Forest Policy and Economics 86 (2018) 4–12

Contents lists available at ScienceDirect

Forest Policy and Economics

journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/forpol

The role of government in operationalising markets for REDD + in Indonesia MARK

Henry James Boer
Adjunct Research Fellow, Centre for Governance and Public Policy, School of Government and International Relations, Griffith Business School, Griffith University,
Brisbane, Australia

A R T I C L E I N F O A B S T R A C T

Keywords: The global climate initiative Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD +) initially
REDD + included carbon markets as one potential policy mechanism to finance a range of forestry projects in developing
Carbon markets countries. Indonesia was an early leader on REDD +, and set up the regulatory frameworks and monitoring
Indonesia policy systems to support demonstration projects that could trade credits in voluntary carbon markets. This article
Governmentality
applies a neoliberal governmentality framework to evaluate the development of REDD + market institutions in
Indonesia during the Readiness period between 2008 and 2013. It critiques the role of the state in this process,
and how the authority of public agencies shapes the actions of private subjects. The case of Indonesia indicates a
pivotal role for government agencies at multiple levels in integrating the operation of REDD + market activities
within a supportive regime of forest and land management. Critical to this process was legislation to trade in
forest carbon and obtain project licenses, devolved land-use planning and forest management that could support
commercial activities, and robust MRV surveillance systems to oversee on-ground activities. Despite these ef-
forts, projects were often subject to an uncertain and highly contested forest management regime, undermining
attempts to demonstrate the viability of operationalising market mechanisms at the local scale.

1. Introduction
The global climate initiative Reducing Emissions from Deforestation
and Forest Degradation (REDD+) was initially conceived as a global
incentives framework to transfer resources and capital to developing
countries in return for implementing measures and programs that ad-
dressed forest loss (McDermott, 2014). In the lead-up to and following
the UNFCCC Bali Conference in 2007, carbon markets were en-
thusiastically promoted by NGOs, multilateral agencies and some de-
veloped countries as one potential mechanism to source long term fi-
nance for REDD +. At the UNFCCC negotiations held in Durban in
2011, Parties endorsed the decision that “…appropriate market-based
approaches could be developed by the [Council of the Parties]COP to
support results-based actions for REDD +” (UNFCCC, 2011). Devel-
oping countries were encouraged to establish the institutions and
technical infrastructure to facilitate carbon markets – in addition to
implementing a broad range of forest management programs and social
and environmental safeguards. Countries were also to host demon-
stration projects to trial the various components required to trade
carbon credits in future international and/or regional compliance
markets.
The initial attraction of markets was the potential to commercialise
forest carbon as a new export commodity, competing against existing
timber and agricultural industries (Fletcher et al., 2016). REDD +
projects could offer multiple opportunities, such as income for com-
munities through payments for ecosystem services (PES), a new in-
vestment option for local businesses, and a potential stream of revenue
for governments. Markets offered a potentially large source of capital,
primarily as offsets purchased by large emitting countries and private
industry, and thereby providing a complementary option to multilateral
or bilateral funds (Ebeling and Yasué, 2008). Despite the initial en-
thusiasm, REDD + offsets are not tradable in global cap and trade
markets limiting potential finance (Angelsen et al., 2017), and projects
have faced significant obstacles setting up in developing countries (Sills
et al., 2014). Reference to markets for REDD+ activities was also ab-
sent in the Paris Agreement, with emphasis shifting to low emissions
development integrated within nationally determined contributions
(NDCs) (UNFCCC, 2015).
During the REDD + Readiness period, a number of countries sup-
ported setting up markets as one component of a broader suite of
programs. Indonesia, for example, implemented specific laws to reg-
ulate carbon as an ecosystem service, and regulations to establish
projects and share finance and co-benefits (MoF, 2008, 2009a, 2009b,
2012). The Indonesian Government (with support from multilateral and
bilateral funds) invested substantial resources to develop robust carbon
measurement, monitoring, reporting and verification (MRV) systems
that meet international standards (Satgas REDD +, 2013). At the sub-
national scale, several prominent REDD + demonstration projects

E-mail address: h.boer@griffith.edu.au.

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.forpol.2017.10.004
Received 18 January 2017; Received in revised form 2 October 2017; Accepted 2 October 2017
1389-9341/ © 2017 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
H.J. Boer
expended considerable resources to develop the management programs
and contract agreements to attract investor finance and trade forest
commodities in the voluntary market (Sills et al., 2014). However, these
market projects have faced significant barriers; such as limited long
term financing for project activities (Dixon and Challies, 2015), lack of
community support and participation, and ongoing uncertainty and
conflict over forest tenure and resource access (Resosudarmo et al.,
2014).
Considering the early emphasis on markets, there is comparatively
limited analysis of the various policies and components to set up market
mechanisms for REDD + in Indonesia (see Astuti and McGregor, 2015).
Empirical analysis of REDD + in Indonesia has covered the myriad of
program activities and technical components introduced at the national
and sub-national scales, as well as the highly contested governance
arrangements that characterised the reform process (for example Agung
et al., 2014; Luttrell et al., 2014; Moelino et al. 2014; van Noordwijk
et al. 2014; Wibowo and Giessen, 2015; McGregor et al., 2015). To
provide a fuller analysis of efforts to establish REDD + market in-
stitutions in Indonesia, this article focuses on the critical Readiness
period between 2008 and 2013. It applies a neoliberal governmentality
lens to explore the rationales, practices/technologies and forms of
knowledge that underpin different regimes of forest and carbon gov-
ernment (Winkel, 2012; Arts, 2014; McGregor et al., 2015). The article
analyses the various legislative, land-use planning frameworks and
technical programs that contributed towards a nascent commercial re-
gime for trading in forest carbon. Importantly, it elaborates on the
critical function of the state, and the conduct and authority exercised by
public bureaucracies in establishing these mechanisms.
The analysis recasts administrative government as an important
locus of authority and capacity in facilitating carbon markets as a form
of neoliberal conservation. In Indonesia, this required various govern-
ment agencies to develop and coordinate an array of regulatory and
monitoring practices that could effectively steer and direct the actions
of private companies and NGO's engaged in project activities. Critical to
this process was legislation to trade in forest carbon and obtain project
licenses, devolved land-use planning and forest management that could
support commercial activities, and robust MRV surveillance systems to
oversee market transactions and on-ground activities. The state was
pivotal to supporting and integrating this new array of market intui-
tions within broader forest management systems, but projects were
often subject to an uncertain and highly contested governing regime.
REDD + markets are unlikely to function effectively in Indonesia
without substantial further administrative reforms and policy integra-
tion across scales in order to deliver consistent and transparent out-
comes at the local scale.
The next section of this paper develops a theoretical framework of
neoliberal governmentality and its application to REDD+. The fol-
lowing sections apply this framework to assess the establishment of
markets for REDD + projects in Indonesia.
2. Theoretical framework
2.1. Neo-liberal governmentalities
Foucault's (2008) concept of governmentality provides a flexible
approach to analyse different governing practices and the exercise of
power. Governmentality enables analysis is the various practices of rule
(Dean, 2010), and how these practices are applied, re-combined and
then reformed in particular social and political contexts. Govern-
mentality theory explores the various rationalities and technologies of
government, and their relationship to forms of knowledge and the co-
production of subjects (Dean, 2010). Rationalities comprise a collective
logic around the activities of government, and thereby sort the multiple
legal, regulatory and bureaucratic processes into logical associations.
Whilst rationalities conceive of certain ways of governing, technologies
enable this thinking to be operationalised and applied in action (Miller
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Forest Policy and Economics 86 (2018) 4–12
and Rose, 2008). Technologies represent the various tools or mechan-
isms for governing such as the procedures, policies, techniques of cal-
culation, laws, or processes of analysis, that enable authorities to shape,
direct and limit collective and individual agency (Miller and Rose,
2008). Subjectivities or identities also symbolise how actors respond to
particular government programs, including their implicit support and at
times resistance (Lemke, 2002).
In Foucault's (2008) analysis, the state functions as an important
institutional formation through which different ideas and technologies
can be appropriated into government. The state is not an aggregation of
stable institutions, but rather operates as a site where government
technologies are stabilised into institutional settings (Lemke, 2007).
The state is conceptualised as a ‘transactional reality’ (Foucault, 2007),
constituted through a dynamic ensemble of power relations and prac-
tices that at the same time produce, and are reproduced by, the in-
stitutional features of the state. Political transformation is therefore not
attributed to the policies of an autonomous state, but can be traced to
the series of new technologies and forms of knowledge that shape
government action. In the contemporary context, the state can be seen
to operate through networks of relations found within an array of
public and private organisations (Miller and Rose, 2008, pp.56–57).
The modern state itself exists and functions within these wider circuits
of power, as part of shifting networks of public and private actors that
are differentially rewarded through access to certain institutions
(Jessop, 2010).
In the series of lectures presented at the College de France Foucault
(2007, 2008) explored certain governmentalities of neoliberalism re-
presented by the repositioning of markets and economic management
as the focus of public policy, supported by various practices and pro-
grammatic knowledge driving these new functions of government. Neo-
liberalism provides a systematic and comprehensive expansion of the
market to become the organising and regulative principle underlying
the state and society, and as the model for human relations in general
(Lemke, 2002). The key thrust of neoliberalism is to create conditions
that produce competitiveness and entrepreneurial behaviour, and to
promote a particular type of freedom and subjectivity expressed
through individual choice. Neo-liberal government produces the eco-
nomic rational subject driven to maximise self-benefit and to profit
through competition. Neo-liberal subjects are therefore responsive to
manipulation through incentives, and individuals can be directed to-
wards socially desirable ends through appropriate incentive structures
(Fletcher, 2010, p.123). The neoliberal state is not governed through
overbearing bureaucracies that direct the population, but by shaping
the possible domains and incentives through which individuals govern
their lives (Lemke, 2002).
Foucault (2008, p.132) argues that neoliberalism works actively to
create the space for competition to take place, and for this reason is not
necessarily laissez-faire capitalism, but rather a government interven-
tion of constant vigilance and active management. Government action
is interventionist only to the extent that it sustains the conditions for
market activity, its task being to universalise competition and invent
market like systems for the actions of individuals, groups, and institu-
tions (Lemke, 2002). Government becomes reliant on new types of
expertise from economics, accounting and financial management and
outsources responsibilities to the private sector or civil society (Bevir,
2011). This increased function of these non-state actors in mobilising
the preferences of the population and carrying-out regulatory functions
is representative of the changing rationalities of neoliberal government
(Sending and Neumann, 2006, p.652). Non-state interests are redefined
from an object of government action to an active participant in, and
subject of rule.
2.2. REDD + and neo-liberal government
The application of a neoliberal governmentality frame can help
reveal how REDD + markets employ a divergent collection of
H.J. Boer
technologies, subjectivities and forms of knowledge, that in turn de-
termine the ways in which forests can be governed. Neoliberal ap-
proaches to tackling environmental problems emphasise the use of
market instruments and incentives to influence individual behaviour
and encourage private investment in delivering solutions (Büscher
et al., 2012). The rationale is that the production of ecosystem com-
modities creates a profit or price motive that drives individual max-
imisation of benefits (Büscher et al., 2012, p.13). In the case of defor-
estation and carbon emissions, solutions often focus on market
instruments that set prices for the environmental services provided by
forests and determine the monetary value of carbon (Portela et al.,
2008). When applied to REDD +, these market instruments operate by
inventing a new exchange value around the carbon sequestered in
ecosystems, and then establishing the conditions for the operation of an
alternative forest economy (Corbera, 2012).
Transforming forest management practices at disparate locations
around the globe into a tradable commodity involves a number of
calculative practices that measure, quantify and standardise carbon into
commensurable credits (Lövbrand and Stripple, 2012). Forests se-
quester and store volumes of carbon dioxide, which can be converted
into metric tonnes that can be sold as standardised credits in global and
domestic markets. Landowners, companies and even governments can
generate REDD + credits by undertaking numerous land-use activities
such as conservation, reforestation, sustainable forest management or
carbon agriculture. Voluntary forest carbon markets are increasingly
governed by these formal and informal networks of non-state or private
actors who assume responsibility for multiple components of the forest
carbon commodity chain (Hajek et al., 2011; Lovell, 2014). This in-
creasing agency of private operators in the carbon economy represents
“…a transformation of politics that involves a replacement of formal
and hierarchical techniques of government with more indirect regimes
of economic calculation (Lövbrand and Stripple, 2012, p.659).”
In some forest a carbon markets, by contrast, government bureau-
cracies have assumed significant administrative and operational con-
trol. Such as Mexico's' Payment for Ecosystem Services (PES) program,
which operated according to the state's mandatory regulation and
funding of various projects (Shapiro-Garza, 2013). In Indonesia, gov-
ernment agencies increased their regulatory power in markets that
certify sustainably sourced timber, by establishing national state based
schemes that compete directly with international certification schemes
operated by networks of NGO's and private interests (Giessen et al.,
2016). In the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), a large bureau-
cracy operating under the UNFCCC and in national level governments is
responsible for the detailed assessment, approval and monitoring of
project activities (Stripple, 2010). This represents the application of
administrative rationalism, where professionalised government agen-
cies govern through formal rules and laws and the application of
technical knowledge to identify environmental problems and develop
solutions (Stripple, 2010). The model of efficient administrative ra-
tionalism is symbolised by vertical integration, based on clearly defined
roles and the concentration of decision-making authority at the apex
(Keskitalo et al., 2012). However, integration is not always uniform,
and bureaucracies will often compete over resources and authority in
the governing of public domains such as forests (Giessen et al., 2016).
3. Methods
The research project adopts a qualitative, single case study method.
Qualitative research generates a holistic understanding of social phe-
nomena and the complex interdependence of issues, and provides rich
and detailed description of the subject matter (Denzin and Lincoln,
2011, p.5). A qualitative design suited the research as it aims to provide
a detailed and rich description of the overlapping series of policy and
technical reforms that support REDD + markets in Indonesia. The re-
search also situates REDD + within the political and economic condi-
tions that characterise forest and land management in Indonesia. A
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Forest Policy and Economics 86 (2018) 4–12
single case study of was used because it enabled application of well
developed theory to a new context and set of phenomena (George and
Bennett, 2005). Indonesia provides a critical case for developing a
carbon economy for forests, enabling the partial test of a neoliberal
governmentality framework.
Data collection involved qualitative semi-structure interviews,
which enabled investigation of the various insights, interpretations and
reasoning of key respondents (Rubin and Rubin, 2005). This is im-
portant, because REDD + is a highly contested political domain subject
to competing ideas and values regarding suitable approaches to manage
forests and carbon. Interview questions were derived from key litera-
ture in the field, including primary documents from Indonesia and
aimed to understand relationships between different programs and the
role of different state and non-state actors. Interview respondents were
recruited using a combination of purposive and snowball sampling.
Interview data were collected from 35 senior practitioners engaged
directly in REDD + in Indonesia - with 15 respondents specifically
addressing market issues including; Indonesian government agencies,
the UN-REDD Programme Indonesia, United Nations Environment
Program (UNEP), the Australian and German Governments, World
Wide Fund for Nature (WWF), The Nature Conservancy (TNC), do-
mestic NGOs, carbon companies and researchers. A list of interviewees
and pseudonyms can be found in attached Supplementary Table 1. This
research was conducted according to ethical standards and for reasons
of confidentially the names of interviewees are not provided.
The interview data was combined with primary and secondary
documents, such as legislation, REDD + program reports, departmental
strategies, and research reports. Utilising multiple documentary sources
is an important method for generating a critical interpretation of an
issue area (McCulloch, 2004). Triangulation methods were used to
combine multiple sources of documentary data with interview tran-
scripts, which helped improve reliability and validity. Triangulation
with different data points provides corroboration and convergence
around a particular social event or process, reducing bias in the analysis
(Yin, 2009). The data was analysed using a combination of coding and
thematic analysis. Coding provides a systematic method to collate and
organise the data according to related topics, concepts and themes, and
to link the text to the theoretical framework (Saldana, 2013). The codes
and frames were drawn from the primary materials, followed by a series
of theory based codes, with data analysed against the codes until high-
level saturation was achieved.
4. Results and discussion
4.1. REDD + in Indonesia
Indonesia has the world's second highest rate of deforestation and
forest degradation, estimated at approximately 2 million hectares per
year and is one of the top 5 global GHG emitters amongst developed
and developing countries. Indonesia was also an early leader in the
development of REDD + in the international negotiations, and in 2007
hosted the UNFCCC CoP 13 in Bali. In 2009, the Indonesian
Government announced an ambitious and voluntary pledge to cut the
country's emissions between 26% and 41% by 2030, primarily by re-
ducing high rates of deforestation (Satgas REDD +, 2013). Indonesia
subsequently attracted substantial finance and technical support from
multilateral agencies and bilateral partners such as Norway. Since
2007, the country has made progress on a national reform agenda and
released a National REDD + Strategy, set up a dedicated coordinating
agency, and introduced a moratorium on new forestry concessions
(Satgas REDD +, 2012; Agung et al., 2014). In 2015, the government of
Joko Widodo reintegrated the REDD + agency within a newly formed
Ministry of Environment and Forestry (MoEF), who were charged with
responsibility to implement the national REDD + program. The result is
a complex array of policy reforms and project activities underway at
different scales, of which markets and incentives comprise a
H.J. Boer
complicated and uncertain component.
4.2. Carbon market regulations
The Indonesian Government adopted the rationale and discourse
that a market based approach could resolve the market and associated
governance problems that cause deforestation (IFCA, 2008; UNREDD,
2012; MoF, 2012). Coalitions of international development agencies
such as the World Bank, large international environment NGOs and
bilateral governments actively promoted markets as a key policy me-
chanism to be developed and trialed in Indonesia (World Bank, 2009;
Luttrell et al., 2014). There are few existing markets for forest eco-
system services in Indonesia, so a new carbon commodity chain could
provide economic alternatives to current land-use activities (IFCA,
2008). At the project level, this could increase the investment and re-
turns from forest management and expand the incentives for in-
dividuals, businesses and communities to participate in conservation
activities (Project Director, Australian Bilateral Partnership pers. comm.
2012).
To support market development, sections in the Indonesian bu-
reaucracy adopted a relatively strategic role, enabling new legislation
and policies, and retaining responsibility for oversight and monitoring
of project activities. The initial reforms were enacted by the former
Ministry of Forestry (MoF) but the regulatory process was subsequently
taken over by the REDD + Taskforce, The President's Unit for
Development Monitoring and Oversight (UKP4), the REDD + Agency,
and then returned to the MoEF (Astuti and McGregor, 2015; Wibowo
and Giessen, 2015). Indonesia was one of the first countries to establish
the institutions, or the legal rules and supporting information systems
to sell and purchase credits in the voluntary carbon market. The gov-
ernment also committed to ongoing regulatory reform to make the
domestic market compatible with future international carbon ac-
counting standards, and trading rules set out under the UNFCCC. The
former MoF also introduced several key regulations and one decree that
outline the legal and administrative processes to gain government ap-
provals and operational licenses for REDD + projects (MoF, 2008; MoF,
2009a; MoF, 2009b; MoF, 2012):
• Regulation No. 68 of 2008 on Demonstration Activities of REDD;
• Regulation No. 30 of 2009 on the Implementation Procedures of
Reducing Emission from Deforestation and Forest Degradation; and
• Decree No. 36 of 2009 on Procedures for Licensing of Commercial
Utilisation of Carbon Sequestration and/or Storage in Production
and Protected Forests.
• Regulation No. P.20/Menhut-II/2012 replaces the procedures to
apply for a permit or permission from the Ministry of Forestry for
REDD + activities that were found in Regulation No. P.68/Menhut-
II/2008 and Regulation No. P.30/Menhut-II/2009.
The Regulations and Decree outline a number of important steps
and conditions for project proponents to gain the required approvals.
The Regulations specify what type of carbon sequestration activities are
permitted in particular forest tenures – including forest conservation,
reforestation or timber plantations. The Regulations also outline stages
in the project development and approval phase, and the processes for
registering land and carbon offset contracts with government agencies.
Regulation No. P. 20/Menhut-II/2012, stipulates that forest carbon
projects can be implemented in state forests that have been designated
as either production, protection, conservation or a private/community
forest. The proponents of forest carbon activities can be government
agencies, state-owned or private enterprises, cooperatives or a com-
munity. The Implementation Regulation deals with REDD + projects of
30 years' duration. It enables national and international entities to be
‘REDD implementers’, and the implementer holds the right to trade the
carbon credits created by REDD+ activities (Wright, 2011, p.127). The
Licensing Decree provides details for trading in carbon ecosystem
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Forest Policy and Economics 86 (2018) 4–12
services, and how carbon credits are to be marketed, including provi-
sions relating to the verification of emissions reductions (Wright, 2011).
Importantly, the Licensing Decree specifics how revenues generated in
the forest carbon market are to be distributed between project devel-
opers and various government agencies.
The application and approval stage outlined in the government
regulations is a complex, multi-stage process and projects require a
number of permits and licenses. In submitting an application, devel-
opers are required to provide substantial information including the
economic feasibility of the project, biophysical and social conditions of
the site, risk assessment and management and the planned on-ground
forestry activities. Although the regulations permit a range of new
commercial activities in forests, the MoF retained significant authority
in the project assessment and approval stage, and in ongoing mon-
itoring. This indicates that various government agencies occupy a re-
latively centralised role in managing and regulating the development of
carbon offsets, how they operate, and how benefits are distributed. The
fledgling REDD+ carbon market is subject – at least on paper - to
significant oversight and regulation by national, provincial and district
authorities at successive stages of project design and operation. Carbon
market activities are subject to hierarchical bureaucratic authority at
multiple levels to assess activities, combined with ongoing monitoring
functions over forest and carbon resources. REDD + in Indonesia is thus
similar to other carbon markets such as the CDM that rely on a level of
administrative rationality; where the bureaucracy exercises authority
through formal rules or laws and the constant creation and application
of technical knowledge (Stripple, 2010).
4.3. Carbon rights
Forest carbon markets require the state to create property rights to
enable the privatisation of the carbon sequestration and/or storage
services provided by forests. In many countries, carbon forest rights do
not formally exist and governments are required to introduce laws to
allocate rights between the state and private interests, and define the
principles of ownership for any emissions reductions (Palmer, 2011).
Processes to legalise carbon property rights are therefore an exercise of
neoliberal governmentality, a form of state activity to create new ter-
ritories of economic intervention, and to organise the conditions for the
commercialisation and appropriation of new commodities (Fletcher and
Breitling, 2012).
To complement other REDD + market reforms the Indonesian
Government has created a regime of partial property rights to facilitate
commercial trading in the carbon sequestered and/or stored in forests
(Indrarto et al., 2012). Legal issues relating to carbon tenure are cov-
ered by several regulations, in particular Articles 25 and 33 of Gov-
ernment Regulation No. 6/2007 on Forest Systems and the Formulation
of Forest Management and Use, which states that carbon capture or
sequestration is a type of forest environmental service. An entity is
granted the right over commercial use of environmental services, and
also the right to trade in carbon credits through the licensing process for
a REDD+ demonstration project (Wright, 2011). Additional regula-
tions promulgated in 2009 extend carbon rights to include private and
community forest concessionaires, and to village forest managers. The
extension of rights to carbon sequestration/storage is an attempt by the
Indonesian Government to privatise the carbon contained in forests as
part of the process to further commercialise and territorialise ecosystem
services.
The bureaucracy continues to administer the process in a formal and
legal sense, and most lands subject to REDD + activities occur on public
land, much of which is already allocated for either timber and estate
crop production, or for conservation purposes. As such, carbon rights to
forests represent a partial privatisation only, and the state retains sig-
nificant authority in how lands are allocated, demarcated and ad-
ministered between carbon activities and multiple other land-uses.
Approximately 130 million of Indonesia's 187 million ha land base has
H.J. Boer
been assigned to forest zones under the jurisdiction of the MoEF and is
administered under the New Forestry Law (NFL) issued in 1999. This
means the MoEF has the authority to assign the use or management
rights of approximately 70% of Indonesia's land base to private entities
and communities, but they remain de-jure state lands. Further, the
utilisation of forest resources is subject to a complex system of forest
concession allocation, licensing and permits, that are administered by
agencies operating at different levels within the central, provincial and
district governments (Brockhaus et al., 2012; Sahide and Giessen,
2015).
These issues of jurisdictional authority and coordination are com-
pounded by legal uncertainty that arises from unresolved land tenure
and rights to forest resources (Resosudarmo et al., 2014). Access and
ownership over land and forests is highly politicised and subject to
regular conflict between commercial interests, local communities and
the various government agencies (Wright, 2011; Sahide and Giessen
2015). To resolve tenure claims under REDD +, the Indonesian Gov-
ernment proposed using existing forest delineation processes under the
National Land Agency. However, the legislation and process is highly
technical and legalistic, vesting significant authority in the central ad-
ministration. These mechanisms can result in protracted legal processes
that lead to further uncertainty over tenure claims, and often ignore or
limit the interests of local stakeholders. Several interviewees from na-
tional NGOs argued that these existing processes are ineffective and
further regulatory reform will be required to establish an equitable and
effective legal process (Project Director, National NGO pers. comm.
2012).
4.4. Forest management and land-use planning
Forest allocation in Indonesia involves a series of statutory planning
and management frameworks that specify where certain activities are
permitted, and how commercial activities are to be managed.
Commercial carbon projects will be subject to the same planning and
allocation frameworks that govern other land and forest uses. As part of
REDD +, the Indonesian Government is expanding Forest Management
Units (FMUs or KPH), an existing legislative requirement for all public
forest estate areas, including production and conservation forests. FMUs
are administered through the national planning agency BAPPENAS and
provide a localised planning, management and enforcement instrument
designed to improve how forests are governed. They have multiple
objectives, such as enhancing production outcomes for commercial
operators, providing benefits to local community interests, and im-
proving conservation and management systems (Kartodihardjo et al.,
2011). FMU's operate through a local statutory body that has the au-
thority to plan and regulate all activities in the forest area, covering the
mapping and designation of forest areas, monitoring law enforcement,
and setting harvesting quotas on commercial activities (Sahide et al.,
2016).
FMUs expand the capacity of the central government through the
planning agency BAPPENAS to regulate and monitor the forest estate
through an administering instrument operating at the local level
(Sahide et al., 2016). They enable central agencies to govern at a dis-
tance (Arts, 2014), exercising a disaggregated and yet important form
of control over the disparate forest estate. They provide a decentralised
and devolved planning and governing mechanism that redistributes
authority to local forest services and district governments (Bupati), but
also to timber plantation companies and communities operating or
living in the forest area (Bae et al., 2014). FMUs operate through an
inclusive type of forest citizenship, extending the responsibility and
obligation to govern forests to a range of local stewards who become
both subjects and objects of this governing regime. These public, pri-
vate and community networks establish and operate the regime to
which they are subjected as members. FMUs set the conditions, com-
mercial rules, management systems and the localised monitoring re-
gimes to which those interests accessing the forest areas must operate.
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Forest Policy and Economics 86 (2018) 4–12
FMUs are thus critical to REDD + delivery at the local level and im-
portantly for integrating companies, stakeholders and landholders into
a new regime of forest carbon activities (Director MoF, Director BAP-
PENAS pers. comm. 2012).
To support the rollout of FMUs, the Indonesian Government through
the central planning agency BAPPENAS is also prioritising regional
spatial planning as a key policy instrument. Indonesia's spatial planning
laws are based on a principle of coordinated regulatory hierarchy, in-
tegrating national level policy and development goals, with land-use
objectives and priorities of the provinces and districts (Brockhaus et al.,
2012; Indrarto et al., 2012). Spatial planning enables central agencies
to govern through a negotiated process with sub-national governments
and local interests. Spatial planning establishes a series of inducements
and restrictions on the freedoms of individuals and communities by
determining the location, type and extent of economic opportunities,
including REDD + projects. Spatial planning operates as an instrument
of allocation and demarcation, specifying zones where certain forest
activities are permitted and others prohibited. In Indonesia, spatial
planning is a statutory requirement for district and provincial govern-
ments to map and zone where land-use development can occur, the
location of settlements and infrastructure, in addition to designating
conservation and other land-use categories. Spatial plans will thus have
a significant influence on where carbon market projects are located,
and how they are accommodated alongside other potentially competing
land-uses(Deputy Director, Indonesian Climate Agency pers. comm.
2012).
4.5. Monitoring and mapping
The Indonesian Government and partners have invested substantial
resources to set up the technical infrastructure for a functioning carbon
market, such as a national and sub-national MRV system, a reference
emissions level (REL), and forest mapping systems. At the broader scale
these MRV, forest inventory and mapping systems, form part of the
surveillance apparatus of REDD + that supports the functioning of
multiple regulatory and market mechanisms. According to Gane
(2012), surveillance systems provide a mechanism of social discipline
and control within neoliberal governmentalities. Surveillance systems
operate as a post-disciplinary model of governance, which devolves
monitoring capacities to new agents of control that emerge from the
market (Gane, 2012, p.631). In REDD +, satellite based MRV and
mapping operate as a post-disciplinary instrument of surveillance that
enables the tracking and monitoring of forest activities on the ground,
and by extension the people, communities and companies that conduct
these activities. At the national level, MRV expands the state's capacity
to monitor access to forest areas, functioning as a sophisticated in-
formation retrieval mechanism that extends government into all forest
areas.
The development of Indonesia's MRV system and the associated
MRV Strategy (Government of Indonesia, 2012) was coordinated
through the national REDD+ Taskforce and taken over by the REDD +
Agency. MRV systems are an important governing technology in that
they regulate market performance, in addition to the performance and
self-regulation of individuals in the marketplace (Astuti and McGregor,
2015). Government agencies will apply MRV to assess carbon market
projects against national and sub-national mitigation targets (Satgas
REDD +, 2013). MRV also oversees how private and public entities
engage in the market, in terms of generating volumes of data on credit
transactions, and the delivery of contracts and other services. MRV and
carbon accounting systems are thus part of creating a new market in
ecosystem services, and are thereby internal to the regulation of the
market itself. As an instrument of carbon governing MRV monitors the
macro and micro economies of forest and land-use activities, and
thereby operates as a tool of economic vigilance characteristic of neo-
liberal government. MRV enables governments to monitor patterns and
apply probabilities to assess how efficiently the market is operating and
H.J. Boer
thereby adjusting and manipulating institutions to achieve certain ends.
By demarcating the capacities and boundaries of government action,
the MRV system is therefore instrumental to the production and con-
sumption of forest carbon commodities.
A key component of Indonesia's REDD + program is dedicated to
developing the infrastructure and human capacity to collect data on
forests. The aim is to develop a sophisticated and detailed under-
standing about how biochemical cycles and human interactions func-
tion at different localities and scales. Across Indonesia, there are mul-
tiple research projects dedicated to measuring carbon fluxes of forests
to determine sequestration rates and carbon storage capacity. Research
is being conducted into the economic and social drivers of forest loss,
and how different industry sectors and local agents produce greenhouse
gas (GHG) emissions. REDD + demonstration projects are also creating
inventories of the biophysical aspects of different forest ecosystems and
integrating this information with census data and other biophysical
information. For example, the GoI with support from bilateral agencies
is creating the Indonesia National Carbon Accounting Systems (INCAS),
and a forest mapping and inventory system called the One Pap Initiative
(OMI). These mapping systems aim to develop one integrated geo-
graphical information system for Indonesia that supports a range of
cross-agency forest planning and management activities. According to
Astuti and McGregor (2015 p. 2287) the OMI operates as an important
technology of carbon government that could overcome the fragmenta-
tion of forest spatial information and decision making, and provide a
rationale for restructuring forest governance through the in-
stitutionalisation of new forms of knowledge.
4.6. Governing subjects and the state
Markets for REDD + in Indonesia also construct new ideal sub-
jectivities in the management of forests. Markets aim to encourage local
businesses, communities and individuals to become active agents in the
production of forest carbon, as well as the delivery of other social and
developmental benefits. These new subjects include the carbon forest
manager or project operator, who participates in the production and
commercialisation of carbon to create profits and livelihoods (Stephan
et al., 2013). In Indonesia, there are multiple carbon consultancies that
provide services such as technical advice on carbon accounting, con-
duct surveys and collect data, develop project design documents, as
well as provide training and support. Local projects also foster the local
village or household forest carbon worker, trained and employed in
various aspects of carbon measurement and auditing, or in forest and
land management. This represents a process of subject conversion or
diversification - such as from loggers and swidden agriculturalists to
sustainable forest managers and project operators.
Carbon markets also foster new networks of public-private, com-
mercial and civil agents that act as the developers, managers, regulators
and administrators of these programs. Consistent with a neoliberal
governmentality, many of these agents assume various responsibilities
in setting up and regulating the new REDD + carbon economy in
Indonesia. Driven by a combination of strategic self-interest and ethical
responsibility, new coalitions form around the creation of formal and
informal institutions designed to enhance environmental and carbon
accountancy standards, and to ensure regulatory compliance (Dixon
and Challies, 2015). These coalitions increasingly attract further
players that recognise the benefits of having all competitors meet cer-
tain performance standards and benchmarks. The expanding networks
shape how these new market regimes operate and assume important
responsibilities in the stewardship of public forests. Markets function as
a prescriptive steering mechanism where the actions of various carbon
forest subjects are shaped and defined according to the conditions and
rules set by the production, trading and management of a carbon
commodity.
Governmentality theory approaches the state as a dynamic and
composite reality, through which different ideas and technologies can
9
Forest Policy and Economics 86 (2018) 4–12
be appropriated into government (Lemke, 2007). In neoliberal gov-
ernment, the state is responsible for creating the institutional conditions
and expanding opportunities for entrepreneurial activities, and needs to
create the conditions for markets and incentives to function efficiently
(Lemke, 2007). The state in Indonesia, to some degree, provides a cri-
tical collection of institutions through which REDD + market inter-
ventions were created and then operated (Astuti and McGregor, 2015).
The state itself is not the actor or the agent responsible for governing
REDD + or transforming land-use change, but rather offers an institu-
tional formation that enables certain types of governing programs.
Rather than enacting reform as a powerful public entity, the state
provides a combination of institutional processes and systems of orga-
nisation that facilitate new carbon market interventions. The state is
adjusted by the introduction of markets in new ecosystem services, but
state institutions also inform, shape and condition how these markets
are governed within a particular territorial domain. At the domestic
level the state needs to accommodate public institutions that are ac-
countable to international rules and standards around carbon, whilst
operating within the confines of existing policy and planning regimes,
and on-ground practices that demarcate use and access to forest re-
sources.
Analysing markets and REDD + needs to account for the formal and
informal functions administered by different state institutions, and how
this shapes and is shaped by the actions of both public bureaucracies
and private actors and networks. The state offers the location and re-
sources to enact political strategies by networks of state and non-state
interests aligned to particular goals and discourses (Jessop 2010). The
state also supports a discursive and institutional space though which
different interests can contest issues, to determine how problems should
be addressed and who should hold the responsibility and authority to
govern. Clearly this occurred in Indonesia, where various coalitions of
public and private interests were able to utilise various parliamentary
and bureaucratic institutions to both progress and block certain REDD
+ reforms (Luttrell et al., 2014). The Indonesian state is also responsive
and vulnerable to numerous competing demands from public sector
interests, and a range of private, NGO and community stakeholders,
that constantly seek to mould and manipulate forest institutions to-
wards particular objectives. Many of these interests have an active
function in the governing of market activities, resulting in a contested
and often shifting authority over who potentially governs REDD +
projects and the public forest estate (Director, International NGO pers.
comm 2012).
4.7. Challenges to establishing market projects
Despite progress on various institutional components to facilitate a
carbon forest market in Indonesia, it faces significant challenges for
further expansion. One of the major challenges is the access to finance.
REDD + credits are not incorporated into existing compliance carbon
markets. A new international trading framework under the Paris
Agreement is still under negotiation, and it remains uncertain whether
REDD + activities will be included. As a result many projects have
struggled to attract longer term finance despite substantial up-front
investment by project developers (Sills et al., 2014; Dixon and Challies,
2015). More critically, REDD + projects do not compete against the
opportunity costs of existing extractive industries that provide sub-
stantial economic and social returns for communities, industries and
governments (Fletcher et al. 2016). If carbon markets or other sources
fail to deliver private investment then resource extraction and land-use
conversions remain potent incentives (UN-REDD, 2012). In the pro-
vince of Aceh, for example, the government was initially very suppor-
tive of REDD + as an alternative to palm oil, however finance failed to
materialise and the government proceeded to issue companies large
palm oil licenses on uncleared peat swamp forests (Tata et al., 2014).
For a market to operate successfully requires high-level coordina-
tion and monitoring, which raises important questions regarding the
H.J. Boer
efficacy of public institutions to operationalize the various governing
technologies needed for REDD +. A director from an international NGO
argued that the forest administration in Indonesia is so dysfunctional
and under resourced that governments at multiple levels are currently
unable to deliver the complex institutional reforms and technical sys-
tems required for a transparent REDD + market (Director, International
NGO pers. comm. 2012). For example, establishing sophisticated MRV
systems requires substantial resources, in addition to the cost of pro-
curing regular field data and satellite imagery (Indrarto et al., 2012).
One of the critical challenges is developing the technical and human
capacity to accurately monitor land cover change, a critical step to
building an MRV system that meets international standards (Team
Leader - German Bilateral Agency pers. comm. 2012). The Indonesian
Government and partners may be unable to verify multiple REDD +
interventions and assess how these are meeting designated GHG re-
duction targets, and thereby undermine the delivery of market based
payments. Critically, Indonesia's public agencies currently lack the ca-
pacity to deliver a range of supportive administrative functions, or
provide the broader governance conditions for REDD + market based
projects to operate.
According to bureaucracy political theory, public agencies can often
display dualistic and conflicting goals, such that their interests in ad-
ministering activities is part of their formal public mandate, but they
often seek organisational interests and compete for influence and con-
trol over government resources across levels (Giessen et al., 2016). In
Indonesia, a critical issue relates to the legal uncertainty over who
governs forested lands caused by the numerous and often conflicting
laws and regulations administered by competing central agencies or
provincial and district governments(Sahide and Giessen, 2015). Whilst
central agencies in Jakarta have responsibility for allocating forest
concessions, district governments often issue permits for palm oil
plantations and other developments (see Setiawan et al., 2016). Spatial
planning remains a problematic activity, subject to numerous over-
lapping laws, with decisions often reflecting the agency and level of
responsibility and their political connections (Brockhaus et al., 2012,
p.33). For carbon project operators this creates a high degree of reg-
ulatory confusions, as does the complex system of forest delineation,
and the various laws for obtaining the necessary licenses and planning
approvals to trade in carbon credits. In reality, authority over who
governs REDD + project activities in Indonesia is a highly contested
domain (Luttrell et al., 2014).
This regulatory overlap, combined with the conflicting roles of
different agencies has led to some significant problems with start-up
carbon projects in Indonesia. Commercial investors require legal clarity
over forest classification and carbon ownership, particularly as they
compete with other forest concessionaries and plantation developers.
They also require the state to enforce the law and ensure that REDD +
projects themselves, as well as other competing or compatible land-use
are complying with existing regulations and land-use planning regimes.
An example of the problems faced by carbon entrepreneurs is the
65,000 ha Rimba Raya Project in Central Kalimantan, recognised as one
of the leaders in developing offsets for the voluntary carbon market
(Bolick et al., 2009; Indriatmoko et al., 2014). The project faced sub-
stantial hurdles and delays in obtaining bureaucratic approvals, but
finally managed to secure the correct licenses from the MoF and began
selling carbon credits in 2013. During the application stage the district
government granted a concession to a palm company over a section of
the project area, and there remain ongoing legal disputes over the re-
maining areas of forest (Indriatmoko et al., 2014).
In REDD + countries such as Indonesia, the state clearly does not
operate as a cohesive or homogenous entity nor does it necessarily
provide the institutional conditions to manage forest resources ac-
cording to the broader public interests. Multiple agencies claim and
compete for authority over forested land and mineral resources, and
assume a discretionary role for all decisions regarding future allocation,
use and management (Sahide and Giessen, 2015). This was highlighted
10
Forest Policy and Economics 86 (2018) 4–12
when in 2009 the MoF released the regulations to support markets and
revenue sharing, which were actively opposed and not endorsed by the
Ministry of Finance (Manager, National Climate Change Agency pers.
comm 2012). In reality, the state in Indonesia often displays a limited or
compromised authority over resources and their utilisation, and is
challenged to provide an accountable or transparent system of forest
and land administration. The state has proven to be an extremely
porous entity that enables specific economic interests to control access
and utilise public forest institutions for selective benefit. For decades
the state in Indonesia has operated as a suitable ensemble of laws and
mechanisms for specific political and business elites to exploit forests
for selective private gain (McCarthy 2011).
5. Conclusion
Neo-liberal type climate change approaches adopt the rationality of
a deregulated, networked based and privatised market system as a so-
lution to deforestation. Government's intervene only to the extent that it
fosters market expansion, with entrepreneurial activity conducted by a
range of private actors that assume responsibility for governing the
carbon supply chain, and devolved authority for managing forest eco-
systems. The case of Indonesia's early Readiness phase indicates a much
more prominent role for government agencies in governing REDD +
markets, suggesting that neoliberal type approaches need to account for
the administrative functions and authority exercised by public bu-
reaucracies. Establishing a carbon market requires a functioning ad-
ministrative apparatus that can deliver a range of coordination and
regulatory functions, as well as land-use planning that engages multiple
interests. REDD + market activities are subject – at least on paper - to
hierarchical administrative authority at multiple levels to assess activ-
ities, combined with ongoing forest monitoring and surveillance func-
tions. In Indonesia, the result is a complex and contested regime of
governing that engages various carbon subjects such as private com-
panies and NGO's, but whose actions are steered and directed by the
authority exercised by different sections of the public bureaucracy.
Critically, Indonesia was to provide the conditions to demonstrate
how an international market for REDD+ credits could operate on the
ground. So far it remains a speculative demonstration process only and
there has not been substantial progress towards anything resembling a
carbon forest economy. This highlights an inherent problem at the heart
of neoliberal based conservation approaches and their practical appli-
cations in developing countries. Indonesia currently lacks the institu-
tional capacity and administrative integration required for a highly
accountable carbon commodity chain. Projects have struggled to set up
operations, with the efficacy of new market instruments constantly
undermined by competing public agencies and private interests at
multiple levels. These critical challenges, combined with inherent
policy uncertainty around REDD +, may discourage communities or
businesses to participate in projects, and thereby fail to recruit them as
neoliberal stakeholders in the carbon economy. REDD + markets are
unlikely to function effectively in Indonesia, without further and po-
tentially wide reaching reforms to the way government agencies ad-
minister forests.
The Paris Climate Agreement reaffirmed REDD + as an important
component of the international climate regime, but with a greater effort
on performance based national approaches. A global trading framework
remains under development but is unlikely to be in place before 2020,
and few countries have indicated support for REDD + type offsets to be
included. As the case of Indonesia suggests, markets may only provide a
niche opportunity for certain private interests to voluntary offset
emissions as a commitment to social and environmental responsibility,
rather than a large scale trading mechanism to address deforestation or
global emissions. REDD + in Indonesia now resembles a government
run forest management program rather than it's original premise of a
market in ecosystem services and incentives. A more viable path to
meet emission reduction targets could be provided by the Indonesian
H.J. Boer
Government's focus on implementation of FMUs, spatial planning and
other forest management approaches as part of implementing low
emissions pathways and NDCs.
Supplementary data to this article can be found online at https://
doi.org/10.1016/j.forpol.2017.10.004.
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Further reading
Giessen, L; Krott, M; Möllmann, T; (2014). Increasing representation of states by utili-
tarian as compared to environmental bureaucracies in international forest and for-
est–environmental policy negotiations, Forest Policy Econ., 38, 97-104.
Minang, P.A; Van Noordwijk, M; Duguma, L.A; (2014). REDD + readiness progress across
countries: time for reconsideration, Clim. Pol., 14, 685-708.