G.R. No.
L-1278, January 21, 1949 of the resistance to the enemy is not a valid defense under the
LORETO BARRIOQUINTO AND NORBERTO JIMENEZ, PETITIONERS,
VS. ENRIQUE A. FERNANDEZ, ANTONIO BELMONTE AND
FELICISIMO OCAMPO, AS COMMISSIONERS OF THE FOURTEENTH
GUERILLA AMNESTY COMMISSION, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
FERIA, J.:
This is a special action of mandamus instituted by the petitioners
against the respondents who composed the 14th Guerilla
Amnesty Commission, to compel the latter to act and decide
whether or not the petitioners are entitled to the benefits of
amnesty.
Petitioners Norberto Jimenez and Loreto Barrioquinto were
charged with the crime of murder. As the latter had not yet been
arrested the case proceeded agianst the former, and after trial the
court of first Instance of Zamboanga sentenced Jimenez to life
imprisonment. Before the period for perfecting an appeal had
expired, the defendant Jimenez became aware of the
Proclamation No. 8, dated September 7, 1946, which grants
amnesty in favor of all persons who may be charged with an act
penalized under the Revised Penal code in furtherance of the
resistance to the enemy, and committed during the period from
December 8, 1941, to the date when each particular area of the
Philippines where the offense was actually committed was
liberated from eney control and occupation, and said Jimenez
decided to submit his case to the Guerrilla Amnesty Commission
presided by the respondents herein, and the other petitioner
Loreto Barrioquinto, who had then been already apprehended,
did the same.
After a preliminary hearing had started, the Amnesty Commission,
presided by the respondents, issued on January 9, 1947, an order
returning the cases of the petitioners to the Court of First Instance
of Zamboanga, without deciding whether or not they are entitled
to the benefits of the said Amnesty Proclamation, on the ground
that inasmuch as neither Barrioquinto nor Jimenez have admited
having committed the offense, because Barrioquinto alleged that
it was Hipolito Tolention who shot and killed the victim, they
cannot invoke the benefits of amnesty.
The Amnesty Proclamation of September 7, 1946, issued by the
President with the concurrence of Congress of the Philippines,
reads in part as follows:
"WHEREAS, since the inception of the war and until the liberation
of the different areas comprising the territory of the Philippines,
volunteer armed forces of Filipinos and of other nationalities
operated as guerrillas and other patriotic individuals and groups
pursued activities in opposition to the forces and agents of the
Japanese Empire in the invasion and occupation of the Philippines;
"WHEREAS, members of such forces, in their determined efforts
to resist the enemy, and to bring about his ultimate defeat,
committed acts penalized under the Revised Penal Code;
"WHEREAS, charges have been presented in the courts against
may members of these resistance forces, for such acts;
"WHEREAS, the fact that such acts were committed in furtherance
laws of the Philippines;
"WHEREAS, the persons so accused should not be regarded as
criminals but rather as patriots and heroes who have rendered
invaluable services to the nation; and
"WHEREAS, it is desirable that without the least possible delay,
these persons be freed from the indignity and the jeopardy to
which they are now being subjected;
"NOW, THEREFORE, I, Manuel Roxas, President of the Philippines,
in accordance with the provisions of Article VII, section 10,
paragraph 6 of the constitution, do hereby declare and proclaim
an amnesty in favor of all persons who committed any act
penalized under the Revised Penal code in furtherance of the
resistance to the enemy or agianst persons aiding in the war effort
of the enemy, and committed during the period from December 8,
1941 to the date when each particular area of the Philippines was
actually liberated from the enemy control and occupation. This
amnesty shall not apply to crimes against chastity or to acts
committed from purely personal motives.
"It is further proclaimed and declared that in order to determine
who among those against whom charges may be filed in the
future, come within the terms of this amnesty, Guerilla Amnesty
Commissions, simultaneously to be established, shall examine the
facts and circumstances surrounding each case and, if necessary,
conduct summary hearings of witnesses both for the complainant
and the accused. These Commissions shall decide each case and,
upon finding that it falls within the terms of this proclamation, the
Commissions shall so declare and this amnesty shall immediately
be effective as to the accused, who shall forthwith be released or
discharged."
The theory of the respondents, supported by the dissenting
opinion, is predicated on a wrong conception of the nature or
character of an amnesty. Amnesty must be distinguished from
pardon.
Pardon is granted by the Chief Executive and as such it is a private
act which must be pleaded and proved by the person pardoned,
because the courts take no notice thereof; while amnesty by
Proclamation of the Chief Executive with the concurrence of
Congress, and it is a public act of which the courts should take
judicial notice. Pardon is granted to one after conviction; while
amnesty is granted to classes of persons or communities who may
guilty of political offenses, generally before or after the institution
of the criminal prosecution and sometimes after conviction.
Pardon looks forward and relieves the offender form the
consequences of an offense of which he has been convicted, that
is, it abolishes or forgives the punishment, and for that reason it
does "nor work the restoration of the rights to hold public office,
or the right of suffrage, unless such rights be expressly restored by
the terms of the pardon," and it "in no case exempts the culprit
from the payment of the civil indemnity imposed upon him by the
sentence" (article 36, Revised Penal Code). While amnesty looks
backward and abolishes and puts into oblivion the offense with
which he is charged that the person released by amnesty stands
before the law precisely as though he had committed no offense.
(Section 10[6], Article VII, Philippine Constitution; State vs. Blalock,
61 N. C., 242, 247; In re Briggs, 135 N. C., 118; 47 S. E., 403; Ex
parte Law, 35 Ga., 285, 296; State ex rel Anheuser-Busch brewing
1
Ass'n. vs. Eby, 170 Mo., 497; 71 S. W., 52, 61; Burdick vs. United
States, N.y., 35 S. Ct., 267; 271; 236 U.S., 79; 59 Law. ed., 476)
In view of the foregoing, we are of the opinion and so hold that, in
order to entitle a person to the benefits of the amnesty
proclamation of September 7, 1946, it is not necessary that he
should, as a condition precedent or sine qua non, admit having
committed the criminal act of offense with which he is charged,
and allege the amnesty as a defense; it is sufficient that the
evidence, either of the complainant or the accused, shows that
the offense committed comes within the terms of saids Amnesty
Proclamation. Hence, it is not correct to say that "invocation of
the benefits of amnesty is in the nature of a plea of confession
and avoidance." Although the accused does not confess the
imputation against him, he may be declared by the court or the
Amnesty Commissions entitled to the benefits of the amnesty. For,
whether or not he admits or confesses having commited the
offense with which he is charged, the Commissions should, if
necessary or requested by the interested party, conduct summary
hearing of the witnesses both for the complainants and the
accused on whether he has committed the offense in furtherance
of the resistance to the enemy , or against persons aiding in the
war efforts of the enemy, and decide whether he is entitled to the
benefits of amnesty and to be "regarded as a patriot or hero who
have rendered invaluable services to the nation," or not, in
accordance with the terms of the Amnesty Proclamation. Since
the Amnesty Proclamation is a public act, the courts as well as the
Amnesty Commissions created thereby should take notice of the
terms of said Proclamation and apply the benefits granted therein
to cases coming within their province or jurisdiction,whether
pleaded or claimed by the person charged with such offenses or
not, if the evidence presented shows that the accused is entitled
to said benefits.
The right to the benefits of amnesty, once established by the
evidence presented, either by the complainant or prosecution, or
by the defense, can not be waived, because it is of public interest
that a person who is regarded by the Amnesty Proclamation,
which has the force of a law,not only as innocent, for he stands in
the eyes of the law as if he had never committed any punishable
offense because of the amnesty, but as a patriot or hero, can not
be punished as a criminal. Just as the courts of justice can not
convict a person who, according to the evidence, has committed
an act not punishable by law, although he confesses being guilty
thereof, so also and a fortiori they can not convict a person
considered by law not a criminal, but a patriot and hero, for
having rendered invaluable services to the nation in committing
such an act.
While it is true that the evidence must show that the offense
charged was not against chastity and was committed in
furtherance of the resistence against the enemy,for otherwise, it
is to be naturally presumed that it has been committed for purely
personal motive, it is nonetheless true that though the motive as a
mental impulse is a state of mind or subjective, it need not be
testified to by the defendant himself at his arraignment or hearing
of the case. Generally the motive for the commission of an offense
is established by the testimony of witnesses on the acts or
statements of the accused before or immediately after the
commission of the offense, deeds or words that may express it or
from which his motive or reason for committing it may be inferred.
The statement or testimony of a defendant at the time of
arraignment or the hearing of the case about said motive, can not
generally be considered and relied on, specially if there is
evidence to the contrary, as the true expression of the reason or
motive he had at the time of committing the offense. Because
such statement or testimony may be an afterthought or colored
by the interest he may have to suit his defense or the purpose for
which he intends to achieve with such declaration. Hence it does
not stand to reason and logic to say, as the dissenting opinion
avers, that unless the defendant admits at the investigation or
hearing having committed the offense with which he is charged,
and states that he did it in furtherance of the resistance to the
enemy, and not for purely personal motive, it is impossible for the
court or Commission to verify the motive for the commission of
the offense, because only the accused could explain his belief and
intention or the motive of committing the offense.
There is no necessity for an accused to admit his responsibility for
the commission of a criminal act before a court or Amnesty
Commission may investigate and extend or not to him the benefits
of amnesty. The fact that he pleads not guilty or that he has not
committed the act with which he is does not necessarily prove
that he is not guilty thereof. Notwithstanding his denial, the
evidence for the prosecution or complainant may show the
contrary, as it si generally the case in criminal proceedings, and
what should in such a case be determined is whether or not the
offense committed is of political character. The plea of not having
committed the offense made by an accused simply means that he
can not be convicted of the offense charged because he is not
guilty thereof, and, even if the evidence would show that he is,
because he has committed it in furtherance of the resistance to
the enemy or against persons aiding in the war efforts of the
enemy, and not for purely political motives.
According to Administrative order No. 11 of October 2, 1946,
creating the Amnesty Commissions, issued by the President of the
Philippines, cases pending in the Courts of First Instance of the
province in which the accused claims the benefits of Amnesty
Proclamation, and cases already decided by said courts but not
yet elevated on appeal to the appellate courts, shall be passed
upon and decided by the respective Amnesty Commission, and
cases pending appeal shall be passed upon by the Seventh
Amnesty commission. Under the theory of the respondents and
the writer of the dissenting opinion, the Commissions should
refuse to comply with the directive of said Adminsitrative Order,
because in almost all cases pending in the Court of First Instance,
and all those pending appeal from the sentence of said courts, the
defendats must not have pleaded guilty or admitted having
committed the offense charged, for, otherwise, they would not or
could not have appealed from the judgment of the Courts of First
Instance. To hold that an Amnesty Commission should not
proceed to the investigation and act and decide whether the
offense with which an accused was charged comes within the
Amnessty Proclamation if he does not admit or confess having
committed it, would be to defeat the purpose for which the
Amnesty Proclamation was issued and the Amnesty Commissions
were established. If the courts have to proceed to the trial or
hearing of a case and decide whether the offense committed by
the defendant comes within the terms of the Amnesty
Proclamation although the defendant has pleaded not guilty,
there is no reason why the Amnesty Commissions can not do
so.Where a defendant to admit or confess having committed the
offense or being responsible therefor before he can invoke the
benefit of amnesty, as there is no law which makessuch admission
or confession not admissible as evidence against him in the courts
2
of justice in case the Amnesty Commission finds that the offense
does not come within the terms of the Amnesty Proclamation,
nobody or few would take the risk of submitting their case to said
Commissions.

Besides, in the present case, the llegation of Loreto Barrioquinto

that the offended party or victim was shot and killed by Agapito
Hipolito, does not necessarily bar the respondents from finding,
after the summary hearing of the witnesses for the complainants
and the accused, directed in the said Amnesty Proclamation and
Administrative Order No. 11, that the petitioners are responsible
for the killing of the victim, either as principals by cooperation,
inducement or conspiration, or as accessories before as well as
after the fact, but that they are entitled to the benefits of amnesty,
because they were members of the same group of guerrilleros
who killed the victim in furtherance of the resistance to the
enemy or against persons aiding in the war efforts of the enemy.

Wherefore, the respondents are hereby ordered to immediately

proceed to hear and decide the applications for amnesty of
petitioners Barrioquinto and Jimenez, unless the courts have in
the meantime already decided, expressly and finally, the question
whether or not they are entitled to the benefits of the Amnesty
Proclamation No. 8 of September 7, 1946. So ordered.

Moran, C. J., Paras, Bengzon, and Briones, JJ., concur.

3
G.R. No. L-37420, July 31, 1984
MACARIA A. TORRES, PETITIONER, vs. COURT OF APPEALS,
VICENTE SANTILLAN, ALFREDO NARCISO, TOMAS NARCISO,
AMADO NARCISO, SALUD NARCISO, DEMETRIA NARCISO AND
ADELINA NARCISO, RESPONDENTS.
[G.R. No. L-37421. July 31, 1984]
MACARIA A. TORRES, PETITIONER, vs. COURT OF APPEALS,
VICENTE SANTILLAN, ALFREDO NARCISO, SALUD NARCISO,
BALDOMERO BUENAVENTURA, DEMETRIA NARCISO, LEONARDO
QUINTO, ADELINA NARCISO, CESARIO PUNZALAN, TOMAS
NARCISO AND AMADO NARCISO, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
This Petition for Review on Certiorari, treated as a special civil
action[1], prays that the judgment rendered by the then Court of
Appeals in the consolidated cases, CA-G.R. No. 34998-R entitled
"Macaria A. Torres, plaintiff-appellee vs. Vicente Santillan, et al.,
defendants-appellants", and CA-G.R. No. 34999-R entitled
"Vicente Santillan, et al., plaintiffs-appellants vs. Macaria A.
Bautista, et al., defendants-appellees", and the Resolution denying
the Motion for Reconsideration and Petition for New Trial, be set
aside; and that, instead, the Order of the Court of First Instance of
August 7, 1963 be affirmed, or, in the alternative, that the case be
remanded to it for new trial.
Involved in this controversy are the respective claims of petitioner
and private respondents over Lot No. 551 of the Sta. Cruz de
Malabon Estate (part of the friar lands) in Tanza, Cavite, with an
area of approximately 1,622 square meters, covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-6804 issued in the name of the legal heirs
of Margarita Torres.
The facts of the case cover three generations. The propositus,
Margarita Torres, during the Spanish regime, was married to Claro
Santillan, Vicente and Antonina were begotten of this union. Claro
died leaving Margarita a widow. Antonina married and had six
children, namely: Alfredo, Salud (married to Baldomero
Buenaventura), Demetria (married to Leonardo Quinto), Adelina
(married to Cesario Punzalan), Tomas, and Amado all surnamed
Narciso, who, together with Vicente Santillan, are the private
respondents. Antonina died before the institution of the cases,
while Vicente died on June 4, 1957[2], during the pendency of the
cases in the Trial Courts, without progeny.
After the death of her husband, Margarita Torres cohabited with
Leon Arvisu Arbole, without benefit of marriage. Out of their
cohabitation, petitioner Macaria Torres (later married to Francisco
Bautista) was born on June 20, 1898, and baptized on June 26,
1898. In a Certificate of Baptism issued by the Parish Priest of
Tanza, Cavite, Leon Arvisu (Arbole) and Margarita Torres were
named as father and mother of petitioner, whose name was listed
as "Macaria Arvisu" (Exhibit "C"). Another Baptismal Certificate,
however, listed her name as Macaria Torres, while her father's
name was left blank (Exhibit "4"). Subsequently, or on June 7,
1909, Leon Arbole and Margarita Torres were married (Exhibit
"A"). Petitioner lived with and was reared by her parents.
Margarita, the mother, died on December 20, 1931 (Exhibit "D"),
while Leon, the father, passed away on September 14, 1933
(Exhibit "E").
Lot No. 551, an urban lot with an area of 1,622 sq. ms., more or
less, had been leased temporarily by the Government (Lease No.
17) to Margarita Torres who was the actual occupant of the lot.
The date of the lease cannot be determined with exactitude from
the records. On December 13, 1910, the Government, through the
Director of Lands, issued to Margarita Torres, Sale Certificate No.
222 (Exhibit "B") over the said lot at the price of P428.80, payable
in 20 annual installments of P20.00 each. The rental/s previously
paid of P17.40 was credited to the purchase price. Testimonial
evidence is to the effect that Leon Arbole paid the installments
out of his earnings as a water tender at the Bureau of Lands,
Tanza, Cavite. The last installment, however, was paid on
December 17, 1936, or three (3) years after his death.
On August 25, 1933, twenty (20) days before his death, Leon
Arbole sold and transferred in a notarial deed all his rights and
interest to the one-half (½) portion of Lot No. 551 in favor of
petitioner, for the sum of P300.00.[3]
On June 6, 1953, Vicente Santillan executed an Affidavit claiming
possession of Lot No. 551 and asking for the issuance of title in his
name, which he filed with the Bureau of Lands. Based thereon, the
Bureau of Lands issued the corresponding patent in the name of
the legal heirs of Margarita Torres. Transfer Certificate of Title No.
T-6804 was eventually issued by the Register of Deeds of Cavite
on November 7, 1957, also in the name of said heirs.
On June 3, 1954, private respondents filed a complaint against
petitioner for Forcible Entry, with the Justice of the Peace Court of
Tanza, Cavite, alleging that petitioner had entered a portion of Lot
No. 551 without their consent, constructed a house, and refused
to vacate upon demand. For her part, petitioner claimed that she
is a co-owner of the lot in question, being one of the daughters of
Margarita Torres: The ejectment case was decided against
petitioner and the latter appealed to the then Court of First
Instance of Cavite, where it was docketed as Civil Case No. 5547
(Ejectment Case).
On June 8, 1954, petitioner instituted an action for partition of Lot
No. 551 before the then Court of First Instance of Cavite, docketed
as Civil Case No. 5505 (Partition Case), alleging that said lot was
conjugal property of the spouses Margarita Torres and Leon
Arbole, and that she is their legitimated child. Private respondents
filed an Answer alleging that the lot belonged exclusively to
Margarita Torres; that they are her only heirs, and that the
complaint for partition should be dismissed.
The Ejectment Case and the Partition Case were jointly tried and
decided on November 20, 1958 with a finding that Lot No. 551 is
the paraphernal property of Margarita Torres, and adjudicating to
private respondents two-thirds (2/3) of the property in equal
shares, and to petitioner a one-third (1/3) portion.[4] Petitioner
moved for reconsideration, which private respondents opposed.
Pending its resolution, the Provincial Capitol of Cavite was burned,
resulting in the complete destruction of the records of the two
cases, which, however, were later partially reconstituted.
On August 7, 1963, the then Court of First Instance of Cavite,
Branch I, issued an Order granting reconsideration and amending
the Decision of November 20, 1958. The dispositive portion
thereof reads as follows:
4
"Wherefore, judgment is hereby rendered in Civil Case No. 5505:
(1) Declaring Macaria A. Torres as the legitimated child of the
spouses Leon Arbole and Margarita Torres;
(2) Declaring that Lot No. 551 of the Sta. Cruz de Malabon Estate
is a conjugal partnership property of the spouses Leon Arbole and
Margarita Torres;
(3) Adjudicating four-sixths (4/6th) of Lot No. 551 of S.C. de
Malabon Estate to Macaria Torres, and two-sixths (2/6th) in equal
shares to Alfredo, Tomas, Amado, Salud, Demetria and Adelina, all
surnamed Narciso, legitimate children and heirs of the deceased
Antonina Santillan, since Vicente Santillan is already dead. The
parties may make the partition among themselves by proper
instruments of conveyance, subject to confirmation by the Court.
In fairness, however, to the parties, each party should be alloted
that portion of the lot where his or her house has been
constructed, as far as this is possible. In case the parties are
unable to agree upon the partition, the Court shall appoint three
commissioners to make the partition.
As to Civil Case No. 5547, the same is hereby dismissed.
Without costs in both cases."[5]
In concluding that petitioner is a legitimated child, the Trial Court
opined:
"It is undisputed that when Macaria A. Torres was born on June 20,
1898, her parents, Leon Arbole and Margarita Torres, had the
capacity to marry each other. There was no legal impediment for
them to marry. It has also been established that Macaria A. Torres
had been taken care of, brought up and reared by her parents
until they died. The certificate of baptism (Exh. 'G') also shows
that Macaria Torres was given the family name of Arvisu, which is
also the family name of her father, Leon Arbole, and that her
father is Leon Arvisu and her mother is Margarita Torres. Such
being the case, Macaria A. Torres possessed the status of an
acknowledged natural child. And when her parents were married
on June 7, 1909, she became the legitimated daughter of Leon
Arbole and Margarita Torres."[6]
Private respondents appealed. On April 2, 1973, the then Court of
Appeals[7] rendered the judgment sought to be set aside herein,
the decretal part of which states:
"Wherefore, judgment is hereby rendered in Civil Case No. 5505:
(1) Declaring that Macaria A. Torres is not the legitimated child of
the spouses Leon Arbole and Margarita Torres;
(2) Declaring that Lot No. 551 of the Sta. Cruz de Malabon Estate
is a conjugal partnership property of the spouses Leon Arbole and
Margarita Torres; and
(3) Adjudicating one-half (½) of Lot No. 551 of S. C. de Malabon
Estate to Macaria Torres, and the other half (½) in equal shares to
Alfredo, Tomas, Amado, Salud, Demetria and Adelina, all
surnamed Narciso, legitimate children and heirs of Antonina
Santillan, since Vicente Santillan is already dead. The parties may
make the partition among themselves by proper instruments of
conveyance, subject to confirmation by the Court. In fairness,
however, to the parties, each party should be alloted that portion
of the lot where his or her house has been constructed, as far as
this is possible. In case the parties are unable to agree upon the
partition, the Court shall appoint three commissioners to make
the partition.
As to Civil Case No, 5547, the same is hereby dismissed.
Without costs in both cases."[8]
The Appellate Court was of the opinion that:
"Macaria A. Torres is not a legitimated daughter of Leon Arvisu
Arbole and Margarita Torres, the former not having been legally
acknowledged before or after the marriage of her parents. As
correctly pointed out by the appellants in their brief, the fact that
she was taken cared of, brought up and reared by her parents
until they died, and that the certificate of baptism (Exhibit 'C')
shows that she was given the family name of Arvisu did not
bestow upon her the status of an acknowledged natural child.
"Under Article 121 of the old Civil Code, the governing law on the
matter, children shall be considered legitimated by subsequent
marriage only when they have been acknowledged by the parents
before or after the celebration thereof, and Article 131 of the
same code provides that the acknowledgement of a natural child
must be in the record of birth, in a will or in some public
document. Article 131 then prescribed the form in which the
acknowledgement of a natural child should be made. The
certificate of baptism of Macaria A. Torres (Exhibit 'C') is not the
record of birth referred to in Article 131. This article of the old
Civil Code 'requires that unless the acknowledgement is made in a
will or other public document, it must be made in the record of
birth, or in other words, in the civil register' (Samson vs. Corrales
Tan, 48 Phil. 405)."[9]
A Motion for Reconsideration and for New Trial; dated April 16,
1973, was filed by petitioner. In support thereof, petitioner
submitted a typewritten Sworn Statement, dated March 5, 1930
of spouses Leon Arvisu (Arbole) and Margarita Torres[10], reading
in full as follows:
"SWORN STATEMENT
"We, Leon Arvisu and Margarita Torres husband and wife
respectively, of majority age, and residents of the Municipality of
Tanza, Province of Cavite, P.I., after being duly sworn to according
to law depose and say:
"That Macaria de Torres is our legitimized daughter she being
born out of wedlock on the 26th of June 1898 at Tanza, Cavite, but
as stated she was legitimized by our subsequent marriage.
"That at the time of her birth or conception, we, her parents could
have married without dispensation had we desired.
"That as natural child our aforesaid daughter was surnamed de
Torres after that of her mother's at the time she was baptized as
per record on file in the Church.
"That as a legitimized daughter she should now be surnamed
Arvisu after her father's family name.
"Wherefore, it is respectfully requested to anybody concerned
that proper remedy be made for the change of the surname of
said Macaria de Torres as desired.
"In testimony hereof, we hereunto signed out names at Tanza,
Cavite, this 5th day of March 1930.
5
 then formed, composed of Justices Antonio Lucero, Magno S.
Gatmaitan, Lourdes P. San Diego, Jose N. Leuterio and Luis B.
(Thumbmarked) (Thumbmarked) Reyes (Justice Perez having retired or having disqualified himself).
In a minute resolution of August 24, 1973, the Division of five, by a
vote of three to two, denied both reconsideration and new trial.
LEON ARVISU MARGARITA
TORRES To warrant review, petitioner has summarized her submission
based on two assignments of error. The first was expressed as
follows:

Signed in the "Although the Court of Appeals is correct in declaring that

presence of: Macaria A. Torres is not the legitimated child of the spouses Leon
Arbole and Margarita Torres, it has overlooked to include in its
(Sgd.) Illegible (Sgd.)Macaria de findings of facts the admission made by Vicente Santillan and the
Bautista heirs of Antonina Santillan (herein respondents) that Macari
x -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Torres and Vicente Santillan and Antonina Santillan are brother
---------------------------------x and sisters with a common mother Margarita Torres and they are
the legal heirs and nearest of relatives of Margarita Torres, and as
a consequence thereof, the Court of Appeals had drawn an
incorrect conclusion in adjudicating the entire share of Margarita
UNITED STATES Torres in the conjugal property solely to Vicente Santillan and the
)
OF AMERICA heirs of Antonina Santillan." (Emphasis ours)
PHILIPPINE As we understand it, petitioner has conceded, with which we
)
ISLANDS concur, that, without taking account of the sworn statement of
March 5, 1930, she cannot be considered a legitimated child of
MUNICIPALITY
) ss her parents. Continuous possession of the status of a natural child,
OF TANZA
fact of delivery by the mother, etc. will not amount to automatic
PROVINCE OF recognition, but an action for compulsory recognition is still
)
CAVITE necessary, which action may be commenced only during the
lifetime of the putative parents, subject to certain exceptions.[12]

The admission adverted to appears in paragraph 3 of private

"Subscribed and sworn to before me this 5th day of March 1930.
The affiant Leon Arvisu exhibited to me no cedula certificate being
exempt on account of going over 60 years of age and Margarita
Torres having exhibited no cedula certificate being exempt on
account of her sex.
respondents' original complaint in the Ejectment Case reading:
"the plaintiffs and the defendant Macaria A. Bautista are the legal
heirs and nearest of kins of Margarita Torres, who died in Tanza,
Cavite on December 20, 1931." (Underscoring supplied).

"Witness my hand and seal of office on the date and place The statement, according to petitioner, is an admission of her
aforesaid. legitimation and is controlling in the determination of her
participation in the disputed property.

We are not persuaded. In the Amended Complaint filed by private

CONSTANCIO VELASCO
Not. Reg, No. 56 Notary Public,
Page No. 2 Province
Book No. III Series of 1930."[11]
Until Dec. 31, 1930.
The reason given for the non-
production of the notarial document during trial was that the
same was only found by petitioner's daughter, Nemensia A.
Bautista, among the personal belongings of private, respondent,
Vicente Santillan, an adverse party after his death and who may
have attempted to suppress it. Private respondents, for their part,
argued against new trial, and contended that it is not newly
discovered evidence which could not have been produced during
the trial by the exercise of due diligence.
The decision of the Appellate Court was rendered by a Division of
three, composed of Justices Jesus Y. Perez, Jose N. Leuterio and
Luis B. Reyes, ponente. When the Motion for Reconsideration and
New Trial was considered, there was disagreement, possibly as to
whether or not new trial should be granted in respect of the
sworn statement of March 5, 1930. A Special Division of five was
respondents in the same Ejectment Case, the underlined portion
was deleted so that the statement simply read:
Cavite
"That the plaintiffs are the legal heirs and nearest of kin of
Margarita Torres, who died at Tanza, Cavite, on December 20,
1931;"
In virtue thereof, the Amended Complaint takes the place of the
original. The latter is regarded as abandoned and ceases to
perform any further function as a pleading. The original complaint
no longer forms part of the record.[13]
If petitioner had desired to utilize the original complaint she
should have offered it in evidence. Having been amended, the
original complaint lost its character as a judicial admission, which
would have required no proof, and became merely an
extrajudicial admission, the admissibility of which, as evidence,
required its formal offer. Contrary to petitioner's submission,
therefore, there can be no estoppel by extrajudicial admission
made in the original complaint, for failure to offer it in
evidence.[14]
6
It should also be noted that in the Partition Case private
respondents, in their Answer (parag. 4), denied the legitimacy of
petitioner.

The second error attributed to the Appellate Court has been

pleaded as follows:

"Also, the Court of Appeals has gravely abused its discretion when
it denied the petition for new trial, knowing as it does that the
judgment is clearly erroneous in view of the evidence which is
offered and no mount of diligence on the part of the petitioner
could it be produced in court at any tine before it was offered as it
was found from the personal belongings of Vicente Santillan, an
adverse party, after his death."

It is our considered opinion that new trial was warranted to

prevent a possible miscarriage of justice. Assuming that the
genuineness and due execution of the Sworn Statement of March
5, 1930 is established in accordance with procedural due process,
a new trial would resolve such vital considerations as (1) whether
or not said Sworn Statement qualifies as the public document
prescribed in Article 131 of the old Civil Code; [15] (2) whether or
not it conforms to an act of acknowledgment by the parents after
the celebration of their marriage as required by Article 121 of the
same code[16]; and (3) whether or not petitioner's signature as a
witness to said document was the equivalent of the consent
necessary for acknowledgment of an adult person under Article
133 of that Code.[17] Affirmative answers would confer upon
petitioner the status of a legitimated child of her parents, and
would entitle her to enjoy hereditary rights to her mother's estate.

Private respondents stress that since petitioner signed as a

witness to the document, she should be chargeable with
knowledge of its existence, and, therefore, the Sworn Statement
was not newly discovered evidence. In our view, the document
can reasonably qualify as newly discovered evidence, which could
not have been produced during the trial even with the exercise of
due diligence; specially if it really had been in the possession of
Vicente Santillan, an adverse party who, it was alleged,
suppressed the document.

In the interest of judicial expediency, the new trial can be

conducted by respondent Appellate Court, now empowered to do
so under Section 9 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.

WHEREFORE, this case is hereby remanded to the now

Intermediate Appellate Court for new trial, and depending on its
outcome, said Court shall also resolve the respective participation
of the parties in the disputed property, inclusive of the estate of
the deceased Vicente Santillan. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Plana, Relova, Gutierrez, Jr., and De la Fuente, JJ., concur.

Teehankee, J., (Chairman), concurs in a separate opinion.

7
G.R. No. 85423 May 6, 1991
JOSE TABUENA, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and EMILIANO TABERNILLA, JR., respondents.
Ramon Dimen for petitioner.
Dionisio A. Hernandez for private respondent.
CRUZ, J.:
The petitioner faults the decision of the trial court, as affirmed by
the respondent court, for lack of basis. It is argued that the lower
courts should not have taken into account evidence not submitted
by the private respondent in accordance with the Rules of Court.
The subject of the dispute is a parcel of residential land consisting
of about 440 square meters and situated in Poblacion, Makato,
Aklan. In 1973, an action for recovery of ownership thereof was
filed in the Regional Trial Court of Aklan by the estate of Alfredo
Tabernilla against Jose Tabuena, the herein petitioner. After trial,
judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiff and the defendant
was required to vacate the disputed lot.1
As the trial court found, the lot was sold by Juan Peralta, Jr.
sometime in 1926 to Alfredo Tabernilla while the two were in the
United States. Tabernilla returned to the Philippines in 1934, and
Damasa Timtiman, acting upon her son Juan's instruction,
conveyed the subject land to Tabernilla. At the same time, she
requested that she be allowed to stay thereon as she had been
living there all her life. Tabernilla agreed provided she paid the
realty taxes on the property, which she promised to do, and did.
She remained on the said land until her death, following which the
petitioner, her son and half-brother of Juan Peralta, Jr., took
possession thereof. The complaint was filed when demand was
made upon Tabuena to surrender the property and he refused,
claiming it as his own.
The trial court rejected his defense that he was the absolute
owner of the lot, which he inherited from his parents, who
acquired it even before World War II and had been living thereon
since then and until they died. Also disbelieved was his contention
that the subject of the sale between Peralta and Tabernilla was a
different piece of land planted to coconut trees and bounded on
three sides by the Makato River.
Tabuena appealed to the respondent court, complaining that, in
arriving at its factual findings, the trial court motu proprio took
cognizance of Exhibits "A", "B" and "C", which had been marked
by the plaintiff but never formally submitted in evidence. The trial
court also erred when, to resolve the ownership of the subject lot,
it considered the proceedings in another case involving the same
parties but a different parcel of land.
The said exhibits are referred to in the pre-trial order as follows:
Plaintiff proceeded to mark the following exhibits: Exh. "A", letter
dated October 4, 1921 addressed in Makato, Capiz, Philippines;
Exh. "A-1", paragraph 2 of the letter indicating that the amount of
P600.00—the first P300.00 and then another P300.00 as interest
since October 4, 1921; Exh. "A-2", is paragraph 3 of the letter; Exh.
"B", a Spanish document; Exh. "C", deed of conveyance filed by
Tomasa Timtiman and Alfredo Tabernilla in 1923; and Exh. "C-1",
paragraph 4 of Exh. "C".
In sustaining the trial court, the respondent court held that,
contrary to the allegations of the appellant, the said exhibits were
in fact formally submitted in evidence as disclosed by the
transcript of stenographic notes, which it quoted at length. 2 The
challenged decision also upheld the use by the trial court of
testimony given in an earlier case, to bolster its findings in the
second case.
We have examined the record and find that the exhibits
submitted were not the above-described documents but Exhibits
"X" and "T" and their sub-markings, which were the last will and
testament of Alfredo Tabernilla and the order of probate. It is not
at all denied that the list of exhibits does not include Exhibits "A",
"B" and "C". In fact, the trial court categorically declared that
"Exhibits "A-1, "A-2", "B", "C" and "C-l," were not among those
documents or exhibits formally offered for admission by plaintiff-
administratrix." This is a clear contradiction of the finding of the
appellate court, which seems to have confused Exhibits "A," "B"
and "C" with Exhibits "X" and "Y", the evidence mentioned in the
quoted transcript.
Rule 132 of the Rules of Court provides in Section 35 thereof as
follows:
Sec. 35. Offer of evidence.—The court shall consider no evidence
which has not been formally offered. The purpose for which the
evidence is offered must be specified.
The mere fact that a particular document is marked as an exhibit
does not mean it has thereby already been offered as part of the
evidence of a party. It is true that Exhibits "A," "B" and "C" were
marked at the pre-trial of the case below, but this was only for the
purpose of identifying them at that time. They were not by such
marking formally offered as exhibits. As we said in Interpacific
Transit, Inc. vs. Aviles,3 "At the trial on the merits, the party may
decide to formally offer (the exhibits) if it believes they will
advance its cause, and then again it may decide not to do so at all.
In the latter event, such documents cannot be considered
evidence, nor can they be given any evidentiary value."
Chief Justice Moran explained the rationale of the rule thus:
. . . The offer is necessary because it is the duty of a judge to rest
his findings of facts and his judgment only and strictly upon the
evidence offered by the patties at the trial.4
We did say in People vs. Napat-a5 that even if there be no formal
offer of an exhibit, it may still be admitted against the adverse
party if, first, it has been duly identified by testimony duly
recorded and, second, it has itself been incorporated in the
records of the case. But we do not find that these requirements
have been satisfied in the case before us. The trial court said the
said exhibits could be validly considered because, even if they had
not been formally offered, one of the plaintiffs witnesses,
Cunegunda Hernandez, testified on them at the trial and was even
cross-examined by the defendant's counsel. We do not agree.
Although she did testify, all she did was identify the documents.
Nowhere in her testimony can we find a recital of the contents of
the exhibits.
Thus, her interrogation on Exhibit "A" ran:
LEGASPI: That is this Exh. "A" about ?
A The translation of the letter.
8
Q What is the content of this Exh. "A", the letter of the sister of
Juan Peralta to Alfredo Tabernilla?
Court: The best evidence is the document. Proceed.6
She also did not explain the contents of the other two exhibits.
The respondent court also held that the trial court committed no
reversible error in taking judicial notice of Tabuena's testimony in
a case it had previously heard which was closely connected with
the case before it. It conceded that as a general rule "courts are
not authorized to take judicial notice, in the adjudication of cases
pending before them, of the contents of the records of other
cases, even when such cases have been tried or are pending in the
same court, and notwithstanding the fact that both cases may
have been heard or are actually pending b before the same
judge.7 Nevertheless, it applied the exception that:
. . . in the absence of objection, and as a matter of convenience to
all parties, a court may properly treat all or any part of the original
record of a case filed in its archives as read into the record of a
case pending before it, when, with the knowledge of the opposing
party, reference is made to it for that purpose, by name and
number or in some other manner by which it is sufficiently
designated; or when the original record of the former case or any
part of it, is actually withdrawn from the archives by the court's
direction, at the request or with the consent of the parties, and
admitted as a part of the record of the case then pending.8
It is clear, though, that this exception is applicable only when, "in
the absence of objection," "with the knowledge of the opposing
party," or "at the request or with the consent of the parties," the
case is clearly referred to or "the original or part of the records of
the case are actually withdrawn from the archives" and "admitted
as part of the record of the case then pending." These conditions
have not been established here. On the contrary, the petitioner
was completely unaware that his testimony in Civil Case No. 1327
was being considered by the trial court in the case then pending
before it. As the petitioner puts it, the matter was never taken up
at the trial and was "unfairly sprung" upon him, leaving him no
opportunity to counteract.
The respondent court said that even assuming that the trial court
improperly took judicial notice of the other case, striking off all
reference thereto would not be fatal to the plaintiff's cause
because "the said testimony was merely corroborative of other
evidences submitted by the plaintiff." What "other evidences"?
The trouble with this justification is that the exhibits it intends to
corroborate, to wit, Exhibits "A", "B" and "C", have themselves not
been formally submitted.
Considering the resultant paucity of the evidence for the private
respondent, we feel that the complaint should have been
dismissed by the trial court for failure of the plaintiff to
substantiate its allegations. It has failed to prove that the subject
lot was the same parcel of land sold by Juan Peralta, Jr. to Alfredo
Tabernilla and not another property, as the petitioner contends.
Even assuming it was the same lot, there is no explanation for the
sale thereof by Juan Peralta, Jr., who was only the son of Damasa
Timtiman. According to the trial court, "there is no question that
before 1934 the land in question belonged to Damasa Timtiman."
Juan Peralta, Jr. could not have validly conveyed title to property
that did not belong to him unless he had appropriate
authorization from the owner. No such authorization has been
presented.
It is true that tax declarations are not conclusive evidence of
ownership, as we have held in many cases.1âwphi1 However, that
rule is also not absolute and yields to the accepted and well-
known exception. In the case at bar, it is not even disputed that
the petitioner and his predecessors-in-interest have possessed the
disputed property since even before World War II. In light of this
uncontroverted fact, the tax declarations in their name become
weighty and compelling evidence of the petitioner's ownership. As
this Court has held:
While it is true that by themselves tax receipts and declarations of
ownership for taxation purposes are not incontrovertible evidence
of ownership they become strong evidence of ownership acquired
by prescription when accompanied by proof of actual possession
of the property.9
It is only where payment of taxes is accompanied by actual
possession of the land covered by the tax declaration that such
circumstance may be material in supporting a claim of
ownership.10
The tax receipts accompanied by actual and continuous
possession of the subject parcels of land by the respondents and
their parents before them for more than 30 years qualify them to
register title to the said subject parcels of land.11
The Court can only wonder why, if Alfredo Tabernilla did purchase
the property and magnanimously allowed Damasa Timtiman to
remain there, he did not at least require her to pay the realty
taxes in his name, not hers. The explanation given by the trial
court is that he was not much concerned with the property, being
a bachelor and fond only of the three dogs he had bought from
America. That is specious reasoning. At best, it is pure conjecture.
If he were really that unconcerned, it is curious that he should
have acquired the property in the first place, even as dacion en
pago. He would have demanded another form of payment if he
did not have the intention at all of living on the land. On the other
hand, if he were really interested in the property, we do not see
why he did not have it declared in his name when the realty taxes
thereon were paid by Damasa Timtiman or why he did not object
when the payments were made in her own name.
In comparison, all the acts of Damasa Timtiman and Jose Tabuena
indicate that they were the owners of the disputed property.
Damasa Timtiman and her forebears had been in possession
thereof for more than fifty years and, indeed, she herself stayed
there until she died.12 She paid the realty taxes thereon in her
own name.13 Jose Tabuena built a house of strong materials on
the lot.14 He even mortgaged the land to the Development Bank
of the Philippines and to two private persons who acknowledged
him as the owner.15 These acts denote ownership and are not
consistent with the private respondent's claim that the petitioner
was only an overseer with mere possessory rights tolerated by
Tabernilla.
It is the policy of this Court to accord proper deference to the
factual findings of the courts below and even to regard them as
conclusive where there is no showing that they have been
reached arbitrarily. The exception is where such findings do not
conform to the evidence on record and appear indeed to have no
valid basis to sustain their correctness. As in this case.
The conclusions of the trial court were based mainly on Exhibits
"A", "B" and "C", which had not been formally offered as evidence
and therefore should have been totally disregarded, conformably
9
to the Rules of Court. The trial court also erred when it relied on
the evidence submitted in Civil Case No. 1327 and took judicial
notice thereof without the consent or knowledge of the petitioner,
in violation of existing doctrine. Thus vitiated, the factual findings
here challenged are as an edifice built upon shifting sands and
should not have been sustained by the respondent court.

Our own finding is that the private respondent, as plaintiff in the

lower court, failed to prove his claim of ownership over the
disputed property with evidence properly cognizable under our
adjudicative laws. By contrast, there is substantial evidence
supporting the petitioner's contrary contentions that should have
persuaded the trial judge to rule in s favor and dismiss the
complaint.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The appealed decision is

REVERSED and SET ASIDE, with costs against the private
respondent. It is so ordered.

Narvasa, Gancayco, Griño-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

10
G.R. No. L-28100, November 29, 1971
GABRIEL BAGUIO, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, VS. TEOFILA L. VDA. DE
JALAGAT, FOR HERSELF AND IN REPRESENTATION OF HER
MINOR CHILDREN, DOMINADOR, LEA, AND TEONIFE, ALL
SURNAMED JALAGAT; ANABELLA JALAGAT AND EMMANUEL
JALAGAT, DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES.
DECISION
FERNANDO, J.:
The specific legal question raised in this appeal from an order of
dismissal by the Court of First Instance of Misamis Oriental,
presided by the Hon. Benjamin K. Gorospe, one which has not as
yet been the subject of a definitive ruling, is whether or not on a
motion to dismiss on the ground of res judicata that the cause of
action is barred by a prior judgment, a lower court may take
judicial notice of such previous case decided by him resulting in
the prior judgment relied upon. Judge Gorospe answered in the
affirmative. So do we. An affirmance is thus called for.
The case started with the complaint for the quieting of title to real
property filed by plaintiff, now appellant, Gabriel Baguio, on
February 14, 1966. There was on March 7, 1966 a motion to
dismiss filed by defendants, now appellees, on the ground that
the cause of action is barred by a prior judgment. This was the
argument advanced: "The instant complaint or case, besides
being clearly unfounded and malicious, is identical to or the same
as that Civil Case No. 1574 filed by the same plaintiff and against
Melecio alias Mening Jalagat, now deceased and whose legal heirs
and successors in interest are the very defendants in the instant
complaint or Civil Case No. 2639. Said Civil Case No. 1574 was
filed on October 7, 1958 for 'Recovery of Possession and
Ownership of Real Estate’ and entitled Gabriel Baguio, plaintiff,
versus Melecio alias Mening Jalagat, defendant, involving
practically the same property and practically the same parties as
defendants are the widow and the children, respectively, thus the
legal or forced heirs of the deceased Melecio Jalagat. That the
said Case No. 1574, which is identical to or is the same case as the
instant one, has already been duly and finally terminated as could
be clear from [an] order of this Honorable Court [dated December
6, 1965]."[1] There was an opposition on the part of plaintiff made
on March 26, 1966 on the ground that for prior judgment or res
judicata to suffice as a basis for dismissal it must be apparent on
the face of the complaint. It was then alleged that there was
nothing in the complaint from which such a conclusion may be
inferred. Then, on September 26, 1966, came the order
complained of worded thus: "Acting on the motion to dismiss
filed by counsel for the defendants under date of March 4, 1966,
anchored on the ground that plaintiff's cause of action is barred
by a prior judgment, which this Court finds to be well-founded as
it has already dismissed plaintiff's complaint in Civil Case No. 1574
against Melecio Jalagat alias Mening Jalagat, defendants'
predecessor in interest from whom they have derived their rights,
in an order dated December 6, 1965, pursuant to Section 3 of Rule
17 of the new Rules of Court, which case involved the same parcel
of land as the one in the instant case, as prayed for, Civil Case No.
2639 should be as it is hereby [dismissed]. The Court's previous
dismissal of Civil Case No. 1574 has the effect of an adjudication
upon the merits and consequently is a bar to and may be pleaded
in abatement of any subsequent action against the same parties
over the same issues and the same subject-matter by the same
plaintiff. [So ordered]."[2] Hence this appeal.
The order of dismissal, as noted at the outset, must be
sustained. It is in accordance with law.
1. The sole error assigned is that a bar by prior judgment cannot
be raised in a motion to dismiss when such ground does not
appear on the face of the complaint. What immediately calls
attention in the rather sketchy and inconclusive discussion in the
six-page brief of appellant is that there was no denial as to the
truth of the statement made by Judge Gorospe that there was a
previous dismissal of the same plaintiff's complaint against the
predecessor-in-interest of defendants, who as expressly admitted
by appellant was the deceased husband of one of them and father
of the rest. There was no denial either of the property involved
being the same and of the finality of the decision in the previous
case which would show that appellant's claim was devoid of any
support in law. It would be therefore futile for the court to
continue with the case as there had been such a prior judgment
certainly binding on appellant. What then was there for the lower
court to do? Was there any sense in its being engaged in what
was essentially a fruitless endeavor as the outcome was
predictable?
Certainly, the law would lend itself to a well-deserved reproach if
the Rules of Court would sanction such a proceeding distinguished
by nothing but its futility. It ought to be clear even to appellant
that under the circumstances, the lower court certainly could take
judicial notice of the finality of a judgment in a case that was
previously pending and thereafter decided by it. That was all that
was done by the lower court in decreeing the dismissal. Certainly
such an order is not contrary to law. A citation from the
comments of former Chief Justice Moran is
relevant. Thus: "Courts have also taken judicial notice of previous
cases to determine whether or not the case pending is a moot one
or whether or not a previous ruling is applicable in the case under
consideration."[3]
2. There is another equally compelling consideration. Appellant
undoubtedly had recourse to a remedy which under the law then
in force could be availed of. It would have served the cause of
justice better, not to mention the avoidance of needless expense
on his part and the vexation to which appellees were subjected if
he did reflect a little more on the matter. Then the valuable time
of this Tribunal would not have been frittered away on a useless
and hopeless appeal. It has ever been the guiding principle from
Alonso v. Villamor,[4] a 1910 decision, that a litigant should not be
allowed to worship at the altar of technicality. That is not to
dispense justice according to law. Parties, and much more so their
counsel, should ever keep such an imperative of our legal system
in mind.[5]
WHEREFORE, the order of dismissal of September 26, 1966 is
hereby affirmed. With costs against plaintiff.
Concepcion, C.J., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Barredo, Villamor,
and Makasiar, JJ., concur.
Reyes, J.B.L., J., concurs with J. Teehankee in his separate opinion.
Teehankee, J., concurs in a separate opinion.
11
G.R. No. 122480, April 12, 2000 Credit

BPI-FAMILY SAVINGS BANK, INC., PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF

1989
APPEALS, COURT OF TAX APPEALS AND THE COMMISSIONER OF
Tax P112,491.00
INTERNAL REVENUE, RESPONDENTS.
Credit

DECISION TOTAL
P297,492.00
PANGANIBAN, J.: AMOUNT

If the State expects its taxpayers to observe fairness and honesty
in paying their taxes, so must it apply the same standard against
itself in refunding excess payments. When it is undisputed that a
taxpayer is entitled to a refund, the State should not invoke
technicalities to keep money not belonging to it. No one, not even
the State, should enrich oneself at the expense of another.
The Case
REFUNDABLE
"It appears from the foregoing 1989 Income Tax Return that
petitioner had a total refundable amount of P297,492 inclusive of
the P112,491.00 being claimed as tax refund in the present case.
However, petitioner declared in the same 1989 Income Tax Return
that the said total refundable amount of P297,492.00 will be
applied as tax credit to the succeeding taxable year.

Before us is a Petition for Review assailing the March 31, 1995

Decision of the Court of Appeals[1] (CA) in CA-GR SP No. 34240,
which affirmed the December 24, 1993 Decision[2] of the Court of
Tax Appeals (CTA). The CA disposed as follows:
"WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the petition is
hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit."[3]
"On October 11, 1990, petitioner filed a written claim for refund in
the amount of P112,491.00 with the respondent Commissioner of
Internal Revenue alleging that it did not apply the 1989
refundable amount of P297,492.00 (including P112,491.00) to its
1990 Annual Income Tax Return or other tax liabilities due to the
alleged business losses it incurred for the same year.

On the other hand, the dispositive portion of the CTA Decision
affirmed by the CA reads as follows:
"WHEREFORE, in [view of] all the foregoing, Petitioner’s claim for
refund is hereby
DENIED and this Petition for Review is DISMISSED for lack of
merit."[4]
Also assailed is the November 8, 1995 CA Resolution[5] denying
reconsideration.
The Facts
The facts of this case were summarized by the CA in this wise:
"This case involves a claim for tax refund in the amount of
P112,491.00 representing petitioner’s tax withheld for the year
1989.
"Without waiting for respondent Commissioner of Internal
Revenue to act on the claim for refund, petitioner filed a petition
for review with respondent Court of Tax Appeals, seeking the
refund of the amount of P112,491.00.
"The respondent Court of Tax Appeals dismissed petitioner’s
petition on the ground that petitioner failed to present as
evidence its Corporate Annual Income Tax Return for 1990 to
establish the fact that petitioner had not yet credited the amount
of P297,492.00 (inclusive of the amount P112,491.00 which is the
subject of the present controversy) to its 1990 income tax liability.
"Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, however, the same
was denied by respondent court in its Resolution dated May 6,
1994."[6]
As earlier noted, the CA affirmed the CTA. Hence, this Petition.[7]
Ruling of the Court of Appeals

In its Corporate Annual Income Tax Return for the year 1989, the
following items are reflected: In affirming the CTA, the Court of Appeals ruled as follows:

"It is incumbent upon the petitioner to show proof that it has not
Income P1,017,931,831.00
credited to its 1990 Annual income Tax Return, the amount of
P297,492.00 (including P112,491.00), so as to refute its previous
Deductions P1,026,218,791.00
declaration in the 1989 Income Tax Return that the said amount
Net Income will be applied as a tax credit in the succeeding year of 1990.
(P8,286,960.00) Having failed to submit such requirement, there is no basis to
(Loss)
grant the claim for refund. x x x
Taxable
Income P8,286,960.00 "Tax refunds are in the nature of tax exemptions. As such, they
(Loss) are regarded as in derogation of sovereign authority and to be
construed strictissimi juris against the person or entity claiming
Less: the exemption. In other words, the burden of proof rests upon the
taxpayer to establish by sufficient and competent evidence its
1988 P185,001.00 entitlement to the claim for refund."[8]
Tax
12
Issue
In their Memorandum, respondents identify the issue in this wise:
"The sole issue to be resolved is whether or not petitioner is
entitled to the refund of P112,491.00, representing excess
creditable withholding tax paid for the taxable year 1989."[9]
The Court’s Ruling
The Petition is meritorious.
Main Issue:
Petitioner Entitled to Refund
It is undisputed that petitioner had excess withholding taxes for
the year 1989 and was thus entitled to a refund amounting to
P112,491. Pursuant to Section 69[10] of the 1986 Tax Code which
states that a corporation entitled to a refund may opt either (1) to
obtain such refund or (2) to credit said amount for the succeeding
taxable year, petitioner indicated in its 1989 Income Tax Return
that it would apply the said amount as a tax credit for the
succeeding taxable year, 1990. Subsequently, petitioner informed
the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) that it would claim the
amount as a tax refund, instead of applying it as a tax credit.
When no action from the BIR was forthcoming, petitioner filed its
claim with the Court of Tax Appeals.
The CTA and the CA, however, denied the claim for tax refund.
Since petitioner declared in its 1989 Income Tax Return that it
would apply the excess withholding tax as a tax credit for the
following year, the Tax Court held that petitioner was presumed
to have done so. The CTA and the CA ruled that petitioner failed
to overcome this presumption because it did not present its 1990
Return, which would have shown that the amount in dispute was
not applied as a tax credit. Hence, the CA concluded that
petitioner was not entitled to a tax refund.
We disagree with the Court of Appeals. As a rule, the factual
findings of the appellate court are binding on this Court. This rule,
however, does not apply where, inter alia, the judgment is
premised on a misapprehension of facts, or when the appellate
court failed to notice certain relevant facts which if considered
would justify a different conclusion.[11] This case is one such
exception.
In the first place, petitioner presented evidence to prove its claim
that it did not apply the amount as a tax credit. During the trial
before the CTA, Ms. Yolanda Esmundo, the manager of
petitioner’s accounting department, testified to this fact. It
likewise presented its claim for refund and a certification issued
by Mr. Gil Lopez, petitioner’s vice-president, stating that the
amount of P112,491 "has not been and/or will not be
automatically credited/offset against any succeeding quarters’
income tax liabilities for the rest of the calendar year ending
December 31, 1990." Also presented were the quarterly returns
for the first two quarters of 1990.
The Bureau of Internal Revenue, for its part, failed to controvert
petitioner’s claim. In fact, it presented no evidence at all. Because
it ought to know the tax records of all taxpayers, the CIR could
have easily disproved petitioner’s claim. To repeat, it did not do so.
More important, a copy of the Final Adjustment Return for 1990
was attached to petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration filed
before the CTA.[12] A final adjustment return shows whether a
corporation incurred a loss or gained a profit during the taxable
year. In this case, that Return clearly showed that petitioner
incurred P52,480,173 as net loss in 1990. Clearly, it could not have
applied the amount in dispute as a tax credit.
Again, the BIR did not controvert the veracity of the said return. It
did not even file an opposition to petitioner’s Motion and the
1990 Final Adjustment Return attached thereto. In denying the
Motion for Reconsideration, however, the CTA ignored the said
Return. In the same vein, the CA did not pass upon that significant
document.
True, strict procedural rules generally frown upon the submission
of the Return after the trial. The law creating the Court of Tax
Appeals, however, specifically provides that proceedings before it
"shall not be governed strictly by the technical rules of
evidence."[13] The paramount consideration remains the
ascertainment of truth. Verily, the quest for orderly presentation
of issues is not an absolute. It should not bar courts from
considering undisputed facts to arrive at a just determination of a
controversy.
In the present case, the Return attached to the Motion for
Reconsideration clearly showed that petitioner suffered a net loss
in 1990. Contrary to the holding of the CA and the CTA, petitioner
could not have applied the amount as a tax credit. In failing to
consider the said Return, as well as the other documentary
evidence presented during the trial, the appellate court
committed a reversible error.
It should be stressed that the rationale of the rules of procedure is
to secure a just determination of every action. They are tools
designed to facilitate the attainment of justice.[14] But there can
be no just determination of the present action if we ignore, on
grounds of strict technicality, the Return submitted before the
CTA and even before this Court.[15] To repeat, the undisputed fact
is that petitioner suffered a net loss in 1990; accordingly, it
incurred no tax liability to which the tax credit could be applied.
Consequently, there is no reason for the BIR and this Court to
withhold the tax refund which rightfully belongs to the petitioner.
Public respondents maintain that what was attached to
petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration was not the final
adjustment Return, but petitioner’s first two quarterly returns for
1990.[16] This allegation is wrong. An examination of the records
shows that the 1990 Final Adjustment Return was attached to the
Motion for Reconsideration. On the other hand, the two quarterly
returns for 1990 mentioned by respondent were in fact attached
to the Petition for Review filed before the CTA. Indeed, to rebut
respondents’ specific contention, petitioner submitted before us
its Surrejoinder, to which was attached the Motion for
Reconsideration and Exhibit "A" thereof, the Final Adjustment
Return for 1990.[17]
CTA Case No. 4897
Petitioner also calls the attention of this Court, as it had done
before the CTA, to a Decision rendered by the Tax Court in CTA
Case No. 4897, involving its claim for refund for the year 1990. In
13
that case, the Tax Court held that "petitioner suffered a net loss
for the taxable year 1990 x x x."[18] Respondent, however, urges Vitug, J., abroad, on official business.
this Court not to take judicial notice of the said case. [19]

As a rule, "courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of the

contents of the records of other cases, even when such cases have
been tried or are pending in the same court, and notwithstanding
the fact that both cases may have been heard or are actually
pending before the same judge."[20]

Be that as it may, Section 2, Rule 129 provides that courts may

take judicial notice of matters ought to be known to judges
because of their judicial functions. In this case, the Court notes
that a copy of the Decision in CTA Case No. 4897 was attached to
the Petition for Review filed before this Court. Significantly,
respondents do not claim at all that the said Decision was
fraudulent or nonexistent. Indeed, they do not even dispute the
contents of the said Decision, claiming merely that the Court
cannot take judicial notice thereof.

To our mind, respondents’ reasoning underscores the weakness of

their case. For if they had really believed that petitioner is not
entitled to a tax refund, they could have easily proved that it did
not suffer any loss in 1990. Indeed, it is noteworthy that
respondents opted not to assail the fact appearing therein -- that
petitioner suffered a net loss in 1990 – in the same way that it
refused to controvert the same fact established by petitioner’s
other documentary exhibits.

In any event, the Decision in CTA Case No. 4897 is not the sole
basis of petitioner’s case. It is merely one more bit of information
showing the stark truth: petitioner did not use its 1989 refund to
pay its taxes for 1990.

Finally, respondents argue that tax refunds are in the nature of tax
exemptions and are to be construed strictissimi juris against the
claimant. Under the facts of this case, we hold that petitioner has
established its claim. Petitioner may have failed to strictly comply
with the rules of procedure; it may have even been negligent.
These circumstances, however, should not compel the Court to
disregard this cold, undisputed fact: that petitioner suffered a net
loss in 1990, and that it could not have applied the amount
claimed as tax credits.

Substantial justice, equity and fair play are on the side of

petitioner. Technicalities and legalisms, however exalted, should
not be misused by the government to keep money not belonging
to it and thereby enrich itself at the expense of its law-abiding
citizens. If the State expects its taxpayers to observe fairness and
honesty in paying their taxes, so must it apply the same standard
against itself in refunding excess payments of such taxes. Indeed,
the State must lead by its own example of honor, dignity and
uprightness.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED and the assailed

Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue is ordered to
refund to petitioner the amount of P112,491 as excess creditable
taxes paid in 1989. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Melo, (Chairman), Purisima, and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.

14
G.R. NO. 151857, April 28, 2005
CALAMBA STEEL CENTER, INC. (FORMERLY JS STEEL
CORPORATION), PETITIONER, VS. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL
REVENUE, RESPONDENT.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
A tax refund may be claimed even beyond the taxable year
following that in which the tax credit arises. Hence, excess
income taxes paid in 1995 that have not been applied to or used
in 1996 may still be the subject of a tax refund in 1997, provided
that the claim for such refund is filed with the internal revenue
commissioner within two years after payment of said taxes. As a
caveat, the Court stresses that the recognition of the entitlement
to a tax refund does not necessarily mean the automatic payment
of the sum claimed in the final adjustment return of the
taxpayer. The amount of the claim must still be proven in the
normal course.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review[1] under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, assailing the January 10, 2002 Decision[2] of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-GR SP No. 58838. The assailed Decision
disposed as follows:
“IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is
DISMISSED and the assailed Decision and Resolution are
AFFIRMED. Costs against Petitioner.”[3]
The Facts
Quoting the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA), the CA narrated the
antecedents as follows:
“Petitioner is a domestic corporation engaged in the manufacture
of steel blanks for use by manufacturers of automotive, electrical,
electronics in industrial and household appliances.
“Petitioner filed an Amended Corporate Annual Income Tax
Return on June 4, 1996 declaring a net taxable income of
P9,461,597.00, tax credits of P6,471,246.00 and tax due in the
amount of P3,311,559.00.
“Petitioner also reported quarterly payments for the second and
third quarters of 1995 in the amounts of P2,328,747.26 and
P1,082,108.00, respectively.
“It is the proposition of the [p]etitioner that for the year 1995,
several of its clients withheld taxes from their income payments to
[p]etitioner and remitted the same to the Bureau of Internal
Revenue (BIR) in the sum of P3,159,687.00. Petitioner further
alleged that due to its income/loss positions for the three quarters
of 1996, it was unable to use the excess tax paid for and in its
behalf by the withholding agents.
“Thus, an administrative claim was filed by the [p]etitioner on
April 10, 1997 for the refund of P3,159,687.00 representing excess
or unused creditable withholding taxes for the year 1995. The
instant petition was subsequently filed on April 18, 1997.
“Respondent, in his Answer, averred, among others, that:
‘1) Petitioner has no cause of action;
‘2) Petitioner failed to comply with the procedural requirements
set out in Section 5 of Revenue Regulations No. [(RR)] 12-94;
‘3) It is incumbent upon [p]etitioner to prove by competent and
sufficient evidence that the tax refund or tax credit being sought is
allowed under the National Internal Revenue Code and its
implementing rules and regulations; and
‘4) Claims for tax refund or tax credit are construed strictly
against the taxpayer as they partake the nature of tax exemption.
“To buttress its claim, [p]etitioner presented documentary and
testimonial evidence. Respondent, on the other hand, presented
the [r]evenue [o]fficer who conducted the examination of
[p]etitioner’s claim and found petitioner liable for deficiency value
added tax. Petitioner also presented rebuttal evidence.
“The sole issue submitted for [o]ur determination is whether or
not [p]etitioner is entitled to the refund of P3,159,687.00
representing excess or overpaid income tax for the taxable year
1995.”[4]
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In denying petitioner’s refund, the CA reasoned out that no
evidence other than that presented before the CTA was adduced
to prove that excess tax payments had been made in 1995. From
the inception of the case to the formal offer of its evidence,
petitioner did not present its 1996 income tax return to disclose
its total income tax liability, thus making it difficult to determine
whether such excess tax payments were utilized in 1996.
Hence, this Petition.[5]
The Issue
Petitioner raises this sole issue for our consideration:
“Whether the Court of Appeals gravely erred when, while
purportedly requiring petitioner to submit its 1996 annual income
tax return to support its claim for refund, nonetheless ignored
the existence of the tax return extant on the record the
authenticity of which has not been denied or its admissibility
opposed by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue.”[6]
The Court’s Ruling
The Petition is partly meritorious.
Sole Issue:
Entitlement to Tax Refund
Section 69 of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC)[7]
provides:
“Sec. 69. Final adjustment return. -- Every corporation liable to
tax under Section 24 shall file a final adjustment return covering
15
the total taxable income for the preceding calendar or fiscal year. a tax credit, not a tax refund. Petitioner herein does not claim a
If the sum of the quarterly tax payments made during the said tax credit, but a tax refund. Therefore, the statutory limitation
taxable year is not equal to the total tax due on the entire taxable does not apply.
net income of that year the corporation shall either:
Income Payments Merely
‘(a) Pay the excess tax still due; or Declared Part of Gross Income

‘(b) Be refunded the excess amount paid, as the case may be.
“In case the corporation is entitled to a refund of the excess
estimated quarterly income taxes paid, the refundable amount
shown on its final adjustment return may be credited against the
estimated quarterly income tax liabilities for the taxable quarters
of the succeeding taxable year.”
Tax Refund
Allowed by NIRC
A perusal of this provision shows that a taxable corporation is
entitled to a tax refund when the sum of the quarterly income
taxes it paid during a taxable year exceeds its total income tax due
also for that year. Consequently, the refundable amount that is
shown on its final adjustment return may be credited, at its option,
against its quarterly income tax liabilities for the next taxable year.
Petitioner is a corporation liable to pay income taxes under
Section 24 of the NIRC. Hence, it is a taxable corporation. In 1995,
it reported that it had excess income taxes that had been paid for
and on its behalf by its withholding agents; and that, applying the
above-quoted Section 69, this excess should be credited against
its income tax liabilities for 1996. However, it claimed in 1997 that
it should get a refund, because it was still unable to use the excess
income taxes paid in 1995 against its tax liabilities in 1996. Is this
possible? Stating the argument otherwise, may excess income
taxes paid in 1995 that could not be applied to taxes due in 1996
be refunded in 1997?
The answer is in the affirmative. Here are the reasons:
Claim of Tax Refund Beyond the
Succeeding Taxable Year
First, a tax refund may be claimed even beyond the taxable year
following that in which the tax credit arises.
No provision in our tax law limits the entitlement to such a refund,
other than the requirement that the filing of the administrative
claim for it be made by the taxpayer within a two-year
prescriptive period. Section 204(3) of the NIRC states that no
refund of taxes “shall be allowed unless the taxpayer files in
writing with the Commissioner [the] claim for x x x refund within
two years after the payment of the tax.”
Applying the aforequoted legal provisions, if the excess income
taxes paid in a given taxable year have not been entirely used by a
taxable corporation against its quarterly income tax liabilities for
the next taxable year, the unused amount of the excess may still
be refunded, provided that the claim for such a refund is made
within two years after payment of the tax. Petitioner filed its
claim in 1997 -- well within the two-year prescriptive period. Thus,
its unused tax credits in 1995 may still be refunded.
Even the phrase “succeeding taxable year” in the second
paragraph of the said Section 69 is a limitation that applies only to
Second, to be able to claim a tax refund, a taxpayer only needs to
declare the income payments it received as part of its gross
income and to establish the fact of withholding.
Section 5 of RR 12-94[8] states:
xxx xxx xxx
“(a) Claims for Tax Credit or Refund of income tax deducted and
withheld on income payments shall be given due course only
when it is shown on the return that the income payment received
has been declared as part of the gross income and the fact of
withholding is established by a copy of the Withholding Tax
Statement duly issued by the payor to the payee showing the
amount paid and the amount of tax withheld therefrom.
“(b) Excess Credits. -- A taxpayer's excess expanded withholding
tax credits for the taxable quarter/taxable year shall automatically
be allowed as a credit for purposes of filing his income tax return
for the taxable quarter/taxable year immediately succeeding the
taxable quarter/taxable year in which the aforesaid excess credit
arose, provided, however, he submits with his income tax return a
copy of his income tax return for the aforesaid previous taxable
period showing the amount of his aforementioned excess
withholding tax credits.
“If the taxpayer, in lieu of the aforesaid automatic application of
his excess credit, wants a cash refund or a tax credit certificate for
use in payment of his other national internal tax liabilities, he shall
make a written request therefor. Upon filing of his request, the
taxpayer's income tax return showing the excess expanded
withholding tax credits shall be examined. The excess expanded
withholding tax, if any, shall be determined and
refunded/credited to the taxpayer-applicant. The refund/credit
shall be made within a period of sixty (60) days from date of the
taxpayer's request provided, however, that the taxpayer-applicant
submitted for audit all his pertinent accounting records and that
the aforesaid records established the veracity of his claim for a
refund/credit of his excess expanded withholding tax credits.”
That petitioner filed its amended 1995 income tax return in 1996
is uncontested. In addition, the resulting investigation by the BIR
on August 15, 1997, reveals that the income accounts were
“correctly declared based on the existing supporting
documents.”[9] Therefore, there is no need for petitioner to show
again the income payments it received in 1995 as part of its gross
income in 1996.
That petitioner filed its 1996 final adjustment return in 1997 is the
crux of the controversy. However, as will be demonstrated shortly,
the lack of such a return will not defeat its entitlement to a refund.
Tax Refund Provisions:
Question of Law
Third, it is a cardinal rule that “only legal issues may be raised” [10]
16
in petitions for review under Rule 45. [11]
The proper interpretation of the provisions on tax refund is a
question of law that “does not call for an examination of the
probative value of the evidence presented by the parties-
litigants.”[12] Having been unable to use the excess income taxes
paid in 1995 against its other tax liabilities in 1996, petitioner
clearly deserves a refund. It cannot by any sweeping denial be
deprived of what rightfully belongs to it.
The truth or falsity of the contents of or entries in the 1996 final
adjustment return, which has not been formally offered in
evidence and examined by respondent, involves, however, a
question of fact. This Court is not a trier of facts. Neither is it a
collection agency for the government. Although we rule that
petitioner is entitled to a tax refund, the amount of that refund is
a matter for the CTA to determine judiciously based on the
records that include its own copy of petitioner’s 1996 final
adjustment return.
Liberal Constructionof Rules
Fourth, ordinary rules of procedure frown upon the submission of
final adjustment returns after trial has been conducted. However,
both the CTA law and jurisprudence mandate that the
proceedings before the tax court “shall not be governed strictly by
technical rules of evidence.”[13] As a rule, its findings of fact[14] (as
well as that of the CA) are final, binding and conclusive[15] on the
parties and upon this Court; however, as an exception, such
findings may be reviewed or disturbed on appeal[16] when they are
not supported by evidence.[17]
Our Rules of Court apply “by analogy or in a suppletory[18]
character and whenever practicable and convenient”[19] and “shall
be liberally construed in order to promote their objective of
securing a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action
and proceeding.”[20] After all, “[t]he paramount consideration
remains the ascertainment of truth.”[21]
In the present case, the 1996 final adjustment return was attached
as Annex A to the Reply to Comment filed by petitioner with the
CA.[22] The return shows a negative amount for its taxable income
that year. Therefore, it could not have applied or used the excess
tax credits of 1995 against its tax liabilities in 1996.
Judicial Notice
of Attached Return
Fifth, the CA and CTA could have taken judicial notice of the 1996
final adjustment return which had been attached in CTA Case No.
5799. “Judicial notice takes the place of proof and is of equal
force.”[23]
As a general rule, courts are not authorized to take judicial notice
of the contents of records in other cases tried or pending in the
same court, even when those cases were heard or are actually
pending before the same judge. However, this rule admits of
exceptions, as when reference to such records is sufficiently made
without objection from the opposing parties:
‘“. . . [I]n the absence of objection, and as a matter of convenience
to all parties, a court may properly treat all or any part of the
original record of a case filed in its archives as read into the record
of a case pending before it, when, with the knowledge of the
opposing party, reference is made to it for that purpose, by name
and number or in some other manner by which it is sufficiently
designated; or when the original record of the former case or any
part of it, is actually withdrawn from the archives by the court's
direction, at the request or with the consent of the parties, and
admitted as a part of the record of the case then pending.’”[24]
Prior to rendering its Decision on January 12, 2000, the CTA was
already well-aware of the existence of another case pending
before it, involving the same subject matter, parties and causes of
action.[25] Because of the close connection of that case with the
matter in controversy, the CTA could have easily taken judicial
notice[26] of the contested document attached in that other case.
Furthermore, there was no objection raised to the inclusion of the
said 1996 final adjustment return in petitioner’s Reply to
Comment before the CA. Despite clear reference to that return, a
reference made with the knowledge of respondent, the latter still
failed to controvert petitioner’s claim. The appellate court should
have cast aside strict technicalities[27] and decided the case on the
basis of such uncontested return. Verily, it had the authority to
“take judicial notice of its records and of the facts [that] the
record establishes.”[28]
Section 2 of Rule 129 provides that courts “may take judicial
notice of matters x x x ought to be known to judges because of
their judicial functions.”[29] If the lower courts really believed that
petitioner was not entitled to a tax refund, they could have easily
required respondent to ascertain its veracity and accuracy[30] and
to prove that petitioner did not suffer any net loss in 1996.
Contrary to the contention of petitioner, BPI-Family Savings Bank
v. CA[31] (on which it rests its entire arguments) is not on all fours
with the facts of this case.
While the petitioner in that case also filed a written claim for a tax
refund, and likewise failed to present its 1990 corporate annual
income tax return, it nonetheless offered in evidence its top-
ranking official’s testimony and certification pertaining to only two
taxable years (1989 and 1990). The said return was attached only
to its Motion for Reconsideration before the CTA.
Petitioner in this case offered documentary and testimonial
evidence that extended beyond two taxable years, because the
excess credits in the first (1995) taxable year had not been used
up during the second (1996) taxable year, and because the claim
for the refund of those credits had been filed during the third
(1997) taxable year. Its final adjustment return was instead
attached to its Reply to Comment filed before the CA.
Moreover, in BPI-Family Savings Bank, petitioner was able to
show “the undisputed fact: that petitioner had suffered a net loss
in 1990 x x x.”[32] In the instant case, there is no such “undisputed
fact” as yet. The mere admission into the records of petitioner’s
1996 final adjustment return is not a sufficient proof of the truth
of the contents of or entries in that return.
In addition, the BIR in BPI-Family Savings Bank did not controvert
the veracity of the return or file an opposition to the Motion and
the return. Despite the fact that the return was ignored by both
the CA and the CTA, the latter even declared in another case (CTA
Case No. 4897) that petitioner had suffered a net loss for taxable
17
year 1990. When attached to the Petition for Review filed before receive the support of the courts when these officers attempt to
this Court, that Decision was not at all claimed by the BIR to be perform in a conscientious and lawful manner the duties imposed
fraudulent or nonexistent. The Bureau merely contended that this upon them by law.”[43] Only after it is shown that “if something is
Court should not take judicial notice of the said Decision. received when there is no right to demand it, and it was duly
delivered through mistake, the obligation to return it arises.” [44]
In this case, however, the BIR has not been given the chance to
challenge the veracity of petitioner’s final adjustment In brief, we hold that petitioner is entitled to a refund; however,
return. Neither has the CTA decided any other case categorically the amount must still be proved in proper proceedings before the
declaring a net loss for petitioner in taxable year 1996. After this CTA.
return was attached to petitioner’s Reply to Comment before the
CA, the appellate court should have required the filing of other WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby PARTLY GRANTED, and the
responsive pleadings from respondent, as was necessary and assailed Decision SET ASIDE. The case is REMANDED to the Court
proper for it to rule upon the return. of Tax Appeals for the proper and immediate determination of the
amount to be refunded to petitioner on the basis of the latter’s
Admissibility Versus Weight 1996 final adjustment return. No pronouncement as to costs.

Indeed, “[a]dmissibility x x x is one thing, weight is another.” [33] SO ORDERED.

“To admit evidence and not to believe it are not incompatible with
each other x x x.”[34] Mere allegations by petitioner of the figures Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, and Garcia, JJ.,
in its 1996 final adjustment return are not a sufficient proof of the concur.
amount of its refund entitlement. They do not even constitute
evidence[35] adverse to respondent, against whom they are being
presented.[36]

While it seems that the “[non-production] of a document which

courts almost invariably expect will be produced ‘unavoidably
throws a suspicion over the cause,’”[37] this is not really the
conclusion to be arrived at here. When petitioner purportedly
filed its administrative claim for a tax refund on April 10, 1997, the
deadline for filing the 1996 final adjustment return was not yet
over. Hence, it could not have attached this return to its claim.

For reasons unknown even to this Court, petitioner failed to offer

such return as evidence during the trial phase of this case. For its
negligence, petitioner “cannot be allowed to seek refuge in a
liberal application of the [r]ules”[38] by giving it a blanket approval
of the total refund it claims. “While in certain instances, we allow
a relaxation in the application of the rules, we never intend to
forge a weapon for erring litigants to violate the rules with
impunity. The liberal interpretation and application of rules apply
only in proper cases of demonstrable merit and under justifiable
causes and circumstances.”[39]

It would not be proper to allow petitioner to simply prevail and

compel a refund in the amount it claims, without affording the
government a reasonable opportunity to contest the former’s
allegations.[40] Negligence consisting of the unexplained failure to
offer the exhibit should not be rewarded with undeserved
leniency. Petitioner still bears the burden of proving the amount
of its claim for tax refund. After all, “[t]ax refunds are in the
nature of tax exemptions”[41] and are to be construed strictissimi
juris against the taxpayer.

Finally, even in the absence of a final adjustment return or any

claim for a tax refund, respondent is authorized by law to
examine any book, paper, record or other data that may be
relevant or material to such inquiry.[42] Failure to make an
assessment of petitioner’s proper tax liability or to contest the
return could be errors or omissions of administrative officers that
should never be allowed to jeopardize the government’s financial
position.

Verily, “the officers of the Bureau of Internal Revenue should

18