Cudia vs pma
search or inquire into: x x x to subject to an official probe x x x: to conduct
Issue:
Does the power of the Commission on Human Rights to investigate include
the power to adjudicate?
Ruling: The findings of fact and the conclusions of law of the CHR are merely
recommendatory and, therefore, not binding to this Court. The reason is
that the CHR’s constitutional mandate extends only to the investigation of
all forms of human rights violations involving civil and political rights.224 As
held in Cariño v. Commission on Human Rights225 and a number of
subsequent cases,226 the CHR is only a fact-finding body, not a court of
justice or a quasi-judicial agency. It is not empowered to adjudicate claims
on the merits or settle actual case or controversies. The power to
investigate is not the same as adjudication:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of
adjudicative power is that it may investigate, i.e., receive evidence and
make findings of fact as regards claimed human rights violations involving
civil and political rights. But fact-finding is not adjudication, and cannot be
likened to the judicial function of a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial
agency or official. The function of receiving evidence and ascertaining
therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a judicial function, properly
speaking. To be considered such, the faculty of receiving evidence and
making factual conclusions in a controversy must be accompanied by the
authority of applying the law to those factual conclusions to the end that the
controversy may be decided or determined authoritatively, finally and
definitively, subject to such appeals or modes of review as may be provided
by law. This function, to repeat, the Commission does not have.
x x x x
[i]t cannot try and decide cases (or hear and determine causes) as courts of
justice, or even quasi-judicial bodies do. To investigate is not to adjudicate
or adjudge. Whether in the popular or the technical sense, these terms have
well understood and quite distinct meanings.
"Investigate," commonly understood, means to examine, explore, inquire or
delve or probe into, research on, study. The dictionary definition of
“investigate” is "to observe or study closely: inquire into systematically: "to
an official inquiry;" The purpose of investigation, of course, is to discover, to
find out, to learn, obtain information. Nowhere included or intimated is the
notion of settling, deciding or resolving a controversy involved in the facts
inquired into by application of the law to the facts established by the
inquiry.
The legal meaning of "investigate" is essentially the same: "(t)o follow up
step by step by patient inquiry or observation. To trace or track; to search
into; to examine and inquire into with care and accuracy; to find out by
careful inquisition; examination; the taking of evidence; a legal inquiry;" "to
inquire; to make an investigation," "investigation" being in turn described as
"(a)n administrative function, the exercise of which ordinarily does not
require a hearing. 2 Am J2d Adm L Sec. 257; x x x an inquiry, judicial or
otherwise, for the discovery and collection of facts concerning a certain
matter or matters."
"Adjudicate," commonly or popularly understood, means to adjudge,
arbitrate, judge, decide, determine, resolve, rule on, settle. The dictionary
defines the term as "to settle finally (the rights and duties of the parties to a
court case) on the merits of issues raised: xx to pass judgment on: settle
judicially: x x x act as judge." And "adjudge" means "to decide or rule upon
as a judge or with judicial or quasi-judicial powers: xx to award or grant
judicially in a case of controversy x x x."
In the legal sense, "adjudicate" means: "To settle in the exercise of judicial
authority. To determine finally. Synonymous with adjudge in its strictest
sense;" and "adjudge" means: "To pass on judicially, to decide, settle or
decree, or to sentence or condemn. x x x Implies a judicial determination of
a fact, and the entry of a judgment."
SPCMB vs. AMLC, G.R. No. 216914, Dec. 6, 2016 Mangune vs. Ermita, G.R. No. 182604, September 27, 2016
Issue: Is AMLC an administrative body with quasi-judicial powers? Issue: Is E.O. No. 567 constitutional?
Ruling: E.O. No. 567 is constitutional. E.O. No. 567 is within the
Ruling: In administrative law, a quasi-judicial proceeding involves: (a) taking
constitutional power of the President to issue. The President may, by
and evaluation of evidence; (b) determining facts based upon the evidence
executive or administrative order, direct the reorganization of government
presented; and (c) rendering an order or decision supported by the facts
entities under the executive department. This is sanctioned under the
proved. Inquisitorial power, which is also known as examining or
Constitution, as well as other statutes
investigatory power, is one of the determinative powers of an
administrative body which better enables it to exercise its quasi-judicial
authority. This power allows the administrative body to inspect the records
Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid only
and premises, and investigate the activities, of persons or entities coming
when they are not contrary to the laws or the Constitution.39 Thus, to be
under its jurisdiction, or to require disclosure of information by means of
valid, an administrative issuance, such as an executive order,40 must comply
accounts, records, reports, testimony of witnesses, production of
with the following requisites:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
documents, or otherwise.
(1) Its promulgation must be authorized by the legislature;

Nowhere from the text of the law nor its Implementing Rules and (2) It must be promulgated in accordance with the prescribed procedure;
Regulations can we glean that the AMLC exercises quasi-judicial functions
whether the actual preliminary investigation is done simply at its behest or (3) It must be within the scope of the authority given by the legislature;
conducted by the Department of Justice and the Ombudsman. and

Plainly, the AMLC's investigation of money laundering offenses and its (4) It must be reasonable.41
determination of possible money laundering offenses, specifically its inquiry
into certain bank accounts allowed by court order, does not transform it E.O. No. 567 satisfies all of the above requisites.
into an investigative body exercising quasi-judicial powers. Hence, Section
11 of the AMLA, authorizing a bank inquiry court order, cannot be said to First, E.O. No. 567 itself identifies its statutory and constitutional basis.
violate SPCMB's constitutional right to procedural due process.
E.O. No. 567 was issued pursuant to Section 17 of the Local Government
Code expressly devolving to the local government units the delivery of basic
services and facilities, including health services, to
wit:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Sec. 17. Basic Services and Facilities. -

(a) Local government units shall endeavor to be self-reliant and shall

continue exercising the powers and discharging the duties and functions
currently vested upon them. They shall also discharge the functions and
responsibilities of national agencies and offices devolved to them pursuant
to this Code. Local government units shall likewise exercise such other
powers and discharge such other functions and responsibilities as are
necessary, appropriate, or incidental to efficient and effective provisions
of the basic services and facilities enumerated herein.
 issue. The President may, by executive or administrative order, direct the
(b) Such basic services and facilities include, but are not limited to, the reorganization of government entities under the executive department. This
following: is sanctioned under the Constitution, as well as other
statutes.44chanrobleslaw
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
xxx In Tondo Medical Center Employees Association v. Court of Appeals,45
petitioners questioned the validity of Executive Order No. 10246 (E.O. No.
(2) For a Municipality:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary 10246 issued by then President Joseph Ejercito Estrada which, also pursuant
xxx to Section 17 of the Local Government Code, provided for the changes in
the roles, functions, and organizational processes of the DOH. Petitioners
(iii) Subject to the provisions of Title Five, Book I of this Code, health alleged that E.O. No. 102 was void on the ground that it was issued in excess
services which include the implementation of programs and projects on of the President's authority, as the structural and functional reorganization
primary health care, maternal and child care, and communicable and non- of the DOH is a legislative function.47 In rejecting petitioners' argument, we
communicable disease control services, access to secondary and tertiary held that the issuance of E.O. No. 102 is an exercise of the President's
health services; purchase of medicines, medical supplies, and equipment constitutional power of control over the executive department, supported
needed to carry out the services herein enumerated; by the provisions of the Administrative Code, recognized by other statutes,
and consistently affirmed by this Court.48 Similarly, in Malaria Employees
xxx and Workers Association of the Philippines, Inc. v. Romulo,49 where the issue
(4) For a City: is also the validity of E.O. No. 102, we reiterated that the President has the
authority to carry out a reorganization of the DOH under the Constitution
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibraryAll the services and facilities of the municipality and other statutory laws.
and province. x x x
Our ruling in the above cases applies squarely in this case. The transfer of
xxx the administration and supervision of TPDH from the DOH to the City of
Taguig is a result of the President's exercise of her power of control over the
(e) National agencies or offices concerned shall devolve to local executive department, including the DOH.
government units the responsibility for the provision of basic services and
facilities enumerated in this Section within six (6) months after the The Constitution declares it a policy of the State to ensure the autonomy of
effectivity of this Code. local governments while Section 17 of the Local Government Code secures
to the local governments the genuine and meaningful autonomy that would
As used in this Code, the term "devolution" refers to the act by which the develop them into self-reliant communities and effective partners in the
national government confers power and authority upon the various local attainment of national goals.50 Therefore, in issuing E.O. No. 567, the
government units to perform specific functions and President was actually carrying out the provisions of the Constitution and
42
responsibilities. chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary the Local Government Code. She was performing her duty to ensure the
It is the policy of the Local Government Code to provide for a more faithful execution of the laws.51chanrobleslaw
responsive and accountable local government structure through a system of
decentralization.43 Thus, E.O. No. 567 merely implements and puts into As regards the second requisite, that the order must be issued or
operation the policy and directive set forth in the Local Government Code. promulgated in accordance with the prescribed procedure, petitioners do
not question the procedure by which E.O. No. 567 was issued. In the
Similarly, E.O. No. 567 is within the constitutional power of the President to absence of strong evidence to the contrary, acts of the other branches of
the government are presumed to be valid, and there being no objection more powers, authority, responsibilities, and resources. The process of
from the respondents as to the procedure in the promulgation of E.O. No. decentralization shall proceed from the national government to the local
567, the presumption is that the executive issuance duly complied with the government units.
procedures and limitations imposed by law.52chanrobleslaw
(b) It is also the policy of the State to ensure the accountability of local
The third requisite provides that an administrative issuance must not be government units through the institution of effective mechanisms of recall,
ultra vires or beyond the limits of the authority conferred. It must not initiative and referendum.
supplant or modify the Constitution, its enabling statute and other existing
laws, for such is the sole function of the legislature which the other (c) It is likewise the policy of the State to require all national agencies and
branches of the government cannot usurp.53chanrobleslaw offices to conduct periodic consultations with appropriate local government
units, non governmental and people's organizations, and other concerned
In assailing E.O. No. 567, petitioners argue that it violates Section 17(e) of sectors of the community before any project or program is implemented in
the Local Government Code. Section 17(e) partly their respective jurisdictions.55chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
reads:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary The foregoing provision echoes Section 3, Article X of the 1987 Constitution,
(e) National agencies or offices concerned shall devolve to local government which reads:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
units the responsibility for the provision of basic services and facilities Sec. 3. The Congress shall enact a local government code which shall
enumerated in this Section within six (6) months after the effectivity of this provide for a more responsive and accountable local government structure
Code. instituted through a system of decentralization with effective mechanisms
of recall, initiative, and referendum, allocate among the different local
xxx government units their powers, responsibilities, and resources, and provide
For petitioners, the provision limits the devolution of services to a period of for the qualifications, election, and appointment and removal, term,
only six (6) months from the effectivity of the Local Government Code. Any salaries, powers and functions and duties of local officials, and all other
devolution after the expiration of such period can only be done through a matters relating to the organization and operation of the local
statutory act. Thus, the issuance of E.O. No. 567, which was well-beyond units.56chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
such period, is a clear usurpation of legislative functions. Decentralization is the devolution of national administration, not power, to
local governments.57 One form of decentralization is devolution,58 which
In order to ascertain whether the six-month period bars devolution after its involves the transfer of powers, responsibilities, and resources for the
expiration, we bear in mind that we must interpret not by the letter that performance of certain functions from the central government to the
killeth, but by the spirit that giveth life.54 Thus, we revisit the Declaration of LGUs.59 It has been said that devolution is indispensable to
Policy of the Local Government Code, which decentralization.60chanrobleslaw
provides:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Sec. 2. Declaration of Policy. - Based on the foregoing, there is no question that the law favors devolution.
In fact, as mentioned earlier, Section 5(a) of the Local Government Code
(a) It is hereby declared the policy of the State that the territorial and explicitly states that in case of doubt, any question on any provision on a
political subdivisions of the State shall enjoy genuine and meaningful local power of a local government shall be resolved in favor of devolution of
autonomy to enable them to attain their fullest development as self-reliant powers and of the LGU.
communities and make them more effective partners in the attainment of
national goals. Toward this end, the State shall provide for a more Considering the same, petitioners' restrictive interpretation of Section 17(e)
responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through a is inconsistent with the Constitution and the Local Government Code. It
system of decentralization whereby local government units shall be given limits the devolution intended by both the Constitution and the Local
Government Code to an unduly short period of time.
The more reasonable understanding of the six-month period is that the
framers of the law provided for the period to prompt the national
government to speedily devolve the existing services to the LGUs. However,
it was not intended as a prescriptive period, as to absolutely prohibit the
national government from devolving services beyond the period. Most
especially so in this case because the TPDH was created long after the lapse
of the six-month period, thus making its devolution within such period
impossible.
Notably, there is nothing in Section 17(e) or in the Local Government Code
which provides for what would happen after the six-month period.
Therefore, it cannot be said that the law clearly and unequivocally prohibits
devolution after the six-month period.
In support of their position that devolution can only be done within said
period, petitioners quote a portion of the Transcript of the Session
Proceedings for the Local Government Code.61 However, a reading of the
quoted transcript indicates that what the legislators considered was when
the law and devolution will commence and not their intent to prohibit
devolution after the end of the six-month period. Notably, in Tondo Medical
Center Employees Association, we upheld the validity of E.O. No. 102 which
also sought to implement the devolution of services under the Local
Government Code, even if it was issued long after the lapse of the six-month
period.
Petitioners also posit that E.O. No. 567 violates the IRR promulgated by the
DOH pursuant to Article 25 of the IRR of the Local Government Code as it
excludes district health offices and hospitals in the NCR, including TPDLI,
from devolution.
We emphasize that under the Local Government Code, it is the Oversight
Committee, composed of representatives from both the executive and the
legislative branches of government, which was tasked to formulate the
implementing rules and regulations of the law.62 The Local Government
Code did not delegate to any other entity the formulation of its
implementing rules and regulations. Thus, on February 21, 1992, President
CorazoniC. Aquino approved the Oversight Committee's draft of the
implementing rules and regulations and issued Administrative Order No.
27063 (A.O. No. 270).
Petitioners' position that Article 25 of the IRR of the Local Government Code
further delegated to the DOH the task of formulating another set of
implementing rules and regulations is without any basis.
The Local Government Code and its IRR do not contain any provision
directing the DOH to promulgate implementing rules and regulations on the
devolution of health services. The pertinent portion of Article 25 of the IRR
of the Local Government Code actually states:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Art. 25. Responsibility for Delivery of Basic Services and Facilities. - The LGUs
shall, in addition to their existing functions and responsibilities, provide
basic services and facilities devolved to them covering, but not limited to,
the following:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
xxx
Municipality
xxx
(c) Subject to the provisions of Rule XXIII on local health boards and
in accordance with the standards and criteria of the Department
of Health (DOH), provision of health services through:
(1) Implementation of programs and projects on primary health care,
maternal and child care, and communicable and non-
communicable disease control services;
(2) Access to secondary and tertiary health services; and
(3) Purchase of medicines, medical supplies, and equipment needed
to carry out the devolved health services.
xxx
Based from the above, Article 25 mandates that the health services to be
provided by the LGUs must comply with the standards and criteria given by
the DOH. It does not direct the DOH to create rules on how devolution of
health services must be implemented.
Indeed, petitioners' failure to explain why there would be two (2)
implementing rules and regulations for a single law and its basis proves that
their position is without any merit. More, their failure to provide important
details regarding the supposed DOH IRR such as its title and number, date of
issuance and series number signifies the falsity of petitioners' claim.
Even assuming that the DOH was directed to promulgate a subsequent IRR,
and that the DOH issued the IRR, said IRR does not exempt district health
offices, including hospitals in the NCR from devolution. The quoted sections
of the alleged DOH IRR read:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Sec. 17. General Provisions. -
(a) The DOH shall devolve to LGUs concerned public health programs and
projects and such health and medical packages as currently in place at
the Integrated Provincial Health Offices, District Health Offices, City
Health Offices, and Municipal Health Offices, including the barangay
health stations as follows:
xxx
(3) Secondary health services are medical health services provided
by some rural health units, infirmaries, district hospitals and out-
patient departments of provincial hospitals. x x x
Sec. 18. Specific Provisions. - The devolution prescribed in the preceding
section shall include the following:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
(a) Province
(1) The Integrated Provincial Health Office including the provincial
hospital, district health offices including district hospitals,
Medicare and municipal hospitals. However, the district health
offices in the National Capital Region including its district
hospitals are not included in the devolution as prescribed herein.
x x x64
Section 18 (a)(l) merely excludes district hospitals in the NCR from the
process of devolution as prescribed in Section 17. The former does not
entirely prohibit devolution of health services in district hospitals in the
NCR.
At any rate, we emphasize that the DOH is subject to the power of control
of the President. Therefore, E.O. No. 567 issued by the President shall
prevail over any issuance made by the DOH and not the other way around.
The fourth requisite pertains to the reasonableness of an administrative
issuance. It is an axiom in administrative law that administrative authorities
should not act arbitrarily and capriciously in the issuance of rules and
regulations. To be valid, such rules and regulations must be reasonable and
fairly adapted to secure the end in view. If shown to bear no reasonable
relation to the purposes for which they were authorized to be issued, then
they must be held to be invalid.65 Specific to a reorganization, it is regarded
as valid provided it is pursued in good faith. As a general rule, a
reorganization is carried out in good faith if it is for the purpose of economy
or to make bureaucracy more efficient.66chanrobleslaw
E.O. No. 567 meets the test of reasonableness. The transfer of the
administration and supervision of TPDH from the DOH to the City of Taguig
aims to provide the City of Taguig the genuine and meaningful autonomy
which would make it an effective and efficient partner in the attainment of
national goals and providing basic health services and facilities to the
community. It implements and breathes life to the provisions of the
Constitution and the Local Government Code on creating a more responsive
and accountable local government structure instituted through a system of
decentralization.
Petitioners complain that E.O. No. 567 violated their rights because they
were transferred to other public health facilities without being afforded
with the necessary provisions for expenses relative to their transfer and re-
assignment, as required by Section 6 of R.A. No. 7305.
Similar to our ruling in Tondo Medical Center Employees Association, we
hold that petitioners' allegations are too general and unsubstantiated by the
records for us to pass upon. The persons affected are not specified; details
of their appointments and transfers—such as position, salary grade, and the
date they were appointed—are not given; and the circumstances which
attended the alleged violations are not identified.67 Further, while we
recognize the inconvenience which may be suffered by petitioners as a
result of E.O. No. 567, the need to make the delivery of health services more
efficient and more compelling is far from being unreasonable or arbitrary.
Be that as it may, we stress that E.O. No. 567 only lays down the directive to
transfer the administration and supervision of TPDH from the DOH to the
City of Taguig. The details and particulars of its implementation are set forth
in the subsequent issuances of the City of Taguig, i.e., E.O. No. 053 and E.O.
No. 001, as well as the MOA dated October 23, 2006 between the DOH and
the City of Taguig.
Considering the validity of E.O. No. 567, the subsequent Executive Orders
issued by Mayor Tinga, as well as the MOA between the DOH and the City of
Taguig, implementing E.O. No. 567 are likewise valid.
In sum, we find that the petition failed to show any constitutional infirmity
or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
President Arroyo's issuance of E.O. No. 567.
Republic vs. Drugmakers Laboratories, G.R. No. 190837
Issue:
Who has the power to validly issue and implement Circular Nos. 1 and 8, s.
1997: the Secretary of Health or the FDA?
Ruling: Circular Nos. 1 and 8, s. 1997 cannot be considered as administrative
regulations because they do not: (a) implement a primary legislation by
providing the details thereof; (b) interpret, clarify, or explain existing
statutory regulations under which the FDA operates; and/or (c) ascertain
the existence of certain facts or things upon which the enforcement of RA
3720 depends. In fact, the only purpose of these circulars is for the FDA to
administer and supervise the implementation of the provisions of AO 67, s.
1989, including those covering the BA/BE testing requirement, consistent
with and pursuant to RA 3720.43Therefore, the FDA has sufficient authority
to issue the said circulars and since they would not affect the substantive
rights of the parties that they seek to govern – as they are not, strictly
speaking, administrative regulations in the first place – no prior hearing,
consultation, and publication are needed for their validity.
Issue:
Do the assailed circulars partake of administrative rules and regulations and,
as such, must comply with the requirements of prior hearing, consultation
and publication?
Ruling: In general, an administrative regulation needs to comply with the
requirements laid down by Executive Order No. 292, s. 1987, otherwise
known as the "Administrative Code of 1987," on prior notice, hearing, and
publication in order to be valid and binding, except when the same is merely
an interpretative rule. This is because "[w]hen an administrative rule is
merely interpretative in nature, its applicability needs nothing further than
its bare issuance, for it gives no real consequence more than what the law
itself has already prescribed. When, on the other hand, the administrative
rule goes beyond merely providing for the means that can facilitate or
render least cumbersome the implementation of the law but substantially
increases the burden of those governed, it behooves the agency to accord
at least to those directly affected a chance to be heard, and thereafter to be
duly informed, before that new issuance is given the force and effect of
law."36
since the circulars would not affect the substantive rights of the parties that
they seek to govern – as they are not, strictly speaking, administrative
regulations in the first place – no prior hearing, consultation, and
publication are needed for their validity.

Cawad vs. Abad, G.R. No. 207145, July 28, 2015
Issue: Is DBM-DOH Joint Circular No. 1 reasonable and within the scope of
authority granted to the respondents?
Ruling: Yes. With respect to the infirmities of the DBM-DOH Joint Circular
raised in the petition, they cannot be said to have been issued with grave
abuse of discretion for not only are they reasonable, they were likewise
issued well within the scope of authority granted to the respondents. In
fact, as may be gathered from prior issuances on the matter, the circular did
not make any substantial deviation therefrom, but actually remained
consistent with, and germane to, the purposes of the law.
Issue: Is DBM-DOH Joint Circular No. 1 null and void for its failure to comply
with Section 3523 of RA No. 7305 on publication in a newspaper of general
circulation, as well as its failure to file a copy of the same with the UP Law
Center-ONAR?
Ruling: Anent petitioners' contention that the DBM-DOH Joint Circular is null
and void for its failure to comply with Section 3523 of RA No. 7305 providing
that its implementing rules shall take effect thirty (30) days after publication
in a newspaper of general circulation, as well as its failure to file a copy of
the same with the University of the Philippines Law Center-Office of the
National Administrative Register (UP Law Center-ONAR), jurisprudence as
well as the circumstances of this case dictate otherwise.
Indeed, publication, as a basic postulate of procedural due process, is
required by law in order for administrative rules and regulations to be
effective.24 There are, however, several exceptions, one of which are
interpretative regulations which "need nothing further than their bare
issuance for they give no real consequence more than what the law itself
has already prescribed."25 These regulations need not be published for they
add nothing to the law and do not affect substantial rights of any person.26
Thus, in Association of Southern Tagalog Electric Cooperatives, et. al. v.
Energy Regulatory Commission (ERC),27 wherein several orders issued by
the ERC were sought to be invalidated for lack of publication and non-
submission of copies thereof to the UP Law Center - ONAR, it has been held
that since they merely interpret RA No. 7832 and its IRR, particularly on the
computation of the cost of purchased power, without modifying, amending
or supplanting the same, they cannot be rendered ineffective, to wit:
When the policy guidelines of the ERC directed the exclusion of discounts
extended by power suppliers in the computation of the cost of purchased
power, the guidelines merely affirmed the plain and unambiguous meaning
of "cost" in Section 5, Rule IX of the IRR of R.A. No. 7832."Cost" is an item of
outlay, and must therefore exclude discounts since these are "not amounts
paid or charged for the sale of electricity, but are reductions in rates.
xxxx
Thus, the policy guidelines of the ERC on the treatment of discounts
extended by power suppliers "give no real consequence more than what the
law itself has already prescribed." Publication is not necessary for the
effectivity of the policy guidelines.
As interpretative regulations, the policy guidelines of the ERC on the
treatment of discounts extended by power suppliers are also not required
to be filed with the U.P. Law Center in order to be effective. Section 4,
Chapter 2, Book VII of the Administrative Code of 1987 requires every rule
adopted by an agency to be filed with the U.P. Law Center to be effective.
However, in Board of Trustees of the Government Service Insurance System
v. Velasco, this Court pronounced that "not all rules and regulations
adopted by every government agency are to be filed with the UP Law
Center." Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature are
not required to be filed with the U.P. Law Center. Paragraph 9 (a) of the
Guidelines for Receiving and Publication of Rules and Regulations Filed with
the U.P. Law Center states:
9. Rules and Regulations which need not be filed with the U.P. Law Center,
shall, among others, include but not be limited to, the following:
a. Those which are interpretative regulations and those merely internal in
nature, that is, regulating only the personnel of the Administrative agency
and not the public.
Issue:
Is Sec. 6.5 of DBM-CSC Joint Circular, insofar as it provides that “an official
or employee authorized to be granted longevity pay under an existing law is
not eligible for the grant of step increment due to length of service”, valid
and constitutional?
Ruling: Moreover, insofar as the DBM-DOH Joint Circular similarly withholds
the Step Increment due to length of service from those who are already
being granted Longevity Pay, the same must likewise be declared
unenforceable
Soriano vs. Sec. of Finance, G.R. No. 184450. Jan. 24, 2017
Issue: Whether or not Sections 1 and 3 of RR 10-2008 are consistent with
the law in declaring that “an MWE who receives other benefits in excess of
the statutory limit of P30,000 is no longer entitled to the exemption
provided by R.A. 9504”, consistent with the law?
Ruling: sec. 1 and 3 of the RR add a requirement not found in the law.
A. Nowhere in the provisions of ra 9504 would one find the
qualifications prescribed by the assailed provisions of rr 10-2008.
B. Minimum wage is mandated; employers may not freely choose on
their own to designate in which way. The min wage exempted by ra
9504 is that which is referred to in the labor code
C. Ra 9504 is explicit as to the coverage of the exemption: the wages
that are not in excess of the minimum wage as determined by the
wage boards, including the corresponding holiday, overtime, night
diff, and hazard pays
D. The proper interpretation of RA 9504 is that it imposes taxes only
on the taxable income received in excess of the minimum wage, but
the MWEs will not lose their exemption as such. Workers who
receive the statutory min wage their basic pay remain MWEs. The
receipt of any other income during the year does not disqualify
them as MWEs. They remain mwes, entitled to exemption as such,
but the taxable income they receive other than as MWEs may be
subjected to appropriate taxes.
Purisima vs. Phil. Tobacco Institute, G.R. No. 210251, Apr. 17, 2017
Issue: Is Section 11 of Revenue Regulation No. 17-2012 issued on authority
of R.A. No. 10351, otherwise known as the Sin Tax Reform Law of 2012?
Ruling: it can be gleaned that the lawmakers intended to impose the excise
tax on every pack of cigarettes that come in 20 sticks. Individual pouches or
packaging combinations of 5'sand l0's for retail purposes are allowed and
will be subjected to the same excise tax rate as long as they are bundled
together by not more than 20 sticks. Thus, by issuing Section11of RR17-
2012 andAnnex"D-1"on Cigarettes Packed by Machine of RMC90-2012, the
BIR went beyond the express provisions of RA10351.
It is an elementary rule in administrative law that administrative rules and
regulations enacted by administrative bodies to implement the law which
they are entrusted to enforce have the force of law and are entitled to great
weight and respect. However, these implementations of the law must not
override, supplant,or modify the law but must remain consistent with the
law they intend to implement. It is only Congress which has the power to
repeal or amend the law.
In this case, Section 11 of RR17-2012 and Annex"D-1" on Cigarettes Packed
by Machine of RMC90-2012 clearly contravened the provisions of
RA10351.1âwphi1 It is a well-settled principle that are venue regulation
cannot amend the law it seeks to implement. In Commissioner of Internal
Revenue v. Seagate Technology (Philippines), 14 we held that a mere
administrative issuance, like a BIR regulation, cannot amend the law; the
former cannot purport to do any more than implement the latter. The
courts will not countenance an administrative regulation that overrides the
statute it seeks to implement.
In the present case, area ding of Section 11 of RR17-2012 and Annex"D-1"
on Cigarettes Packed by Machine of RMC 90-2012 reveals that they are not
simply regulations to implement RA10351. They are amendatory provisions
which require cigarette manufacturers to be liable to pay for more tax than
the law, RA10351, allows. The BIR, in issuing these revenue regulations,
created an additional tax liability for packaging combinations smaller than
20 cigarette sticks. In so doing, the BIR amended the law, an act beyond the
power of the BIR to do.
In sum, we agree with the ruling of the RTC that Section 11 of RR17-2012
and Annex"D-1" on Cigarettes Packed by Machine of RMC 90-2012 are null
and void.
Quezon City PTCA vs. DepEd, G.R. No. 188720, Feb. 23, 2016
Issue:
Is DepEd Order No. 54, s. 2009, an invalid exercise of the rule-making power
delegated to the Secretary of Education?
Ruling: Department Order No. 54, Series of 2009 was validly issued by the
Secretary of Education pursuant to his statutorily vested rule-making power
and pursuant to the purposes for which the organization of parent-teacher
associations is mandated by statute. Likewise, there was no fatal procedural
lapse in the adoption of Department Order No. 54, Series of 2009.
Delegation of powers is a rule that is widely recognized especially in the
legislative branch of government. With the increasing complexity of the
government's functions and the growing inability of the legislature to
address the myriad of problems demanding its attention, Congress found it
necessary to delegate its powers to administrative agencies. This is the
power of subordinate legislation.
"With this power, administrative bodies may implement the broad policies
laid down in a statute by 'filling in' the details which the Congress may not
have the opportunity or competence to provide."13 On this basis,
administrative agencies may promulgate supplementary regulations which
have the force and effect of law.14 In order for a valid delegation to exist,
two basic tests must be complied with: the completeness test, and the
sufficient standard test.
"Under the first test, the law must be complete in all its terms and
conditions when it leaves the legislature, such that, when it reaches the
delegate, the only thing he would have to do is enforce it. On the other
hand, under the sufficient standard test, there must be adequate guidelines
or stations in the law to map out the boundaries of the delegate's authority
and prevent the delegation from running riot. These two tests are both
intended to prevent a total transference of legislative authority to the
delegate, who is not allowed to step into the shoes of the legislature and
exercise a power essentially legislative."19
Also, these two tests ensure that administrative agencies, in the exercise of
their power of subordinate legislation, create rules and regulations that are
germane to the objects and purposes of the law they implement; and are
not in contradiction, but in full conformity with the standards prescribed
by this law.
Issue:
For its non-publication and in the absence public consultations, was the
issuance of DepEd Order No. 54 violative of petitioner’s right to due
process?
Ruling: This does not invalidate the Department Order. As is evident from
the previously quoted provisions of Book VII, Chapter 2 of the
Administrative Code, all that is required for the validity of rules promulgated
by administrative agencies is the filing of three (3) certified copies with the
University of the Philippine Law Center. Within 15 days of filing,
administrative rules become effective.
MPSTA vs. Garcia, G.R. No. 192708, Oct. 2, 2017
Issue:
Considering that the parties participated in the public consultation of GSIS’
policy resolutions on PBP, APL and CLIP was it non-publication validly
dispensed with?
Ruling: The policies are invalid due to lack of publication. While GSIS filed
copies of the subject resolutions with the office of the national
administrative register (ONAR), it only did so after the claims of the retirees
and beneficiaries had already been lodged. The resolutions were not
published in either the official gazette or a newspaper of general circulation
of the country.