power to reserve from
sale or other disposition and for specific public uses
or purposes, any land belonging to the private
domain of the Government, or any of the Friar
Lands, the use of which is not otherwise directed by
law, and thereafter such land shall be used for the
purposes specified by such proclamation until
otherwise provided.
18
G.R. No. L-66866: REPUBLIC VS. DE PORKAN
June 18, 1987, 151 SCRA 88
- Possession resulting in presumption of right to grant
application
FACTS
Minda de Porkan and Lolita Macatindog acquired Lots
Nos. 1099 and 1546 from their predecessors-interests,
who in turn acquired said lots though a grant by the
government by virtue of their proven, open, exclusive
and undisputed possession for more than 30 years. An
issue over said lots arose when a certain Viola Azurin
obtained from the then Philippine Fisheries Commission
an Ordinary Fishpond Permit covering portions of Lots
Nos. 1099 and 1546.
Azurin filed with the Bureau of Lands a complaint for
correction, amendment or cancellation of the
Homestead Patent of De Porkan over Lot no. 1546 and
the Free Patent of Macatindog over Lot No. 1099
alleging among others that the patentees secured their
patents and titles through fraud, misrepresentation and
illegal machinations.
The Solicitor General sided with Azurin; when the case
was brought to the Court of First Instance, the SG stated
that the disputed portions of land were actually claimed
by Azurin and that such lands could not be disposed by
the Director of Lands under the Public Land Act. Hence,
the patents and titles issued to de Porkan and
Macatindog were void insofar as the portion occupied
and covered by the fishpond permit of Azurin.
After hearing however, the CFI dismissed the
complaints and upheld the validity of the titles/patents
of de Porkan & Macatindog over the lands in dispute.
The SG in the present petition avers among others that
the lots in dispute could not be the subject of disposition
under the Homestead and Free Patent provisions of the
Public Act since they are marshy and swampy, certified
as such as more suitable for fishpond development,
disposable only thru lease under the Public Land Act.
ISSUE
Whether or not possession and cultivation of a land for
more than 30 years will entitle the possessor thereof of
a government grant and a certificate of title.
HELD
Yes.
As early as 1953, the respondents had already acquired
by operation of law not only a right to a grant over Lot
No. 1099, but a grant of the Government over the same
alienable land by virtue of their proven, open, exclusive
and undisputed possession for more than 30 years,
since the Spanish colonial period.
The possession of a public land identified as Lot No.
1099 dates back to the time of the Spanish colonial
period. Such possessions of the said public land has
attained the character and duration prescribed by law
as the equivalent of an express grant from the
Government. The mandate of the law itself provides that
possessors “shall be conclusively presumed to have
performed all the conditions essential to a government
grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title”. By
legal fiction, the land ceases to be public and thus
becomes a private land.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
vs.
THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT,
ESTEBAN MENDOZA and LEON PASAHOL
G.R. No. 71285 November 5, 1987
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
FACTS:
On December 18, 1968, a petition was filed by Esteban
Mendoza and Leon Pasahol with the then Court of First
Instance of Bataan, Branch I, alleging ownership of the
land in question (Lot 444) by purchase from its original
owners and thereafter, actual, continuous, public and
adverse possession by them tacked on to their
predecessors-in-interest for a period exceeding 30
years.
Petitioners' predecessors-in-interest failed to answer in
the cadastral court for lack of knowledge of the
existence of an ongoing cadastral proceeding because
of which Lot No. 444 was declared public land by CFI
Bataan.
On appeal, the Intermediate Appellate Court affirmed
the trial court's decision which granted the private
respondents' petition to reopen the cadastral
registration proceeding of the lot in dispute and ordering
its registration in the names of the respondents.
In this instant petition, the petitioner challenges the
decision of the appellate court as being contrary to law
on the ground that it held that the subject land is
agricultural and alienable land of the public domain and
that the same can be subject to acquisitive prescription
of thirty (30) years of open, continuous and
uninterrupted possession.
The petitioner maintains that unless the President upon
the recommendation of the Secretary of Natural
Resources, reclassifies and declares a particular land
as agricultural or disposable, its status as military
reservation or forest land remains unaltered and no
amount of physical occupation and cultivation thereof
can change it to agricultural land and bring it within the
provisions of the Public Land Act.
19
ISSUE: Whether or not respondents have a bona
fide claim of ownership as to entitle them to registration
and title over the subject land. NO
HELD:
The Supreme Court held that the fact remains that the
subject land has not yet been released from its
classification as part of the military reservation zone and
still has to be reclassified as alienable public land with
the approval of the President of the Philippines as
required by the Public Land Act (Commonwealth Act
No. 141) and Republic Act No. 1275.
Therefore, the SC cannot sustain the appellate court's
ruling that the land in dispute is no longer part of the
military reservation on the basis of a mere proposal to
classify the same as alienable and disposable land of
the public domain. A proposal cannot take the place of
a formal act declaring forest land released for
disposition as public agricultural land. To sustain the
appellate ruling would be to pre-empt the executive
branch of the government from exercising its
prerogative in classifying lands of the public domain.
It was ruled in the case of Director of Lands v. Court of
Appeals, (129 SCRA 689, 692-693) that:
The classification of public lands is an
exclusive prerogative of the Executive
Department of the Government and not of
the Courts. In the absence of such
classification, the land remains as
unclassified land until it is released
therefrom and rendered open to disposition,
This is also in consonance with the Regalian
doctrine that all lands of the public domain
belong to the State (Secs. 8 & 10, Art. XIV,
1973 Constitution), and that the State is the
source of any asserted right to ownership in
land and charged with the conservation of such
patrimony (Republic v. Court of Appeals, 89
SCRA 648 [1979])
Since the subject property is still unclassified, whatever
possession Applicant may have had, and, however
long, cannot ripen into private ownership.
Director of Lands v. IAC
[G.R. No. 73246. March 2, 1993.]
Second Division, Nocon (J): 4 concur
Facts:
Land involved is an island known as Tambac Island in
Lingayen Gulf. Situated in the Municipality of Bani,
Pangasinan, the area consists of 187,288 sq. m., more or less.
The initial application for registration was filed for Pacific
Farms, Inc. under the provisions of the Land Registration Act,
Act 496, as amended. The Republic of the Philippines, thru
the Director of Lands opposed the application alleging that
the applicant, Pacific Farms, Inc. does not possess a fee
simple title to the land nor did its predecessors possess the
land for at least 30 years immediately preceding the filing of
application. The opposition likewise specifically alleged that
the applicant is a private corporation disqualified under the
1973 Constitution from acquiring alienable lands of the
public domain citing Section 11, Article 14. The Director of
Forest Development also entered its opposition alleging that
the land is within the unclassified public land and, hence,
inalienable. Other private parties also filed their oppositions,
but were subsequently withdrawn. In an amended
application, Pacific Farms, Inc. filed a manifestation-motion
to change the applicant from Pacific Farms, Inc. to J. Antonio
Araneta. Despite the supposed amendment, there was no
republication. On 4 October 1979, the trial court rendered a
decision adjudicating the subject property to J. Antonio
Araneta. On appeal to the then Intermediate Appellate
Court, the decision of the lower court was affirmed on 12
December 1985. Hence, the petition for review.
The Supreme Court granted the petition, and reversed the
decisions of the courts a quo.
1. Submission of tracing cloth mandatory in
registration; Failure to submit original tracing cloth as
evidence fatal
In Director of Lands v. The Honorable Intermediate Appellate
Court and Lino Anit, it was ruled that the submission of the
tracing cloth plan is a mandatory requirement for
registration. In Director of Lands v. Reyes, on the other hand,
it was held that failure to submit in evidence the original
tracing cloth plan is fatal it being a statutory requirement of
mandatory character. It is of no import that the Director of
Lands failed to object to the presentation of the certified
copy of the said plan. What is required is the original tracing
cloth plan of the land applied for and objection to such
requirement cannot be waived either expressly or impliedly.
As held in Director of Lands v. Reyes, if the original tracing
cloth plan was indeed with the Land Registration
Commission, there is no reason why the applicant cannot
easily retrieve the same and submit it in evidence, it being
an essential requirement for registration.
2. Amendment of the name of applicant is an attempt
to evade disqualification
The amendment of the application from the name of Pacific
Farms, Inc., as applicant, to the name of J. Antonio Araneta,
was a mere attempt to evade disqualification. The
Constitution, whether the 1973 or 1987, prohibits private
corporations or associations from holding alienable lands of
the public domain except by lease. Apparently realizing such
prohibition, applicant amended its application to conform
with the mandates of the law.
3. Requirement of republication due to amendments
to the application is allowed by the courts upon just and
reasonable terms; it is required if it is due to substantial
change in the boundaries of the area.
Amendments to the application may be due to change in
parties or substantial change in the boundaries or increase
in the area of the land applied for. As to amendments to the
application due to change in parties, neither the Land
Registration Act, as amended, nor PD 1529 (the Property
Registration Decree_, requires republication and
registration may be allowed by the court at any stage of the
20
proceeding upon just and reasonable terms. On the other
hand, republication is required if the amendment is due to
substantial change in the boundaries or increase in the area
of the land applied for.
4. PD 1529 applied properly in the present case
There is no relevant dispute in the lower court's application
of PD 1529, instead of Act 496, in adjudicating the land to
the then applicant, assuming that the land involved is
registrable. Both laws are existing and can stand together.
PD 1529 was enacted to codify the various laws relative to
registration of property, in order to facilitate effective
implementation of said laws.
5. Classification of lands of the public domain:
mineral. Forest and Disposable and alienable lands.
Lands of the public domain are classified under three main
categories, namely: Mineral, Forest and Disposable or
Alienable Lands. Under the Commonwealth Constitution,
only agricultural lands were allowed to be alienated. Their
disposition was provided for under CA 141 (Secs. 6-7), which
states that it is only the President, upon the
recommendation of the proper department head, who has
the authority to classify the lands of the public domain into
alienable or disposable, timber and mineral lands. Mineral
and Timber or forest lands are not subject to private
ownership unless they are first reclassified as agricultural
lands and so released for alienation.
6. Courts have no authority to classify unclassified
land; Regalian Doctrine
The courts cannot release the subject property from the
unclassified category, which is beyond their competence and
jurisdiction. The classification of public lands is an exclusive
prerogative of the Executive Department of the Government
and not of the Courts. In the absence of such classification,
the land remains unclassified until released therefrom and
rendered open to disposition. This is in consonance with the
Regalian doctrine that all lands of the public domain belong
to the State, and that the State is the source of any asserted
right to ownership in land and charged with the conservation
of such patrimony. Under the Regalian Doctrine, all lands not
otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership
are presumed to belong to the State. Hence, a positive act of
the government is needed to declassify a forest land into
alienable or disposable land for agricultural or other
purposes.
7. Burden of proof in proving the land is alienable or
disposable is on the person applying for registration
The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of state
ownership of the lands of the public domain is on the person
applying for registration that the land subject of the
application is alienable or disposable. Unless the applicant
succeeds in showing by convincing evidence that the
property involved was acquired by him or his ancestors
either by composition title from the Spanish Government or
by possessory information title, or any other means for the
proper acquisition of public lands, the property must be held
to be part of the public domain. The applicant must present
evidence and persuasive proof to substantiate his claim.
8. Tax declarations and receipts are not conclusive
evidence of ownership
Tax declarations and receipts are not conclusive evidence of
ownership or of the right to possess land when not
supported by evidence. The fact that the disputed property
may have been declared for taxation purposes in the names
of the applicants or of their predecessors-in-interest way
back in 1921 does not necessarily prove ownership. They are
merely indicia of a claim of ownership.
9. State cannot be estopped by omission, mistake or
error of its officials
In Director of Lands v. CA, it was held that it is a well-settled
rule that the State cannot be estopped by the omission,
mistake or error of its officials or agents, if omission there
was, in fact. Thus, the fact that BF Map LC 673 dated 1 March
1927, in that case, showing subject property to be within
unclassified region was not presented in evidence will not
operate against the State. Likewise, in the present case, the
contention that the BFD, LC Map No. 681, certified on August
8, 1927 which was the basis of the report and
recommendation of the Land Examiner, is too antiquated;
that it cannot be conclusively relied upon and was not even
presented in evidence, cannot be well taken.
10. Unclassified property; possession cannot ripen into
private ownership
Since the subject property is still unclassified, whatever
possession the applicant may have had and however long,
cannot ripen into private ownership. The conversion of
subject property does not automatically render the property
as alienable and disposable.
11. Government called upon to classify the land
The Government should seriously consider the matter of the
reclassification of the land in question. The attempt of
people to have disposable lands they have been tilling for
generations titled in their name should not only be viewed
with understanding attitude, but as a matter of policy
encouraged.
21
D. DISPOSITION OF PUBLIC LAND
The President may at any time and in a like
manner transfer such lands from one class to
another, for the purposes of their administration and
disposition.
Classification of Public Lands Open to Disposition
1.Agricultural
2.Residential, commercial, industrial, or for similar
productive purposes
3.educational, charitable, or other similar purposes
4. Reservations for town sites for public and quasi-
public uses.
Classification of Lands an Executive Prerogative
Before the government could alienate or dispose of
lands of the public domain, the President (thru the
DENR) must first officially classify these lands as
alienable or disposable.
“Government Land” and “Public Land”
Distinguished
The two are not synonymous terms; the first includes
not only the second, but also other lands of the
government already reserved or devoted to public use
or subject to private right.
Modes of Disposition
No Public Land can be Acquired Except by a Grant
from the State
It is indispensable that there be a showing of Title from
the State that may come in the form of a homestead,
sales or free patent or grant.
Only Alienable and Disposable (A&D) may be the
Subject of Disposition
Occupation thereof in the concept of owner, no matter
how long, cannot ripen into ownership and be
registered as a title.
The applicant’s remedy lies in the release of the
property from its present classification.
Specific Modes of Disposition
Public lands suitable for agricultural purposes can
be disposed of only as follows:
1. For homestead settlement
2. By sale
3.By lease, and
4. By confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles:
a. by judicial legalization – may apply to the Regional
Trial Court where the land is located for the
confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a
certificate therefore, under the Property Registrration
Decree.
b. by administrative legalization (free patent) – any
natural-born citizen of the Philippines who is not the
owner of more than 12 hectares, and who, for at least
30 years prior to the effectivity of the amendatory act,
has continuously occupied and cultivated a tract or
tracts of land for disposition, who shall have paid the
real estate tax land subject to disposition.
For homestead settlement
· Any citizen of the Philippines
· Over the age of 18 or head of the family
· A homestead of the not exceeding 12 hectares
· Applicant must have cultivated and improved at least
one fifth of the land continuously
· Resided at least one year in the municipality
Homestead patent granted has the force and effect
of a Torrens title.
Sale of public agricultural lands
· Any citizen of the Philippines
· Of lawful age or head of the family
· Applicant may purchase not to exceed 12 hectares
which shall be sold thru sealed bidding
The purchase price may be paid in full or in not
more then 10 annual equal installments from the
date of the award.
Lease
· Any citizen of the Philippines
· Of lawful age; and
· Any corporation of which at least 60% of the capital
stock belong wholly to the citizens of the Philippines
Non-registrable Properties
1. Property of public dominion
· Intended for public use
· Intended for some public service
2. Forest lands
3.Watersheds
4. Mangrove swamps
22
5. Mineral lands
6. National parks
7.Military or naval reservation
8.Foreshore and reclaimed lands
9.Submerged areas
10.Lakes
11.Navigable rivers
12.Creeks
13. Reservations for public and semi-public purposes
Classification and Disposition of Lands for
Residential, Commercial or Industrial Purposes
1. Lands reclaimed by the government by dredging,
filling, or other means
2. Foreshore;
3. Marshy lands or lands covered with water bordering
upon the shores or banks of navigable lakes or rivers;
4. Lands not included in any of the foregoing classes.
The lands comprised in classes 1,2, and 3 shall be
disposed of to private parties by lease only.
Conditions of the Lease
The lessee shall construct permanent improvements
appropriate for the purpose, shall commence the
construction within 6 months from the date of the
award.
At the expiration of the lease, all improvements made
by the lessee shall become the property of the
Government.
Lands for Residential, Commercial or Industrial
Purposes Shall be Disposed of through Oral Bidding
(Except direct sale)
Sale of Lands Within Military Reservations
Priority shall be given to bona fide occupants and then
to war veterans.
Cadastral Registration Proceedings
The cadastral system of registration constitutes
another means of bringing lands under the operation of
the Torrens system. The purpose is to serve public
interests by requiring that the titles to such lands “be
settled and adjudicated.”
Friar Lands
The so-called friar lands were purchased by the
government for sale to actual occupants. These lands
are not public lands but private or patrimonial property
of the government and their acquisition is not governed
by the provisions of CA 141 (Public Land Act).
Action for Reversion
Director of Lands has Continuing Authority to
Investigate Fraudulent Issuance of Patents
Government Initiates an Action for Cancellation of Title
and Reversion
Lands of the public domain fraudulently awarded to the
applicant may be recovered or reverted back to its
original owner, the government. An action for reversion
has to be instituted by the Solicitor General.
Action for Nullity of Land Titles Distinguished from
Reversion
Nullity of land is based on the fact that the land is
beyond the jurisdiction of Director of Lands to bestow
Reversion of land is based on fraudulent claim
Prohibited Alienations
No alienation, transfer, or conveyance of any
homestead after 5 years and before 25 years after
issuance of title shall be valid without the approval of
the Secretary of DENR.
Procedure, Legal Restrictions and Encumbrances
1.The full name of applicant, his age, place of birth,
citizenship, civil status, and post-office address.
2. That the applicant has all the qualifications.
3. That he has none of the disqualifications.
4. That the application is made in good faith.
5. That the application is made for the exclusive
benefit of the applicant
6. Accurate description of the land.
7. Whether all or part of the land is occupied or
cultivated or improved.
8. That the land applied for is neither timber or mineral.
In case of death of applicant or grantee before the
issuance of the patent or final grant of the land, he
shall be succeeded by his heirs in law.
All other natural resources shall remain with the State.
Land is subject of public servitudes, right of way not
exceeding 20 meters in width.
Private corporations disqualified from acquiring
lands of the public domain except by lease for a
period not exceeding 25 years, renewable for not
more than 20 years and not to exceed one
23
thousand hectares in area.
Part II Revised Forestry Code (Presidential Decree
No. 705)
Governing Law
PD 705, otherwise known as the “Revised Forestry
Code of the Philippines,” is the law governing the
management and utilization of forest lands.
The law places emphasis not only on the utilization of
forest resources but more so on the protection,
rehabilitation and development of forest lands, in order
to ensure the continuity of their productive condition.
Definition of Terms
(a) Public forest – is the mass of lands of the public
domain which has not been the subject of present
system of classification.
(b) Permanent forest or forest reserves – refer to those
lands of the public domain which have been the
subject of the present system of classification and
determined to be needed for forest purposes.
(c) Alienable and disposable lands – refer to those
lands of the public domain which have been the
subject of the present system of classification and
declared as not needed for forest purposes.
(d) Forest lands – include the public forest, permanent
or forest reserves, and forest reservations.
(e) Grazing land – refers to that portion of the public
domain which had been set aside for the raising of
livestock.
(f) Mineral lands – refer to those lands of the public
domain which have been classified as such by the
Secretary of Natural Resources in accordance with
prescribed and approved criteria, guidelines and
procedure.
(g) Forest reservations – refer to forest lands which
have been reserved by the President of the Philippines
for any specific purpose or purposes.
(h) National park – refers to a forest land reservation
which has been withdrawn from settlement or
occupancy and set aside as such exclusively to
preserve the scenery, the natural and historic objects
and the wild plants and animals therein, and to provide
enjoyment of these features in such a manner as will
leave them unimpaired for future generations.
(i) Game refuge or bird sanctuary – refers to a forest
land designated for the protection of game animals,
birds and fish and closed to hunting and fishing in
order that the excess population may flow and restock
surrounding areas.
(j) Marine parks – refer to any off-shore area inhabited
by rare and unique species of marine flora and fauna.
(k) Seashore park – refers to any public shore area
delimited for outdoor recreation, sports fishing,
waterskiing and related healthful activities.
(l) Watershed reservation – is a forest land reservation
established to protect or improve the conditions of the
water yield thereof or reduce sedimentation.
(m) Watershed – is a land area drained by a stream or
fixed body of water and its tributaries having a
common outlet for surface run-off.
(n) Critical watershed – is a drainage area of a river
system supporting existing and proposed hydro-
electric power and irrigation works needing immediate
rehabilitation as it is being subjected to a fast
denudation causing accelerated erosion and
destructive floods. It is closed from logging until it is
fully rehabilitated.
(o) Mangrove – is a term applied to the type of forest
occurring on tidal flat along the seacost.
(p) Kaingin – is a portion of the forest land which is
subjected to shifting and/or permanent slash-and-burn
cultivation having little or no provision to prevent soil
erosion.
(q) Forest product – means timber, pulpwood,
firewood, bark, tree top, resin, gum, wood, oil,
beeswax, honey, rattan, or other forest growth, the
associated water, fish, game, scenic, historical,
recreational and geologic resources in forest lands.
(r) Industrial tree plantation – is any tract of forest land
purposely and extensively planted to timber crops
primarily to supply the raw material requirements of
existing or proposed processing plants and related
industries.
(s) Tree farm – refers to any tract of forest land
purposely and extensively planted to trees of economic
value for their fruits, flowers, leaves, barks, or
extractives, but not for the wood thereof.
(t) Selective logging – means the systematic removal
of the mature, over-mature and defective trees in such
a manner as to leave adequate number and volume of
healthy residual trees of the desired species for the
protection and conservation of soil and water.
(u) Lease – privilege granted by the State to a person
to occupy and possess, in consideration of specified
rental, any forest land of the public domain in order to
undertake any authorized activity therein.
(v) License – is a privilege granted by the State to a
person to utilize forest resources, without any right of
occupation and possession over the same.
(w) License agreement – is a privilege granted by the
24
State to a person to utilize forest resources, without
any right of occupation and possession over the same,
but with the obligation to develop, protect, and
rehabilitate the same in accordance with the terms and
conditions set forth in said agreement.
(x) Permit – is a short-term privilege or authority
granted by the State to a person to utilize any limited
forest resources without any right of occupation and
possession therein.
(y) Ecosystem – means the ecological community
considered together with non-living factors and its
environment as a unit.
(z) Silviculture – is the establishment, development
reproduction and care of forest trees.
(aa) Private right – refers to titled rights of ownership
under existing laws, which possession may include
places of abode and worship, burial grounds, and old
clearings, but excludes production forest inclusive of
logged-over areas, commercial forests and established
plantations of forest trees and trees of economic value.
G.R. No. L-30389 December 27, 1972
Lessons Applicable: (Land Titles and Deeds)
Sec. 2 Art. XII 1987 Constitution
Imperium v. Dominium
legality of the grant is a question between the grantee and
the government
FACTS:
Aniano David acquired lawful title pursuant to his
miscellaneous sales application in accordance with which an
order of award and for issuance of a sales patent (*similar to
public auction) was made by the Director of Lands on June
18, 1958, covering Lot 2892.
On the basis of the order of award of the Director of Lands
the Undersecretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources
issued on August 26, 1959, Miscellaneous Sales Patent No.
V-1209 pursuant to which OCT No. 510 was issued by the
Register of Deeds of Naga City on October 21, 1959.
Land in question is not a private property as the Director of
Lands and the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources have always sustained the public character for
having been formed by reclamation (as opposed to
peittioners contention that it is accretion)
The only remedy: action for reconveyance on the ground of
fraud - But there was no fraud in this case
ISSUES:

W/N Lee Hong Kok can question the grant. - NO
W/N David has original acquisition of title. - YES
HELD: Court of Appeals Affirmed. (no legal justification for
nullifying the right of David to the disputed lot arising from
the grant made in his favor by respondent officials)
Only the Government, represented by the Director of Lands,
or the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, can
bring an action to cancel a void certificate of title issued
pursuant to a void patent. The legality of the grant is a
question between the grantee and the government. Private
parties like the plaintiffs cannot claim that the patent and
title issued for the land involved are void since they are not
the registered owners thereof nor had they been declared as
owners in the cadastral proceedings of Naga Cadastre after
claiming it as their private property.
Well-settled Rule : no public land can be acquired by private
persons without any grant, express or implied, from the
government
Cabacug v. Lao: holder of a land acquired under a free
patent is more favorably situated than that of an owner of
registered property. Not only does a free patent have a force
and effect of a Torrens Title, but in addition the person to
whom it is granted has likewise in his favor the right to
repurchase within a period of 5 years.
Imperium v. Dominium
Imperium - government authority possessed by the state
which is appropriately embraced in the concept of
sovereignty
Dominium - capacity to own or acquire property. The use of
this term is appropriate with reference to lands held by the
state in its proprietary character. In such capacity, it may
provide for the exploitation and use of lands and other
natural resources, including their disposition, except as
limited by the Constitution.
ALBERTO G. PINLAC vs CA
FACTS:
1. PETS: WWII veterans filed with RTC Quieting of Title
of a forest land acquired thru prescription. They named as
RESP several persons and corporations who are titled
owners of subdivided parcels of land within the subject
property. One of those so impleaded as a party-respondent
was the Vil-Ma Maloles Subdivision (hereinafter, Vil-Ma).
2. Since personal service of summons could not be
effected on Vil-Ma and some of the other named
respondents, petitioners moved for leave of court to serve
summons by publication- GRANTED. Published in the
“Metropolitan Newsweek”, a periodical edited and
published in the City of Caloocan and Malolos, Bulacan.
3. RESP declared in default : TC DECISION: rendered in
favor of petitioners and against the defaulted respondents
25
1) Declaring petitioners through the principal petitioners
hereof, to wit: Alberto G. Pinlac, Atty. Eriberto H. Decena,
Rodolfo T. Reyes, Felipe Briones and Juanito S. Metilla as
absolute owners in fee simple title of the aforesaid Lots 1, 2
& 3 hereof by virtue of extra-ordinary prescription, with the
exception of the lands covered by the respective transfer
certificate of title belonging to the non-defaulted
respondents;
4. Pet for annulment of Decision was filed with CA by
the titled owners of the subdivided lots within Vil-Ma, that
TC nullified all their titles, lack of jurisdiction and extrinsic
fraud:
(2) They were never made parties to Civil Case No. Q-35672,
nor were their lots described in the complaint, published
summons, and Partial Decision. Named defendant was VIL-
MA, a totally separate and independent entity which had
already ceased to exist way back in January of 1976.
Moreover, the summons, as well as the Partial Decision was
not published in a newspaper or periodical of general
circulation. Thus, the defective service of summons to said
defendant did not place the individual lot owners under the
trial court’s jurisdiction, nor are they bound by the adverse
judgment.
(3) They were denied due process of law as they were not
given their day in court. They should have been included as
indispensable parties-respondents in Civil Case No. Q-
35672 since the petitioners therein were seeking to annul
their respective transfer certificates of title.
5. CA: GRANTED the injunction: indispensable parties in the
case, were not individually served with summons. So
annulled decision: becomes all the more apparent when
petitioners claim or asseverate that the assailed Partial
Decision can not bind Vilar-Maloles (VILMA), the umbrella
name, for the simple reason that said PARTNERSHIP was
dissolved on January 26, 1976, for it can no longer be sued
as it had no more juridical personality.
6. Petitioners contend that “the summons and the Partial
Decision were published in a local newspaper edited in
Caloocan City and Malolos, Bulacan known as
“METROPOLITAN NEWSWEEK” implying that said summons
and Partial Decision were not published in a newspaper of
general circulation in Quezon City as required by PD 1079,
Sec. 1 thereof. Petitioners not having been duly notified of
the hearing/proceedings, the Partial Decision being assailed
is without significance to them or as far as petitioners are
concerned said Partial Decision is null and void.
7. CERTIORARI: PETS Contend that the service of summons
by publication was legal and in accordance with the
requirements of Rule 14, Section 14 of the Rules of Court.
The service by publication was done pursuant to the orders
of the trial court dated May 5, 1993 and September 29, 1983.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT A-QUO HAS
ACQUIRED JURISDICTION OVER RESPONDENT VILMA
MALOLES SUBDIVISION BY THE PUBLICATION OF THE
SUMMONS AND PETITION AS ORDERED BY THE COURT IN
CIVIL CASE NO. Q-35672 AND SO THE PARTIAL DECISION
(ANNEX “B”) WAS LEGAL, VALID AND PROPER.
HELD: NEGAVOO
While the service of summons by publication may have been
done with the approval of the trial court, it does not cure the
fatal defect that the “Metropolitan Newsweek” is not a
newspaper of general circulation in Quezon City. The Rules
strictly require that publication must be “in a newspaper of
general circulation and in such places and for such time as
the court may order.” The court orders relied upon by
petitioners did not specify the place and the length of time
that the summons was to be published. In the absence of
such specification, publication in just any periodical does not
satisfy the strict requirements of the rules. The incomplete
directive of the court a quo coupled with the defective
publication of the summons rendered the service by
publication ineffective. The modes of service of summons
should be strictly followed in order that the court may
acquire jurisdiction over the respondents, and failure to
strictly comply with the requirements of the rules regarding
the order of its publication is a fatal defect in the service of
summons. It cannot be overemphasized that the statutory
requirements of service of summons, whether personally, by
substituted service, or by publication, must be followed
strictly, faithfully and fully, and any mode of service other
than that prescribed by the statute is considered ineffective.
Be that as it may, even granting that the publication strictly
complied with the rules, the service of summons would still
be ineffective insofar as private respondents are concerned.
At the time the complaint for Quieting of Title was filed on
November 2, 1983, Vilma Maloles Subdivision no longer
existed as a juridical entity. Vilma Maloles Subdivision, a
partnership, was dissolved more than six (6) years earlier, as
evidenced by a Certificate of Dissolution issued by the SEC
dated January 26, 1976. Consequently, it could no longer be
sued having lost its juridical personality.
RESIDENTIAL DECREE No. 892 February 16,
1976
DISCONTINUANCE OF THE SPANISH
MORTGAGE SYSTEM OF REGISTRATION AND
OF THE USE OF SPANISH TITLES AS EVIDENCE
IN LAND REGISTRATION PROCEEDINGS
WHEREAS, fraudulent sales, transfers, and other
forms of conveyances of large tracts of public and
private lands to unsuspecting and unwary buyers
appear to have been perpetrated by unscrupulous
persons claiming ownership under Spanish titles or
grants of dubious origin;
WHEREAS, these fraudulent transactions have
often resulted in conflicting claims and litigations
between legitimate title holders, bona fide
occupants or applicants of public lands, on the one
hand, and the holders of, or persons claiming rights
under, the said Spanish titles or grants, on the
other, thus creating confusion and instability in
property ownership and threatening the peace and
order conditions in the areas affected;
26
WHEREAS, statistic in the Land Registration
Commission show that recording in the system of
registration under the Spanish Mortgage Law is
practically nil and that this system has become
obsolete;
WHEREAS, Spanish titles to lands which have not
yet been brought under the operation of the Torrens
system, being subject to prescription, are now
ineffective to prove ownership unless accompanied
by proof of actual possession;
WHEREAS, there is an imperative need to
discontinue the system of registration under the
Spanish Mortgage Law and the use of Spanish titles
as evidence in registration proceedings under the
Torrens system;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS,
President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers
vested in me by the Constitution, do hereby decree
and order;
Section 1. The system of registration under the
Spanish Mortgage Law is discontinued, and all
lands recorded under said system which are not yet
covered by Torrens title shall be considered as
unregistered lands.
All holders of Spanish titles or grants should apply
for registration of their lands under Act No. 496,
otherwise known as the Land Registration Act,
within six (6) months from the effectivity of this
decree. Thereafter, Spanish titles cannot be used as
evidence of land ownership in any registration
proceedings under the Torrens system.
Hereafter, all instruments affecting lands originally
registered under the Spanish Mortgage Law may be
recorded under Section 194 of the Revised
Administrative Code, as amended by Act 3344;
Section 2. All laws, executive orders, administrative
orders, rules and regulations inconsistent with the
foregoing provisions are hereby repealed or
accordingly modified;
Section 3. This Decree shall take effect
immediately.
Done in the City of Manila, this 16th day of
February, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred
and seventy-six.
PD 1529
A. APPLICATIONS
Section 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file
in the proper Court of First Instance an application for
registration of title to land, whether personally or through
their duly authorized representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-
in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide
claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
(2) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands by
prescription under the provision of existing laws.
(3) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands or
abandoned river beds by right of accession or accretion
under the existing laws.
(4) Those who have acquired ownership of land in any other
manner provided for by law.
Where the land is owned in common, all the co-owners shall
file the application jointly.
Where the land has been sold under pacto de retro, the
vendor a retro may file an application for the original
registration of the land, provided, however, that should the
period for redemption expire during the pendency of the
registration proceedings and ownership to the property
consolidated in the vendee a retro, the latter shall be
substituted for the applicant and may continue the
proceedings.
A trustee on behalf of his principal may apply for original
registration of any land held in trust by him, unless
prohibited by the instrument creating the trust.
Time Immemorial — refers to a period of time when as far
back as memory can go, certain ICCs/IPs are known to have
occupied, possessed in the concept of owner, and utilized a
defined territory devolved to them, by operation of
customary law or inherited from their ancestors, in
accordance with their customs and traditions.
PATRIMONIAL PROPERTY OF THE STATE
Article 422. Property of public dominion, when no longer
intended for public use or for public service, shall form part
of the patrimonial property of the State.
*Under Article 422 there must be a formal declaration by the
executive or possibly legislative department of the
government that the property of the State is no longer
needed for public use of for public service; otherwise, the
property continues to be property of public dominion
notwithstanding the fact that it is not actually devoted for
such use or service.
27
What lands may not be declared open to disposition or
concession?
Those which have been reserved for public or quasi-public
uses;
Those which have been appropriated by the government;
Those which have become private property like the friar
lands and the ancestral lands under the IPRA Law
The Revised Forestry code also provides that no land of the
public domain 18% in slope or over shall be classified as
alienable and disposable;
Submerged lands like the waters (sea or bay) above them are
part of the inalienable natural resources.
What are the classification of lands under the Constitution?
Classification under 1935 Constitution- Agricultural, forest or
timber
Classification under 1973 Constitution- Agricultural,
industrial, commercial, residential, resettlement, mineral,
timber and mineral lands
Classification under 1987 Constitution- Agricultural, forest,
timber and national parks
All others under the 1987 Constitution are patrimonial
property
No public land can be acquired except by a grant from the
State
1. RA 6957 as amended by RA 7718 explicitly states that a
contractor can be paid “a portion as percentage of the reclaimed
land” subject to the constitutional requirement that only Filipino
citizens or corporation with at least 60% Filipino equity can
acquire the same. In addition, when the lands were transferred
to the NHA, these were considered Patrimonial lands of the
state, by which it has the power to sell the same to any qualified
person.
2. Patrimonial properties of the State – not or no
longer intended for public use.
ACQUISITION OF PROPERTY BY PRESCRIPTION.
Prescription, in general, is a mode of acquiring (or losing)
ownership and other real rights through the lapse of time in
the manner and under conditions laid down by law, namely,
that the possession should be in the concept of an owner,
public, peaceful, uninterrupted and adverse. Acquisitive
prescription is either ordinary or extraordinary. Ordinary
acquisitive prescription requires possession in good faith
and with just title for 10 years. Without good faith and just
title, acquisitive prescription can only be extraordinary in
character which requires uninterrupted adverse possession
for 30 years. (Heirs of Maningding v. CA, 342 Phil. 567
(1979)).
Thus, for ordinary acquisitive prescription to set in,
possession must be for at least 10 years, in good faith and
with just title. Possession is “in good faith” when there is a
reasonable belief that the person from whom the thing is
received has been the owner thereof and could thereby
transmit his ownership. (Art. 1127, NCC). There is “just title”
when the adverse claimant comes into possession of the
property through any of the modes recognized by law for the
acquisition of ownership or other real rights, but the grantor
is neither the owner nor in a position to transmit the right.
(Art. 1129, NCC).
Homestead patent granted has the force and effect
of a Torrens title.
Sale of public agricultural lands
· Any citizen of the Philippines
· Of lawful age or head of the family
· Applicant may purchase not to exceed 12 hectares
which shall be sold thru sealed bidding
The purchase price may be paid in full or in not
more then 10 annual equal installments from the
date of the award.

3. Modes of disposition Lease

· Any citizen of the Philippines
Modes of Disposition · Of lawful age; and
· Any corporation of which at least 60% of the capital
No Public Land can be Acquired Except by a Grant stock belong wholly to the citizens of the Philippines
from the State
Non-registrable Properties
It is indispensable that there be a showing of Title from
the State that may come in the form of a homestead, 1. Property of public dominion
sales or free patent or grant. · Intended for public use
· Intended for some public service
Only Alienable and Disposable (A&D) may be the
Subject of Disposition 2. Forest lands

Occupation thereof in the concept of owner, no matter 3.Watersheds

how long, cannot ripen into ownership and be
registered as a title. 4. Mangrove swamps
5. Mineral lands
The applicant’s remedy lies in the release of the
property from its present classification. 6. National parks

Specific Modes of Disposition 7.Military or naval reservation

Public lands suitable for agricultural purposes can 8.Foreshore and reclaimed lands
be disposed of only as follows:
9.Submerged areas
1. For homestead settlement
2. By sale 10.Lakes
3.By lease, and
4. By confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles: 11.Navigable rivers
a. by judicial legalization – may apply to the Regional
Trial Court where the land is located for the 12.Creeks
confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a
certificate therefore, under the Property Registrration 13. Reservations for public and semi-public purposes
Decree.
b. by administrative legalization (free patent) – any Classification and Disposition of Lands for
natural-born citizen of the Philippines who is not the Residential, Commercial or Industrial Purposes
owner of more than 12 hectares, and who, for at least
30 years prior to the effectivity of the amendatory act, 1. Lands reclaimed by the government by dredging,
has continuously occupied and cultivated a tract or filling, or other means
tracts of land for disposition, who shall have paid the
real estate tax land subject to disposition. 2. Foreshore;

For homestead settlement
· Any citizen of the Philippines
· Over the age of 18 or head of the family
· A homestead of the not exceeding 12 hectares
· Applicant must have cultivated and improved at least
one fifth of the land continuously
· Resided at least one year in the municipality
3. Marshy lands or lands covered with water bordering
upon the shores or banks of navigable lakes or rivers;
4. Lands not included in any of the foregoing classes.
The lands comprised in classes 1,2, and 3 shall be
disposed of to private parties by lease only.

28
Conditions of the Lease
The lessee shall construct permanent improvements
appropriate for the purpose, shall commence the
construction within 6 months from the date of the
award.
At the expiration of the lease, all improvements made
by the lessee shall become the property of the
Government.
Lands for Residential, Commercial or Industrial
Purposes Shall be Disposed of through Oral Bidding
(Except direct sale)
Sale of Lands Within Military Reservations
Priority shall be given to bona fide occupants and then
to war veterans.
Cadastral Registration Proceedings
The cadastral system of registration constitutes
another means of bringing lands under the operation of
the Torrens system. The purpose is to serve public
interests by requiring that the titles to such lands “be
settled and adjudicated.”
Friar Lands
The so-called friar lands were purchased by the
government for sale to actual occupants. These lands
are not public lands but private or patrimonial property
of the government and their acquisition is not governed
by the provisions of CA 141 (Public Land Act).
Action for Reversion
Director of Lands has Continuing Authority to
Investigate Fraudulent Issuance of Patents
Government Initiates an Action for Cancellation of Title
and Reversion
Lands of the public domain fraudulently awarded to the
applicant may be recovered or reverted back to its
original owner, the government. An action for reversion
has to be instituted by the Solicitor General.
Action for Nullity of Land Titles Distinguished from
Reversion
Nullity of land is based on the fact that the land is
beyond the jurisdiction of Director of Lands to bestow
Reversion of land is based on fraudulent claim
Prohibited Alienations
No alienation, transfer, or conveyance of any
homestead after 5 years and before 25 years after
issuance of title shall be valid without the approval of
the Secretary of DENR.
Procedure, Legal Restrictions and Encumbrances
1.The full name of applicant, his age, place of birth,
citizenship, civil status, and post-office address.
29
2. That the applicant has all the qualifications.
3. That he has none of the disqualifications.
4. That the application is made in good faith.
5. That the application is made for the exclusive
benefit of the applicant
6. Accurate description of the land.
7. Whether all or part of the land is occupied or
cultivated or improved.
8. That the land applied for is neither timber or mineral.
In case of death of applicant or grantee before the
issuance of the patent or final grant of the land, he shall
be succeeded by his heirs in law.
All other natural resources shall remain with the State.
Land is subject of public servitudes, right of way not
exceeding 20 meters in width.
Private corporations disqualified from acquiring
lands of the public domain except by lease for a
period not exceeding 25 years, renewable for not
more than 20 years and not to exceed one thousand
hectares in area.
EPUBLIC ACT No. 10023
AN ACT AUTHORIZING THE ISSUANCE OF
FREE PATENTS TO RESIDENTAL LANDS
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of
Representatives of the Philippines in Congress
assembled:
Section 1. Qualifications. - Any Filipino citizen who
is an actual occupant of a residential land may apply
for a Free Patent Title under this Act: Provided; That
in highly urbanized cities, the land should not
exceed two hundred (200) square meters; in other
cities, it should not exceed five hundred (500)
square meters; in first class and second class
municipalities, it should not exceed seven hundred
fifty (750) square meters; and in all other
municipalities, it should not exceed one thousand
(1,000) square meters; Provided, further, That the
land applied for is not needed for public service
and/or public use.
Section 2. Coverage. - This Act shall cover all lands
that are zoned as residential areas, including
townsites as defined under the Public Land
Act; Provided, That none of the provisions of
Presidential Decree No. 705 shall be violated.
Zoned residential areas located inside a delisted
military reservation or abandoned military camp,
and those of local government units (LGUs) or
townsites which preceded Republic Act No. 7586 or
the National Integrated Protected Areas System
(NIPAS) law, shall also be covered by this Act.
Section 3. Application. - The application on the land
applied for shall be supported by a map based on
an actual survey conducted by a licensed geodetic
engineer and approved by the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) and a
technical description of the land applied for together
with supporting affidavit of two (2) disinterested
persons who are residing in the barangay of the city
or municipality where the land is located, attesting to
the truth of the facts contained in the application to
the effect that the applicant thereof has, either by
himself or through his predecessor-in-interest,
actually resided on and continuously possessed and
occupied, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of
ownership, the land applied for at least ten (10)
years and has complied with the requirements
prescribed in Section 1 hereof.
Section 4. Special Patents. - Notwithstanding any
provision of law to the contrary and subject to
private rights, if any, public land actually occupied
and used for public schools, municipal halls, public
plazas or parks and other government institutions
for public use or purpose may be issued special
patents under the name of the national agency or
LGU concerned: Provided, That all lands titled
under this section shall not be disposed of unless
sanctioned by Congress if owned by the national
agency or sanctioned by the sanggunian concerned
through an approved ordinance if owned by the
LGU.
Section 5. Removal of Restrictions. - The
restrictions regarding encumbrances, conveyances,
transfers or dispositions imposed in Sections 118,
119,121, 122 and 123 of Chapter XII, Title VI of
Commonwealth Act No. 141 as amended, shall not
apply to patents issued under this Act.
Section 6. Period for Application. - All applications
shall be filed immediately after the effectivity of this
Act before the Community Environment and Natural
Resources Office (CENRO) of the DENR. The
CENRO is mandated to process the application
within one hundred and twenty (120) days to include
compliance with the required notices and other legal
requirements, and forward this recommendation to
the Provincial Environment and Natural Resources
Office (PENRO), who shall have five (5) days to
approve or disapprove the patent. In case of
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approval, patent shall be issued; in case of
conflicting claims among different claimants, the
parties may seek the proper judicial remedies. 1avvphi 1
Section 7. Implementing Rules and Regulations. -
The Director of the Land Management Bureau of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR) shall promulgate rules and regulations to
carry out the provisions of this Act, and shall see to
it that such are gender responsive.
Section 8. Repealing Clause. - All laws, decrees,
executive order, executive issuance's or letters of
instruction, rules and regulations or any part thereof
inconsistent with or contrary to the provisions of this
Act are hereby deemed repealed, amended or
modified accordingly.
Section 9. Separability Clause. - If, for any reason
or reasons, any part or parts of this Act shall be
declared unconstitutional or invalid by any
competent court, other parts of this Act shall be
thereby shall continue to be in full force and effect.
Section 10. Effectivity Clause. - This Act shall take
effect fifteen days (15) after its publication in two (2)
national newspapers of general education.
PERSON QUALIFIED
ARTICLE XII
National Economy and Patrimony
SECTION 3. Lands of the public domain are classified into
agricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands, and national
parks. Agricultural lands of the public domain may be further
classified by law according to the uses which they may be
devoted. Alienable lands of the public domain shall be
limited to agricultural lands. Private corporations or
associations may not hold such alienable lands of the public
domain except by lease, for a period not exceeding twenty-
five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five years,
and not to exceed one thousand hectares in area. Citizens of
the Philippines may lease not more than five hundred
hectares, or acquire not more than twelve hectares thereof
by purchase, homestead, or grant.
Taking into account the requirements of conservation,
ecology, and development, and subject to the requirements
of agrarian reform, the Congress shall determine, by law, the
size of lands of the public domain which may be acquired,
developed, held, or leased and the conditions therefor.
SECTION 7. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private
lands shall be transferred or conveyed except to individuals,
corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold
lands of the public domain.

SECTION 8. Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 7 of

this Article, a natural-born citizen of the Philippines who has
lost his Philippine citizenship may be a transferee of private
lands, subject to limitations provided by law.

BATAS PAMBANSA BLG. 185 – AN ACT TO IMPLEMENT

SECTION FIFTEEN OF ARTICLE XIV OF THE CONSTITUTION
AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

Section 1. In implementation of Section fifteen of Article XIV

of the Constitution, a natural-born citizen of the Philippines
who has lost his Philippine citizenship may be a transferee of
private land, for use by him as his residence, subject to the
provisions of this Act.

Sec. 2. Any natural-born citizen of the Philippines who has

lost his Philippine citizenship and who has the legal capacity
to enter into a contract under Philippine laws may be a
transferee of a private land up to a maximum area of one
thousand square meters, in the case of urban land, or one
hectare in the case of rural land, to be used by him as his
residence. In the case of married couples, one of them may
avail of the privilege herein granted; Provided, That if both
shall avail of the same, the total area acquired shall not
exceed the maximum herein fixed.

In case the transferee already owns urban or rural lands for

residential purposes, he shall still be entitled to be a
transferee of additional urban or rural lands for residential
purposes which, when added to those already owned by
him, shall not exceed the maximum areas herein authorized.

Sec. 3. A transferee under this Act may acquire not more

than two lots which should be situated in different
municipalities or cities anywhere in the Philippines;
Provided, That the total area thereof shall not exceed one
thousand square meters in the case of urban lands or one
hectare in the case of rural lands for use by him as urban land
shall be disqualified from acquiring acquiring rural land, and
vice versa.

Sec. 4. As used in this Act

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