PALE Case Digests 2

Canon 3

In Re: Luis Tagorda

Solicitation of clients thru another, evidenced by correspondence

FACTS: The crux of the issue is the letter herein reproduced:

MY DEAR LIEUTENANT: I would like to inform you of the approaching date for our
induction into office as member of the Provincial Board, that is on the 16th of next month. Before
my induction into office I should be very glad to hear your suggestions or recommendations for the
good of the province in general and for your barrio in particular. You can come to my house at any
time here in Echague, to submit to me any kind of suggestion or recommendation as you may desire.

I also inform you that despite my membership in the Board I will have my residence here in
Echague. I will attend the session of the Board of Ilagan, but will come back home on the following
day here in Echague to live and serve with you as a lawyer and notary public. Despite my election as
member of the Provincial Board, I will exercise my legal profession as a lawyer and notary public. In
case you cannot see me at home on any week day, I assure you that you can always find me there on
every Sunday. I also inform you that I will receive any work regarding preparations of documents of
contract of sales and affidavits to be sworn to before me as notary public even on Sundays.

I would like you all to be informed of this matter for the reason that some people are in the belief
that my residence as member of the Board will be in Ilagan and that I would then be disqualified to
exercise my profession as lawyer and as notary public. Such is not the case and I would make it clear
that I am free to exercise my profession as formerly and that I will have my residence here in
Echague.

I would request you kind favor to transmit this information to your barrio people in any of your
meetings or social gatherings so that they may be informed of my desire to live and to serve with you
in my capacity as lawyer and notary public. If the people in your locality have not as yet contracted
the services of other lawyers in connection with the registration of their land titles, I would be willing
to handle the work in court and would charge only three pesos for every registration.

The provincial fiscal of Isabela, with whom joined the representative of the Attorney-General in the oral
presentation of the case, suggests that the respondent be only reprimanded.

ISSUE: Whether the “solicitation” made by herein respondent warrants the disciplinary action

RULING: YES, respondent herein is suspended

The statute as amended conforms in principle to the Canons of Professionals Ethics adopted by the
American Bar Association in 1908 and by the Philippine Bar Association in 1917. Canons 27 and 28 of the
Code of Ethics provide:

ADVERTISING, DIRECT OR INDIRECT. — The most worthy and effective advertisement

possible, even for a young lawyer, and especially with his brother lawyers, is the establishment of a
 well-merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust. This cannot be forced, but
must be the outcome of character and conduct. The publication or circulation of ordinary simple
business cards, being a matter of personal taste or local custom, and sometimes of convenience, is
not per se improper. But solicitation of business by circulars or advertisements, or by personal communications or
interview not warranted by personal relations, is unprofessional. It is equally unprofessional to procure business
by indirection through touters of any kind, whether allied real estate firms or trust companies
advertising to secure the drawing of deeds or wills or offering retainers in exchange for executorships
or trusteeships to be influenced by the lawyer. Indirect advertisement for business by furnishing or inspiring
newspaper comments concerning the manner of their conduct, the magnitude of the interest involved, the importance of
the lawyer's position, and all other like self-laudation, defy the traditions and lower the tone of our high calling, and are
intolerable.

It becomes our duty to condemn in no uncertain terms the ugly practice of solicitation of cases by lawyers. It
is destructive of the honor of a great profession. It lowers the standards of that profession. It works against
the confidence of the community in the integrity of the members of the bar. It results in needless litigation
and in incenting to strife otherwise peacefully inclined citizens.

We think that our action should go further than this if only to reflect our attitude toward cases of this
character of which unfortunately the respondent's is only one. The commission of offenses of this nature
would amply justify permanent elimination from the bar. But as mitigating, circumstances working in favor of
the respondent there are, first, his intimation that he was unaware of the impropriety of his acts, second, his
youth and inexperience at the bar, and, third, his promise not to commit a similar mistake in the future. A
modest period of suspension would seem to fit the case of the erring attorney.

Dacanay v. Baker & Mckenzie

Using a name of an international law firm

FACTS: Lawyer Adriano E. Dacanay, admitted to the bar in 1954, in his 1980 verified complaint, sought to
enjoin Juan G. Collas, Jr. and nine other lawyers from practising law under the name of Baker & McKenzie, a
law firm organized in Illinois.

In a letter dated November 16, 1979 respondent Vicente A. Torres, using the letterhead of Baker &
McKenzie, which contains the names of the ten lawyers, asked Rosie Clurman for the release of 87 shares of
Cathay Products International, Inc. to H.E. Gabriel, a client.

Attorney Dacanay, in his reply dated December 7, 1979, denied any liability of Clurman to Gabriel. He
requested that he be informed whether the lawyer of Gabriel is Baker & McKenzie "and if not, what is your
purpose in using the letterhead of another law office." Not having received any reply, he filed the instant
complaint.

ISSUE: Whether the use of the respondents of the name “Baker and Mckenzie” is allowed

RULING: NO, it is not allowed

We hold that Baker & McKenzie, being an alien law firm, cannot practice law in the Philippines (Sec. 1, Rule
138, Rules of Court). As admitted by the respondents in their memorandum, Baker & McKenzie is a
professional partnership organized in 1949 in Chicago, Illinois with members and associates in 30 cities
around the world. Respondents, aside from being members of the Philippine bar, practising under the firm
name of Guerrero & Torres, are members or associates of Baker & Mckenzie.

As pointed out by the Solicitor General, respondents' use of the firm name Baker & McKenzie constitutes a
representation that being associated with the firm they could "render legal services of the highest quality to
multinational business enterprises and others engaged in foreign trade and investment" (p. 3, respondents'
memo). This is unethical because Baker & McKenzie is not authorized to practise law here.

Respondents are enjoined from practising law under the firm name Baker & McKenzie.

Ouano Arrastre v. Hon. Aleanor

2 branches of law firm using the same firm name

FACTS: Private respondent International Pharmaceuticals, Inc. ("IPI") filed a complaint before the Regional
Trial Court of Cebu City against Mercantile Insurance Company, Inc. ("Mercantile") and petitioner Ouano
Arrastre Service, Inc. ("OASI") for replacement of certain equipment imported by IPI which were insured by
Mercantile but were lost on arrival in Cebu City, allegedly because of mishandling by petitioner OASI.

Petitioner OASI's answer was filed by the law firm of Ledesma, Saludo and Associates ("LSA") and signed by
Atty. Manuel Trinidad of the Cebu office or branch of LSA. However, sometime thereafter, Atty. Trinidad
resigned from LSA and Atty. Fidel Manalo, a partner from the Makati office of LSA, filed a motion to
postpone the hearing stating that the case had just been endorsed to him by petitioner OASI.

On 12 January 1990, after trial which Atty. Manalo handled for OASI, the trial court rendered a decision
holding Mercantile and petitioner OASI jointly and severally liable for the cost of replacement of the
damaged equipment plus damages, totalling P435,000.00.

On 26 June 1990 petitioner's counsel, through Atty. Catipay of the Cebu Branch of the LSA, filed a notice of
appeal 1 claiming that the decision was "mistakenly sent" by the trial court to the law firm's Head Office in
Makati.

On 2 July 1990, public respondent judge denied OASI's motion for reconsideration declaring that the appeal
cannot be given due course for lack of merit and ordered that the writ of execution be enforced. On appeal,
the Court of Appeals dismissed petitioner's appeal upon the grounds that: (1) there had been a valid service of
the decision

The Court of Appeals found as a fact that a copy of the decision was served upon Atty. Catipay but that he
refused to receive it:

Finally, on this point, there is an uncontroverted sworn statement of the lower court's legal aide, Mr.
Jesus A. Lim, attesting to the fact that on February 7, 1990 he served on Atty. Ronald Catipay a copy
of the decision in the case, but that the latter 'refused to receive copy of the decision and instead
instructed me to send the copy of the decision to the Makati Office of the law firm' and that Mr. Lim
accompanied the lawyer to a place where a xerox machine was located, copied the decision and gave
to the lawyer a xerox copy of said decision. This statement seems to find corroboration in the later
allegation of Atty. Catipay that their Cebu office never 'officially' received copy of the decision.

ISSUE: Whether the service of the decision at the Cebu branch binds also the Makati branch
RULING: YES, it binds the Makati branch

The Court is not persuaded by the contention that the period to file a notice of appeal had not commenced
to run as there had been no valid service of the trial court's decision upon petitioner's counsel.

Petitioner's counsel was and is the firm of Ledesma, Saludo and Associates (and not any particular member or
associate of that firm) which firm happens to have a main office in Makati and a branch office in Cebu City.
The Court notes that both the main and branch offices operate under one and the same name, Saludo
Ledesma and Associates. Having represented itself to the public as comprising a single firm, LSA should not
be allowed at this point to pretend that its main office and its branch office in effect constitute separate law
firms with separate and distinct personalities and responsibilities.

Petitioner does not deny that Atty. Manalo, a partner in LSA based in its Makati main office, received the
copy of the decision. Such a receipt binds the LSA law partnership.

The trial court's decision was validly served upon petitioner's counsel, whether we look to the unjustified
refusal by Atty. Catipay of LSA-Cebu to accept a copy of the trial court's decision on 7 February 1990 and the
actual notice received by Atty. Catipay on that date through his acquisition of a photocopy of that decision, or
whether we look to the receipt of the trial court's decision by LSA Makati on 21 February 1990. In view of
the unitary nature of the law firm retained by petitioner as its counsel, we believe that the reglementary period
for filing a notice of appeal actually began to run on 8 February 1990. However, even if the Court were to
accept (which it does not) the supposition that the reglementary period began to run only on 22 February
1990, the day after the copy of the trial court's decision was received by LSA-Makati, it is quite clear that the
notice of appeal filed by petitioner's counsel on 26 June 1990 was wholly late. By the time the notice of appeal
was filed, the trial court's decision had become final and executory as to petitioner and could be executed
against it.

B.R. Sebastian v. CA

Law firm as the counsel of the client, not the attorney itself

FACTS: Eulogio B. Reyes, now deceased, filed an action for damages with the then Court of First Instance
(now Regional Trial Court) of Rizal, Pasay City Branch, against the Director of Public Works, the Republic of
the Philippines and petitioner herein, B. R. Sebastian Enterprises, Inc.

Petitioner, thru its counsel, the law firm of Baizas, Alberto and Associates, timely appealed the adverse
decision to the respondent Court of Appeals

On 19 February 1974, petitioner, thru its then counsel of record, received notice to file Appellant's Brief
within 45 days from receipt thereof. It had, therefore, until 5 April 1974 within which to comply.

Counsel for petitioner failed to file the Brief; thus, on 9 July 1974, respondent Court issued a Resolution
requiring said counsel to show cause why the appeal should not be dismissed for failure to file the Appellant's
Brief within the reglementary period. 4 A copy of this Resolution was received by counsel for petitioner on 17
July 1974.

As the latter failed to comply with the above Resolution, respondent Court, on 9 September 1974, issued
another Resolution this time dismissing petitioner's appeal
On 28 September 1974, petitioner, this time thru the BAIZAS LAW OFFICE, filed a motion for
reconsideration 7 of the resolution dismissing its appeal alleging that as a result of the death of Atty. Crispin
Baizas, senior partner in the law firm of BAIZAS, ALBERTO & ASSOCIATES, the affairs of the said firm
are still being settled between Atty. Jose Baizas (son of Crispin Baizas) and Atty. Ruby Alberto, the latter
having established her own law office; furthermore, Atty. Rodolfo Espiritu, the lawyer who handled this case
in the trial court and who is believed to have also attended to the preparation of the Appellant's Brief but
failed to submit it through oversight and inadvertence, had also left the firm.

CA denied the motion, prompting it to elevate the matters before the SC which denied their prayer of setting
aside the decision of CA, denying them their motion to set aside the resolution.

ISSUE: Whether respondent Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion in denying petitioner's
motion to reinstate its appeal, previously dismissed for failure to file the Appellant's Brief.

RULING: NO, CA did not abused their discretion.

What obtained in this case is simple negligence on the part of petitioner's counsel, which is neither excusable
nor unavoidable. Petitioner thus failed to demonstrate sufficient cause to warrant a favorable action on its
plea.

We find no merit in petitioner's contentions. Petitioner's counsel was the law firm of BAIZAS, ALBERTO &
ASSOCIATES and not merely Atty. Crispin Baizas. Hence, the death of the latter did not extinguish the
lawyer-client relationship between said firm and petitioner.

In Gutierrez & Sons, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 32 the appeal filed by the law firm of BAIZAS, ALBERTO
& ASSOCIATES on behalf of respondent therein was dismissed for failure to comply with the requisites
enumerated in the Rules of Court; the excuse presented by said counsel was also the death of Atty. Crispin
Baizas. This Court held therein that:

The death of Attorney Baizas was not a valid excuse on the part of his associates for not attending to
Alvendia's appeal, supposing arguendo that his office was solely entrusted with the task of
representing Alvendia in the Court of Appeals. Attorney Espiritu (not Attorney Baizas) was the one
actually collaborating with Viola in handling Alvendia's case. He did not file a formal appearance in
the Court of Appeals.

Undoubtedly, there was inexcusable negligence on the part of petitioner's counsel in failing to file the
Appellant's Brief. As revealed by the records, petitioner's counsel, the BAIZAS ALBERTO & ASSOCIATES
law firm, received the notice to file Brief on 19 February 1974. It failed to do so within the 45 days granted to
it. Said law firm also received a copy of the respondent Court's Resolution of 9 July 1974 requiring it to show
cause why the appeal should not be dismissed for failure to file the Brief within the reglementary period.
Petitioner chose not to comply with it, thus compelling the respondent Court to issue on 9 September 1974 a
Resolution dismissing the appeal, a copy of which the former also received. Then, on 28 September 1974, the
BAIZAS LAW OFFICE moved for reconsideration of the said Resolution which respondent Court denied in
its Resolution of 9 October 1974. Nothing more was heard from petitioner until after a year when, on 6
November 1975, it filed the instant petition in reaction to the issuance of a writ of execution by the trial court
following receipt of the records for the respondent Court.
The "confusion" in the office of the law firm following the death of Atty. Crispin Baizas is not a valid
justification for its failure to file the Brief. With Baizas' death, the responsibility of Atty. Alberto and his
Associates to the petitioner as counsel remained until withdrawal by the former of their appearance in the
manner provided by the Rules of Court. This is so because it was the law firm which handled the case for
petitioner before both the trial and appellate courts. That Atty. Espiritu, an associate who was designated to
handle the case, later left the office after the death of Atty. Baizas is of no moment since others in the firm
could have replaced him.. Upon receipt of the notice to file Brief, the law firm should have re-assigned the
case to another associate or, it could have withdrawn as counsel in the manner provided by the Rules of
Court so that the petitioner could contract the services of a new lawyer.

Based on the foregoing, it is clear that there was failure to show a good and sufficient cause which would
justify the reinstatement of petitioner's appeal. Respondent Court of Appeals did not them commit any grave
abuse of discretion when it denied petitioner's motion to reinstate its appeal.

Cojuangco v. Palma

Gross Immoral Conduct: an illustrative case

FACTS: Complainant and respondent met sometime in the 70’s. Complainant was a client of Angara
Concepcion Regala & Cruz Law Offices (ACCRA) and respondent was the lawyer assigned to handle his
cases. Owing to his growing business concerns, complainant decided to hire respondent as his personal
counsel.

Consequently, respondent’s relationship with complainant’s family became intimate. He traveled and dined
with them abroad.2 He frequented their house and even tutored complainant’s 22-year old daughter Maria
Luisa Cojuangco

On June 22, 1982, without the knowledge of complainant’s family, respondent married Lisa in Hongkong. It
was only the next day that respondent informed complainant and assured him that "everything is legal."
Complainant was shocked, knowing fully well that respondent is a married man and has three children. Upon
investigation, complainant found that respondent courted Lisa during their tutoring sessions.

Complainant also came to know that: (a) on the date of the supposed marriage, respondent requested from
his (complainant’s) office an airplane ticket to and from Australia, with stop-over in Hong Kong; (b)
respondent misrepresented himself as "bachelor" before the Hong Kong authorities to facilitate his marriage
with Lisa; and (c) respondent was married to Elizabeth Hermosisima and has three children, namely: Eugene
Philippe, Elias Anton and Eduardo Lorenzo.

On August 24, 1982, complainant filed with the Court of First Instance, Branch XXVII, Pasay City a
petition3 for declaration of nullity of the marriage between respondent and Lisa, docketed as Civil Case No.
Pq-0401-P. In the Decision4 dated November 2, 1982, the CFI declared the marriage null and void ab initio.

December 28, 1983, the First Division of this Court issued in G.R. No. 645388 a Resolution9 (a) setting aside
the CFI Decision dated November 2, 1982 in Civil Case No. Pq–0401-P declaring the marriage between
respondent and Lisa null and void ab initio; and (b) remanding the case to the CFI for proper proceeding and
determination. To this date, the records fail to disclose the outcome of this case.
Respondent filed a motion to dismiss6 on the ground of lack of cause of action. He contended that the
complaint fails to allege acts constituting deceit, malpractice, gross misconduct or violation of his lawyer’s
oath. There is no allegation that he acted with "wanton recklessness, lack of skill or ignorance of the law" in
serving complainant’s interest. Anent the charge of grossly immoral conduct, he stressed that he married
complainant’s daughter with "utmost sincerity and good faith" and that "it is contrary to the natural course of
things for an immoral man to marry the woman he sincerely loves."

On March 20, 2003, Investigating Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan submitted a Report and
Recommendation finding respondent guilty of grossly immoral conduct and violation of his oath as a lawyer.
She recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a period of three (3) years.

The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the above Report and Recommendation, but it reduced
respondent’s penalty to only one (1) year suspension.

ISSUE: Whether Atty. Palma is guilty of gross immoral conduct warranting a disciplinary action

RULING: YES, Atty. Palma is guilty; hence he is imposed of debarment

At the outset, it must be stressed that the law profession does not prescribe a dichotomy of standards among
its members. There is no distinction as to whether the transgression is committed in the lawyer’s professional
capacity or in his private life. This is because a lawyer may not divide his personality so as to be an attorney at
one time and a mere citizen at another.17 Thus, not only his professional activities but even his private life,
insofar as the latter may reflect unfavorably upon the good name and prestige of the profession and the
courts, may at any time be the subject of inquiry on the part of the proper authorities.

While, complainant himself admitted that respondent was a good lawyer,19 however, professional
competency alone does not make a lawyer a worthy member of the Bar. Good moral character is always an
indispensable requirement.

The ringing truth in this case is that respondent married Lisa while he has a subsisting marriage with
Elizabeth Hermosisima. The Certification20 from the Local Civil Registrar of Cebu City shows that he
married Elizabeth on December 19, 1971 at Cardial’s Private Chapel, Cebu City. On the other hand, the
Certificate of Marriage21 from the Deputy Registrar of Marriages, Hong Kong, proves respondent’s
subsequent marriage with Lisa on July 9, 1982. That Elizabeth was alive at the time of respondent’s second
marriage was confirmed on the witness stand by Atty. Victor P. Lazatin, Elizabeth’s classmate and family
friend.22

Undoubtedly, respondent’s act constitutes grossly immoral conduct, a ground for disbarment under Section
27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court. He exhibited a deplorable lack of that degree of morality required
of him as a member of the Bar. In particular, he made a mockery of marriage which is a sacred institution
demanding respect and dignity. His act of contracting a second marriage is contrary to honesty, justice,
decency and morality.

First, he abandoned his lawful wife and three children. Second, he lured an innocent young woman into
marrying him. And third, he misrepresented himself as a "bachelor" so he could contract marriage in a
foreign land.
The circumstances here speak of a clear case of betrayal of trust and abuse of confidence. It was respondent’s
closeness to the complainant’s family as well as the latter’s complete trust in him that made possible his
intimate relationship with Lisa. When his concern was supposed to be complainant’s legal affairs only, he
sneaked at the latter’s back and courted his daughter. Like the proverbial thief in the night, he attacked when
nobody was looking. Moreover, he availed of complainant’s resources by securing a plane ticket from
complainant’s office in order to marry the latter’s daughter in Hongkong. He did this without complainant’s
knowledge. Afterwards, he even had the temerity to assure complainant that "everything is legal." Clearly,
respondent had crossed the limits of propriety and decency.

Anent respondent’s argument that since the validity of his marriage to Lisa has not yet been determined by
the court with finality, the same poses a prejudicial question to the present disbarment proceeding. Suffice it
to say that a subsequent judgment of annulment of marriage has no bearing to the instant disbarment
proceeding. As we held in In re Almacen,33 a disbarment case is sui generis for it is neither purely civil nor
purely criminal but is rather an investigation by the court into the conduct of its officers. Thus, if the acquittal
of a lawyer in a criminal action is not determinative of an administrative case against him,34 or if an affidavit
of withdrawal of a disbarment case does not affect its course,35 then the judgment of annulment of
respondent’s marriage does not also exonerate him from a wrongdoing actually committed.

Canon 4

Cordova v. Hon. Labayen

Unjust administrative complaint against a court officer to avoid or delay a valid decision rendered

FACTS: The records of this administrative matter show that in an action for ejectment filed against the
predecessor in interest of herein complainants,7 judgment was rendered on April 14, 1992 by the Municipal
Trial Court, Branch 6, Bacolod City, in Civil Case No. 18761, ordering defendants to vacate the premises and
to pay plaintiffs therein the sum of P5,000.00 as attorney's fees plus P1,200.00 appearance fee, P18,000.00 for
rentals from May, 1991 to April, 1992, and costs of suit. On August 20, 1992, the Regional Trial Court
affirmed said judgment after finding that there was no cogent reason to reverse the lower court's decision.

A Motion for Writ of Execution Pending Appeal was filed by plaintiffs on September 4, 1995, to which an
Opposition and Motion for Reconsideration was filed by defendants on September 10, 1992. The Regional
Trial Court granted the motion on September 28, 1992 and the writ of execution was issued on September
30, 1992. However, in the afternoon of September 29, 1992, plaintiffs filed a Motion for Reconsideration of
the order of September 28, 1992 granting the motion for execution, on the ground that they could not file the
supersedeas bond because the court allegedly failed to apprise them of the amount thereof and, at the same
time, attaching to said motion a bond in the amount of P18,000.00. The motion for reconsideration was
denied by the Regional Trial Court on October 1, 1992, as a consequence of which the writ of execution
previously issued was implemented on October 8, 1992 and plaintiffs were ordered restored to the possession
of the subject premises.

Therein defendant Luz Cordova went to the Court of Appeals on a petition for certiorari with injunction but
was rebuffed therein. In a decision promulgated on March 31, 1993 in CA-G.R. SP No. 29102, said appellate
court affirmed in toto the decision of the Regional Trial Court. As a result, the lower court granted on April
21, 1993 the Motion for Alias Writ of Execution filed by plaintiffs and ordered the release of the amounts of
P12,000.00 and P18,000.00 deposited by therein defendants. An alias writ of execution was subsequently
issued on April 26, 1993.

The administrative complaint now filed before us by herein complainants, as heirs and successors in interest
of the late Luz Cordova, revolves around the validity of the writ of execution issued by Judge Moscardon and
the alias writ of execution issued by Judge Labayen.

ISSUE: Whether the issuance of the writ is valid

RULING: YES, it is a valid writ executed hence the administrative complaint filed is baseless,
warranting suspension of Atty. Sabio as disciplinary measure.

ISSUE regarding the validity: Sections 8 and 10 of Rule 70 clearly provide that to stay the immediate execution
of judgment in ejectment proceedings, it is necessary that the defendant-appellant must (a) perfect his appeal,
(b) file a supersedeas bond, and (c) periodically deposit the rentals falling due during the pendency of the
appeal.

The purpose of the supersedeas bond is to answer for the rents, damages and costs accruing down to the
judgment of the inferior court appealed from, the amount of which is to be determined from the judgment of
said court. The postulation of complainants and their counsel that the execution sought was effectively stayed
by the filing of a supersedeas bond was sufficiently refuted and justifiably rejected when we consider the
circumstances then obtaining.

First. The amount of the supersedeas bond to be posted is easily discernible from the dispositive portion of
the judgment of the municipal trial court. Hence, it was erroneous, if not altogether a deliberate falsity, for
Atty. Sabio to claim that they could not file a supersedeas bond because that court failed to determine the
same.

Second. The bond should have been filed forthwith after the municipal trial court had rendered judgment
against complainants, which judgment was immediately 9nalysed, without prejudice to the right of appeal. As
the records readily reveal, the purported bond was belatedly filed on September 29, 1992, more than five
months later, and only after the aforementioned Regional Trial Court had already issued an order granting the
motion for execution pending appeal. We cannot, therefore, elude the impression thus created that the filing
thereof came only as a dilatory afterthought on the part of defendants and their counsel. In a vain attempt to
remedy the situation, Atty. Sabio filed a motion for reconsideration of the order granting execution, but the
same necessarily had to fail for being frivolous.

Third. It will be observed that no supersedeas bond was filed after the rendition of the decision either in the
court of origin or in the appellate court. The requirement for the filing of a supersedeas bond is mandatory.8
Defendants in the ejectment case appealed to the latter court without filing a supersedeas bond. Such failure
is a ground for outright execution of the judgment of the municipal trial court, the duty of the appellate court
to order the execution of the appealed decision being thereby ministerial and imperative.9

Fourth. The Court of Appeals stated that the amount of P18,000.00 deposited by defendants therein
represented rental payments for the period from May, 1991 to April, 1992, and that a writ of execution had
by then already been issued by the Regional Trial Court. Evidently, therefore, the amount thus deposited
could not qualify as or subserve the purpose of a supersedeas bond
LEGAL ETHICS ISSUE: It is worth noting that the administrative complaint was filed against herein
respondents only after the Court of Appeals had rendered a decision in 10nalys of plaintiffs. This in itself is
already a clear indication that the acts of respondents are valid and legal. Yet, Atty. Sabio persisted in
instituting these baseless charges against respondents to their proven prejudice.14 As correctly observed by
the Bar Confidant, under the given circumstances, it is apparent that complainants decided to institute the
present case only on the advice and/or upon the urging of Atty. Sabio. It also bears stressing that respondent
Judge Labayen even waited for the Court of Appeals’ decision before acting on the motion for an alias writ of
execution of plaintiffs, if only to obviate any imputation of bias or partiality.

We are fully convinced that, despite the misleading assertions of Atty. Sabio, the issuance of the writ of
execution was done in the valid and judicious exercise of the functions and duties of respondent judges. We
have carefully examined and 10nalysed the procedure adopted by respondents in the issuance and
enforcement of the questioned writs. It would be the height of injustice were we to impose any sanction on
them for complying faithfully with the procedural mandate of the rules governing the matter.

The Court would like to call attention again to the reprehensible propensity of disgruntled litigants, most
especially their counsel, of filing totally baseless and unfounded charges against judges and court personnel in
a vain attempt to escape the dire consequences of their own negligence or in an effort to transgress the lawful
orders of the court. Judges and court personnel should be protected from unjust accusations of dissatisfied
litigants, abetted by counsel who seek thereby to camouflage their shortcomings. Besides, it goes without
saying that mere suspicion that a judge is partial to one of the parties to the case is not enough. There should
be evidence to prove the charge,15 which is obviously absent in the case at bar.

As an officer of the court, a lawyer has the sworn duty to assist in, not to impede or pervert, the
administration of justice. The present administrative charge seeks to cast doubt on the integrity of respondent
judges, the judicial personnel and the court which they represent, in flagrant abdication of the bounden
responsibility of a lawyer to observe and maintain the respect due to courts of justice. Atty. Sabio thus
deserves to be punished for instigating the filing of an administrative complaint by his clients, in the guise of
upholding their rights but actually to frustrate the enforcement of lawful court orders and consequently
obstruct the desirable norms and course of justice.

Canon 5

De Roy v. CA

Keeping abreast of decisions of the SC

FACTS: The facts of the case are undisputed. The firewall of a burned-out building owned by petitioners
collapsed and destroyed the tailoring shop occupied by the family of private respondents, resulting in injuries
to private respondents and the death of Marissa Bernal, a daughter. Private respondents had been warned by
petitioners to vacate their shop in view of its proximity to the weakened wall but the former failed to do so.
On the basis of the foregoing facts, the Regional Trial Court. First Judicial Region, Branch XXXVIII,
presided by the Hon. Antonio M. Belen, rendered judgment finding petitioners guilty of gross negligence and
awarding damages to private respondents. On appeal, the decision of the trial court was affirmed in toto by
the Court of Appeals in a decision promulgated on August 17, 1987, a copy of which was received by
petitioners on August 25, 1987. On September 9, 1987, the last day of the fifteen-day period to file an appeal,
petitioners filed a motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration, which was eventually
denied by the appellate court in the Resolution of September 30, 1987. Petitioners filed their motion for
reconsideration on September 24, 1987 but this was denied in the Resolution of October 27, 1987.

This Court finds that the Court of Appeals did not commit a grave abuse of discretion when it denied
petitioners' motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration, directed entry of judgment and
denied their motion for reconsideration. It correctly applied the rule laid down in Habaluyas Enterprises, Inc.
v. Japzon, [G.R. No. 70895, August 5, 1985,138 SCRA 461, that the fifteen-day period for appealing or for
filing a motion for reconsideration cannot be extended.

Counsel for the petition argued that the case used by CA in their decision should not be used as to the
absence of publication for it to become effective

ISSUE: Whether the decision of the supreme court needs to be published for its effectivity

RULING: NO, it does not need publication

Contrary to petitioners' view, there is no law requiring the publication of Supreme Court decisions in the
Official Gazette before they can be binding and as a condition to their becoming effective. It is the bounden
duty of counsel as lawyer in active law practice to keep abreast of decisions of the Supreme Court particularly
where issues have been clarified, consistently reiterated, and published in the advance reports of Supreme
Court decisions (G. R. s) and in such publications as the Supreme Court Reports Annotated (SCRA) and law
journals.

Fajardo v. Torpe

Keeping abreast with the law, in re: duty of counsel to client

FACTS: Complainant was the defendant in Civil Case No. 581 for Forcible Entry, entitled, "Felisa Imperial
versus Josefina Fajardo", and the plaintiff in Civil Case No. 582 for Unlawful Detainer, entitled, "Josefina B.
Fajardo versus Felisa Imperial." The cases were consolidated and tried jointly by the Municipal Trial Court of
Ba-ao, Camarines Sur, which rendered judgment in favor of Imperial.1 Complainant’s counsel, respondent
herein, appealed to the Regional Trial Court of Iriga City, which affirmed the appealed decision.

Hence, complainant instructed respondent to file a petition for review with the Court of Appeals.
Respondent demanded the amount of P4,300.002 for the preparation and filing of the petition which
complainant complied by remitting the amount to respondent.

It appears that the petition for review was later dismissed by the Court of Appeals on the grounds of
insufficient payment of docket fees and failure to attach the certified true copy of the assailed decision.
Complainant only learned of the resolution dismissing her petition when her opponent, Imperial, filed a
motion for new trial attaching a copy thereof in the separate action filed by complainant with the RTC of
Iriga City for recovery of possession.

Complainant thus filed a complaint charging respondent of "Gross Ignorance of the Law and Negligence in
the Performance of Profession."

The Integrated Bar of the Philippines Commission on Bar Discipline directed respondent to answer the
complaint. Despite receipt of the Order of the IBP-CBD, respondent failed to answer the Complaint.
Subsequently, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline issued a Notice dated February 13, 20014 setting the
case for hearing on March 13, 2001. Again, despite receipt by respondent of the notice, he failed to appear at
the scheduled hearing. Complainant was allowed to present her evidence ex parte.

On September 22, 2003, the IBP-CBD submitted its Report finding respondent liable as charged and
recommending that he be fined P1,500.00 and suspended from the practice of law for a period ranging from
four (4) to six (6) months. The IBP Board of Governors adopted the findings of the Investigating
Commissioner but reduced the suspension to one (1) month.

ISSUE: Whether the disciplinary action is valid

RULING: YES, it is valid hence warranting the suspension for 1 year

Rabanal v. Tugade10 that an attorney is bound to protect his client’s interest to the best of his ability and with
utmost diligence. Implicit with this directive is the command that all lawyers are duty-bound to keep abreast
of the law and legal developments as well as to participate in continuing legal education programs.11 All law
practitioners should be fully conversant of the requirements for the filing of certiorari proceedings under Rule
65 of the Rules of Court.12 Ignorantia legis non excusat.13 Ignorance encompasses not only substantive but
also procedural laws.

Respondent was not only remiss in the preparation of the petition, but may have misappropriated a portion
of the sum remitted to him by complainant for the purpose of filing the petition because the docketing fees
he remitted was short of P280.00. What is worse is that respondent failed to inform complainant of the actual
status of the appeal. Such behavior cannot and should not be countenanced because they run afoul with the
following provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility: Canons 15-17

Moreover, Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility mandates that a lawyer shall not neglect a
legal matter entrusted to him and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable. Verily:

Once he agrees to take up the cause of a client, a lawyer owes fidelity to such cause and must always be
mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him. He must serve the client with competence and diligence
and champion the latter’s cause with wholehearted fidelity, care and devotion. Elsewise stated, he owes entire
devotion to the interest of the client, warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his client’s rights, and the
exertion of his utmost learning and ability to the end that nothing be taken or withheld from his client, save
by the rules of law, legally applied. This simply means that his client is entitled to the benefit of any and every
remedy and defense that is authorized by the law of the land and he may expect his lawyer to assert every
such remedy or defense. If much is demanded from an attorney, it is because the entrusted privilege to
practice law carries with it the correlative duties not only to the client but also to the court, to the bar and to
the public. A lawyer who performs his duty with diligence and candor not only protects the interest of his
client; he also serves the ends of justice, does honor to the bar and helps maintain the respect of the
community to the legal profession.

Canon 6

Gonzales-Austria v. Abaya

Administrative case against a judge and court officer

FACTS: Atty. Ligaya Gonzales-Austria, then Branch Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 52, Puerto Princess City 1 Mrs. Leonila Fuertes and Mr. Edgardo Servando charged Judge Emmanuel
M. Abaya, then Presiding Judge of RTC, Branch 51, Puerto Princess City 2 with:

1. Estafa through falsification of public or official documents, by verifying official hours rendered by
one employee in the person of Miss Anabelle Cardenas who never reported for duty from August
1983 to May 1984 by encashing and receiving salaries of said Miss Cardenas through forgery of
payee's signature in the treasury warrants, thus deceiving the government and defrauding the
Government treasury of a big amount of money;

2. Gross dishonesty and corruption by soliciting, demanding, receiving bribed (sic) money in
exchange for favorable resolutions and decisions from different litigants in Branch 52, where said
Judge was temporarily assigned from November 1984 to April 1986 and of which one of the
undersigned complainant (sic), LIGAYA GONZALES-AUSTRIA is the Branch Clerk of Court;

3. Illegal exaction of portion of the salaries of his subordinate Edgardo Servando as part and
condition of his continued employment in Branch 51, where Judge Abaya is the presiding judge.,

Judge Abaya denied all these charges in his comment dated August 29, 1986, filed in compliance with the
Court Resolution of August 12, 1986. He asserted that these charges were concocted in retaliation against the
administrative complaint docketed as Adm. Matter No. 698-P he earlier filed on July 18,1986 against one of
his accusers, Atty. Ligaya Gonzales-Austria for dishonesty and grave misconduct in having forged his
signature in a probation order in Criminal Case No. 4995 of the RTC, Branch 52, Puerto Princess

By resolution of December 11, 1986, the cases were referred to Court of Appeals Justice Oscar M. Herrera
for investigation, report and recommendation. Based on the evidence presented by the parties, Justice Herrera
finds the respondents guilty of the charges against them and thereby recommends:

1. The FORFEITURE of retirement benefits of Judge Abaya except earned leave credits;

2. The REMOVAL of Annabelle Cardenas from office as Court Stenographer;

3. A one-year SUSPENSION from office as Attorney of Atty. Ligaya G. Austria in AC-2909.

ISSUE: Whether the administrative sanctions against the personalities above are valid

RULING: YES, they’re valid

 IN RE: Judge Abaya’s conduct and Annabelle Cardenas - GUILTY

Estafa thru Falsification of Public or Official Documents by Judge Abaya and Annabelle Cardenas.— The
gravamen of this charge is that Annabelle Cardenas who was appointed as Stenographic Reporter of Branch
51, RTC, Palawan in August 1983 upon the recommendation of Judge Abaya as Presiding Judge therein, was
a ghost employee from August 1983 to May 1984 as she never reported for work during said period, being
then employed at Princess Tours Rafols Hotel as a tourist guide. Notwithstanding, with her knowledge and
consent, Judge Abaya verified as true and correct her daily time records as stenographic reporter purportedly
showing that she rendered service and incurred no absences or tardiness from August 9 to September 30,
1983 and rendered service for the period from October 1, 1983 to May 31, 1984 and was granted leave of
absence from March 14 to 30, 1984 and from April 23 to 27, 1984. Thus, she was paid her salaries
corresponding to the periods allegedly worked. Some of the Treasury Warrants covering her salaries were,
according to complainants, encashed by Judge Abaya by forging Annabelle Cardenas' signature.

We find the charges against Judge Abaya and Annabelle Cardenas to be supported by substantial evidence.
Especially damaging to the pretensions of the respondents that Annabelle Cardenas rendered service as
stenographic reporter during the period under consideration are the school records of the Holy Trinity
College, showing that Annabelle Cardenas was attending school in the first semester of school year 1983-1984
from 2:00 P.M. to 8:15 P.M.5 While she claimed to have been permitted by her teacher to attend her typing
and stenography classes after office hours, the school records reveal that she has other subjects such as
Business Organization and Management (3 units), Ten Commandments (3 units), Sining ng Pakikipagtalastas
(3 units) and Accounting for Single Proprietorship (3 units), her attendance in which can be safely concluded
from the passing grades she received in said subjects. Equally damaging to respondents' assertion are the
Daily Time Records of Princess Tours 6 showing that Annabelle Cardenas acted as tourist guide on 43
working days when she was supposedly rendering service as stenographic reporter. Her explanation that her
name was placed on the daily time record as team leader, although she did not actually conduct the tours
reflected therein is too shallow to merit belief.

 IN Re: Abaya’s Gross and Corruption- GUILTY

Nelly Vicente referred her to Carmencita P. Baloco, the officer-in-charge who then called Judge Abaya from
the other branch. Judge Abaya directed her to the adjoining courtroom where he told her, "Ang kaso ninyo ay
medyo tagilid, 50-50 dahil walang eyewitness." (Your case is shaky with only a 50-50 chance of winning
because there is no eyewitness.) She retorted that there was an eyewitness but the Judge insisted that there
was none because the supposed eyewitness had his back turned when her son was stabbed. Nonetheless, the
Judge assured her that he would be able to do something about it ("Ngunit lahat ay magagawan ko ng paraan
dahil ako ang nakakaalam sa mga decision dito").lâwphî1.ñèt When Mrs. Fuertes asked the Judge what he
wanted, he told her that he has a problem. "Kailangan ko ng pera Limang Libo at Ide-deny ko ang bail na
mga acusado" (I need Five Thousand Pesos and I will deny bail to the accused). Mrs. Fuertes expressed
puzzlement on why she had to give money when she was the aggrieved party, but the Judge cut her off by
saying he needed the money badly before he leaves for Manila. Mrs. Fuertes answered that she would have to
consult her brothers-in-law about the matter. The Judge told her to see him at his house at 7:00 o'clock in the
evening.

Roselyn Teologo, stenographic reporter of Branch 52 corroborated that portion of Mrs. Fuertes' testimony
relating to the phone call of Nelly Vicente to Mrs. Fuertes, the latter's arrival on August 13, 1985 at Branch 52
and Mrs. Fuertes having been closeted with Judge Abaya inside the courtroom for about 20 minutes. She
further testified that Carmen Baloco who eavesdropped on the Judge and Mrs. Fuertes' conversation
remarked, "Grabe ito, nanghihingi ng pera." (This is terrible, he is asking money.) She added that when Judge
Abaya emerged from the courtroom, he instructed her not to tell anybody that Mrs. Fuertes had been there.

Additional corroborative evidence was given by Judge Angel R. Miclat, then acting City Fiscal for Puerto
Princess City handling Criminal Case No. 5304. He testified that Mrs. Fuertes came to him in August of 1986
to inform him that Judge Abaya was asking P5,000.00 from her so that the bail application of the accused
would be denied. While he advised her to file a complaint against Judge Abaya, he was informed later on that
Mrs. Fuertes gave Judge Abaya not the amount being asked, but only about P1,200.00.

 In Re: Illegal Exaction of Abaya – NOT GUILTY

Edgardo Servando, one of the complainants herein, and who was appointed stenographer on September 3,
1984 upon the recommendation of Judge Abaya, declared that such recommendation was made in
consideration of his agreement to give Judge Abaya Pl,000.00 from his initial salary and thereafter a monthly
amount of P400.00, which undertaking he complied with. However, in December when the Judge before
leaving for Manila for the Christmas vacation asked him for Pl,000.00 from as fringe benefits, medical
allowance and year-end bonus, he was unable to comply as he did not then have cash, the payment of said
benefits having been in checks. A week later, he received a notice of termination effective at the close of
business hours on December 31, 1984 from the Supreme Court upon the recommendation of Judge Abaya.

Nilo Jamora, a former stenographer of Branch 51 testified that since his employment in said Branch, Judge
Abaya had been exacting from him P350.00 every payday, which exaction ceased only in March 1986 when
Atty. Ligaya Gonzales-Austria filed her charges against Judge Abaya. He further stated that when he refused
to retract his charges against Judge Abaya before the Sangguniang Panlalawigan despite the Judge's offer of
money, the latter demoted him to process server.

While the investigating officer, Justice Herrera observed that both Servando and Jamora "testified in a natural
and straightforward, albeit in an angry manner without attempting to conceal their contempt for Judge
Abaya,17 he concluded that "the evidence in this regard would be unable to withstand judicial scrutiny for
want of ample corroboration. It would simply be the word of one against a judge. 18

We are in accord with this observation, for indeed, the charge if true is so demeaning to an RTC judge that it requires more than
a bare allegation to sustain it. In this regard, we give respondent Judge the benefit of the doubt.

 SUMMARY The office of a judge exists for one solemn end — to promote justice by administering
it fairly and impartially. In regarding justice as a commodity to be sold at a price, Judge Abaya
betrayed the very essence of magistracy. In complicity with Annabelle Cardenas, he likewise abused
the trust and confidence of the people, shortchanging them of services undoubtedly vital to the
speedy administration of justice.

By these acts, Judge Abaya has demonstrated his unfitness and unworthiness of the honor and
requisites attached to his office. As he had previously resigned, we hereby order the forfeiture of his
retirement benefits, except earned leave credits, as recommended by the investigating officer Justice
Herrera.
 In Re: Gonzales-Austria – GUILTY, Suspended

Atty. Ligaya Gonzales-Austria admits to having signed the probation order and of having promulgated it, but
explains that these were done with the knowledge and consent of Judge Abaya, who had asked her to prepare
orders and decisions in Branch 52 to ease his load of presiding over two (2) branches. She adverts to Judge
Abaya's order of November 4, 1985 which granted accused Leonardo Cruz' motion for reconsideration of the
order denying probation. This order, which carried certain conditions, set the promulgation of the probation
order on January 16, 1986 at 8:00 o'clock in the morning. In the meantime, Judge Abaya requested Atty.
Austria to prepare the probation order with the day and month in blank for the signature of the Judge.

On January 16,1986, Judge Abaya was absent so the promulgation was reset to April 16, 1986. On the latter
date, the provincial warden failed to bring the accused to court, hence the promulgation of the probation
order was again reset to June 3, 1986, with Judge Abaya allegedly giving instructions before he left for Manila
to promulgate said order even in his absence should the probationer Leonardo Cruz arrive in court.
On April 21, 1986, Leonardo Cruz came and begged that the probation order be promulgated the following
day, April 22, 1986 as he had to leave for Coron in the same pumpboat that brought him to Puerto Princess
and he had no money to sustain him up to the time the Judge arrives from Manila. As requested, the
promulgation was set on April 22, 1986, only for Atty. Austria to discover that Judge Abaya had neglected to
sign the probation order. In view of the predicament of Leonardo Cruz and the authority granted to her by
Judge Abaya, Atty. Austria signed Judge Abaya's name to the probation order and promulgated it.

Answer: Sec. 5. Duties of the Clerk in the absence or by direction of the judge. — In the absence of the judge,
the clerk may perform all the duties of the judge in receiving applications, petitions, inventories, reports, and
the issuance of all orders and notices that follow as a matter of course under these rules, and may also, when
directed so to do by the judge, receive the accounts of executors, administrators, guardians, trustees, and
receivers, and all evidence relating to them, or to the settlement of the estates of deceased persons, or to
guardianship, trusteeships, or receiverships, and forthwith transmit such reports, accounts, and evidence to
the judge, together with his findings in relation to the same, if the judge shall direct him to make findings and
include the same in his report.

Signing orders in the name of, and simulating the signature of the judge is not one of them.

Atty. Austria's theory of agency that she lawfully acted as agent of the Judge is wholly devoid of merit. The
judicial power vested in a judge and its exercise is strictly personal to the Judge because of, and by reason of
his highest qualification, and can never be the subject of agency. That would not only be contrary to law, but
also subversive of public order and public policy. Nor could her void act in signing the name of the judge be
validly ratified by the latter. Judge Abaya himself is bereft of any power to authorize the clerk of court to sign
his name in his official capacity in a matter pending adjudication before him. The issuance of the order in
question is strictly judicial and is exclusively vested in the judge which is beyond his authority to delegate.

Generally speaking, a lawyer who holds a government office may not be disciplined as a member of the bar
for misconduct in the discharge of his duties as a government official. 23 However, if that misconduct as a
government official is of such a character as to affect his qualification as a lawyer or to show moral
delinquency, then he may be disciplined as a member of the bar on such ground.

Lim v. Barcelona

Extortion of a lawyer who is a government official

FACTS: Complainant Lim alleged that on the first week of August 2000, respondent phoned him and
introduced himself as a lawyer and chief of the Public Assistance Center, NLRC. Respondent informed him
that his employees filed a labor complaint against him in his office and it was necessary for him to see and
talk with respondent. From then on respondent would often call him. Respondent visited him in his office
and told him to settle the case or else his business, Top Gun Billiards, would be shut down. Lim recalled that
on August 14, 2000, at around 7:30 p.m., respondent again visited his establishment and told him to settle the
case for P20,000.00.

Notably, almost nine months before the filing of his complaint, or on August 14, 2000, complainant Lim
personally submitted a letter to the NBI requesting the NBI to investigate respondent Atty. Edilberto
Barcelona.4 According to the NBI report, after due investigation, it decided to conduct an entrapment
operation. On August 15, 2000, Special Investigator Marvin de Jemil, sent nine five hundred peso bills and
five one hundred peso bills for fluorescent powder dusting to the NBI Forensic Chemistry Division. Further,
the NBI reported that thru the NBI Identification and Records Division, it found no record of such person
named Edilberto Barcelona.

The NBI report also stated that on August 16, 2000, Lim informed the NBI operatives that at around 7:00
p.m. respondent would drop by his pool house to collect the money. At around 6:30 p.m., the operatives
went to the pool house and strategically positioned themselves and posed as pool players. At about 7:20 p.m.,
respondent arrived, sat on a plastic chair and talked to complainant Lim. At around 7:30 p.m., Lim handed
the marked money to the respondent who, in turn, received it. While respondent was counting the money and
about to place it inside his bag, he was immediately arrested. The respondent initially resisted and tried to
create scandal but was later pacified.

The NBI averred that the respondent was informed of his constitutional rights and was brought to the NBI
office where he was booked and fingerprinted. In his fingerprint chart, the respondent indicated that he was a
government lawyer and assigned at the office of the Chief, Public Assistance Center, NLRC, Banawe,
Quezon City. He showed his identification card. Later he was brought to the Forensic Chemistry Division for
ultraviolet examination. The certification issued by Forensic Chemist Loren G. Janobas stated that there were
"yellow fluorescent specks and smudges" on the back and palm of the left and right hand of the respondent.
On August 17, 2000, the NBI turned over respondent to the City Prosecutor of Manila who eventually
indicted him for robbery/extortion.

Respondent, in his defense, alleges that he normally played billiards at the Top Gun Billiard Center where he
would drop by from his office before going to his residence; that when certain employees of the billiard
center learned that he was a lawyer and Chief of the Public Assistance Center of the NLRC, they confided in
him their grievance against their employer, Lim, for alleged violation of labor laws, there respondent gave
them assistance; that with the proper complaint and required documentation accomplished, respondent's
office scheduled the case for a dialogue-conference between the complaining workers and their employer;
that on instigation and coercion of complainant Lim, respondent became a victim of theft, billiard hustling,
swindling and syndicated gambling on August 9, 2000; that on or about August 9, 2000, respondent filed a
complaint for theft of cellphone and pack of cigarettes, billiard hustling, syndicated gambling, and swindling
against Lim and his three workers, eventually docketed as I.S. No. 38251 to 53.

Respondent's Comment narrated his version on how the money allegedly was given to him. According to the
respondent, on August 16, 2000, at about 3 p.m., he received a phone call from complainant Lim informing
him that Ian Gonvan,10 one of the accused in I.S. No. 38251, admitted taking his cellphone and was willing
and ready to return it at around 7 p.m., at the Top Gun Billiard Center.

He did not see Gonvan within the premises so he sat and watched the billiard games going on while he
waited. After about 15 minutes Lim sat beside him and told him that Gonvan could no longer return the
cellphone and instead Gonvan entrusted Lim with the equivalent value in cash. According to respondent, Lim
persistently whispered to him to accept and count the wad of paper money Lim pulled out. According to
respondent, he consistently refused to touch the money and he insisted, "Gusto ko munang makaharap ang
sinasabi mong si Gumban,"11 continuously refusing to accept, much less count, the offered wad of money.
Respondent added that when Lim realized that he could not be prevailed upon to accept it, he placed and
inserted the wad of money in the open side pocket of respondent's shoulder bag that respondent normally
carried, again pleading to respondent that he should count the money. Respondent added that Lim's behavior
was rude and intimidating so much so that respondent protested such rudeness. But respondent said while he
was trying to retrieve the wad of money to throw it back to Lim, about five or seven burly men accosted
respondent and handcuffed him over his vehement protestations.

The Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP concluded that it is highly improbable that the NBI could be
misled by complainant Lim into conducting an entrapment operation against respondent, if there was no
merit to his complaint against respondent. From a reading of the NBI Report as well as the documents
attached to said report, it is evident that the NBI considered the merits of Lim's complaint of extortion
against respondent. Finding it worth pursuing, the NBI conducted an entrapment operation against
respondent. On the basis of the entrapment operation conducted by the NBI, respondent was caught in the
act, so to speak, of attempted extortion. Respondent was brought to the City Prosecutor of Manila for
inquest and the appropriate complaint for Robbery/Extortion was filed against respondent.15

Based on its own evaluation and the NBI Report, the Investigating Commissioner of the Commission on Bar
Discipline recommended the suspension of respondent from the practice of law for a period of two years.

ISSUE: Whether the disciplinary action was valid

RULING: YES, disciplinary measures should be imposed, hence he is disbarred

The grounds for disbarment or suspension of an attorney are: (1) deceit; (2) malpractice or other gross
misconduct in office; (3) grossly immoral conduct; (4) conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude; (5)
violation of the lawyer's oath; (6) willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court; and (7) willfully
appearing as an attorney for a party without authority.18

The NBI found that respondent's hands had yellow fluorescent specks and smudges with which the money
used for the entrapment of the respondent had been powdered. We find no reason to doubt the NBI report.
Also, we see no basis to overturn the presumption that the NBI had done its duty regularly.

Respondent would make us believe that the specks and smudges of yellow fluorescent were in his hands
because Lim offered him what was allegedly the payment for the stolen cellphone by a certain Gonvan.
Regrettably, there is no corroboration from Gonvan nor anyone else on this matter. Thus, respondent's story
appears to us entirely self-serving.

We had held previously that if a lawyer's misconduct in the discharge of his official duties as government
official is of such a character as to affect his qualification as a lawyer or to show moral delinquency, he may
be disciplined as a member of the Bar on such ground.19 More significantly, lawyers in government service in
the discharge of their official tasks have more restrictions than lawyers in private practice. Want of moral
integrity is to be more severely condemned in a lawyer who holds a responsible public office. 20 Rule 1.02 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at
defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system. Extortion by a government lawyer, an
outright violation of the law, calls for the corresponding grave sanctions. With the aforesaid rule a high
standard of integrity is demanded of a government lawyer as compared to a private practitioner because the
delinquency of a government lawyer erodes the people's trust and confidence in the government.

Indeed, the primary objective of administrative cases against lawyers is not only to punish and discipline the
erring individual lawyers, but also to safeguard the administration of justice by protecting the courts and the
public from the misconduct of lawyers and to remove from the legal profession persons whose utter
disregard of the lawyer's oath has proven them unfit to continue discharging the trust reposed in them as
members of the bar.23 These pronouncements gain practical significance in this case, considering that
respondent is a senior lawyer of the NLRC. It bears stressing also that government lawyers who are public
servants owe fidelity to the public service, a public trust. As such, government lawyers should be more
sensitive to their professional obligations as their disreputable conduct is more likely to be magnified in the
public eye.

In Montano v. IBP,25 this Court said that only in a clear case of misconduct that seriously affects the
standing and character of the lawyer may disbarment be imposed as a penalty. In the instant case, the Court is
convinced that the evidence against respondent is clear and convincing. He is administratively liable for
corrupt activity, deceit, and gross misconduct. As correctly held by the Board of Governors of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines, he should not only be suspended from the practice of law but disbarred.