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Civil Procedure

Handwritten Case Digests

1. DAR vs Trinidad Valley Realty and Development Corporation, 715 SCRA 650

FACTS: Trinidad Valley Realty and Development Corporation, et al.) are the registered owners
of a parcel of land in Vallehermoso, Negros Oriental. The landholding are devoted to the
cultivation of sugar cane. The Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) placed 479.8905 hectares
of the said landholding under the coverage of RA 6657. Trinidad Valley Realty and
Development Corporation, et al. filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Negros Oriental,
a Petition for Declaration of Unconstitutionality. Despite allegations by the DAR, RTC ruled that
it had jurisdiction over the instant case.

ISSUE:​ WON the RTC has jurisdiction over the instant case.

RULING: No. The case at bar deals with acts of the DAR and the application, implementation,
enforcement, or interpretation of RA 6657 - issues which do not involve the "special jurisdiction"
of the RTC acting as a Special Agrarian Court. Hence, when the court a quo heard and decided
the instant case, it did so without jurisdiction. Jurisdiction is determined exclusively by the
Constitution and the law and cannot be conferred by the voluntary act or agreement of the
parties. It cannot also be acquired through or waived, enlarged or diminished by their act or
omission, nor conferred by the acquiescence of the court. The nature of an action, as well as
which court or body has jurisdiction over it, is determined based on the allegations contained in
the complaint of the plaintiff, irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon
all or some of the claims asserted therein.

2. Surviving Heirs of Alfredo Bautista vs Lindo, 718 SCRA 321

FACTS: Alfredo Bautistasa owns a free-patent land located in Davao Oriental. A few years later,
he subdivided the property and sold it to several vendees. Three years later, Bautista filed a
complaint for repurchase against respondents before the RTC in Davao Oriental, anchoring his
cause of action on Section 119 of Ca 141, Public Land Act. Other respondents filed a motion to
dismiss alleging that the complaint failed to state the value of the property. They asserted the
RTC has no jurisdiction over the complaint in question since the property which Bautista seeks
to repurchase is below the PhP 20,000 jurisdictional ceiling. Petitioners argue that an action for
repurchase is not a real action, but one incapable of pecuniary estimation, it being founded on
privity of contract between the parties.

ISSUE: WON the action filed by petitioners is one involving title to or possession of real property
or any interest therein or one incapable of pecuniary estimation.
RULING: No. The cause of action to redeem the land is one for specific performance, which is
an action incapable for pecuniary estimation. The course of action embodied in the complaint by
the present petitioners’ predecessor, Alfredo R. Bautista, is to enforce his right to repurchase
the lots he formerly owned pursuant to the right of a free-patent holder under Sec. 119 of CA
141 or the Public Land Act. The Court rules that the complaint to redeem a land subject of a free
patent is a civil action incapable of pecuniary estimation.

3. Tung Ho Steel Enterprises vs Ting Guan Trading Corporation, 720 SCRA 707

FACTS​: Ting Guan obligated itself under a contract of sale to deliver heavy metal scrap iron
and steel to Tung Ho. Subsequently,Tung Ho filed an action against Ting Guan for the
recognition and enforcement of the arbitral award before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Makati. Ting Guan moved to dismiss the case. The RTC denied Ting Guan’s motion to dismiss.
Ting Guan raised the RTC’s alleged lack of jurisdiction over its person as additional ground for
the dismissal of the complaint. Ting Guan insisted that Ms. Fe Tejero, on whom personal service
was served, was not its corporate secretary and was not a person allowed under Section 11,
Rule 14 of the Rules of Court to receive a summons. The RTC denied the motion and ruled that
Ting Guan had voluntarily submitted to the court’s jurisdiction when it raised other arguments
apart from lack of jurisdiction in its motion to dismiss.

ISSUE​: WON the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the person of Ting Guan.

RULING​: Yes, the trial court has acquired jurisdiction over the person of Ting Guan. Tejero was
not a corporate secretary and, therefore, was not the proper person to receive the summons
under Section 11, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court. However, Ting Guan voluntarily appeared
before the trial court in view of the procedural recourse that it took before that court. Its
voluntary appearance is equivalent to service of summons.Furthermore, Ting Guan’s failure to
raise the alleged lack of jurisdiction over its person in the first motion to dismiss is fatal to its
cause. Ting Guan voluntarily appeared before the RTC when it filed a motion to dismiss and a
"supplemental motion to dismiss" without raising the RTC’s lack of jurisdiction over its person.
Failure to raise the issue of improper service of summons in the first motion to dismiss is a
waiver of this defense and cannot be belatedly raised in succeeding motions and pleadings.

4. Tagalog vs Lim Vda. De Gonzales, 730 SCRA 201

FACTS: Respondents filed with the RTC of Toledo City, Cebu a Complaint for Recovery of
Possession against petitioner. In the complaint, respondents stated that they were the coowners
of the land. They alleged that Tagalog occupied a portion of the land as lessee and paid a rent
on a month to month basis by virtue of a verbal contract. Respondents alleged that Tagalog
discontinued paying the rent and stopped inhabiting the house.

ISSUE:​ WON the Regional Trial Court had jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action.
RULING: No. The jurisdiction of a particular court is determined by the nature of the action
pleaded as appearing from the allegations in the complaint. Based on the allegations in
respondent’s complaint, it is clear that the case involves only the issue of physical possession or
unlawful detainer as defined in Section, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court. Since the complaint was
filed within one year from the expiration of the right to hold possession, this case is clearly an
unlawful detainer suit within the jurisdiction of the MTC.

5. UST Faculty Union vs UST, 731 SCRA 456

FACTS: Members of the faculties of the university attended the convocation, including members
of the USTFU, without the participation of the members of the UST administration. Upon
learning that the convocation was intended to be an election, members of the USTFU walked
out. Thus, there were two (2) groups claiming to be the USTFU: the Gamilla Group and the
group led by Atty. Mariño, Jr. (Mariño Group). A Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) was
entered into by the Gamilla Group and the UST. The CBA superseded an existing CBA entered
into by the UST and USTFU.

ISSUE: WON the Honorable Court of Appeals committed serious and reversible error when it
manifestly overlooked relevant facts not disputed by the parties which, if properly considered,
would justify a different conclusion and in rendering a judgment that is based on a
misapprehension of facts.

RULING: NO. Petitioner makes several allegations that UST committed ULP . The onus
probandi falls on the shoulders of petitioner to establish or substantiate such claims by the
requisite quantum of evidence. In labor cases as in other administrative proceedings,
substantial evidence or such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as sufficient
to support a conclusion is required. In the petition at bar, petitioner miserably failed to adduce
substantial evidence as basis for the grant of relief.

7. Arigo vs Swift, 735 SCRA 102

FACTS: The USS Guardian is an Avenger-class mine countermeasures ship of the US Navy.
While transiting the Sulu Sea, the ship ran aground on the northwest side of South Shoal of the
Tubbataha Reefs. No one was injured in the incident, and there have been no reports of leaking
fuel or oil. Petitioners claim that the grounding, salvaging and post-salvaging operations of the
USS Guardian cause and continue to cause environmental damage of such magnitude which
events violate their constitutional rights to a balanced and healthful ecology.

ISSUE:​ WON petitioners have legal standing.

RULING: YES, Petitioners have legal standing. Locus standi is “a right of appearance in a court
of justice on a given question.” Specifically, it is “a party’s personal and substantial interest in a
case where he has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result” of the act being challenged,
and “calls for more than just a generalized grievance.” The right to a balanced and healthful
ecology need not be written in the Constitution for it is assumed, like other civil and polittcal
rights guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, to exist from the inception of mankind and it is an issue of
transcendental importance with intergenerational implications. Such right carries with it the
correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment.

8. Monsanto vs Lim, 735 SCRA 252

FACTS​:Home Development Mutual Fund (Pag-IBIG), requested the intervention of Executive


Judge Monsanto, RTC Catbalogan, Samar, on the alleged anomalous auction sale conducted
by Sheriff De Guzman. The case was re-assigned the same to Judge Usman of Branch 28.
After hearing, wherein Pascual Monsanto (Monsanto, Petitioner) appeared in behalf and as
assignee of Eduardo, Judge Usman noted,that no formal petition or complaint was actually filed
which presents a judicial issue.

ISSUE​: WON the court acquired jurisdiction over the subject matter.

RULING​: No, the court did not acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter. There was no proper
initiatory pleading that was filed before the trial court.Filing the appropriate initiatory pleading
and the payment of the prescribed docket fees vest a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject
matter. Section 5, Rule 1 of the Rules of Court specifically provides that a civil action is
commenced by the filing of the original complaint in court.Hence, the CA Resolution was
annulled and set aside. Likewise, the RTC Branch 28 Order was declared null and void.

9. Antonio Garcia vs Ferro Chemical Inc., 737 SCRA 252

FACTS: Antonio Garcia, as seller, and Ferro Chemicals, Inc., through Ramon Garcia, as buyer,
entered into a deed of absolute· sale and purchase of shares of stock. The deed was for the
sale and purchases of shares of stock from various corporations. The information based on the
complaint of Ferro Chemicals, Inc. was filed against Antonio Garcia before the Regional Trial
Court. He was charged with estafa under Article 318 (Other Deceits) of the Revised Penal Code
for allegedly misrepresenting to Ferro Chemicals, Inc. that the shares subject of the contracts
entered into were free from all liens and encumbrances.

ISSUE:​ WON the Regional Trial Court had jurisdiction over the case.

RULING: No. The Regional Trial Court did not have jurisdiction to hear and decide the case.
Jurisdiction of a court over the subject matter is vested by law. In criminal cases, the imposable
penalty of the crime charged in the information determines the court that has jurisdiction over
the case. The information charged Antonio Garcia with violation of Article 318 of the Revised
Penal Code, which is punishable by arresto mayor, or imprisonment for a period of one (1)
month and one (1) day to six (6) months. When the information was filed on September 3, 1990,
the law in force was Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 before it was amended by Republic Act No.
7691. Under Section 32 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, the Metropolitan Trial Court had
jurisdiction over the case. The trial court’s lack of jurisdiction cannot be cured by the parties’
silence on the matter. The failure of the parties to raise the matter of jurisdiction also cannot be
construed as a waiver of the parties.

10. Aurora de Pedro vs Romasan Development Corporation, 743 SCRA 52

FACTS: Respondent alleged in its complaints that it was the owner and possessor of a parcel of
land in Antipolo City. Upon checking CENRO-DENR, it was discovered that the DENR issued
free patents covering portions of respondent’s property to several persons including the
petitioner de Pedro. The RTC issued an order declaring as nullity the titles and free patents
issued to all defendants in respondent’s complaint, including the free patent issued to De Pedro.
Petitioner argued that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over her person because of improper
and defective service of summons. De Pedro pointed out that summons was not personally
served upon her.

ISSUE: WON the trial court decision was void for failure of the trial court to acquire jurisdiction
over the person of petitioner Aurora N. De Pedro.

RULING: Yes. The sheriff’s return must show the details of the efforts exerted to personally
serve summons upon defendants or respondents, before substituted service or service by
publication is availed. The Officer’s Return in this case showed no detail of the sheriff’s efforts to
serve the summons personally upon petitioner. Thus, the sheriff’s return in this case was
defective. No substituted service or service by publication will be allowed based on such
defective return. The judgment, therefore, suffers a jurisdictional defect.

11. Angeles vs CA, 735 SCRA 82

FACTS: A complaint for annulment of real estate mortgage, foreclosure sale, reconveyance and
damages was filed by spouses Juan and Anatalia Coronel (the Coronels) against herein
petitioner Elisa Angeles and several other in the RTC. Petitioner was evicted from the subject
property as a result of the enforcement of the Writ of Execution Pending Appeal. Petitioner filed
a Petition for Contempt with the CA alleging that the OIC Martin defied the trial court’s order to
elevate the records of case to the CA and acted in collusion with the Coronels to ensure that the
latter obtain execution pending appeal. The CA ruled that the petition should have been filed
with the court a quo.

ISSUE:​ WON the CA committed grave abuse of discretion for dismissing the case.

RULING: No, the CA is correct in dismissing such case. If the respondent public officers should
be punished for their perceived defiance or failure to abide by the trial court’s directives and
processes, then the contempt charge should have been initiated in the court a quo, and not in
the CA. Sections 4 and 5, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court state, respectively, that “proceedings for
indirect contempt may be initiated motu proprio by the court against which the contempt was
committed” and “where the charge for indirect contempt has been committed against a Regional
Trial Court or a court of equivalent or higher rank, or against an officer appointed by it, the
charge may be filed with such court.”

12.PINAUSUKAN SEAFOOD HOUSE, INC. VS. FAR EAST BANK

FACTS:
Pinausukan issued four real estate mortgages in favor of Far East Bank & Trust Company.
Indebted of 15M, respondent commenced proceedings for the extrajudicial foreclosure of the
mortgages. Pinausukan applied for the issuance of a TRO to stop the extrajudicial foreclosure
and public auction but was later on dismissed. Pinausukan learned that Atty. Villaflor, its
counsel, had not informed it about the order of dismissal of the case. He filed a petition for
annulment in the CA seeking nullification of the dismissal due to his counsel's gross and
palpable negligence. Pinausukan was also never notified that its attorney had changed his
office and address. Pinausukan asserts that Atty. Villaflor constituted professional misconduct
amounting to EXTRINSIC FRAUD to warrant the case’s dismissal.The CA dismissed the
petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petition for annulment of judgment grounded on extrinsic fraud should be
granted by the CA.

RULING:

The appeal lacks merit.

Given the extraordinary nature of the remedy of annulment of judgment, Pinausukan must be
mindful of the following statutory requirements as set forth in Rule 47:

Xxx

4) The petition should be verified, and should allege with particularity the facts and the law relief
upon for annulment, as well as those supporting the petitioner’s good and substantial cause of
action or defense, as the case may be.

The procedural defect in Pinausukan’s petition was its disregard of the fourth requirement
consisting in its failure to submit together with the petition the affidavits of witnesses or
documents supporting the cause of action.The substantive defect related to the neglect of Atty.
Villaflor did not constitute extrinsic fraud because – based solely on the allegations, they do not
constitute extrinsic fraud as contemplated under Rule 47. The petitions own language states
that what is involved is mistake and gross negligence of the petitioner’s own counsel. In
applying Rule 47, mistake and gross negligence cannot be equated to intrinsic fraud. By its
nature, extrinsic fraud related to a cause that is collateral in character, it relates to an act of the
prevailing party which is committed outside of the case. Even in the presence of fraud,
annulment will not lie unless the fraud is committed by the adverse party, not by one’s own
lawyer. Wherefore, the court AFFIRMS the resolutions of the CA; ORDERS the petitioner to pay
cost of suit.

13. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE,V. SILICON PHILIPPINES, INC.

FACTS:

Respondent filed an application for Tax Refund in the amount of 21 M pesos for the alleged
unutilized input tax in the second quarter of 1998. Afterwards, since there was no final action
taken by Petitioner on Respondent’s claim for refund, Respondent filed a Petition for Review
before the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) on June 30 2000. The Court of Tax Appeals partially
granted the petition. It ordered the Tax Refund certificate in favor or Respondent but the amount
originally claimed was reduced (now only 8 M pesos) for reason that only such amount was
validly represented by documentary evidence. The Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the
CTA decision.

ISSUE:
W/N the CTA has acquired jurisdiction thereby entitling the Respondent to a Tax Refund

RULING: NO.

As provided by Section 112 (D) of the National Internal Revenue Code of 1997, the CIR has 120
days to act on Petitions for Tax Refunds. Upon the Commissioner’s denial or inaction over such
Petition, an aggrieved party has 30 days, to perfect an appeal to the CTA. otherwise, the judicial
claim shall prescribe as filed out of time. When Respondent filed its claim, and its corresponding
judicial claim, the NIRC was already in effect and the strict observance in applying Section 112
of said Code is proper. Therefore, when Respondent was unable to observe the 30-day period,
a dismissal of his appeal with prejudice for lack of jurisdiction was warranted.

14. Villagracia vs. 5th district Sharia Court

Facts:
Roldan Mala purchased a 300sqm parcel of land from Canete. TCT was issued in Mala's name,
and at the time of purchase, Villagracia occupied said parcel of land evidenced with a katibayan
issued by the LRA.When the land was surveyed, it was found that Villegracia occupied the
parcel of land covered by Mala's certificate of title. To settle his conflicting claim with villagracia,
Mala initiated barangay conciliation proceedings. They failed to settle and Mala filed an action to
recover possession of the parcel of land with respondent 5th Sharia district court. In his petition
Mala alleged he is a Filipino muslim. failed to file an answer.Considering that Villagracia is a
Christian, he argued that respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court had no jurisdiction to take
cognizance of Mala's action for recovery of possession of a parcel of land.

Issue: Whether a Shari’a District Court may validly hear, try, and decide a real action where one
of the parties is a non-Muslim if the District Court decides the action applying the provisions of
the Civil Code of the Philippines

Held: No, Under Article 143 of the Muslim Code, the jurisdiction of Shari’a District Courts over
real actions not arising from customary contracts is concurrent with that of existing civil courts.
However, this concurrent jurisdiction over real actions "is applicable solely when both parties are
Muslims".
Under Rule 9, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, "defenses and objections not pleaded either in a
motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived."

15. Tumpag vs. Tumpag

FACTS:
Esperanza Tumpag (petitioner) filed a complaint for recovery of possession with damages
against Samuel Tumpag (respondent) before the RTC for occupying a 1000 sq.m of the
above-described parcel of land of the Plaintiff for more than TEN (10) years, at the tolerance of
Plaintiff. Sometime in 1987, Plaintiff wanted to recover the portion occupied by Defendant but
Defendant refused to return to Plaintiff or vacate said portion he has occupied inspite of
repeated demands from Plaintiff. And, to prevent Plaintiff from recovering the portion he has
occupied. Together with his answer, the respondent moved to dismiss the complaint on the
following grounds: failure to state a cause of action; that the action was barred by prior
judgment; and lack of jurisdiction. RTC dismissed the case. CA nullified the decision of the RTC.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the complaint should be dismissed because of petitioner’s failure to allege in the
complaint the assessed value of the disputed property (also considering that a copy of
Declaration of Real Property showing the property’s assessed value was attached to the
complaint).

RULING:
No. Generally, the court should only look into the facts alleged in the complaint to determine
whether a suit is within its jurisdiction. There may be instances, however, when a rigid
application of this rule may result in defeating substantial justice or in prejudice to a party’s
substantial right.In Marcopper Mining Corp. v. Garcia, the RTC was allowed to consider, in
addition to the complaint, other pleadings submitted by the parties in deciding whether or not the
complaint should be dismissed for lack of cause of action. In Guaranteed Homes, Inc. v. Heirs
of Valdez, the court held that the factual allegations in a complaint should be considered in
tandem with the statements and inscriptions on the documents attached to it as annexes or
integral parts.

16. Zacarias vs. Anacay

Facts:

Zacarias filed a complaint for Ejectment with Damages or Unlawful Detainer case in MCTC of
Cavite against respondents Anacay and members of her household. The complaint alleged that
Zacarias is the lawful owner of the parcel of land in as evidenced by a Tax Declaration.
However, she discovered that the respondents have entered the subject property and occupied
the same. When demanded to vacate, respondents refused. After due proceedings, the MCTC
dismissed the complaint and ruled in favor of respondents Anacay. The case was appealed to
the RTC but reversed the inferior court's decision. It was appealed to the CA but reversed the
RTC's decision. The CA held that the MCTC clearly had no jurisdiction over the case as the
complaint did not satisfy the jurisdictional requirement of a valid cause for unlawful detainer.

Issue/s:
Whether or not the MCTC has jurisdiction over the unlawful detainer case?

Held:
No, the MCTC has no jurisdiction over the case.

In ejectment cases, the complaint should embody such statement of facts as to bring the party
clearly within the class of cases for which Section 1 of Rule 70 which provides a summary
remedy and must show enough on its face to give the court jurisdiction without resort to parol
evidence.
The complaint filed by the petitioner failed to alleged the cause of action for unlawful detainer as
it does not describe possession by the respondents being initially legal or tolerated by the
petitioner and which became illegal upon termination by the petitioner of such lawful
possession. The court ruled that where the complaint did notsatisfy the jurisdictional
requirement of a valid cause for unlawful detainer, the MCTC had no jurisdiction over the vase.
The jurisdictional facts must appear on the face of the complaint. The complaint filed by the
petitioner does not state how the entry was affected and when the dispossession started, the
remedy should either be accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria.

17. Lanuza vs. BF Corporation

FACTS:

BF Corporation filed a collection complaint with the RTC against Shangri-La and its board
members and directors for default of payment in the former's services rendered in constructing
Shangri-La mall and a parking structure. The board members and directors were alleged to be
in bad faith. Shangri-La and the others filed a motion to suspend the proceedings in view of BF
Corporation's failure to submit its dispute to arbitration, in accordance with the arbitration clause
provided in its contract, which was denied by the RTC. Petitioners filed an answer, alleging that
they had already resigned as members of Shangri-La's board of directors. Respondents filed a
petition for certiorari with the CA, which then granted the petition for certiorari and ordered the
submission of the dispute to arbitration. BF Corporation elevated the case to the SC which then
affirmed the CA’s decision.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners should be made parties to the arbitration proceedings,
pursuant to the arbitration clause provided in the contract between BF Corporation and
Shangri-La

RULING:
The petition must fail.

Since a corporation's existence is only by fiction of law, it can only exercise its rights and powers
through its directors, officers, or agents, who are all natural persons. A consequence of a
corporation's separate personality is that consent by a corporation through its representatives is
not consent of the representative, personally. When there are allegations of bad faith or malice
against corporate directors or representatives, it becomes the duty of courts or tribunals to
determine if these persons and the corporation should be treated as one.

When the directors are impleaded in a case against a corporation, alleging malice or bad faith
on their part in directing the affairs of the corporation, complainants are effectively alleging that
the directors and the corporation are not acting as separate entities. Complainants effectively
pray that the corporate veil be pierced because the cause of action between the corporation and
the directors is the same.Complainants have no choice but to institute only one proceeding
against the parties. Under the Rules of Court, filing of multiple suits for a single cause of action
is prohibited. Institution of more than one suit for the same cause of action constitutes splitting
the cause of action, which is a ground for the dismissal of the others.

18. Zuniga-Santos vs Santos Gran

Facts: Petitioner Eliza Zuñiga​Santos filed a Complaint for annulment of sale and revocation of
title against respondents Maria Divina Gracia Santos​ Gran (Gran) and the Register of Deeds of
Marikina City. She discovered that her properties were transferred in Gran’s name, the alleged
daughter of her second husband whose birth certificate was forged to make it appear so. Gran
filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground the Amended Complaint failed to state a cause of action
as the void and voidable documents sought to be nullified were not properly identified nor the
substance thereof set forth. RTC dismissed. CA Affirmed.
Issue: Whether or not the dismissal of petitioner’s Amended Complaint should be sustained.

Ruling: Yes. ​A pleading should state the ultimate facts essential to the rights of action or
defense asserted, as distinguished from mere conclusions of fact, or conclusions of law​.
The claim that the sale was effected through “voidable and void documents” partakes merely of
a conclusion of law that is not supported by any averment of circumstances that will show why
or how such conclusion was arrived at. In fact, what these “voidable and void documents” are
were not properly stated and/or identified. ​Hence, by merely stating a legal conclusion, the
Amended Complaint presented no sufficient allegation upon which the Court could grant the
relief petitioner prayed for. Thus, said pleading should be dismissed on the ground of failure to
state cause of action, as correctly held by the RTC.

19. Penta Pacific Realty Corporation vs. Ley Construction

Facts: The petitioner owned the 25th floor of the Pacific Star Building in Makati City, where a
portion of it was leased by Ley Construction, through its authorized agent, Century Properties.
In the lease contract, it was agreed upon by the parties that in case of default in monthly rentals,
the petitioner may repossess the property. Later on, the respondent expressed his intention to
purchase the entire property, whereby they executed a contract to sell and a reservation
agreement. Respondent made partial payment but failed to pay the monthly amortizations.
Exchange of letters between the parties was made, where the petitioner expressed to cancel
the contract to sell and the reservation agreement, and demanded that the respondent pay the
rentals. The respondent failed to pay the rentals and did not vacate the premises, leading the
petitioner to file an ejectment complaint against the former. The RTC ruled in favor of the
petitioner, ordering the respondent to pay the rentals and to vacate the area. CA affirmed the
RTC's decision.

Issue: Whether or not the MeTC has jurisdiction over the case.

Held: Yes

The aforequoted allegations of the complaint made out a case of unlawful detainer, vesting the
MeTC with exclusive original jurisdiction over the complaint. As alleged therein, the cause of
action of the petitioner was to recover possession of the subject property from the respondent
upon the latter’s failure to comply with the former’s demand to vacate the subject property after
the latter’s right to remain thereon terminated by virtue of the demand to vacate. Indeed, the
possession of the latter, although lawful at its commencement, became unlawful upon its
non-compliance with the former’s demand to vacate.

The jurisdiction of the MeTC was not ousted by the fact that what was ultimately proved as to
how entry by the respondent had been made or when the dispossession had started might have
departed from that alleged in the complaint. As earlier stated, jurisdiction over the subject matter
was determined from the allegations of the complaint, which clearly set forth a cause of action
for unlawful detainer

20. Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company vs Ley Construction


Facts:

Plaintiff issued a Letter of Credit in favor of Global Enterprises Limited, in the amount of USD
802,500.00. The letter of credit covered the importation by defendant LCDC of 15,000 metric
tons of Iraqi cement from Iraq. The latter negotiated its Letter of Credit with the negotiating
bank Credit Suisse of Zurich. American Express Bank debited plaintiff’s account USD
770,691.30 and credited Credit Suisse Zurich Account with American Express Bank for the
negotiation of Letter. The obligation covered by the subject Letter of Credit in the amount of
USD 802,500.00 has long been overdue and unpaid, notwithstanding repeated demands for
payment thereof. Plaintiff then instituted the instant complaint for recovery of payments,
inclusive of interest and penalty and other costs. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss by way of
demurrer to evidence. RTC granted the demurrer. CA found no merit in the Bank’s appeal.
Hence this petition.

Issue: W/N there is a cause of action?

Ruling:

A cause of action has three essential elements: (1) the existence of a legal right in favor of the
plaintiff; (2) a correlative legal duty of the defendant to respect such right; and(3) an act or
omission by such defendant in violation of the right of the plaintiff with a resulting injury or
damage to the plaintiff for which the latter may maintain an action for the recovery of relief from
the defendant.

Although the first two elements may exist, a cause of action arises only upon the occurrence of
the last element, giving the plaintiff the right to maintain an action in court for recovery of
damages or other appropriate relief. In this case, however, even the legal rights of the Bank and
the correlative legal duty of LCDC have not been sufficiently established by the Bank in view of
the failure of the Bank’s evidence to show the provisions and conditions that govern its legal
relationship with LCDC, particularly the absence of the provisions and conditions supposedly
printed at the back of the Application and Agreement for Commercial Letter of Credit. Even
assuming arguendo that there was no impropriety in the negotiation of the Letter of Credit and
the Bank’s cause of action was simply for the collection of what it paid under said Letter of
Credit, the Bank did not discharge its burden to prove every element of its cause of action
against LCDC.

21. Crisologo v JEWN Industrial Corp.

Facts:
JEWM filed a separate action for cancellation of lien with prayer for the issuance of a preliminary
injunction before RTC-Br. 14 to prevent the public sale of the subject land. “The Register of
Deeds of Davao City, Sheriff Robert Medialdea, John and Jane Does and all persons acting
under their direction" were impleaded as defendants. Spouses Crisologo filed a Very Urgent
Manifestation, questioning the authority of the Court to restrain the execution proceedings. This
was opposed by JEWM on the ground that
the Spouses were not parties in the case. No motion to intervene was, however, filed as the
Spouses believed that it was unnecessary since they were already the John and Jane Does
named in the complaint. RTC-Br. 14 denied Spouses Crisologo’s Omnibus Motion and granted
JEWM’s writ of preliminary injunction. CA affirmed decision of RTC-Br. 14.

ISSUE: ​WON CA correctly ruled that RTC-Br. 14 acted without grave abuse of discretion in
failing to recognize Spouses Crisologo as indispensable parties in the case for cancellation of
lien?

RULING:
No. In an action for the cancellation of memorandum annotated at the back of a certificate of
title, the persons considered as indispensable include those whose liens appear as annotations
pursuant to Section 108 of P.D. No. 1529. Spouses Crisologo’s liens were indeed annotated at
the back of TCT Nos. 325675 and 325676. Thus, as persons with their liens annotated, they
stand to be benefited or injured by any order relative to the cancellation of annotations in the
pertinent TCTs. In other words, they are as indispensable as JEWM itself in the final disposition
of the case for cancellation, being one of the many lien holders. As indispensable parties,
Spouses Crisologo should have been joined as defendants in the case.

22. Republic v. Nomboku


Facts:
When Nomboku filed an appeal to the CA after the Secretary of Labor denied the appeal of the
former and affirmed the Med-Arbiter’s Order of granting PALCEA-SUPER’s petition for direct
certification election, CA ruled in favor of Nomboku and nullified Sec. 17, Rule VIII of
Department Order for being in conflict with Art. 259 of the Labor Code. The Secretary of Labor
filed a Motion for Reconsideration. This prompted Nomboku to file a Motion to Expunge on the
ground that the Secretary of Labor is a mere nominal party who has no legal standing to
participate or prosecute the case and that, being a quasi-judicial officer, he should have
refrained from filing the said Motion for Reconsideration and should have maintained the cold
neutrality of an impartial judge.

ISSUE: ​Whether the Secretary of Labor, a quasi-judicial officer, has locus standi to appeal the
decision he participated in and rendered and then have it subjected to a higher court for review

RULING:
No. The Secretary of Labor is not the real party-in interest. Under Section 1, Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court, only real parties-in-interest who participated in the litigation of the case before
the CA can avail of an appeal by certiorari. Here, the case emanated from the petitions for
certification election filed with the Med-Arbiter and subsequently appealed to the Secretary of
Labor. She had occasion to hear the parties’ respective contentions and rule thereon. As the
officer who rendered the decision now subject of these cases, the Secretary of Labor should
have remained impartial and detached from the time the cases reached her until the same were
being scrutinized on appeal.

23. Magallanes vs Palmer Asia Inc, G.R. No. 205179, July 18, 2014

FACTS​: Andrews International Product. Inc (Andrews) filed a case against its employee
Magallanes for violation of BP 22. Pending such case, Palmer Asia (Palmer) entered into an
agreement with Andrews whereby all the business of Andrews was going to be handled by
Palmer. During hearing, the counsel of Palmer appeared on behalf of Andrews. Magallanes
assailed that Palmer is not a real party in interest. MeTC 62 denied Magallanes’ motion for lack
of merit. RTC ruled in favor of Magallanes because “the x x x complaining juridical entity has
not fully established the existence of a debt by Mr. Magallanes in its favor.” CA modified
decision of the RTC and ruled against Magallanes.

ISSUE​: Whether or not Palmer is a real party-in-interest.

RULING​: No. The real party in this case is Andrews (see Section 2 of Rule 3 of the Rules of
Court). Although Andrews relinquished control of its business to Palmer, it was never dissolved
and thus remained existing. The Corporation Code provides that a corporation can only be
dissolved in two ways, voluntary and involuntary. In the case of Andrews, no document was
presented that majority of its Board of Directors passed a resolution terminating its corporate
life. No complaint was also filed with the SEC to involuntarily terminate the same, thus, for all
intents and purposes, it is still existing although not operational.

24. Association of Flood Victims v. COMELEC

​ ACTS​: On 28 August 2012, the Supreme Court affirmed COMELEC Resolution cancelling the
F
certificate of registration of the Alliance of Barangay Concerns (ABC) Party​List which won in the
party​list elections in the 2010 national elections. The disqualification of the ABC Party​List
resulted in the recomputation of the party​list allocations in the House of Representatives, in
which the COMELEC followed the formula outlined in the case of Barangay Association for
National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) v. Commission on Elections. On 25 October
2012, petitioners Association of Flood Victims and Jaime Aguilar Hernandez (Hernandez) filed
with this Court a special civil action for certiorari, asserting that the COMELEC committed grave
abuse of discretion when it issued Minute Resolution No. 12​0859.

ISSUE​: WON the petitioners have capacity to sue.

RULING​: NO. Petitioners do not have legal capacity to sue.

In their petition, it is stated that petitioner Association of Flood Victims "is a non​profit
and non​partisan organization in the process of formal incorporation and that petitioner
Hernandez "is a Tax Payer and the Lead Convenor of the Association of Flood Victims." Clearly,
petitioner Association of Flood Victims, which is still in the process of incorporation, cannot be
considered a juridical person or an entity authorized by law, which can be a party to a civil
action. In other words, Petitioner Association of Flood Victims is an unincorporated association
not endowed with a distinct personality of its own. An unincorporated association, in the
absence of an enabling law, has no juridical personality and thus, cannot sue in the name of the
association.

25. GERONIMO v. CA

FACTS​: Respondent spouses Estela and Rodolfo Calderon filed a complaint before the HLURB
for specific performance and issuance of cease and desist order for damages against Spouses
Geronimo who erected a building in their lot. The building turned out to be their church and that
the noise therein allegedly affected respondents’ health and caused inconvenience . HLURB
rendered a decision in favor of respondents. CA affirmed decision of HLURB. Petitioners
averred that the HLURB has no jurisdiction over the case which primarily involves abatement of
nuisance, primarily lodged with the regular courts, and that they(petitioner spouses Geronimo)
are not real parties thereof for the reason that the action filed is also against SACC (name of the
petitioner's church) and the Silverland Subdivision Assoiation.

ISSUE​: (1) WON HLURB has jurisdiction over the case


(2) WON Petitioners Spouses Geronimo are indispensable parties in this case

HELD​:
(1) Yes. The law recognized that subdivision and condominium development involves public
interest and welfare and should be brought to a body, like the HLURB, that has technical
expertise. In the exercise of its powers, the HLURB, on the other hand, is empowered to
interpret and apply contracts, and determine the rights of private parties under these contracts.
This ancillary power, generally judicial, is now no longer with the regular courts to the extent that
the pertinent HLURB laws provide.

(2) Yes. Petitioners are indispensable parties for they were the ones who built and operate the
church inside the subdivision and without them no final determination can be had of the action.
Petitioners are the ones who will be affected by the judgment. In fact, they are the ones who are
prohibited from using the subject property as a church.

26. City of Lapu-lapu v. PEZA


Facts:
These are consolidated petitions for review on certiorari the City of Lapu-Lapu and the Province
of Bataan separately filed against the Philippine Economic Zone Authority (PEZA).

In G.R. No. 184203, the City of Lapu-Lapu (the City) assails the Court of Appeals’ decision
dated January 11, 2008 and resolution dated August 6, 2008, dismissing the City’s appeal for
being the wrong mode of appeal. The City appealed the Regional Trial Court, Branch 111,
Pasay City’s decision finding the PEZA exempt from payment of real property taxes.

In G.R. No. 187583, the Province of Bataan (the Province) assails the Court of Appeals’
decision dated August 27, 2008 and resolution dated April 16, 2009, granting the PEZA’s
petition for certiorari. The Court of Appeals ruled that the Regional Trial Court, Branch 115,
Pasay City gravely abused its discretion in finding the PEZA liable for real property taxes to the
Province of Bataan.

ISSUES​:

I. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the City of Lapu-Lapu’s appeal for raising
pure questions of law;

II. Whether the Regional Trial Court, Branch 111, Pasay City had jurisdiction to hear, try, and
decide the City of Lapu-Lapu’s petition for declaratory relief;

III. Whether the petition for injunction filed before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 115, Pasay
City, is a local tax case appealable to the Court of Tax Appeals;

HELD​:

I. The Court of Appeals did not err in dismissing the City of Lapu-Lapu’s appeal for raising pure
questions of law. The City availed itself of the wrong mode of appeal before the Court of
Appeals. The City raised pure questions of law in its appeal. The issue of whether the Regional
Trial Court of Pasay had jurisdiction over the PEZA’s petition for declaratory relief is a question
of law, jurisdiction being a matter of law. The issue of whether the PEZA is a government
instrumentality exempt from payment of real property taxes is likewise a question of law since
this question is resolved by examining the provisions of the PEZA’s charter as well as other laws
relating to the PEZA.

II. The Regional Trial Court of Pasay had no jurisdiction to hear, try, and decide the PEZA’s
petition for declaratory relief against the City of Lapu-Lapu. A petition for declaratory relief must
satisfy six requisites:

[F]irst, the subject matter of the controversy must be a deed, will, contract or other written
instrument, statute, executive order or regulation, or ordinance; second, the terms of said
documents and the validity thereof are doubtful and require judicial construction; third, there
must have been ​no breach of the documents in question; fourth, there must be an actual
justiciable controversy or the "ripening seeds" of one between persons whose interests are
adverse; fifth, the issue must be ripe for judicial determination; and sixth, adequate relief is not
available through other means or other forms of action or proceeding.142 (Emphases omitted)

We rule that the PEZA erred in availing itself of a petition for declaratory relief against the City.
The City had already issued demand letters and real property tax assessment against the
PEZA, in violation of the PEZA’s alleged tax-exempt status under its charter. The Special
Economic Zone Act of 1995, the subject matter of PEZA’s petition for declaratory relief, ​had
already been breached. The trial court, therefore, had no jurisdiction over the petition for
declaratory relief.

III. The Court of Appeals had no jurisdiction over the PEZA’s petition for certiorari against the
Province of Bataan. The PEZA’s petition for certiorari may be treated as an appeal. First, the
petition for certiorari was filed within the 15-day reglementary period for filing an appeal. The
PEZA filed its petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals on October 15, 2007,205 which
was 12 days from October 3, 2007206 when the PEZA had notice of the trial court’s order
denying the motion for reconsideration.However, the PEZA’s petition for certiorari was filed
before the wrong court. The PEZA should have filed its petition before the Court of Tax
Appeals.

27. Fernandez v. Villegas


FACTS:
In an ejectment case filed by Lourdes Fernandez and Cecilia Sapno against Norma Villegas, an
appeal was sought by the plaintiff Fernandez and which was denied on the ground that the
verification and certification against forum shopping was defective since it was only signed by
Lourdes in violation of Sec. 5 Rule 7 of the Rules of Court which requires all the plaintiffs to sign
the same. There was no showing that Lourdes was authorized and that there was no special
power of attorney either; hence, CA dismissed the appeal by plaintiff.

ISSUE: WON CA erred in dismissing outright the CA petition due to a defective verification and
certification against forum shopping.

HELD:
Yes. SC granted plaintiff’s petition and remanded the case to the CA. the fact that only one of
the petitioners executed the verification or certification of forum shopping will not deter the court
from proceeding the action. Following the last paragraph of Sec. 5 Rule 7 of the ROC, there
was also substantial compliance with the certification against forum shopping requirement,
notwithstanding the fact that only Lourdes signed the same.

28. Fuji Television Network Inc. v. Arlene Espiritu

FACTS​:
Arlene Espiritu filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with NLRC against her employer Fuji
Television Network Inc. Arlene filed a manifestation before the SC stating that the court may not
take jurisdiction over the case since Fuji failed to authorize Corazon E. Acerden to sign the
verification.

ISSUE: WON the petition for review should be dismissed as Corazon E. Acerden, the signatory
of the verification and certification of non forum shopping of the petition, had no authority to sign
the verification and certification on behalf of Fuji.

RULING​: No, the petition should not be dismissed. Section 4(e) of Rule 45 74 requires that
petitions for review should "contain a sworn certification against forum shopping as provided in
the last paragraph of section 2, Rule 42." Section 5 of the same rule provides that failure to
comply with any requirement in Section 4 is sufficient ground to dismiss the petition. In its
petition for review on certiorari, Fuji attached Hideaki Ota’s secretary’s certificate,authorizing
Shuji Yano and Jin Eto to represent and sign for and on behalf of Fuji. The secretary’s certificate
was duly authenticated by Sulpicio Confiado, Consul-General of the Philippines in Japan.
Likewise attached to the petition is the special power of attorney executed by Shuji Yano,
authorizing Corazon to sign on his behalf. The verification and certification against forum
shopping was signed by Corazon. Thus, Fuji substantially complied with the requirements of
verification and certification against forum shopping.

​29. Kalipunan ng Damayang Mahihirap Inc. v. Sec. Jesse Robredo


FACTS:
Petitioners directly filed a petition for prohibition and mandamus before the SC, seeking to
compel the public respondents to first secure an eviction and/or demolition order from the court
prior the implementation of Sec. 28 (a) and (b) of RA 7279 which authorize evictions and
demolitions without any court order when (1) persons or entities occupy danger areas and (2)
persons or entities where government infrastructure projects are about to be implemented. They
argue that the said law offend their right to due process. Public respondents prayed for an
outright dismissal of the petition for its serious procedural defects and for violation the principle
of hierarchy of courts.

ISSUE:​ WON petition should be dismissed

RULING:
YES. Petitioners have unduly disregarded the hierarchy of courts by coming directly to the Court
with their petition for prohibition and mandamus. They appear to have forgotten that the SC is a
court of last resort, not a court of first instance. The hierarchy of courts should serve as a
general determinant of the appropriate forum for Rule 65 petitions. The concurrence of
jurisdiction among the SC, CA and RTC to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo
warranto, habeas corpus and injunction does not give the petitioners the unrestricted freedom of
choice of forum.
30. Candelaria vs RTC City of San Fernando
G.R. No.173861

Facts​:
During an alleged buy-bust operation, petitioners were arrested for delivering, with the intention
to sell, five cases of counterfeit Fundador Brandy. They were formally charged with violation of
Section 155 in relation to Section 170 of Republic Act No. 8293, otherwise known as the
Intellectual Property Code of the Philippines. After they were arraigned and had pleaded not
guilty to the charge, petitioners filed a Motion to Suppress/Exclude Evidence based on
inadmissibility of evidence. They contended that the evidence the prosecution intended to
present were obtained in violation of their constitutional right against unreasonable searches
and seizures. This is considering that at the time the alleged counterfeit products were seized,
they were neither committing nor attempting to commit a crime in the presence of the arresting
officers as to justify the conduct of search and seizure following their unlawful arrest. RTC
denied their motion, hence a petition for certiorari under rule 65 was filed.

Issue​:
Whether the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in denying the petitioner’s motion to set the case for suppression hearing.

Ruling​:
No. Petitioner failed to show how the RTC supposedly abused its discretion.
It is to be stressed that in every special civil action under Rule 65, a party seeking the writ
whether for certiorari, prohibition or mandamus, must be able to show that his or her resort to
such extraordinary remedy is justified by the absence of an appeal or any plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. He must allege in his petition and establish facts
to show that any other existing remedy is not speedy or adequate.

31. Vergara v. Otadoy


FACTS​:
Atty. Otadoy, a counsel at a habeas corpus case, filed a motion to postpone the pre-trial
conference to April 20, 2007. He claimed that on March 4, 2007, he was invited to deliver a
lecture at the National Annual Lectureship of the Church of Christ on March 11-14, 2007. As a
minister and evangelist of that church, he chose to accept the invitation rather than attend the
pre-trial conference. Without waiting for a ruling on his motion, Atty. Otadoy proceeded to attend
the lecture in Zamboanga. At the pre-trial conference, the petitioners’ counsel opposed the
motion to postpone the pre-trial conference arguing that Atty. Otadoy failed to file a pre-trial brief
and that his motion was filed late. The petitioners’ counsel moved that he be allowed to present
his evidence ex parte as stated in Section 5, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court. RTC denied
petitioner's but CA granted Atty. Otadoy's motion to postpone pre trial stating that procedural
rules should not be strictly applied as to derogate substantive rights of the parties
Issue​:
whether the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying Atty. Otadoy’s motion to
postpone the pretrial conference.

Held​:
No. The RTC had legal basis to deny the motion for postponement. UnderRule 18 of the Rules
of Court, the counsels and the parties are mandated to appear at pre-trial. Their
non-appearance may be excused only if there is a valid cause or if a representative appears on
their behalf. If the defendant fails to appear, the RTC may allow the plaintiff to present evidence
ex parte and may render judgment based on it. This Court has ruled that a motion for
postponement is a privilege and not a right. The movant should not assume that his motion
would be granted.