In Re: CITY OF PORT ARTHUR, TEXAS, and the PORT.
ARTHUR POLICE ASSOCIATION, American Arbitration Association
Case No. AAA-01-17-003-2984, Indefinite Suspension (Discharge) of
Police Detective Mickey Sterling
MINER: DON B. HAYS - Selected by the parties
APPEARANCES:
For the Company - For the Union —
BETTYE LYNN, ESQ. ROBERT THOMAS, ESQ.
Lynn Law, PLLC Attorney and Counselor at Law
306 West Broadway Avenue 5100 Westheimer
Fort Worth, TX. 76104 Suite 105
Houston, TX 77056
THE ISSUES
Based on a general (non-specific) stipulation by the parties
(representatives) the following issues appear to have been properly raised
for resolution by this Hearing Examiner (arbitrator):
Issue No. 1; Did the City of Port Arthur, Texas,
Preponderantly prove the truth and correctness of the allegations
of wrongdoing contained within Port Arthur Police Department
Chief Patrick Melvin’s notice of indefinite (disciplinary)
suspension (dismissal), issued to Port Arthur Police Officer
(Detective) Mickey Sterling on or about June 2, 2017?
Issue No. 2: If the answer to Issue No. 1 is YES, did the city
preponderantly prove it had just cause to permanently dismiss
Port Arthur Detective Mickey Sterling effective with thedepartmental notice, based on such preponderantly proven
violations?
Issue No. 3: If the answer to Issues No. 1 or No. 2 is NO,
what should be the appropriate remedy?!
STANDARD OF PROOF
In the absence of a stipulation, published policy or Collective
Bargaining Agreement (CBA) mandate, our research and experience
convince us that management’s adverse action against this employee should
be sustained only if such personnel (disciplinary) action is supported by a
preponderance of the city’s credible evidence.” Preponderance of the
evidence has often been defined by the courts and arbitrators “as the degree
of relevant evidence that a reasonable person, considering the record as a
whole, would accept as sufficient to find that a contested fact is more likely
to be true than untrue.” More specifically such (preponderant) standard
requires the “trier of fact (hearing examiner) to be convinced that the
existence of an alleged fact is more probable than its nonexistence before
' We note parenthetically that both representatives agreed that under the provisions of the Texas
Local Government Code and the local collective bargaining agreement, if we find that Chief Melvin
preponderantly proved that he has just cause to take some disciplinary action against Police Officer
‘Sterling, but the city’s evidence does not establish the reasonableness (proportionality) of assessing
termination as the appropriate sanction, we are authorized to reduce such punishment to what we
consider more appropriate, based on the preponderant evidence, notwithstanding certain Texas State
Court decisions which arguably restrict (place limits on) the permissible length of a police officer’s
disciplinary suspension.
* Because the question of quantum of proof focuses primarily on the arbitrator's (Hearing
Examiner's) deliberation process (not on each party’s burden) the standard of proof question
essentially falls to the arbitrator (Hearing Examiner). See Elkouri & Elkouri, How Arbitration
‘Works, 6" Edition, Chapter 15.3.D.iia Quantum of Proof in Discharge cases, ‘See also Fairweather,
Practice and Procedure in Labor Arbitration, 1999, (4" Edition).
2he/she may find in favor of the party who has the burden to persuade [the
arbitrator] of that disputed fact’s existence.’*
However, when applying such proof standard if the credible evidence
on a particular issue appears to be “evenly balanced” between the two
patties’ conflicting positions, or where there exists reasonable doubt as to
the side on which the credible evidence preponderates, the individual/entity
bearing the proof burden is often viewed as having failed to successfully
carry that particular (disputed) point.’ We would also note that there
appears to be a juxtaposed principle of practice/procedure, whereby when
two reasonable possibilities can be inferred from the totality of the credible
evidence, neither party’s position can be conclusively ruled to have been
persuasively proven.
JUST (PROPER) CAUSE
The expressed/implied standard for arbitral review of disciplinary’
actions, at least in most Texas cities appears often to be expressed as “ust
cause.” And, unless otherwise described by the parties, such term is
generally viewed as being synonymous with the terms “cause,” “proper
cause” or “reasonable cause.”” Furthermore, we are unaware of any
* Seo Hill & Sinicropi, Evidence in Arbitration, BNA 1980/1981.
‘Moberly v. Sec'y of HLS, 592 F.3d 1315, 1322 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (other citations omitied),
5 See Smith v. United States, 557 F. Supp. 42, 51 (D.C. Ark. 1982).
|; McNamara v. United States, 199 F. Supp. 879, 883 (D.C. 1961).
7'S.D, Warrant Co. v, United Paperworkers” Intemational Union, 846 F.2d 827 (1* Cir, 1998),
3