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ABSTRACT
ofMiami
© 2010University
fewcountries in LatinAmerica
wherean alternationofexecutivepower
had notoccurredsincetheinception ofthethirdwave ofdemocratiza-
tion.7Froma methodological thisstudycan further
perspective, con-
tributeto establishingwhetherthe applicationof models of voting
behaviorthathavebeen used in advanceddemocracies are suitablefor
thestudyofdevelopingdemocracies.
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thattheFMLNwouldturnEl SalvadorintoanotherVenezuela.Forits
own part,theFMLNtriedto capitalizeon theshortcomings of thedif-
ferentARENAadministrations, especially theirfailureto effectively
tacklepoverty.
Overall,however,in 2009thelevelofpolarization somewhat dimin-
ished;the FMLN's partyprogram (plan gobierno)pledged main-
de to
taindollarization,
respectprivate
property, promote businessandinvest-
mentopportunities, and adhereto all freetradeagreements, including
CAFTA{Economist 2008).Funes,theFMLNcandidate, repeatedly talked
about buildinga constructive relationship with the United States
(Schmidtand Malkin2009) and, to show his commitment to the free
market,announcedthathe would implement policieslike those of
Brazilianpresident
Lulada Silva(Colburn2009,149).
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Table3. IdeologicalSelf-Placement
in theAmericas,
2008
12 3 4 5 6
Non- ExtremeExtreme
Mean Standard response Left Right
Country Ideology Number Deviation % % %
Table4. Cross-Time
IdeologicalSelf-Placement
in El Salvador
Distribution
of Ideological Self-Placement
(%)
Extreme Center- Center- Extreme
Mean Standard Left Left Center Right Right
Year Ideology Deviation (1-2) (3-4) (5-6) (7-8) (9-10)
1991a 5.82 1.63 2.4 7.8 60.9 19.4 7.0
1995 5.72 2.02 10.7 6.9 51.7 10.9 9.8
1999 6.07 2.73 9.6 4.5 36.3 7.9 16.6
2004 6.89 3.02 10.5 5.2 21.9 13.0 35.5
2008 5.30 2.96 19-9 12.9 29.7 12.1 17.0
2009 4.96 3.24 25.7 12.5 23.0 14.8 17.1
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Conclusions
For years,the presidential electionsin El Salvadorproducedimpas-
sioneddebatesbothin and outsidethatcountry. Thisarticlehas taken
an empirical approachto tryto explainsome of thefactors thatmay
havemotivated citizens'choicesat thepollsin thepast15 years.While
itis truethatan empirical analysiscannotfullyaccountforall thevari-
ables and conditionsthatmayhave influenced an election,themodels
explainan important partofthevariance.
The resultsofthestatisticalanalysishelpus to understand thepat-
ternsofelectoralbehaviorthathavebeen developingin El Salvadorin
recentyears.Ideologyand theevaluation ofpolicyperformance, along
withpartyidentification,candidateimages,andthefocuson issuessuch
as theeconomyand crime,largely explaintheoutcomeoftheelections.
Mostofthepredictors arelinkedto therational choicevotingmodel.In
contrast,variableslinked to the sociological model have been relevant
onlysporadically.
Ideologyhas been a majordeterminant of thevotein El Salvador
ever sincethe first
postconflict elections in 1994.Citizenswho consider
themselves on the leftof the ideologicalspectrumhave consistently
votedfortheFMLN,whilecitizenswho place themselves on theright
haveconsistently votedforARENA.Votersat thecenter, however, who
composethemajority oftheelectorate, weretheoneswho,up to 2009,
tippedthepresidential racesin favorof ARENA.In each election,the
swingofcentrist voterstowardeithersideofthespectrum has beenkey
to thefinaloutcome.30
Although ARENA'S victoriesin thepresidential racesfrom1994to
2004can be partlyexplainedbythevoteobtainedfromthelargeper-
centageofcitizenswho consideredthemselves on therightto center-
rightoftheideologicalspectrum (plus theadded votefromthemajor-
ityof thoseat the center),ideologyalone is not enoughto account
forthatparty'ssuccess. The positiveor negativeevaluationof the
policiesundertaken by ARENA'Sdifferent administrations (retrospec-
tiveevaluation)and the expectationsabout thosepolicies(prospec-
tiveevaluation)also servedas predictors of vote in all models.The
modelsshow thatformanyyears,in spiteof a degreeof discontent,
SalvadoransfeltthatARENAwas bettersuitedthantheFMLNto carry
out certainpolicies,especiallywithregardto fighting crimeand pro-
moting economic and
growth jobs. ARENA'S electoralsuccess there-
forecan be attributed notonlyto theideologicalvotebutalso to the
party'sabilityto convincecitizens - even thosewho did not identify
withtheextremerightand thosewithlowerincomes - thatitwas pre-
to
pared govern.Certainly, other features of ARENA'S campaigns,
such as itssuperiorfinancialresources,itsdepictionof the FMLNas
unqualified,and itswarningsofa communist takeover,mayalso have
a but
played role, only to theextent that citizenswere convinced that
ARENA'Spolicieswereviable.
Throughout theyearsofARENA'S dominance, theFMLNmaintained
a strongand important base of supportamongcitizenswho clearly
identifiedwiththe leftand, to a certainextent,amongthoseat the
The party,however,seemed unsuccessful
center-left. at generating
enough electoralsupportamong voters at the center,mostlybecauseits
stanceon issueslikeCAFTAand dollarization did notseemto resonate
withmoderate voters.The choiceofformer FMLNcommandants, such
as Guardadoand Handal,as candidatesin two previouselectionsdid
notseemto helpthecause,either.
Notes
The authorwould like to thankJeannette Aguilar,RubiArana,Cynthia
Arnson, JoséMiguelCruz,Mitchell Seligson,MichaelLewis-Beck, NinaWiese-
and
homeier, DominiqueZephyr fortheir
valuable in
help obtaining dataand
information as wellas AbbyCordovaforhersuggestions
forthisarticle, on an
earlierversionofthemanuscript. RodCuestasprovidedimportant helpin edit-
ingthemanuscript. A specialnoteofappreciation goes to thethreeanonymous
reviewers ofLAPSfortheirmanyvaluableideasand suggestions on thecontent
ofthearticle.
1. Huntington arguesthatelectionsmaybe an insufficient signof democ-
racy.He proposesthatin orderto be consolidateddemocracies, countries
shouldhaveto pass the"two-turnover test":thewinnersin a founding election
are defeatedin a subsequentelectionand the new winnersare also later
defeated.
2. A poll by Borgeand AsociadosconductedbetweenFebruary 16 and 22
produceda technical draw(ARENA40.9percentvs. FMLN40.0percent).Other
polls(LPGDatos,CIOPS-UTEC) also produceda technicaldraw.Earlierpollsin
2009gavetheFMLNa widerlead. See El Diariode Hoy,variousdates.
3. Thepercentage ofundecidedvoterswas similar in all polls:CID-Gallup,
forinstance,reported that18.1percentofSalvadorans wereundecidedbymid-
February.
4. The officialresultsof the2009 electionscan be foundat theTribunal
SupremoElectoral website.
5. Although the2009electionsimplieda majorchangeinthepolitical land-
scape, ARENA continued to hold an importantnumber of the seats in the
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