CHAD MICHAELL G.

DELIMA
CIVIL PROCEDURE (T-TH-F)

(1) JONATHAN LANDOIL VS. MANGUDADATU

FACTS:
Respondents filed a complaint for damages against petitioner in the lower court. Trial
proceeded without the participation of petitioner and declared it in default. Petitioner filed a motion for
new trial but was denied. When the writ of execution was served, petitioner alleged that it is yet to
receive the order of denial for the motion for new trial. A petition for prohibition was filed with CA and
respondents submitted its opposition and attached to their pleading is a certification that the order
denying the motion for new trial was no longer available for a deposition since trial, had already been
terminated. It also opined that the alleged error committed by the trial court of disregarding the oral
deposiotions, was certiorari or prohibition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the taking of oral deposition was proper under the circumstances.

RULING:
A motion for new trial may be filed on the grounds of 1) fraud, accident, mistake or excusable
negligence that could not have been guarded against ordinary prudence, and by reason of which the
aggrieved party’s rights have probably been impaired; 2) newly discovered evidence, that, with
reasonable diligence,. The aggrieved party could not have discovered and produced at the trial; 3) and
that if presented, would probably alter the result.

A deposition may be taken with leave of court after jurisdiction has been obtained over any
defendant or over property that is the subject of the action; or without such leave after an answer has
been served. In keeping with the principle of promoting the just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of
every action and proceeding, depositions are allowed as a departure from the accepted and usual
judicial proceedings of examining witness in open court where demeanor could be observed by the trial
judge. As a rule, depositions should be allowed absent any showing that taking them would prejudice
any party.

(2) SOLIDBANK CORPORATION (now Metrobank) vs. GATEWAY ELECTRONICS CORPORATION

FACTS:
Gateway obtained 4 foreign currency denominated loans from petitioner Solid Bank as capital
for its manufacturing operations. The loans were secured by Promissory notes and by assignment to
Solid Bank of all the proceeds of Gateway's Back-end Services Agreement with Alliance
Semiconductors. However, Gateway failed to pay its obligations despite repeated demands from the
petitioner. This prompted petitioner to file a complaint for collection of sum of money.

During the trial, Petitioner filed a motion for the production and inspection of documents after
learning that Gateway already received proceeds of its Back-end agreement with Alliance. The motion
called for the inspection of all books of accounts, financial statements, receipts, checks, vouchers, and
other accounting records. The court granted the motion.
 Subsequently, after a couple of postponements, Gateway was only able to produce the billings
and not all the other documents. The Court chastised it for not exerting due diligence in procuring the
required documents and it ordered that those not produced shall be deemed established in accordance
with Solid Bank's claim.

Gateway filed a petition for certiorari before the CA to nullify the 2 orders of the lower court. CA
granted the petition and ruled that the motion to produce and inspect failed to comply with Sec. 1, Rule
27 of the Ruled of Court. Hence this petition.

ISSUE: W/N THE MOTION FOR PRODUCTION AND INSPECTION COMPLIED WITH SEC. 1, RULE 27 OF THE
RULES OF COURT

HELD: NO (Petition denied).

Rule 27 of the Revised Rules of Court permits "fishing" for evidence, the only limitation being
that the documents, papers, etc., sought to be produced are not privileged, that they are in the
possession of the party ordered to produce them and that they are material to any matter involved in
the action. A fishing expedition no longer precludes a party from prying into the facts underlying his
opponent's case. However, fishing for evidence has its limitations.

Solidbank's motion was fatally defective and violates Sec. 1 Rule 27 due to its failure to specify
with particularity the documents it required Gateway to produce. Simply, the motion called for a blanket
inspection, too broad and too generalized in scope. Its request that "all documents pertaining to, arising
from, in connection with or involving the Back-end Services Agreement" ask for a promiscuous mass of
documents.

A motion for production and inspection of documents should not demand a roving inspection of
a promiscuous mass of documents. The inspection should be limited to those documents designated
with sufficient particularity in the motion, such that the adverse party can easily identify the documents
he is required to produce.

Since it is Solid Bank who asserted that Gateway already received payment from its Back-end
Agreement with Alliance, then the burden of proof is on its side. Burden of proof is the duty of a party to
present evidence on the facts in issue necessary to establish his claim or defense by the amount of
evidence required by law. Throughout the trial, the burden of proof remains with the party upon whom
it is imposed, until he shall have discharged the same.

(3) HYATT INDUSTRIAL MANUFACTURING CORP, vs. LEY CONSTRUCTION and DEV’T CORP

FACTS:
Respondent Ley Construction and Dev’t Corp (LCDC) filed a complaint for specific performance
and damages with RTC Makati against Hyatt Industrial Manufacturing Corp (Hyatt). Hyatt reneged in its
obligation to transfer 40% of the pro indiviso share of a real property in Makati in favour of LCDC despite
its full payment of purchase price. Hyatt failed to develop the property in a joint venture, despite LCDC’s
payment of 40% of the pre-construction cost. LCDC filed an amended complaint impleading Princeton as
additional defendant claiming that Hyatt sold the subject property to Princeton in fraud of LCDC.
 LCDC filed a second amended complaint adding as defendant, Yu (president of Hyatt), alleging
that LCDC paid the purchase price to Hyatt through Yu. Responsive pleadings were filed and LCDC filed
notices to take the depositions of Yu; Pacita Tan Go (Account Officer of RCBC); and Elena Sy (Finance
Officer of Hyatt). Hyatt also filed notice to take deposition of Manuel Ley (president of LCDC), while
Princeton filed notice to take deposition of Manuel and Janet Ley.

RTC ordered deposition-taking to proceed. At the scheduled deposition of Elena Sy, Hyatt and
Yu prayed that all settings for depositions be disregarded and pre-trial be set instead, contending that
the taking of depositions only delay the resolution of the case; RTC agreed and ordered all depositions
cancelled and pre-trial to take place. LCDC moved for reconsideration; RTC denied. LCDC filed an Urgent
Motion to Suspend Proceedings Due to Pendency of Petition for Certiorari in CA.

Meanwhile, pre-trial proceeded at RTC as scheduled and with the refusal of LCDC to enter into
pre-trial, Hyatt, Yu and Princeton moved to declare LCDC non-suited; Granted by RTC. LCDC filed MR;
denied; went to CA’ 12th Division on appeal, denied. LCDC then filed with this Court, a petition for
certiorari; dismissed. The CA’s then 7th Division found the appeal meritorious. The case is remanded to
the court a quo for further hearing and directing the latter to allow the deposition taking without delay
Hyatt and Princeton filed their respective MRs; denied by CA; hence, this petition for review on
certiorari.

ISSUE:
Whether or not CA erred in remanding the case to the trial court and order the deposition-
taking to proceed.

RULING:
NO. CA was correct in remanding the case to the RTC and ordering the deposition-taking to
proceed. A deposition should be allowed, absent any showing that taking it would prejudice any party. It
is allowed as a departure from the accepted and usual judicial proceedings of examining witnesses in
open court where their demeanor could be observed by trial judge, consistent with the principle of
promoting just, speedy, and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding; and provided it is
taken in accordance with the provisions of ROC, i.e., with leave of court if summons have been served,
and without such leave if an answer has been submitted; and provided further that a circumstance for
its admissibility exists (Section 4, Rule 23).

The rules on discovery should not be unduly restricted; otherwise, the advantage of a liberal
discovery procedure in ascertaining the truth and expediting the disposal of litigation would be
defeated.

A.M No. 03-1-09-SC: provided for guidelines to be observed by trial court judges and clerks of
court in the conduct of pre-trial and use of deposition-discovery measures. Trial courts are directed to
issue orders requiring parties to avail of interrogatories to parties under Rule 45 and request for
admission of adverse party under Rule 26 or at their discretion make use of depositions under Rule 23 or
other measures under Rule 27 and 28 within 5 days from filing of the answer. Parties are likewise
required to submit, at least 3 days before the pre-trial, pre-trial briefs, containing among others a
manifestation of the parties of their having availed or their intention to avail themselves of discovery
procedures or referral to commissioners.
 In the case at bar, LCDC complied with Section 1, Rule 23, as it made its notice to take
depositions after the answers of defendants have been served. LCDC having complied with the rules
then prevailing, the trial court erred in cancelling the previously scheduled depositions.

While it is true that depositions may be disallowed by trial courts if the examination is
conducted in bad faith; or in such a manner as to annoy, embarrass, or oppress the person who is the
subject of the inquiry, or when the inquiry touches upon the irrelevant or encroaches upon the
recognized domains of privilege, such circumstances, however, are absent in the case at bar.

While speedy disposition of cases is important, such consideration however should not
outweigh a thorough and comprehensive evaluation of cases, for the ends of justice are reached not
only through the speedy disposal of cases but more importantly, through a meticulous and
comprehensive evaluation of the merits of the case. Records also show that the delay of the case is NOT
attributable to the depositions sought by LCDC but was caused by the many pleadings filed by all the
parties including petitioners.

The argument that the taking of depositions would cause unnecessary duplicity as the intended
deponents shall also be called as witnesses during trial, is also without merit. The trial court, before
dismissing LCDC’s complaint, gave LCDC 2 options: (a) enter into a pre-trial conference, advising LCDC
that what it would like to obtain at the deposition may be obtained at the pre-trial conference, thus
expediting early termination of the case; and (b) terminate the pre-trial conference and apply for
deposition later on. The trial court erred in forcing LCDC to choose only from these options and in
dismissing its complaint upon LCDC’s refusal to choose either of the two.

The information sought to be obtained through the depositions of Elena and Pacita are
necessary to fully equip LCDC in determining what issues will be defined at the pre-trial. Without such
information before pre-trial, LCDC will be forced to prosecute its case in the dark – the very situation
which the rules of discovery seek to prevent. Indeed, the rules on discovery seek to make trial less a
game of blind man’s bluff and more a fair contest with the basic issues and facts disclosed to the fullest
practicable extent.

(4) ROGER MANZANO v. LUZ DESPABILADERAS

FACTS:
Petitioner Roger Manzano (Manzano) filed an action for the enforcement of money debt with
damages before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Iriga against Respondent Luz Despabiladeras.
(Despabiladeras) who received construction materials from the former on credit. During pre-trial, the
parties agreed that Manzano shall submit an ―offer to stipulate‖ showing an itemized list of materials
delivered to Despabiladeras together with the cost claimed by Manzano within 15 days. Despabiladeras
shall state her objections if any or comment therein within the same period of time.

Instead of submitting the same, Manzano filed a ―Request for Admission‖ asking
Despabiladeras to admit the materials particularly described therein, that the value of the goods
delivered amount to P314,610.50 and that only P130,000.00 has been paid. But Despabiladeras gave no
response to the said request. The RTC ruled against Despabiladeras while The Court of Appeals held in
her favor setting aside the implied admission which served as the basis of the RTC‘s decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the unanswered request for admission has any legal consequences.

HELD:
Rule 26 of the Rules of Court provides that at any time after issues have been joined, a party
may serve upon any other party a written request for the admission by the latter of the genuineness of
relevant documents described in and exhibited with the request or of the truth of any material and
relevant matters of fact set forth in the request.

The above-quoted sections should not be disregarded as in fact the trial court did not, when it
ordered Despabiladeras to file comment thereon, just because the parties mutually agreed that
Manzanosubmit ―an offer to stipulate.‖ For as stated earlier, the request for admission is a remedy
afforded any party after the issues have been joined.

Despabiladeras having failed to discharge what is incumbent upon her under Rule 26, that is to
deny under oath the facts bearing on the main issue contained in the ―Request for Admission‖ she was
deemed to have admitted that she received the construction materials, the cost of which was indicated
in the request and was indebted to the petitioner in the amount stated therein.

(5) SALES VS. SABINO

FACTS:
In RTC Pasig City, Cyril Sabino filed an amended complaint for damages against, among others,
Jowel Sales, driver of the vehicle involved in the accident which ultimately caused the death of Sabino’s
son, Elbert.

Before any responsive pleading could be filed, Sabino, notified the defendants that he will take the
deposition of one Buaneres Corral before the Clerk of Court, RTC- Pasig City.

On Dec. 27, 1995 and resumed on Jan. 3, 1996, the deposition on oral examination of Buaneres Corral
was taken before the Clerk of Court of Pasig, in the presence and with the active participation of Sales’
counsel, Atty. Villacorta, who even lengthily cross-examined the deponent. In the course of trial,
respondent had the deposition of Buaneres Corral marked as her Exhibits “DD” and “EE” with
submarkings.

Upon conclusion of her evidentiary presentation, Sabino made a Formal Offer of Exhibits, among which
are Exhibits “DD” and “EE”. Also offered in evidence as Exhibit “BB” is a certification from the Bureau of
Immigration attesting to the May 28, 1996 departure for abroad of Buaneres Corral via Flight No. PR
658.

Sales opposed the admission of Exhs. “DD” and “EE” and asked that they be expunged from the records
on the ground that the jurisdictional requirements for their admission under Section 4, Rule 23 of the
ROC were not complied with.

The TC admitted, among other evidence, Sabino’s Exhibits “DD”, “EE” and “BB”.
Sales’ MR was denied by the court so he went on certiorari to the CA imputing grave abuse of discretion
on the part of the TC in admitting in evidence the deposition (Exhibits “DD” and “EE”).

CA affirmed the TC and effectively denied due course to and dismissed Sales’ recourse, explaining that
Sales’ active participation, through counsel, during the taking of subject deposition and adopting it as his
own exhibits, has thereby estopped him from assailing the admissibility thereof as part of Sabino’s
evidence.

Sales filed this petition.

ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not the requirements of Sec. 4, Rule 24 (now Sec. 3) ROC were satisfied by Sabino when
it presented a certification attesting to the fact that deponent has left the country but silent as to WoN
at the time his deposition was offered in evidence deponent is in the Philippines

(2) Whether or not Sales in cross-examining the deponent during the taking of his deposition waived any
and all objections in connection therewith

HELD:
(1) YES. Sales contends that none of the conditions in Sec. 4, Rule 23 ROC exists to justify the admission
in evidence of Sabino’s Exhibits “DD” and “EE”. Hence, it was error for the appellate court to have
upheld their admission. Discounting the probative value of the certification from the Bureau of
Immigration (Exh. “BB”) that deponent Buaneres Corral departed for abroad on May 28, 1996, Sales
argues that said certification merely proves the fact of Corral having left the country on the date
mentioned. It does not establish that he has not returned since then and is unavailable to be present in
court to personally testify.

While depositions may be used as evidence in court proceedings, they are generally not meant to be a
substitute for the actual testimony in open court of a party or witness. Stated a bit differently, a
deposition is not to be used when the deponent is at hand. Indeed, any deposition offered during a trial
to prove the facts therein set out, in lieu of the actual oral testimony of the deponent in open court, may
be opposed and excluded on the ground of hearsay. However, depositions may be used without the
deponent being called to the witness stand by the proponent, provided the existence of certain
conditions is first satisfactorily established. 5 exceptions for the admissibility of a deposition are listed in
Section 4, Rule 23. Among these is when the witness is out of the Philippines.

TC determined that deponent Bueneres Corral was abroad when the offer of his deposition was made.
This factual finding of absence or unavailability of witness to testify deserves respect, having been
adequately substantiated. The certification by the Bureau of Immigration provides that evidentiary
support. It is customary for courts to accept statements of parties as to the unavailability of a witness as
a predicate to the use of depositions. Had deponent Buaneres Corral indeed returned to the Philippines
subsequent to his departure via Flight No. PR 658, Sales could have presented evidence to show such.

(2) NO. As a rule, the inadmissibility of testimony taken by deposition is anchored on the ground that
such testimony is hearsay, i.e., the party against whom it is offered has no opportunity to cross-examine
the deponent at the time his testimony is offered. But it matters not that opportunity for cross-
examination was afforded during the taking of the deposition; for normally, the opportunity for cross-
examination must be accorded a party at the time the testimonial evidence is actually presented against
him during the trial or hearing. In fine, the act of cross-examining the deponent during the taking of the
deposition cannot, without more, be considered a waiver of the right to object to its admissibility as
evidence in the trial proper. In participating, therefore, in the taking of the deposition, but objecting to
its admissibility in court as evidence, petitioner did not assume inconsistent positions. He is not, thus,
estopped from challenging the admissibility of the deposition just because he participated in the taking
thereof.

Section 29, Rule 23 provides that, while errors and irregularities in depositions as to notice,
qualifications of the officer conducting the deposition, and manner of taking the deposition are deemed
waived if not objected to before or during the taking of the deposition, objections to the competency of
a witness or the competency, relevancy, or materiality of testimony may be made for the first time at
the trial and need not be made at the time of the taking of the deposition, unless they could be obviated
at that point.

While perhaps a bit anti-climactic to state at this point, certiorari will not lie against an order admitting
or rejecting a deposition in evidence, the remedy being an appeal from the final judgment. For this
reason, the CA could have dismissed Sales’ invocation of its certiorari jurisdiction.