BIENVENIDO M. CADALIN, ROLANDO M. AMUL, DONATO B.

EVANGELISTA, and the rest of 1,767

NAMED-COMPLAINANTS, thru and by their Attorney-in-fact, Atty. GERARDO A. DEL MUNDOvs.
PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT ADMINISTRATION’S ADMINISTRATOR, NLRC, BROWN &
ROOT INTERNATIONAL, INC. AND/OR ASIA INTERNATIONAL BUILDERS CORPORATION
GRN 104776, December 5,1994.
FACTS:
This is a consolidation of 3 cases of SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS in the Supreme Court for Certiorari.

On June 6, 1984, Cadalin, Amul and Evangelista, in their own behalf and on behalf of 728 other OCWs
instituted a class suit by filing an “Amended Complaint” with the POEA for money claims arising from their
recruitment by ASIA INTERNATIONAL BUILDERS CORPORATION (AIBC) and employment by BROWN
& ROOT INTERNATIONAL, INC (BRI) which is a foreign corporation with headquarters in Houston,
Texas, and is engaged in construction; while AIBC is a domestic corporation licensed as a service
contractor to recruit, mobilize and deploy Filipino workers for overseas employment on behalf of its foreign
principals.

The amended complaint sought the payment of the unexpired portion of the employment contracts, which
was terminated prematurely, and secondarily, the payment of the interest of the earnings of the Travel and
Reserved Fund; interest on all the unpaid benefits; area wage and salary differential pay; fringe benefits;
reimbursement of SSS and premium not remitted to the SSS; refund of withholding tax not remitted to the
BIR; penalties for committing prohibited practices; as well as the suspension of the license of AIBC and
the accreditation of BRII

On October 2, 1984, the POEA Administrator denied the “Motion to Strike Out of the Records” filed by
AIBC but required the claimants to correct the deficiencies in the complaint pointed out.

AIB and BRII kept on filing Motion for Extension of Time to file their answer. The POEA kept on granting
such motions.

On November 14, 1984, claimants filed an opposition to the motions for extension of time and asked that
AIBC and BRII declared in default for failure to file their answers.

On December 27, 1984, the POEA Administrator issued an order directing AIBC and BRII to file their
answers within ten days from receipt of the order.

(at madami pang motions ang na-file, new complainants joined the case, ang daming inavail na remedies
ng both parties)
On June 19, 1987, AIBC finally submitted its answer to the complaint. At the same hearing, the parties
were given a period of 15 days from said date within which to submit their respective position papers. On
February 24, 1988, AIBC and BRII submitted position paper. On October 27, 1988, AIBC and BRII filed a
“Consolidated Reply,” POEA Adminitartor rendered his decision which awarded the amount of $824,
652.44 in favor of only 324 complainants. Claimants submitted their “Appeal Memorandum For Partial
Appeal” from the decision of the POEA. AIBC also filed its MR and/or appeal in addition to the “Notice of
Appeal” filed earlier.

NLRC promulgated its Resolution, modifying the decision of the POEA. The resolution removed some of
the benefits awarded in favor of the claimants. NLRC denied all the MRs. Hence, these petitions filed by
the claimants and by AlBC and BRII.

The case rooted from the Labor Law enacted by Bahrain where most of the complainants were deployed.
His Majesty Ise Bin Selman Al Kaifa, Amir of Bahrain, issued his Amiri Decree No. 23 on June 16, 1176,
otherwise known re the Labour Law for the Private Sector. Some of the provision of Amiri Decree No. 23
that are relevant to the claims of the complainants-appellants are as follows:

“Art. 79: x x x A worker shall receive payment for each extra hour equivalent to his wage entitlement
increased by a minimum of twenty-rive per centurn thereof for hours worked during the day; and by a
minimum off fifty per centurn thereof for hours worked during the night which shall be deemed to being
from seven o’clock in the evening until seven o’clock in the morning .”

Art. 80: Friday shall be deemed to be a weekly day of rest on full pay.
If employee worked, 150% of his normal wage shall be paid to him x x x.”

Art. 81; x x x When conditions of work require the worker to work on any official holiday, he shall be paid
an additional sum equivalent to 150% of his normal wage.”

Art. 84: Every worker who has completed one year’s continuous service with his employer shall be entitled
to Laos on full pay for a period of not less than 21 days for each year increased to a period not less than
28 days after five continuous years of service.”

A worker shall be entitled to such leave upon a quantum meruit in respect of the proportion of his service
in that year.”

Art. 107: A contract of employment made for a period of indefinite duration may be terminated by either
party thereto after giving the other party prior notice before such termination, in writing, in respect of
monthly paid workers and fifteen days’ notice in respect of other workers. The party terminating a contract
without the required notice shall pay to the other party compensation equivalent to the amount of wages
payable to the worker for the period of such notice or the unexpired portion thereof.”

Art. Ill: x x x the employer concerned shall pay to such worker, upon termination of employment, a leaving
indemnity for the period of his employment calculated on the basis of fifteen days’ wages for each year of
the first three years of service and of one month’s wages for each year of service thereafter. Such worker
shall be entitled to payment of leaving indemnity upon a quantum meruit in proportion to the period of his
service completed within a year.”
ISSUE:
1. WON the foreign law should govern or the contract of the parties.(WON the complainants who have
worked in Bahrain are entitled to the above-mentioned benefits provided by Amiri Decree No. 23 of
Bahrain).

2. WON the Bahrain Law should apply in the case. (Assuming it is applicable WON complainants’ claim
for the benefits provided therein have prescribed.)

3. Whether or not the instant cases qualify as; a class suit (siningit ko nalang)
(the rest of the issues in the full text of the case refer to Labor Law)

RULING:
1. NLRC set aside Section 1, Rule 129 of the 1989 Revised Rules on Evidence governing the pleading
and proof of a foreign law and admitted in evidence a simple copy of the Bahrain’s Amiri Decree No. 23 of
1976 (Labour Law for the Private Sector).

NLRC applied the Amiri Deere, No. 23 of 1976, which provides for greater benefits than those stipulated in
the overseas-employment contracts of the claimants. It was of the belief that where the laws of the host
country are more favorable and beneficial to the workers, then the laws of the host country shall form part
of the overseas employment contract. It approved the observation of the POEA Administrator that in labor
proceedings, all doubts in the implementation of the provisions of the Labor Code and its implementing
regulations shall be resolved in favor of labor.

The overseas-employment contracts, which were prepared by AIBC and BRII themselves, provided that
the laws of the host country became applicable to said contracts if they offer terms and conditions more
favorable than those stipulated therein. However there was a part of the employment contract which
provides that the compensation of the employee may be “adjusted downward so that the total computation
plus the non-waivable benefits shall be equivalent to the compensation” therein agree,’ another part of the
same provision categorically states “that total remuneration and benefits do not fall below that of the host
country regulation and custom.”

Any ambiguity in the overseas-employment contracts should be interpreted against AIBC and BRII, the
parties that drafted it. Article 1377 of the Civil Code of the Philippines provides:
‘The interpretation of obscure words or stipulations in a contract shall not favor the party who caused the
obscurity.”

Said rule of interpretation is applicable to contracts of adhesion where there is already a prepared form
containing the stipulations of the employment contract and the employees merely “take it or leave it.” The
presumption is that there was an imposition by one party against the other and that the employees signed
the contracts out of necessity that reduced their bargaining power.
We read the overseas employment contracts in question as adopting the provisions of the Amiri Decree
No. 23 of 1976 as part and parcel thereof. The parties to a contract may select the law by which it is to be
governed. In such a case, the foreign law is adopted as a “system” to regulate the relations of the parties,
including questions of their capacity to enter into the contract, the formalities to be observed by them,
matters of performance, and so forth. Instead of adopting the entire mass of the foreign law, the parties
may just agree that specific provisions of a foreign statute shall be deemed incorporated into their contract
“as a set of terms.” By such reference to the provisions of the foreign law, the contract does not become a
foreign contract to be governed by the foreign law. The said law does not operate as a statute but as a set
of contractual terms deemed written in the contract.

A basic policy of contract is to protect the expectation of the parties. Such party expectation is protected
by giving effect to the parties’ own choice of the applicable law. The choice of law must, however, bear
some relationship the parties or their transaction. There is no question that the contracts sought to be
enforced by claimants have a direct connection with the Bahrain law because the services were rendered
in that country.

2. NLRC ruled that the prescriptive period for the filing of the claims of the complainants was 3 years, as
provided in Article 291 of the Labor Code of the Philippines, and not ten years as provided in Article 1144
of the Civil Code of the Philippines nor one year as provided in the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976.

Article 156 of the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976 provides:

“A claim arising out of a contract of employment shall not actionable after the lapse of one year from the
date of the expiry of the Contract”.

As a general rule, a foreign procedural law will not be applied in the forum (local court), Procedural
matters, such as service of process, joinder of actions, period and requisites for appeal, and so forth, are
governed by the laws of the forum. This is true even if the action is based upon a foreign substantive law.

A law on prescription of actions is sui generis in Conflict of Laws in the sense that it may be viewed either
as procedural or substantive, depending on the characterization given such a law. In Bournias v. Atlantic
Maritime Company (220 F. 2d. 152, 2d Cir. [1955]), where the issue was the applicability of the Panama
Labor Code in a case filed in the State of New York for claims arising from said Code, the claims would
have prescribed under the Panamanian Law but not under the Statute of Limitations of New York. The
U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals held that the Panamanian Law was procedural as it was not “specifically
intended to be substantive,” hence, the prescriptive period provided in the law of the forum should apply.
The Court observed: “. . . we are dealing with a statute of limitations of a foreign country, and it is not clear
on the face of the statute that its purpose was to limit the enforceability, outside as well as within the
foreign country concerned, of the substantive rights to which the statute pertains. We think that as a
yardstick for determining whether that was the purpose, this test is the most satisfactory one.

The Court further noted: “Applying that test here it appears to us that the libellant is entitled to succeed, for
the respondents have failed to satisfy us that the Panamanian period of limitation in question was
specifically aimed against the particular rights which the libellant seeks to enforce. The Panama Labor
Code is a statute having broad objectives.” The American court applied the statute of limitations of New
York, instead of the Panamanian law, after finding that there was no showing that the Panamanian law on
prescription was intended to be substantive. Being considered merely a procedural law even in Panama, it
has to give way to the law of the forum (local Court) on prescription of actions.

However the characterization of a statute into a procedural or substantive law becomes irrelevant when
the country of the forum (local Court) has a “borrowing statute.” Said statute has the practical effect of
treating the foreign statute of limitation as one of substance. A “borrowing statute” directs the state of the
forum (local Court) to apply the foreign statute of limitations to the pending claims based on a foreign law.
While there are several kinds of “borrowing statutes,” one form provides that an action barred by the laws
of the place where it accrued will not be enforced in the forum even though the local statute was not run
against it.

Section 48 of Code of Civil Procedure is of this kind. It provides: “If by the laws of the state or country
where the cause of action arose, the action is barred, it is also barred in the Philippine Islands.”

Section 48 has not been repealed or amended by the Civil Code of the Philippines. In the light of the 1987
Constitution, however, Section 48 cannot be enforced ex proprio vigore insofar as it ordains the
application in this jurisdiction of Section 156 of the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976.

The courts of the forum (local Court) will not enforce any foreign claim obnoxious to the forum’s public
policy. To enforce the one-year prescriptive period of the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976 as regards the
claims in question would contravene the public policy on the protection to labor.

In the Declaration of Principles and State Policies, the 1987 Constitution emphasized that:“The state shall
promote social justice in all phases of national development” (Sec. 10).
‘The state affirms labor as a primary social economic force. It shall protect the rights of workers and
promote their welfare” (Sec. 18).

In Article XIII on Social Justice and Human Rights, the 1987 Constitution provides:
“Sec. 3. The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and overseas, organized and unorganized, and
promote full employment and equality of employment opportunities for all.”

Thus, the applicable law on prescription is the Philippine law.

The next question is whether the prescriptive period governing the filing of the claims is 3 years, as
provided by the Labor Code or 10 years, as provided by the Civil Code of the Philippines.

Article 1144 of the Civil Code of the Philippines provides:

“The following actions must be brought within ten years from the time the right of action accross:

(1) Upon a written contract; (2) Upon an obligation created by law; (3) Upon a judgment”
In this case, the claim for pay differentials is primarily anchored on the written contracts between the
litigants, the ten-year prescriptive period provided by Art. 1144(l) of the New Civil Code should govern.
3. NO. A class suit is proper where the subject matter of the controversy is one of common or general
interest to many and the parties are so numerous that it is impracticable to bring them all before the court.
When all the claims are for benefits granted under the Bahrain law many of the claimants worked outside
Bahrain. Some of the claimants were deployed in Indonesia under different terms and condition of
employment.

Inasmuch as the First requirement of a class suit is not present (common or general interest based on the
Amiri Decree of the State of Bahrain), it is only logical that only those who worked in Bahrain shall be
entitled to rile their claims in a class suit.

While there are common defendants (AIBC and BRII) and the nature of the claims is the same (for
employee’s benefits), there is no common question of law or fact. While some claims are based on the
Amiri Law of Bahrain, many of the claimants never worked in that country, but were deployed elsewhere.
Thus, each claimant is interested only in his own demand and not in the claims of the other employees of
defendants. A claimant has no concern in protecting the interests of the other claimants as shown by the
fact, that hundreds of them have abandoned their co-claimants and have entered into separate
compromise settlements of their respective claims. The claimants who worked in Bahrain can not be
allowed to sue in a class suit in a judicial proceeding.

WHEREFORE, all the three petitioners are DISMISSED.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
CIPRIANO ORBECIDO III, Respondent.
G.R. No. 154380 October 5, 2005
QUISUMBING, J.:
Facts:
Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros M. Villanueva at the United Church of Christ in the Philippines in
Lam-an, Ozamis City, on May 24, 1981. They were blessed with a with a son and a daughter, Kristoffer
Simbortriz V. Orbecido and Lady Kimberly V. Orbecido.
Lady Myros left for the United States bringing along their son Kristoffer in 1986. After few years, Cipriano
discovered that his wife had been naturalized as an American citizen.

Cipriano learned from his son that his wife had obtained a divorce decree sometime in 2000 and then
married a certain Innocent Stanley and lived in California.

He then filed with the trial court a petition for authority to remarry invoking Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the
Family Code. No opposition was filed. Finding merit in the petition, the court granted the same. The
Republic, herein petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), sought reconsideration but it
was denied. Orbecido filed a petition for review of certiorari on the Decision of the RTC.

Issue:
Whether or not respondent Orbecido can remarry under Article 26 of the Family Code.

Held:
Yes. The Court’s unanimous decision in holding Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code be interpreted
as allowing a Filipino citizen who has been divorced by a spouse who had acquired a citizenship and
remarried, also to remarry under Philippine law.

The article should be interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the time of the celebration of the
marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on,one of them became naturalized as a foreign citizen and
obtained a divorce decree.

The instant case was one where at the time the marriage was solemnized, the parties were two Filipino
citizens, but later on, the wife was naturalized as an American citizen and subsequently obtained a divorce
granting her capacity to remarry, and indeed, she remarried an American citizen while residing in the US.
The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party were a foreigner at the time
of the solemnization of the marriage.

However, since Orbecido was not able to prove as fact his wife’s naturalization, he was still barred from
remarrying.

Corpuz vs. Sto. Tomas Case Digest

G.R. No. 186571, August 11, 2010

FACTS:

Gerbert Corpuz, a former Filipino citizen but now a naturalized Canadian, married Daisylyn Sto. Tomas, a
Filipina. He soon left to Canada after their wedding due to work commitments. He returned to Philippines
on April 2005 only to find out Daisylyn has an affair with another man. Gerbert returned to Canada to file a
divorce that took effect on January 2006.

Two years later, he found another Filipina and wanted to marry her in the Philippines. He went to Pasig
City Registrar's Office to register his Canadian divorce decree but was denied considering that his
marriage with Daisylyn still subsists under Philippine law, that the foregin divorce must be recognized
judicially by the Philippine court.

Gerbert subsequently filed at the Regional Trial Court a judicial recognition of foreign divorce but was
subsequently denied since he is not the proper party and according to Article 26 of the Civil Code, only a
Filipino spouse can avail the remedy.
ISSUE:

Whether or not Article 26 can also be applied to Corpuz' petition of recognition of the foreign divorce
decree

HELD:

The Court held that alien spouses cannot claim the right as it is only in favor of Filipino spouses. The
legislative intent of Article 26 is for the benefit of the clarification of the marital status of the Filipino
spouse.

However, aliens are not strip to petition to the RTC for his foreign divorce decree as it is a conclusive
presumption of evidence of the authenticity of foreign divorce decree with confirmity to the alien's national
law.

The Pasig City Registrar's Office acted out of line when it registered the foreign divorce decree without
judicial order recognition. Therefore, the registration is still deemed to be void.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. MANALO

G.R. No. 221029
Apr 24, 2018

FACTS: Respondent Marelyn Tanedo Manalo (Manalo) filed a petition for cancellation of entry of marriage
in the Civil Registry of San Juan, Metro Manila, by virtue of a judgment of divorce rendered by the Japanese
court. Manalo was allowed to testify. Among ithe documents that were offered and admitted were: (1) Court
Order finding the petition and its attachments to be sufficient in form and in substance; (2) Affidavit of
Publication; (3) Certificate of Marriage between Manalo and her former Japanese husband; (4) Divorce
Decree of the Japanese court; (5) Authentication/Certificate issued by the Philippine Consulate General in
Osaka, Japan of the Notification of Divorce; and (6) Acceptance of Certificate of Divorce.
The Office of the Solicitor’s General, as it appeared for the petitioner Republic of the Philippines, did not
present any controverting evidence to rebut the allegations of Manalo.
The trial court denied the petition for lack of merit. It opined that, based on Article of Article 15 of the New
Civil Code, the Philippine law “does not afford Filipinos the right to file for a divorce, whether they are in the
country or living abroad, if they are married to Filipinos or to foreigners, or if they celebrated their marriage
in the Philippines or in another country.
On appeal, the CA overturned the RTC decision. It held that Article 26 of the Family Code of the Philippines
is applicable even if it was Manalo who filed for divorce against her Japanese husband because the decree
they obtained makes the latter no longer married to the former capacitating him to remarry.
ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage between a foreigner and a Filipino was dissolved through a divorce
filed abroad by the latter?
HELD: Yes. Article 26 of the Family Code which reads:
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force
in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this
country, except those prohibited under Articles 35 (1), (4), (5) and (6), 3637 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce
is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry,
the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law. (As amended by
Executive Order 227)
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 confers jurisdiction on the Philippine Courts to extend the effect of a foreign
divorce decree to a Filipino spouse without undergoing trial to determine the validity of the
dissolution of the marriage. It authorizes our courts to adopt the effects of a foreign divorce decree
precisely because the Philippines does not allow divorce. Philippine courts cannot try the case on the merits
because it is tantamount to trying a divorce case. Under the principles of comity, our jurisdiction recognizes
a valid divorce obtained by a spouse of foreign nationality, but the legal effects thereof, e.g., on custody,
care, and support of the children or property relations of the spouses, must still be determined by our court.
The Court state the twin elements for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as follows:
1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and
2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitation him or her to remarry.
The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of the marriage, but
their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to
remarry.
Moreover, invoking the nationality principle is erroneous. Such principle, found under Article 15of the Civil
Code, is not an absolute and unbending rule. In fact, the mere existence of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 is a
testament that the State may provide for an exception thereto. Also, blind adherence to the nationality
principle must be disallowed if it would cause unjust discrimination and oppression to certain classes of
individuals whose rights are equally protected by law.
The Court, however, asserts that it cannot yet write finis to this controversy by granting Manalo’s petition to
recognize and enforce the divorce decree rendered by the Japanese Court. Before a foreign divorce decree
can be recognized by our courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its
conformity to the foreign law allowing it.
Aznar v. Garcia
Facts
Edward E. Christensen, an American citizen from California and domiciled in the Philippines, left a will
executed in the Philippines in which he bequeathed Php 3,600.00 to Maria Helen Christensen ("Helen") and
the remainder of his estate to his daughter, Maria Lucy Christensen Daney. The laws of California allows
the testator to dispose of his estate in any manner he pleases. However, California law also provides that
the personal property of a person is governed by the laws of his domicile. The executor, Adolfo C. Aznar,
drew a project of partition in conformity with the will. Helen opposed the project of partition arguing that
Philippine laws govern the distribution of the estate and manner proposed in the project deprived her of her
legitime.

Issue
Whether or not the succession is governed by Philippine laws.

Held
Yes. Philippine law governs.

Ratio
Article 16 of the Civil Code provides that the intrinsic validity of testamentary dispositions are governed by
the national law of the decedent, in this case, California law. The provision in the laws of California giving a
testator absolute freedom in disposing of his estate is the internal law which applies only to persons
domiciled within the said estate. On the other hand, the provision in the laws of California stating that
personal property is governed by the laws of the domicile of its owner is the conflict of laws rule that applies
to persons not domicile in the said state. Accordingly, the laws of the Philippines, in which the testator is
domiciled governs the succession and the regime of legitimes must be respected.

Bank of America vs American Realty Corporation

GR 133876 December 29, 1999
Facts:
Petitioner granted loans to 3 foreign corporations. As security, the latter mortgaged a property located in
the Philippines owned by herein respondent ARC. ARC is a third party mortgagor who pledged its own
property in favor of the 3 debtor-foreign corporations.

The debtors failed to pay. Thus, petitioner filed collection suits in foreign courts to enforce the loan.
Subsequently, it filed a petition in the Sheriff to extra-judicially foreclose the said mortgage, which was
granted.

On 12 February 1993, private respondent filed before the Pasig RTC, Branch 159, an action for damages
against the petitioner, for the latter’s act of foreclosing extra-judicially the real estate mortgages despite
the pendency of civil suits before foreign courts for the collection of the principal loan.
Issue:
WON petitioner’s act of filing a collection suit against the principal debtors for the recovery of the loan
before foreign courts constituted a waiver of the remedy of foreclosure.

Held: Yes.
1. Loan; Mortgage; remedies:

In the absence of express statutory provisions, a mortgage creditor may institute against the mortgage
debtor either a personal action or debt or a real action to foreclose the mortgage. In other words, he may
pursue either of the two remedies, but not both. By such election, his cause of action can by no means be
impaired, for each of the two remedies is complete in itself.

In our jurisdiction, the remedies available to the mortgage creditor are deemed alternative and not
cumulative. Notably, an election of one remedy operates as a waiver of the other. For this purpose, a
remedy is deemed chosen upon the filing of the suit for collection or upon the filing of the complaint in an
action for foreclosure of mortgage. As to extrajudicial foreclosure, such remedy is deemed elected by the
mortgage creditor upon filing of the petition not with any court of justice but with the Office of the Sheriff of
the province where the sale is to be made.

In the case at bar, petitioner only has one cause of action which is non-payment of the debt. Nevertheless,
alternative remedies are available for its enjoyment and exercise. Petitioner then may opt to exercise only
one of two remedies so as not to violate the rule against splitting a cause of action.

Accordingly, applying the foregoing rules, we hold that petitioner, by the expediency of filing four civil suits
before foreign courts, necessarily abandoned the remedy to foreclose the real estate mortgages
constituted over the properties of third-party mortgagor and herein private respondent ARC. Moreover, by
filing the four civil actions and by eventually foreclosing extra-judicially the mortgages, petitioner in effect
transgressed the rules against splitting a cause of action well-enshrined in jurisprudence and our statute
books.

2. Conflicts of Law

Incidentally, petitioner alleges that under English Law, which according to petitioner is the governing law
with regard to the principal agreements, the mortgagee does not lose its security interest by simply filing
civil actions for sums of money.

We rule in the negative.

In a long line of decisions, this Court adopted the well-imbedded principle in our jurisdiction that there is no
judicial notice of any foreign law. A foreign law must be properly pleaded and proved as a fact. Thus, if the
foreign law involved is not properly pleaded and proved, our courts will presume that the foreign law is the
same as our local or domestic or internal
law. This is what we refer to as the doctrine of processual presumption.

In the instant case, assuming arguendo that the English Law on the matter were properly pleaded and
proved in said foreign law would still not find applicability.

Thus, when the foreign law, judgment or contract is contrary to a sound and established public policy of
the forum, the said foreign law, judgment or order shall not be applied.

Additionally, prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for their
object public order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments
promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.

The public policy sought to be protected in the instant case is the principle imbedded in our jurisdiction
proscribing the splitting up of a single cause of action.

Moreover, foreign law should not be applied when its application would work undeniable injustice to the
citizens or residents of the forum. To give justice is the most important function of law; hence, a law, or
judgment or contract that is obviously unjust negates the fundamental principles of Conflict of Laws.

Clearly then, English Law is not applicable.

ORION SAVINGS BANK vs. SHIGEKANE SUZUKI G.R. No. 205487, November 12, 2014 Facts: 

Respondent Shigekane Suzuki, a Japanese national, met with Ms. Helen Soneja to inquire about a
condominium unit and a parking slot at Cityland Pioneer, Mandaluyong City, allegedly owned by Yung
Sam Kang, a Korean national.

Soneja informed Suzuki that Unit No. 536 [covered by Condominium Certificate of Title (CCT) No. 18186]
and Parking Slot No. 42 [covered by CCT No. 9118] were for sale. Soneja likewise assured Suzuki that
the titles to the unit and the parking slot were clean.

After payment of the price of the unit and parking slot, Kang then executed a Deed of Absolute Sale.
Suzuki took possession of the condominium unit and parking lot, and commenced the renovation of the
interior of the condominium unit.


Kang thereafter made several representations with Suzuki to deliver the titles to the properties, which
were then allegedly in possession of Alexander Perez (Perez, Orion’s Loans Officer) for safekeeping.
Despite several verbal demands, Kang failed to deliver the documents.

Suzuki later on learned that Kang had left the country, prompting Suzuki to verify the status of the
properties. He learned that CCT No. 9118 representing the title to the Parking Slot No. 42 contained no
annotations although it remained under the name of Cityland Pioneer. Despite the cancellation of the
mortgage to Orion, the titles to the properties remained in possession of Perez.

Suzuki then demanded the delivery of the titles. Orion, through Perez, however, refused to surrender the
titles, and cited the need to consult Orion’s legal counsel as its reason.

Issue: Whether or not Korean Law should be applied in conveying the conjugal property of spouses Kang?
Ruling: In the present case, the Korean law should not be applied. It is a universal principle that real or
immovable property is exclusively subject to the laws of the country or state where it is located. Thus, all
matters concerning the title and disposition of real property are determined by what is known as the lex
loci rei

sitae, which can alone prescribe the mode by which a title can pass from one person to another, or by
which an interest therein can be gained or lost. On the other hand, property relations between spouses
are governed principally by the national law of the spouses. However, the party invoking the application of
a foreign law has the burden of proving the foreign law. The foreign law is a question of fact to be properly
pleaded and proved as the judge cannot take judicial notice of a foreign law. Matters concerning the title
and disposition of real property shall be governed by Philippine law while issues pertaining to the conjugal
nature of the property shall be governed by South Korean law, provided it is proven as a fact. In the
present case, Orion, unfortunately failed to prove the South Korean law on the conjugal ownership of
property. It merely attached a "Certification from the Embassy of the Republic of Korea" to prove the
existence of Korean Law. This certification, does not qualify as sufficient proof of the conjugal nature of
the property for there is no showing that it was properly authenticated. Accordingly, the International Law
doctrine of presumed-identity approach or processual presumption comes into play, i.e., where a foreign
law is not pleaded or, even if pleaded, is not proven, the presumption is that foreign law is the same as
Philippine Law. Under Philippine Law, the phrase "Yung Sam Kang ‘married to' Hyun Sook Jung" is
merely descriptive of the civil status of Kang. In other words, the import from the certificates of title is that
Kang is the owner of the properties as they are registered in his name alone, and that he is married to
Hyun Sook Jung. There is no reason to declare as invalid Kang’s conveyance in favor of Suzuki for the
supposed lack of spousal consent. It is undisputed that notwithstanding the supposed execution of the
Dacion en Pago on February 2, 2003, Kang remained in possession of the condominium unit. In fact,
nothing in the records shows that Orion even bothered to take possession of the property even six (6)
months after the supposed date of execution of the Dacion en Pago. Kang was even able to transfer
possession of the condominium unit to Suzuki, who then made immediate improvements thereon.

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