Anti-Child Abuse Law (Ra 7610)
The
Malto vs People
FACTS: Sometime during the month of November 1997 to 1998, Malto
seduced his student, AAA, a minor, to indulge in sexual intercourse
several times with him. Prior to the incident, petitioner and AAA had a
“mutual understanding” and became sweethearts. Pressured and
afraid of the petitioner’s threat to end their relationship, AAA
succumbed and both had sexual intercourse.
Upon discovery of what AAA underwent, AAA’s mother lodged a
complaint in the Office of the City Prosecutor of Pasay City. Assistant
City Prosecutor charged the petitioner in an Information a violation of
Section 5(a), Article III, RA 7610. During the month of November 1997
up to 1998, in Pasay City, Michael John. Z. Malto, a professor, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take advantage and exert
influence, relationship and moral ascendancy and induce and/or
seduce his student at Assumption College, complainant, AAA, a minor
of 17 years old, to indulge in sexual intercourse and lascivious conduct
for several times with him as in fact said accused has carnal knowledge.
The trial court found the evidence for the prosecution sufficient to
sustain petitioner’s conviction and rendered a decision finding
petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violation of Article III,
Section 5(a), par. 3 of RA 7610, as amended and sentenced him
to reclusion temporal.
In a decision, the appellate court affirmed his conviction even if it found
that his acts were not covered by paragraph (a) but by paragraph (b)
of Section 5, Article III of RA 7610; and thereby sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty prision mayor.
ISSUE
Whether or not the CA erred in sustaining petitioner’s conviction on the
grounds that there was no rape committed since their sexual
intercourse was consensual by reason of their “sweetheart” relationship
RULING
NEGATIVE. Petitioner is wrong.
Petitioner violated Section 5(b), Article III of RA 7610, as amended.
first element of Section 5(b), Article III of RA 7610 pertains to the act or
acts committed by the accused. The second element refers to the state
or condition of the offended party. The third element corresponds to
the minority or age of the offended party. Since all three elements of
the crime were present, the conviction of petitioner was proper.
Consent of the child is immaterial in criminal cases involving violation of
Sec. 5, Art. III of RA 7610. Petitioner claims that AAA welcomed his kisses
and touches and consented to have sexual intercourse with him. They
engaged in these acts out of mutual love and affection. The
sweetheart theory applies in acts of lasciviousness and rape, felonies
committed against or without the consent of the victim. It operates on
the theory that the sexual act was consensual. It requires proof that the
accused and the victim were lovers and that she consented to the
sexual relations.
For purposes of sexual intercourse and lascivious conduct in child abuse
cases under RA 7610, the sweetheart defense is unacceptable. A child
exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse cannot
validly give consent to sexual intercourse with another person.
A child cannot give consent to a contract under our civil laws. This is on
the rationale that she can easily be the victim of fraud as she is not
capable of fully understanding or knowing the nature or import of her
actions. The State, as parens patriae, is under the obligation to minimize
the risk of harm to those who, because of their minority, are as yet
unable to take care of themselves fully. Those of tender years deserve
its protection.
The harm which results from a child’s bad decision in a sexual encounter
may be infinitely more damaging to her than a bad business deal. Thus,
the law should protect her from the harmful consequences of her
attempts at adult sexual behavior. For this reason, a child should not be
deemed to have validly consented to adult sexual activity and to
surrender herself in the act of ultimate physical intimacy under a law
which seeks to afford her special protection against abuse, exploitation
and discrimination. In other words, a child is presumed by law to be
incapable of giving rational consent to any lascivious act or sexual
intercourse.
To provide special protection to children from all forms of
abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation and discrimination, and other
conditions prejudicial to their development; provide sanctions for their
commission and carry out a program for prevention and deterrence of
and crisis intervention in situations of child abuse, exploitation, and
discrimination. As well as to intervene on behalf of the child when the
parents, guardian, teacher or person having care or custody of the
child fails or is unable to protect the child against abuse, exploitation,
and discrimination or when such acts against the child are committed
by the said parent, guardian, teacher or person having care and
custody of the same.
The best interest of children shall be the paramount consideration in all
actions concerning them, whether undertaken by public or private
social welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities, and
legislative bodies, consistent with the principles of First Call for Children
as enunciated in the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the
Child. Every effort shall be exerted to promote the welfare of
children and enhance their opportunities for a useful and happy life.
G.R. No. 186469 June 13, 2012
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JOVER MATIAS y DELA FUENTE, Accused-appellant
FACTS: Appellant Jover Matias y Dela Fuente and private complainant
AAA were neighbours. In the evening of June 6, 2004, AAA, a minor, was
on her way to the vegetable stall of a certain "Manuela" to buy
something when, all of a sudden, appellant pulled her towards a house
that was under construction. There, he forced her to lie on a bamboo
bed, removed her shorts and underwear, and inserted first, his finger,
and then his penis into her vagina. Appellant threatened to kill her if she
should report the incident to anyone. When AAA arrived home, she
narrated to her mother and aunt what appellant did to her. In defense,
appellant claimed that in the evening of the incident, he and his uncle,
Romeo Matias, were doing construction work at the house of his aunt.
He was therefore surprised when two policemen arrested him at around
6:30 in the evening of even date and detained him at the Baler Police
Station.
ISSUE: Whether or Not it was correct to convict appellant of "rape" under
Sec. 5 (b), Article III of RA 7610.
Ruling: YES. Under Section 5 (b), Article III of RA 7610 in relation to RA
8353, if the victim of sexual abuse is below 12 years of age, the offender
should not be prosecuted for sexual abuse but for statutory rape under
Article 266-A(1)(d) of the Revised Penal Code. if the victim is 12 years or
older, the offender should be charged with either sexual abuse under
Section 5(b) of RA 7610 or rape under Article 266-A (except paragraph
1[d]) of the Revised Penal Code. In this case, the RTC, convicted
appellant for "rape" under Sec. 5 (b), Article III of RA 7610 upon a finding
that AAA was a minor below 12 years old at the time of the commission
of the offense. However, a punctilious scrutiny of the records shows that
AAA was born on April 23, 1991, which would make her 13 years old at
the time of the commission of the offense. Thus, appellant can be
prosecuted and convicted either under Sec. 5 (b), Article III of RA 7610
for sexual abuse, or under Article 266-A of the RPC, except
for rape under paragraph 1(d). the RTC concluded that AAA was the
"victim of sexual abuse labeled 'rape', considering the established fact
that there was sexual intercourse between him and AAA. Thus,
appellant's conviction was clearly under Sec. 5 (b), Article III of RA 7610
or sexual abuse and not for rape under Article 266-A of the RPC.
Salvador Flordeliz y Abenojar v. People of the Philippines | G.R. No.
186441 | March 3, 2010 |
FACTS: Sometime in March 1995, ABC, the wife of petitioner and the
mother of private complainants AAA and BBB, left for Malaysia as an
overseas worker. AAA and BBB were left under the care and custody of
petitioner.In April 1995, while sleeping with BBB and AAA, who was then
eleven (11) years old, petitioner touched AAA’s vagina, then played
with it. AAA cried and told petitioner that it was painful. The latter
stopped, but warned AAA not to tell anyone about it. Petitioner
allegedly committed the same acts against AAA repeatedly. Not long
after, petitioner was convicted of homicide and imprisoned in
Muntinlupa City. In 2001, petitioner was released on parole.
Petitioner allegedly started molesting BBB in May 2002. The petitioner
inserts his 2 fingers into BBB’s vagina whenever BBB visits petitioner, New
Year’s Day, day before AAA’s birthday, and All Saints Day.
Notwithstanding the repeated incidents of sexual abuse committed
against her, BBB did not reveal her experiences to anybody because of
fear for her life and that of her mother.
AAA and BBB had the chance to reveal the abuse when their mother
ABC arrived for a vacation. AAA immediately told ABC what petitioner
did to her. When confronted by ABC, BBB likewise admitted the
repeated abuses committed by petitioner. ABC reported the incidents
to the NBI. After conducting medical examinations on AAA and BBB,
the attending physician remarked that there was a "disclosure of sexual
abuse and she noted the presence of hymenal notch in posterior
portion of hymenal rim that may be due to previous blunt force or
penetrating trauma suggestive of abuse."With these findings, petitioner
was charged with the crimes of Acts of Lasciviousness, committed
against AAA, and nine (9) counts of Qualified Rape through Sexual
Assault, committed against BBB, before the RTC.
ISSUE: Whether petitioner be charged of Acts of Lasciviousness in
relation to R.A. 7610 without stating in the information
RULING: Yes. Section 32, Article XIII of the Implementing Rules and
Regulations of R.A. No. 7610 defines lascivious conduct as follows:
The intentional touching, either directly or through clothing, of the
genitalia, anus, groin, breast, inner thigh, or buttocks, or the introduction
of any object into the genitalia, anus or mouth of any person, whether
of the same or opposite sex, with an intent to abuse, humiliate, harass,
degrade, or arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person, bestiality,
masturbation, lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic area of a
person.
Based on the foregoing definition, petitioners act of touching AAA’s
vagina and playing with it obviously amounted to lascivious conduct.
Considering that the act was committed on a child less than twelve
years old and through intimidation, it is beyond cavil that petitioner is
guilty under the aforesaid laws.
The Court is aware that the Information specifically charged petitioner
with Acts of Lasciviousness under the RPC, without stating therein that it
was in relation to R.A. No. 7610. However, the failure to designate the
offense by statute or to mention the specific provision penalizing the
act, or an erroneous specification of the law violated, does not vitiate
the information if the facts alleged therein clearly recite the facts
constituting the crime charged. The character of the crime is not
determined by the caption or preamble of the information or by the
specification of the provision of law alleged to have been violated, but
by the recital of the ultimate facts and circumstances in the complaint
or information.
In the instant case, the body of the Information contains an averment
of the acts alleged to have been committed by petitioner and
unmistakably describes acts punishable under Section 5(b), Article III of
R.A. No. 7610.
It is also undisputed that petitioner is the father of AAA. The RTC did not
appreciate the alternative circumstance of relationship, because it was
not alleged in the Information. We do not agree.
The resolution of the investigating prosecutor, which formed the basis of
the Information, a copy of which is attached thereto, stated that
petitioner is the victim’s biological father. There was, therefore,
substantial compliance with the mandate that an accused be
informed of the nature of the charge against him.
People of the Philippines v. Eduardo Dahilig y Agaran |
G.R. No. 187083 | June 13, 2011
FACTS: AAA, a helper, was sleeping when the accused made sexual
advances on her. She shouted for help from her co-helper but to no
avail because the latter was sound asleep. Eventually, the accused
succeeded to undress her. Then, he forced his penis into her vagina
which caused her pain and returned to his quarters when he was done.
The accused left their employer's house; AAA then informed her
employer about the incident. Their employer immediately assisted her
in filing a case against accused which caused the arrest of the
accused. The accused offered to marry AAA but the latter refused. In
the medical examination, it was disclosed that there was a healing
laceration in her hymen although no spermatozoa was found.
The accused denied the allegations and contended that the sexual
congress that transpired between them was consensual as she was
then his girlfriend. The RTC found the accused guilty beyond reasonable
doubt for the crime of Rape as what he laid before the court for its
consideration was a mere self-serving claim of their relationship. The CA
affirmed the RTC’s decision but clarified that the crime charged should
have been "Child Abuse" as defined and penalized in Sec. 5 (b) of R.A.
No. 7610, based on the fact that the complainant was a minor, being
16 years of age at the time of the commission of the offense.
ISSUE: Whether the crime committed was Rape (Violation of Article 266-
A par. 1 in relation to Article 266-B, 1st par. of the Revised Penal Code,
as amended by R.A. No. 8353), or is it Child Abuse, defined and
penalized by Sec. 5, (b), R.A. No. 7610
RULING: As elucidated by the RTC and the CA in their respective
decisions, all the elements of both crimes are present in this case. Under
Section 5(b), Article III of RA 7610in relation to RA 8353, if the victim of
sexual abuse is below 12 years of age, the offender should not be
prosecuted for sexual abuse but for statutory rape under Article 266-A
(1)(d) of the Revised Penal Code and penalized with reclusion
perpetua. On the other hand, if the victim is 12 years or older, the
offender should be charged with either sexual abuse under Section 5(b)
of RA 7610 or rape under Article 266-A (except paragraph 1[d]) of the
Revised Penal Code. However, the offender cannot be accused of
both crimes for the same act because his right against double jeopardy
will be prejudiced. A person cannot be subjected twice to criminal
liability for a single criminal act. Likewise, rape cannot be complexed
with a violation of Section 5(b) of RA 7610. Under Section 48 of the
Revised Penal Code (on complex crimes), a felony under the Revised
Penal Code (such as rape) cannot be complexed with an offense
penalized by a special law.
In this case, the victim was more than 12 years old when the crime was
committed against her. The Information against appellant stated that
AAA was 13 years old at the time of the incident. Therefore, appellant
may be prosecuted either for violation of Section 5(b) of RA
7610orrapeunderArticle 266-A (except paragraph 1[d]) of the Revised
Penal Code. While the Information may have alleged the elements of
both crimes, the prosecution's evidence only established that appellant
sexually violated the person of AAA through force and intimidation by
threatening her with a bladed instrument and forcing her to submit to
his bestial designs. Thus, rape was established.
Accordingly, the accused can indeed be charged with either Rape or
Child Abuse and be convicted therefor. Considering, however, that the
information correctly charged the accused with rape in violation of
Article 266-A par. 1 in relation to Article 266-B, 1st par. of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 8353, and that he was convicted
therefor, the CA should have merely affirmed the conviction.
Garingarao v People, GR No. 192760
FACTS: AAA was brought to the Virgen Milagrosa Medical Center by her
father BBB and mother CCC due to fever and abdominal pain. In the
morning, BBB and CCC left to attend to his office and CCC to the family
store. When they returned AAA said that she wanted to go home; she
was permitted by Dr. Morante to be discharged from the hospital with
instructions that she should continue her medications. Upon coming
home AAA revealed that Garingao (nurse on duty that day) sexually
abused her.
An Information was filed against Garingarao for acts of
lasciviousness in relation to RA 7610. During the trial, AAA testified that,
Garingarao, entered her room to check her medications and if she was
still experiencing pains. Garingarao lifted AAA’s bra and touched her
left breast and insisted that he was only examining her. Garingarao also
slid his finger inside AAA’s private part and only stopped when he saw
that AAA really had her monthly period. In his defense, the accused
testified that he went inside AAA’s room to administer her medicines
and check her vital signs. Garingarao alleged that the filing of the case
was motivated by the argument he had with AAA’s father about the
administering of medicines. He was supported by the testimony of the
nursing aide, Tamayo. Garingarao further alleged that, assuming the
charges were correct, there was only one incident when he allegedly
touched AAA and as such, he should have been convicted only of acts
of lasciviousness and not of violation of RA 7610. The RTC found
Garingarao guilty as charged and gave credence to the testimony of
AAA over Garingarao’s denial. He appealed the decision, however the
CA ruled that Garingao should be convicted under RA 7610 because
AAA was 16 years old when the crime was committed; according to
the CA the offender shall be charged with rape or lascivious conduct
under the RPC only if the victim is below 12 years old, otherwise the
provisions of RA 7610 shall prevail
ISSUE/S: W/N the accused is liable under RA 7610
RULING: Yes. Garingarao insists that it was physically impossible for him
to commit the acts charged against him because there were many
patients and hospital employees around. He further alleges that
assuming the charges were correct, there was only once incident when
he allegedly touched AAA and as such, he should have been
convicted only of acts of lasciviousness and not of violation of RA 7610
 Court has ruled that in cases of acts of lasciviousness the lone
testimony of the offended party, if credible, is sufficient to establish the
guilt of the accused. Also, denial and alibi are considered weak
defenses against the positive identification by the victim
Elements of Sexual Abuse under Section 5, Article III of RA 7610:
o Accused commits the act of sexual intercourse or
lascivious conduct
o Said act is performed with a child exploited in
prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse; and
o The child, whether male or female, is below 18 years of
age
Lascivious Conduct (Section 32, Article XIII of the IRR of RA 7610)
o The intentional touching, either directly or through
clothing, of the genitalia, anus, groin, breast, inner thigh,
or buttocks, or the introduction of any object into the
genitalia, anus or mouth, of any person, whether of the
same or opposite sex, with the intent to abuse, humiliate,
harass, degrade, or arouse or gratify the sexual desire of
any person, bestiality, masturbation, lascivious exhibition
of the genitals or pubic area of a person
Prosecution was able to establish that Garingarao touched AAA’s
breasts and inserted his finger into her private part for his sexual
gratification—he used his influence as a nurse by pretending that his
actions were part of the physical examination he was doing. A child is
deemed subject to other sexual abuse when the child is the victim of
lascivious conduct under the coercion or influence of any adult—there
must be some form of compulsion equivalent to intimidation which
subdues the free exercise of the offended party’s free will. Garingarao
coerced AAA into submitting to his lascivious acts by pretending that
he was examining her.
ON THE INCIDENT ONLY HAPPENING ONCE
 Section 3(b) of RA 7610 provides that the abuse may be habitual
or not
o The fact that the offense occurred only once is enough
to hold Garingarao liable for acts of lasciviousness under
RA 7610
People v. Olayon
Facts: The then 22-year old herein respondent Gaspar Olayon was
charged with violation of Section 10(a) of Republic Act No. 7610 in two
separate Informations filed before the RTC of Pasig City, of which the
then 14-year old AAA was alleged to be the victim. Respondent was
also charged for acts of lasciviousness before the RTC of Taguig, of
which the same then 14-year old AAA was alleged to be the victim. The
case was transferred to the Pasig City RTC and consolidated. The three
cases were jointly tried. The RTC acquitted the accused for acts of
lasciviousness but convicted him for Sec. 10(a) RA 7610. The CA
acquitted the accused of the charge for Sec. 10(a) RA 7610 because
the sexual intercourse between Olayon and AAA was consensual. Thus,
it does not amount to sexual abuse.
Issue: Can the accused be convicted of violation of RA 7610?
Ruling: Yes. As Section 10 refers to acts of child abuse prejudicial to the
childs development other than child prostitution and other sexual
abuse[16] under Section 5, attempt to commit child prostitution,[17]
child trafficking,[18] attempt to commit child trafficking,[19] and
obscene publications and indecent shows,[20] the Court of Appeals
did not commit grave abuse of discretion in holding that x x x sexual
abuse [as defined under Section 5] x x x is a completely distinct and
separate offense from child abuse [as defined under Section 10].
Consensual sexual intercourse or even acts of lasciviousness with a
minor who is 12 years old or older could constitute a violation of Section
5(b) of R.A. No. 7610. For Section 5(b) punishes sexual intercourse or
lascivious conduct not only with a child exploited in prostitution but also
with a child subjected to other sexual abuse.[21]
Section 2(g) of the Rules and Regulations on the Reporting and
Investigation of Child Abuse Cases, promulgated to implement R.A. No.
7610, defines sexual abuse as including the employment, use,
persuasion, inducement, enticement or coercion of a child to engage
in, or assist another person to engage in, sexual intercourse or lascivious
conduct or the molestation, prostitution, or incest with children.
For consensual sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with a minor,
who is not exploited in prostitution, to thus fall within the purview of
Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610, persuasion, inducement, enticement or
coercion of the child must be present.

In the case at bar, even if respondent were charged under Section 5(b),
instead of Section 10(a), respondent would just the same have been
acquitted as there was no allegation that an element of the offense
coercion or influence or intimidation attended its commission.
Caballo vs. People
FACTS: Christian 23 years old, a dancer, met AAA a 17 years old, his
choreographer’s niece, in her uncle’s place. When she stayed in her
uncle’s place, AAA and Christian became sweethearts. He succeeded
in convincing her to have repeated sexual intercourse because of his
promise to marry and an assurance that they will use the withdrawal
method so she will not get pregnant. AAA, however, became
pregnant, and Christian, was shocked with the development, proposed
that she had an abortion. She acceded to the request but failed.
Hence a child was born out of the relationship. When confronted by her
mother, Christian promised to marry AAA. The mother later filed a case
for violation of Section 10(a) of Republic Act 7610. He argues that his
promise to marry and use of the withdrawal method are not
inducement or persuasion as to make the case within the purview of
the offense. The phrase “due to the coercion or influence of any adult”
is the relevant phrase for interpretation. According to him, it must be
accompanied by some form of coercion or intimidation to constitute
child abuse.
ISSUE: Whether or not Christian may be convicted for violation of
Republic Act 7610.
RULING: YES.
Section 5(b), Article III of RA 7610 pertinently reads:
SEC. 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. – Children,
whether male or female, who for money, profit, or any other
consideration or due to the coercion or influence of any adult,
syndicate or group, indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct,
are deemed to be children exploited in prostitution and other sexual
abuse.
In view of the foregoing, the Court observes that Caballo’s
actuations may be classified as “coercion” and “influence” within the
purview of Section 5, Article III of RA 7610:
First, the most crucial element is AAA’s minority. It is undisputed that AAA
was only 17 years old at the time of the commission of the crime and is
hence, considered a child under the law.31 In this respect, AAA was not
capable of fully understanding or knowing the import of her actions and
in consequence, remained vulnerable to the cajolery and deception
of adults, as in this case.
Based on this premise, jurisprudence settles that consent is immaterial in
cases involving a violation of Section 5, Article III of RA 7610; as such, the
argument that AAA and Caballo were sweethearts remains irrelevant.
The Malto ruling is largely instructive on this point:
For purposes of sexual intercourse and lascivious conduct in child abuse
cases under RA 7610, the sweetheart defense is unacceptable. A child
exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse cannot
validly give consent to sexual intercourse with another person.
The language of the law is clear: it seeks to punish “those who commit
the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with a child exploited
in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse.” Unlike rape,
therefore, consent is immaterial in cases involving violation of Section 5,
Article III of RA 7610. The mere act of having sexual intercourse or
committing lascivious conduct with a child who is exploited in
prostitution or subjected to sexual abuse constitutes the offense. It is a
malum prohibitum, an evil that is proscribed.
A child cannot give consent to a contract under our civil laws. This is on
the rationale that she can easily be the victim of fraud as she is not
capable of fully understanding or knowing the nature or import of her
actions. The State, as parens patriae, is under the obligation to minimize
the risk of harm to those who, because of their minority, are as yet
unable to take care of themselves fully. Those of tender years deserve
its protection. The harm which results from a child’s bad decision in a
sexual encounter may be infinitely more damaging to her than a bad
business deal. Thus, the law should protect her from the harmful
consequences of her attempts at adult sexual behavior. For this reason,
a child should not be deemed to have validly consented to adult sexual
activity and to surrender herself in the act of ultimate physical intimacy
under a law which seeks to afford her special protection against abuse,
exploitation and discrimination. (Otherwise, sexual predators like
petitioner will be justified, or even unwittingly tempted by the law, to
view her as fair game and vulnerable prey.) In other words, a child is
presumed by law to be incapable of giving rational consent to any
lascivious act or sexual intercourse. x x x x (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied; citations omitted)

Second, coupled with AAA’s minority is Caballo’s seniority. Records
indicate that Caballo was 23 years old at the time of the commission of
the offense and therefore, 6 years older than AAA, more or less. The age
disparity between an adult and a minor placed Caballo in a stronger
position over AAA so as to enable him to force his will upon the latter.
Third, Caballo’s actions effectively constitute overt acts of coercion
and influence. Records reveal that Caballo repeatedly assured AAA of
his love for her, and even, promised to marry her. In addition, he also
guaranteed that she would not get pregnant since he would be using
the “withdrawal method” for safety. Irrefragably, these were meant to
influence AAA to set aside her reservations and eventually give into
having sex with him, with which he succeeded.
Fourth, at least, with respect to the parties’ first sexual encounter, it is
observed that the brash and unexpected manner in which Caballo
pursued AAA to her room and pressed on her to have sex with him,
effectively placed her in, to a certain extent, a position of duress.. An
important factor is that AAA refused Caballo’s incipient advances and
in fact, asked him to leave. However, AAA eventually yielded. Thus, it
stands to reason that she was put in a situation deprived bf the benefit
of clear thought and choice. In any case, the Court observes’ that any
other choice would, nonetheless, remain tarnished due to AAA ‘s
minority as above-discussed.
Hence, considering that Caballo’s acts constitute “coercion” and
“influence” within the context of the law, and that AAA indulged in
sexual intercourse and/or lascivious conduct with Caballo due to the
same, she is deemed as a “child exploited in prostitution and other
sexual abuse”; as such, the second element of the subject offense
exists. In fine, finding all elements to be present, the Court hereby
sustains Caballo’s conviction for violation of Section 5(b), Article III of RA
7610.”
Anti-Sexual Harassment (RA 7877)
Domingo vs. Rayala 546 Scra 90
Facts: Ma. Lourdes T. Domingo (Domingo), then Stenographic Reporter
III at the NLRC, filed a Complaint for sexual harassment against Rayala,
the chairman of NLRC. She alleged that Rayala called her in his office
and touched her shoulder, part of her neck then tickled her ears.
Rayala argued that his acts does not constitute sexual harassment
because for it to exist, there must be a demand, request or requirement
of sexual favor.
Issue: Whether or not Rayala commit sexual harassment.
Rulings: Yes. The law penalizing sexual harassment in our jurisdiction is
RA 7877.
Section 3 thereof defines work-related sexual harassment in this wise:
Sec. 3. Work, Education or Training-related Sexual Harassment Defined.
– Work, education or training-related sexual harassment is committed
by an employer, manager, supervisor, agent of the employer, teacher,
instructor, professor, coach, trainor, or any other person who, having
authority, influence or moral ascendancy over another in a work or
training or education environment, demands, requests or otherwise
requires any sexual favor from the other, regardless of whether the
demand, request or requirement for submission is accepted by the
object of said Act.
(a) In a work-related or employment environment, sexual harassment is
committed when:
(1) The sexual favor is made as a condition in the hiring or in the
employment, re-employment or continued employment of said
individual, or in granting said individual favorable compensation, terms,
conditions, promotions, or privileges; or the refusal to grant the sexual
favor results in limiting, segregating or classifying the employee which in
a way would discriminate, deprive or diminish employment
opportunities or otherwise adversely affect said employee; .
(2) The above acts would impair the employee’s rights or privileges
under existing labor laws; or .
(3) The above acts would result in an intimidating, hostile, or offensive
environment for the employee. even if we were to test Rayala’s acts
strictly by the standards set in Section 3, RA 7877, he would still be
administratively liable. It is true that this provision calls for a “demand,
request or requirement of a sexual favor.” But it is not necessary that the
demand, request or requirement of a sexual favor be articulated in a
categorical oral or written statement. It may be discerned, with equal
certitude, from the acts of the offender. Holding and squeezing
Domingo’s shoulders, running his fingers across her neck and tickling her
ear, having inappropriate conversations with her, giving her money available opening for her. Not finding any, petitioner again offered
allegedly for school expenses with a promise of future privileges, and her a job in the family planning research undertaking. She expressed
making statements with unmistakable sexual overtones – all these acts hesitation if a physical examination would include “hugging” her but
of Rayala resound with deafening clarity the unspoken request for a petitioner assured her that he was only kidding about it. Petitioner then
sexual favor. invited her to go bowling. Petitioner told her to meet him at Borja
Street so that people would not see them on board the same car
Jacutin vs. People of the Philippines
together. Soon, at the designated place, a white car driven by
G.R. No. 140604. March 6, 2002
petitioner stopped. She got in. Petitioner held her pulse and told her
not to be scared. After dropping by at his house to put on his bowling
Facts: Juliet Q. Yee, then a 22-year old fresh graduate of nursing,
attire, petitioner got back to the car.
averred that on 28 November 1995 her father accompanied her to
the office of petitioner at the City Health Office to seek employment.
While driving, petitioner casually asked her if she already took her
Juliet’s father and petitioner were childhood friends. Juliet was
bath, and she said she was so in a hurry that she did not find time for it.
informed by the doctor that the City Health Office had just then filled
Petitioner then inquired whether she had varicose veins, and she said
up the vacant positions for nurses but that he would still see if he might
“no.” Petitioner told her to raise her foot and lower her pants so that
be able to help her.
he might confirm it. She felt assured that it was all part of the research.
Petitioner still pushed her pants down to her knees and held her thigh.
The following day, 29 November 1995, Juliet and her father returned to
He put his hands inside her panty until he reached her pubic hair.
the City Health Office, and they were informed by petitioner that a
Surprised, she exclaimed “hala ka!” and instinctively pulled her pants
medical group from Texas, U.S.A., was coming to town in December to
up. Petitioner then touched her abdomen with his right hand saying
look into putting up a clinic in Lapasan, Cagayan de Oro, where she
words of endearment and letting the back of his palm touch her
might be considered. On 01 December 1995, around nine o’clock in
forehead. He told her to raise her shirt to check whether she had
the morning, she and her father went back to the office of petitioner.
nodes or lumps. She hesitated for a while but, eventually, raised it up
The latter informed her that there was a vacancy in a family planning
to her navel. Petitioner then fondled her breast. Shocked at what
project for the city and that, if she were interested, he could interview
petitioner did, she lowered her shirt and embraced her bag to cover
her for the job. Petitioner then started putting up to her a number of
herself, telling him angrily that she was through with the research. He
questions. When asked at one point whether or not she already had a
begged her not to tell anybody about what had just happened.
boyfriend, she said “no.” Petitioner suggested that perhaps if her
Before she alighted from the car, petitioner urged her to reconsider
father were not around, she could afford to be honest in her answers
her decision to quit. He then handed over to her P300.00 for her
to the doctor. The father, taking the cue, decided to leave. Petitioner
expenses.
then inquired whether she was still a virgin, explaining to her his theory
on the various aspects of virginity. He “hypothetically” asked whether
Issue: Whether or not petitioner is guilty of the crime of sexual
she would tell her family or friends if a male friend happened to
harassment as defined and punished under R.A. 7877.
intimately touch her. Petitioner later offered her the job where she
would be the subject of a “research” program. She was requested to
Ruling: Yes. Section 3 of Republic Act 7877 provides:
be back after lunch.
“SEC. 3. Work, Education or Training-related Sexual Harassment
Before proceeding to petitioner’s office that afternoon, Juliet dropped
Defined. – Work, education or training-related sexual harassment is
by at the nearby church to seek divine guidance as she felt so
committed by an employer, employee, manager, supervisor, agent of
“confused.” When she got to the office, petitioner made several
the employer, teacher, instructor, professor, coach, trainor, or any
telephone calls to some hospitals to inquire whether there was any
other person who, having authority, influence or moral ascendancy
over another in a work or training or education environment,
demands, requests or otherwise requires any sexual favor from the
other, regardless of whether the demand, request or requirement for
submission is accepted by the object of said Act.
“(a) In a work-related or employment environment, sexual harassment
is committed when:
“(1) The sexual favor is made as a condition in the hiring or in the
employment, re-employment or continued employment of said
individual, or in granting said individual favorable compensation,
terms, conditions, promotions, or privileges; or the refusal to grant the
sexual favor results in limiting, segregating or classifying the employee
which in any way would discriminate, deprive or diminish employment
opportunities or otherwise adversely affect said employee.”
While the City Mayor had the exclusive prerogative in appointing city
personnel, it should stand to reason, nevertheless, that a
recommendation from petitioner in the appointment of personnel in
the municipal health office could carry good weight. Indeed,
petitioner himself would appear to have conveyed, by his words and
actions, an impression that he could facilitate Juliet’s employment.
Indeed, petitioner would not have been able to take undue liberalities
on the person of Juliet had it not been for his high position in the City
Health Office of Cagayan de Oro City. The findings of the
Sandiganbayan were bolstered by the testimony of Vivian Yu,
petitioner’s secretary between 1979 to 1994, of Iryn Lago Salcedo,
Public Health Nurse II, and of Farah Dongallo y Alkuino, a city health
nurse, all of whom were said to have likewise been victims of perverse
behavior by petitioner.
Anti-Violence against Women and their Children Act (RA 9262)
Rustan Ang Pascua Vs. Honorable Court of Appeals and Irish Sagud
G.R. No. 182835
April 20, 2010
FACTS: Rustan Ang and Irish Sagud were on-and- off sweethearts, when
the latter learned afterwards that Rustan had taken a live-in partner
(now his wife), whom he gotten pregnant, Irish broke up with him. Prior
to the marriage of Rustan, he got in touch with Irish and tried to
convince her to elope with him. Irish rejected the proposal and
changed her cellphone number but Rustan somehow managed to get
hold of it and sent her text messages, using the following numbers: 0920-
4769301 and 0921-8084768. Irish replied to his text messages but it was
to ask him to leave her alone. In the early morning of June 5, 2005, Irish
received through multimedia message (MMS) a picture of a naked
woman with spread legs and with Irish’s face superimposed on the
figure. The sender’s cellphone number, stated in the message, was
0921-8084768, one of the numbers Rustan used. Rustan boasted that it
would be easy for him to create similarly scandalous pictures and
threatened to spread the picture through the internet. One of the
messages he sent to Irish was: “Madali lang ikalat yun, my chatrum ang
tarlac rayt pwede ring send sa lahat ng chatter.” Irish sought the help
of Vice Mayor Maria Aurora who referred her to the police. Under the
police supervision, Irish contacted Rustan through the cellphone
number he used in sending the picture and his text messages. Irish asked
Rustan if he could meet her at Lorentess Resort. Rustan came with a
motorcycle and was arrested by the police upon walking towards Irish.
The police searched him and seized his Sony Ericsson P900 cellphone
and several SIM cards.
Irish filed a case in violation of Sec 5 (h) of Republic Act 9262. The RTC
found Irish’s testimony completely credible, given in an honest and
spontaneous manner. Thus the RTC found Rustan guilty of the said
crime. Rustan appealed but denied, then raised the case to the higher
court.
Issues:
Whether or not the accused Rustan sent Irish by cellphone message the
picture pasted with her face pasted on the body of a nude woman,
inflicting anguish, psychological distress, and humiliation on her in
violation of Sec 5 (h) of RA 9262.
The subordinate issues are:
1) Whether or not a “dating relationship” existed between Rustan
and Irish as this term is defined in RA 9262
 2) Whether or not a single act of harassment, like sending the nude
picture in this case, constitutes a violation of Sec 5 (h) of RA 9262
3) Whether or not the evidence used to convict Rustan was
obtained from him in violation of his constitutional rights; and
4) Whether or not the RTC properly admitted in evidence the
obscene picture presented in the case
RULING:
1) Yes. Dating relationship as defined in Section 3 “refers to a
situation wherein the parties live as husband and wife without
the benefit of marriage or are romantically involved over time
and on a continuing basis during the course of the relationship.
A casual acquaintance or ordinary socialization between two
individuals in a business or social context is not a dating
relationship.
2) Yes. Section 3 (a) of RA 9262 punishes “any act or series of acts”
that constitutes violence against women.This means that a
single act of harassment, which translates into violence, would
be enough. The object of the law is to protect women and
children. Punishing only violence that is repeatedly committed
would license isolated ones.
3) No. Prosecution did not present in evidence either the
cellphone or the SIM cards that the police officers seized from
him at the time of the arrest. The prosecution did not need such
items to prove its case. Exhibit C for the prosecution was but a
photograph depicting the Sony Ericsson P900 cellphone that
was used, which cellphone Rustan admitted owning during pre-
trial conference. Moreover, Rustan admitted having sent the
malicious text message to Irish.
4) The objection is too late since he should have objected to the
admission of the picture on such ground at the time it was
offered in evidence. He should be deemed to have already
waived such ground for objection. Besides, the rules he cites do
not apply to the present criminal action. The Rules on Electronic
Evidence applies only to civil actions, quasi judicial
proceedings, and administrative proceedings.
The court AFFIRMED the decision of RTC
Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act (RA 9208, as amended)
People vs Lalli, GR 195419, October 12, 2011
Facts: The complainant here was approached by one of the accused
asking her if she wanted a job in Malaysia as a restaurant entertainer.
However, she didn’t have a passport and was chided by the accused
to use her sister’s passport instead. One of the accused assured that it
will not be a problem as they have a contact in the DFA who will
arrange it. Upon arrival in Malaysia, she and her companions were
brought to a restaurant where they found out from another Filipino
worker that it is a prostitution den and that the women there are
prostitutes. She eventually worked as a prostitute there and was
subjected to sexual intercourse with different men. One day she was
able to contact her other sister and informed her about her situation.
One day her sister’s husband came to the restaurant and helped her
escape.
Issue: W/N the accused are guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crimes of illegal recruitment and trafficking in persons
Ruling: Yes. It is clear that a person or entity engaged in recruitment and
placement activities without the requisite authority from the
Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE), whether for profit or not,
is engaged in illegal recruitment. The Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration (POEA), an agency under DOLE created by Executive
Order No. 797 to take over the duties of the Overseas Employment
Development Board, issues the authority to recruit under
the Labor Code. The commission of illegal recruitment by three or more
persons conspiring or confederating with one another is deemed
committed by a syndicate and constitutes economic sabotage.
In People v. Gallo, the Court enumerated the elements of syndicated
illegal recruitment, to wit:
the offender undertakes either any activity within the meaning of
recruitment and placement defined under Article 13(b), or any of the
prohibited practices enumerated under Art. 34 of the Labor Code;
he has no valid license or authority required by law to enable one to
lawfully engage in recruitment and placement of workers; and
the illegal recruitment is committed by a group of three (3) or more
persons conspiring or confederating with one another.
Aringoy claims and admits that he only referred Lolita to Lalli for job
opportunities to Malaysia. Such act of referring, whether for profit or not,
in connivance with someone without a POEA license, is already
considered illegal recruitment, given the broad definition of recruitment
and placement in the Labor Code.
In this case, Lolita would not have been able to go to Malaysia if not for
the concerted efforts of Aringoy, Lalli and Relampagos. First, it
was Aringoy who knew Lolita, since Aringoy was a neighbor of Lolitas
grandfather. It was Aringoy who referred Lolita to Lalli, a fact clearly
admitted by Aringoy. Second, Lolita would not have been able to go
to Malaysia if Lalli had not purchased Lolitas boat ticket to Malaysia.
It is clear that through the concerted efforts
of Aringoy, Lalli and Relampagos, Lolita was recruited and deployed to
Malaysia to work as a prostitute. Such conspiracy
among Aringoy, Lalli and Relampagos could be deduced from the
manner in which the crime was perpetrated each of the accused
played a pivotal role in perpetrating the crime of illegal recruitment,
and evinced a joint common purpose and design, concerted action
and community of interest.
The crime of Trafficking in Persons is qualified when committed by a
syndicate, as provided in Section 6(c) of RA 9208:
(c) When the crime is committed by a syndicate, or in large scale.
Trafficking is deemed committed by a syndicate if carried out by a
group of three (3) or more persons conspiring or confederating with one
another. It is deemed committed in large scale if committed against
three (3) or more persons, individually or as a group.
Trafficking in Persons under Sections 3(a) and 4 of RA 9208 is not only
limited to transportation of victims, but also includes the act of
recruitment of victims for trafficking. In this case, since it has been
sufficiently proven beyond reasonable doubt, as discussed in Criminal
Case No. 21930, that all the three accused
(Aringoy,Lalli and Relampagos) conspired and confederated with one
another to illegally recruit Lolita to become a prostitute in Malaysia, it
follows that they are also guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of Qualified Trafficking in Persons committed by a syndicate under RA
9208 because the crime of recruitment for prostitution also constitutes
trafficking.
Anti-Piracy and Anti-Highway Robbery (PD 532)
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. EMILIANO CATANTAN
y TAYONG, accused-appellant.
Facts: At 3:00 o'clock in the morning of 27 June 1993, the Pilapil brothers
Eugene, 21, and Juan Jr., 18, were fishing in the sea some 3 kilometers
away from the shores of Tabogon, Cebu. Suddenly, another boat
caught up with them. One of them, later identified as the accused
Emiliano Catantan, boarded the pumpboat of the Pilapils and leveled
his gun at Eugene. With his gun, Catantan struck Eugene on the left
cheekbone and ordered him and Juan Jr. to "dapa." Then Catantan
told Ursal to follow him to the pumpboat of the Pilapils. There they
hogtied Eugene, forced him to lie down at the bottom of the boat,
covered him with a tarpaulin up to his neck, stepped on him and
ordered Juan Jr. to ferry them to Daan Tabogon. They left behind the
other pumpboat which the accused had earlier used together with its
passengers one of whom was visibly tied.
Noting that they were already far out into the sea, Eugene reminded
Catantan that they were now off-course but Catantan told Eugene to
keep quiet or he would be killed. Later, the engine conked out and
Juan Jr. was directed to row the boat. Eugene asked to be set free so
he could help but was not allowed; he was threatened with bodily harm
instead. Meanwhile Juan Jr. managed to fix the engine, but as they
went farther out into the open sea the engine stalled again. This time
Eugene was allowed to assist his brother. Eugene's hands were set free
but his legs were tied to the outrigger. At the point of a tres cantos held
by Ursal, Eugene helped row the boat.
As they passed the shoreline of Nipa, they saw another boat. Catantan
asked whose boat that was and the Pilapils told him that it was
operated by a certain Juanito and that its engine was new. Upon
learning this, Catantan ordered the Pilapil brothers to approach the
boat cautioning them however not to move or say anything.
On the pretext that they were buying fish Catantan boarded the "new"
pumpboat. Once aboard he ordered the operator Juanito to take
them to Mungaz, another town of Cebu. When Juanito tried to beg-off
by saying that he would still pull up his net and harvest his catch,
Catantan drew his revolver and said, "You choose between the two, or
I will kill you." Juanito, obviously terrified, immediately obeyed and Ursal
hopped in from the other pumpboat and joined Catantan.
But, as Ursal was transferring to the "new" pumpboat, its outrigger
caught the front part of the pumpboat of the Pilapils so he kicked hard
its prow; it broke. The jolt threw Eugene into the sea and he landed on
the water headlong. Juan Jr. then untied his brother's legs and the two
swam together clinging to their boat. Fortunately another pumpboat
passed by and towed them safely ashore.
Issue: Are the accused guilty of violation of PD 532?
Ruling: Yes. Accused-appellant argues that in order that piracy may be
committed it is essential that there be an attack on or seizure of a vessel.
He claims that he and his companion did not attack or seize the fishing
boat of the Pilapil brothers by using force or intimidation but merely
boarded the boat, and it was only when they were already on board
that they used force to compel the Pilapils to take them to some other
place. Appellant also insists that he and Ursal had no intention of
permanently taking possession or depriving complainants of their boat.
As a matter of fact, when they saw another pumpboat they ordered
the brothers right away to approach that boat so they could leave the
Pilapils behind in their boat. Accordingly, appellant claims, he simply
committed grave coercion and not piracy.
Under the definition of piracy in PD No. 532 as well as grave coercion as
penalized in Art. 286 of the Revised Penal Code, this case falls squarely
within the purview of piracy. While it may be true that Eugene and Juan
Jr. were compelled to go elsewhere other than their place of
destination, such compulsion was obviously part of the act of seizing
their boat. The testimony of Eugene, one of the victims, shows that the
appellant actually seized the vessel through force and intimidation.
To sustain the defense and convert this case of piracy into one of grave
coercion would be to ignore the fact that a fishing vessel cruising in
Philippine waters was seized by the accused by means of violence
against or intimidation of persons. As Eugene Pilapil testified, the
accused suddenly approached them and boarded their pumpboat
and Catantan aimed his revolver at them as he ordered complaining
witness Eugene Pilapil to "dapa" or lie down with face downwards, and
then struck his face with a revolver, hitting the lower portion of his left
eye, after which, Catantan told his victims at gun point to take them to
Daan Tabogon.
While appellant insists that he and Ursal had no intention of depriving
the Pilapils permanently of their boat, proof of which they left behind
the brothers with their boat, the truth is, Catantan and Ursal abandoned
the Pilapils only because their pumpboat broke down and it was
necessary to transfer to another pumpboat that would take them back
to their lair. Unfortunately for the pirates their "new" pumpboat ran out
of gas so they were apprehended by the police soon after the Pilapils
reported the matter to the local authorities.
The fact that the revolver used by the appellant to seize the boat was
not produced in evidence cannot exculpate him from the crime. The
fact remains, and we state it again, that Catantan and his co-accused
Ursal seized through force and intimidation the pumpboat of the Pilapils
while the latter were fishing in Philippine waters.
People v. Tulin
FACTS: In 1991, the accused-appellants, then manning a motor launch
and armed w/ high powered guns, fired upon, boarded and seized M/T
Tabangao, a cargo vessel owned by the PNOC Shipping and Transport
Corp. sailing off the coast of Mindoro near Silongay Island loaded w/
petroleum products, together w/ the complement and crew members.
Accused – appellants directed the vessel to proceed to Singapore
while sending misleading radio messages to PNOC that the ship was
undergoing repairs. In Singapore, the cargoes were unloaded and
transferred to “Navi Pride”. Accused-appellant supervised the crew of
navi pride in receiving the cargo. Accused-appellant conteded that
he can no longer be convicted of piracy in the PH waters as defined
and penalized in PD 532 because RA 7659 which amended art.122 of
the RPC, has impliedly superseded PD. 532.
ISSUE: Whether RA 7659 obliterated the crime committed by accused-
appellant Cheong.
RULING: NO. RA 7659 neither superseded nor amended the provisions
on piracy under PD No. 532. There is no contradiction between the two
laws. Art. 122 of the RPC, as amended by RA 7659 provided that piracy
must be committed on the high seas or in PH waters by any person not
a member of its complement nor a passenger thereof. Under PD 532,
the coverage of the law on piracy embraces any person including “a
passenger or member of the complement of said vessel in PH waters.
ISSUE: Whether or not the PH courts have jurisdiction over the crime
committed
RULING: YES. PD 532 provides that the seizure and attack of vessels and
it cargo should be committed w/in the PH waters, however, the
disposition of the vessel and its cargo, which is still deemed part of the
crime need not happen inside PH waters. According to the facts, the
actual seizure and attack happened w/in the PH territory and this is
sufficient for the court to have jurisdiction over the said crime, despite
the disposal of its cargo on a different territory.
Human Security Act ( RA 9372)
Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc. v. Anti-Terrorism
Council
FACTS: This case consists of 6 petitions challenging the constitutionality
of RA 9372, “An Act to Secure the State and Protect our People from
Terrorism,” aka Human Security Act of 2007. Petitioner-organizations
assert locus standion the basis of being suspected “communist fronts”
by the government, whereas individual petitioners invoke the
“transcendental importance” doctrine and their status as citizens and
taxpayers.KARAPATAN, Hustisya, Desaparecidos, SELDA, EMJP, and
PCR allege they have been subjected to “close security surveillance by
state security forces,” their members followed by “suspicious persons”
and “vehicles with dark windshields,” and their offices monitored by
“men with military build.” They likewise claim they have been branded
as “enemies of the State.”
BAYAN, GABRIELA, KMP, MCCCL, COURAGE, KADAMAY, SCW, LFS,
Anakbayan, PAMALAKAYA, ACT, Migrante, HEAD, and Agham would
like the Court to take judicial notice of respondents’ alleged action of
tagging them as militant organizations fronting for the CPP and NPA.
They claim such tagging is tantamount to the effects of proscription
without following the procedure under the law. Meanwhile, IBP and
CODAL base their claim of locus standi on their sworn duty to uphold
the Constitution.
Petitioners claim that RA 9372 is vague and broad, in that terms like
“widespread and extraordinary fear and panic among the populace”
and “coerce the government to give in to an unlawful demand” are
nebulous, leaving law enforcement agencies with no standard to
measure the prohibited acts.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 9372 is vague and broad in defining the crime
of terrorism
RULING: NO. The doctrines of void-for-vagueness and overbreadth find
no application in the present case since these doctrines apply only to
free speech cases and that RA 9372 regulates conduct, not speech.
Romualdez v. Sandiganbayan: The overbreadth and the vagueness
doctrines have special application only to free speech cases, and are
not appropriate for testing the validity of penal statutes. Romualdez v.
COMELEC:A facial invalidation of criminal statutes is not appropriate,
but the Court nonetheless proceeded to conduct a vagueness
analysis, and concluded that the therein subject election offense under
the Voter’s Registration Act of 1996, with which the therein petitioners
were charged, is couched in precise language. The aforementioned
cases rely heavily on Justice Mendoza’s Separate Opinion in the
Estrada case: Allegations that a penal statute is vague and overbroad
do not justify a facial review of its validity. A facial challenge is allowed
to be made to a vague statute and to one, which is overbroad
because of possible chilling effect upon protected speech. This
rationale does not apply to penal statutes. Criminal statutes have
general in terrorem effect. If facial challenge is allowed, the State may
well be prevented from enacting laws against socially harmful conduct.
Overbreadth and vagueness doctrines then have special application
only to free speech cases. They are inapt for testing the validity of penal
statutes.
ISSUE: Whether or not a penal statute may be assailed for being vague
as applied to petitioners
RULING: NO. Since a penal statute may only be assailed for being
vague as applied to petitioners, a limited vagueness analysis of the
definition of “terrorism” in RA 9372 is legally impossible absent an actual
or imminent chargeagainst them. The doctrine of vagueness and the
doctrine of overbreadth do not operate on the same plane. A statute
or acts suffers from the defect of vagueness when: It lacks
comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence must
necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. It is
repugnant to the Constitution in 2 ways: 1. Violates due process for
failure to accord fair notice of conduct to avoid; 2. Leaves law
enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes
an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle. The overbreadth
doctrine decrees that a governmental purpose to control or prevent
activities constitutionally subject to state regulations may not be
achieved by means, which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby
invade the area of protected freedoms. Under no case may ordinary
penal statutes be subjected to a facial challenge. If facial challenge to
a penal statute is permitted, the prosecution of crimes may be
hampered. No prosecution would be possible.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is merit in the claim that RA 9372 regulates
speech so as to permit a facial analysis of its validity
RULING: There is no merit in the claim that RA 9372 regulates speech so
as to permit a facial analysis of its validity. Section 3 of RA 9372 provides
the following elements of the crime of terrorism:
1. Offender commits an act punishable under RPC and the
enumerated special penal laws;
2. Commission of the predicate crime sows and creates a
condition of widespread and extraordinary fear and panic
among the populace;
3. The offender is actuated by the desire to coerce the
government to give in to an unlawful demand.
Petitioners contend that the element of “unlawful demand” in the
definition of terrorism must necessarily be transmitted through some
form of expression protected by the free speech clause. The argument
does not persuade. What RA 9372 seeks to penalize is conduct, not
speech. Petitioners’ notion on the transmission of message is entirely
inaccurate, as it unduly focuses on just one particle of an element of
the crime. Almost every commission of a crime entails some mincing of
words on the part of offender. Utterances not elemental but inevitably
incidental to the doing of the criminal conduct alter neither the intent of
the law to punish socially harmful conduct nor the essence of the whole
act as conduct and not speech.
Anti-Wire Tapping Act (RA 4200)
Ramirez v. CA G.R. No. 93833 | September 28, 1995
Facts: A civil case damages was filed by petitioner Socorro Ramirez in
the Quezon City RTC alleging that the private respondent, Ester Garcia,
in a confrontation in the latter’s office, allegedly vexed, insulted and
humiliated her in a “hostile and furious mood” and in a manner
offensive to petitioner’s dignity and personality,” contrary to morals,
good customs and public policy.”
In support of her claim, petitioner produced a verbatim transcript of the
event and sought damages. The transcript on which the civil case was
based was culled from a tape recording of the confrontation made by
petitioner.
As a result of petitioner’s recording of the event and alleging that the
said act of secretly taping the confrontation was illegal, private
respondent filed a criminal case before the Pasay RTC for violation of
Republic Act 4200, entitled “An Act to prohibit and penalize wire
tapping and other related violations of private communication, and
other purposes.”
Petitioner filed a Motion to Quash the Information, which the RTC later
on granted, on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an
offense, particularly a violation of R.A. 4200.
The CA declared the RTC’s decision null and void and denied the
petitioner’s MR, hence the instant petition.
Issue: W/N the Anti-Wiretapping Act applies in recordings by one of the
parties in the conversation
Ruling: Yes. Section 1 of R.A. 4200 entitled, ” An Act to Prohibit and
Penalized Wire Tapping and Other Related Violations of Private
Communication and Other Purposes,” provides:
Sec. 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all
the parties to any private communication or spoken word, to tap any
wire or cable, or by using any other device or arrangement, to secretly
overhear, intercept, or record such communication or spoken word by
using a device commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or
detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape recorder, or however otherwise
described.
The aforestated provision clearly and unequivocally makes it illegal for
any person, not authorized by all the parties to any private
communication to secretly record such communication by means of a
tape recorder. The law makes no distinction as to whether the party
sought to be penalized by the statute ought to be a party other than or
different from those involved in the private communication. The
statute’s intent to penalize all persons unauthorized to make such
recording is underscored by the use of the qualifier “any”.
Consequently, as respondent Court of Appeals correctly concluded,
“even a (person) privy to a communication who records his private
conversation with another without the knowledge of the latter (will)
qualify as a violator” under this provision of R.A. 4200.
A perusal of the Senate Congressional Records, moreover, supports the
respondent court’s conclusion that in enacting R.A. 4200 our lawmakers
indeed contemplated to make illegal, unauthorized tape recording of
private conversations or communications taken either by the parties
themselves or by third persons.
The nature of the conversations is immaterial to a violation of the
statute. The substance of the same need not be specifically alleged in
the information. What R.A. 4200 penalizes are the acts of
secretly overhearing, intercepting or recording private
communications by means of the devices enumerated therein. The
mere allegation that an individual made a secret recording of a private
communication by means of a tape recorder would suffice to
constitute an offense under Section 1 of R.A. 4200. As the Solicitor
General pointed out in his COMMENT before the respondent court:
“Nowhere (in the said law) is it required that before one can be
regarded as a violator, the nature of the conversation, as well as its
communication to a third person should be professed.”
Petitioner’s contention that the phrase “private communication” in
Section 1 of R.A. 4200 does not include “private conversations” narrows
the ordinary meaning of the word “communication” to a point of
absurdity. The word communicate comes from the latin
word communicare, meaning “to share or to impart.” In its ordinary
signification, communication connotes the act of sharing or imparting
signification, communication connotes the act of sharing or imparting,
as in a conversation, or signifies the “process by which meanings or
thoughts are shared between individuals through a common system of
symbols (as language signs or gestures)”
These definitions are broad enough to include verbal or non-verbal,
written or expressive communications of “meanings or thoughts” which
are likely to include the emotionally-charged exchange, on February
22, 1988, between petitioner and private respondent, in the privacy of
the latter’s office. Any doubts about the legislative body’s meaning of
the phrase “private communication” are, furthermore, put to rest by the
fact that the terms “conversation” and “communication” were
interchangeably used by Senator Tañada in his Explanatory Note to the
Bill.
Gaanan vs. Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC)
GR No. L-69809, October 16, 1986 [145 SCRA 112]
FACTS: A direct assault case against Leonardo Laconico was filed by
complainant Atty. Tito Pintor and his client Manuel Montebon. The said
complainants made a telephone call to Laconico to give their terms for
withdrawal of their complaint.
Laconico, later on, called appellant Gaanan, who is also a
lawyer, to come to his office to advise him about the proposed
settlement. When complainant called up, Laconico requested
appellant to secretly listen to the telephone conversation through a
telephone extension so as to hear personally the proposed conditions
for the settlement. After enumerating the conditions, several calls were
made to finally confirm if the settlement is agreeable to both parties.
As part of their agreement, Laconico has to give the money to
the complainant's wife at the office of the Department of Public
Highways. But, he insisted to give the money to the complainant himself.
After receiving the money, the complainant was arrested by the agents
of the Philippine Constabulary, who were alerted earlier before the
exchange. Appellant stated on his affidavit that he heard complainant
demand P8,000.00 for the withdrawal of the case for direct assault.
Laconico attached the affidavit of appellant to the complainant for
robbery/extortion which he filed against the complainant.
In defense, complainant charged appellant and Laconico with
violation of the Anti-Wiretapping Act as the appellant heard the
telephone conversation without complainant's consent.
Trial Court: both Gaanan and Laconico were guilty of violating
Sect. 1 of RA No. 4200.IAC: affirmed the decision of the trial court.
Hence, this petition. The case at bar involves an interpretation
of the Republic Act No. 4200 or also known as Anti-Wiretapping Act.
Petitioner contends that telephones or extension telephones are not
included in the enumeration of "commonly known" listening or
recording devices, nor do they belong to the same class of
enumerated electronic devices contemplated by law. However,
respondent argues that an extension telephone is embraced and
covered by the term "device" within the context of the aforementioned
law because it is not a part or portion of a complete set of a telephone
apparatus.
ISSUE: Whether or not an extension telephone is among the prohibited
devices in Section 1 of the Act, such that its use to overhear a private
conversation would constitute unlawful interception of
communications between the two parties using a telephone line?
RULING: No. Section 1 of Republic Act No. 4200 states that:
It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized
by all the parties to any private communication or
spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any
other device or arrangement, to secretly overhear,
intercept, or record such communication or spoken
word by using a device commonly known as a
dictaphone or dictagraph or dictaphone or walkie-
talkie or tape recorder, or however otherwise
described:
It shall also be unlawful for any person, be he a
participant or not in the act or acts penalized in the
next preceding sentence, to knowingly possess any
tape record, wire record, disc record, or any other such
record, or copies thereof, of any communication or
spoken word secured either before or after the
effective date of this Act in the manner prohibited by
this law; or to replay the same for any other person or
persons; or to communicate the contents thereof,
either verbally or in writing, or to furnish transcriptions
thereof, whether complete or partial, to any other
person: Provided, That the use of such record or any
copies thereof as evidence in any civil, criminal
investigation or trial of offenses mentioned in section 3
hereof, shall not be covered by this prohibition.
The law refers to a "tap" of a wire or cable or the use of a "device or
arrangement" for the purpose of secretly overhearing, intercepting, or
recording the communication. There must be either a physical
interruption through a wiretap or the deliberate installation of a device
or arrangement in order to overhear, intercept, or record the spoken
words. An extension telephone cannot be placed in the same category
as a dictaphone, dictagraph or the other devices enumerated in
Section 1 of RA No. 4200 as the use thereof cannot be considered as
"tapping" the wire or cable of a telephone line.
Hence, the phrase "device or arrangement", although not exclusive to
that enumerated therein, should be construed to comprehend
instruments of the same or similar nature, that is, instruments the use of
which would be tantamount to tapping the main line of a telephone. It
refers to instruments whose installation or presence cannot be
presumed by the party or parties being overheard because, by their
very nature, they are not of common usage and their purpose is
precisely for tapping, intercepting or recording a telephone
conversation. The petition is granted and the petitioner is acquitted of
the crime of violation of Republic Act No. 4200.