WEEK 9 (from Certiorari and Appeal distinguished)
XI.C MADRIGAL TRANSPORT V. LAPANDAY HOLDINGS CORP.,
G.R. NO. 156067, AUGUST 11, 2004 MATA
The special civil action for certiorari and appeal are two
different remedies that are mutually exclusive; they are not
alternative or successive. Where appeal is available,certiorari will not
prosper, even if the ground therefor is grave abuse of discretion.
Certiorari is not a substitute for the lapsed remedy of appeal.
Facts:
On February 9, 1998, Petitioner Madrigal Transport, Inc.
(Madrigal) filed a Petition for Voluntary Insolvency before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 49. Later, on February
21, 1998, petitioner filed a Complaint for damages against
Respondents Lapanday Holdings Corporation (Lapanday), Macondray
and Company, Inc. (Macondray), and Luis P. Lorenzo Jr. before the RTC
of Manila, Branch 36.
In the latter action, Madrigal alleged that it had entered into
a joint venture agreement with Lapanday for the primary purpose of
operating vessels to service the shipping requirements of Del Monte
Philippines, Inc however, despite demands, Lapanday and Lorenzo
had allegedly been unable to deliver those Del Monte charter hire
contracts.
On February 23, 1998, the insolvency court (RTC Branch 49)
declared petitioner insolvent.On March 30, 1998 and April 6, 1998,
Respondents Lapanday, Lorenzo and Macondray filed their respective
Motions to Dismiss on the complaint for damages filed by the
Petitioner.
On December 16, 1998, Branch 36 granted the Motion, for
failure of the Complaint to state a cause of action. Applying Sections
32 and 33 of the Insolvency Law, the trial court opined that upon the
filing by Madrigal of a Petition for Voluntary Insolvency, the latter lost
the right to institute the Complaint for Damages. The RTC ruled that
the exclusive right to prosecute the actions belonged to the court-
appointed assignee.
On January 26, 1999, petitioner filed a Motion for
Reconsideration(MR), but was denied by the said court July 26, 1999.
Subsequently, petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari with the Court
of Appeals, seeking to set aside the December 16, 1998(the one which
granted the MD of the Complaint for damages) and the July 26, 1999(
the one which denied the MR) Orders of the trial court.On January 10,
2000, the appellate court ruled that since the main issue in the instant
case was purely legal, the Petition could be treated as one for review
as an exception to the general rule that certiorari was not proper
when appeal was available. This was later on challenged by the
Respondents via their MRs. The Court of Appeals dismissed Madrigals
Petition for Certiorari. The CA opined that an order granting a motion
to dismiss was final and thus the proper subject of an appeal,
not certiorari. It averred that even if the Petition could be treated as
an appeal, it would still have to be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction
because the issues raised by petitioner involved pure questions of law
that should be brought to the Supreme Court, pursuant to Section 2 of
Rule 50 and Section 2(c) of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court.
Hence, the petition.
Issue:
Is the petition for certiorari proper?
Ruling:
No.
Supreme Court held thatwhen any tribunal, board or officer
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in
excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of its or his jurisdiction, and there is no
appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition
in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that
judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such
tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law
and justice may require.
The petition shall be accompanied by a certified true copy of
the judgment, order or resolution subject thereof, copies of all
pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent thereto, and a sworn
certification of non-forum shopping as provided in the third
paragraph of Section 3, Rule 46.
Further, a writ of certiorari may be issued only for the
correction of errors of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The writ cannot be used
for any other purpose, as its function is limited to keeping the inferior
court within the bounds of its jurisdiction.
The following requisites must concur for certiorari to
prosper: (1) the writ is directed against a tribunal, a board or any
officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (2) such tribunal,
board or officer has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction;
and (3) there is no appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy
in the ordinary course of law.
Where appeal is available to the aggrieved party, the action
for certiorari will not be entertained. Remedies of appeal (including
petitions for review) and certiorari are mutually exclusive, not
alternative or successive. Hence, certiorari is not and cannot be a
substitute for an appeal, especially if one’s own negligence or error in
ones choice of remedy occasioned such loss or lapse. Whenan appeal
is available, certiorari will not prosper, even if the ground therefor is
grave abuse of discretion.
An order of dismissal, whether correct or not, is a final
order.It is not interlocutory because the proceedings are terminated;
it leaves nothing more to be done by the lower court. Therefore the
remedy of the plaintiff is to appeal the order.
In this case, the RTC did not rendered a decision that is in in
excess of its jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of its jurisdiction when it dismissed the complaint on
the ground that there was no cause of action as per supported by the
facts of the case. Since, it was the order of dismissal that was
questioned, a certiorari is improper because it can be cured through
an appeal. There are exceptional circumstances that the Supreme
Court may grant certiorari despite the availability of appeal however,
in this case, Petitioner did not show that the court, order constitutes a
despotic, capricious, or whimsical exercise of power, but it availed
certiorari because the 15-day period within which to file an appeal
had already lapsed. Petition is denied.
Quick digest:
ABC Transport filed Petition for Voluntary Insolvencyin an
insolvency court. Later on, it filed a complaint for damages against
DEF Corporation for failure to comply the agreement in their contract
in another court. The insolvency case was granted. DEF Corporation
filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that there was no cause of
action because the complaint for damages must be filed at the
insolvency court where ABC Transport filed its insolvency case as
provided by the Insolvency Law. The RTC order dismissal to the
It’s not a PROVREM 2015  1

Complaint for damages for lack of cause of action. ABC Transport then
filed a petition for certiorari to the Court of Appeals over the order of
dismissal of the RTC. As a judge, will you grant the petition for
certiorari?
No.
Supreme Court held that where appeal is available to the
aggrieved party, the action for certiorari will not be entertained.
Remedies of appeal, including petitions for review, and certiorari are
mutually exclusive, not alternative or successive. Certiorari is not and
cannot be a substitute for an appeal, especially if one’s own negligence
or error in ones choice of remedy occasioned such loss or lapse. When
an appeal is available, certiorari will not prosper, even if the ground
therefor is grave abuse of discretion.
The following requisites must concur for certiorari to
prosper: (1) the writ is directed against a tribunal, a board or any
officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (2) such tribunal,
board or officer has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction;
and (3) there is no appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy
in the ordinary course of law.
An order of dismissal, whether correct or not, is a final order.
It is not interlocutory because the proceedings are terminated; it
leaves nothing more to be done by the lower court. Therefore the
remedy of the plaintiff is to appeal the order.
In this case, the order of dismissal rendered by the RTC is a
final order in which it can avail appeal within its given period.
However, ABC Transport failed to file an appeal within its required
period. Neither had it appeared that there was an excess of
jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction that was exercised by the RTC. Therefore, the petition
for certiorari was improper.
Side Notes:
Discussion of the difference between appeal and certiorari.
As to the Purpose. Certiorari is a remedy designed for the correction
of errors of jurisdiction, not errors of judgment. Even if the findings of
the court are incorrect, as long as it has jurisdiction over the case, such
correction is normally beyond the province of certiorari. On the other
hand, where the error is not one of jurisdiction, but of an error of law
or fact -- a mistake of judgment -- appeal is the remedy.
As to the Manner of Filing. Over an appeal, the CA exercises its
appellate jurisdiction and power of review. Over a certiorari, the
higher court uses its original jurisdiction in accordance with its power
of control and supervision over the proceedings of lower courts. An
appeal is thus a continuation of the original suit, while a petition
for certiorari is an original and independent action that was not part
of the trial that had resulted in the rendition of the judgment or order
complained of. The parties to an appeal are the original parties to the
action. In contrast, the parties to a petition for certiorari are the
aggrieved party (who thereby becomes the petitioner) against the
lower court or quasi-judicial agency, and the prevailing parties (the
public and the private respondents, respectively).
As to the Period of Filing. Ordinary appeals should be filed within
fifteen days from the notice of judgment or final order appealed
from. Where a record on appeal is required, the appellant must file a
WEEK 9 (from Certiorari and Appeal distinguished)
notice of appeal and a record on appeal within thirty days from the
said notice of judgment or final order. A petition for review should be
filed and served within fifteen days from the notice of denial of the
decision, or of the petitioners timely filed motion for new trial or
motion for reconsideration. In an appeal bycertiorari, the petition
should be filed also within fifteen days from the notice of judgment or
final order, or of the denial of the petitioners motion for new trial or
motion for reconsideration. On the other hand, a petition
for certiorari should be filed not later than sixty days from the notice
of judgment, order, or resolution. If a motion for new trial or motion
for reconsideration was timely filed, the period shall be counted from
the denial of the motion.
As to the Need for a Motion for Reconsideration. A motion for
reconsideration is generally required prior to the filing of a petition
for certiorari, in order to afford the tribunal an opportunity to correct
the alleged errors.
XI.F TOPACIO V. ONG, G.R. NO. 179895, DECEMBER 18, 2008
CABUENAS CLEA
Principle:
The title to a public office may not be contested except directly, by a quo
warranto proceedings, and it cannot be assailed collaterally, even
through mandamus or a motion to annul or set aside order. In
Nacionalista Party v. De Vera, the Court ruled that prohibition does not
lie to inquire into the validity of the appointment of a public officer.
FACTS: Petitioner via the present petition for certiorari and
prohibition seeks to prevent Justice Ong from further exercising the
powers, duties and responsibilities of a Sandiganbayan Associate
Justice.
In Kilosbayan Foundation v. Ermita, the Court enjoined Ong from
accepting an appointment to the position of Associate Justice of the
Supreme Court or assuming position and discharging the functions of
that office, until he shall have successfully completed all necessary
steps, through appropriate adversarial proceedings in court, to show
that he is a natural-born Filipino citizen and correct the records of his
birth and citizenship.
Ong immediately filed with the RTC a Petition for the
“amendment/correction/supplementation or annotation of an entry
in his Certificate of Birth. The RTC granted his petition and recognized
him as a natural-born citizen.
Petitioner implored respondent OSG to initiate post-haste a quo
warranto proceeding against Ong in the latter’s capacity as an
incumbent Associate Justice of the Sandiganbayan because Ong failed
to meet the citizenship requirement form the time of his appointment.
Hence this petition.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the OSG committed grave abuse of discretion in
deferring the filing of a petition for quo warranto.
2. Whether the petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by
petitioner partakes of the nature of a quo warranto
proceeding with respect to Ong.
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HELD:
1. No.
The Court appreciates no abuse of discretion, much less, a
grave one, on the part of the OSG in deferring action on the
filing of a quo warranto case until after the RTC case has
been terminated with finality. A decision is not deemed
tainted with grave abuse of discretion simply because the
affected party disagrees with it. The Solicitor General is the
counsel of the government, its agencies and
instrumentalities, and its officials or agents. In the discharge
of its task, the Solicitor General must see to it that the best
interest of the government is upheld within the limits set by
law.
2. Yes.
While denominated as a petition for certiorari and
prohibition, the petition partakes of the nature of a quo
warranto proceeding with respect to Ong, for it effectively
seeks to declare null and void his appointment as an
Associate Justice of the Sandiganbayan for being
unconstitutional. While the petition professes to be one for
certiorari and prohibition, petitioner even adverts to a "quo
warranto" aspect of the petition.
Being a collateral attack on a public officer's title, the present
petition for certiorari and prohibition must be dismissed.
The title to a public office may not be contested except
directly, by quo warranto proceedings; and it cannot be
assailed collaterally, even through mandamus or a motion to
annul or set aside order. In Nacionalista Party v. de Vera, the
Court ruled that prohibition does not lie to inquire into the
validity of the appointment of a public officer.
. . . [T]he writ of prohibition, even when directed against
persons acting as judges or other judicial officers, cannot be
treated as a substitute for quo warranto or be rightfully
called upon to perform any of the functions of the writ. If
there is a court, judge or officer de facto , the title to the office
and the right to act cannot be questioned by prohibition. If
an intruder takes possession of a judicial office, the person
dispossessed cannot obtain relief through a writ of
prohibition commanding the alleged intruder to cease from
performing judicial acts, since in its very nature prohibition
is an improper remedy by which to determine the title to an
office.
Even if the Court treats the case as one for quo warranto, the
petition is, just the same, dismissible.
A quo warranto proceeding is the proper legal remedy to
determine the right or title to the contested public office and
to oust the holder from its enjoyment. It is brought against
the person who is alleged to have usurped, intruded into, or
unlawfully held or exercised the public office, and may be
commenced by the Solicitor General or a public prosecutor,
as the case may be, or by any person claiming to be entitled
to the public office or position usurped or unlawfully held or
exercised by another.
Nothing is more settled than the principle, which goes back
to the 1905 case of Acosta v. Flor, reiterated in the recent
2008 case of Feliciano v. Villasin, that for a quo warranto
petition to be successful, the private person suing must
show a clear right to the contested office. In fact, not even
a mere preferential right to be appointed thereto can lend a
modicum of legal ground to proceed with the action.
WEEK 9 (from Certiorari and Appeal distinguished)
In the present case, petitioner presented no sufficient proof
of a clear and indubitable franchise to the office of an
Associate Justice of the Sandiganbayan. He in fact concedes
that he was never entitled to assume the office of an
Associate Justice of the Sandiganbayan.
The rightful authority of a judge, in the full exercise of his
public judicial functions, cannot be questioned by any
merely private suitor, or by any other, except in the form
especially provided by law. To uphold such action would
encourage every disgruntled citizen to resort to the courts,
thereby causing incalculable mischief and hindrance to the
efficient operation of the governmental machine.
Petition dismissed.
SHORT DIGEST:
X filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition against Justice Y from
further exercising the powers, duties and responsibilities of a
Sandiganbayan Associate Justice.
X contends that Ong should immediately desist from holding the
position of Associate Justice of the Sandiganbayan since he is
disqualified on the basis of citizenship. (Y alleged to be a Chinese
citizen).
ISSUE: Whether the petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by
petitioner partakes of the nature of a quo warranto proceeding with
respect to Ong.
HELD: Yes.
While denominated as a petition for certiorari and prohibition, the
petition partakes of the nature of a quo warranto proceeding with
respect to Ong, for it effectively seeks to declare null and void his
appointment as an Associate Justice of the Sandiganbayan for being
unconstitutional. While the petition professes to be one for certiorari
and prohibition, petitioner even adverts to a "quo warranto" aspect of
the petition.
Even if the Court treats the case as one for quo warranto, the petition
is, just the same, dismissible.
A quo warranto proceeding is the proper legal remedy to determine
the right or title to the contested public office and to oust the holder
from its enjoyment. It is brought against the person who is alleged to
have usurped, intruded into, or unlawfully held or exercised the public
office, and may be commenced by the Solicitor General or a public
prosecutor, as the case may be, or by any person claiming to be
entitled to the public office or position usurped or unlawfully held or
exercised by another.
XI.G MORABE V. BROWN, G.R. NO. L-6018, MAY 31, 1954 CANETE
FRANCIS
PRINCIPLE:
“The action of the petitioner is not an action of injunction but
one of mandamus, because it seeks the performance of a legal duty, the
reinstatement of Pablo S. Afuang. The writ known as preliminary
mandatory injunction is also a mandamus, though merely provisional
in character.”
FACTS:
It’s not a PROVREM 2015  3
 WEEK 9 (from Certiorari and Appeal distinguished)

Respondent William Brown had dismissed his employee,
Pablo S. Afuang, because he was one of the complainants in an
investigation conducted by the petitioner Emiliano Morabe, Acting
Chief, Wage Administration Service,of charges against the respondent
that the latter paid his employees beyond the time fixed in Republic
Act No. 602.
The judgment appealed from is hereby reversed, and the
respondent William Brown is hereby ordered to reinstate Pablo S.
Afuang to the position he held prior to his dismissal.
QUICK DIGEST:

An original petition filed by the petitioner in the Court of FACTS:

First Instance of Manila praying that the respondent be ordered to
reinstate Pablo S. Afuang, and that a writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction issue for his reinstatement.The court issued a writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction.
The respondent presented a petition asking for the dismissal
of the petition on the ground that Pablo S. Afuang had presented a
letter asking excuse or apology from the respondent for having taken
his case to court. However, his motion was not acted upon and the case
was heard and the parties presented their evidence.
The CFI rendered judgment finding that the dismissal from
the service of Pablo S. Afuang is unlawful and violates section 13 of the
Minimum Wage Law, because the fact that he testified at the
investigation is not a valid ground for his dismissal from the service.
The court, however, refused to grant an order for the reinstatement of
said Pablo S. Afuang on the ground that this remedy, which it
considers as an injunction, is available only against acts about to
be committed or actually being committed, and not against past
acts;
Petitioner Morabe filed the original petitionin the CFI of
Manila praying that the respondent be ordered to reinstate Pablo S.
Afuang and a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction issue for his
reinstatement. The latter was dismissed by the respondent on the
ground that he was one of the complainants in an investigation
conducted by the petitionerof charges against the respondent that the
latter paid his employees beyond the time fixed in Republic Act No.
602.
The CFI rendered judgment finding that the dismissal from
the service of Pablo S. Afuang is unlawful and violates section 13 of the
Minimum Wage Law. The court, however, refused to grant an order
for the reinstatement of said Pablo S. Afuang on the ground that this
remedy, which it considers as an injunction, is available only against
acts about to be committed or actually being committed, and not
against past acts.
ISSUE:WON the CFI erred in not ordering the respondent to reinstate
Pablo S. Afuang in the service.

ISSUE: WON the CFI erred in not ordering the respondent to reinstate HELD: YES.
Pablo S. Afuang in the service. It is evident that the court a quo erred in considering that
mandatory injunction is preventive in nature, and may not be granted
HELD:YES. by the Court of First Instance once the act complained of has been
It is evident that the court a quo erred in considering that carried out. The action of the petitioner is not an action of injunction
mandatory injunction is preventive in nature, and may not be granted but one of mandamus, because it seeks the performance of a legal
by the Court of First Instance once the act complained of has been duty, the reinstatement of Pablo S. Afuang. The writ known as
carried out.The action of the petitioner is not an action of injunction preliminary mandatory injunction is also a mandamus, though
but one of mandamus, because it seeks the performance of a legal merely provisional in character.
duty, the reinstatement of Pablo S. Afuang. The writ known as
preliminary mandatory injunction is also amandamus, though
merely provisional in character.
XI.K HERRERA V. BARRETTO, 25 PHIL. 245 TRIXIE SEE XI.P
In the case at bar, Pablo S. Afuang was entitled to continue in
the service of respondent, because his act is expressly provided to be Jurisdiction Exercise of
no ground or reason for an employee's dismissal. Section 13 of Jurisdiction
Republic Act No. 602 states that "it shall be unlawful for any person to
discharge or in any other manner to discriminate against any Jurisdiction is the Where there is
employee because such employee has filed any complaint or authority to hear and jurisdiction of the
instituted or caused to be instituted any proceeding under or related
determine a cause — person and subject
to this Act. Pablo S. Afuang was, therefore, unlawfully deprived of his
right or privilege to continue in the service of the respondent, because matter, as we have
the right to act in a said before, the
his dismissal was unlawful or illegal. Having been deprived of such
right or privilege, it is within the competence of courts to compel the case. Since it is the decision of all other
respondent to admit him back to his service. power to hear and questions arising in
determine, it does not the case is but an
In Manila Electric Co. vs. Del Rosario and Jose,the lower court depend either upon the exercise of that
ordered the Manila Electric Co. to furnish electric current to Jose, the regularity of the jurisdiction.
electric company having cut the current to Jose's house because it exercise of that power
suspected him of stealing electricity by the use of a jumper. This Court or upon the
held that the action was not one of injunction but of mandamus, as it rightfulness of the
compelled the electric company to furnish Jose with electric service.
decisions made.
In the case at bar, the court can also order the respondent to reinstate
Pablo S. Afuang. Were we to hold that Afuang may not be reinstated
because he has already been dismissed; there would not be any
remedy against the injustice done him, or for him to return to the
position or employment from which he was unlawfully discharged. The authority to decide
a cause at all, and not

It’s not a PROVREM 2015  4


the decision rendered
therein, is what makes
up jurisdiction.
Facts:
The case at bar involves a motion for certiorari by the
petitioner against Judge Barretto for allegedly acting without
jurisdiction on the case involving the cockpit license permit of
Constancio Joaquin which the petitioner, in his capacity of the
Caloocan Municipal President revoked to operate. Respondent judge
apparently issued a provisional license upon the filing of Joaquin for a
mandatory injunction without notice to the petitioner. The petitioner
now files a motion for certiorari before the higher court against the
respondent for acting in excess of jurisdiction for issuing the
mandatory injunction of provisional license.
Issue: WON a writ of certiorari the proper action on the case at bar.
Ruling:
No. A writ for certiorari is not issued unless it is established
whether or not the court to which it is directed acted without or in
excess of jurisdiction. Once the court has jurisdiction over the subject
matter and parties in a case all decisions exercised within its
jurisdiction, however erroneous or irregular, cannot be corrected by
certiorari. The court held that the CFI has the jurisdiction over the
present case to resolve all matters arising in question.Court held that
Jurisdiction is the authority to hear and determine a cause —the
right to act in a case. Since it is the power to hear and determine, it
does not depend either upon the regularity of the exercise of that
power or upon the rightfulness of the decisions made. Jurisdiction
should therefore be distinguished from the exercise of jurisdiction.
The authority to decide a cause at all, and not the decision rendered
therein, is what makes up jurisdiction.
Certiorari on one hand may not be used to correct errors committed
within the jurisdiction of the court no matter how irregular or
erroneous it is.
XI.L MICROSOFT CORP. V. BEST DEAL COMPUTER CENTER CORP.,
G.R. NO. 148029, SEPTEMBER 24, 2002 LAMBAN
PRINCIPLE:
Certiorari under Rule 65 is a remedy designed for the correction
of errors of jurisdiction and not errors of judgment.
The distinction is clear: A petition for certiorari seeks to correct
errors of jurisdiction while a petition for review seeks to correct
errors of judgment committed by the court. Errors of judgment
include errors of procedure or mistakes in the court's findings.
Where a court has jurisdiction over the person and subject
matter, the decision on all other questions arising in the case is
an exercise of that jurisdiction. Consequently, all errors
WEEK 9 (from Certiorari and Appeal distinguished)
committed in the exercise of such jurisdiction are merely errors
of judgment.
FACTS:
- The case involves MICROSOFT CORPORATION fighting to protect its
intellectual property rights through filing a complaint for Injunction
and Damages with Ex Parte Application for Temporary Restraining
Order and the Provisional Measure of Preservation of Evidence
against Best Deal Computer Center Corporation, Perfect Deal
Corporation and Marcos C. Yuen doing business as Perfect Byte
Computer Center alleging that defendants without authority or
license copied, reproduced, distributed, installed and/or loaded
software programs owned by Microsoft into computer units sold by
them to their customers. Furthermore, it prayed for the issuance of a
writ of preliminary injunction to restrain and enjoin defendants from
illegally reproducing, selling and distributing unlicensed software
programs and also applied for the issuance of an ex parte order for the
seizure and impounding of relevant evidence that can be or may be
found at defendants' business premises.
-The Las Pinas trial court set petitioner's prayer for a temporary
restraining order for hearing but at the same time denied its
application for an ex parte order ratiocinating that the Intellectual
Property Code does not expressly allow its issuance and that, in any
case, the TRIPS (Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights) AGREEMENT cannot prevail over it, and that petitioner's
application partook of a search and seizure order available only in
criminal cases.
-In the instant petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised
Rules of Court petitioner submits that the court a quo gravely abused
its discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it ruled
that the law does not allow an ex parte provisional remedy of seizure
and impounding of infringing evidence. It maintains that Sec. 216.2,
Part IV, of RA 8293 authorizes such order. It concedes though that
while RA 8293 does not expressly mention the provisional and ex
parte nature of the remedy, nonetheless, Art. 50 of the TRIPS
Agreement amply supplies the deficiency. It allegedly resorted to the
instant recourse because it had no appeal or any plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. It automatically
invoked the jurisdiction of this Court supposedly because of the
importance of the issue involved. It bypassed the Court of Appeals on
the premise that it would be useless to first seek recourse thereat as
the party aggrieved by the appellate court's ruling would nonetheless
elevate the matter to this Court. By then, petitioner surmised, the level
of intellectual piracy would have worsened. Likewise, petitioner
presumes that direct resort to this Court is justified as the petition
involves a pure question of law.
Issue:
1. Whether or not Petition for Certiorari can be exercised to correct
public respondent's evaluation of the evidence and factual findings.
2. Whether acts complained of by the petitioner constitutes error of
judgement or error of jurisdiction.
Held:
It’s not a PROVREM 2015  5

1. Negative.
- Certiorari under Rule 65 is a remedy designed for the correction
of errors of jurisdiction and not errors of judgment.
-The sole office of the writ of certiorari is the correction of errors of
jurisdiction including the commission of grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction, and does not include correction of
public respondent's evaluation of the evidence and factual findings
thereon.
-The petition for certiorari must be based on jurisdictional grounds
because as long as the respondent acted with jurisdiction, any error
committed by him or it in the exercise thereof will amount to nothing
more than an error of judgment which may be reviewed or corrected
only by appeal. Even an abuse of discretion is not sufficient by itself to
justify the issuance of a writ of certiorari.
2. Acts complained of constitutes error of judgement
-Section 19, par. (8), BP Blg. 129, as amended, provides that Regional
Trial Courts in Metro Manila shall have exclusive original jurisdiction
in all cases in which the demand, exclusive of interest, damages of
whatever kind, attorneys fees, costs or the value of the property in
controversy exceeds P200,000.00. In the complaint filed before the
court a quo, petitioner averred that it incurred no less
thanP750,000.00 in attorney's fees, investigation and litigation
expenses and another P2,000,000.00 by way of moral damages.
Clearly, the above amounts fall within the jurisdiction of the Regional
Trial Court. Also, the complaint was properly lodged in the Regional
Trial Court of Las Pias considering that one of the principal defendants
was residing thereat.
-Petitioner asserts that respondent trial court gravely abused its
discretion in denying its application for the issuance of an ex parte
order. However, other than this bare allegation, petitioner failed to
point out specific instances where grave abuse of discretion was
allegedly committed. It was never shown how respondent tribunal
supposedly exercised its power in a despotic, capricious or whimsical
manner. There being no hint of grave abuse of discretion that can be
attributed to the lower court, hence, it could be safely held that the
assailed orders were rendered in the proper exercise of its
jurisdiction.
-Significantly, even assuming that the orders were erroneous,
such error would merely be deemed as an error of judgment that
cannot be remedied by certiorari. As long as the respondent
acted with jurisdiction, any error committed by him or it in the
exercise thereof will amount to nothing more than an error of
judgment which may be reviewed or corrected only by appeal.
The distinction is clear: A petition for certiorari seeks to correct
errors of jurisdiction while a petition for review seeks to correct
errors of judgment committed by the court. Errors of judgment
include errors of procedure or mistakes in the court's findings.
Where a court has jurisdiction over the person and subject
matter, the decision on all other questions arising in the case is
an exercise of that jurisdiction. Consequently, all errors
committed in the exercise of such jurisdiction are merely errors
of judgment. Certiorari under Rule 65 is a remedy designed for
WEEK 9 (from Certiorari and Appeal distinguished)
the correction of errors of jurisdiction and not errors of
judgment.
Quick Digest of Facts:
- The case involves MICROSOFT CORPORATION fighting to protect its
intellectual property rights through filing a complaint for Injunction
and Damages with Ex Parte Application for Temporary Restraining
Order and the Provisional Measure of Preservation of Evidence
against Best Deal Computer Center Corporation, Perfect Deal
Corporation and Marcos C. Yuen doing business as Perfect Byte
Computer Center alleging that defendants without authority or
license copied, reproduced, distributed, installed and/or loaded
software programs owned by Microsoft into computer units sold by
them to their customers with prayer of issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction to restrain and enjoin defendants from illegally
reproducing, selling and distributing unlicensed software programs
and an application for the issuance of an ex parte order for the seizure
and impounding of relevant evidence that can be or may be found at
defendants' business premises. But the trial court denied its
application for an ex parte order.
-A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 was filed submitting that the
court a quo gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction when it ruled that the law does not allow an ex parte
provisional remedy of seizure and impounding of infringing evidence.
XI.M CAMPOS V. WISLIZENUS, 35 PHIL. 373 FERNANDEZ
PRINCIPLE:
The general rule is that, where the jurisdiction of the court
depends upon the existence of facts, and the court judicially
considers and adjudicates the question of its jurisdiction, and
decides that the fact exist which are necessary to give it jurisdiction
of the case, the finding is conclusive and cannot be controverted
in a collateral proceeding.
FACTS:
This is a petition for a writ of certiorari to be directed to the Court of
First Instance of the Province of Cebu requiring it to forward to this
court the proceedings had in a certain election contest between the
petitioner Nemesio Campos and the respondent Teodoro Aldanse, to
the end that such proceeding may be revised by this court and certain
steps taken therein annulled on the ground that, in taking them, the
court acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction.
Upon the proclamation by the municipal board of inspectors of the
municipality of Sibonga, Province of Cebu, declaring the respondent
Teodoro Aldanese elected to the position of municipal president of
said municipality, the petitioner filed a protest against the election.
After the filing of the protest copies were duly made for service on the
various persons receiving votes for the office of the municipal
president. The service of the notice of protest upon the respondent
Teodoro Aldanese was made by delivering a copy thereof to one
Isidoro Aldanese, a brother of the respondent Teodoro Aldanese, and
who, it is claimed by the petitioner, was living in the house of the
respondent Teodoro Aldanese at the time. Isidoro Aldanese
It’s not a PROVREM 2015  6

acknowledged in writing on the back of the original notice of protest
the fact that he had received it. A copy of the certificate of service was
attached to the petition and made a part of it as Exhibit. Thereafter, a
motion was made to the court in which the election contest was
pending for the dismissal of the proceedings on the ground that not all
of the persons receiving votes for the office of municipal president
were notified as required by law and therefore the court acquired no
jurisdiction of the proceedings. The court, after hearing the parties
with regard to the service of the notice of protest on the respondent
Teodoro Aldanese, held that, under the facts submitted, no service of
the protest had been made on the respondent Teodoro Aldanese in
the manner requires by law and that, therefore, the court acquired no
jurisdiction of the proceedings and accordingly dismissed the protest.
The petitioner contends that the court exceeded its jurisdiction in
dismissing the proceedings and that its action should be annulled and
set aside and that the court should be ordered to proceed with the
contest.
The respondent filed a demurrer to the petition on the ground, among
others, that it did not state facts sufficient to justify the issuance of the
writ, and the question before us arises on that demurrer.
The court said: No proof whatever as to who is "I. Aldanese" has been
presented. It does not appear who was the person who signed and
under what authority he signed, not even whether he resides in the
house of the respondent. The court, in the absence of proof, finds that
the notice was insufficient. Furthermore, said notice was not made
within the period fixed by law.
While the petition has annexed to it as an exhibit an affidavit of service
of the notice of protest on the respondent Teodoro Aldanese which
shows that the notice was served in the manner required by law, that
affidavit of service was not made or presented to the court until after
the order had been made dismissing the proceedings. It was first
presented to the court as a part of the moving papers on the motion
for a reconsideration of the order dismissing the proceedings. The
order of dismissal was made on the 19th of July, 1916, at which time
the only evidence before the court as to the service of the notice was
that stated in the order of the court above-quoted. The affidavit of
service was made on the 20th of July on which date the motion for
reconsideration was presented.
ISSUE:
Whether the court’s finding as to jurisdiction is conclusive and
cannot be controverted in a collateral proceeding..
SC RULING:
Yes.
The general rule is that, where the jurisdiction of the court
depends upon the existence of facts, and the court judicially
considers and adjudicates the question of its jurisdiction, and
decides that the fact exist which are necessary to give it jurisdiction
of the case, the finding is conclusive and cannot be controverted
in a collateral proceeding.
WEEK 9 (from Certiorari and Appeal distinguished)
The rule applies to a case where the proper service of notice on the
candidates voted for was challenged and the court determined upon
the facts presented, after hearing the allegations of the parties and
their arguments based thereon, that service had not been made as
required by law. Such a determination involves a mixed question of
law and fact; and it is a rule, as stated in the case cited, that, where
the jurisdiction of the court depends upon the determination of a
question of fact and that question has been determined by the court
after a hearing, that determination is conclusive and cannot be
attacked collaterally. In the case before us evidence as to the fact of
service was introduced by the petitioner and the sufficiency of that
evidence was challenged by the respondent. The petitioner did not
take advantage of the opportunity given him by the challenge to
present other and further evidence in relation to the service but
stood squarely upon the facts already presented and accepted a
decision of the court thereon. Under such circumstances there was
nothing left for the court to do except to decide the question upon
the facts as they were. The court did so; and although to say so is
unnecessary to a decision of this case, we are of the opinion that its
finding on the facts as they existed of record at the time was well
founded.
The court acquires no jurisdiction of an election protest unless the
protestant shows to the court that a notice of protest has been served
in the manner required by law upon all the candidates receiving votes
for the office concerning which the protest was filled and who were
candidates for that office. The absence of such proof is fatal to the
petitioner when the motion is dismissed on that ground. There is no
doubt that the court would receive an affidavit of service or other
evidence showing that the service referred to was made in accordance
with law if such evidence were offered at any time before the motion
was made and, probably, even after the motion was made but before
the order of dismissal was entered. In this case, however, no evidence
was offered establishing the fact of proper service until after the order
dismissing the proceedings was entered, except the evidence referred
to in the order of dismissal and the order denying the motion for a
rehearing. The evidence referred to in such orders was insufficient to
establish the service. In the absence of provisions in the Election Law
stating how such service should be made the provisions of the Code of
Civil Procedure relative to that matter control.
It may be added that the determination of a question of fact on which
its jurisdiction depends does not of itself affect the court's jurisdiction.
It has power to resolve the question of fact; and its decision is within
its powers whichever was it may go. Such a finding cannot be attacked
by certiorari
The demurrer is sustained and the complaint will be dismissed on the
merits, unless the petitioner within ten days files an amended
complaint stating facts sufficient to warrant the issuance of the
remedy.
QUICK DIGEST:
FACTS:
TA was proclaimed as the municipal president of Sibonga, Cebu. C filed
a protest against TA. Notice was served to TA through his brother IA
in the house. TA prayed for the dismissal of the petition since service
It’s not a PROVREM 2015  7

was not properly done, thus the court did not acquire jurisdiction over
the case. The court, after hearing the parties with regard to the service
of the notice of protest on the TA no service of the protest had been
made on TA in the manner required by law therefore, the court
acquired no jurisdiction of the proceedings and accordingly dismissed
the protest.
ISSUE:
Whether the court’s finding as to jurisdiction is conclusive and
cannot be controverted in a collateral proceeding..
Yes.
The general rule is that, where the jurisdiction of the court
depends upon the existence of facts, and the court judicially
considers and adjudicates the question of its jurisdiction, and
decides that the fact exist which are necessary to give it jurisdiction
of the case, the finding is conclusive and cannot be controverted
in a collateral proceeding.
The rule applies to a case where the proper service of notice on the
candidates voted for was challenged and the court determined upon
the facts presented, after hearing the allegations of the parties and
their arguments based thereon, that service had not been made as
required by law. Such a determination involves a mixed question of
law and fact; and it is a rule, as stated in the case cited, that, where
the jurisdiction of the court depends upon the determination of a
question of fact and that question has been determined by the court
after a hearing, that determination is conclusive and cannot be
attacked collaterally. In the case before us evidence as to the fact of
service was introduced by the petitioner and the sufficiency of that
evidence was challenged by the respondent. The petitioner did not
take advantage of the opportunity given him by the challenge to
present other and further evidence in relation to the service but
stood squarely upon the facts already presented and accepted a
decision of the court thereon. Under such circumstances there was
nothing left for the court to do except to decide the question upon
the facts as they were. The court did so; and although to say so is
unnecessary to a decision of this case, we are of the opinion that its
finding on the facts as they existed of record at the time was well
founded.
The determination of a question of fact on which its jurisdiction
depends does not of itself affect the court's jurisdiction. It has power
to resolve the question of fact; and its decision is within its powers
whichever was it may go. Such a finding cannot be attacked
by certiorari
XI.O ABAD SANTOS V. PROVINCE OF TARLAC, 67 PHIL. 480 DY
1. CERTIORARI; CONTROL OF COURT OVER JUDGMENT THAT
HAS NOT BECOME FINAL; JUDGMENT UPON A
COMPROMISE. — It is not claimed that the judgment in
question has become final. In fact, it cannot be so claimed
because the fiscal's motion for reconsideration thereof was
presented five days after its rendition. Not having become
final, the lower court has plenary control over it and can
modify or set it aside as law and justice require. (Arnedo vs.
Llorente and Liongson, 18 Phil., 267; De Fiesta vs. Llorente
and Manila Railroad Co., 25 Phil., 554, 561.) And the fact that
WEEK 9 (from Certiorari and Appeal distinguished)
the decision was rendered upon a compromise, gives it no
greater validity than if it had been rendered after a trial. It
stands on the same footing as that of an ordinary judgment
which may be opened or vacated on adequate grounds, such
as fraud, mistake or absence of 'real consent. (15 R. C. L., 646,
646; sec. 113, Act No. 190; Yboleon vs. Sison 59 Phil., 281.)
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; JURISDICTIONAL, QUESTION; MEANING OF
ABUSE OF DISCRETION. — Whether or not the grounds
alleged by the provincial fiscal in his motion for
reconsideration seeking relief from the effects of the
compromise and from the judgment rendered thereon are or
are not sufficient, is not a question of jurisdiction but one of
judgment which we do not decide here. No abuse of
discretion is shown by the petitioners, and by abuse of
discretion we mean such capricious and whimsical exercise
of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.
Long Digest
Facts:
The Province of Tarlac instituted action for the
condemnation of certain parcels of land for the construction of the
Capas-Murcia Diversion road against herein petitioners Abad. A
compromise agreement was entered into between said province and
the petitioners for the payment to the latter of the agreed value of
their lands. The respondent judge approved the compromise in a
partial decision rendered by himand ordered the parties to comply
with the conditions therein set forth.
Subsequently, the provincial fiscal, in behalf of the Province
of Tarlac, moved for the reconsideration of the decision on the ground
that in giving his assent to the compromise, he acted under the
mistaken belief that the prices fixed therein had been approved by the
appraisal committee of the provincial government, and that the
Province of Tarlac, at the time of the compromise, had no longer any
authority to expropriate the lands, because by virtue of Executive
Order No. 71, the Capas-Murcia Diversion road was declared a
national highway under the authority of the Commonwealth of the
Philippines.
The respondent judge acceded to this motion and, setting
aside its decision, ordered the reopening of the case and authorized
the substitution of the Commonwealth of the Philippines for the
Province of Tarlac as party plaintiff, in accordance with the petition of
the Solicitor-General to that effect. Hence, this petition.
The petitioners, on the other hand, contend that the
respondent judge was without power to set aside his partial decision
which was founded upon a compromise duly approved by him. It is
not claimed that the judgment in question has become final.
Issue:
WON the respondent judge acted with grave abuse of
discretion when he set aside his partial decision based on the
compromise agreement entered into by the parties?
Ruling:
NO.
Not having become final, the lower court has plenary control
over it and can modify or set it aside as law and justice require. And
the fact that the decision was rendered upon a compromise, gives it
no greater validity than if it had been rendered after a trial. It stands
on the same footing as that of an ordinary judgment which may be
It’s not a PROVREM 2015  8

opened or vacated on adequate grounds, such as fraud, mistake or
absence of real consent.
No abuse of discretion is shown by the petitioners, and by
abuse of discretion we mean such capricious and whimsical exercise
of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.
Short Digest:
Facts:
Tarlac Province and the Abads entered into a compromise
agreement from which Judge Locsin’s partial decision was based. The
provincial fiscal moved for a reconsideration on the ground that the
compromise was entered into under a mistaken belief, and by virtue
of EO No. 71, wherein it removed the province’s authority to
expropriate the questioned property.
The motion was granted by respondent Judge. Hence this
case, as the petitioners argued that the former lost his authority to set
aside his decision because it has already been promulgated.
Issue:
WON the respondent judge acted with grave abuse of
discretion when he set aside his partial decision based on the
compromise agreement entered into by the parties?
Ruling:
No. Not having become final, the lower court has plenary
control over it and can modify or set it aside as law and justice require.
Grave abuse of discretion is such capricious and whimsical exercise of
judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.
1. XI.P • LEUNG BEN V. O’BRIEN, 38 PHIL 182 VALENCIA
Leung Ben v O’Brien
Principle – Excess of jurisdiction distinguished from lack of
jurisdiction
Excess of jurisdiction contemplates the situation where a court,
having jurisdiction should irregularly transcend its authority as well
as the situation where the court is totally devoid of lawful power.
FACTS: O’Brien lost P15,000 to Leung Ben in a series of gambling,
banking and percentage games. O’Brien filed a complaint with
application for attachment to recover the money on the ground that
the latter was about to depart from the Philippine islands with intent
to defraud his creditors.
The trial court granted the writ of attachment so Leung Ben moved to
have the same quashed because the ground invoked in the application
for attachment must arise from a contract but money lost in gambling,
however, is not founded on contract, express or implied.
The motion was denied, hence the instant petition for certiorari
alleging that the Court of First Instance acted in excess of its
jurisdiction in granting the writ of attachment; that the petitioner has
no plain, speedy, and adequate remedy by appeal or otherwise; and
that consequently the writ of certiorari supplies the appropriate
remedy for his relief.
ISSUE:
WEEK 9 (from Certiorari and Appeal distinguished)
(1) Supposing that the Court of First Instance has granted an
attachment for which there is no statutory authority, can this court
entertain the present petition and grant the desired relief?
(2) Is the statutory obligation to restore money won at gaming an
obligation arising from "contract, express or implied?"
HELD: DENIED
1. YES, Under section 514 of the Code of Civil Procedure the
Supreme Court has original jurisdiction by the writ
of certiorari over the proceedings of Courts of First Instance,
wherever said courts have exceeded their jurisdiction and
there is no plain, speedy, and adequate remedy. In the same
section, it is further declared that the proceedings in the
Supreme Court in such cases hall be as prescribed for Courts
of First Instance in section 217-221, inclusive, of said Code.
Taking the three together, it results in our opinion that any irregular
exercise of juridical power by a Court of First Instance, in excess of its
lawful jurisdiction, is remediable by the writ of certiorari, provided
there is no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy; and in order to
make out a case for the granting of the writ it is not necessary that the
court should have acted in the matter without any jurisdiction
whatever. Indeed the repeated use of expression excess of jurisdiction
shows that the lawmaker contemplated the situation where a court,
having jurisdiction should irregularly transcend its authority as well
as the situation where the court is totally devoid of lawful power.
the word jurisdiction as used in attachment cases, has reference not
only to the authority of the court to entertain the principal action but
also to its authority to issue the attachment, as dependent upon the
existence of the statutory ground. (6 C. J., 89.) This distinction between
jurisdiction to issue the attachment as an ancillary remedy incident to
the principal litigation is of importance; as a court's jurisdiction over
the main action may be complete, and yet it may lack authority to
grant an attachment as ancillary to such action. Thus in Rocha &
Co. vs. Crossfield and Figueras (6 Phil. Rep., 355), a receiver had been
appointed without legal justification. It was held that the order
making the appointment was beyond the jurisdiction of the court; and
though the court admittedly had jurisdiction of the main cause, the
order was vacated by this court upon application a writ of certiorari.
By parity of reasoning it must follow that when a court issues a writ
of attachment for which there is no statutory authority, it is acting
irregularly and in excess of its jurisdiction, in the sense necessary to
justify the Supreme Court in granting relief by the writ of certiorari.
2. YES
Money lost in gaming and voluntarily paid by the loser to the winner
can not in the absence of statue, be recovered in a civil action. But Act
No. 1757 of the Philippine Commission, which defines and penalizes
several forms of gambling, contains numerous provisions recognizing
the right to recover money lost in gambling or in the playing of certain
games (secs. 6, 7, 8, 9, 11). The original complaint in the action in the
Court of First Instance is not clear as to the particular section of Act
No. 1757 under which the action is brought, but it is alleged that the
money was lost at gambling, banking, and percentage game in which
the defendant was banker. It must therefore be assumed that the
It’s not a PROVREM 2015  9

action is based upon the right of recovery given in Section 7 of said
Act, which declares that an action may be brought against the banker
by any person losing money at a banking or percentage game.
In permitting the recovery of money lost at play, Act No. 1757 has
introduced modifications in the application of articles 1798, 180`, and
1305 of the Civil Code. The first two of these articles relate to gambling
contracts, while article 1305 treats of the nullity of contracts
proceeding from a vicious or illicit consideration. Taking all these
provisions together, it must be apparent that the obligation to return
money lost at play has a decided affinity to contractual obligations;
and we believe that it could, without violence to the doctrines of the
civil law, be held that such obligations is an innominate quasi-contract
In our opinion the cause of action stated in the complaints in the court
below is based on a contract, express or implied and is therefore of
such nature that the court had authority to issue writ of attachment.
The application for the writ of certiorari must therefore be denied and
the proceedings dismissed. So ordered.
2. HERRERA (SUPRA) TRIXIE
3. XI.R. NAPA V. WEISSENHAGEN, 29 PHIL. 182 VILLAGANAS
PRINCIPLE:
The writ of certiorari in so far as it was a method by which mere
errors of an inferior court could be corrected no longer exists. Its
place is now taken by the appeal. So long as the inferior court
maintains jurisdiction, its errors can be corrected only by that
method (APPEAL).
FACTS:
An action for the summary recovery of the possession of land was filed
by Julian Larong and HermenegildoBayla against Agapito Napa.
The court ruled in favor of the plaintiff (respondent herein) and
ordered delivery of possession.The decision was rendered on the 14th
of April, 1913, and appeal was taken therefrom on the 29th of the
same month.
The cause having arrived in the Court of First Instance for
determination on the appeal, a motion was made by the appellee to
dismiss the appeal on the ground that it had not been perfected within
the time required by law. The court entertained this motion, granted
it, and dismissed the appeal.
The purpose of this proceeding is to obtain a writ of certiorari for the
revision of the record of the court below, the revocation of the
judgment entered upon the order granting the motion to dismiss the
appeal, and to set aside the whole proceeding to the ground that the
court lacked jurisdiction to dismiss the appeal.
ISSUE:
WON certiorari is proper in this case.
RULING:
WEEK 9 (from Certiorari and Appeal distinguished)
NO.
It is clear at a glance that the Court of First Instance had jurisdiction
to consider a motion to dismiss the appeal and the exercise of that
jurisdiction did not result in its loss, it having been exercised in
accordance with the established forms and methods of procedure
prescribed by the practice of the country. We have held in numerous
case that a writ of certiorari will not be issued unless it clearly appears
that the court to which it is to be directed acted without or in excess
of jurisdiction in performing the acts complained of. We have also held
that if a court had jurisdiction of the subject matter and of the person,
decision upon all question pertinent to the cause are decisions which
its jurisdiction and however irregular or erroneous they may be, they
cannot be corrected by certiorari. A Court of First Instance has
jurisdiction to dismiss an appeal taken to it from a judgment of a
justice's court and, therefore, had jurisdiction to decide every
question pertaining thereto. This being the case, the
consideration of the motion and the dismissal of the appeal as a
consequence thereof are not acts in excess of jurisdiction. It may
be stated as a general rule that the decision by a court of one of the
fundamental question before it does not, except perhaps in cases
involving a constitutional question, deprive it of jurisdiction
whichever way it may decide.
The writ of certiorari in so far as it was a method by which mere
errors of an inferior court could be corrected no longer exists. Its
place is now taken by the appeal. So long as the inferior court
maintains jurisdiction, its errors can be corrected only by that
method. The writ in this country has been confined to the
correction of defects of jurisdiction solely and cannot be legally
used for any other purpose. (Id.)
If the judgment of the justice's court was void, it was nevertheless
appealable, although the losing party might have been able to rid
himself of it by other means. Having been appealed, it stands upon
substantially the same footing in the appellate court, so far as the
appeal itself is concerned, as any other judgment of a justice's court
and the jurisdiction of the appellate court in that appeal is as full and
complete as it is in any other.
It’s not a PROVREM 2015  10