SECTION 14

CRIMINAL DUE PROCESS

21
Tatad v. Sandiganbayan
G.R. Nos. L-72335-39 March 21, 1998

Facts:

The complainant, Antonio de los Reyes, originally filed what he termed "a report" with
the Legal Panel of the Presidential Security Command (PSC) on October 1974, containing
charges of alleged violations of RA No. 3019 against then Secretary of Public Information
Francisco S. Tatad. The "report" was made to "sleep" in the office of the PSC until the end of
1979 when it became widely known that Secretary Tatad had a falling out with President Marcos
and had resigned from the Cabinet. On December 12, 1979, the 1974 complaint was
resurrected in the form of a formal complaint filed with the Tanodbayan. The Tanodbayan acted
on the complaint on April 1, 1980 which was around two months after petitioner Tatad's
resignation was accepted by Pres. Marcos by referring the complaint to the CIS, Presidential
Security Command, for investigation and report. On June 16, 1980, the CIS report was
submitted to the Tanodbayan, recommending the filing of charges for graft and corrupt practices
against former Minister Tatad and Antonio L. Cantero. By October 25, 1982, all affidavits and
counteraffidavits were in the case was already for disposition by the Tanodbayan. However, it
was only on June 5, 1985 that a resolution was approved by the Tanodbayan. Five criminal
information were filed with the Sandiganbayan on June 12, 1985, all against petitioner Tatad
alone.

Issue:

Whether or not the accused was deprived of his constitutional right to due process?

Ruling:
Yes. Due process and right to speedy disposition of trial were violated. First, the
complaint came to life, only after petitioner Tatad had a falling out with President Marcos.
Second, departing from established procedures prescribed by law for preliminary investigation,
which require the submission of affidavits and counteraffidavits by the complainant and the
respondent and their witnesses, the Tanodbayan referred the complaint to the Presidential
Security Command for finding investigation and report. P.D. 911 prescribes a ten-day period for
the prosecutor to resolve a case under preliminary investigation by him from its termination.
Although, the period fixed by law was merely directory, a delay of close to three years cannot be
deemed reasonable.

22
Galman v. Sandiganbayan
G.R. No. 72670 September 12, 1986

Facts:

An investigating committee was created to determine the facts on the case involving the
assassination of Ninoy Aquino. It appears that majority and minority reports showed that they
are unconvinced on the participation of Galman as the assassin of late Sen. Aquino. Majority
reports recommended the 26 military respondents as indictable for the premeditated killing of
Aquino and Galman which the Sandiganbayan did not give due consideration.

The office of the Tanod Bayan was originally preparing a resolution charging the 26
military accused as principal to the crime against Aquino but was recalled upon
the intervention of President Marcos who insist on the innocence of the accused. Marcos
however recommended the filing of murder charge and to implement the acquittal as planned so
that double jeopardy may be invoked later on.

The petitioners filed an action for miscarriage of justice against the Sandiganbayan and
gross violation of constitutional rights of the petitioners for failure to exert genuine efforts in
allowing the prosecution to present vital documentary evidence and prayed for nullifying the bias
proceedings before the Sandiganbayan and ordering a re-trial before an impartial tribunal.

Issue:

Whether or not petitioner was deprived of his rights as an accused?

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the prosecution was deprived of fair opportunity to
prosecute. The court further contends that the previous trial was a mock trial where the
authoritarian President ordered the Sandiganbayan and Tanod Bayan to closely monitor the trial
which was undertaken with due pressure to the judiciary. The court’s decision of acquittal is one
void of jurisdiction owing to its failure in observing due process during the trial therefore the
judgment was also deemed void. More so, the trial was one vitiated with lack of due process
on the account of collusion between the lower court and Sandiganbayan for the rendition of a
pre-determined verdict of the accused.

The denial on the motion for reconsideration of the petitioners by the court was set aside and
rendered the decision of acquittal of the accused null and void. An order for a re-trial was
granted.

23
Alonte v. Savellano
G.R. No. 131652 March 9, 1998

FACTS:

Alonte was accused of raping JuvieLynPunongbayan with accomplice Buenaventura

Concepcion. It was alleged that Concepcion befriended Juvie and had later lured her into
Alonete’s house who was then the mayor of Biňan, Laguna. The case was brought before RTC
Biňan. The counsel and the prosecutor later moved for a change of venue due to alleged
intimidation. While the change of venue was pending, Juvie executed an affidavit of desistance.
The prosecutor continued on with the case and the change of venue was done notwithstanding
opposition from Alonte. The case was raffled to the Manila RTC under J Savellano. Savellano
later found probable cause and had ordered the arrest of Alonte and Concepcion. Thereafter,
the prosecution presented Juvie and had attested the voluntariness of her desistance the same
being due to media pressure and that they would rather establish new life elsewhere. Case was
then submitted for decision and Savellano sentenced both accused to reclusion perpetua.
Savellano commented that Alonte waived his right to due process when he did not cross
examine Juvie when clarificatory questions were raised about the details of the rape and on the
voluntariness of her desistance.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Alonte has been denied criminal due process.

HELD:

The SC ruled that Savellano should inhibit himself from further deciding on the case due
to animosity between him and the parties. There is no showing that Alonte waived his right. The
standard of waiver requires that it “not only must be voluntary, but must be knowing, intelligent,
and done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences.”
Mere silence of the holder of the right should not be so construed as a waiver of right, and the
courts must indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver. Savellano has not shown
impartiality by repeatedly not acting on numerous petitions filed by Alonte. The case is
remanded to the lower court for retrial and the decision earlier promulgated is nullified.

PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE
24

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. DRAMAYO

G.R. No. L-21325 October 29, 1971

FACTS:

There is an element of ingenuity as well as of novel in the plea made by counsel de

oficio in this appeal of the accused PableoDramayo and PaternoEcubin, who were sentenced to
life imprisonment for the murder of EstelitoNogaliza. The claim is vigorously pressed that
because the information alleged conspiracy on the part of seven defendants, with only the two
appellants being convicted, two having been utilized as state witnesses and the other three
having been acquitted on the ground of insufficiency of evidence as to their culpability, the
judgment of conviction against the appellants cannot stand, there being a reasonable doubt as
to their guilt. To bolster such a contention, certain alleged deficiencies in the proof offered by the
prosecution were noted. A careful study of the evidence of record would leave no other rational
conclusion but that the deceased met his death at the hands of the appellants in the manner as
found by the lower court.

It was on the basis of the above testimony offered by the prosecution that the lower court
reached its decision. Its dispositive portion found the accused, now appellant PableoDramayo
and PaternoEcubin, guilty beyond reasonable doubt, of the crime of murder.

ISSUE:

Was their right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty violated?

HELD:

The SC affirms the decisions of the trial and appellate courts. The contention of the
appeal cannot prosper. The judgment of conviction should not have occasioned any surprise on
the part of the two appellants, as from the evidence deserving of the fullest credence, their guilt
had been more than amply demonstrated. The presumption of innocence could not come to
their rescue as it was more than sufficiently overcome by the proof that was offered by the
prosecution. What would have been a blot on the law is that if, on the facts as established, no
reasonable doubt being entertained, the two appellants would have been acquitted likewise just
because the other five defendants, for the reasons above stated, were not similarly sentenced.
The principal contention raised is thus clearly untenable. It must be stated likewise that while
squarely advanced for the first time, there had been cases where this Court, notwithstanding a
majority of the defendants being acquitted, the element of conspiracy likewise being allegedly
present, did hold the party or parties, responsible for the offense guilty of the crime charged, a
moral certainty having arisen as to their capability

25
DUMLAO vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
G.R. No. L-52245 January 22, 1980

FACTS:

This is a Petition for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction and/or Restraining Order filed
by petitioners, in their own behalf and all others allegedly similarly situated, seeking to enjoin
respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) from implementing certain provisions of
Batas Pambansa Big. 51, 52, and 53 for being unconstitutional.

Petitioner Dumlao specifically questions the constitutionality of section 4 of Batas

PambansaBlg. 52 as discriminatory and contrary to the equal protection and due process
guarantees of the Constitution

Petitioners then pray that the statutory provisions they have challenged be declared null
and void for being violative of the Constitution.

ISSUE:

Does the provision of BP 52 sec. 4, paragraph 2 affect violate the right of presumption of
innocence as challenged by the petitioners?

HELD:

The issue raised by other taxpayer petitioners is without merit. The law merely provides
for disqualifications of running in elective government positions and does not violate any right of
the presumption of innocence. Who is barred or disqualified is a person convicted or is facing
criminal charges. It does not convict any person.
26
Marquez v COMELEC
G.R. No. 112889 April 18, 1995

Facts:

It is averred that at the time respondent Rodriguez filed his certificate of candidacy, a
criminal charge against him for ten counts of insurance fraud or grand theft of personal property
was still pending before the Municipal Court of Los Angeles, USA. A warrant issued by said
court for his arrest, it is claimed, has yet to be served on private respondent on account of
his alleged “flight” from that country.

Before the May 1992 elections, a petition for cancellation of respondent’s certificate of
candidacy on the ground of the candidate’s disqualification under section 40 of the Local
Government Code (Section 40. Disqualification. The following persons are disqualified from
running for any local elective position... (e) Fugitive from justice in criminal or non-political cases
here or abroad.) was filed by petitioner, but COMELEC dismissed the petition. Private
respondent was proclaimed Governor-elect of Quezon. Petitioner instituted quo warranto
proceedings against private respondent before the COMELEC but the latter dismissed the
petition.

Issue:

WON Rodriguez, who at the time of the filing of his COC is said to be facing criminal
charges before a foreign court and evading a warrant of arrest comes within the term “fugitive of
justice” as provided for in section 40 of the Local Government Code.

Held:

NO. Although it is provided in Article 73 of the Rules and Regulations implementing the
Local Government Code of 1991that for a person to be considered as a fugitive from justice, he
has to be convicted by final judgment, but such definition is an ordinate and under
circumscription of the law. For the term “Fugitive from justice” includes not only those who after
conviction to avoid punishment but likewise those who, after being charged flee to avoid
prosecution. This definition truly finds support from jurisprudence, and it maybe conceded as
expressing the general and ordinary connotation of the term. The COMELEC is directed to
proceed and settle the case in conformity of the given clarification with the term “fugitive from
justice”.

27
Feeder International Line vs. CA
G.R. No. 94262 May 31, 1991

FACTS:

The M/T “ULU WAI” foreign vessel of Honduran registry, owned and operated by Feeder
International Shipping Lines of Singapore, was carrying 1,100 metric tons of gas oil and 1,000
metric tons of fuel oil consigned to Far East Synergy Corporation of Zamboanga. The vessel
anchored in Iloilo without notifying the customs authorities, who upon knowing this, discovered
that it did not have the required ship and shipping documents. The vessel and its cargo were
held and a Warrant of Seizure and Detention over the same was issued after due investigation.
The vessel was then found guilty of violating the Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines.
This decision was affirmed both by the Court of Tax Appeals and the Court of Appeals.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner was deprived of property without due process of law in that its
right to be presumed innocent was not recognized and the decision was not supported by proof
beyond reasonable doubt.

HELD:

Proceedings for the forfeiture of goods illegally imported are not criminal in nature since
they do not result in the conviction of the wrongdoer nor in the imposition upon him of a penalty,
proof beyond reasonable doubt is not required in order to justify the forfeiture of goods. In this
case, the degree of proof required is merely substantial evidence which means such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.

In this case, it was held that the Government has sufficiently established that an illegal
importation, or at least an attempt thereof, has been committed with the use of the vessel M/T
“ULU WAI,” thus warranting the forfeiture of said vessel and its cargo pursuant to the provisions
of the Tariff and Customs Code. Moreover, the petitioner, which is a corporate entity, has no
personality to invoke the right to be presumed innocent which right is available only to an
individual who is an accused in a criminal case.

RIGHT TO BE HEARD BY HIMSELF AND COUNSEL

28
People vs. Holgado
GR L-2809, 22 March 1950

Facts:

Frisco Holgado was charged in the Court of First Instance of Romblon with slight illegal
detention because according to the information, being a private person, he did "feloniously and
without justifiable motive, kidnap and detain one Artemia Fabreag in the house of Antero
Holgado for about eight hours thereby depriving said Artemia Fabreag of her personal liberty."

Holgado pleaded guilty without the benefit of a lawyer. Two days later, the trial court
rendered judgment, finding Holgado guilty and sentencing him the penalty of prision mayor.
Holgado appealed.

Issue:

Whether the duties required of the trial court when the accused has no counsel were
complied with?

Held:

Under the circumstances, particularly the qualified plea given by the accused, who was
unaided by counsel, it was not prudent, to say the least, for the trial court to render such a
serious judgment finding the accused guilty of a capital offense, and imposing upon him such a
heavy penalty as ten years and one day of prision mayor to twenty years, without absolutely any
evidence to determine and clarify the true facts of the case.

Under Section 3, Rule 112 of the the Rules of Court, when a defendant appears without
attorney, the court has four important duties to comply with: (1) It must inform the defendant that
it is his right to have attorney before being arraigned; (2) After giving him such information the
court must ask him if he desires the aid of an attorney; (3) If he desires and is unable to employ
attorney, the court must assign attorney de oficio to defend him; and (4) If the accused desires
to procure an attorney of his own the court must grant him a reasonable time therefor.

Not one of these duties had been complied with by the trial court. The record discloses
that said court did not inform the accused of his right to have an attorney nor did it ask him if he
desired the aid of one. The trial court failed to inquire whether or not the accused was to employ
an attorney, to grant him reasonable time to procure one or to assign an attorney de oficio. In
criminal cases there can be no fair hearing unless the accused be given an opportunity to be
heard by counsel. The right to be heard would be of little avail if it does not include the right to
be heard by counsel. Hence, the judgment appealed from is reversed and the case is remanded
to the Court below for a new arraignment and a new trial after the accused is apprised of his
right to have and to be assisted by counsel.

29

G.R. No. 74259 February 14, 1991

GENEROSO P. CORPUZ, petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

Facts:
Petitioner is the Supervising Accounting Clerk in the Office of the Provincial Treasurer of Nueva
Vizcaya. When his designation was terminated, the Certificate of Turnover revealed a shortage
in the amount of P72,823.08. The shortage was not denied by the petitioner. 3 He insisted,
however, that he is not guilty of the charge because the shortage imputed to him was malversed
by other persons. But Acting Deputy Provincial Treasurer Bernardo C. Aluning, Paymaster
Diosdado Pineda testified for the prosecution. Acting Provincial Treasurer Perfecto Martinez
corroborated their testimonies charging petitioner as the culprit of the crime of Malversation of
Public Funds.
The petitioner seeks reversal of the decision of the respondent court which found him guilty
beyond reasonable doubt as principal of the crime of Malversation of Public Funds.
He claims that he is the victim of a "sinister design" to hold him responsible for a crime he has
not committed and should thefore be presumed as innocent.

Issue:
Whether or not he can invoke the right of presumption of innocence when there is substantial
evidence against him.
Held:
The Supreme Court held that, “The equipoise rule invoked by the petitioner is applicable only
where the evidence of the parties is evenly balanced, in which case the constitutional
presumption of innocence should tilt the scales in favor of the accused. There is no such
equipoise here. The evidence of the prosecution is overwhelming and has not been overcome
by the petitioner with his nebulous claims of persecution and conspiracy. The presumed
innocence of the accused must yield to the positive finding that he malversed public funds to the
prejudice of the public whose confidence he has breached. His conviction must be affirmed.”

Case 30
People vs Agbayani
GR No. 122770
January 16, 1998

Facts:
Appellant was convicted by the court below of the crime of rape upon her daughter, Eden
Agbayani, thereby sentencing him the penalty of death. Thus this case is brought to the
Supreme Court for Automatic Review. During appellant’s arraignment in the lower court, he was
assisted by Atty. Baldado & Atty. Cruz (both were appointed as counsel de oficio). On the
succeeding dates of trial, the prosecution presented Eden & SPO1 Salvador Buenviaje. During
these hearings, however, appellant was represented by Atty. Temanil of the Public Attorney’s
Office. The trial court gave full credence to the testimony of Eden who appeared, during her
entire testimonies on January 20 and May 4, 1995, coherent, candid and responsive. Thus the
trial court convicted him of the crime.

Appellant, through his new counsel de parte Atty. Siobal and Atty. Floresta, filed a Motion for
New Trial on the ground that serious irregularities prejudicial to his substantial rights were
committed during the trial. He alleges among others that his counsel de officio failed to cross-
examine complainant & police investigator exhaustively. He further alleges that his counsel de
oficio was never prepared during all the scheduled hearings; worse, even waived the presence
of appellant after the third witness for the prosecution was presented.

Issue:
Whether or not appellant’s right to be heard by himself and counsel was violated

Held:
No. Appellant’s contention that his counsel was not ready at all times because at the hearing on
January 20, 1995 he asked for a continuation as he has not yet interviewed his client is
misleading. Atty. Temanil made that statement after he cross-examined Eden and after the judge
realized that it was almost 1:00 o’clock in the afternoon & both of them were hungry.

Finally, contrary to appellant's allegation, a meticulous examination of the transcripts of the

stenographic notes convinces this Court that Atty. Temanil sufficiently cross-examined Eden. If
he decided to terminate his cross-examination, it could have been due to the futility of any
further cross-examination which might only prove favourable to the prosecution, as it might have
opened another window of opportunity for EDEN to strengthen her testimony.
(31 lacking)

Case 32
People v. Quitlong,
G.R. No. 121562,
July 10, 1998

Facts:
At around six o’clock in the evening of 20 October 1994, Lito Adjaro, who had just come
from work as a dispatcher of passenger jeepneys plying the Baguio City-Loakan route, repaired
to a nearby game parlor where he saw 19-year-old University of Baguio medical technology
student Jonathan Calpito playing billiards with Jonathan Gosil. Adjaro was Calpito’s neighbor
and barkada(gangmate) in Loakan. At past eight o’clock, Calpito decided that it was time to go
home. Since at that hour there were no longer passenger jeepneys bound for Loakan, the three
friends decided to walk down to Harrison Road behind the Melvin Jones grandstand to grab a
taxicab. The area was well-lighted. Wanting to partake of some "fishballs," Calpito and Gosil
approached a fishball vendor about three to four meters away. The two returned with three
sticks of fishballs worth fifteen pesos. When Calpito counted the change for his 100-peso bill,
he saw that he had only been handed back thirty five pesos. Confronted by Calpito and Gosil,
the fishball vendor would not admit that he had short-changed Calpito. Herbert Soriano, a civil
engineer driving a passenger-type jeep on his way to Loakan from the Dominican Hill, was seen
passing by. Adjaro, his neighbor, hailed him. Soriano positioned his jeep around four or five
meters from where Gosil and Calpito were still having an argument with the fishball
vendor. Soriano called out to the two to board the jeep but they ignored him. Moments later,
Soriano saw eight men rushing towards Gosil and Calpito from the direction of the taxicab-stand
behind his jeep. Some of the men later backed out but four of them pursued Calpito who,
meanwhile, had started to retreat from the group. The four men, however, succeeded in
cornering Calpito. Soriano saw Calpito fall to the ground and thought that the latter had just
been weakened by the men's punches but, when Calpito was carried on board his jeep, Soriano
realized that Calpito had been stabbed. Dr. Kathryna Ayro, the hospital’s medico-legal officer,
conducted the autopsy on the victim upon the request of Dr. Samuel Cosme. That same
evening of 20 October 1994, at 8:55, Calpito died at the Baguio General Hospital. On 21 April
1995, the trial court, following his evaluation of the respective submissions of the prosecution
and the defense, including their rebuttal and sur-rebuttal evidence, rendered its now assailed
decision.

Issue:
WON the Charge is made conformably with prevailing substantive and procedural
requirements.
Ruling:
Article III, Section 14, of the 1987 Constitution, in particular, mandates that no person
shall be held answerable for a criminal offense without due process of law and that in all
criminal prosecutions the accused shall first be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him.[17] The right to be informed of any such indictment is likewise explicit in
procedural rules.[18] The practice and object of informing an accused in writing of the charges
against him has been explained as early as the 1904 decision of the Court in U.S. vs. Karelsen;
[19]
viz: “First. To furnish the accused with such a description of the charge against him as will
enable him to make his defense; and second, to avail himself of his conviction or acquittal for
protection against a further prosecution for the same cause; and third, to inform the court of the
facts alleged, so that it may decide whether they are sufficient in law to support a conviction, if
one should be had. (United States vs. Cruikshank, 92 U.S., 542). In order that this requirement
may be satisfied, facts must be stated, not conclusions of law. Every crime is made up of certain
acts and intent; these must be set forth in the complaint with reasonable particularity of time,
place, names (plaintiff and defendant), and circumstances. In short, the complaint must contain
a specific allegation of every fact and circumstance necessary to constitute the crime charged.
An information, in order to ensure that the constitutional right of the accused to be informed of
the nature and cause of his accusation is not violated, must state the name of the accused; the
designation given to the offense by the statute; a statement of the acts or omissions so
complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate time
and date of the commission of the offense; and the place where the offense has been
committed.[20] In embodying the essential elements of the crime charged, the information must
set forth the facts and circumstances that have a bearing on the culpability and liability of the
accused so that the accused can properly prepare for and undertake his defense. Respondents
where guilty on the crime of murder.
CASE 33
PECHO v. PEOPLE
G.R. N0. 111399
SEPTEMBER 27, 1996

FACTS

In the information charged before him, Petitioner Pecho was alleged to have violated Section (e)
of RA 3019 otherwise known as ANTI-GRAFT AND CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT but when the
decision was rendered, he was convicted, instead, of a different crime which is the complex
crime of attempted estafa through falsification of official and commercial documents.

ISSUE

WON petitioner’s right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him was
violated.

HELD

No, petitioner’s right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him was
not violated. What determines the real nature and cause of accusation against an accused is
the actual recital of facts stated in the information or complaint and not the caption or preamble
of the information or complaint nor the specification of the provision of law alleged to have been
violated, they being conclusions of law.
Case 34
SORIANO VS. SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. NO.L-65952
July 31, 1984

Facts:
The petitioner, who was an Asst. Fiscal, was assigned to investigate an accusation against Tan
for qualified theft. Within the course of the petitioner’s investigation, the petitioner demanded
four thousand pesos (P4000.00) from Tan as a price for dismissing the case. The latter reported
the matter to the NBI. The NBI set up an entrapment for the petitioner. Tan was given a two
thousand peso bill (P2000.00), a marked bill, and he had supplied the other half. The
entrapment was successful and the information was filed with the Sandiganbayan. After trial, the
Sandiganbayan rendered a decision finding the petitioner guilty for violating the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act (R.A.3019). A motion for reconsideration was filed but it was denied by the
Sandiganbayan, hence this instant petition.

Issue:
Whether or Not the investigation conducted by the petitioner can be regarded as “contract or
transaction” within the purview of RA.3019.

Held:
R.A. 3019, Sec.3. Corrupt practices of public officers - In addition to acts or omissions of public
officers already penalized by existing laws, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any
public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:

xxx
b. Directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any gift, present, share percentage or benefit, for
himself or for other person, in connection with any contract or transaction between the Govt.
and any other party wherein the public officer in his official capacity has to intervene under the
law.

The petitioner stated that the facts make out a case of direct bribery under Art.210 of the RPC
and not a violation of R.A. 3019 sec.3 (b). The offense of direct bribery is not the offense
charged and is not included in the offense charged which is violation of R.A.3019 sec.3 (b).
The respondent claimed that, transaction as used hereof, is not limited to commercial or
business transaction, but includes all kinds of transaction whether commercial, civil, or
administrative in nature.
The court agrees with the petitioner. It is obvious that the investigation conducted by the
petitioner was neither a contract nor transaction. A transaction like a contract is one which
involves some consideration as in credit transactions. And this element is absent in the
investigation conducted by the petitioner.

Judgment modified. Petitioner is guilty of direct bribery under Art.210 of the RPC.

Case 35
Borja vs. Mendoza
GR NO. L-45667
June 20, 1977

Facts: Borja was accused of slight physical injuries in the City of Cebu. However, he was not
arraigned. That notwithstanding, respondent Judge Senining proceeded with the trial in absentia
and rendered a decision finding petitioner guilty of the crime charged. The case was appealed
to the Court o First Instance in Cebu presided by respondent Judge Mendoza. It was alleged
that the failure to arraign him is a violation of his constitutional rights. It was also alleged that
without any notice to petitioner and without requiring him to submit his memorandum, a decision
on the appealed case was rendered The Solicitor General commented that the decision should
be annulled because there was no arraignment.

Issue: WON petitioner’s constitutional right was violated when he was not arraigned.

Held: Yes. Procedural due process requires that the accused be arraigned so that he may be
informed as to why he was indicted and what penal offense he has to face, to be convicted only
on a showing that his guilt is shown beyond reasonable doubt with full opportunity to disprove
the evidence against him. It is also not just due process that requires an arraignment. It is
required in the Rules that an accused, for the first time, is granted the opportunity to know the
precise charge that confronts him. It is imperative that he is thus made fully aware of possible
loss of freedom, even of his life, depending on the nature of the crime imputed to him. At the
very least then, he must be fully informed of why the prosecuting arm of the state is mobilized
against him. Being arraigned is thus a vital aspect of the constitutional rights guaranteed him.
Also, respondent Judge Senining convicted petitioner notwithstanding the absence of an
arraignment. With the violation of the constitutional right to be heard by himself and counsel
being thus manifest, it is correct that the Solicitor General agreed with petitioner that the
sentence imposed on him should be set aside for being null. The absence of an arraignment
can be invoked at anytime in view of the requirements of due process to ensure a fair and
impartial trial.
Wherefore, the petition for certiorari is granted. The decision of respondent Judge Romulo R.
Senining dated December 28, 1973, finding the accused guilty of the crime of slight physical
injuries, is nullified and set aside. Likewise, the decision of respondent Judge Rafael T.
Mendoza dated November 16, 1976, affirming the aforesaid decision of Judge Senining, is
nullified and set aside. The case is remanded to the City Court of Cebu for the prosecution of
the offense of slight physical injuries, with due respect and observance of the provisions of the
Rules of Court, starting with the arraignment of petitioner.

Case 36
People v. Tee
G.R. No. 140546-47
January 20, 2003

Facts:
The case involves an automatic review of judgment made against Tee who was convicted for
illegal possession of marijuana and sentenced to death. The defense assailed the decision of
the court for taking admissible as evidence the marijuana seized from the accused by virtue of
allegedly general search warrant. They further contend that the accused was deprived of his
right to speedy trial by failure of the prosecution to produce their witness who failed to appear
during the 20 hearing dates thereby slowing down the trial procedure.

Issue:

Whether or not the substantive right of the accused for a speedy trial prejudiced during the
hearing of the case.

Held:

The court ruled that the substantive right of the accused for a fair and speedy trial was not
violated. It held that the Speedy Trial Act of 1998 provides that the trial period for the criminal
cases should be in general 180 days. However, in determining the right of an accused to speedy
trial, courts should do more than a mathematical computation of the number of postponements
of the scheduled hearings of the case. The right to a speedy trial is deemed violated only when:
(1) the proceedings are attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays; or (2) when
unjustified postponements are asked for and secured; or (3) when without cause or justifiable
motive a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the party having his case tried.

The concepts of speedy trial is necessarily relative where several factors are weighed such as
the length of time of delay, the reason of such delay, and conduct of prosecution and the
accused and the prejudice and damaged caused to the accused of such delay. The court did not
find the 20 days of delayed hearing unreasonable length of time as to constitute deprivation of
the constitutional rights of the accused for a speedy trial in addition to the fact that court trial
may be always subjected to postponement for reasonable cause of delay. In the absence of
showing that the reason for delay was capricious or oppressive, the State must not be deprived
of reasonable opportunity in prosecuting the accused.

37
Flores vs. People
GR L-25769 | December 10, 1974

FACTS:

Petitioners, Francisco Flores and Francisco Angel, were accused for robbery. Information was
filed in December 1951. They were found guilty of the crime charged in November 1955.
Notice of appeal was file in December 1955. It was until February 1958 that action was taken
by CA—a resolution remanding the records of the case to the lower court for a rehearing of the
testimony of a certain witness deemed material for the disposition of the case. Such resolution
was amended dated August 1959 which granted the petitioners to set aside the decision so that
evidence for the defense on new facts may be received and a new decision in lieu of the old one
may be rendered. The case was returned to the lower court but nothing was done for about a
year because the offended party failed to appear despite the 6/7 dates set for such hearing.
Furthermore, when the offended party took the witness stand, his testimony was characterized
as a mere fiasco as he could no longer remember the details of the alleged crime and even
failed to identify the 2 accused.

The trial court instead of rendering a decision sent back the records to the appellate tribunal. 5
more years elapsed without anything being done, petitioners sought dismissal of the case
against them due to inordinate delay in the disposition (from December 1955- May 1965). CA
was unresponsive notwithstanding the vigorous plea of the pplea of the petitioners, its last order
being a denial of a second MR dated January 1966. CA’s defense is that the case was not
properly captioned as “People of the Philippines” and without “Court of Appeals” being made a
party to the petition.

ISSUE: WON constitutional right to a speedy trial was violated.

HELD: YES. Petition for certiorari was granted. Orders denying Motion to dismiss as Motion to
Reconsideration are set aside and nullified. Criminal Case against petitioners was dismissed.

Constitutional right to a speedy trial means one free from vexatious, capricious and oppressive
delays. An accused is entitled to a trial at the earliest opportunity. He cannot be oppressed by
delaying the commencement of the trial for an unreasonable length of time. The Constitution
does not say that such right may be availed only where the prosecution of a crime is
commenced and undertaken by the fiscal. It does not exclude from its operation cases
commenced by private individuals. “Where a person is prosecuted criminally, he is entitled to a
speedy trial, irrespective of the nature of the offense or the manner in which it is authorized to
be commenced”.
Case 38
Conde v. Rivera
GR No 21741
January 25, 1924

Facts:
Aurelia Conde, formerly a municipal midwife in Lucena, Tayabas, has been forced to respond to
no less the five information for various crimes and misdemeanors, has appeared with her
witnesses and counsel at hearings no less than on eight different occasions only to see the
cause postponed, has twice been required to come to the Supreme Court for protection, and
now, after the passage of more than one year from the time when the first information was filed,
seems as far away from a definite resolution of her troubles as she was when originally
charged.

Issue:
Whether or Not petitioner has been denied her right to a speedy and impartial trial.

Held:
Philippine organic and statutory law expressly guarantee that in all criminal prosecutions the
accused shall enjoy the right to have a speedy trial. Aurelia Conde, like all other accused
persons, has a right to a speedy trial in order that if innocent she may go free, and she has been
deprived of that right in defiance of law. We lay down the legal proposition that, where a
prosecuting officer, without good cause, secures postponements of the trial of
a defendant against his protest beyond a reasonable period of time, as in this instance for more
than a year, the accused is entitled to relief by a proceeding in mandamus to compel a dismissal
of the information, or if he be restrained of his liberty, by habeas corpus to obtain his freedom.

(39-42 lacking)
CASE 43
In Re: Request for Live Radio and TV Coverage of the Trial in the Sandiganbayan of the
Plunder Cases against Former President Joseph Estrada, A.M. No. 00-1-4-03-SC,
September 13, 2001.

FACTS:
This is a motion for reconsideration of the decision denying petitioners'
requestfor p e r m i s s i o n t o t e l e v i s e a n d b r o a d c a s t l i v e t h e t r i a l o f f o r m e r P r e
s i d e n t E s t r a d a b e f o r e t h e Sandiganbayan. The motion was filed by the Secretary of
Justice, as one of the petitioners, who argues that there is really no conflict between the right of
the people to public information and the freedom of the press, on the one hand, and, on the
other, the right of the accused to a fair trial that if there is a clash between these rights, it
must be resolved in favor or of the right of the p e o p l e a n d t h e p r e s s b e c a u s e
t h e p e o p l e , a s t h e r e p o s i t o r y o f s o v e r e i g n t y, a r e e n t i t l e d t o information; and
that live media coverage is a safeguard against attempts by any party to use the courts as
instruments for the pursuit of selfish interests. On the other hand, former President Joseph E.
Estrada reiterates his objection to the live TV and radio coverage of his trial on the ground that
its allowance will violate the sub judice rule and that, based on his experience with the
impeachment trial, live media coverage will only pave the way for so-called "expert
commentary" which can trigger massive demonstrations aimed atpressuring the Sandiganbayan
to render a decision one way or the other. Mr. Estrada contends that the right of
the people to information may be served through other means less distracting,
degrading, and prejudicial than live TV and radio coverage.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the cases of a former President pending before the Sandiganbayan canbe
covered by live television and radio broadcast without impairing the right of the accused to a just
and fair trial.

HELD:
NO. The Court finds no reason to alter or in any way modify its decision prohibiting live
or real time broadcast by radio or television of the trial of the former president. In lieu of live TV
and radio coverage of the trial, the Court has resolved to order the audio visual recording of the
trial for documentary purposes. Considering the significance of the trial before the
Sandiganbayan of former President Estrada and the importance of preserving the
records thereof, the Court believes that there should be an audio-visual recording of the
proceedings. The recordings will not be for live or real t i m e b r o a d c a s t b u t f o r
d o c u m e n t a r y p u r p o s e s . O n l y l a t e r w i l l t h e y b e a v a i l a b l e f o r p u b l i c showing,
after the Sandiganbayan shall have promulgated its decision in every case to which the
recording pertains. In Ayer Productions Pty.Ltd. v. Capulong, this Court held: "A limited
intrusion into a person's privacy has long been regarded as permissible where that
person is a public figure and the information sought to be elicited from him or to be
published about him constitute matters of a public character."

CASE 44

People v. Mapalao, G.R. No. 92415, May 14, 1991.

Facts: Eleven (11) people rode in a Ford Fiera going to Baguio. Namely they are: Felizardo
Galvez, Jimmy Jetwani, Simeon Calama, Rene Salonga,Eduardo Lopez, Adolfo Quiambao,
Aliman Bara-akal, Anwar Hadji Edris, Gumanak Ompa and defendant-appelants in this
case, Omar Magpalao and Rex Magumnang.

After an hour of driving, the car stopped so that one of the passengerscould urinate. While
the car was stopped the Bara-akal, Edris, Ompa, Magpalao and Magumnang pointed guns and
knives at the other passengers and divested them of their properties.

On of the robbers then ordered Galvez to drive the car towards the precipice (bangin). When
the car was near the precipice, Galvez then stepped to the brakes. The other passengers
jumped out of the car and went to different directions to escape. Galvez however, was left in
side the car and was stabbed by one of the robbers. The robbers then escaped. Quiambao, who
owned the car helped Galvez to get to a hospital. Galvez died in the hospital. The robbers were
then apprehended with the exception of Edris who remain at large. Mangumnang however
escaped while being in detention and Bara-akal died inside the jail. Since Mangumnang was not
arrested, the trial in absentia continued as to him. Ompa, Magpalao, and Magumnang were all
held guilty as principal by direct participation of the crime of Robbery with Homicide.

Issue: Whether or Not the lower court erred in failing to apply the Constitutional mandate on the
presumption of innocence and proof beyond reasonable doubt when it allowed the trial in
absentia to push through on the part of defendant-appellant Magumnang.

Held:
The Court affirmed the decision of the lower court. The reason is that the lower court has
jurisdiction over Magumnang the moment the latter was in custody. Jurisdiction once acquired is
not lost upon the instance of parties but until the case is terminated. Since all the requisites of
trial in absentia are complete, the court has jurisdiction over Magumnang.

In addition, Magumnang was presumed innocent during his trial in absentia. The prosecution
had strong evidence against him as proof beyond reasonable doubt that he is a principal by
direct participation in the crime of Robbery with Homicide. Thus, the Constitutional mandate was
not violated.

(45 lacking)
CASE 46

United States v. Javier, G.R. No. L-12990, January 21, 1918.

Facts: Simeon de los Santos, Feliciano Garcia, Alberto Tolentino, and a certain Gutierrez, were
charged for the crime of robbery. De los Santos, Garcia and Gutierrez were convicted of the
crime charged, while Tolentino was acquitted. Counsel for Simeon de los Santos insists that
there is no evidence of record connecting de los Santos with the commission of the crime other
than his own confession in the court of the justice of the peace, and that this confession was
improperly admitted in evidence, it not affirmatively appearing that it was made voluntarily. On
the other hand, counsel for Feliciano Garcia calls attention to the fact that one of his co-
accused, Alberto Tolentino, was acquitted by the trial judge although he was identified by the
witness Soto as a member of the band which committed the crime, and yet Garcia was
convicted upon the testimony of this witness; and thus argues that since the trial court did not
accept Soto's testimony as to Tolentino, it should not have been accepted as to Garcia. Lastly,
the counsel for Garcia, Gutierrez, and De los Santos asked for a new trial on the ground that,
their counsel in the trial court having been taken ill before the trial, they were not able to secure
the presence of their witnesses.

Issue:
Whether or not the defense can complain about the failure to secure the presence of
witnesses at trial on appeal.

Held:
As to the allegation of the counsel for Garcia, Gutierrez, and De los Santos their
counsel in the trial court having been taken ill before the trial, they were not able to secure the
presence of their witnesses, to warrant the conduct of a new trial, the record discloses, however,
that, it appearing that the original counsel assigned to defend these accused was sick at the
time of the trial, new counsel was assigned for their defense by the court, and it does not appear
that any effort was made to secure the presence of witnesses nor was any motion made to the
court for a continuance for that purpose. The appellants in a criminal case cannot be heard for
the first time on appeal to complain that they could not secure the presence of witnesses at the
trial, when it does not appear that they made any effort so to do before or during the progress of
the trial, or that they sought the aid of the court to compel the attendance of their witnesses, or
objected to proceeding without them.

CASE 47

Talino v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. L-75511-14, March 16, 1987.

FACTS:
The petitioner, along with several others, were charged in four separate informations
with estafa through falsification of public documents for having allegedly conspired to defraud
the government in the total amount of P26,523.00, representing the cost of repairs claimed to
have been undertaken, but actually not needed and never made, on four government vehicles,
through falsification of the supporting papers to authorize the illegal payments. Docketed as CC
Nos. 6681, 6682, 6683 and 6684, these cases were tried jointly for all the accused until after the
prosecution had rested, when Genaro Basilio, Alejandro Macadangdang and petitioner Talino
asked for separate trials, which were allowed. They then presented their evidence at such trials,
while the other accused continued defending themselves in the original proceedings, at which
one of them, Pio Ulat gave damaging testimony against the petitioner, relating in detail his
participation in the questioned transactions. In due time, the Sandiganbayan rendered its
decision in all the four cases finding Talino, Basilio, Macadangdang Ulat and Renato Valdez
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes charged while absolving the other defendants for
insufficient evidence. This decision is now challenged by the petitioner on the ground that it
violates his right of confrontation as guaranteed by the Constitution.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the testimony in a separate trial was considered by the respondent court
against the petitioner, who claims that it was in fact the sole basis of his conviction.

HELD:
NO. It was not considered in its finding of facts but the court has this to say on the issue.
In its decision, the respondent court makes the following remarks about the separate trial. It
would really have been simpler had there been no separate trial because the accused Pio B.
Ulat said so many incriminatory things against the other accused when he took the stand in his
own defense. But because Basilio, Talino and Macadangdang were granted separate trials and
they did not cross examine Ulat because, as a matter of fact, they were not even required to be
present when the other accused were presenting their defenses, the latter's testimonies cannot
now be considered against said three accused.
The rule in every case is that the trial court should exercise the utmost circumspection in
granting a motion for separate trial, allowing the same only after a thorough study of the claimed
justification therefor, if only to avoid the serious difficulties that may arise, such as the one
encountered and regretted by the respondent court, in according the accused the right of
confrontation.

(48-51 lacking)
52
DOMINGO PADUA vs.VICENTE ERICTA
G.R. No. L-38570 May 24, 1988
Facts:
Plaintiff filed an action for damages when his 8 year old daughter was hit by a truck
owned by private respondents. During the trial, private respondents counsel requested two
cancellations of the proceedings which were granted by respondent judge. After defendants'
attorney had twice sought and obtained cancellation of trial settings, as above narrated, it was
plaintiff Padua's counsel who next moved for cancellation of a hearing date. He pleaded that he
had another hearing on the same date which he was anxious to terminate because it had
already been pending for almost 10 years.
Respondent Judge rejected the plaintiffs plea for cancellation of one of three (3) hearing
dates, on the ground that “…neither plaintiff nor counsel appeared. The plaintiff’s wife, however,
appeared in Court and informed the Court that the plaintiff’s counsel had to attend to a very
important case in the provinces. Neither did the plaintiff himself appear. In view hereof, let this
case be dismissed.” The rejection and subsequent dismissal of the case resulted in the
prejudice of the plaintiff and now he seeks relief from the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent committed grave abuse of discretion when he rejected
plaintiff’s motion and dismissed the case.
Ruling:
Yes. Postponements of trials and hearings should not be allowed except on meritorious
grounds; and the grant or refusal thereof rests entirely in the sound discretion of the Judge. It
goes without saying, however, that that discretion must be reasonably and wisely exercised, in
the light of the attendant circumstances
It is deemed an abuse of discretion for them, on their own motion, to enter a dismissal
which is not warranted by the circumstances of the case. While it is true that the dismissal of an
action on grounds specified under Section 3, Rule 17 of the Revised Rules of Court is
addressed to their discretion, such discretion must be exercised soundly with a view to the
circumstances surrounding each particular case. If facts obtain that serve as mitigating
circumstances for the delay, the same should be considered and dismissal denied or set aside
especially where the suit appears to be meritorious and the plaintiff was not culpably negligent
and no injury results to defendant
The Trial Court ignored the fact that private respondent’s counsel had twice applied for
and been granted postponements of the trial; that plaintiff’s motion was filed 5 days prior to the
hearing, and this was the very first postponement he sought from the court. Also, no opposition
was presented by the defendants. Finally, the reason of the cancellation was meritorious
because counsel had a case in the Tarlac Court scheduled on the same day, March 6, 1974,
which had been pending since 1964 and which the Tarlac Court understandably was anxious to
terminate. Under the circumstances, the respondent Judge's action was unreasonable,
capricious and oppressive, and should be as it is hereby annulled.

53
FRANCISCO FLORES and FRANCISCO ANGEL vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. L-25769 December 10, 1974
Facts:
Plaintiffs in this case were charged with robbery on December 31, 1951 and
subsequently convicted on November 29, 1955. They filed an appeal on December 8, 1955. For
three years, until February 10, 1958, no action was taken by the Court of Appeals. On that day,
there was a resolution remanding the case to the lower court for a rehearing.
No action was done for a year because the offended party failed to appear despite
several dates set for such hearing. When he finally did appear, the victim could no longer
remember the details of the crime and there was even failure to identify the 2 accused. Instead
of rendering a decision, the lower court merely sent back the records to the appellate tribunal.
Another 5 years passed without anything done, petitioners now sought dismissal of the case
against them due to such inordinate delay in their disposition, which covered the period of
December 8, 1955 to May 10, 1965, a period of almost a decade; thus did they invoke their
constitutional right to a speedy trial.
Issue:
Whether or not plaintiffs’ right to a speedy trial has been violated.
Ruling:
Yes. The constitutional right to a speedy trial, as was noted in a recent decision,
Acebedo v. Sarmiento, "means one free from vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays”
Thus, if the person accused were innocent, he may within the shortest time possible be spared
from anxiety and apprehension arising from a prosecution, and if culpable, he will not be kept
long in suspense as to the fate in store for him. As was also pointed out in Sarmiento: " The
remedy in the event of a non-observance of this right is by habeas corpus if the accused
were restrained of his liberty, or by certiorari, prohibition, or mandamus for the final
dismissal of the case."
(In Acebedo v. Sarmiento, the accused in that case moved to dismiss the case because
the trial commenced nearly 8 years after the filing of the charges. The court granted the
dismissal which was also upheld in this court.)
Petitioners can thus invoke their right to speedy trial. In the absence of any valid
decision, the stage of trial has not been completed. In this case then, as of May 10, 1965, when
they moved to dismiss in the Court of Appeals, petitioners could validly contend that they had
not been accorded their right to be tried as promptly as circumstances permit. It was not the
pendency in the Court of Appeals of their cases that should be deemed material. It is at times
unavoidable that appellate tribunals cannot, even with due diligence, put an end to suits
elevated to them. What is decisive is that with the setting aside of the previous decision in the
resolution of August 5, 1959 (the feb resolution had a subsequent one amending it), petitioners
could validly premise their plea for dismissal on this constitutional safeguard. That is the sole
basis for the conclusion reached by us — considering the controlling doctrine announced with
such emphasis by this Court time and time again.
Mercado v. Santos "The Constitution does not say that the right to a speedy trial may
be availed of only where the prosecution for crime is commenced and undertaken by the fiscal.
It does not exclude from its operation cases commenced by private individuals. Where once a
person is prosecuted criminally, he is entitled to a speedy trial, irrespective of the nature of the
offense or the manner in which it is authorized to be commenced." – additional notes
54
THE UNITED STATES, vs.TAN TENG,
G.R. No. 7081 September 7, 1912
Facts:
Defendant was charged with the crime of raping seven year old Oliva Pacomio in the
house of her sister. Oliva Pacomio, Accused followed Oliva into her room and he asked for
some face powder. He then held Oliva down and stayed in that position for quite some time.
Several days later, perhaps a week or two, the sister of Oliva Pacomio discovered that the latter
was suffering from a venereal disease known as gonorrhea.
Defendant was then arrested and tested for gonorrhea which showed that defendant
indeed had gonorrhea. The medical experts who testified agreed that this disease could have
been communicated from him to her by the contact described.
Defendant contends that the substance taken from his body is inadmissible because it
would be tantamount to testifying against himself.
Issue;
Whether or not the evidence taken from the body of the defendant is admissible in court
Ruling:
Yes. The prohibition contained in section 5 of the Philippine Bill that a person shall not be
compelled to be a witness against himself, is simply a prohibition against legal process to
extract from the defendant's own lips, against his will, an admission of his guilt.
The doctrine contended for by appellant would prohibit courts from looking at the fact of
a defendant even, for the purpose of disclosing his identity. Such an application of the
prohibition under discussion certainly could not be permitted. Such an inspection of the bodily
features by the court or by witnesses, can not violate the privilege granted under the Philippine
Bill, because it does not call upon the accused as a witness — it does not call upon the
defendant for his testimonial responsibility. Evidence obtained in this way from the accused, is
not testimony but his body itself.
(the court stated several examples wherein evidence obtained from the body of the accused
was permitted such as the stolen property found on a thief, bloody clothes worn by the accused
and etc.)

55. Villaflor v. Summers

GR No. 16444,
September 8, 1920

Facts:
Petitioner Villaflor was charged with the crime of adultery. The trial judge ordered the petitioner
to subject herself into physical examination to test whether or not she was pregnant to prove the
determine the crime of adultery being charged to her. Herein petitioner refused to such physical
examination interposing the defense that such examination was a violation of her constitutional
rights against self-incrimination.

Issue:
Whether or Not the physical examination was a violation of the petitioner’s constitutional rights
against self-incrimination.

Held:
No. It is not a violation of her constitutional rights. The rule that the constitutional guaranty, that
no person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, is limited to a
prohibition against compulsory testimonial self-incrimination. The corollary to the proposition is
that, an ocular inspection of the body of the accused is permissible.

56. Beltran v. Samson

GR. No. 32025
September 23, 1929

Facts:
Beltran, as a defendant for the crime of Falsification, refused to write a sample of his
handwriting as ordered by the respondent Judge. The petitioner in this case contended that
such order would be a violation of his constitutional right against self-incrimination because such
examination would give the prosecution evidence against him, which the latter should have
gotten in the first place. He also argued that such an act will make him furnish evidence against
himself.

Issue:
Whether or not the writing from the fiscal's dictation by the petitioner for the purpose of
comparing the latter's handwriting and determining whether he wrote certain documents
supposed to be falsified, constitutes evidence against himself within the scope and meaning of
the constitutional provision under examination.

Held:
The court ordered the respondents and those under their orders desist and abstain absolutely
and forever from compelling the petitioner to take down dictation in his handwriting for the
purpose of submitting the latter for comparison. Writing is something more than moving the
body, or the hands, or the fingers; writing is not a purely mechanical act, because it requires the
application of intelligence and attention; and in the case at bar writing means that the petitioner
herein is to furnish a means to determine whether or not he is the falsifier, as the petition of the
respondent fiscal clearly states. Except that it is more serious, we believe the present case is
similar to that of producing documents or chattels in one's possession. We say that, for the
purposes of the constitutional privilege, there is a similarity between one who is compelled to
produce a document, and one who is compelled to furnish a specimen of his handwriting, for in
both cases, the witness is required to furnish evidence against himself. It cannot be contended
in the present case that if permission to obtain a specimen of the petitioner's handwriting is not
granted, the crime would go unpunished. Considering the circumstance that the petitioner is a
municipal treasurer, it should not be a difficult matter for the fiscal to obtained genuine
specimens of his handwriting. But even supposing it is impossible to obtain specimen or
specimens without resorting to the means complained herein, that is no reason for trampling
upon a personal right guaranteed by the constitution. It might be true that in some cases
criminals may succeed in evading the hand of justice, but such cases are accidental and do not
constitute the raison d' etre of the privilege. This constitutional privilege exists for the protection
of innocent persons.

Case 57
Chavez v. CA

FACTS: this is a petition for habeas corpus. Petitioner invoking jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court that he is entitled to be freed from imprisonment upon ground that trial which resulted his
conviction, he was denied of his constitutional right not to be compelled to testify against
himself. Judgment of conviction was for qualified theft of a motor vehicle. Information was filed
against the accused together with other accused that they conspired, with intent to gain and
abuse of confidence without the consent of owner Dy Lim, took the vehicle. All the accused
plead not guilty.

[NOTE: You don’t have to include writing this part, this is only for reference:

Prosecution version of what happened:

Chavez saw Lee driving the thunderbird(car) and asked if it is for sale. Lee answered yes.
Chavez met Sumilang and informed about the car. The two went to Asistio and made a plan to
capitalize on Romeo Vasquez' reputation as a wealthy movie star, introduce him as a buyer to
someone who was selling a car and, after the deed of sale is signed, by trickery to run away
with the car. Asistio would then register it, sell it to a third person for a profit. Chavez known to
be a car agent was included in the plan. He furnished the name of Johnson Lee who was selling
his Thunderbird. Chavez arranged the meeting with Lee. They agreed on the price and went to
Dy Sunk which is the registered owner of the car. Deed of sale was drawn and signed by
Sumilang. At Eugene's, a man approached Sumilang with a note which stated that the money
was ready at the Dalisay Theater. Sumilang then wrote on the same note that the money should
be brought to the restaurant. At the same time he requested Lee to exhibit the deed of sale of
the car to the note bearer. The

Thunderbird was parked, found that it was gone. They then immediately reported its loss to the
police. Much later, the NBI recovered the already repainted car and impounded it. Chavez,
Sumilang and Asistio converged that same day at Barrio Fiesta, a restaurant at Highway 54
near the Balintawak monument in Caloocan. There, Asistio handed to Sumilang P1,000.00 cash
and a golf set worth P800.00 as the latter's share in the transaction. On the 14th of November,
the registration of the car was transferred in the name of Sumilang in Cavite City, and three
days later, in the name of Asistio in Caloocan.

Sumilang’s verson (one of the accused):

Sumilang saw Chavez at gas station and told about the Thunderbird. They raised the money.
Chavez went to Sumilang house and asked if he was ready for the rest of money. He affirmed.
At Eugene’s Sumilang saw Pascual and warned Chavez was a smart agent and advised that
Sumilang should be careful. Then the deed of sale was executed. Two or three days after,
Asistio offered to buy the car of Sumilang and tendered the down payment.)

The Trial court gave credence to the testimony of Sumilang. As to Chavez, his testimony
established his guilt beyond reasonable doubt and branded him “Self – confessed culprit”.
ISSUE: Whether or not constitutional right of Chavez against self – incrimination had been
violated?

HELD: Petitioner was enveloped by a coercive force; they deprived him of his will to resist; they
foreclosed choice. With all these, we have no hesitancy in saying that petitioner was forced to
testify to incriminate himself, in full breach of his constitutional right to remain silent. It cannot be
said now that he has waived his right. He did not volunteer to take the stand and in his own
defense; he did not offer himself as a witness; on the contrary, he claimed the right upon being
called to testify. There is no waiver of the privilege. "To be effective, a waiver must be certain
and unequivocal, and intelligently, understandably, and willingly made; such waiver following
only where liberty of choice has been fully accorded. After a claim a witness cannot properly be
held to have waived his privilege on vague and uncertain evidence. Supreme Court decision:
Petition granted. Accused must be discharge.

(lacking 58-60)