This article has been accepted for publication in a future issue of this journal, but has not been
fully edited. Content may change prior to final publication. Citation information: DOI 10.1109/ACCESS.2016.2606404, IEEE Access
QoE-based Distributed Multichannel Allocation in
5G Heterogeneous Cellular Networks: A
Matching-coalitional Game Solution
Ducheng Wu, Qihui Wu, Senior Member, IEEE, Yuhua Xu, Member, IEEE, Jianjun Jing, Zhiqiang Qin
Abstract—We investigate the problem of multichannel allo-
cation for small-cell users (SUs) in 5G heterogeneous cellular
networks (HCNs) by taking users’ quality of experience (QoE)
into account. In most existing channel allocation approaches, they
are assumed that each user can only transmit on one channel
and the optimization goal is the network throughput without
considering users’ QoE demands. Moreover, the individual QoE
losses of macro-cell users (MUs), which are caused by the cross-
tiered interference, are not considered.
In this paper, considering SUs’ QoE demands and the in-
dividual QoE losses of MUs, we propose a joint matching-
coalitional game theoretical scheme to solve such a QoE based
multichannel allocation problem with individual cross-tiered
interference constraint in each channel. Concretely, according to
the different interference and competition relationships among
users, we divide the complicated problem into two subproblems,
i.e., Q1: intra-cell channel allocation for SUs, and Q2: inter-
cell channel allocation for small-cell base stations (SBSs). We
formulate the intra-cell channel allocation as a many-to-one
selfish matching game and formulate the inter-cell channel allo-
cation subproblem as an altruistical coalitional game separately.
Then, the complicated problem can be solved based on the
two proposed games iteratively. We propose a joint channel
allocation algorithm for the matching-coalitional game theoretical
scheme. We prove that the proposed algorithm converges to a
stable channel allocation profile. Simulation results show that the
proposed algorithm achieves higher global SUs’ satisfaction than
the smallest interference channel selection and random allocation.
Index Terms—5G, heterogeneous cellular networks, multichan-
nel allocation, QoE, game.
I. I NTRODUCTION
HE traffic load in current wireless networks has exponen-
T tially increased due to the proliferation of new wireless
technologies, and will continue to increase in the foresee-
able future. The next-generation (5G) wireless communication
system is expected to provide high data rates and system
This work was supported by the Natural Science Foundation for Distin-
guished Young Scholars of Jiangsu Province under Grant No. BK20160034,
the National Natural Science Foundation of China under Grant No. 61401508
and No. 61671473, and in part by the Open Research Foundation of National
Key Laboratory of Science and Technology on Information Transmission and
Dissemination Technologies in Communication Networks.
Ducheng Wu, Yuhua Xu and Jianjun Jing are with the College of
Communications Engineering, PLA University of Science and Technology,
Nanjing, China (e-mail: wuducheng@foxmail.com, yuhuaenator@gmail.com,
jianjun.jing@panda.cn).
Qihui Wu is with the College of Electronic and Information Engineering,
Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics, Nanjing, China (e-mail:
wuqihui2014@sina.com).
Zhiqiang Qin is with Information Science and Technology Institute,
Zhengzhou, China (e-mail: qinzhiq2006@163.com).
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capacity to meet the rapid growth of wireless data services
and requirements, i.e., 60 Mbps and 300 Mbps in uplink and
downlink, respectively, in 95 percent of locations and time [1].
Small-cell technologies are seen as a technology component
for the 5G wireless communication system to increase the
wireless data by reusing spectrum resources [2]–[5]. Small-
cell base stations (SBSs) are low-power and short-range base
stations providing wireless services to small-cell users (SUs)
which are different from traditional macro-cell base stations
(MBSs). Because SBSs can be installed in surrounding ar-
eas, the 5G cellular wireless systems will have a multi-tier
architecture consisting of macro-cells and small-cells to serve
users. In underlay heterogeneous wireless networks, macro-
cells share the spectrum resource with small-cells, and macro-
cell users (MUs) are interfered by SBSs at the same time with
the increasing of spectral efficiency.
It is well known that the quality of experience (QoE) is
an essential indicator in 5G wireless communication system.
In order to ensure a high degree of QoE for each MU, the
cross-tiered interference caused by SBSs in each channel must
be limited. However, in order to increase the QoE of SUs,
each SBS is willing to occupy spectrum resource as much as
possible. The co-tiered interference among SBSs and the cross-
tiered interference between MBSs and SBSs will be more
serious. Thus, there is a lot of necessary to manage co-tiered
and cross-tiered interference to exploit the benefits promised
by SBSs [6]–[8].
In this paper, we focus on the mitigation of co-tiered
interference and study the issue of QoE-based multichannel
allocation for SUs with cross-tiered interference constraint for
MUs in heterogeneous wireless networks.
There are some existing works which have studied re-
source allocation problems in 5G heterogeneous networks
with convex optimization algorithm [10], greedy algorithm
[9], clustering based approach [11], [12] and game based
approach [13]–[15]. Among them, game based approach has
been seen as one of the most important decision theoretic
solutions for resource allocation in 5G communication system
due to the distributed and autonomous decision process. In
[18], the authors proposed a local altruistic potential game for
distributed channel selection, and used the spatial adaptive play
to achieve global optimization. In [19], the authors proposed
a MAC-layer interference minimization potential game to
investigate the problem of distributed channel allocation. In
the proposed game, there is no information exchange among
users. Users in the proposed game select only one channel
This article has been accepted for publication in a future issue of this journal, but has not been fully edited. Content may change prior to final publication. Citation information: DOI 10.1109/ACCESS.2016.2606404, IEEE Access
to transmit information. In [13], [16], [17], the problem of
resource allocation in the small-cell networks was formulated
as a Stackelberg game, where the MBS acted as a leader
and could put forward its own strategies and then the SBSs
acted as followers and respond. In [20], the authors proposed a
coalition formation game based scheme to address the uplink
resource allocation problem for multiple D2D and cellular
users which combed different transmission modes, mutual
interferences, and resource sharing policy in a single utility
function. Literature [21] constituted a unified treatment of
matching theory tailored to the peculiar properties of resource
management in 5G wireless networks.
However, in most of the above mentioned works, there
are three main drawbacks: i) Most mentioned works assumed
that one SU (or MU) can only occupy one channel (or a
resource block) at a certain time. In practice, the demands of
SUs are different and each SU can transmit in multichannel
simultaneously due to the progress of the hardware devices. ii)
In most existing works, the optimization goals were the system
throughput and did not consider SUs’ QoE requirements. It is
known that the QoE utility is a nonlinear function of the sum
throughput of all occupied channels for each SU. Thus, the
influence to users’ QoE, which is caused by cross-tiered and
co-tiered interference, is more difficult to detect and many of
the existing methods are no longer applicable. iii) Among the
above mentioned works, [18], [19] only studied the problem
of co-tiered interference mitigation in monolayer small-cell
networks and did not consider cross-tiered interference in
heterogeneous networks. In [13], [16], [17], [20], cross-tiered
interference was modeled into different utility functions of
SUs, SBSs and MBSs without considering the individual
influence to the satisfaction of each MU.
In this paper, we propose a joint matching-coalitional game
theoretical scheme to allocate channels for SBSs and their
associated SUs in heterogeneous wireless networks, which
makes an effort to promote the global SUs’ satisfaction with
individual cross-tiered interference constraint to protect MUs’
QoE satisfaction. It is well known that there are three kinds
of influence relationships among users in the heterogeneous
wireless network, i.e., the cross-tiered interference relationship
between SUs and MUs, the co-tiered interference relationship
among SUs associated with different SBSs (inter-cell SUs),
and the competition relationship among SUs associated with
same SBSs (intra-cell SUs). Based on the different interference
and competition relationships, we divide the complicated chan-
nel allocation problem into two subproblems, i.e., Q1: intra-
cell channel allocation for SUs, and Q2: inter-cell channel allo-
cation for SBSs. We formulate the intra-cell channel allocation
as a many-to-one matching game (in which SUs selfishly
compete for the channels which have been allocated to SBSs)
and formulate the inter-cell channel allocation subproblem
as a coalitional game (in which SBSs utilize the available
channels cooperatively and altruistically under the cross-tiered
interference constraint) separately.
The reasons for using the proposed joint matching-
coalitional game theoretical scheme model are threefold: i)
The complicated channel allocation problem is divided into
two tractable subproblems and can be solved based on the two
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proposed games iteratively. ii) The cross-tiered interference
constraint can only be considered in the inter-cell channel
allocation subproblem. The reason is that for MUs the cross-
tiered interference is caused by SBSs. The cross-tiered inter-
ference constraint is more properly handed in the coalitional
game in which SBSs are the players. iii) Compared with
the user terminal equipments, SBSs have strong abilities of
communication and computing. In many situations, SBSs are
deployed by communication operators. Thus, SBSs can solve
the inter-cell channel allocation subproblem cooperatively and
altruistically with the coalitional game. While, SUs with
weaker communication and computing abilities are rational
and naturally selfish, so they want to optimize their own QoE
satisfaction. Thus, SUs selfishly compete for the channels in
the proposed intra-cell channel allocation matching game. The
proposed joint matching-coalitional game not only focuses on
optimizing a global function at the SBS (macroeconomic) level
but also considers SUs’ local decisions and interactions at the
SU (microeconomic) level.
The main contributions of this article are summarized as
follows:
• Considering the individual interference to each MU, we
formulate the QoE based multichannel allocation problem
of SUs in 5G heterogeneous underlaying cellular net-
works as a nonlinear optimization problem with cross-
tiered interference constraint. To simplify the compli-
cated combinatorial optimization problem, we divide the
problem into two subproblems, i.e., i) intra-cell channel
allocation for SUs and ii) inter-cell channel allocation for
SBSs, which have considered the different interference
and competition relationships among SUs and MUs and
captured the different characteristics of SUs and SBSs.
• To analyze and solve the two subproblems separately, we
propose two resource allocation games, i.e., many-to-one
matching game and coalitional game. Combining these
two games, we propose a joint matching-coalitional game
theoretical scheme to solve the complicated combinatorial
optimization problem in an iterative manner.
• We propose a joint channel allocation algorithm for
the matching-coalitional game theoretical scheme. We
prove that the proposed algorithm converges to a stable
channel allocation profile for both the proposed many-
to-one matching game and coalitional game. We evaluate
the influence of different network environments on our
proposed matching-coalitional game based approach by
comparing it with some other existing approaches.
The rest of this article is organized as follows. In section
II, we present the system model and problem formulation. In
Section III, the multichannel allocation problem is formulated
as a joint matching-coalitional game theoretical scheme, the
existence of stable channel allocation profile is analyzed, and
a multi-agent learning algorithm is proposed. In Section IV,
simulation results and discussion are given. Finally, we make
conclusion in Section V.
II. S YSTEM M ODEL AND P ROBLEM F ORMULATION
The model of a single macro-cell with M MUs, i.e., M =
{1, 2, . . . , M }, and N small-cells, i.e., N = {1, 2, . . . , N }, are
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where p0 is the transmission power of the MBS in each

l
channel, g0,m is the channel gain from the MBS to MU m
in channel l, Fl is the SBS set who have occupied channel l,
i.e., ∀n ∈ Fl , there has l ∈ Cn . pn is the transmission power
l
of SBS n, gn,m is the channel gain from SBS n to MU m in
2
channel l, σm is the noise power.
The achieved throughput of MU m can be described as:
∑
Rm = B0 log2 (1 + γm,l ), (2)
l∈bm

where B0 is the bandwidth of each channel.

SU MU SBS signal MBS signal In current and future wireless systems, a key user-related
Cross-tiered interference Co-tiered interference metric is Quality of Experience (QoE). In the following,
we use a specific unified demand-aware satisfaction utility
Fig. 1. System model of a macro-cell and small-cells with downlink resource function to describe QoE for different users with different
sharing.
throughput requirements. The satisfaction function of users is a
universal sigmoid function, which can unify the utility function
considered as shown in Fig. 1. There are L dedicated channels, of users with different traffics [23]. And it is expressed as
i.e., L = {1, . . . , L}, for MUs to transmit information. MUs follow:
transmit information on orthogonal channels to avoid conflict. 1
u(r) = , (3)
It is assumed that small-cells can transmit in same channels 1 + e−τ (r−rreq )
with MUs only when the satisfactions of all MUs are higher where r is the received throughput of each user, τ is used
than determinate levels. On other words, the received cross- to adjust the slope of the utility curve around the required
tiered interference of MUs in their occupied channels is transmission rate rreq . τ reflects the demand degree of rreq .
smaller than some thresholds. The parameters τ and rreq are different for different users.
In each small-cell, there are one or more SUs associating This method is also applicable to other satisfaction function
with the SBS. We assume that there are S SUs in the network, forms.
i.e., S = {1, 2, . . . , S}. And πn SUs are associated with each When small-cells share the dedicated channels with MUs,
SBS n in∪a closed style, i.e., Sn = {xn1 , xn2 , . . . , xnπn }, the satisfaction of MU m (uM U
m (Rm )) must higher than a
xni ∈ S, n∈N Sn = S and Sn ∩ Sn′ = ø, ∀n ̸= n′ . It is as- predetermined value Vm = uM m
U
(R Vm ), where Vm is the QoE
sumed that SBSs can transmit in same channels with inter-cell threshold of MU m. Since u(r) is a nondecreasing function
interference, but SUs associated with the same SBS can only of r, there must be Rm > RVm , where RVm is the throughput
occupy orthogonal channels to avoid intra-cell interference. threshold of MU m. Thus, the received interference of MU
Since the allocated channel resource of MUs can be m in its occupied channels must be restrained. In order to
managed efficiently with the resource scheduling and power facilitate analysis, we assume that the received interference of
control mechanisms [22] and the macro-cell has a higher MU m caused by SBSs in all its occupied channels is smaller
priority to allocate channels to MUs, we focus on the channel than a same interference threshold Ithed,m ,
allocation problem between small-cells and SUs with cross-
p0 g0,m RVm
tiered interference constraint in the scenario that MUs have B0 log2 (1 + )= . (4)
2
Ithed,m + σm µm
been allocated determinate channels to transmit.
We set bm = {βm 1 2
, βm µm
, . . . , βm } and as = In other words, the interference thresholds of L dedicated
{αs , αs , . . . , αs } as allocated channel set of MU m
1 2 ηn
channels can be calculated before the channel allocation
and SU s, where βm j
, αsi ∈ L, 0 ≤ µm ≤ L, 0 ≤ ηn ≤ L. of small-cells. The interference thresholds are expressed as
Particularly, it is assumed that bm ∩ bm′ = ø, ∀m, m′ ∈ M. {I 1 , I 2 , . . . , I L }.
Similarly, SUs in certain small-cell n transmit information Similarly, the SINR of SU s in channel l can be described
on orthogonal channels, i.e., as ∩ as′ = ø, ∀s, s′ ∈ Sn . as
Here b = (b1 , b2 , . . . , bM ) has been determined by the pφs gφl s ,s
γs,l = l +
∑ l
, (5)
MBS, while a = (a1 , a2 , . . . , aS ) is the optimized variable p0 g0,s pn gn,s + σs2
set to be determined. Specifically, the channel selection n∈Fl \φs

strategy of SUs in certain small-cell n can be denoted as where φs is the associated SBS of SU s.
an = (axn1 , axn2 , . . . , axnπn ), an ⊂ a. It can easily find The aggregate throughput of SU s in small-cell φs can be
that the occupied channel set of SBS n can be denoted as described as:
π∪n ∑
Cn = axni , where Cn = {c1 , . . . , c|Cn | } , Cn ⊂ L. Rs = B0 log2 (1 + γs,l ). (6)
i=1 l∈as
Then, the power of received signal to interference and noise
ratio (SINR) of MU m in channel l can be described as Then the satisfaction of SU s is us (Rs ). The global QoE utility
l of SUs is given by
p0 g0,m ∑
γm,l = ∑ l 2
, (1) U (a) = us (Rs ). (7)
pn gn,m + σm
n∈Fl s∈S

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TABLE I
KEY VARIABLES USED IN THIS PAPER . As we know, to solve (8), any direct search method would
involve an exhaustive search of all possible channel allocation
Variables Explanation a for all SUs. It is apparent that such an approach incurs an
M MU set
M Number of MUs extremely high complexity due to the huge action space of a.
N SBS set As mentioned before, there are two kinds of interference
N Number of SBSs relationships and a competition relationship, i.e., the cross-
L Dedicated channel set tiered interference relationship between SUs and MUs which
L Number of dedicated channels
S SU set is related to the second constraint in (8) and the co-tiered in-
S Number of SUs terference relationships among SUs belong to different SBSs,
Sn The SU set associated with SBS n and a competition relationship among SUs associated with
πn Number of SUs associated with SBS n
xni The i’th SU in small-cell n
same SBSs which is related to the first constraint. Due to the
bm Allocated channel set of MU m complex interference relationship and constraints, it is hard for
as , axni Allocated channel set of SU s and SU xni the macro-cell to allocate channels to SUs directly.
b Channel allocation vector of MUs On one hand, compared with the user terminal equipments,
a Channel allocation vector of SUs
an Channel allocation vector of SUs in small-cell n SBSs have strong abilities of communication and computing.
Cn Occupied channel set of SBS n In many situations, SBSs are deployed by communication
p0 , pn Transmission powers of MBS and SBS n operators. Thus, to meet the cross-tiered interference constraint
l
g0,m l
, gn,m Channel gain from MBS, SBS n to MU m in l and achieve a high global QoE utility, SBSs have a strong
Fl SBSs’ coalition who have occupied channel l
σ2 Noise power
motivation to utilize the channel resource cooperatively and
R Achieved throughput altruistically. On the other hand, SUs are rational and naturally
γ SNIR selfish with limited communication and computing abilities, so
B0 Bandwidth of each channel they focus on the available channels in their associated SBSs
u QoE utility function
Vm QoE threshold of MU m and selfishly compete for the channels to optimize their own
Il Interference threshold of MUs in channel l QoE satisfaction.
U Global QoE utility of SUs To simplify and resolve the complicated multichannel allo-
A Available channel allocation space cation problem, we propose a joint matching-coalitional game
ψl The MU who has occupied channel l
φs The associated SBS of SU s theoretical scheme and divide the problem into two subprob-
C SBS channel allocation strategy lems, i.e., Q1: intra-cell channel allocation for SUs, and Q2:
Un Sum of satisfaction of all SUs in small-cell n inter-cell channel allocation for SBSs. We apply an iterative
ϵxni Matching utility of SU xni
approach which deals with intra-cell channel allocation for
εl Matching utility of channel l
Un Coalitional utility of SBS n SUs (Q1) and inter-cell channel allocation for SBSs (Q2)
separately and iteratively. The channel allocation vector can
be rewritten as a = (a1 , a2 , . . . , aN ). And for the inter-cell
Thus, we can formulate the optimal resource allocation channel allocation, the SBS channel allocation strategy can
problem in the small-cell network as the following optimiza- be denoted as C = (C1 , C2 , . . . , CN ). Since the number of
tion problem channel allocation objects are much less in subproblems Q1
and Q2 than the original problem (8), the proposed solution
max U (a),
a∈A is more tractable.
as ∩ as′ = ø, ∀s, s′ ∈ Sn , n ∈ N ;
s.t. ∑ (8) Game theory is an effective approach towards solving
l
pn gn,ψl
< I l , ∀l ∈ L, the above resource allocation problem involving multiple
n∈Fl
interactive objects. Thus, we formulate the intra-cell channel
where A is the available channel allocation space, ψl is the allocation as a many-to-one selfish matching game in which
MU who has occupied channel l. the players are SUs and channel agents, and formulate the
The above problem is obviously a NP-hard non-linear inter-cell channel allocation subproblem as a cooperative and
programming problem [24]. In the formulated problem, it is altruistical coalitional game in which the players are SBSs
noted that the optimization utility function (7) has no obvious separately. The proposed joint matching-coalitional game not
increasing and concave properties with a even with the linear only focuses on optimizing a global function at the SBS level
constraint. Moreover, the cross-tiered interference constraint but also considers SUs’ selfish decisions and local interactions
makes this problem more difficult. Therefore, it is too hard to at the SU level. The specific schematic of the joint matching-
derive the optimal solution by gradient descent algorithm or coalitional game theoretical scheme is shown in Fig.2. In the
some other convex optimization algorithms. following, we will analyze the two subproblems separately.
A summary of key notations is presented in Table I.
A. Many-to-one matching game for intra-cell channel alloca-
III. A J OINT M ATCHING - COALITIONAL G AME tion
T HEORETICAL S CHEME FOR R ESOURCE A LLOCATION
In this subsection, we propose an intra-cell channel allo-
In this section, we resort to a joint matching-coalitional cation matching game to solve subproblem Q1 [25]1 . Given
game theoretical scheme to solve such a complicated problem
of QoE based multichannel resource allocation. 1 Part of this work was accepted by IEEE/CIC ICCC2016.

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Cross-tiered interference the transmitters and available resources that are individually
constraint
conducted by such preference lists.
Definition 1: A matching µ is defined as a function from the
set Cn ∪Sn into the set of Cn ∪Sn such that (l ∈ Cn , s ∈ Sn ): 1)
Channel coalition µ(l) ∈ Sn and |µ(l)| = 1 for each channel, 2) µ(s) ∈ Cn ∪{ø}
and |µ(s)| ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . . , |Cn |} for each SU and 3) l ∈ µ(s)
Cooperative and altruistical if and only if µ(l) = s.
coalitional game Therefor, the tuple {Cn , Sn , ≻C , ≻S } determines the small-

x
x
x
cell channel allocation problem with ≻C = {≻l }l∈Cn being
Iteration
the preference set of the channels, ≻S = {≻s }s∈Sn being the
preference set of the SUs.
Many-to-one selfish To fully describe the matching µ, we define the preferences
matching games by two sides of the game. From the SUs’ side, each SU xni
(xni = s ∈ Sn ) can occupies multichannel and seeks to
Channel agent maximize its own, individual satisfaction function. Therefore,
xni only focuses on and applies for the channels which are
Fig. 2. The specific schematic of the joint matching-coalitional game not occupied by itself, i.e., Cn \ {axni }. It is assumed that
theoretical scheme.
each SU competes for only one of the best channel for its
satisfaction in Cn \ {axni } every time until the game reaches
a feasible macro-cell channel allocation C(t), we attempt to stability. Assuming that the current channel allocation vector
find an efficient channel assignment for SUs in each small- is an = (axn1 , axn2 , . . . , axnπn ), the satisfaction of SU xni
cell at iteration t. Specifically, for small-cell n the allocated can be rewritten by uni (axni | C−n ) = uxni (Rxni ), where
channel set is Cn (t). When SU xni (xni ∈ Sn ) transmits in C−n = (C1 , . . . , Cn−1 , Cn+1 , . . . , CN ).
channel l ∈ Cn (t), i.e., l ∈ axni , then the SINR of SU xni in Thus, the utility of SU xni in small-cell n for a given
channel l can be expressed as channel l ∈ Cn \ {axni } ∪ {ø} is given by
l
pn gn,x ϵxni (l, axni | C−n ) = uni (axni + l | C−n )
(11)
γxni ,l = l
∑ ni . (9) −uni (axni | C−n ),
p0 g0,x ni
+ pn′ gnl ′ ,xni + σ 2
n′ :l∈Cn′ (t),n′ ̸=n where uni (axni + l | C−n ) is the satisfaction of xni when
Thus, based on (6) the ∑ aggregate throughput of SU xni adds channel l to transmit. In particular, when l = ø, there
at iteration t is Rxni (t) = l∈ax B0 log2 (1 + γxni ,l ). For have ϵxni (ø, axni | C−n ) = 0.
ni
each small-cell n, it tries to maximize the sum of satisfaction For SU xni , a preference relationship ≻xni is defined that,
of all SUs in small-cell n, i.e., for any two channels l, l′ ∈ Cn \ {axni } ∪ {ø}, l ̸= l′ , there has
l ≻xni l′ if and only if ϵxni (l, axni | C−n ) > ϵxni (l′ , axni |
∑
πn
Un (an | C(t)) = uxni (Rxni (t)). (10) C−n ).
i=1 From the channels’ side, each channel seeks to maximize
Because the macro-cell channel allocation C(t) is fixed at its own, individual contribution to the SU satisfaction. Specifi-
iteration t and small-cell channel allocation an (t) of n does cally, from the channel l’s point of view, there are two kinds of
not affect other SBSs n′ ∈ N \n, all SBSs can optimize their SUs in small-cell n, i.e., i) the SU who have occupied channel
channel allocation simultaneously. l in the current and ii) the other else SUs in small-cell n.
|C (t)| Then, the utility of the channel l in small-cell n for a given
There are πn n small-cell channel allocation strategies
for small-cell n. When πn or |Cn (t)| is large, the action space SU xni is given by
of an is huge, and direct search methods can not handle this ε{l (xni | C−n )
subproblem effectively. In the following, we resort a many-to- uni (axni + l | C−n ) − uni (axni | C−n ), l ̸∈ axni
=
one matching game to solve subproblem Q2. uni (axni | C−n ) − uni (axni − l | C−n ), l ∈ axni ,
The small-cell channel allocation approach using matching (12)
game involves multiple decision-making agents, i.e., the avail- where where uni (axni − l | C−n ) is the satisfaction of xni
able channel resources (Cn (t)) and the SUs in small-cell n when abandons channel l from axni .
(Sn ). The solutions (i.e., matching between channel resources Thus, for channel l, a preference relationship ≻l is defined
and SUs) are produced by individual actions of the agents. that, for any two SUs xni , xni′ ∈ Sn , i ̸= i′ , there has xni ≻l
In the following proposed many-to-one matching game, the xni′ if and only if εl (xni | C−n ) > εl (xni′ | C−n ).
available channel resources (Cn (t)) will be assigned to a set It is shown that the preference relationships of SUs and
of SUs (Sn ), where each channel will be assigned to at most channels are strongly affected by the current formation of other
one SU. In the following section, we replace Cn (t) with Cn SU-channel matching due to externalities of the utility func-
for convenience, as well as other notations in small-cell n. tions. Due to externalities, SUs and channels may continuously
The actions (matching requests, confirmation or rejection) change their preference orders. Thus, the traditional deferred
are determined by the given preference profiles. The match- acceptance (DA) algorithm based on preference orders without
ing outcome yields mutually beneficial assignments between externalities are unsuitable as the ranking of the preference

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Algorithm 1: Intra-cell channel allocation algorithm using SBSs are modeled as the players. To investigate this subprob-
stable matching lem, we denote the coalitions as F = (F1 , F2 , . . . , FL ), where
Fl ⊂ N . In other words, all the SBSs who occupy channel
Initialization: At current time t, calculate C based on channel l constitute the coalition Fl and each SBS n can participate
selection profile a. in multiple coalitions simultaneously. Consequently, all SBSs,
Matching algorithm: who interfere with each other in channel l, are in the same
Step 1: Each SU xni calculates the utility ϵxni (l, axni | C−n ), coalition Fl , thus the co-tier interference can be efficiently
l ∈ Cn \ {axni } ∪ {ø} and updates its preference ≻xni . Each mitigated inside the coalition Fl .
SU xni sends a proposal to its most favored channel. Given a channel allocation vector a = (a1 , a2 , . . . , aN )
Step 2: Each channel l (l ∈ Cn ) calculates the utility εl (xni | and the corresponding macro-cell channel allocation strategy
C−n ) for all the SUs who have sent proposals to channel l and C = (C1 , C2 , . . . , CN ), then the coalitions are determined, i.e.,
the SU who has occupied channel l and updates its preference F (a) = (F1 (a), F2 (a), . . . , FL (a)) in which Fl (a) = {n :
≻l . l ∈ Cn }.
Step 3: Randomly select a channel l from Cn , and withdraw Formally, we define a coalitional game among the SBSs as
channel l from the SU (xni′ ) who has occupied l before, {N , F , U}, where each SBS n can i) join in a coalition Fk
i.e., axni′ = axni′ − l. Then, redistribute l to the first (n ̸∈ Fk ), ii) depart from a coalition Fl (n ∈ Fl ) or iii) replace
preferential SU (xni∗ ) among the proposal SUs and xni′ , i.e., another SBS n′ in a coalition Fh (n′ ∈ Fh , n ̸∈ Fh ).
axni∗ = axni∗ + l. Update the channel allocation vector an . When SBS n tries to join in a coalition Fk (n ̸∈ Fk ), each
Output: Return to Step 1 and repeat until ̸ ∃[l, s], s.t. l ≻s ø SU in small-cell n calculates the increment of QoE utility
and s ≻l µ(l). Then stable matching µ. (ϵxni (l, an | C−n )) after adds channel l to transmit based
on (11). If SBS n has joined in the coalition Fk , then SBS n
allocates channel k to the SU with the greatest QoE increment,
i.e., xni∗ = argxni max ϵxni (k, an | C−n ) and axni∗ ,k =
varies as the matching forms. We propose a small-cell channel axni∗ ∪ {k}. Then, the individual utility of SBS n to join
allocation algorithm that performs a matching between the in coalition Fk (n ̸∈ Fk (a)) is defined as follows
channels and SUs while taking into account the individual  ∑
satisfactions. 
 {Uj (a′ ) − Uj (a)},

 j∈Fk (a)∪{n}
Definition 2: A matching µ is competitive stable, if and only ∑
Un (+k, a) = pn gn,ψk + pj gj,ψk < I k
if no pair of {[l, s] | l ∈ Cn , s ∈ Sn } blocks the matching. That 



j∈Fk (a)
is, ̸ ∃[l, s], s.t. l ≻s ø and s ≻l µ(l). 0, otherwise,
(13)
Theorem 1. The proposed intra-cell channel allocation algo-
where a′ = a \ {axni∗ } ∪ {axni∗ ,k }. The defined utility
rithm is guaranteed to converge to a local stable matching.
function reflects the marginal contribution of ∑ SBS n joining
Proof: Due to the limited numbers of SUs and occupied coalition Fk . It is clear that when pn gn,ψk + pj gj,ψk <
channels, the sum of satisfaction of all SUs in small-cell n is j∈Fk (a)

limited. Moreover, the sum of satisfaction (10) is nondecreas- I k , the individual

∑ utility can be rewritten as ϵxni∗ (k, axni∗ |
ing with Step 3, i.e., εl (xni∗ | C−n ) − εl (xni′ | C−n ) ≥ 0. C−n ) + {Uj (a′ ) − Uj (a)}. Because each SBS can
j∈Fl (a)
Thus, after finite repeats, the proposed algorithm will finally transmit in multichannel and there must be ϵxni∗ (k, axni∗ |
converge to a global or local maximum point of Un with stable C−n ) ≥ 0, ∀n ∈ N , k ∈ L \ {Cn }, thus each SBS would
matching and no further improvement can be achieved in Step like to join coalitions as many as possible to increase its
3, i.e., xni∗ = xni′ . own utility. However, due ∑to the interference caused by each
SBS’s action, there has {Uj (a′ ) − Uj (a)} ≤ 0. Thus,
j∈Fl (a)
B. Coalitional game with overlapping coalitions for inter-cell each SBS should takes the utility loss of other members of
channel allocation the coalition into account when deicides whether to join the
The coalitional game, in which the players form coalitions coalition.
to improve the system performance, has recently been studied When SBS n departs from a coalition Fl (n ∈ Fl ), SU
in the area of wireless communications networks. Unlike xni′ , who had occupied channel l, has to give up to transmit
capacity limited and selfish SUs, SBSs have strong incentives in channel l, i.e., axni′ ,−l = axni′ \ {l}. Then, the individual
to cooperation with strong abilities of communication and utility of SBS n to depart from coalition Fl (n ∈ Fl (a)) is
computing. Since each small-cell could share the L dedicated defined as follows
channels simultaneously, we formulate the macro-cell channel ∑
Un (−l, a) = {Uj (a′′ ) − Uj (a)}, (14)
allocation problem as a coalitional game with overlapping
j∈Fl (a)
coalitions.
′′
In particular, depending on the SINR feedbacks, the SBSs where a = a \ {axni′ } ∪ {axni′ ,−l }. The defined utility
can decide to form coalitions so as to mitigate the co-tiered function reflects the marginal contribution of SBS n joining
interference and manage the cross-tiered interference to MUs coalition Fl . For every SBS n, we formally define the follow-
in cooperative manners. In the proposed coalitional game, the ing join and departure rule:

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Definition 3: Join and Departure Rule Consider a channel
allocation vector a and the corresponding macro-cell channel
allocation strategy C = (C1 , C2 , . . . , CN ). 1) A SBS n has an
incentive to join coalition Fk (n ̸∈ Fk (a)) if Un (+k, a) > 0.
2) A SBS n has an incentive to depart from coalition Fl (n ∈
Fl (a)) if Un (−l, a) ≥ 0.
As we know that the received interference of a certain MU
in channel h is limited, thus the size of each coalition is
limited. When SBS n wants to ∑join coalition Fhh (n ̸∈ Fh (a))
and there has pn gn,ψh + pj gj,ψh > I , SBS n can
j∈Fh (a)
try to replace with a SBS n′ (n ∈ Fh (a)) to achieve a higher
system utility. Then, we define the following replacement rule:
Definition 4: Replacement Rule Consider a channel allo-
cation vector a , for coalition Fh , a SBS n (n∑̸∈ Fh (a)) can
replace SBS n′ (n′ ∈ Fh (a)) if i) pn gn,ψh + pj gj,ψh >
∑ j∈Fh (a)
I h , ii) pn gn,ψh + pj gj,ψh < I h , iii) Un (+h, ã) >
j∈Fh (a)\{n′ }
Un′ (+h, ã), where ã is the allocation vector after SBS n′
departs from coalition Fh , i.e., ã = a \ {axn′ i′ } ∪ {axn′ i′ ,−l }.
Remark 1: If a SBS n unilaterally takes an action (join in or
depart from a coalition, or replace another SBS in a coalition)
based on the join and departure rule and the replacement rule,
the global QoE utility of SUs increases. It is clear that the
∑ QoE utility of SUs can be also expressed as U (a) =
global
Un . i) When each SBS n joins in a coalition Fk (n ̸∈ Fk ),
n∈N
the change of the global QoE utility of SUs is U (a′ )−U (a) =
Un (+k, a) > 0. ii) Similarly, when SBS n departs from a
coalition Fl (n ∈ Fl ), the change of the network satisfaction
utility is U (a′′ ) − U (a) = Un (−l, a) ≥ 0. iii) When SBS n
replaces another SBS n′ in a coalition Fh (n′ ∈ Fh , n ̸∈ Fh ),
the change of the global QoE utility of SUs is U (ã\{axni∗ }∪
{axni∗ ,h }) − U (a) = Un (+h, ã) − Un′ (+h, ã) > 0.
To find the stable channel allocation profile, we propose a
joint channel allocation algorithm for the matching-coalitional
game. At each iteration t, we select a subproblem (Q1/Q2)
to optimize according predetermined probabilities. From the
two games G1 and G2, it can be noted that U can strictly
increasing along such better reply actions of players. We repeat
the two kinds of processes in all iterations until no further
improvement is made.
Theorem 2. The proposed proposed Algorithm 2 for the joint
matching-coalitional game is guaranteed to converge to a
stable channel allocation profile of both the proposed many-
to-one matching game and coalitional game jointly.
Proof: For intra-cell channel allocation in each small-
cell n using matching algorithm in each Step 3, it is seen
that the small-cell satisfaction Un is nondecreasing, and the
network satisfaction utility is increasing until achieves a global
stable matching. Moreover, it is seen that the updating SBS
n’s action in each Step 4 makes the global QoE utility U
increasing from the definitions of join and departure rule and
replacement Rule. Since the global QoE utility is up bounded,
the learning algorithm will finally converge to a global or
local maximum point of U in finite steps, i.e., a stable channel
allocation profile, and no further improvement can be achieved
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Algorithm 2: Joint channel allocation algorithm for the
matching-coalitional game
Step 1: The initial channel allocation profile is a[0], where
as [0] = ø, Cn = ø ∀s ∈ Sn , n ∈ N .
Step 2: At iteration t, the optimizing action is chosen accord-
ing the probabilities PQ1 = ζ and PQ2 = 1 − ζ, 0 < ζ < 1.
Specifically, randomly select a number x from [0,1], if x < ζ,
then go to Step 3, otherwise, go to Step 4.
Step 3: In each small-cell n, redistribute the occupied intra-
cell channels Cn using the matching algorithm in Algorithm
1. Each SBS n reports the SUs’ channel selection profile an ,
then update the channel allocation profile a[t+1] synthetically.
Return to Step 2 and repeat.
Step 4: Randomly select a small-cell n and a channel l. i)
∑
If n ̸∈ Fl [t] and pn gn,ψl + pj gj,ψl < I l , SBS n tries
j∈Fl [t]
to join in coalition Fl based on the join and departure rule.
ii) If n ∈ Fl [t], SBS n tries to depart from coalition Fl
based on the∑join and departure rule. iii) If n ̸∈ Fl [t] and
pn gn,ψl + pj gj,ψl > I l , find another SU n′ (n′ ∈ Fl [t]),
j∈Fl [t]
SBS n tries to replace n′ in Fl based on the replacement rule.
Update the channel allocation vector a[t + 1]. Return to Step
2 and repeat.
in Step 3 and Step 4 in proposed Algorithm 2. Theorem 2 is
proved.
IV. S IMULATION R ESULT
A. Simulation scenario
In the following simulation study, the radius of the macro-
cell is 30m, the radius of small-cells is 10m. SBSs and MUs
are randomly located in the circular coverage of the MBS.
There are 8 channels and the bandwidth of each available
channel is 180 kHz. The maximal transmission powers of
MBS and SBSs are P0max = 43dBm and Pnmax = 23dBm
respectively. Then the transmission powers of MBS and SBSs
in each channel are set as p0 = P0max /L and pn = Pnmax /L.
The noise power density is −174dBm/Hz. To model the
propagation environment, we only consider path loss for
analysis simplicity for small-cell network as many of previous
studies [11]. For path-loss P L = 38.46 + 20log(dns ), where
dns is the distance between SBS n and SU s. For simplicity, it
is assumed that each MU has only occupied one of all available
channels, and the cross-tiered interference threshold of each
MU is randomly selected from zero to half of the received
MBS signal power. There are 1∼4 SUs associating with each
SBS. The required transmission rates of SUs are randomly
distributed in [0, 2]Mbps, and the demand degree τ of each
SU is randomly select from [0, 20]. A simulation snapshot
with a MBS and 15 SBS is shown in Fig. 3.
B. Convergence analysis
We analyze the expected convergence behaviors of Algo-
rithm 2. Here, we set 1) ζ = 0, 0.2, 0.4, 0.6 as constants and
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1

0.9

The cumlative distribution function (CDF)

 0.8 ζ=0
ζ=0.2
0.7
 ζ=0.4
0.6 ζ=0.6
 ζ(t)
0.5

 0.4
MBS 0.3

MU 0.2
 SBS
0.1
SU
 0
         0 200 400 600 800 1000
Iterations
Fig. 3. A simulation snapshot with a MBS and 15 SBS.
Fig. 5. The convergence speed comparison.

16
30
14
Alogrithm 2
25 Smallest interference channel selection
The global QoE utility of SUs

12
Random selection
ζ=0
10 ζ=0.2
The global QoE utility
20
ζ=0.4
8 ζ=0.6
ζ(t) 15
6

4 10

2
5

0
0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800
Iterations 0
5 10 15 20
Number of SBSs

Fig. 4. The expected convergence behaviors of Algorithm 2 with ζ =

0, 0.2, 0.4, 0.6 and ζ(t). Fig. 6. The global QoE utilities when varying the number of SBSs.

2) ζ(t) = 1 − Tmaxt
where Tmax is a constant no less than the
maximum iterations (Here we set Tmax = 2000). As we know,
different values of ζ mean different selection probabilities of
intra-cell channel allocation and inter-cell channel allocation
in each iteration. The expected convergence behaviors of
Algorithm 2 are shown in Fig. 4.
It is noted from the figure that when the value of ζ decreases
and ζ > 0, the convergence speed of Algorithm 2 significantly
increases. The converged global QoE utility of Algorithm
2 with ζ = 0 is smaller than all others. In other words,
the performance of optimizing the global QoE utility with
Algorithm 2 containing intra-cell channel allocation (ζ > 0) is
better than Algorithm 2 without intra-cell channel allocation
(ζ = 0).
The companion results of the cumulative allocation function
(CDF) of the iterations needed for converging are shown
in Fig. 5. Then, it can be concluded that the convergence
performance of ζ(t) is the best. The reasons are that i) at the
beginning of the iteration, intra-cell channel resource is scarce
and ii) the globe utility improvement of inter-cell channel
allocation is much bigger than the improvement of intra-cell
channel allocation at most time before the convergence.
C. Global QoE utility analysis
In this subsection, we present the performance evaluation
results of achieved global QoE utility denoted as (7). For
comparison, the achieved global QoE utilities are calculated by
three different approaches: i) optimize the global QoE utility
with the proposed Algorithm 2 (ζ = 0.1), ii) a randomly
selected SBS allocates one of its associated SU the best
channel (the channel with the smallest received interference of
the SU) in each iteration, iii) each SU is randomly allocated
an available channel set at once with the constraints.
Firstly, we vary the number of SBSs in the heterogeneous
wireless network, i.e., we set N = 5, 10, 15, 20 respectively
and L = 8, max(πn ) = 4. The global QoE utilities when
varying the number of SBSs are shown in Fig. 6.
It is shown from Fig.6 that the utility performance of opti-
mizing the global QoE utility with the proposed Algorithm 2 is
the better than the smallest interference channel selection, and
the utility performance of random selection is the worst. The
reason is that, the random selection only allocates channels
at once without any optimization process. In the smallest
interference channel selection only one SBS can take action
in each iteration, while in Algorithm 2 SBSs can collaborate

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16
14
12
The global QoE utility
10
8
6 8
Algorithm 2
4 Algorithm 2
Smallest interference channel selection
Random selection
2 Random selection
0
6 7 8 9 10
Number of channels
Fig. 7. The global QoE utilities when varying the number of channels.
with each other more fully. It is also noted from the figure
that as the number of SBSs increases (the number of SUs also
increase), the achieved utility of the proposed Algorithm 2
increases.
Secondly, we vary the number of channels (for simplicity,
the number of MUs varies with the number of channels) in the
heterogeneous wireless network, i.e., we set L = 6, 7, 8, 9, 10
respectively and N = 10, max(πn ) = 4. The global QoE
utilities when varying the number of channels are shown in
Fig. 7.
It is noted from Fig. 7 that as the number of channels
increases, the achieved utility also increases. It is also is
shown from the figure that the utility gap between Algorithm 2
and the smallest interference channel selection is smaller and
smaller as the number of channels increases. The reason is that,
as the channel resource increases, each SU has more available
channels to be allocated, and the advantage of Algorithm 2
is smaller. It is clear that if the channel resource is enough,
all SUs can be served with enough channel resource with
Algorithm 2 and the smallest interference channel selection.
Thirdly, we vary the maximal SU number of each small-cell
in the heterogeneous wireless network, i.e., we set max(πn ) =
3, 4, 5, 6 respectively and N = 10, L = 8. In other words,
there are 1∼max(πn ) SUs associating with each SBS. The
global QoE utilities when varying the number of channels are
shown in Fig. 8.
It is noted from Fig. 8 that as the maximal SU number
increases, the achieved utility increases. The reason may be
that the number of SUs who have low channel resource
requirements also increase with the increase of the maximal
SU number. Thus, SBSs with the limited channel resource
can provide service to more SUs. Moreover, it can be found
from the figure that the utility gap between Algorithm 2 and
the smallest interference channel selection is more and more
bigger as the maximal SU number increases.
V. C ONCLUSION
In this paper, we investigated the problem of QoE-based
multichannel allocation in 5G HCNs with cross-tiered inter-
ference constraint. We proposed a joint matching-coalitional
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20
18
16
14
The global QoE utility
12
10
6
4 Smallest interference channel selection
2
0
3 4 5 6
The maximal SU number of each small cel
Fig. 8. The global QoE utilities when varying the maximal SU number.
game theoretical scheme to solve such a complicated multi-
channel allocation problem. Based on the different interference
and competition relationships among users, we divided the
complicated problem into two subproblems, i.e., Q1: intra-
cell channel allocation for SUs and Q2: inter-cell channel
allocation for SBSs. We formulated the intra-cell channel
allocation as a many-to-one selfish matching game in which
SUs selfishly compete for the channels which have been allo-
cated to SBSs, and formulated the inter-cell channel allocation
subproblem as an altruistical coalitional game in which SBSs
utilize the available channels cooperatively and altruistically
under the cross-tiered interference constraint separately. Then
the complicated problem could be solved based on the two
proposed games iteratively. We proposed a joint channel allo-
cation algorithm for the matching-coalitional game theoretical
scheme. We proved that the proposed algorithm converges to
a stable channel allocation profile of both the proposed many-
to-one matching game and coalitional game. In the future, we
will consider sociality-aware resource allocation problems in
5G HCNs.
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