CIVPRO CASE MATRIX C2021
CASE # CASE NAME FACTS / ISSUE
C. CAUSE OF ACTION
01 Joseph v. Perez is the owner of a cargo truck for conveying items & passengers for a
Bautista consideration from Dagupan to Manila. Truck was driven by Villa going to Bulacan.
Luis Joseph with a cargo of livestock boarded the truck at Dagupan City. WHILE
TRUCK WAS NEGOTIATING WITH the national highway proceeding towards
Manila, VILLA TRIED TO OVERTAKE A TRICYCLE. At about the same time, a
pickup truck, owned by Sioson but driven by Lazaro tried to overtake the truck which
was then in the process of OVERTAKING THE TRICYCLE, thereby forcing the truck
to veer towards the shoulder of the road & ram into a mango tree. As a result, Joseph
sustained a fracture in his leg.
Issue: W/N the judgement on the compromise agreement under the cause of action
based on quasi-delict is not a bar to the cause of action for breach of contract of
carriage?
NO. The argument that there are two causes of action embodied in petitioner’s
complaint, hence the judgment on the compromise agreement under the cause of action
based on quasi-delict is not a bar to the cause of action for breach of contract of
carriage, is untenable. Trial court is correct in holding that there was only one cause of
action involved although the bases of recovery invoked by petitioner against the
defendants therein were not necessarily identical since the respondents were not
identically circumstanced. However, a recovery by the petitioner under one remedy
necessarily bars recovery under the other. This, in essence, is the rationale for the
proscription in our law against double recovery for the same act or omission which,
obviously, stems from the fundamental rule against unjust enrichment.
02 Monzon v. Respondent spouses filed an action for injunction against Monzon and Atty. Luna,
Spouses Relova RTC Tagaytay’s clerk of court. Monzon contracted a loan of P600,000 and P200,000
vs. Addio with Sps. Perez and Sps. Relova, respectively, which were secured by mortgages.
Properties Monzon sold the mortgaged properties to both spouses (but it was not delivered yet).
Coastal Lending Corporation foreclosed on Monzon’s properties (since she was also
indebted to Coastal) which included the sold and mortgaged properties of both
spouses. Addio Properties won the bidding which resulted in a P1.6M surplus which is
the focus of the spouses’ action. They wanted to restrain Atty. Luna from delivering
the surplus to Monzon and to deliver it to them as payment for Monzon’s loans.
Essentially, the spouses won because Monzon was declared in default and was
prevented from adducing evidence on her behalf.
The SC Ruled that the declaration of default was improper and remanded the case to
the RTC. They also found that the legal basis of the injunction against Atty. Luna,
Rule 68, was erroneously applied as the foreclosure was extrajudicial while Rule 68
only applied to judicial foreclosures. Thus, there was no cause of action against Atty.
Luna. Finally, the Court gave the spouses the choice to either treat the injunction as a
claim for a sum of money or not as the former would mean a waiver of their mortgage
03 Philippine PASUDECO transports sugar from Mabalacat to Magalang, Pampanga. Following the
National eruption of the Mount Pinatubo in 1991, access to national highways and bridges
Construction along Pampanga was blocked. Hence, PASUDECO wrote a letter to the Toll
RULING / DOCTRINE
A cause of action is understood to be the delict or wrongful act or omission committed by the
defendant in violation of the primary rights of the plaintiff. It is true that a single act or omission
can be violative of various rights at the same time, as when the act constitutes juridically a
violation of several separate and distinct legal obligations. However, where there is only one
delict or wrong, there is but a single cause of action regardless of the number of rights that may
have been violated belonging to one person. The singleness of a cause of action lies in the
singleness of the delict or wrong violating the rights of one person. Nevertheless, if only one
injury resulted from several wrongful acts only one cause of action arises.
RECOVERY OF PARTY UNDER ONE REMEDY, BARS RECOVERY UNDER THE
OTHER - The trial court was, therefore, correct in holding that there was only one cause of
action involved although the bases of recovery invoked by petitioner against the defendants
therein were not necessarily identical since the respondents were not identically circumstanced.
However, a recovery by the petitioner under one remedy necessarily bars recovery under the
other. This, in essence, is the rationale for the proscription in our law against double recovery
for the same act or omission which, obviously, stems from the fundamental rule against unjust
enrichment.
SOLIDARY OBLIGATIONS; PAYMENT OF ONE DEBTOR RELEASES THE OTHER
DEBTORS FROM LIABILITY - The respondents having been found to be solidarily liable to
petitioner, the full payment made by some of the solidary debtors and their subsequent release
from any and all liability to petitioner inevitably resulted in the extinguishment and release from
liability of the other solidary debtors, including herein respondent Patrocinio Perez
A cause of action exists if the following elements are present: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff
by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created; (2) an obligation on the part
of the named defendant to respect or not to violate such right; and (3) an act or omission on the
part of such defendant violative of the right of plaintiff or constituting a breach of the obligation
of defendant to the plaintiff for which the latter may maintain an action for recovery of
damages.
The Court found that respondents do not have a cause of action against Atty. Ana Liza Luna for
the delivery of the subject amounts on the basis of Section 4, Rule 68 of the Rules of Court, for
the reason that the foregoing Rule does not apply to extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgages.
PASUDECOs negligence in transporting sugarcanes without proper harness/straps, and that of
PNCC in removing the emergency warning devices, were two successive negligent acts which
were the direct and proximate cause of Latagans injuries. As such, PASUDECO and PNCC are
CIVPRO CASE MATRIX C2021
Corp v. CA Regulatory Board if they can use NLEX which is under the maintainance and
(Ortiz) operation of petitioner Philippine National Construction Corporation. They entered
into a MOA under several terms and conditions. On January 1993, private repondents
Arnaiz, Latagan and Generalao was driving along NLEX when their car passed upon
the flattened sugarcanes which fell on the road. Thus caused them to lose control over
their vehicle. The flattened sugarcanes belonged to PASUDECO. Earlier, PNCC, with
the help of PASUDECO’s Engineer, tried to clear the road and placed signs so that
motorists can be guided. However, PNCC immediately removed those safety barriers
even without clearing the flattened sugarcanes. A case was filed in the RTC which
granted Latagan an award for damages. This was affirmed by CA but upon appeal, the
CA modified RTC’s decision making PNCC and PASUDECO solidarily liable for
Latagan’s award for damages. Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari under rule 45.
W/N the petitioners should be held solidarily liable - Yes
04 View Master Allen Roxas applied for a loan with fmic in order to obtain funds to be used to bid for
Corp v. Roxas contral and ownership of State Investment where Viewmaster acted as guarantor.
Roxas entered with Viewmaster upon the following conditions: 1. 50% of stock shall
be sold to viewmaster and 2. Development of certain parcels of lands. HOWEVER, the
parties did not put the agreement in writing. Eventually, FMIC granted the loan.
Despite demand by view master, Roxas failed and refused to comply with such
conditions. Hence, viewmaster filed a case for specific performance against everyone.
WoN Petitioner’s complaint before the RTC does not state cause of action? YES.
05 San Lorenzo Almeda Development and Equipment Corporation (ADEC) owns a land in San
Village Lorenzo Village, Makati. It bought said land from Ponciano Almeda. The TCT
Association Inc. covering the land had several conditions which according to ADEC are limitations on
v. CA its rights. Thus, ADEC filed a case against San Lorenzo Village Association Inc
(SLVAI). SLVAI filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of cause of action on
the part of ADEC alleging that the sale between Ponciano Almeda and ADEC is not
registered. Both the Lower Court and CA ruled that there is a cause of action in this
case.
WoN the present case alleges a cause of action? -YES
06 Sps. Expedito Spouses Zepeda alleged that they obtained a loan in the amount of P5,800,000.00 from
Zepeda and Alice Chinabank secured by a Real Estate Mortgage over a parcel of land. The spouses
D. Zepeda v. subsequently encountered difficulties in paying their loan obligations, so they
China Banking requested for restructuring which was allegedly granted by Chinabank. Despite this
Corporation agreement, Chinabank xtrajudicially foreclosed the subject property. Ownership was
consolidated in the bank’s favour. The spouses contended that the foreclosure
proceedings should be annulled for failure to comply with the posting and publication
requirements. Chinabank then filed an answer with special affirmative defenses as well
as a set of written interrogatories with twenty questions. The trial court denied these
defenses and ordered the pre-trial. Chinabank filed with the CA a petition for
certiorari. This was granted on the ground that the spouses’ complaint did not state a
cause of action.
W/N the complaint states a cause of action — YES.
jointly and severally liable. Nonetheless, the petition is bound to be dismissed in the first place
since the allegations of the petitioner is based on questions of facts. A petition for certiorari
under Rule 45 must be based only on questions of law.
A cause of action is the fact or combination of facts which affords a party a right to judicial
interference in his behalf. The requisites for a cause of action are: (a) a right in favor of the
plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created, (b) an obligation on
the part of the defendant to respect and not to violate such right; and (c) an act or omission on
the part of the defendant constituting a violation of the plaintiffs right or breach of the obligation
of the defendant to the plaintiff. Briefly stated, it is the reason why the litigation has come
about; it is the act or omission of the defendant resulting in the violation of someone’s right. In
this case at bar, neither of the parties has fully performed their obligation within the one-year
period. Hence, the case falls within the coverage of the statute of frauds, which means that
the agreement is unenforceable. Therefore, there is no cause of action between the parties.
A complaint states a cause of action where it contains the 3 essential elements of a cause of
action, a) the legal right of the plaintiff, b) the correlative obligation of the defendant, c) the act
or omission of the defendant in violation of said legal right. A motion to dismiss on the ground
of failure to state a cause of action in the complaint hypothetically admits the truth of the facts
alleged therein. In this case, the averments in the complaint like the title of ADECs vendor, the
execution of the sale by said vendor to ADEC, the latters status as the vendors successor-in-
interest, and the altered physical environment along Pasay Road, are allegations well within the
hypothetical-admission principle. These averments satisfy the three elements of a cause of
action. In other words, the complaint did state a cause of action.
The Supreme Court ruled in the affirmative. A cause of action is a formal statement of the
operative facts that give rise to a remedial right. The question of whether the complaint states a
cause of action is determined by its averments regarding the acts committed by the defendant.
The spouses claimed that with the approval of the loan restructuring agreement, Chinabank
made them believe that foreclosure would be held in abeyance. They also alleged that the
proceeding was conducted without complying with the posting and publication requirements.
The Court found the allegations in the complaint sufficient to establish a cause of action for
nullifying the foreclosure of the mortgaged property. The fact that the spouses admitted that
they failed to redeem the property and that the title was consolidated in Chinabank’s name did
not preclude them from seeking to nullify the extrajudicial foreclosure.
DOCTRINE: The essential elements of a cause of action are as follow:
1. A right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises
or is created;
2. An obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or not to violate such
right; and
3. An act or omission on the part of such defendant in violation of the right of the
CIVPRO CASE MATRIX C2021
07 Sea-Land Service, Sea-Land Services, Inc. and A.P. Moller/Maersk Line (AMML), both carriers of cargo
Inc. v. CA in containerships as well as common carriers, entered into a contract. It was a vessel
sharing agreement where they mutually agreed to purchase, share and exchange
needed space for cargo in their respective containerships. Florex International, Inc.
(Florex) delivered cargo to AMML filled with various foodstuffs, with Oakland,
California as the port of discharge and San Francisco as place of delivery. Pursuant to
the agreement, respondent AMML loaded the subject cargo on MS Sealand Pacer, a
vessel owned by petitioner. Under this arrangement, therefore, AMML was the
principal carrier while Sea-Land was the containership operator. The consignee
refused to pay for the cargo, alleging that delivery thereof was delayed.
Thus, Florex filed a complaint against Maersk-Tabacalera Shipping Agency
(Filipinas), Inc. for reimbursement of the value of the cargo and other charges.
AMML filed its Answer, alleging that, even on the assumption that Florex was entitled
to reimbursement, it was Sea-Land who should be liable. Accordingly, AMML filed a
Third Party Complaint against Sea-Land, averring that whatever damages sustained by
Florex were caused by Sea-Land, which actually received and transported Florex’s
cargo on its vessels and unloaded them.
ISSUE/s:
W/N the CA failed to state a cause of action. -- NO
W/N the CA committed GAD in disregarding an agreement to arbitrate. -- YES
08 Lorbes v. CA Lorbes filed an action for reformation of instrument and damages against Delos Reyes
and Cruz before the RTC of Antipolo. The action is based on the agreement that the
Deed of Absolute Sale will only serve as an equitable mortgage or a loan secured by a
mortgage. In the RTC, Delos Reyes and Cruz failed to file their answer within the
reglementary period and thus through the motion of Lorbes, RTC held them in default.
The RTC also ruled in favor of Lorbes. On appeal before the CA, it was reversed
stating that there was a violation of due process and that Lorbes failed to substantiate
their claims specially that the case was for reformation of instrument and no ground
provided for in the Civil Code was alleged. Hence, Lorbes appealed before the SC.
ISSUE:: Whether the caption of the pleading determines the case of action—No, it is
the allegations in the complaint that determine cause of action
09 Progressive Progressive Development Corporation leased to Westin Seafood Market a piece of
Development v. land for 9 years and 3 months for P600,000. Westin failed to pay rent. A stipulation in
CA the Contract of Lease allowed Progressive to take the movables of Westin in the leased
property and sell it to when lessee fails to pay for rentals. When Progressive exercised
this option under the lease contract, Westin filed a case for forcible entry before the
MeTC of QC. In this case, the parties agreed that Westin would deposit 8 million
pesos in a bank to guarantee payment of rentals, which they failed to do so. As such,
Westin filed another case for damages with the RTC while the forcible entry case was
still pending with the MeTC. The case for damages was admitted in the RTC.
Progressive filed a petition for certiorari with the CA which was dismissed since a
motion for consideration needs to be filed with the RTC before a petition for certiorari
may be filed. Hence this case.
plaintiff or constituting a breach of the obligation of the defendant.
FIRST ISSUE: Failure to state a cause of action
The CA did not err in reading the Complaint of Florex and AMML’s Answer together with the
Third Party Complaint to determine whether a cause of action is properly alleged. In the
determination of whether or not the complaint states a cause of action, the annexes
attached to the complaint may be considered, they being parts of the complaint.
SECOND ISSUE: An agreement to arbitrate
The agreement clearly provided that the Principal Carrier shall have the right to seek damages
and/or indemnity from the Containership Operator by arbitration, pursuant to the agreement.
Allowing AMML’s Third Party Claim against Sea-Land to proceed would be in violation of the
Agreement. The CA failed to consider that, precisely, arbitration is the mode by which the
liability of the Containership Operator may be finally determined. As the Principal Carrier with
which Florex directly dealt with, respondent AMML can and should be held accountable by
Florex in the event that it has a valid claim against the former. Arbitration being the mode of
settlement between the parties expressly provided for by their Agreement, the Third Party
Complaint should have been dismissed.
Ruling: Lorbes won. Not the caption but the alleged acts or omission determine cause of action.
The SC agreed that it was wrong for the RTC not to lift the default order and there was indeed a
violation of due process. However, it ruled that CA is mistaken for dismissing the case for
failure to prove any grounds for reformation of contract. Based on the arguments and allegation,
the cause of action is not really for reformation but to declare the Deed of Absolute Sale as an
equitable mortgage. Moreover, the Court held that the fact that the complaint filed by petitioners
before the trial court was categorized to be one for reformation of instrument should not
preclude the Court from passing upon the issue of whether the transaction was in fact an
equitable mortgage as the same has been squarely raised in the complaint and had been the
subject of arguments and evidence of the parties.
Doctrine: The Court held that it is not the caption of the pleading but the allegations
therein that determine the nature of the action, and the Court shall grant relief warranted
by the allegations.
Sec 3 of Rule 4 provides that a party may not institute more than one suit for a single cause of
action. Sec. 4 also provides that if two or more suits are instituted on the basis of the same cause
of action, the filing of one or a judgment upon the merits in any one is available as a ground for
the dismissal of the other or others. Cause of action is defined as the act of omission by which a
party violates a right of another. The cause of action in the forcible entry case and the damages
case is for the alleged illegal retaking of possession of the leased premises by the lessor, from
which all legal reliefs arise. A comparative analysis of the two complaints show that not only
elements of res judicata are present, but also both complaints constitutes the same cause of
action. Both complaints allege the same set of facts and issues as basis for the relief. The
complaint for damages was redundant as the forcible entry complaint already prayed for
compensatory damages. There is but one single cause of action regardless of the number of
rights that may have been violated, and all such rights should be alleged in a single complaint as
constituting one single cause of action. A claim cannot be divided in such a way that a part of
CIVPRO CASE MATRIX C2021
ISSUE: W/N the RTC case for damages is valid while the forcible entry case pending
before the MeTC is still pending
10 Umale v. Canoga Umale leased the property of respondent Canoga Corp for a period of 2 years but
Park Corp. respondent sold this land. Before the contract expired, respondent filed an unlawful
detainer case against petitioner for violation of the contract. While the case is pending,
respondent filed another unlawful detainer case on the ground of expiration of lease
contract. The petitioner questions the second case arguing that it must be dismissed
because on litis pendentia. The Supreme Court ruled that the second case cannot be
dismissed on the ground of litis pendentia because of the absence of the third requisite.
Moreover, the respondent is also not guilty of forum shopping.
11 Flores v. Mallare- FACTS: Flores filed a complaint in the RTC alleging that the two respondents, B and
Philipps C refused to pay the amounts of 11 K and 10 K representing the costs of truck tires
purchased on credit on various occassion. F considered them as two separate causes of
actions. B filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction since the
amount of the demand was 11 K and under BP 129, the RTC has original jurisdiction
on the amount of more than 20 K. The motion further averred that the obligation of C
was separate and distinct from B. C joined in moving for dismissal. Judge then
dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. F appealed by certiorari maintaining that the
RTC has jurisdiction based on the totality rule.
ISSUE: W/N The RTC has jurisdiction over the case? NO, there is misjoinder of
action and therefore, the use of the totality rule was misplaced.
D. PARTIES TO CIVIL ACTIONS [Rule 3 Sec. 1-11]
01 RAYO v. Midas Diversified Export Co. obtained a loan from Metrobank as evidence by
METROBANK promissory notes. To secure the payment of an P8,000,000 loan, Louisville Realty and
Development Corporation executed in favor of Metrobank, a real estate mortgage.
When Midas failed to pay, Metrobank extra-judicially foreclosed the real estate
mortgage in accordance with Act No. 3135, as amended.
Metrobank was the highest bidder. Writ of Possession over the properties was issued
in favor of the Metrobank to be implemented by the Deputy Sheriff.
A deed of assignment was entered into with Louisville, Winston Linwy L. Chua and
Eduardo Rayo which makes Rayo a co-assignee over the subject real properties.
Rayo filed a complaint against Metrobank alleging that his predecessor, Louisville,
was not notified of the proceedings and Section 7 (ex parte motion or petition for the
issuance of a writ of possession) of Act No. 3135 is unconstitutional. CA ruled that
Rayo is neither the registered owner nor the successor-in- interest of the
registered owner; hence, not a real party-in-interest. SC denied petition for lack of
merit.
ISSUE/s:
WON Rayo have the legal personality in the annulment of judgment proceedings?
– No
WON Section 7 of Act No. 3135, is unconstitutional? - No
Is Metrobank guilty of forum-shopping? - No
the amount of damages may be recovered in one case and the rest in another.
I. Litis pendentia exists when the following requisites are present:
a. Identity of the parties in the two actions;
b. Substantial identity in the causes of action and in the reliefs sought by the parties; and
c. The identity between the two actions should be such that any judgment that may be
rendered in one case, regardless of which party is successful, would amount to res
judicata in the other.
II. To determine whether a party violated the rule against forum shopping, the test applied
is whether the elements of litis pendentia are present or whether a final judgment in one
case will amount to res judicata in another.
It appears that there is a misjoinder of parties because the claims against respondents Binongcal
and Calion are separate and distinct and neither of which falls within the lower court's
jurisdiction.
Where 2 OR MORE PLAINTIFFS sue a defendant in a single complaint or ONE PLAINTIFF
sues several defendants in a single complaint based on several causes of action, the TOTALITY
RULE applies only where:

· Causes of action arose from the same series of transaction; or
· There’s a common question of fact or law among them as provided in § 6 Rule 3.
Where the plaintiff sues a defendant, the total demand furnishes the jurisdictional test
irrespective of whether several causes of action arose out of different transactions, although,
their joinder would only be permissive — not mandatory.
SC denied petition for lack of merit.
While Rayo would be injured by the judgment in this suit, he has no present substantial interest
to institute the annulment of judgment proceedings and nullify the order granting the writ of
possession. There was no violation of petitioners right to constitutional due process.
An ex parte petition for the issuance of a writ of possession under Section 7 of Act No. 3135 is
not, strictly speaking, a judicial process. It is a non-litigious proceeding authorized in an
extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage. It is a proceeding where the relief is granted without
requiring an opportunity for the person against whom the relief is sought to be heard. No notice
is needed. As Rayo is not a party whose interest is adverse to that of Louisville, there was no bar
to the issuance of a writ of possession to Metrobank. It does not matter that petitioner was not
specifically named in the writ of possession nor notified of such proceedings.
DOCTRINE: A real party-in-interest is one with a present substantial interest which means
such interest of a party in the subject matter of the action as will entitle him, under the
substantive law, to recover if the evidence is sufficient, or that he has the legal title to demand.
OTHER RULINGS:
Rayos’ attempt to challenge the constitutionality of Section 7 of Act No. 3135, constitutes a
collateral attack that is not allowed.
No forum shopping. The issuance of the writ of possession being a ministerial function, and
summary in nature, it cannot be said to be a judgment on the merits. It is only an incident in the
transfer of title. Hence, a separate case for annulment of mortgage and foreclosure sale cannot
be barred by litis pendentia or res judicata.
CIVPRO CASE MATRIX C2021
02 V-Gent, Inc. v. V-Gent filed a money claim against Morning Star to refund the unused tickets.
Morning Star Morning Star questioned the personality of V-Gent to file the suit and claiming that the
Travel & Tours, passengers, in whose names the tickets were issued, are the real parties-in-interest.
Inc. MeTC dismissed the case but declared V-Gent as real party-in-interest. RTC: ruled in
favor of V-Gent. CA: ruled that V-Gent is not a real party-in-interest.
Issue: Whether V-Gent is a real party-in-interest?
03 Resident Marine 2 Consolidated cases. On June 13, 2002, the Department of Energy entered into a
Mammals v. Sec. Geophysical Survey and Exploration Contract-102 (GSEC-102) with JAPEX. This
Reyes involves geological and geophysical studies of the Tanon Strait. On December 21,
2004 FOE and JAPEX formally converted GSEC-102 into SC-46 (Service Contract)
for the exploration, development, production of petroleum resources in a block
covering approximately 2,850 square kilometers offshore the Tanon Strait. Since the
exploration well JAPEX committed to drill was in the marine waters of Aloguinsan
and Pinamungajan, where the Tanon Strait was declared a protected seascape in 1988,
JAPEX agreed to comply with the Environmental Impact Assessment requirements.
The EMB of DENR Region VII granted DOE and JAPEX an ECC for the offshore oil
and gas exploration in Tanon Strait. JAPEX began to drill an exploratory well.
Petitioners seek to enjoin the respondents from implementing SC-46. Petitioners are
the resident marine mammals of the protected seascape of Tanon Strait, joined in
and represented by Gloria Ramos and Rose-Eliz Osorio, in their capacity as legal
guardians of lesser life forms.Second petition is put forth by Central Visayas
Fisherfolk Development Center.
Public respondents, through the Solicitor General, contend that petitioners Resident
Marine Mammals and Stewards have no legal standing to file the present petition;
Issue:
Whether or not Petitioners have locus standi - YES
04 Magallanes vs. Magallanes is the sales agent of Andrews Inc. In order to get his commissions,
No. General Rule: Every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party-in-
interest - the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit. In suits
wherean agent represents a party, the principal is the real party-in-interest; an agent cannot file a
suit in his own name on behalf of the principal. Exception: Rule 3, Section 3 of the Rules of
Court provides the exception when an agent may sue or be sued without joining the principal. In
this case, only the first element is present: the purchase order and the receipt were in the name
of V-Gent. However, the remaining elements are absent because: (1) V-Gent disclosed the
names of thepassengers to Morning Star - in fact the tickets were in their names; and (2) the
transaction was paid using the passengers’ money. Therefore, Rule 3, Section 3 of the Rules of
Court cannot apply.
DOCTRINE: .
GR: Every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party-in-interest - the
party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit.
Exception: Agent may sue or be sued solely in its own name and without joining the principal
when the following elements concur: (1) the agent acted in his own name during the transaction;
(2) the agent acted for the benefit of an undisclosed principal; and (3) the transaction did not
involve the property of the principal. When these elements are present, the agent becomes
bound as if the transaction were its own.
The petitioners, Stewards, have locus standi. The 1997 Rules of Court demand that parties to a
suit be either natural or juridical persons, or entities. It further necessitates the action to be
brought in the name of the real party-in-interest. However, the court has enacted the Rules of
Procedure for Environmental Cases which allows for a citizen suit and permits any Filipino
citizen to file action before the Court for violation of environmental laws.
SEC. 5. Citizen suit. - Any Filipino citizen in representation of others, including minors or
generations yet unborn, may file an action to enforce rights or obligations under environmental
laws.
This provision liberalizes standing for all cases filed enforcing environmental laws and
collapses the traditional rule on personal and direct interest, on the principle that humans are
stewards of nature. The terminology of the text reflects the doctrine first enunciated in Oposa v.
Factoran, insofar as it refers to minors and generations yet unborn.
It is worth noting here that the Stewards are joined as real parties in the Petition and not just in
representation of the named cetacean species. The Stewards, Ramos and Eisma-Osorio, having
shown in their petition that there may be possible violations of laws concerning the habitat of
the Resident Marine Mammals, are therefore declared to possess the legal standing to file this
petition.
SUBSTANTIVE
Under Proclamation No. 2146, the Tañon Strait is an environmentally critical area, having been
declared as a protected area in 1998; therefore, any activity outside the scope of its management
plan may only be implemented pursuant to an ECC secured after undergoing an EIA to
determine the effects of such activity on its ecological system. When the seismic surveys were
done in the Tanon Strait, no such environmental impact was done. The ECC was secured only
prior to the second sub-phase of SC-46. Exploitation and utilization of the energy resource in
Tanon Strait may be allowed only through law passed by Congress, since the strait is a NIPAS
area.
SC-46 is null and void. Two requirements of a service contract were not met - that the president
should be a signatory and within 30 days from execution, the President must report to Congress.
The RTC decision absolving Magallanes from civil liability has attained finality because the
CIVPRO CASE MATRIX C2021
Palmer Asia Magallanes replaced the bouncing checks given by his clients with 5 checks drawn
from his own account. However, these checks also bounced. Sometime in 1995,
Andrews Inc. was taken over by Palmer Asia in furtherance of a marketing strategy
wherein Andrews will change its name to Palmer Asia. Just take note that Andrews
remained as an existing corporation. It did not get dissolved nor did it transfer its assets
and liabilities to Palmer. Because the checks issued by Magallanes also bounced -
Andrews filed a complaint for BP 22 against him in the MeTC of Makati. MeTC
acquitted Magallanes criminally but held him liable civilly. The RTC did not hold
Magallanes liable since the RTC reasoned that the checks were not for valuable
consideration since they were made to pay fictitious transactions and that MAgallanes
cannot be held liable for the bouncing checks of his clients. Palmer filed a petition for
review under Rule 42 in the CA. CA ruled against Magallanes stating that he derived
pecuniary benefit from the transactions.
Issue:
1. Whether or not the RTC decision has attained finality because Andrews
was not able to appeal such - YES
2. Whether or not the CA failed to dismiss Palmer’s petition for lack of
jurisdiction - YES
05 PNB v. Mega A loan agreement was also entered which Mega Prime executed in favor of PNB a
Prime Realty promissory note for P404,496,000. Respondent further alleged that one of the principal
inducements for it to purchase the stockholdings of defendant was to acquire its assets,
specifically the one referred to as the Pantranco property. Mega Prime then entered
into a joint venture to develop the Pantranco property. Mega Prime sought the
annulment of the deed of sale on ground of misrepresentation. Respondent likewise
sought reimbursement of the P150,000,000 plus legal interest incurred by Mega Prime
as expenses for the development of the Pantranco property as actual damages and
further sought moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees.
WON PNB and Mega Prime are entitled to the damages they respectively claim
against each other.
NO. Basic is the jurisprudential principle that in determining actual damages, the
courts cannot rely on mere assertions, speculations, conjectures, or guesswork but must
depend on competent proof or the best obtainable evidence of the actual amount of
loss.
06 Aguila v CA Felicidad Abrogar, with the consent of her late husband and AC Aguila & Sons Co
entered into a MOA selling her property in the amount of P200,000.00. In a special
power of attorney, Abrogar authorized Aguila (manager of AC Aguila & Sons, Co) to
cause the cancellation of TCT No. 195101, in the event that she (Abrogar) failed to
redeem the subject property as provided in the memorandum of Agreement. Abrogar
failed to redeem the property on time, causing Aguila to cancel TCT No. 195101 and
applied for the issuance of a new title in the name of AC Aguila & Sons Co.
Thereafter, Aguila demanded for the peaceful surrender of the questioned property, but
Abrogar refused to vacate prompting Aguila to file an ejectment suit. Aguila won the
case. Abrogar then filed a petition for declaration of nullity of a deed of sale with the
Regional Trial Court of Marikina against Aguila alleging that the signature of her
husband on the deed of sale was a forgery because he was already dead when it was
signed. Aguila filed the instant petition for review contending that he is not the real
party in interest but AC Aguila & Co. against which this case should have been
brought.
ISSUE
complainant - ANDREWS - was not able to file a petition for review on time. The petition filed
by Palmer in the CA should have been dismissed because they are not the real party in interest.
A real party in interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the
suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Unless otherwise authorized by law or these
Rules, every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest.
A case is dismissible for lack of personality to sue upon proof that the plaintiff is not the real
party-in-interest hence grounded on failure to state a cause of action. Remember that the
bouncing checks were issued in favor of Andrews and NOT Palmer. Remember that Andrews
only relinquished its operations to Palmer but the corporation itself never got dissolved. It did
not issue a resolution nor filed in the SEC a petition to terminate itself. Hence, Palmer and
Andrews are two different entities. Hence, the action filed in the CA should have been filed by
or for the name of Andrews and not Palmer.
Assuming that Palmer was acting as an agent of Andrews while filing the case, Palmer should
have included Andrews in the title of the case. In this case, it did not.
Fraud is never lightly inferred; it is good faith that is. Under the Rules of Court, it is presumed
that “a person is innocent of crime or wrong” and that “private transactions have been fair and
regular.” While disputable, these presumptions can be overcome only by clear and preponderant
evidence. Applied to contracts, the presumption is in favor of validity and regularity.
The Supreme Court found the petition meritorious. The Court ruled that since the memorandum
of agreement was executed by A.C. Aguila & Sons, Co. and Abrogar, it is the partnership, not
its officer or agents, which should be impleaded in the instant case. Verily, since Aguila was not
the proper party in interest in this case, the case should be dismissed for failure to state a cause
of action.
Rule 3, §2 of the Rules of Court of 1964, under which the complaint in this case was filed,
provided that "every action must be prosecuted and defended in the name of the real party in
interest." A real party in interest is one who would be benefited or injured by the judgment, or
who is entitled to the avails of the suit. 7 This ruling is now embodied in Rule 3, §2 of the 1997
Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. Any decision rendered against a person who is not a real
party in interest in the case cannot be executed. Hence, a complaint filed against such a
person should be dismissed for failure to state a cause of action.
N.B Complaint cannot state a cause of action against one who cannot be a party to a civil
action
CIVPRO CASE MATRIX C2021
WoN Aguila is the real party in interest. No, it is the partnership not the officers
who should be impleaded
07 Samaniego v. A land with an aggregate area of approximately 10.4496 hectares, more or less,in Patul
Aguila (now Malvar), Santiago, Isabela was to be awarded to petitioners, Samaniego,et. al.
who were then tenants and recipients of the Operation Land Transfer Programunder
PD No. 27. A part of the identified land belonged to the private respondentAguila, who
upon knowledge thereof, seek exemption from PD No. 27 to the RegionalDirector.
Aug 21 1991, the Regional Director granted the application of exemptionwhich
prompted the petitioners to appeal the decision to the Department of AgrarianReform
(DAR). DAR affirmed the decision of the Regional Director. Uponmotion of
petitioners, the former reversed its decision and denied privaterespondent’s application
for exemption. respondents then appealed the Department of Agrarian
Reform’sdecision to the Office of the President which reversed the DAR’s latter
decision andaffirming its former decision and that private respondents are exempted
from PD 27.Petitioner’s raised the issue to the appellate court. The Appellate
courtdismissed the petition on the ground that the petitioners failed to implead the
Officeof the President.
ISSUE:
1.Whether the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the case on the groundthat
petitioners’ failure to implead the Office of the President - YES
;2.Whether the Office of the President is an indispensable party in an appealfrom its
decision
08 Domingo vs Herbert Scheer is a German national who was granted permanent resident status. He 1.
Scheer was given an Alien Certificate of Registration and an Immigration Certificate of
Registration. The DFA was informed by the German Embassy in Manila that Scheer
was wanted by the German Federal Police and that a warrant was out against him and
that his passport was cancelled. Thereafter, the Board of Commissioner (BOC) issued
a Summary Deportation Order which cancelled Scheer’s permanent residence status
and for his summary deportation. BOC solely relied on the German Vice consul to
conclude that he was an undesirable alien. He filed with the BOC an urgent motion for
reconsideration of the summary deportation order but the BOC neither resolved nor
acted on the motion. When Immigration Commissioner Domingo assumed office, she
asked the German Embassy if Scheer was still wanted to which the embassy replied
that he was not. Nevertheless, on June 6, 2002, Marine operatives as well as Board of
Immigration and Deportation (BID) agents arrested Scheer on order of Commissioner
Domingo and was held pending deportation. Scheer filed a petition for certiorari,
1. YES. The Court erred in dismissing the case. The procedure governing appeals tosaid court
from quasi-judicial agencies was embodied in Revised AdministrativeCircular No. 1-95, which
provides in relevant parts:
TO: COURT OF APPEALS, COURT OF TAX APPEALS, THE SOLICITOR
GENERAL,THE GOVERNMENT CORPORATE COUNSEL, ALL MEMBERS OF
THEGOVERNMENT PROSECUTION SERVICE, AND ALL MEMBERS OF
THEINTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES.SUBJECT:....RULES GOVERNING
APPEALS TO THE COURT OF APPEALS FROMJUDGMENTS OR FINAL ORDERS OF
THE COURT OF TAX APPEALS AND QUASI-JUDICIAL AGENCIES.1. Scope.- These
rules shall apply to appeals from judgments or final ordersof the Court of Tax Appeals and from
awards, judgments, final orders orresolutions of or authorized by any quasi-judicial agency in
the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions. Among these agencies are the Civil
ServiceCommission, Central Board of Assessment Appeals, Securities and
ExchangeCommission, Land Registration Authority, Social SecurityCommission, Office of the
President, Civil Aeronautics Board, etc.. . . .
6. Contents of petition. .- The petition for review shall (a) state the fullnames of the parties to
the case, without impleading the court or agencieseither as petitioners or respondents…
Thus, it is clear that petitioners’ failure to implead the Office of the President doesnot warrant
the dismissal of the case as it is in accordance with this circular
2. NO. The Office of the President is not an indispensable party to the case. Anindispensable
party is a party in interest without whom no final determination can behad of an action without
that party being impleaded. Indispensable parties are thosewith such an interest in the
controversy that a final decree would necessarily affecttheir rights, so that the court cannot
proceed without their presence. "Interest",within the meaning of this rule, should be material,
directly in issue and to beaffected by the decree, as distinguished from a mere incidental interest
in thequestion involved. On the other hand, a nominal or pro forma party is one who isjoined as
a plaintiff or defendant, not because such party has any real interest in thesubject matter or
because any relief is demanded, but merely because the technicalrules of pleadings require the
presence of such party on the record.
In the case at bar, even assuming that the Office of the President should havebeen impleaded by
petitioner, it is clear that the Office of the President is merelya pro forma party, in the same way
that a respondent court is a pro forma party inspecial civil actions for certiorari.
1. The SC agrees with the petitioner’s contention that the BOC was an indispensable party to the
respondent’s petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus in the Court of Appeals. The
respondent was arrested and detained on the basis of the Summary Deportation Order of the
BOC. The petitioner caused the arrest of the respondent in obedience to the said Deportation
Order. The respondent, in his Memorandum, prayed that the CA annul not only the Summary
Deportation Order of the BOC but also the latter’s Omnibus Resolution, and, thus, order the
respondent’s immediate release. The respondent also prayed that the CA issue a writ of
mandamus for the immediate resolution of his Urgent Motion for Reconsideration. The said
motion had to be resolved by the BOC as the order sought to be resolved and reconsidered was
issued by it and not by the petitioner alone. The powers and duties of the BOC may not be
exercised by the individual members of the Commission.
Section 7, Rule 3 of the RoC requires indispensable parties to be joined as plaintiffs or
defendants. The joinder of indispensable parties in mandatory. Without the presence of
indispensable parties, the judgement of the court cannot attain real finality. Strangers to a case
CIVPRO CASE MATRIX C2021
mandamus and prohibition in the CA to prevent the deportation. He said that his
deportation was illegal, unjust, unconstitutional and tainted with GADELEJ. He also
said that the BOC has not acted upon his Urgent Motion for Reconsideration despite
the lapse of 6 years. Commissioner commented on the petition saying that the BOC
was an indispensable party, and not impleading the BOC as an indispensable party
warranted the denial of the petition. The CA rendered the decision in favor of Scheer.
CA said that there were numerous cases when only the Commissioner of Immigration
alone was impleaded to decide whether an alien may stay or be deported. (since only
the Commissioner domingo was impleaded and she is only 1 out of 4 commissioners)
Issues:
1. WoN the Bureau of Commissioner was an indispensable party to the
petition? - YES
2. WoN the non-joinder of the Bureau of Commissioner be a ground for
dismissal of the petition? - NO
2.
09 Agro Agro (seller) sold 2 parcels of land to Wonderland (buyer) and in return, Agro would
Conglomerates secure a loan from the bank but Wonderland shall pay for it. Agro was able to receive
vs. CA the proceeds of the loan although the sale did not materialize because Agro did not
deliver the farmland to Wonderland. So the bank went after Agro. Agro contended that
based on the agreement, Wonderland shall pay for the loan. But the RTC ruled that
Agro is liable. Take note that Agro failed to file a third-party complaint against
Wonderland. (This case is between Agro and Regent Bank)
W/N the non-inclusion of Wonderland in this case would prevent the court from
proceeding in the action. (NO)
10 Co v. Acosta Pepsi Cola Bottling Company of the Philippines, Inc. (PEPSI) issued 3 purchase orders
addressed to CTC Appliance Center for 12,000 units of refrigerators. Rufino Co is the
proprietor of the Center. In a formal deed of assignment, petitioner Co assigned his
rights and interests to the three purchase orders and to the money value of the
deliveries made or to be made thereunder to respondent Refrigeration Industries, Inc.
(RII). PEPSI wrote a letter to RII informing them that it was not recognizing the
same.
 Failing to collect from PEPSI, RII sent a letter of demand to the Co
demanding payment of P2,907,535.00, but the latter refused and failed to pay. RII and
Delta Motors Corporation (Delta) filed a case for a sum of money with attachment
before Branch X of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, against Pepsi Cola Bottling
Company of the Philippines, Inc., and petitioner Rufino Co. RII and Delta filed a
formal ex-parte motion to dismiss the complaint against PEPSI. Attached to the motion
is an instrument entitled Delta Motors, RII, and PEPSI mutually agreed to release and
forever discharge each other from any and all liabilities or causes of action arising out
of the transaction involving the 1,000 units of refrigerator.
WoN the respondent court lost authority to act further in the case insofar as Co is
concerned. YES.
11 Metropolitan Central Bank (CB; now BSP) and RBG entered into an agreement, wherein RBG shall
Bank and Trust facilitate the loan applications of farmer-borrowers under the CB-International Bank
Company for Reconstruction and Development’s (IBRD’s) Rural Credit Line. The agreement
(Metrobank) v. required RBG to open a separate bank account where the IBRD loan proceeds shall be
are not bound by the judgment rendered by the court. The absence of an indispensable party
renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void. Lack of authority to act not only of the
absent party but also as to those present. The responsibility of impleading all the indispensable
parties’ rests on the petitioner/plaintiff.
2. The non-joinder of indispensable parties is not a ground for the dismissal of an action. Parties
may be added by order of the court on motion of the party or on its own initiative at any stage of
the action and/or such times as are just. If the petitioner/plaintiff refuses to implead an
indispensable party despite the order of the court, the latter may dismiss the complaint/petition
for the petitioner/plaintiff’s failure to comply therefor. The remedy is to implead the non-party
claimed to be indispensable. In this case, the CA did not require the respondent (petitioner
therein) to implead the BOC as respondent, but merely relied on the rulings of the Court in Vivo
v. Arca, and Vivo v. Cloribel. The CA’s reliance on the said rulings is, however, misplaced. The
acts subject of the petition in the two cases were those of the Immigration Commissioner and
not those of the BOC; hence, the BOC was not a necessary nor even an indispensable party in
the aforecited cases.
The Court may be curing the defect in this case by adding the BOC as party-petitioner. The
petition should not be dismissed because the second action would only be a repetition of the
first. In Salvador, et al., v. Court of Appeals, et al., we held that it cannot be claimed by the
State that the BOC was not afforded its day in court, simply because only the petitioner, the
Chairperson of the BOC, was the respondent in the CA.
Agro was held liable by the Court. The SC emphasized that Agro could not excuse itself from
liability and hold Wonderland liable to pay the loan upon the rescission of their sales contract. If
petitioners sustained damages as a result of the rescission, it should have impleaded Wonderland
and asked damages (but they did not). The non-inclusion of a necessary party does not prevent
the court from proceeding in the action, and the judgment rendered therein shall be without
prejudice to the rights of such necessary party.
RII and Delta’s complaint for a sum of money with attachment against PEPSI and Co clearly
shows that PEPSI and the Co are indispensable parties to the case. In fact, RII and Delta sued
both PEPSI and Co under a common cause of action. Likewise, the affidavit attached in support
of the complaint is framed in such a way that there can be no doubt as to the intention of the RII
and Delta in suing PEPSI and the petitioner herein as indispensable parties. After the lower
court dropped PEPSI as a party defendant in Civil Case No. 42815, the respondent court lost
authority to act further in the case insofar as Co is concerned.
Where two defendants are sued under a common cause of action, plaintiff’s agreement to
drop and release and discharge one of the defendants from the case should extend to the
other even if both defendants have not yet filed any answer.
The agreement was between CB and RBG. Wherein, RBG assumed liability under the Project
terms and Conditions by solidarily binding itself with the principal debtors (i.e. farmer-
borrowers) to fulfill the obligation. Therefore, CB’s immediate recourse should have been
against the farmer-borrowers and RBG. It erred in deducting the amounts against
CIVPRO CASE MATRIX C2021
Rural Bank of deposited. RBG opened an account with Metrobank. As depositary, Metrobank is to
Gerona, Inc. receive the credit advice released by the CB and Metrobank, in turn, would credit such
(RBG) amount to RBG’s savings account.
CB on several dates released credit advices in favor of Metrobank in the following
amounts and for the respective farmer-borrower: (1) 178,652 – Domindaor de Jesus;
189,052 – Basilio Panopio, and 220,000 – Ponciano Lagman. Metrobank, in turn,
credited the said amounts to RBG’s savings account.
For some reason, the CB issued debit advices – reversing all the approved IBRD
loans. CB debited from Metrobank’s demand deposit account the amounts
corresponding to the IBRD loans. Upon receipt of such debit advices, Metrobank
debited 312,052.41 from RBG’s savings account. Metrobank demanded from RBG for
the satisfaction of the outstanding balance (i.e. deficiency between the aggregate
amount of IBRD loans and amount Metrobank was able to debit from RBG’s account).
Metrobank filed a complaint for collection of sum of money against RBG before
the RTC.
RTC ruled for Metrobank. It ruled that there was legal subrogation under Art. 1302 of
the Civil Code. It ordered RBG to pay Metrobank the outstanding amount plus 14%
per annum interest until paid. The CA, however, reversed the decision. Aside from
ruling that there was no legal subrogation, it also ruled that CB should have been
impleaded as a necessary party (!!!) so that it could shed light on the IBRD loan
reversals. Hence, the petition was filed before the SC. Metrobank argues that CB is not
a necessary party, because RBG already admitted its liability for the amount
Metrobank failed to recover. Furthermore, Metrobank argued that to further implead
CB would unduly delay the proceedings. (The case was filed with the RTC 20 years
ago)
ISSUE: Whether CB is a necessary party to the case (NO).
12 Plasabas v. CA Petitioner Sps. Plasabas and Malazarte filed a complaint for recovery of title to
property with the RTC of Maasin. The subject property is a coconut land in Canturing,
Maasin, Southern Leyte. However, during the trial in the RTC, it was revealed that
Plasabas is not the sole owner of the said property. Based on the testimonies of the
petitioner’s witnesses, the property was passed on from Francisco Plasabas to his son,
Leoncio. Then, Leoncio passed it to Jovita Talam, petitioner Nieves’ grandmother.
Then to Antonina Talam, her mother. And then to her and her siblings – Jose, Victor,
and Victoria.
The trial court dismissed the case without hearing the merits for the failure of the Sps.
Plasabas and Malazarte to implead the other co-owners, who are considered as
indispensable parties to the case. This ruling was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
The issue before the Supreme Court is WoN the co-owners are indispensable parties to
a case?
13 Casals v. Tayud Robert Casals and Inocentes Ouano, organizers of Apollo Homes and Investment
Golf Corporation, furnished an Affidavit of Quitclaim and Waiver in favor of Antonio
Osmeña, their co-organizer in the corporation. By virtue of said document, Osmeña
was able to transfer ownership of certain parcels of land to his name with the tax
declarations issued as a consequence. Out of those properties covered by the waiver
Metrobank’s account. Metrobank assumed no responsibility other than being a conduit.
Impleading CB as a necessary party is completely unnecessary contrary to the position
taken by the CA. In so far as Metrobank is concerned, the CB’s presence and the reasons for its
reversals of the IBRD loans are immaterial after subrogation has taken place.
Rule 3, Sec. 8 of the Rules of Court provides: A necessary party is one who is not
indispensable but who ought to be joined as a party if complete relief is to be accorded as
to those already parties, or for a complete determination or settlement of the claim subject
of the action. [Not really cited by the Court]
In addition, whatever cause of action RBG may have against the CB for the unexplained
reversals and any undue deductions is for RBG to ventilate as a third-party claim; if it has not
done so at this point, then the matter should be dealt with in a separate case.
The SC remanded the case back to the RTC for further determination of the actual amounts due
to Metrobank.
NO. Under Art. 487 of the Civil Code, any of the co-owners may bring an action for ejectment.
The said article covers all kinds of actions for recovery of possession. As such, there was no
need to implead the other co-owners as parties to the case. A co-owner may file suit without
necessarily joining all the other co-owners as co-plaintiffs because the suit is deemed to be
instituted for the benefit of all. But if the judgment is adverse, the same cannot prejudice the
rights of the unimpleaded co-owners.
The allegation of the petitioners in their complaint that they are the sole owners of the property
in litigation is immaterial, considering that they acknowledged during trial that the property is
co-owned by Nieves and her siblings, and that Plasabas and Malazarte have been authorized by
the co-owners to pursue the case on the latter’s behalf. The Court remanded the case to the trial
court for disposition.
YES. Rule 3, Section 7 of the Rules of Court defines indispensable parties as parties-in-interest,
without whom there can be no final determination of an action. The general rule with reference
to the making of parties in a civil action requires the joinder of all necessary parties, and the
joinder of all indispensable parties under any and all conditions, their presence being a sine qua
non for the exercise of judicial power. A person is not an indispensable party, however, if his
CIVPRO CASE MATRIX C2021
and quitclaim, four parcels of land were developed by Osmeña as a memorial park; six
parcels were sold to Tri-Plus Holdings Corporation with Euclid Po as payor; and a
parcel sold to the spouses de Jesus.
The heirs of Robert Casals instituted an action for declaration of nullity, conveyance,
quieting of title, recovery of ownership, accounting and damages against Osmeña,
Euclid Po, Tri-Plus Holdings Corporation, Spouses de Jesus and the Provincial
Assessor of Cebu.
The petitioners filed a Motion for Separate Partial Judgment praying that they be
declared owners of parts of the lots. This petition was granted by the RTC. Petitioners
filed a Motion for Execution which was granted and a Writ of Partial Execution was
issued.
Respondent Tayud Golf filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Annulment of
Final Orders, seeking to nullify the 3 orders on the grounds that the said Orders and
Writ were obtained through extrinsic fraud and that there was lack of jurisdiction over
the person of respondent Tayud Golf, which was never impleaded in the civil case. The
CA found Tayud Golf’s petition meritorious as it declared the cited decisions as null
and void for lack of jurisdiction. A Motion for Reconsideration filed by petitioners was
denied by the CA. Petitioners filed this petition for review under Rule 45.
W/N Tayud Golf is an indispensable party.
14 Pimentel v. Senator Panfilo Lacson delivered a privilege speech entitled "Kaban ng Bayan,
Senate Bantayan!" and called attention to the congressional insertion in the 2008 General
Appropriations Act, particularly the P200 million appropriated for the construction of
the CP Garcia Avenue Extension including Right-of-Way (ROW), and another P200
million appropriated for the extension of C-5 road including ROW. He stated that C-5
is what was formerly called CP Garcia Avenue and that the second appropriation
covers the same stretch – from Sucat Luzon Expressway to Sucat Road in Parañaque
City. Senator Lacson further stated that when he followed the narrow trail leading to
the double entry, it led to Senator Villar, then the Senate President. Senator Madrigal
introduced P.S. Resolution 706 and demanded to direct the Committee on Ethics and
Privileges to investigate the conduct of Senate Manuel B. Villar, Jr. for using his
position of power to influence public officials in relocating the C-5 Road extension
project
ISSUE: Won Senator Madrigal, who filed the complaint against Senator Villar, is an
indispensable party in this petition.
15 Kilosbayan vs. Philippine Charity and Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) and Philippine Gaming
Guingona Management Corporation (PGMC) entered into an agreement dubbed as a Contract of
Lease which would allow the PGMC to conduct online lottery with PCSO. Petitioners
oppose the agreement stating that serious moral and ethical considerations. WoN the
interest in the controversy or subject matter is separable from the interest of the other parties, so
that it will not necessarily be directly or injuriously affected by a decree which does complete
justice between them. Also, a person is not an indispensable party if his presence would merely
permit complete relief between him and those already parties to the action, or if he has no
interest in the subject matter of the action. It is not a sufficient reason to declare a person to be
an indispensable party that his presence will avoid multiple litigation.
The CA, in finding Tayud Golf as an indispensable party, declared that Tayud Golf’s claim of
ownership over the 108 parcels of land is based on a Deed of Assignment executed by Apollo
Homes in favour of the former. Of the 108 properties, 106 parcels were included in the Affidavit
of Quitclaim and Waiver which the heirs of Casals were assailing. The CA also found that 27
parcels of land were already issued certificates of title under the name of Tayud Golf as early as
1993, with another 7 parcels of land which are subject matter of Tayud Golf’s application for
land registration which were still pending issuance of certificates of title. Moreover, 74 parcels
were issued tax declaration under its name, with payment of real estate taxes thereof supported
by various tax clearances. Evidently, Tayud is encompassed within the definition of an
indispensable party. Being the registered owner of at least 27 properties included in the
Affidavit of Quitclaim and Waiver, not to mention the other seven properties which were
pending issuance of certificates of title by virtue of the CA decision dated May 31, 2006, and
the other properties, which were declared for taxation purposes under its name, Tayud Golf
definitely has such a direct interest in the controversy or subject matter of the instant case.
NO, Senator Madrigal is not an indispensable party to the petition before the Court. While it
may be true that she has an interest in the outcome of this case as the author of P.S. Resolution
706, the issues in this case are matters of jurisdiction and procedure on the part of the Senate
Committee of the Whole which can be resolved without affecting Senator Madrigal’s interest.
The nature of Senator Madrigal’s interest in this case is not of the nature that this case could not
be resolved without her participation.
Test to determine if party is indispensable:
An indispensable party is a party who has an interest in the controversy or subject matter that a
final adjudication cannot be made, in his absence, without injuring or affecting that interes-- a
party who has not only an interest in the subject matter of the controversy, but also has an
interest of such nature that a final decree cannot be made without affecting his interest or
leaving the controversy in such a condition that its final determination may be wholly
inconsistent with equity and good conscience. An indispensable party is one who must be
included in an action before it may properly go forward.
A person is not an indispensable party if his presence would merely permit a complete relief
between him and those already parties to the action, or if he has no interest in the subject matter
of the action.
A party's standing before the court is a procedural technicality which it may, in the exercise of
its discretion set aside in view of the importance of the issues raised.
In line with the liberal policy of this Court on locus standi, ordinary taxpayers, members of
Congress, and even association of planters, and non-profit civic organizations were allowed to
CIVPRO CASE MATRIX C2021
petitioners have locus standi? The court stated that locus standi is a procedural
technicality that the courts may set aside in its discretion. Since the issue is of
transcendental importance with serious repercussions, the petitioners were recognized.
WoN the contract of lease is valid. The contract of lease is not valid. The law granted
to PCSO the franchise to conduct lotteries, and such franchise, being granted by the
Congress cannot be shared, or assigned to others. The “Contract of Lease” is actually a
joint venture, and as such violative of the law as it would allow PCMG to shares
PCSO’s franchise.
16 Intellectual Intellectual Property Office of the Philippines (IPOPHL) recommended to the DFA
Property that the Philippines should accede to the Madrid Protocol (implements Madrid
Association vs. Agreement which provides a one stop solution for registering and managing marks
Ochoa worldwide). DFA endorsed this to the president and determined that it is an executive
agreement. President Benigno Aquino III ratified the protocol through an instrument of
accession. Petitioner Intellectual Property Association of the Philippines, an
association of more than 100 law firms and individual practitioners in intellectual
property law whose main objective is to promote intellectual property rights in the
Philippines, commenced a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition to
challenge the President’s accession to the protocol without the concurrence of the
senate. They also stated that the Madrid Protocol was in violation of the IP Code. The
IPAP argues that it has the locus standi to file the case by virtue of its being an
association whose members stand to be injured as a result of the Protocol’s
enforcement. They claim that it will diminish the rights granted by the IP Code to IP
Law practitioners.
Whether or not the IP AP has locus standi to challenge the President's ratification of
the Madrid Protocol YES
17 Velarde vs. Social SJS filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief before the RTC against Velarde. SJS sought
Justice Society the interpretation of several constitutional provisions, specifically on the separation of
(SJS) church and state; and a declaratory judgment on the constitutionality of the acts of
religious leaders endorsing a candidate for an elective office, or urging or requiring the
members of their flock to vote for a specified candidate.
The trial court decided in favor of SJS and failed to include a dispositive portion in its
assailed decision. Thus, Velarde and Soriano filed separate Motions for
Reconsideration which were denied.
WoN respondent/s have any legal standing to file the Petition for Declaratory Relief? -
NO. BUT
initiate and prosecute actions before this Court to question the constitutionality or validity of
laws, acts, decisions, rulings, or orders of various government agencies or instrumentalities
Legal standing refers to a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question. The
person who would assail the validity of a statute must have "a personal and substantial interest
in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain direct injury as a result.” (Direct Injury
test)
The injury that the IPAP will allegedly suffer from the implementation of the Madrid Protocol
is imaginary, incidental and speculative as opposed to a direct and material injury required by
the foregoing tenets on locus standi. The IPAP has misinterpreted the provisions of the IP Code.
Hence, the IPAP cannot claim that it will suffer irreparable injury or diminution of rights
granted to it by Section 125.
The IPAP, however, also emphasizes that the paramount public interest involved has
transcendental importance because its petition asserts that the Executive Department has
overstepped the bounds of its authority by thereby cutting˜∑ into another branch's
functions and responsibilities. The issues raised herein against the implementation of the
Madrid Protocol are of transcendental importance. Accordingly, the court recognized
IPAP's locus standi to bring the present challenge. The Court has adopted a liberal attitude
towards locus standi whenever the issue presented for consideration has transcendental
significance to the people, or whenever the issues raised are of paramount importance to the
public.
Legal standing or locus standi has been defined as a personal and substantial interest in the
case, such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the challenged
act. Interest means a material interest in issue that is affected by the questioned act or
instrument, as distinguished from a mere incidental interest in the question involved.
Parties bringing suits challenging the constitutionality of a law, an act or a statute must show
"not only that the law or act is invalid, but also that they have sustained or are in immediate
or imminent danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and not
merely that they suffer thereby in some indefinite way.
First, parties suing as taxpayers must specifically prove that they have sufficient interest in
preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation.
Second, there was no showing in the Petition for Declaratory Relief that SJS as a political party
or its members as registered voters would be adversely affected by the alleged acts of the
respondents below.
Finally, the allegedly keen interest of its "thousands of members who are citizens-taxpayers-
registered voters" is too general, vague, highly speculative and uncertain to satisfy the
requirement of standing.
BUT
The Court may liberalize the locus standi requirement when a petition raises an issue of
transcendental significance or paramount importance to the people. In IBP v. Zamora, It noted
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that "the IBP has advanced constitutional issues which deserve the attention of this Court in
view of their seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents.”