PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THE SECRETARY OF
JUSTICE, DIRECTOR GENERAL OF THE PHILIPPINE
NATIONAL POLICE, CHIEF STATE PROSECUTOR
JOVENCITO ZUO, STATE PROSECUTORS PETER L. ONG
and RUBEN A. ZACARIAS; 2ND ASSISTANT CITY
PROSECUTOR CONRADO M. JAMOLIN and CITY
PROSECUTOR OF QUEZON CITY CLARO
ARELLANO, petitioners, vs. PANFILO M.
LACSON, respondent.
RESOLUTION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before the Court is the petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration of the Resolution dated
[1] [2]
May 28, 2002, remanding this case to the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City,
Branch 81, for the determination of several
factual issues relative to the application of
Section 8 of Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure on the dismissal of
Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-
81689 filed against the respondent and his
co-accused with the said court. In the
aforesaid criminal cases, the respondent and
his co-accused were charged with multiple
murder for the shooting and killing of eleven
male persons identified as Manuel Montero,
a former Corporal of the Philippine Army,
Rolando Siplon, Sherwin Abalora, who was 16
years old, Ray Abalora, who was 19 years old,
Joel Amora, Jevy Redillas, Meleubren
Sorronda, who was 14 years old, Pacifico
[3]
Montero, Jr., of the 44th Infantry Batallion of
the Philippine Army, Welbor Elcamel, SPO1
Carlito Alap-ap of the Zamboanga PNP, and
Alex Neri, former Corporal of the 44th
Infantry Batallion of the Philippine Army,
bandied as members of the Kuratong
Baleleng Gang. The respondent opposed
petitioners motion for reconsideration. [4]
The Court ruled in the Resolution sought to
be reconsidered that the provisional dismissal
of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-
81689 were with the express consent of the
respondent as he himself moved for said
provisional dismissal when he filed his motion
for judicial determination of probable cause
and for examination of witnesses. The Court
also held therein that although Section 8,
Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure could be given retroactive effect,
there is still a need to determine whether the
requirements for its application are
attendant. The trial court was thus directed
to resolve the following:
... (1) whether the provisional dismissal of the
cases had the express consent of the accused;
(2) whether it was ordered by the court after
notice to the offended party; (3) whether the
2-year period to revive it has already lapsed;
(4) whether there is any justification for the
filing of the cases beyond the 2-year period;
(5) whether notices to the offended parties
were given before the cases of respondent
Lacson were dismissed by then Judge Agnir;
(6) whether there were affidavits of
desistance executed by the relatives of the
three (3) other victims; (7) whether the
multiple murder cases against respondent
Lacson are being revived within or beyond
the 2-year bar.
The Court further held that the reckoning
date of the two-year bar had to be first
determined whether it shall be from the date
of the order of then Judge Agnir, Jr.
dismissing the cases, or from the dates of
receipt thereof by the various offended
parties, or from the date of effectivity of the
new rule. According to the Court, if the cases
were revived only after the two-year bar, the
State must be given the opportunity to justify
its failure to comply with the said time-bar. It
emphasized that the new rule fixes a time-bar
to penalize the State for its inexcusable delay
in prosecuting cases already filed in
court. However, the State is not precluded
from presenting compelling reasons to justify
the revival of cases beyond the two-year bar.
In support of their Motion for
Reconsideration, the petitioners contend that
(a) Section 8, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure is not applicable to
Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-
81689; and (b) the time-bar in said rule
should not be applied retroactively.
The Court shall resolve the issues seriatim.
I. SECTION 8, RULE 117 OF THE REVISED
RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE IS NOT
APPLICABLE TO CRIMINAL CASES NOS. Q-99-
81679 TO Q-99-81689.
The petitioners aver that Section 8, Rule 117
of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure is
not applicable to Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-
81679 to Q-99-81689 because the essential
requirements for its application were not
present when Judge Agnir, Jr., issued his
resolution of March 29, 1999. Disagreeing
with the ruling of the Court, the petitioners
maintain that the respondent did not give his
express consent to the dismissal by Judge
Agnir, Jr., of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679
to Q-99-81689. The respondent allegedly
admitted in his pleadings filed with the Court
of Appeals and during the hearing thereat
that he did not file any motion to dismiss said
cases, or even agree to a provisional dismissal
thereof. Moreover, the heirs of the victims
were allegedly not given prior notices of the
dismissal of the said cases by Judge Agnir,
Jr. According to the petitioners, the
respondents express consent to the
provisional dismissal of the cases and the
notice to all the heirs of the victims of the
respondents motion and the hearing thereon
are conditions sine qua non to the application
of the time-bar in the second paragraph of
the new rule.
The petitioners further submit that it is not
necessary that the case be remanded to the
RTC to determine whether private
complainants were notified of the March 22,
1999 hearing on the respondents motion for
judicial determination of the existence of
probable cause. The records allegedly
indicate clearly that only the handling city
prosecutor was furnished a copy of the notice
of hearing on said motion. There is allegedly
no evidence that private prosecutor Atty.
Godwin Valdez was properly retained and
authorized by all the private complainants to
represent them at said hearing. It is their
contention that Atty. Valdez merely identified
the purported affidavits of desistance and
that he did not confirm the truth of the
allegations therein.
The respondent, on the other hand, insists
that, as found by the Court in its Resolution
and Judge Agnir, Jr. in his resolution, the
respondent himself moved for the provisional
dismissal of the criminal cases. He cites the
resolution of Judge Agnir, Jr. stating that the
respondent and the other accused filed
separate but identical motions for the
dismissal of the criminal cases should the trial
court find no probable cause for the issuance
of warrants of arrest against them.
The respondent further asserts that the heirs
of the victims, through the public and private
prosecutors, were duly notified of said
motion and the hearing thereof. He contends
that it was sufficient that the public
prosecutor was present during the March 22,
1999 hearing on the motion for judicial
determination of the existence of probable
cause because criminal actions are always
prosecuted in the name of the People, and
the private complainants merely prosecute
the civil aspect thereof.
The Court has reviewed the records and has
found the contention of the petitioners
meritorious.
Section 8, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure reads:
Sec. 8. Provisional dismissal. A case shall not
be provisionally dismissed except with the
express consent of the accused and with
notice to the offended party.
The provisional dismissal of offenses
punishable by imprisonment not exceeding
six (6) years or a fine of any amount, or both,
shall become permanent one (1) year after
issuance of the order without the case having
been revived. With respect to offenses
punishable by imprisonment of more than six
(6) years, their provisional dismissal shall
become permanent two (2) years after
issuance of the order without the case having
been revived.
Having invoked said rule before the
petitioners-panel of prosecutors and before
the Court of Appeals, the respondent is
burdened to establish the essential requisites
of the first paragraph thereof, namely:
1. the prosecution with the express
conformity of the accused or the accused
moves for a provisional (sin perjuicio)
dismissal of the case; or both the prosecution
and the accused move for a provisional
dismissal of the case;
2. the offended party is notified of the
motion for a provisional dismissal of the case;
3. the court issues an order granting the
motion and dismissing the case provisionally;
4. the public prosecutor is served with a copy
of the order of provisional dismissal of the
case.
The foregoing requirements are
conditions sine qua non to the application of
the time-bar in the second paragraph of the
new rule. The raison d etre for the
requirement of the express consent of the
accused to a provisional dismissal of a
criminal case is to bar him from subsequently
asserting that the revival of the criminal case
will place him in double jeopardy for the
same offense or for an offense necessarily
included therein. [5]
Although the second paragraph of the new
rule states that the order of dismissal shall
become permanent one year after the
issuance thereof without the case having
been revived, the provision should be
construed to mean that the order of dismissal
shall become permanent one year after
service of the order of dismissal on the public
prosecutor who has control of the
prosecution without the criminal case having
[6]
been revived. The public prosecutor cannot
be expected to comply with the timeline
unless he is served with a copy of the order of
dismissal.
Express consent to a provisional dismissal is
given either viva voce or in writing. It is a
positive, direct, unequivocal consent
requiring no inference or implication to
supply its meaning. Where the accused
[7]
writes on the motion of a prosecutor for a
provisional dismissal of the case No
objection or With my conformity, the writing
amounts to express consent of the accused to
a provisional dismissal of the case. The mere
inaction or silence of the accused to a motion
for a provisional dismissal of the case or his
failure to object to a provisional
dismissal does not amount to express
[10]
consent.
A motion of the accused for a provisional
dismissal of a case is an express consent to
such provisional dismissal. If a criminal case
[11]
is provisionally dismissed with the express
consent of the accused, the case may be
revived only within the periods provided in
the new rule. On the other hand, if a criminal
case is provisionally dismissed without the
express consent of the accused or over his
objection, the new rule would not apply. The
case may be revived or refiled even beyond
the prescribed periods subject to the right of
the accused to oppose the same on the
ground of double jeopardy or that such [12]
revival or refiling is barred by the statute of
limitations. [13]
The case may be revived by the State within
the time-bar either by the refiling of the
Information or by the filing of a new
Information for the same offense or an
offense necessarily included therein. There
would be no need of a new preliminary
investigation. However, in a case wherein
[14]
after the provisional dismissal of a criminal
case, the original witnesses of the
prosecution or some of them may have
recanted their testimonies or may have died
or may no longer be available and new
witnesses for the State have emerged, a new
preliminary investigation must be [15]
conducted before an Information is refiled or
a new Information is filed. A new preliminary
investigation is also required if aside from the
original accused, other persons are charged
under a new criminal complaint for the same
offense or necessarily included therein; or if
under a new criminal complaint, the original
charge has been upgraded; or if under a new
criminal complaint, the criminal liability of
the accused is upgraded from that as an
accessory to that as a principal. The accused
must be accorded the right to submit
counter-affidavits and evidence. After all, the
fiscal is not called by the Rules of Court to
wait in ambush; the role of a fiscal is not
mainly to prosecute but essentially to do
justice to every man and to assist the court in
dispensing that justice. [16]
In this case, the respondent has failed to
prove that the first and second requisites of
[8]
the first paragraph of the new rule were
present when Judge Agnir, Jr. dismissed
[9]
Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-
81689. Irrefragably, the prosecution did not
file any motion for the provisional dismissal
of the said criminal cases. For his part, the
respondent merely filed a motion for judicial
determination of probable cause and for
examination of prosecution witnesses
alleging that under Article III, Section 2 of the
Constitution and the decision of this Court
in Allado v. Diokno, among other cases,
[17]
there was a need for the trial court to
conduct a personal determination of
probable cause for the issuance of a warrant
of arrest against respondent and to have the
prosecutions witnesses summoned before
the court for its examination. The respondent
contended therein that until after the trial
court shall have personally determined the
presence of probable cause, no warrant of
arrest should be issued against the
respondent and if one had already been
issued, the warrant should be recalled by the
trial court. He then prayed therein that:
1) a judicial determination of probable cause
pursuant to Section 2, Article III of the
Constitution be conducted by this Honorable
Court, and for this purpose, an order be
issued directing the prosecution to present
the private complainants and their witnesses
at a hearing scheduled therefor; and
2) warrants for the arrest of the accused-
movants be withheld, or, if issued, recalled in
the meantime until the resolution of this
incident.
Other equitable reliefs are also prayed for. [18]
The respondent did not pray for the
dismissal, provisional or otherwise, of
Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-
81689. Neither did he ever agree, impliedly or
expressly, to a mere provisional dismissal of
the cases. In fact, in his reply filed with the
Court of Appeals, respondent emphasized
that:
... An examination of the Motion for Judicial
Determination of Probable Cause and for
Examination of Prosecution Witnesses filed
by the petitioner and his other co-accused in
the said criminal cases would show that the
petitioner did not pray for the dismissal of
the case. On the contrary, the reliefs prayed
for therein by the petitioner are: (1) a judicial
determination of probable cause pursuant to
Section 2, Article III of the Constitution; and
(2) that warrants for the arrest of the accused
be withheld, or if issued, recalled in the
meantime until the resolution of the
motion. It cannot be said, therefore, that the
dismissal of the case was made with the
consent of the petitioner. A copy of the
aforesaid motion is hereto attached and
made integral part hereof as Annex A. [19]
During the hearing in the Court of Appeals on
July 31, 2001, the respondent, through
counsel, categorically, unequivocally, and
definitely declared that he did not file any
motion to dismiss the criminal cases nor did
he agree to a provisional dismissal thereof,
thus:
JUSTICE SALONGA:
And it is your stand that the dismissal made by the
Court was provisional in nature?
ATTY. FORTUN:
It was in (sic) that the accused did not ask for it. What
they wanted at the onset was simply a judicial
determination of probable cause for warrants of arrest
issued. Then Judge Agnir, upon the presentation by the
parties of their witnesses, particularly those who had
withdrawn their affidavits, made one further conclusion
that not only was this case lacking in probable cause for
purposes of the issuance of an arrest warrant but also it
did not justify proceeding to trial.
JUSTICE SALONGA:
And it is expressly provided under Section 8 that a case
shall not be provisionally dismissed except when it is
with the express conformity of the accused.
ATTY. FORTUN:
That is correct, Your Honor.
JUSTICE SALONGA:
And with notice to the offended party.
ATTY. FORTUN:
That is correct, Your Honor.
JUSTICE SALONGA:
Was there an express conformity on the part of the
accused?
ATTY. FORTUN:
There was none, Your Honor. We were not asked to sign
any order, or any statement, which would normally be
required by the Court on pre-trial or on other matters,
including other provisional dismissal. My very limited
practice in criminal courts, Your Honor, had taught me
that a judge must be very careful on this matter of
provisional dismissal. In fact they ask the accused to
come forward, and the judge himself or herself explains
the implications of a provisional dismissal. Pumapayag
ka ba dito. Puwede bang pumirma ka?
JUSTICE ROSARIO:
You were present during the proceedings?
ATTY. FORTUN:
Yes, Your Honor.
JUSTICE ROSARIO:
You represented the petitioner in this case?
ATTY. FORTUN:
That is correct, Your Honor. And there was nothing of
that sort which the good Judge Agnir, who is most
knowledgeable in criminal law, had done in respect of
provisional dismissal or the matter of Mr. Lacson
agreeing to the provisional dismissal of the case.
JUSTICE GUERRERO:
Now, you filed a motion, the other accused then filed a
motion for a judicial determination of probable cause?
ATTY. FORTUN:
Yes, Your Honor.
JUSTICE GUERRERO:
Did you make any alternative prayer in your motion that
if there is no probable cause what should the Court do?
ATTY. FORTUN:
That the arrest warrants only be withheld. That was the
only prayer that we asked. In fact, I have a copy of that
particular motion, and if I may read my prayer before
the Court, it said: Wherefore, it is respectfully prayed
that (1) a judicial determination of probable cause
pursuant to Section 2, Article III of the Constitution be
conducted, and for this purpose, an order be issued
directing the prosecution to present the private
complainants and their witnesses at the scheduled
hearing for that purpose; and (2) the warrants for the
arrest of the accused be withheld, or, if issued, recalled
in the meantime until resolution of this incident.
JUSTICE GUERRERO:
There is no general prayer for any further relief?
ATTY. FORTUN:
There is but it simply says other equitable reliefs are
prayed for.
JUSTICE GUERRERO:
Dont you surmise Judge Agnir, now a member of this
Court, precisely addressed your prayer for just and
equitable relief to dismiss the case because what would
be the net effect of a situation where there is no
warrant of arrest being issued without dismissing the
case?
ATTY. FORTUN:
Yes, Your Honor. I will not second say (sic) yes the Good
Justice, but what is plain is we did not agree to the
provisional dismissal, neither were we asked to sign any
assent to the provisional dismissal.
JUSTICE GUERRERO:
If you did not agree to the provisional dismissal did you
not file any motion for reconsideration of the order of
Judge Agnir that the case should be dismissed?
ATTY. FORTUN:
I did not, Your Honor, because I knew fully well at that
time that my client had already been arraigned, and the
arraignment was valid as far as I was concerned. So, the
dismissal, Your Honor, by Judge Agnir operated to
benefit me, and therefore I did not take any further step
in addition to rocking the boat or clarifying the matter
further because it probably could prejudice the interest
of my client.
JUSTICE GUERRERO:
Continue.[20]
In his memorandum in lieu of the oral
argument filed with the Court of Appeals, the
respondent declared in no uncertain terms
that:
Soon thereafter, the SC in early 1999
rendered a decision declaring the
Sandiganbayan without jurisdiction over the
cases. The records were remanded to the QC
RTC: Upon raffle, the case was assigned to
Branch 81. Petitioner and the others
promptly filed a motion for judicial
determination of probable cause (Annex
B). He asked that warrants for his arrest not
be issued. He did not move for the dismissal
of the Informations, contrary to respondent
OSGs claim. [21]
The respondents admissions made in the
course of the proceedings in the Court of
Appeals are binding and conclusive on
him. The respondent is barred from
repudiating his admissions absent evidence of
palpable mistake in making such
admissions.[22]
To apply the new rule in Criminal Cases Nos.
Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 would be to add
to or make exceptions from the new rule
which are not expressly or impliedly included
therein.This the Court cannot and should not
do.[23]
The Court also agrees with the petitioners
contention that no notice of any motion for
the provisional dismissal of Criminal Cases
Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 or of the
hearing thereon was served on the heirs of
the victims at least three days before said
hearing as mandated by Rule 15, Section 4 of
the Rules of Court. It must be borne in mind
that in crimes involving private interests, the
new rule requires that the offended party or
parties or the heirs of the victims must be
given adequate a priori notice of any motion
for the provisional dismissal of the criminal
case. Such notice may be served on the
offended party or the heirs of the victim
through the private prosecutor, if there is
one, or through the public prosecutor who in
turn must relay the notice to the offended
party or the heirs of the victim to enable
them to confer with him before the hearing
or appear in court during the hearing. The
proof of such service must be shown during
the hearing on the motion, otherwise, the
requirement of the new rule will become
illusory. Such notice will enable the offended
party or the heirs of the victim the
opportunity to seasonably and effectively
comment on or object to the motion on valid
grounds, including: (a) the collusion between
the prosecution and the accused for the
provisional dismissal of a criminal case
thereby depriving the State of its right to due
process; (b) attempts to make witnesses
unavailable; or (c) the provisional dismissal of
the case with the consequent release of the
accused from detention would enable him to
threaten and kill the offended party or the
other prosecution witnesses or flee from
Philippine jurisdiction, provide opportunity
for the destruction or loss of the prosecutions
physical and other evidence and prejudice
the rights of the offended party to recover on
the civil liability of the accused by his
concealment or furtive disposition of his
property or the consequent lifting of the writ
of preliminary attachment against his
property.
In the case at bar, even if the respondents
motion for a determination of probable cause
and examination of witnesses may be
considered for the nonce as his motion for a
provisional dismissal of Criminal Cases Nos.
Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689, however, the
heirs of the victims were not notified thereof
prior to the hearing on said motion on March
22, 1999. It must be stressed that the
respondent filed his motion only on March
17, 1999 and set it for hearing on March 22,
1999 or barely five days from the filing
thereof. Although the public prosecutor was
served with a copy of the motion, the records
do not show that notices thereof were
separately given to the heirs of the victims or
that subpoenae were issued to and received
by them, including those who executed their
affidavits of desistance who were residents of
Dipolog City or Pian, Zamboanga del Norte or
Palompon, Leyte. There is as well no proof
[24]
in the records that the public prosecutor
notified the heirs of the victims of said
motion or of the hearing thereof on March
22, 1999. Although Atty. Valdez entered his
appearance as private prosecutor, he did so
[25]
only for some but not all the close kins of the
victims, namely, Nenita Alap-ap, Imelda
Montero, Margarita Redillas, Rufino Siplon,
Carmelita Elcamel, Myrna Abalora, and
Leonora Amora who (except for Rufino
Siplon) executed their respective affidavits
[26]
of desistance. There was no appearance for
[27]
the heirs of Alex Neri, Pacifico Montero, Jr.,
and Meleubren Sorronda. There is no proof
on record that all the heirs of the victims
were served with copies of the resolution of
Judge Agnir, Jr. dismissing the said cases. In
fine, there never was any attempt on the part
of the trial court, the public prosecutor
and/or the private prosecutor to notify all the
heirs of the victims of the respondents
motion and the hearing thereon and of the
resolution of Judge Agnir, Jr. dismissing said
cases. The said heirs were thus deprived of
their right to be heard on the respondents
motion and to protect their interests either in
the trial court or in the appellate court.
Since the conditions sine qua non for the
application of the new rule were not present
when Judge Agnir, Jr. issued his resolution,
the State is not barred by the time limit set
forth in the second paragraph of Section 8 of
Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure. The State can thus revive or refile
Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-
81689 or file new Informations for multiple
murder against the respondent.
II. THE TIME-BAR IN SECTION 8, RULE 117 OF
THE REVISED RULES OF CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE SHOULD NOT BE APPLIED
RETROACTIVELY.
The petitioners contend that even on the
assumption that the respondent expressly
consented to a provisional dismissal of
Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-
81689 and all the heirs of the victims were
notified of the respondents motion before
the hearing thereon and were served with
copies of the resolution of Judge Agnir, Jr.
dismissing the eleven cases, the two-year bar
in Section 8 of Rule 117 of the Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure should be applied
prospectively and not retroactively against
the State. To apply the time limit
retroactively to the criminal cases against the
respondent and his co-accused would violate
the right of the People to due process, and
unduly impair, reduce, and diminish the
States substantive right to prosecute the
accused for multiple murder. They posit that
under Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code,
the State had twenty years within which to
file the criminal complaints against the
accused. However, under the new rule, the
State only had two years from notice of the
public prosecutor of the order of dismissal of
Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-
81689 within which to revive the said
cases. When the new rule took effect on
December 1, 2000, the State only had one
year and three months within which to revive
the cases or refile the Informations. The
period for the State to charge respondent for
multiple murder under Article 90 of the
Revised Penal Code was considerably and
arbitrarily reduced. They submit that in case
of conflict between the Revised Penal Code
and the new rule, the former should
prevail. They also insist that the State had
consistently relied on the prescriptive periods
under Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code. It
was not accorded a fair warning that it would
forever be barred beyond the two-year
period by a retroactive application of the new
rule. Petitioners thus pray to the Court to
[28]
set aside its Resolution of May 28, 2002.
For his part, the respondent asserts that the
new rule under Section 8 of Rule 117 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure may be
applied retroactively since there is no
substantive right of the State that may be
impaired by its application to the criminal
cases in question since [t]he States witnesses
were ready, willing and able to provide their
testimony but the prosecution failed to act on
these cases until it became politically
expedient in April 2001 for them to do
so. According to the respondent, penal laws,
[29]
either procedural or substantive, may be
retroactively applied so long as they favor the
accused. He asserts that the two-year
[30]
period commenced to run on March 29, 1999
and lapsed two years thereafter was more
than reasonable opportunity for the State to
fairly indict him. In any event, the State is
[31]
given the right under the Courts assailed
Resolution to justify the filing of the
Information in Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102
to 01-101112 beyond the time-bar under the
new rule.
The respondent insists that Section 8 of Rule
117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure does not broaden the substantive
right of double jeopardy to the prejudice of
the State because the prohibition against the
revival of the cases within the one-year or
two-year periods provided therein is a legal
concept distinct from the prohibition against
the revival of a provisionally dismissed case
within the periods stated in Section 8 of Rule
117. Moreover, he claims that the effects of a
provisional dismissal under said rule do not
modify or negate the operation of the
prescriptive period under Article 90 of the
Revised Penal Code. Prescription under the
Revised Penal Code simply becomes
irrelevant upon the application of Section 8,
Rule 117 because a complaint or information
has already been filed against the accused,
which filing tolls the running of the
prescriptive period under Article 90. [32]
The Court agrees with the respondent that
the new rule is not a statute of
limitations. Statutes of limitations are
construed as acts of grace, and a surrender
by the sovereign of its right to prosecute or of
its right to prosecute at its discretion. Such
statutes are considered as equivalent to acts
of amnesty founded on the liberal theory that
prosecutions should not be allowed to
ferment endlessly in the files of the
government to explode only after witnesses
and proofs necessary for the protection of
the accused have by sheer lapse of time
passed beyond availability. The periods
[33]
fixed under such statutes are jurisdictional
and are essential elements of the offenses
covered. [34]
On the other hand, the time-bar under
Section 8 of Rule 117 is akin to a special
procedural limitation qualifying the right of
the State to prosecute making the time-bar
new rule, the effect is basically the same. As
the State Supreme Court of Illinois held:
This, in effect, enacts that when the specified
period shall have arrived, the right of the
state to prosecute shall be gone, and the
liability of the offender to be punishedto be
deprived of his libertyshall cease. Its terms
not only strike down the right of action which
the state had acquired by the offense, but
also remove the flaw which the crime had
created in the offenders title to liberty. In this
respect, its language goes deeper than
statutes barring civil remedies usually
do. They expressly take away only the
remedy by suit, and that inferentially is held
to abate the right which such remedy would
enforce, and perfect the title which such
remedy would invade; but this statute is
aimed directly at the very right which the
state has against the offenderthe right to
punish, as the only liability which the
offender has incurred, and declares that this
right and this liability are at an end.[41]

an essence of the given right or as an
inherent part thereof, so that the lapse of the
time-bar operates to extinguish the right of
the State to prosecute the accused.
The time-bar under the new rule does not
reduce the periods under Article 90 of the
Revised Penal Code, a substantive law. It is
The Court agrees with the respondent that
procedural laws may be applied
retroactively. As applied to criminal law,
[35]
procedural law provides or regulates the
steps by which one who has committed a
crime is to be punished. In Tan, Jr. v. Court
[36]
of Appeals, this Court held that:
[42]

but a limitation of the right of the State to
revive a criminal case against the accused
after the Information had been filed but
subsequently provisionally dismissed with the
express consent of the accused. Upon the
lapse of the timeline under the new rule, the
State is presumed, albeit disputably, to have
abandoned or waived its right to revive the
case and prosecute the accused. The
dismissal becomes ipso factopermanent. He
can no longer be charged anew for the same
crime or another crime necessarily included
therein. He is spared from the anguish and
[37]
anxiety as well as the expenses in any new
indictments. The State may revive a criminal
[38]
case beyond the one-year or two-year
periods provided that there is a justifiable
necessity for the delay. By the same token,
[39]
if a criminal case is dismissed on motion of
the accused because the trial is not
concluded within the period therefor, the
prescriptive periods under the Revised Penal
Code are not thereby diminished. But [40]
whether or not the prosecution of the
accused is barred by the statute of limitations
or by the lapse of the time-line under the
Statutes regulating the procedure of the
courts will be construed as applicable to
actions pending and undetermined at the
time of their passage. Procedural laws are
retroactive in that sense and to that
extent.The fact that procedural statutes may
somehow affect the litigants rights may not
preclude their retroactive application to
pending actions. The retroactive application
of procedural laws is not violative of any right
of a person who may feel that he is adversely
affected. Nor is the retroactive application of
procedural statutes constitutionally
objectionable. The reason is that as a general
rule no vested right may attach to, nor arise
from, procedural laws. It has been held that a
person has no vested right in any particular
remedy, and a litigant cannot insist on the
application to the trial of his case, whether
civil or criminal, of any other than the existing
rules of procedure.
It further ruled therein that a procedural law
may not be applied retroactively if to do so
would work injustice or would involve
intricate problems of due process or impair
the independence of the Court. In a per
curiam decision in Cipriano v. City of
Houma, the United States Supreme Court
[43]
ruled that where a decision of the court
would produce substantial inequitable results
if applied retroactively, there is ample basis
for avoiding the injustice of hardship by a
holding of nonretroactivity. A construction
[44]
of which a statute is fairly susceptible is
favored, which will avoid all objectionable,
mischievous, indefensible, wrongful, and
injurious consequences. This Court should
[45]
not adopt an interpretation of a statute
which produces absurd, unreasonable,
unjust, or oppressive results if such
interpretation could be avoided. Time and
[46]
again, this Court has decreed that statutes
are to be construed in light of the purposes to
be achieved and the evils sought to be
remedied. In construing a statute, the reason
for the enactment should be kept in mind and
the statute should be construed with
reference to the intended scope and
purpose. [47]
Remedial legislation, or procedural rule, or
doctrine of the Court designed to enhance
and implement the constitutional rights of
parties in criminal proceedings may be
applied retroactively or prospectively
depending upon several factors, such as the
history of the new rule, its purpose and
effect, and whether the retrospective
application will further its operation, the
particular conduct sought to be remedied and
the effect thereon in the administration of
justice and of criminal laws in particular. In
[48]
a per curiam decision in Stefano v.
Woods, the United States Supreme Court
[49]
catalogued the factors in determining
whether a new rule or doctrine enunciated by
the High Court should be given retrospective
or prospective effect:
(a) the purpose to be served by the new
standards, (b) the extent of the reliance by
law enforcement authorities on the old
standards, and (c) the effect on the
administration of justice of a retroactive
application of the new standards.
In this case, the Court agrees with the
petitioners that the time-bar of two years
under the new rule should not be applied
retroactively against the State.
In the new rule in question, as now construed
by the Court, it has fixed a time-bar of one
year or two years for the revival of criminal
cases provisionally dismissed with the express
consent of the accused and with a
priori notice to the offended party. The time-
bar may appear, on first impression,
unreasonable compared to the periods under
Article 90 of the Revised Penal
Code. However, in fixing the time-bar, the
Court balanced the societal interests and
those of the accused for the orderly and
speedy disposition of criminal cases with
minimum prejudice to the State and the
accused. It took into account the substantial
rights of both the State and of the accused to
due process. The Court believed that the time
limit is a reasonable period for the State to
revive provisionally dismissed cases with the
consent of the accused and notice to the
offended parties. The time-bar fixed by the
Court must be respected unless it is shown
that the period is manifestly short or
insufficient that the rule becomes a denial of
justice. The petitioners failed to show a
[50]
manifest shortness or insufficiency of the
time-bar.
The new rule was conceptualized by the
Committee on the Revision of the Rules and
approved by the Court en banc primarily to
enhance the administration of the criminal
justice system and the rights to due process
of the State and the accused by eliminating
the deleterious practice of trial courts of
provisionally dismissing criminal cases on
motion of either the prosecution or the
accused or jointly, either with no time-bar for
the revival thereof or with a specific or
definite period for such revival by the public
prosecutor. There were times when such
criminal cases were no longer revived or
refiled due to causes beyond the control of
the public prosecutor or because of the
indolence, apathy or the lackadaisical
attitude of public prosecutors to the
prejudice of the State and the accused
despite the mandate to public prosecutors
and trial judges to expedite criminal
proceedings. [51]
It is almost a universal experience that the
accused welcomes delay as it usually
operates in his favor, especially if he greatly
[52]
fears the consequences of his trial and
conviction. He is hesitant to disturb the
hushed inaction by which dominant cases
have been known to expire. [53]
The inordinate delay in the revival or refiling
of criminal cases may impair or reduce the
capacity of the State to prove its case with
the disappearance or nonavailability of its
witnesses.Physical evidence may have been
lost. Memories of witnesses may have grown
dim or have faded. Passage of time makes
proof of any fact more difficult. The accused
[54]
may become a fugitive from justice or
commit another crime. The longer the lapse
of time from the dismissal of the case to the
revival thereof, the more difficult it is to
prove the crime.
On the other side of the fulcrum, a mere
provisional dismissal of a criminal case does
not terminate a criminal case. The possibility
that the case may be revived at any time may
disrupt or reduce, if not derail, the chances of
the accused for employment, curtail his
association, subject him to public obloquy
and create anxiety in him and his family. He is
unable to lead a normal life because of
community suspicion and his own anxiety. He
continues to suffer those penalties and
disabilities incompatible with the
presumption of innocence. He may also lose
[55]
his witnesses or their memories may fade
with the passage of time. In the long run, it
may diminish his capacity to defend himself
and thus eschew the fairness of the entire
criminal justice system.[56]
The time-bar under the new rule was fixed by
the Court to excise the malaise that plagued
the administration of the criminal justice
system for the benefit of the State and the
accused; not for the accused only.
The Court agrees with the petitioners that to
apply the time-bar retroactively so that the
two-year period commenced to run on March
31, 1999 when the public prosecutor received
his copy of the resolution of Judge Agnir, Jr.
dismissing the criminal cases is inconsistent
with the intendment of the new rule. Instead
of giving the State two years to revive
provisionally dismissed cases, the State had
considerably less than two years to do
so. Thus, Judge Agnir, Jr. dismissed Criminal
Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 on
March 29, 1999. The new rule took effect on
December 1, 2000. If the Court applied the
new time-bar retroactively, the State would
have only one year and three months or until
March 31, 2001 within which to revive these
criminal cases. The period is short of the two-
year period fixed under the new rule. On the
other hand, if the time limit is applied
prospectively, the State would have two
years from December 1, 2000 or until
December 1, 2002 within which to revive the
cases. This is in consonance with the
intendment of the new rule in fixing the time-
bar and thus prevent injustice to the State
and avoid absurd, unreasonable, oppressive,
injurious, and wrongful results in the
administration of justice.
The period from April 1, 1999 to November
30, 1999 should be excluded in the
computation of the two-year period because
the rule prescribing it was not yet in effect at
the time and the State could not be expected
to comply with the time-bar. It cannot even
be argued that the State waived its right to
revive the criminal cases against respondent
or that it was negligent for not reviving them
within the two-year period under the new
rule. As the United States Supreme Court
said, per Justice Felix Frankfurter, in Griffin v.
People: [57]
We should not indulge in the fiction that the
law now announced has always been the law
and, therefore, that those who did not avail
themselves of it waived their rights .
The two-year period fixed in the new rule is
for the benefit of both the State and the
accused. It should not be emasculated and
reduced by an inordinate retroactive
application of the time-bar therein provided
merely to benefit the accused. For to do so
would cause an injustice of hardship to the
State and adversely affect the administration
of justice in general and of criminal laws in
particular.
To require the State to give a valid
justification as a condition sine qua non to
the revival of a case provisionally dismissed
with the express consent of the accused
before the effective date of the new rule is to
assume that the State is obliged to comply
with the time-bar under the new rule before
it took effect. This would be a rank denial of
justice. The State must be given a period of
one year or two years as the case may be
from December 1, 2000 to revive the criminal
case without requiring the State to make a
valid justification for not reviving the case
before the effective date of the new
rule. Although in criminal cases, the accused
is entitled to justice and fairness, so is the
State. As the United States Supreme Court
said, per Mr. Justice Benjamin Cardozo,
in Snyder v. State of Massachussetts, the
[58]
concept of fairness must not be strained till it
is narrowed to a filament. We are to keep the
balance true. In Dimatulac v. Villon, this
[59]
Court emphasized that the judges action
must not impair the substantial rights of the
accused nor the right of the State and
offended party to due process of law. This
Court further said:
Indeed, for justice to prevail, the scales must
balance; justice is not to be dispensed for the
accused alone. The interests of society and
the offended parties which have been
wronged must be equally considered. Verily,
a verdict of conviction is not necessarily a
denial of justice; and an acquittal is not
necessarily a triumph of justice, for, to the
society offended and the party wronged, it
could also mean injustice. Justice then must
be rendered even-handedly to both the
accused, on one hand, and the State and
offended party, on the other.
In this case, the eleven Informations in
Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01-101112
were filed with the Regional Trial Court on
June 6, 2001 well within the two-year period.
In sum, this Court finds the motion for
reconsideration of petitioners meritorious.
IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the
petitioners Motion for Reconsideration is
GRANTED. The Resolution of this Court, dated
May 28, 2002, is SET ASIDE. The Decision of
the Court of Appeals, dated August 24, 2001,
in CA-G.R. SP No. 65034 is REVERSED. The
Petition of the Respondent with the Regional
Trial Court in Civil Case No. 01-100933 is
DISMISSED for being moot and academic. The
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch
81, is DIRECTED to forthwith proceed with
Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01-101112
with deliberate dispatch.
No pronouncements as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
SUSAN GO and the PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, petitioners, vs.
FERNANDO L.
DIMAGIBA, respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Administrative Circular 12-2000, as
clarified by Administrative Circular 13-
2001, merely establishes a rule of
preference in imposing penalties for
violations of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (BP
22), the Bouncing Checks Law. When the
circumstances of both the offense and the
offender indicate good faith or a clear
mistake of fact without taint of negligence,
the imposition of a fine alone -- instead of
imprisonment -- is the preferred penalty.
As the Circular requires a review of the
factual circumstances of a given case, it
applies only to pending or future
litigations. It is not a penal law; hence, it
does not have retroactive effect. Neither
may it be used to modify final judgments of
conviction.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review[1] under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing
the October 10, 2001[2] and the October
11, 2001[3] Orders of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) (Branch 5), Baguio
City.[4] The October 10, 2001 Order
released Respondent Fernando L.
Dimagiba from confinement and required
him to pay a fine of P100,000 in lieu of
imprisonment. The October 11, 2001
Order disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, [in] applying the doctrine as
held in the above-entitled cases in this case,
the instant petition for Habeas Corpus should
be, as it is hereby, GRANTED. The Baguio City
Jail Warden is hereby ordered to
IMMEDIATELY RELEASE the petitioner from
confinement unless he is being held for some
other lawful cause other than by virtue of the
Sentence Mittimus dated September 28,
2001 issued by CESAR S. VIDUYA, Clerk of
Court, MTC 4, Baguio City. Further, the
petitioner is required to pay a fine in the
amount of P100,000.00 in lieu of his
imprisonment, in addition to the civil aspect
of the Joint Judgment rendered by MTC 4
dated July 16, 1999.[5]
The Facts
The pertinent facts are not disputed.
Respondent Fernando L. Dimagiba
issued to Petitioner Susan Go thirteen
(13) checks which, when presented to the
drawee bank for encashment or payment
on the due dates, were dishonored for the
reason account closed.[6] Dimagiba was
subsequently prosecuted for 13 counts of
violation of BP 22[7] under separate
Complaints filed with the Municipal Trial
Court in Cities (MTCC) in Baguio
City.[8] After a joint trial, the MTCC
(Branch 4) rendered a Decision on July
16, 1999, convicting the accused in the 13
cases. The dispositive portion reads as
follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing
disquisition, this Court finds the evidence of
the prosecution to have established the guilt
of the accused beyond reasonable doubt of
the offenses charged and imposes upon the
accused the penalty of 3 months
imprisonment for each count (13 counts) and
to indemnify the offended party the amount
of One Million Two Hundred Ninety Five
Thousand Pesos (P1,295,000.00) with legal
interest per annum commencing from 1996
after the checks were dishonored by reason
ACCOUNT CLOSED on December 13, 1995, to
pay attorneys fees of P15,000.00 and to pay
the costs.[9]
The appeal of Dimagiba was raffled to
Branch 4 of the RTC in Baguio City.[10] On
May 23, 2000, the RTC denied the appeal
and sustained his conviction.[11] There
being no further appeal to the Court of
Appeals (CA), the RTC issued on
February 1, 2001, a Certificate of Finality
of the Decision.[12]
Thus, on February 14, 2001, the MTCC
issued an Order directing the arrest of
Dimagiba for the service of his sentence
as a result of his conviction. The trial court
also issued a Writ of Execution to enforce
his civil liability.[13]
On February 27, 2001, Dimagiba filed a
Motion for Reconsideration of the MTCC
Order. He prayed for the recall of the
Order of Arrest and the modification of the
final Decision, arguing that the penalty of
fine only, instead of imprisonment also,
should have been imposed on him.[14] The
arguments raised in that Motion were
reiterated in a Motion for the Partial
Quashal of the Writ of Execution filed on
February 28, 2001.[15]
In an Order dated August 22, 2001, the
MTCC denied the Motion for
Reconsideration and directed the
issuance of a Warrant of Arrest against
Dimagiba.[16] On September 28, 2001, he
was arrested and imprisoned for the
service of his sentence.
On October 9, 2001, he filed with the RTC
of Baguio City a Petition[17] for a writ of
habeas corpus. The case was raffled to
Branch 5, which scheduled the hearing for
October 10, 2001. Copies of the Order
were served on respondents counsels
and the city warden.[18]
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
Right after hearing the case on October
10, 2001, the RTC issued an Order
directing the immediate release of
Dimagiba from confinement and requiring
him to pay a fine of P100,000 in lieu of
imprisonment. However, the civil aspect
of the July 16, 1999 MTCC Decision was
not touched upon.[19] A subsequent Order,
explaining in greater detail the basis of
the grant of the writ of habeas corpus,
was issued on October 11, 2001.[20]
In justifying its modification of the MTCC
Decision, the RTC invoked Vaca v. Court
of Appeals[21] and Supreme Court
Administrative Circular (SC-AC) No. 12-
2000,[22] which allegedly required the
imposition of a fine only instead of
imprisonment also for BP 22 violations, if
the accused was not a recidivist or a
habitual delinquent. The RTC held that
this rule should be retroactively applied in
favor of Dimagiba.[23] It further noted that
(1) he was a first-time offender and an
employer of at least 200 workers who
would be displaced as a result of his
imprisonment; and (2) the civil liability had
already been satisfied through the levy of
his properties.[24]
On October 22, 2001, Petitioner Go filed a
Motion for Reconsideration of the RTC
Orders dated October 10 and 11,
2001.[25] That Motion was denied on
January 18, 2002.[26]
Hence, this Petition filed directly with this
Court on pure questions of law.[27]
The Issues
Petitioner raises the following issues for
this Courts consideration:
1. [The RTC] Judge was utterly devoid of
jurisdiction in amending a final and conclusive
decision of the Municipal Trial Court, Branch
4, dated July 16, 1999, in nullifying the
Sentence Mittimus, dated September 28,
2001, issued by x x x [the] Municipal Trial
Court, Branch 4, Baguio City, and in ordering
the release of [Dimagiba] from confinement
in jail for the service of his sentence under
the said final and conclusive judgment;
2. Assuming only for the sake of argument
that habeas corpus is the proper remedy, the
Petition for Habeas Corpus is utterly devoid
of merit as [Dimagiba was] not entitled to the
beneficent policy enunciated in the Eduardo
Vaca and Rosa Lim cases and reiterated in the
Supreme Court Circular No. 12-2000; x x x
3. Granting for the sake of argument that
[Dimagiba was] entitled to the beneficent
policy enunciated in the Eduardo
Vaca and Rosa Lim cases and reiterated in the
Supreme Court Circular No. 12-2000, the
minimum fine that should be imposed on
[Dimagiba] is one million and two hundred
ninety five thousand pesos (P1,295,000.00)
up to double the said amount or
(P2,590,000), not just the measly amount
of P100,000; and
4. [The RTC] judge committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in hearing and deciding
[Dimagibas] Petition for Habeas Corpus
without notice and without affording
procedural due process to the People of the
Philippines through the Office of [the] City
Prosecutor of Baguio City or the Office of the
Solicitor General.[28]
In the main, the case revolves around the
question of whether the Petition for
habeas corpus was validly granted.
Hence, the Court will discuss the four
issues as they intertwine with this main
question.[29]
The Courts Ruling
The Petition is meritorious.
Main Issue:
Propriety of the
Writ of Habeas Corpus
The writ of habeas corpus applies to all
cases of illegal confinement or detention
in which individuals are deprived of
liberty.[30] It was devised as a speedy and
effectual remedy to relieve persons from
unlawful restraint; or, more specifically, to
obtain immediate relief for those who may
have been illegally confined or imprisoned
without sufficient cause and thus deliver
them from unlawful custody.[31] It is
therefore a writ of inquiry intended to test
the circumstances under which a person
is detained.[32]
The writ may not be availed of when the
person in custody is under a judicial
process or by virtue of a valid
judgment.[33] However, as a post-
conviction remedy, it may be allowed
when, as a consequence of a judicial
proceeding, any of the following
exceptional circumstances is attendant:
(1) there has been a deprivation of a
constitutional right resulting in the
restraint of a person; (2) the court had no
jurisdiction to impose the sentence; or (3)
the imposed penalty has been
excessive, thus voiding the sentence as
to such excess.[34]
In the present case, the Petition for a writ
of habeas corpus was anchored on the
ruling in Vaca and on SC-AC No. 12-
2000, which allegedly prescribed the
imposition of a fine, not imprisonment, for
convictions under BP 22. Respondent
sought the retroactive effect of those
rulings, thereby effectively challenging the
penalty imposed on him for being
excessive. From his allegations, the
Petition appeared sufficient in form to
support the issuance of the writ.
However, it appears that respondent has
previously sought the modification of his
sentence in a Motion for
Reconsideration[35] of the MTCCs
Execution Order and in a Motion for the
Partial Quashal of the Writ of
Execution.[36] Both were denied by the
MTCC on the ground that it had no power
or authority to amend a judgment issued
by the RTC.
In his Petition for habeas corpus,
respondent raised the same arguments
that he had invoked in the said Motions.
We believe that his resort to this
extraordinary remedy was a procedural
infirmity. The remedy should have been
an appeal of the MTCC Order denying his
Motions, in which he should have prayed
that the execution of the judgment be
stayed. But he effectively misused the
action he had chosen, obviously with the
intent of finding a favorable court. His
Petition for a writ of habeas corpus was
clearly an attempt to reopen a case that
had already become final and executory.
Such an action deplorably amounted to
forum shopping. Respondent should have
resorted to the proper, available remedy
instead of instituting a different action in
another forum.
The Court also finds his arguments for his
release insubstantial to support the
issuance of the writ of habeas corpus.
Preference in the
Application of Penalties
for Violation of BP 22
The following alternative penalties are
imposable under BP 22: (1) imprisonment
of not less than 30 days, but not more
than one year; (2) a fine of not less or
more than double the amount of the
check, a fine that shall in no case
exceed P200,000; or (3) both such fine
and imprisonment, at the discretion of the
court.[37]
SC-AC No. 12-2000, as clarified by SC-
AC No. 13-2001,[38] established a rule of
preference in imposing the above
penalties.[39] When the circumstances of
the case clearly indicate good faith or a
clear mistake of fact without taint of
negligence, the imposition of a fine alone
may be considered as the preferred
penalty.[40] The determination of the
circumstances that warrant the imposition
of a fine rests upon the trial judge
only.[41] Should the judge deem that
imprisonment is appropriate, such penalty
may be imposed.[42]
SC-AC No. 12-2000 did not delete the
alternative penalty of imprisonment. The
competence to amend the law belongs to
the legislature, not to this Court.[43]
Inapplicability of
SC-AC No. 12-2000
Petitioners argue that respondent is not
entitled to the benevolent policy
enunciated in SC-AC No. 12-2000,
because he is not a first time
offender.[44] This circumstance is,
however, not the sole factor in
determining whether he deserves the
preferred penalty of fine alone. The
penalty to be imposed depends on the
peculiar circumstances of each case.[45] It
is the trial courts discretion to impose any
penalty within the confines of the law. SC-
AC No. 13-2001 explains thus:
x x x. Administrative Circular No. 12-2000
establishes a rule of preference in the
application of the penal provisions of BP 22
such that where the circumstances of both
the offense and the offender clearly indicate
good faith or a clear mistake of fact without
taint of negligence, the imposition of a fine
alone should be considered as the more
appropriate penalty. Needless to say, the
determination of whether the circumstances
warrant the imposition of a fine alone rests
solely upon the Judge. x x x.
It is, therefore, understood that:
xxxxxxxxx
2. The Judges concerned, may in the exercise
of sound discretion, and taking into
consideration the peculiar circumstances of
each case, determine whether the imposition
of a fine alone would best serve the interests
of justice, or whether forbearing to impose
imprisonment would depreciate the
seriousness of the offense, work violence on
the social order, or otherwise be contrary to
the imperatives of justice;
The Court notes that the Petition for a writ
of habeas corpus relied mainly on the
alleged retroactivity of SC-AC No. 12-
2000, which supposedly favored BP 22
offenders.[46] On this point, Dimagiba
contended that his imprisonment was
violative of his right to equal protection of
the laws, since only a fine would be
imposed on others similarly situated.[47]
The rule on retroactivity states that
criminal laws may be applied retroactively
if favorable to the accused. This principle,
embodied in the Revised Penal
Code,[48] has been expanded in certain
instances to cover special laws.[49]
The issue of retroactivity of SC-AC No.
12-2000 was settled in De Joya v. Jail
Warden of Batangas City,[50] which we
quote:
Petitioner's reliance of our ruling in Ordoez v.
Vinarao that a convicted person is entitled to
benefit from the reduction of penalty
introduced by the new law, citing People v.
Simon, is misplaced. Thus, her plea that as
provided for in Article 22 of the Revised Penal
Code, SC Admin. Circular No. 12-2000 as
modified by SC Admin. Circular No. 13-2001
should benefit her has no basis.
First. SC Admin. Circular No. 12-2000 is not a
penal law; hence, Article 22 of the Revised
Penal Code is not applicable. The circular
applies only to those cases pending as of the
date of its effectivity and not to cases already
terminated by final judgment.
Second. As explained by the Court in SC
Admin. Circular No. 13-2001, SC Admin.
Circular No. 12-2000 merely lays down a rule
of preference in the application of the
penalties for violation of B.P. Blg. 22. It does
not amend B.P. Blg. 22, nor defeat the
legislative intent behind the law. SC Admin.
Circular No. 12-2000 merely urges the courts
to take into account not only the purpose of
the law but also the circumstances of the
accused -- whether he acted in good faith or
on a clear mistake of fact without taint of
negligence -- and such other circumstance
which the trial court or the appellate court
believes relevant to the penalty to be
imposed.[51]
Because the Circular merely lays down a
rule of preference, it serves only as a
guideline for the trial courts. Thus, it is
addressed to the judges, who are directed
to consider the factual circumstances of
each case prior to imposing the
appropriate penalty. In other words, the
Administrative Circular does not confer
any new right in favor of the accused,
much less those convicted by final
judgment.
The competence to determine the proper
penalty belongs to the court rendering the
decision against the accused.[52] That
decision is subject only to appeal on
grounds of errors of fact or law, or grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction. Another trial court
may not encroach upon this authority.
Indeed, SC-AC No. 12-2000 necessarily
requires a review of all factual
circumstances of each case. Such a
review can no longer be done if the
judgment has become final and
executory.
In the present case, the MTCC of Baguio
City had full knowledge of all relevant
circumstances from which respondents
conviction and sentence were based. The
penalty imposed was well within the
confines of the law. Upon appeal, the
conviction was sustained by RTC-Branch
4 of Baguio City. Eventually, the Decision
attained finality. Hence, RTC-Branch 5 did
not have the jurisdiction to modify the
lawful judgment in the guise of granting a
writ of habeas corpus.
The doctrine of equal protection of
laws[53] does not apply for the same
reasons as those on retroactivity.
Foremost of these reasons is that the
Circular is not a law that deletes the
penalty of imprisonment. As explained
earlier, it is merely a rule of preference as
to which penalty should be imposed under
the peculiar circumstances of a case. At
any rate, this matter deserves scant
consideration, because respondent failed
to raise any substantial argument to
support his contention.[54]
Modification of Final
Judgment Not Warranted
The Court is not unmindful of So v. Court
of Appeals,[55] in which the final judgment
of conviction for violation of BP 22 was
modified by the deletion of the sentence
of imprisonment and the imposition of a
fine. That case proceeded from an Urgent
Manifestation of an Extraordinary
Supervening Event,[56] not from an
unmeritorious petition for a writ of habeas
corpus, as in the present case. The Court
exercised in that case its authority to
suspend or to modify the execution of a
final judgment when warranted or made
imperative by the higher interest of justice
or by supervening events.[57] The
supervening event in that case was the
petitioners urgent need for coronary
rehabilitation for at least one year under
the direct supervision of a coronary care
therapist; imprisonment would have been
equivalent to a death sentence.[58]
The peculiar circumstances of So do not
obtain in the present case. Respondents
supposed unhealthy physical condition
due to a triple by-pass operation, and
aggravated by hypertension, cited by the
RTC in its October 10, 2001 Order,[59] is
totally bereft of substantial proof. The
Court notes that respondent did not make
any such allegation in his Petition for
habeas corpus. Neither did he mention
his physical state in his Memorandum and
Comment submitted to this Court.
Respondent seeks the retroactive
application of SC-AC No. 12-2000 in his
favor on the basis alone of the alleged
settlement of his civil
liability.[60] Citing Griffith v. Court of
Appeals,[61]he theorizes that answering for
a criminal offense is no longer justified
after the settlement of the debt.
Respondent, however,
misreads Griffith. The Court held in that
case that convicting the accused who, two
years prior to the filing of the BP 22
cases, had already paid his debt (from
which the checks originated) was contrary
to the basic principles of fairness and
justice.[62] Obviously, that situation is not
attendant here.
The civil liability in the present case was
satisfied through the levy and sale of the
properties of respondent only after the
criminal case had been terminated with
his conviction.[63]Apparently, he had
sufficient properties that could have been
used to settle his liabilities prior to his
conviction. Indeed, such an early
settlement would have been an indication
that he was in good faith, a circumstance
that could have been favorably
considered in determining his appropriate
penalty.
At any rate, civil liability differs from
criminal liability.[64] What is punished in the
latter is not the failure to pay the
obligation, but the issuance of checks that
subsequently bounced or were
dishonored for insufficiency or lack of
funds.[65] The Court reiterates the reasons
why the issuance of worthless checks is
criminalized:
The practice is prohibited by law because of
its deleterious effects on public interest. The
effects of the increase of worthless checks
transcend the private interest of the parties
directly involved in the transaction and
touches the interest of the community at
large. The mischief it creates is not only a
wrong to the payee or holder, but also an
injury to the public. The harmful practice of
putting valueless commercial papers in
circulation multiplied a thousand-fold can
very well pollute the channels of trade and
commerce, injure the banking system and
eventually hurt the welfare of society and the
public interest. The law punishes the act not
as an offense against property but an offense
against public order.[66]
WHEREFORE, the Petition
is GRANTED and the assailed
Orders NULLIFIED. Respondents Petition
for habeas corpus is hereby DENIED. Let
this case be REMANDED to MTCC of
Baguio City for the re-arrest of respondent
and the completion of his sentence.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
PRESCILLA TUATES and ANDRES
DE LA PAZ, petitioners, vs. HON.
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN, as Presiding
Judge, Branch 96, RTC Quezon City,
People of the Philippines and I.C.
Construction, Inc., respondents.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before us is a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, seeking to annul the following: (1)
Decision dated April 30, 1999 and
Resolution dated June 9, 1999, rendered
by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 46845; (2) Decision dated
[1]
September 10, 1997 and the Order dated
January 28, 1998 issued by the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City (Branch 96) in
Criminal Cases Nos. Q-97-70428 and Q-
97-70429; and (3) Decision dated
[2]
December 16, 1996 of the Metropolitan
Trial Court of Quezon City (Branch 38) in
Criminal Cases Nos. 38-0130 and 38-
0131. [3]
The facts are as follows:
Convicted by the MTC-Quezon City
(Branch 38) of the crime of Violation of
Presidential Decree No. 772 or the Anti-
Squatting Law, petitioners Prescilla
Tuates and Andres de la Paz, appealed to
the RTC of Quezon City (Branch
96). Their conviction was affirmed in
toto by the RTC in its decision dated
September 10, 1997. Pending resolution
of their motion for reconsideration,
however, Republic Act No. 8368, An Act
Repealing Presidential Decree No. 772,
entitled Penalizing Squatting and Other
Similar Acts was enacted.
In its Order, dated January 28, 1998, the
RTC ruled that only petitioners criminal
convictions were extinguished by R.A.
8368, and the civil aspect, i.e., the
removal of petitioners illegally constructed
house and improvements, shall remain
executory against them. [4]
On a petition for review, the Court of
Appeals sustained the ruling of the RTC
and denied due course to the petition per
its Decision, dated April 30,
1999. Petitioners motion for
[5]
reconsideration was likewise denied by
the CA in its Resolution dated June 9,
1999. [6]
Hence, the present recourse taken by
petitioners, raising the following issues:
1. That petitioners, being charged with
Violation of Presidential Decree No. 772, the
express repeal of said decree absolves the
petitioners of any criminal or civil liability;
2. That public respondent erred in holding
that the civil aspect of the judgment
rendered x x x shall be executory against the
accused; and
3. That the Honorable Court of Appeals, in
affirming the Order of the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City (Branch 96), dated June
9, 1999, grossly erred in ignoring applicable
laws and jurisprudence. [7]
Petitioners argue that the repeal of P.D.
772 by R.A. 8368 carries with it the
extinction of both the criminal and civil
aspects of the crime. Private respondent,
however, insists that public respondents
were correct in ruling that only the
criminal liability was absolved and the civil
liability remains inasmuch as it was not
extinguished in accordance with Article
113 of the Revised Penal Code, which
reads:
ART. 113. Obligation to satisfy civil liability. --
Except in case of extinction of his civil liability
as provided in the next preceding article, the
offender shall continue to be obliged to
satisfy the civil liability resulting from the
crime committed by him, notwithstanding
the fact that he has served his sentence
consisting of deprivation of liberty or other
rights, or has not been required to serve the
same by reason of amnesty, pardon,
commutation of sentence or any other
reason.
In its Motion to Deny Due Course, private
respondent also argues that the petition
should now be denied as its title to the
land subject of this case has already been
adjudged in its favor. [8]
In its Comment, the Office of the Solicitor
General, in behalf of public respondents,
agrees with petitioners that both the
criminal and civil liability were rendered
extinct with the repeal of P.D. 772, and
recommended that the assailed issuances
be reversed and set aside.
We find the petition to be meritorious.
Republic Act No. 8368, otherwise known
as the Anti-Squatting Law Repeal Act of
1997, provides:
SECTION 1. Title. -- This Act shall be known as
the Anti-Squatting Law Repeal Act of 1997.
SEC. 2. Repeal. -- Presidential Decree No. 772,
entitled Penalizing Squatting and Other
Similar Acts is hereby repealed.
SEC. 3. Effect on Pending Cases. -- All pending
cases under the provisions of Presidential
Decree No. 772 shall be dismissed upon the
effectivity of this Act.
SEC. 4. Effect on Republic Act No. 7279. --
Nothing herein shall be construed to nullify,
eliminate or diminish in any way Section 27 of
Republic Act No. 7279 or any of its provisions
relative to sanctions against professional
squatters and squatting syndicates.
SEC. 5. Effectivity. -- This Act shall take effect
thirty (30) days after its publication in two (2)
newspapers of national circulation.
Approved, October 27, 1997. [9]
The repeal of P.D. No. 772 under Section
2 of R.A. No. 8368 is explicit, categorical,
definite and absolute. As such, the act
that was penalized by P.D.
772, i.e., squatting, ceases to be criminal
under R.A. 8368, and the previous
offense is obliterated. [10]
In the same vein, the absolute repeal of
P.D. 772 has the effect of depriving a
court of its authority to punish a person
charged with violation of the old law prior
to its repeal. This is because an
unqualified repeal of a penal law
constitutes a legislative act of rendering
legal what had been previously declared
as illegal, such that the offense no longer
exists and it is as if the person who
committed it never did so. Specially so,
[11]
as in the present case where it is
unconditionally stated in Section 3 of R.A.
No. 8368 that: (A)ll pending cases under
the provisions of Presidential Decree No.
772 shall be dismissed upon the
effectivity of this Act. Obviously, it was
[12]
the clear intent of the law to decriminalize
or do away with the crime of
squatting. Hence, there being no criminal
liability, there is likewise no civil liability
because the latter is rooted in the
former. Where an act or omission is not a
crime, no person can be held liable for
such act or omission. There being no
delict, logically, civil liability ex delicto is
out of the question. [13]
In fact, in People v. Leachon, Jr. we [14]
implicitly recognized the unconditional
repeal of P.D. 772 by R.A. 8368 when we
ordered the dismissal of the petition filed
in said case, without any qualification
whatsoever, because of the enactment of
R.A. 8368, viz.:
But the foregoing antecedent facts and
proceedings notwithstanding, the petition
cannot now prosper because on October 27,
1997, Republic Act No. 8368, entitled An Act
Repealing Presidential Decree No. 772
Entitled Penalizing Squatting and Other
Similar Acts was enacted. Section 3 of the
said Act provides that all pending cases under
the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 772
shall be dismissed upon the effectivity of this
Act.[15]
This is not to say, however, that people
now have the unbridled license to illegally
occupy lands they do not own. R.A. No.
8368 was unanimously approved by the
[16]
members of the Senate of the Philippines
present on its third reading. The [17]
legislature considered it a major piece of
legislation on the countrys anti-poverty
program as it sought to confront the
[18]
perennial problem of poverty at its root,
abolish an otherwise inutile and
oppressive law, and pave the way for a
genuine urban housing and land reform
program. Senate records reveal that it is
the manifest intent of the authors of R.A.
8368 to decriminalize squatting but does
not encourage or protect acts of squatting
on somebody elses land. The law is not [19]
intended to compromise the property
rights of legitimate
landowners. Recourse may be had in
[20]
cases of violation of their property rights,
such as those provided for in Republic Act
No. 7279 or the Urban Development and
Housing Act, penalizing professional
squatters and squatting syndicates as
defined therein, who commit nefarious
and illegal activities ; the Revised Penal
[21]
Code providing for criminal prosecution in
cases of Trespass to
Property, Occupation of Real Property or
[22]
Usurpation of Real Rights in
Property, and similar violations, and,
[23]
cases for Forcible Entry and Unlawful
Detainer under the Rules of Court, as [24]
well as civil liability for Damages under
the Civil Code.
Considering that prosecution for criminal
as well as civil liability under P.D. 772 has
been rendered nugatory with the passage
of R.A. 8368, both criminal and civil
aspects of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-97-
70428 and Q-97-70429 in the RTC as
well as Criminal Cases Nos. 38-0130 and
38-0131 in the MTC filed against
petitioners should be dismissed.
WHEREFORE, finding the petition for
review to be with merit, the Decision
dated April 30, 1999 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 46845, is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. A new
judgment is hereby entered modifying the
Decision dated September 10, 1997 of
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City
(Branch 96) in Criminal Cases No. Q-97-
70428 and Q-97-70429 and the Decision
dated December 16, 1996 issued by the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City
(Branch 38), to the effect that the
dismissal of the aforementioned criminal
cases likewise include the dismissal of the
civil aspects thereof, without prejudice to
the filing of civil and/or criminal actions
under the prevailing laws.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 96132 June 26, 1992
ORIEL MAGNO, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
PARAS, J.:
This is an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Revised Rules of Court, from the decision* of the
respondent Court of Appeals which affirmed in
toto the decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, Branch 104 finding the accused
petitioner, guilty of violations of Batas Pambansa Blg.
22, in Criminal Cases Q-35693 to 35696 before they
were elevated on appeal to the respondent appellate
Court under CA-G.R. CR No. 04889.
The antecedent facts and circumstances of the four
(4) counts of the offense charged, have been clearly
illustrated, in the Comment of the Office of the
Solicitor General as official counsel for the public
respondent, thus:
Petitioner was in the process of putting up a car repair
shop sometime in April 1983, but a did not have
complete equipment that could make his venture
workable. He also had another problem, and that
while he was going into this entrepreneurship, he
lacked funds with which to purchase the necessary
equipment to make such business operational. Thus,
petitioner, representing Ultra Sources International
Corporation, approached Corazon Teng, (private
complainant) Vice President of Mancor Industries
(hereinafter referred to as Mancor) for his needed car
repair service equipment of which Mancor was a
distributor, (Rollo, pp. 40-41)
Having been approached by petitioner on his
predicament, who fully bared that he had no sufficient
funds to buy the equipment needed, the former
(Corazon Teng) referred Magno to LS Finance and
Management Corporation (LB Finance for brevity)
advising its Vice-President, Joey Gomez, that Mancor
was willing and able to supply the pieces of
equipment needed if LS Finance could accommodate
petitioner and provide him credit facilities. (Ibid., P.
41)
The arrangement went through on condition that
petitioner has to put up a warranty deposit equivalent
to thirty per centum (30%) of the total value of the
pieces of equipment to be purchased, amounting to
P29,790.00. Since petitioner could not come up with
such amount, he requested Joey Gomez on a
personal level to look for a third party who could lend
him the equivalent amount of the warranty deposit,
however, unknown to petitioner, it was Corazon Teng
who advanced the deposit in question, on condition
that the same would be paid as a short term loan at
3% interest (Ibid., P. 41)
The specific provision in the Leasing Agreement,
reads:
1.1. WARRANTY DEPOSIT — Before or upon
delivery of each item of Equipment, the Lessee shall
deposit with the Lessor such sum or sums specified in
Schedule A to serve as security for the faithful
performance of its obligations.
This deposit shall be refunded to the Lessee upon the
satisfactory completion of the entire period of Lease,
subject to the conditions of clause 1.12 of this Article.
(Ibid., p. 17)
As part of the arrangement, petitioner and LS Finance
entered into a leasing agreement whereby LS Finance
would lease the garage equipments and petitioner
would pay the corresponding rent with the option to
buy the same. After the documentation was
completed, the equipment were delivered to petitioner
who in turn issued a postdated check and gave it to
Joey Gomez who, unknown to the petitioner,
delivered the same to Corazon Teng. When the check
matured, Petitioner requested through Joey Gomez
not to deposit the check as he (Magno) was no longer
banking with Pacific Bank.
To replace the first check issued, petitioner issued
another set of six (6) postdated checks. Two (2)
checks dated July 29, 1983 were deposited and
cleared while the four (4) others, which were the
subject of the four counts of the aforestated charges
subject of the petition, were held momentarily by
Corazon Teng, on the request of Magno as they were
not covered with sufficient funds. These checks were
a) Piso Bank Check Nos. 006858, dated August 15,
1983, 006859 dated August 28, 1983 and 006860
dated September 15, 1983, all in the amount of
P5,038.43 and No. 006861 dated September 28,
1983, in the amount of P10,076.87. (Ibid., pp. 42 &
43).
Subsequently, petitioner could not pay LS Finance the
monthly rentals, thus it pulled out the garage
equipments. It was then on this occasion that
petitioner became aware that Corazon Teng was the
one who advanced the warranty deposit. Petitioner
with his wife went to see Corazon Teng and promised
to pay the latter but the payment never came and
when the four (4) checks were deposited they were
returned for the reason "account closed." (Ibid., p. 43)
After joint trial before the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, Branch 104, the accused-petitioner was
convicted for violations of BP Blg. 22 on the four (4)
cases, as follows:
. . . finding the accused-appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the offense of violations of B.P.
Blg. 22 and sentencing the accused to imprisonment
for one year in each Criminal Case Nos. Q-35693, Q-
35695 and Q-35696 and to pay to complainant the
respective amounts reflected in subject checks. (Ibid.,
pp. 25, 27)
Reviewing the above and the affirmation of the above-
stated decision of the court a quo, this Court is
intrigued about the outcome of the checks subject of
the cases which were intended by the parties, the
petitioner on the one hand and the private
complainant on the other, to cover the "warranty
deposit" equivalent to the 30% requirement of the
financing company. Corazon Teng is one of the
officers of Mancor, the supplier of the equipment
subject of the Leasing Agreement subject of the high
financing scheme undertaken by the petitioner as
lessee of the repair service equipment, which was
arranged at the instance of Mrs. Teng from the very
beginning of the transaction.
By the nature of the "warranty deposit" amounting to
P29,790.00 corresponding to 30% of the
"purchase/lease" value of the equipments subject of
the transaction, it is obvious that the "cash out" made
by Mrs. Teng was not used by petitioner who was just
paying rentals for the equipment. It would have been
different if petitioner opted to purchase the pieces of
equipment on or about the termination of the lease-
purchase agreement in which case he had to pay the
additional amount of the warranty deposit which
should have formed part of the purchase price. As the
transaction did not ripen into a purchase, but
remained a lease with rentals being paid for the
loaned equipment, which were pulled out by the
Lessor (Mancor) when the petitioner failed to continue
paying possibly due to economic constraints or
business failure, then it is lawful and just that the
warranty deposit should not be charged against the
petitioner.
To charge the petitioner for the refund of a "warranty
deposit" which he did not withdraw as it was not his
own account, it having remained with LS Finance, is
to even make him pay an unjust "debt", to say the
least, since petitioner did not receive the amount in
question. All the while, said amount was in the
safekeeping of the financing company, which is
managed, supervised and operated by the corporation
officials and employees of LS Finance. Petitioner did
not even know that the checks he issued were turned
over by Joey Gomez to Mrs. Teng, whose operation
was kept from his knowledge on her instruction. This
fact alone evoke suspicion that the transaction is
irregular and immoral per se, hence, she specifically
requested Gomez not to divulge the source of the
"warranty deposit".
It is intriguing to realize that Mrs. Teng did not want
the petitioner to know that it was she who
"accommodated" petitioner's request for Joey Gomez,
to source out the needed funds for the "warranty
deposit". Thus it unfolds the kind of transaction that is
shrouded with mystery, gimmickry and doubtful
legality. It is in simple language, a scheme whereby
Mrs. Teng as the supplier of the equipment in the
name of her corporation, Mancor, would be able to
"sell or lease" its goods as in this case, and at the
same time, privately financing those who desperately
need petty accommodations as this one. This modus
operandi has in so many instances victimized
unsuspecting businessmen, who likewise need
protection from the law, by availing of the deceptively
called "warranty deposit" not realizing that they also
fall prey to leasing equipment under the guise of a
lease-purchase agreement when it is a scheme
designed to skim off business clients.
This maneuvering has serious implications especially
with respect to the threat of the penal sanction of the
law in issue, as in this case. And, with a willing court
system to apply the full harshness of the special law
in question, using the "mala prohibitia" doctrine, the
noble objective of the law is tainted with materialism
and opportunism in the highest, degree.
This angle is bolstered by the fact that since the
petitioner or lessee referred to above in the lease
agreement knew that the amount of P29,790.00
subject of the cases, were mere accommodation-
arrangements with somebody thru Joey Gomez,
petitioner did not even attempt to secure the refund of
said amount from LS Finance, notwithstanding the
agreement provision to the contrary. To argue that
after the termination of the lease agreement, the
warranty deposit should be refundable in full to Mrs.
Teng by petitioner when he did not cash out the
"warranty deposit" for his official or personal use, is to
stretch the nicety of the alleged law (B.P. No, 22)
violated.
For all intents and purposes, the law was devised to
safeguard the interest of the banking system and the
legitimate public checking account user. It did not
intend to shelter or favor nor encourage users of the
system to enrich themselves through manipulations
and circumvention of the noble purpose and objective
of the law. Least should it be used also as a means of
jeopardizing honest-to-goodness transactions with
some color of "get-rich" scheme to the prejudice of
well-meaning businessmen who are the pillars of
society.
Under the utilitarian theory, the "protective theory" in
criminal law, "affirms that the primary function of
punishment is the protective (sic) of society against
actual and potential wrongdoers." It is not clear
whether petitioner could be considered as having
actually committed the wrong sought to be punished
in the offense charged, but on the other hand, it can
be safely said that the actuations of Mrs. Carolina
Teng amount to that of potential wrongdoers whose
operations should also be clipped at some point in
time in order that the unwary public will not be failing
prey to such a vicious transaction (Aquino, The
Revised Penal Code, 1987 Edition, Vol. I, P. 11)
Corollary to the above view, is the application of the
theory that "criminal law is founded upon that moral
disapprobation . . . of actions which are
immoral, i.e., which are detrimental (or dangerous) to
those conditions upon which depend the existence
and progress of human society. This disappropriation
is inevitable to the extent that morality is generally
founded and built upon a certain concurrence in the
moral opinions of all. . . . That which we call
punishment is only an external means of emphasizing
moral disapprobation the method of punishment is in
reality the amount of punishment," (Ibid., P.
11, citing People v. Roldan Zaballero, CA 54 O.G.
6904, Note also Justice Pablo's view in People v.
Piosca and Peremne, 86 Phil. 31).
Thus, it behooves upon a court of law that in applying
the punishment imposed upon the accused, the
objective of retribution of a wronged society, should
be directed against the "actual and potential
wrongdoers." In the instant case, there is no doubt
that petitioner's four (4) checks were used to
collateralize an accommodation, and not to cover the
receipt of an actual "account or credit for value" as
this was absent, and therefore petitioner should not
be punished for mere issuance of the checks in
question. Following the aforecited theory, in
petitioner's stead the "potential wrongdoer", whose
operation could be a menace to society, should not be
glorified by convicting the petitioner.
While in case of doubt, the case should have been
resolved in favor of the accused, however, by the
open admission of the appellate court below, oven
when the ultimate beneficiary of the "warranty
deposit" is of doubtful certainty, the accused was
convicted, as shown below:
Nor do We see any merit in appellant's claim that the
obligation of the accused to complainant had been
extinguished by the termination of the leasing
agreement — by the terms of which the warranty
deposit advanced by complainant was refundable to
the accused as lessee — and that as the lessor L.S.
Finance neither made any liquidation of said amount
nor returned the same to the accused, it may he
assumed that the amount was already returned to the
complainant. For these allegations, even if true, do
not change the fact, admitted by appellant and
established by the evidence, that the four checks
were originally issued on account or for value. And as
We have already observed, in order that there may be
a conviction under the from paragraph of Section 2 of
B.P. Blg 22 — with respect to the element of said
offense that the check should have been made and
issued on account or for value — it is sufficient, all the
other elements of the offense being present, that the
check must have been drawn and issued in payment
of an obligation.
Moreover, even granting, arguendo, that the
extinguishment, after the issuance of the checks, of
the obligation in consideration of which the checks
were issued, would have resulted in placing the case
at bar beyond the purview of the prohibition in Section
1 of BP Blg. 22, there is no satisfactory proof that
there was such an extinguishment in the present
case. Appellee aptly points out that appellant had not
adduced any direct evidence to prove that the amount
advanced by the complainant to cover the warranty
deposit must already have been returned to her.
(Rollo, p. 30)
It is indubitable that the respondent Court of Appeals
even disregarded the cardinal rule that the accused is
presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond
reasonable doubt. On the contrary, the same court
even expected the petitioner-appellant to adduce
evidence to show that he was not guilty of the crime
charged. But how can be produce documents
showing that the warranty deposit has already been
taken back by Mrs. Teng when she is an officer of
Mancor which has interest in the transaction, besides
being personally interested in the profit of her side-
line. Thus, even if she may have gotten back the
value of the accommodation, she would still pursue
collecting from the petitioner since she had in her
possession the checks that "bounced".
That the court a quo merely relied on the law, without
looking into the real nature of the warranty deposit is
evident from the following pronouncement:
And the trail court concluded that there is no question
that the accused violated BP Blg. 22, which is a
special statutory law, violations of which are mala
prohibita. The court relied on the rule that in cases
ofmala prohibita, the only inquiry is whether or not the
law had been violated, proof of criminal intent not
being necessary for the conviction of the accused, the
acts being prohibited for reasons of public policy and
the defenses of good faith and absence of criminal
intent being unavailing in prosecutions for said
offenses." (Ibid., p. 26)
The crux of the matter rests upon the reason for the
drawing of the postdated checks by the
petitioner, i.e., whether they were drawn or issued "to
apply on account or for value", as required under
Section 1 of B.P. Blg, 22. When viewed against the
following definitions of the catch-terms "warranty" and
"deposit", for which the postdated checks were issued
or drawn, all the more, the alleged crime could not
have been committed by petitioner:
a) Warranty — A promise that a proposition of fact is
true. A promise that certain facts are truly as they are
represented to be and that they will remain so: . . .
(Black's Law Dictionary, Fifth Edition, (1979) p. 1423)
A cross-reference to the following term shows:
Fitness for Particular Purpose: —
Where the seller at the time of contracting has reason
to know any particular purpose for which the goods
are required and that the buyer is relying on the
seller's skill or judgment to select or furnish suitable
goods, there is, unless excluded or modified, an
implied warranty that the goods shall be fit for such
purpose, (Ibid., p. 573)
b) Deposit: — Money lodged with a person as an
earnest or security for the performance of some
contract, to be forfeited if the depositor fails in his
undertaking. It may be deemed to be part payment
and to that extent may constitute the purchaser the
actual owner of the estate.
To commit to custody, or to lay down; to place; to put.
To lodge for safe- keeping or as a pledge to intrust to
the care of another.
The act of placing money in the custody of a bank or
banker, for safety or convenience, to be withdrawn at
the will of the depositor or under rules and regulations
agreed on. Also, the money so deposited, or the credit
which the depositor receives for it. Deposit, according
to its commonly accepted and generally understood
among bankers and by the public, includes not only
deposits payable on demand and for which
certificates, whether interest-bearing or not, may be
issued, payable on demand, or on certain notice or at
a fixed future time. (Ibid., pp. 394-395)
Furthermore, the element of "knowing at the time of
issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or
credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such
check in full upon its presentment, which check is
subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for
insufficiency of funds or credit or would have been
dishonored for the same reason . . . is inversely
applied in this case. From the very beginning,
petitioner never hid the fact that he did not have the
funds with which to put up the warranty deposit and
as a matter of fact, he openly intimated this to the vital
conduit of the transaction, Joey Gomez, to whom
petitioner was introduced by Mrs. Teng. It would have
been different if this predicament was not
communicated to all the parties he dealt with
regarding the lease agreement the financing of which
was covered by L.S. Finance Management.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is REVERSED
and the accused-petitioner is hereby ACQUITTED of
the crime charged.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-5270 January 15, 1910
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
H. N. BULL, defendant-appellant.
Bruce & Lawrence, for appellant.
Office of the Solicitor-General Harvey, for appellee.
ELLIOTT, J.:
The appellant was convicted in the Court of First
Instance of a violation of section 1 of Act No. 55, as
amended by section 1 of Act No. 275, and from the
judgment entered thereon appealed to this court,
where under proper assignments of error he
contends: (1) that the complaint does not state facts
sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the court; (2) that
under the evidence the trial court was without
jurisdiction to hear and determine the case; (3) that
Act No. 55 as amended is in violation of certain
provisions of the Constitution of the United States,
and void as applied to the facts of this case; and (4)
that the evidence is insufficient to support the
conviction.
The information alleges:
That on and for many months prior to the 2d day of
December, 1908, the said H. N. Bull was then and
there master of a steam sailing vessel known as the
steamship Standard, which vessel was then and there
engaged in carrying and transporting cattle, carabaos,
and other animals from a foreign port and city of
Manila, Philippine Islands; that the said accused H. N.
Bull, while master of said vessel, as aforesaid, on or
about the 2d day of December, 1908, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully, and wrongly carry, transport,
and bring into the port and city of Manila, aboard said
vessel, from the port of Ampieng, Formosa, six
hundred and seventy-seven (677) head of cattle and
carabaos, without providing suitable means for
securing said animals while in transit, so as to avoid
cruelty and unnecessary suffering to the said animals,
in this, to wit, that the said H. N. Bull, master, as
aforesaid, did then and there fail to provide stalls for
said animals so in transit and suitable means for
trying and securing said animals in a proper manner,
and did then and there cause some of said animals to
be tied by means of rings passed through their noses,
and allow and permit others to be transported loose in
the hold and on the deck of said vessel without being
tied or secured in stalls, and all without bedding; that
by reason of the aforesaid neglect and failure of the
accused to provide suitable means for securing said
animals while so in transit, the noses of some of said
animals were cruelly torn, and many of said animals
were tossed about upon the decks and hold of said
vessel, and cruelly wounded, bruised, and killed.
All contrary to the provisions of Acts No. 55 and No.
275 of the Philippine Commission.
Section 1 of Act No. 55, which went into effect
January 1, 1901, provides that —
The owners or masters of steam, sailing, or other
vessels, carrying or transporting cattle, sheep, swine,
or other animals, from one port in the Philippine
Islands to another, or from any foreign port to any port
within the Philippine Islands, shall carry with them,
upon the vessels carrying such animals, sufficient
forage and fresh water to provide for the suitable
sustenance of such animals during the ordinary period
occupied by the vessel in passage from the port of
shipment to the port of debarkation, and shall cause
such animals to be provided with adequate forage and
fresh water at least once in every twenty-four hours
from the time that the animals are embarked to the
time of their final debarkation.
By Act No. 275, enacted October 23, 1901, Act No. 55
was amended by adding to section 1 thereof the
following:
The owners or masters of steam, sailing, or other
vessels, carrying or transporting cattle, sheep, swine,
or other animals from one port in the Philippine
Islands to another, or from any foreign port to any port
within the Philippine Islands, shall provide suitable
means for securing such animals while in transit so as
to avoid all cruelty and unnecessary suffering to the
animals, and suitable and proper facilities for loading
and unloading cattle or other animals upon or from
vessels upon which they are transported, without
cruelty or unnecessary suffering. It is hereby made
unlawful to load or unload cattle upon or from vessels
by swinging them over the side by means of ropes or
chains attached to the thorns.
Section 3 of Act No. 55 provides that —
Any owner or master of a vessel, or custodian of such
animals, who knowingly and willfully fails to comply
with the provisions of section one, shall, for every
such failure, be liable to pay a penalty of not less that
one hundred dollars nor more that five hundred
dollars, United States money, for each offense.
Prosecution under this Act may be instituted in any
Court of First Instance or any provost court organized
in the province or port in which such animals are
disembarked.
1. It is contended that the information is insufficient
because it does not state that the court was sitting at
a port where the cattle were disembarked, or that the
offense was committed on board a vessel registered
and licensed under the laws of the Philippine Islands.
Act No. 55 confers jurisdiction over the offense
created thereby on Courts of First Instance or any
provost court organized in the province or port in
which such animals are disembarked, and there is
nothing inconsistent therewith in Act No. 136, which
provides generally for the organization of the courts of
the Philippine Islands. Act No. 400 merely extends the
general jurisdiction of the courts over certain offenses
committed on the high seas, or beyond the jurisdiction
of any country, or within any of the waters of the
Philippine Islands on board a ship or water craft of
any kind registered or licensed in the Philippine
Islands, in accordance with the laws thereof.
(U.S. vs. Fowler, 1 Phil. Rep., 614.) This jurisdiction
may be exercised by the Court of First Instance in any
province into which such ship or water upon which the
offense or crime was committed shall come after the
commission thereof. Had this offense been committed
upon a ship carrying a Philippine registry, there could
have been no doubt of the Jurisdiction of the court,
because it is expressly conferred, and the Act is in
accordance with well recognized and established
public law. But the Standard was a Norwegian vessel,
and it is conceded that it was not registered or
licensed in the Philippine Islands under the laws
thereof. We have then the question whether the court
had jurisdiction over an offense of this character,
committed on board a foreign ship by the master
thereof, when the neglect and omission which
constitutes the offense continued during the time the
ship was within the territorial waters of the United
States. No court of the Philippine Islands had
jurisdiction over an offenses or crime committed on
the high seas or within the territorial waters of any
other country, but when she came within 3 miles of a
line drawn from the headlines which embrace the
entrance to Manila Bay, she was within territorial
waters, and a new set of principles became
applicable. (Wheaton, Int. Law (Dana ed.), p. 255,
note 105; Bonfils, Le Droit Int., sec 490 et seq.;
Latour, La Mer Ter., ch. 1.) The ship and her crew
were then subject to the jurisdiction of the territorial
sovereign subject through the proper political agency.
This offense was committed within territorial waters.
From the line which determines these waters
the Standard must have traveled at least 25 miles
before she came to anchor. During that part of her
voyage the violation of the statue continued, and as
far as the jurisdiction of the court is concerned, it is
immaterial that the same conditions may have existed
while the vessel was on the high seas. The offense,
assuming that it originated at the port of departure in
Formosa, was a continuing one, and every element
necessary to constitute it existed during the voyage
across the territorial waters. The completed forbidden
act was done within American waters, and the court
therefore had jurisdiction over the subject-matter of
the offense and the person of the offender.
The offense then was thus committed within the
territorial jurisdiction of the court, but the objection to
the jurisdiction raises the further question whether that
jurisdiction is restricted by the fact of the nationality of
the ship. Every. Every state has complete control and
jurisdiction over its territorial waters. According to
strict legal right, even public vessels may not enter the
ports of a friendly power without permission, but it is
now conceded that in the absence of a prohibition
such ports are considered as open to the public ship
of all friendly powers. The exemption of such vessels
from local jurisdiction while within such waters was
not established until within comparatively recent
times. In 1794, Attorney-General Bradford, and in
1796 Attorney-General Lee, rendered opinions to the
effect that "the laws of nations invest the commander
of a foreign ship of war with no exemption from the
jurisdiction of the country into which he comes." (1,
Op. U.S. Attys. Gen., 46, 87.) This theory was also
supported by Lord Stowell in an opinion given by him
to the British Government as late as 1820. In the
leading case of the Schooner Exchange
vs. McFadden (7 Cranch (U.S.), 116, 144), Chief
Justice Marshall said that the implied license under
which such vessels enter a friendly port may
reasonably be construed as "containing exemption
from the jurisdiction of the sovereign within whose
territory she claims the rights of hospitality." The
principle was accepted by the Geneva Arbitration
Tribunal, which announced that "the priviledge of
exterritoriality accorded to vessels of war has been
admitted in the law of nations; not as an absolute
right, but solely as a proceeding founded on the
principle of courtesy and mutual deference between
nations."
(2 Moore, Int. Law Dig., secs. 252 and 254; Hall, Int.
Law, sec. 55; Taylor, Int. Law, sec. 256; Ortolan, Dip
de la Mer, 2. C.X.)
Such vessels are therefore permitted during times of
peace to come and go freely. Local official exercise
but little control over their actions, and offenses
committed by their crew are justiciable by their own
officers acting under the laws to which they primarily
owe allegiance. This limitation upon the general
principle of territorial sovereignty is based entirely
upon comity and convenience, and finds its
justification in the fact that experience shows that
such vessels are generally careful to respect local
laws and regulation which are essential to the health,
order, and well-being of the port. But comity and
convenience does not require the extension of the
same degree of exemption to merchant vessels.
There are two well-defined theories as to extent of the
immunities ordinarily granted to them, According to
the French theory and practice, matters happening on
board a merchant ship which do not concern the
tranquillity of the port or persons foreign to the crew,
are justiciable only by the court of the country to which
the vessel belongs. The French courts therefore claim
exclusive jurisdiction over crimes committed on board
French merchant vessels in foreign ports by one
member of the crew against another. (See Bonfils, Le
Droit Int. (quat. ed.), secs. 624-628; Martens, Le Droit
Int., tome 2, pp. 338, 339; Ortolan, Dip. de la Mer, tit.
1, p. 292; Masse, Droit Int., tome 2, p. 63.) Such
jurisdiction has never been admitted or claim by Great
Britain as a right, although she has frequently
conceded it by treaties. (Halleck, Int. Law (Baker's
ed.), vol. 1, 231; British Territorial Waters Act, 1878.)
Writers who consider exterritoriality as a fact instead
of a theory have sought to restrict local jurisdiction,
but Hall, who is doubtless the leading English
authority, says that —
It is admitted by the most thoroughgoing asserters of
the territoriality of merchant vessels that so soon as
the latter enter the ports of a foreign state they
become subject to the local jurisdiction on all points in
which the interests of the country are touched. (Hall,
Int. Law, p. 263.)
The United States has adhered consistently to the
view that when a merchant vessel enters a foreign
port it is subject to the jurisdiction of the local
authorities, unless the local sovereignty has by act of
acquiescence or through treaty arrangements
consented to waive a portion of such jurisdiction. (15
Op. Attys. Gen., U. S., 178; 2 Moore, Int. Law Dig.,
sec. 204; article by Dean Gregory, Mich. Law Review,
Vol. II, No. 5.) Chief Justice Marshall, in the case of
the Exchange, said that —
When merchant vessels enter for the purpose of
trade, in would be obviously in convinient and
dangerous to society and would subject the laws to
continual infraction and the government to
degradation if such individual merchants did not owe
temporary and local allegiance, and were not
amendable to the jurisdiction of the country.
The Supreme Court of the United States has recently
said that the merchant vessels of one country visiting
the ports of another for the purpose of trade, subject
themselves to the laws which govern the ports they
visit, so long as they remain; and this as well in war as
in peace, unless otherwise provided by treaty. (U.
S. vs. Diekelman, 92 U. S., 520-525.)
Certain limitations upon the jurisdiction of the local
courts are imposed by article 13 of the treaty of
commerce and navigation between Sweden and
Norway and the United States, of July 4, 1827, which
concedes to the consul, vice-consuls, or consular
agents of each country "The right to sit as judges and
arbitrators in such differences as may arise between
the captains and crews of the vessels belonging to the
nation whose interests are committed to their charge,
without the interference of the local authorities, unless
the conduct of the crews or of the captains should
disturb the order or tranquillity of the country." (Comp.
of Treaties in Force, 1904, p. 754.) This exception
applies to controversies between the members of the
ship's company, and particularly to disputes regarding
wages. (2 Moore, Int. Law Dig., sec. 206, p. 318;
Tellefsen vs. Fee, 168 Mass., 188.) The order and
tranquillity of the country are affected by many events
which do not amount to a riot or general public
disturbance. Thus an assault by one member of the
crew upon another, committed upon the ship, of which
the public may have no knowledge whatever, is not by
this treaty withdrawn from the cognizance of the local
authorities.
In 1876 the mates of the Swedish bark Frederike and
Carolina engaged in a "quarrel" on board the vessel in
the port of Galveston, Texas. They were prosecuted
before a justice of the peace, but the United States
district attorney was instructed by the Government to
take the necessary steps to have the proceedings
dismissed, and the aid of the governor of Texas was
invoked with the view to "guard against a repetition of
similar proceedings." (Mr. Fish, Secretary of State, to
Mr. Grip, Swedish and Norwegian charged, May 16,
1876; Moore, Int. Law Dig.) It does not appear that
this "quarrel" was of such a nature as to amount to a
breach of the criminal laws of Texas, but when in
1879 the mate for the Norwegian bark Livingston was
prosecuted in the courts of Philadelphia County for an
assault and battery committed on board the ship while
lying in the port of Philadelphia, it was held that there
was nothing in the treaty which deprived the local
courts of jurisdiction. (Commonwealth vs. Luckness,
14 Phila. (Pa.), 363.) Representations were made
through diplomatic channels to the State Department,
and on July 30, 1880, Mr. Evarts, Secretary of State,
wrote to Count Lewenhaupt, the Swedish and
Norwegian minister, as follows:
I have the honor to state that I have given the matter
careful consideration in connection with the views and
suggestion of your note and the provisions of the
thirteenth article of the treaty of 1827 between the
United States and Sweden and Norway. The
stipulations contained in the last clause of that article .
. . are those under which it is contended by you that
jurisdiction is conferred on the consular officers, not
only in regard to such differences of a civil nature
growing out of the contract of engagement of the
seamen, but also as to disposing of controversies
resulting from personal violence involving offense for
which the party may be held amenable under the local
criminal law.
This Government does not view the article in question
as susceptible of such broad interpretation. The
jurisdiction conferred upon the consuls is conceived to
be limited to their right to sit as judges or abitrators in
such differences as may arise between captains and
crews of the vessels, where such differences do not
involve on the part of the captain or crew a
disturbance of the order or tranquillity of the country.
When, however, a complaint is made to a local
magistrate, either by the captain or one or more of the
crew of the vessel, involving the disturbance of the
order or tranquillity of the country, it is competent for
such magistrate to take cognizance of the matter in
furtherance of the local laws, and under such
circumstances in the United States it becomes a
public duty which the judge or magistrate is not at
liberty voluntarily to forego. In all such cases it must
necessarily be left to the local judicial authorities
whether the procedure shall take place in the United
States or in Sweden to determine if in fact there had
been such disturbance of the local order and
tranquillity, and if the complaint is supported by such
proof as results in the conviction of the party accused,
to visit upon the offenders such punishment as may
be defined against the offense by the municipal law of
the place." (Moore, Int. Law Dig., vol. 2, p. 315.)
The treaty does not therefore deprive the local courts
of jurisdiction over offenses committed on board a
merchant vessel by one member of the crew against
another which amount to a disturbance of the order or
tranquillity of the country, and a fair and reasonable
construction of the language requires un to hold that
any violation of criminal laws disturbs the order or
traquillity of the country. The offense with which the
appellant is charged had nothing to so with any
difference between the captain and the crew. It was a
violation by the master of the criminal law of the
country into whose port he came. We thus find that
neither by reason of the nationality of the vessel, the
place of the commission of the offense, or the
prohibitions of any treaty or general principle of public
law, are the court of the Philippine Islands deprived of
jurisdiction over the offense charged in the information
in this case.
It is further contended that the complaint is defective
because it does not allege that the animals were
disembarked at the port of Manila, an allegation which
it is claimed is essential to the jurisdiction of the court
sitting at that port. To hold with the appellant upon this
issue would be to construe the language of the
complaint very strictly against the Government. The
disembarkation of the animals is not necessary in
order to constitute the completed offense, and a
reasonable construction of the language of the statute
confers jurisdiction upon the court sitting at the port
into which the animals are bought. They are then
within the territorial jurisdiction of the court, and the
mere fact of their disembarkation is immaterial so far
as jurisdiction is concerned. This might be different if
the disembarkation of the animals constituted a
constitutional element in the offense, but it does not.
It is also contended that the information is insufficient
because it fails to allege that the
defendant knowingly and willfully failed to provide
suitable means for securing said animals while in
transit, so as to avoid cruelty and unnecessary
suffering. The allegation of the complaint that the act
was committed willfully includes the allegation that it
was committed knowingly. As said in
Woodhouse vs. Rio Grande R.R. Company (67
Texas, 416), "the word 'willfully' carries the idea, when
used in connection with an act forbidden by law, that
the act must be done knowingly or intentionally; that,
with knowledge, the will consented to, designed, and
directed the act." So in Wong vs. City of Astoria (13
Oregon, 538), it was said: "The first one is that the
complaint did not show, in the words of the ordinance,
that the appellant 'knowingly' did the act complained
of. This point, I think, was fully answered by the
respondent's counsel — that the words 'willfully' and
'knowingly' conveyed the same meaning. To 'willfully'
do an act implies that it was done by design — done
for a certain purpose; and I think that it would
necessarily follow that it was 'knowingly' done." To the
same effect is Johnson vs. The People (94 Ill., 505),
which seems to be on all fours with the present case.
The evidence shows not only that the defendant's
acts were knowingly done, but his defense rests upon
the assertion that "according to his experience, the
system of carrying cattle loose upon the decks and in
the hold is preferable and more secure to the life and
comfort of the animals." It was conclusively proven
that what was done was done knowingly and
intentionally.
In charging an offense under section 6 of General
Orders, No. 58, paragraph 3, it is only necessary to
state the act or omission complained of as constituting
a crime or public offense in ordinary and concise
language, without repitition. It need not necessarily be
in the words of the statute, but it must be in such form
as to enable a person of common understanding to
know what is intended and the court to pronounce
judgment according to right. A complaint which
complies with this requirement is good.
(U.S. vs. Sarabia, 4 Phil. Rep., 556.)
The Act, which is in the English language, impose
upon the master of a vessel the duty to "provide
suitable means for securing such animals while in
transit, so as to avoid all cruelty and unnecessary
suffering to the animals." The allegation of the
complaint as it reads in English is that the defendant
willfully, unlawfully, and wrongfully carried the cattle
"without providing suitable means for securing said
animals while in transit, so as to avoid cruelty and
unnecessary suffering to the said animals in this . . .
that by reason of the aforesaid neglect and failure of
the accused to provide suitable means for securing
said animals were cruelty torn, and many of said
animals were tossed about upon the decks and hold
of said vessels, and cruelty wounded, bruised, and
killed."
The appellant contends that the language of the
Spanish text of the information does not charge him
with failure to provide "sufficient" and "adequate"
means. The words used are "medios suficientes" and
"medios adecuados." In view of the fact that the
original complaint was prepared in English, and that
the word "suitable" is translatable by the words
"adecuado," "suficiente," and "conveniente,"
according to the context and circumstances, we
determine this point against the appellant, particularly
in view of the fact that the objection was not made in
the court below, and that the evidence clearly shows a
failure to provide "suitable means for the protection of
the animals."
2. The appellant's arguments against the
constitutionality of Act No. 55 and the amendment
thereto seems to rest upon a fundamentally erroneous
conception of the constitutional law of these Islands.
The statute penalizes acts and ommissions incidental
to the transportation of live stock between foreign
ports and ports of the Philippine Islands, and had a
similar statute regulating commerce with its ports
been enacted by the legislature of one of the States of
the Union, it would doubtless have been in violation of
Article I, section 3, of the Constitution of the United
States. (Stubbs vs. People (Colo.), 11 L. R. A., N. S.,
1071.)
But the Philippine Islands is not a State, and its
relation to the United States is controlled by
constitutional principles different from those which
apply to States of the Union. The importance of the
question thus presented requires a statement of the
principles which govern those relations, and
consideration of the nature and extent of the
legislative power of the Philippine Commission and
the Legislature of the Philippines. After much
discussion and considerable diversity of opinion
certain applicable constitutional doctrines are
established.
The Constitution confers upon the United States the
express power to make war and treaties, and it has
the power possessed by all nations to acquire territory
by conquest or treaty. Territory thus acquired belongs
to the United States, and to guard against the
possibility of the power of Congress to provide for its
government being questioned, the framers of the
Constitution provided in express terms that Congress
should have the power "to dispose of and make all
needful rules and regulations respecting territory and
other property belonging to the United States." (Art.
IV, sec. 3, par. 3.) Upon the acquisition of the territory
by the United States, and until it is formally
incorporated into the Union, the duty of providing a
government therefor devolves upon Congress. It may
govern the territory by its direct acts, or it may create
a local government, and delegate thereto the ordinary
powers required for local government. (Binns vs. U.
S., 194 U. S., 486.) This has been the usual
procedure. Congress has provided such governments
for territories which were within the Union, and for
newly acquired territory not yet incorporated therein. It
has been customary to organize a government with
the ordinary separation of powers into executive,
legislative, and judicial, and to prescribe in an organic
act certain general conditions in accordance with
which the local government should act. The organic
act thus became the constitution of the government of
the territory which had not been formally incorporated
into the Union, and the validity of legislation enacted
by the local legislature was determined by its
conformity with the requirements of such organic act.
(National Bank vs. Yankton, 11 Otto (U. S.), 129.) To
the legislative body of the local government Congress
has delegated that portion of legislative power which
in its wisdom it deemed necessary for the government
of the territory, reserving, however, the right to annul
the action of the local legislature and itself legislate
directly for the territory. This power has been
exercised during the entire period of the history of the
United States. The right of Congress to delegate such
legislative power can no longer be seriously
questioned. (Dorr vs. U. S., 195 U. S., 138; U.
S. vs. Heinszen, 206 U. S., 370, 385.)
The Constitution of the United States does not by its
own force operate within such territory, although the
liberality of Congress in legislating the Constitution
into contiguous territory tended to create an
impression upon the minds of many people that it
went there by its own force. (Downes vs. Bidwell, 182
U. S., 289.) In legislating with reference to this
territory, the power of Congress is limited only by
those prohibitions of the Constitution which go to the
very root of its power to act at all, irrespective of time
or place. In all other respects it is plenary. (De
Lima vs. Bidwell, 182 U. S., 1; Downes vs. Bidwell,
182 U. S., 244; Hawaii vs. Mankichi, 190 U. S., 197;
Dorr vs. U. S., 195 U. S., 138; Rassmussen vs. U. S.,
197 U. S., 516.)
This power has been exercised by Congress
throughout the whole history of the United States, and
legislation founded on the theory was enacted long
prior to the acquisition of the present Insular
possessions. Section 1891 of the Revised Statutes of
1878 provides that "The Constitution and all laws of
the United States which are not locally inapplicable
shall have the same force and effect within all the
organized territories, and in every Territory hereafter
organized, as elsewhere within the United States."
When Congress organized a civil government for the
Philippines, it expressly provided that this section of
the Revised Statutes should not apply to the
Philippine Islands. (Sec. 1, Act of 1902.)
In providing for the government of the territory which
was acquired by the United States as a result of the
war with Spain, the executive and legislative
authorities have consistently proceeded in conformity
with the principles above state. The city of Manila was
surrendered to the United States on August 13, 1898,
and the military commander was directed to hold the
city, bay, and harbor, pending the conclusion of a
peace which should determine the control, disposition,
and government of the Islands. The duty then
devolved upon the American authorities to preserve
peace and protect person and property within the
occupied territory. Provision therefor was made by
proper orders, and on August 26 General Merritt
assumed the duties of military governor. The treaty of
peace was signed December 10, 1898. On the 22d of
December, 1898, the President announced that the
destruction of the Spanish fleet and the surrender of
the city had practically effected the conquest of the
Philippine Islands and the suspension of the Spanish
sovereignty therein, and that by the treaty of peace
the future control, disposition, and government of the
Islands had been ceded to the United States. During
the periods of strict military occupation, before the
treaty of peace was ratified, and the interim thereafter,
until Congress acted (Santiago vs. Noueral, 214 U.S.,
260), the territory was governed under the military
authority of the President as commander in chief.
Long before Congress took any action, the President
organized a civil government which, however, had its
legal justification, like the purely military government
which it gradually superseded, in the war power. The
military power of the President embraced legislative,
executive personally, or through such military or civil
agents as he chose to select. As stated by Secretary
Root in his report for 1901 —
The military power in exercise in a territory under
military occupation includes executive, legislative, and
judicial authority. It not infrequently happens that in a
single order of a military commander can be found the
exercise of all three of these different powers — the
exercise of the legislative powers by provisions
prescribing a rule of action; of judicial power by
determination of right; and the executive power by the
enforcement of the rules prescribed and the rights
determined.
President McKinley desired to transform military into
civil government as rapidly as conditions would
permit. After full investigation, the organization of civil
government was initiated by the appointment of a
commission to which civil authority was to be
gradually transferred. On September 1, 1900, the
authority to exercise, subject to the approval of the
President. "that part of the military power of the
President in the Philippine Islands which is legislative
in its character" was transferred from the military
government to the Commission, to be exercised under
such rules and regulations as should be prescribed by
the Secretary of War, until such time as complete civil
government should be established, or congress
otherwise provided. The legislative power thus
conferred upon the Commission was declared to
include "the making of rules and orders having the
effect of law for the raising of revenue by taxes,
customs duties, and imposts; the appropriation and
expenditure of public funds of the Islands; the
establishment of an educational system to secure an
efficient civil service; the organization and
establishment of courts; the organization and
establishment of municipal and departmental
government, and all other matters of a civil nature
which the military governor is now competent to
provide by rules or orders of a legislative character."
This grant of legislative power to the Commission was
to be exercised in conformity with certain declared
general principles, and subject to certain specific
restrictions for the protection of individual rights. The
Commission were to bear in mind that the government
to be instituted was "not for our satisfaction or for the
expression of our theoretical views, but for the
happiness, peace, and prosperity of the people of the
Philippine Island, and the measures adopted should
be made to conforms to their customs, their habits,
and even their prejudices, to the fullest extent
consistent with the accomplishment of the
indispensable requisites of just and effective
government." The specific restrictions upon legislative
power were found in the declarations that "no person
shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without
due process of law; that private property shall not be
taken for public use without just compensation; that in
all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the
right to a speedy and public trial, to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation, to be confronted
with the witnesses against him, to have compulsory
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to
have the assistance of counsel for his defense; that
excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive
fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishment
inflicted; that no person shall be put twice in jeopardy
for the same offense or be compelled in any criminal
case to be a witness against himself; that the right to
be secure against unreasonable searches and
seizures shall not be violated; that neither slavery nor
involuntary servitude shall exist except as a
punishment for crime; that no bill of attainder or ex
post facto law shall be passed; that no law shall be
passed abridging the freedom of speech or of the
press or of the rights of the people to peaceably
assemble and petition the Government for a redress
of grievances; that no law shall be made respecting
an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof, and that the free exercise and
enjoyment of religious profession and worship without
discrimination or preference shall forever be allowed."
To prevent any question as to the legality of these
proceedings being raised, the Spooner amendment to
the Army Appropriation Bill passed March 2, 1901,
provided that "all military, civil, and judicial powers
necessary to govern the Philippine Islands . . . shall
until otherwise provided by Congress be vested in
such person and persons, and shall be exercised in
such manner, as the President of the United States
shall direct, for the establishment of civil government,
and for maintaining and protecting the inhabitants of
said Islands in the free enjoyment of their liberty,
property, and religion." Thereafter, on July 4, 1901,
the authority, which had been exercised previously by
the military governor, was transferred to that official.
The government thus created by virtue of the authority
of the President as Commander in Chief of the Army
and Navy continued to administer the affairs of the
Islands under the direction of the President until by
the Act of July 1, 1902, Congress assumed control of
the situation by the enactment of a law which, in
connection with the instructions of April 7, 1900,
constitutes the organic law of the Philippine Islands.
The Act of July 1, 1902, made no substancial changes
in the form of government which the President had
erected. Congress adopted the system which was in
operation, and approved the action of the President in
organizing the government. Substantially all the
limitations which had been imposed on the legislative
power by the President's instructions were included in
the law, Congress thus extending to the Islands by
legislative act nor the Constitution, but all its
provisions for the protection of the rights and
privileges of individuals which were appropriate under
the conditions. The action of the President in creating
the Commission with designated powers of
government, in creating the office of the Governor-
General and Vice-Governor-General, and through the
Commission establishing certain executive
departments, was expressly approved and ratified.
Subsequently the action of the President in imposing
a tariff before and after the ratification of the treaty of
peace was also ratified and approved by Congress.
(Act of March 8, 1902; Act of July 1, 1902;
U.S. vs. Heinszen, 206 U.S., 370; Lincoln vs. U.S.,
197 U.S., 419.) Until otherwise provided by law the
Islands were to continue to be governed "as thereby
and herein provided." In the future the enacting clause
of all statutes should read "By authority of the United
States" instead of "By the authority of the President."
In the course of time the legislative authority of the
Commission in all parts of the Islands not inhabited by
Moros or non-Christian tribes was to be transferred to
a legislature consisting of two houses — the
Philippine Commission and the Philippine Assembly.
The government of the Islands was thus assumed by
Congress under its power to govern newly acquired
territory not incorporated into the United States.
This Government of the Philippine Islands is not a
State or a Territory, although its form and organization
somewhat resembles that of both. It stands outside of
the constitutional relation which unites the States and
Territories into the Union. The authority for its creation
and maintenance is derived from the Constitution of
the United States, which, however, operates on the
President and Congress, and not directly on the
Philippine Government. It is the creation of the United
States, acting through the President and Congress,
both deriving power from the same source, but from
different parts thereof. For its powers and the
limitations thereon the Government of the Philippines
looked to the orders of the President before Congress
acted and the Acts of Congress after it assumed
control. Its organic laws are derived from the formally
and legally expressed will of the President and
Congress, instead of the popular sovereign
constituency which lies upon any subject relating to
the Philippines is primarily in Congress, and when it
exercise such power its act is from the viewpoint of
the Philippines the legal equivalent of an amendment
of a constitution in the United States.
Within the limits of its authority the Government of the
Philippines is a complete governmental organism with
executive, legislative, and judicial departments
exercising the functions commonly assigned to such
departments. The separation of powers is as
complete as in most governments. In neither Federal
nor State governments is this separation such as is
implied in the abstract statement of the doctrine. For
instance, in the Federal Government the Senate
exercises executive powers, and the President to
some extent controls legislation through the veto
power. In a State the veto power enables him to
exercise much control over legislation. The Governor-
General, the head of the executive department in the
Philippine Government, is a member of the Philippine
Commission, but as executive he has no veto power.
The President and Congress framed the government
on the model with which Americans are familiar, and
which has proven best adapted for the advancement
of the public interests and the protection of individual
rights and priviliges.
In instituting this form of government of intention must
have been to adopt the general constitutional
doctrined which are inherent in the system. Hence,
under it the Legislature must enact laws subject to the
limitations of the organic laws, as Congress must act
under the national Constitution, and the States under
the national and state constitutions. The executive
must execute such laws as are constitutionally
enacted. The judiciary, as in all governments
operating under written constitutions, must determine
the validity of legislative enactments, as well as the
legality of all private and official acts. In performing
these functions it acts with the same independence as
the Federal and State judiciaries in the United States.
Under no other constitutional theory could there be
that government of laws and not of men which is
essential for the protection of rights under a free and
orderly government.
Such being the constitutional theory of the
Government of the Philippine Islands, it is apparent
that the courts must consider the question of the
validity of an act of the Philippine Commission or the
Philippine Legislature, as a State court considers an
act of the State legislature. The Federal Government
exercises such powers only as are expressly or
impliedly granted to it by the Constitution of the United
States, while the States exercise all powers which
have not been granted to the central government. The
former operates under grants, the latter subject to
restrictions. The validity of an Act of Congress
depends upon whether the Constitution of the United
States contains a grant of express or implied authority
to enact it. An act of a State legislature is valid unless
the Federal or State constitution expressly or impliedly
prohibits its enaction. An Act of the legislative
authority of the Philippines Government which has not
been expressly disapproved by Congress is valid
unless its subject-matter has been covered by
congressional legislation, or its enactment forbidden
by some provision of the organic laws.
The legislative power of the Government of the
Philippines is granted in general terms subject to
specific limitations. The general grant is not alone of
power to legislate on certain subjects, but to exercise
the legislative power subject to the restrictions stated.
It is true that specific authority is conferred upon the
Philippine Government relative to certain subjects of
legislation, and that Congress has itself legislated
upon certain other subjects. These, however, should
be viewed simply as enactments on matters wherein
Congress was fully informed and ready to act, and not
as implying any restriction upon the local legislative
authority in other matters. (See Opinion of Atty. Gen.
of U. S., April 16, 1908.)
The fact that Congress reserved the power to annul
specific acts of legislation by the Government of the
Philippine tends strongly to confirm the view that for
purposes of construction the Government of the
Philippines should be regarded as one of general
instead of enumerated legislative powers. The
situation was unusual. The new government was to
operate far from the source of its authority. To relieve
Congress from the necessity of legislating with
reference to details, it was thought better to grant
general legislative power to the new government,
subject to broad and easily understood prohibitions,
and reserve to Congress the power to annul its acts if
they met with disapproval. It was therefore provided
"that all laws passed by the Government of the
Philippine Islands shall be reported to Congress,
which hereby reserves the power and authority to
annul the same." (Act of Congress, July 1, 1902, sec.
86.) This provision does not suspend the acts of the
Legislature of the Philippines until approved by
Congress, or when approved, expressly or by
acquiescence, make them the laws of Congress. They
are valid acts of the Government of the Philippine
Islands until annulled. (Miners Bank vs. Iowa, 12 How.
(U. S.), 1.)
In order to determine the validity of Act No. 55 we
must then ascertain whether the Legislature has been
expressly or implication forbidden to enact it. Section
3, Article IV, of the Constitution of the United States
operated only upon the States of the Union. It has no
application to the Government of the Philippine
Islands. The power to regulate foreign commerce is
vested in Congress, and by virtue of its power to
govern the territory belonging to the United States, it
may regulate foreign commerce with such territory. It
may do this directly, or indirectly through a legislative
body created by it, to which its power in this respect if
delegate. Congress has by direct legislation
determined the duties which shall be paid upon goods
imported into the Philippines, and it has expressly
authorized the Government of the Philippines to
provide for the needs of commerce by improving
harbors and navigable waters. A few other specific
provisions relating to foreign commerce may be found
in the Acts of Congress, but its general regulation is
left to the Government of the Philippines, subject to
the reserved power of Congress to annul such
legislation as does not meet with its approval. The
express limitations upon the power of the Commission
and Legislature to legislate do not affect the authority
with respect to the regulation of commerce with
foreign countries. Act No. 55 was enacted before
Congress took over the control of the Islands, and this
act was amended by Act No. 275 after the Spooner
amendment of March 2, 1901, was passed. The
military government, and the civil government
instituted by the President, had the power, whether it
be called legislative or administrative, to regulate
commerce between foreign nations and the ports of
the territory. (Cross vs. Harrison, 16 How. (U.S.), 164,
190; Hamilton vs. Dillin, 21 Wall. (U.S.), 73, 87.) This
Act has remained in force since its enactment without
annulment or other action by Congress, and must be
presumed to have met with its approval. We are
therefore satisfied that the Commission had, and the
Legislature now has, full constitutional power to enact
laws for the regulation of commerce between foreign
countries and the ports of the Philippine Islands, and
that Act No. 55, as amended by Act No. 275, is valid.
3. Whether a certain method of handling cattle is
suitable within the meaning of the Act can not be left
to the judgment of the master of the ship. It is a
question which must be determined by the court from
the evidence. On December 2, 1908, the defendant
Bull brought into and disembarked in the port and city
of Manila certain cattle, which came from the port of
Ampieng, Formosa, without providing suitable means
for securing said animals while in transit, so as to
avoid cruelty and unnecessary suffering to said
animals, contrary to the provisions of section 1 of Act
No. 55, as amended by section 1 of Act No. 275. The
trial court found the following facts, all of which are
fully sustained by the evidence:
That the defendant, H. N. Bull, as captain and master
of the Norwegian steamer known as the Standard, for
a period of six months or thereabouts prior to the 2d
day of December, 1908, was engaged in the
transportation of cattle and carabaos from Chines and
Japanese ports to and into the city of Manila,
Philippine Islands.
That on the 2d day of December, 1908, the
defendant, as such master and captain as aforesaid,
brought into the city of Manila, aboard said ship, a
large number of cattle, which ship was anchored,
under the directions of the said defendant, behind the
breakwaters in front of the city of Manila, in Manila
Bay, and within the jurisdiction of this court; and that
fifteen of said cattle then and there had broken legs
and three others of said cattle were dead, having
broken legs; and also that said cattle were transported
and carried upon said ship as aforesaid by the
defendant, upon the deck and in the hold of said ship,
without suitable precaution and care for the
transportation of said animals, and to avoid danger
and risk to their lives and security; and further that
said cattle were so transported abroad said ship by
the defendant and brought into the said bay, and into
the city of Manila, without any provisions being made
whatever upon said decks of said ship and in the hold
thereof to maintain said cattle in a suitable condition
and position for such transportation.
That a suitable and practicable manner in which to
transport cattle abroad steamship coming into Manila
Bay and unloading in the city of Manila is by way of
individual stalls for such cattle, providing partitions
between the cattle and supports at the front sides,
and rear thereof, and cross-cleats upon the floor on
which they stand and are transported, of that in case
of storms, which are common in this community at
sea, such cattle may be able to stand without slipping
and pitching and falling, individually or collectively,
and to avoid the production of panics and hazard to
the animals on account or cattle were transported in
this case. Captain Summerville of the
steamship Taming, a very intelligent and experienced
seaman, has testified, as a witness in behalf of the
Government, and stated positively that since the
introduction in the ships with which he is acquainted
of the stall system for the transportation of animals
and cattle he has suffered no loss whatever during the
last year. The defendant has testified, as a witness in
his own behalf, that according to his experience the
system of carrying cattle loose upon the decks and in
the hold is preferable and more secure to the life and
comfort of the animals, but this theory of the case is
not maintainable, either by the proofs or common
reason. It can not be urged with logic that, for
instance, three hundred cattle supports for the feet
and without stalls or any other protection for them
individually can safely and suitably carried in times of
storm upon the decks and in the holds of ships; such
a theory is against the law of nature. One animal
falling or pitching, if he is untied or unprotected, might
produce a serious panic and the wounding of half the
animals upon the ship if transported in the manner
found in this case.
The defendant was found guilty, and sentenced to pay
a fine of two hundred and fifty pesos, with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the
costs. The sentence and judgment is affirmed. So
ordered.
Arellano, C.J., Torres, Johnson, Carson and
Moreland, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. L-18924 October 19, 1922
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE
ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
WONG CHENG (alias WONG CHUN), defendant-
appellee.
Attorney-General Villa-Real for appellant.
Eduardo Gutierrez Repide for appellee.
ROMUALDEZ, J.:
In this appeal the Attorney-General urges the
revocation of the order of the Court of First Instance of
Manila, sustaining the demurrer presented by the
defendant to the information that initiated this case
and in which the appellee is accused of having
illegally smoked opium, aboard the merchant
vessel Changsa of English nationality while said
vessel was anchored in Manila Bay two and a half
miles from the shores of the city.
The demurrer alleged lack of jurisdiction on the part of
the lower court, which so held and dismissed the
case.
The question that presents itself for our consideration
is whether such ruling is erroneous or not; and it will
or will not be erroneous according as said court has or
has no jurisdiction over said offense.
The point at issue is whether the courts of the
Philippines have jurisdiction over crime, like the one
herein involved, committed aboard merchant vessels
anchored in our jurisdiction waters. 1awph!l.net
There are two fundamental rules on this particular
matter in connection with International Law; to wit, the
French rule, according to which crimes committed
aboard a foreign merchant vessels should not be
prosecuted in the courts of the country within whose
territorial jurisdiction they were committed, unless
their commission affects the peace and security of the
territory; and the English rule, based on the territorial
principle and followed in the United States, according
to which, crimes perpetrated under such
circumstances are in general triable in the courts of
the country within territory they were committed. Of
this two rules, it is the last one that obtains in this
jurisdiction, because at present the theories and
jurisprudence prevailing in the United States on this
matter are authority in the Philippines which is now a
territory of the United States.
In the cases of The Schooner Exchange vs.
M'Faddon and Others (7 Cranch [U. S.], 116), Chief
Justice Marshall said:
. . . When merchant vessels enter for the purposes of
trade, it would be obviously inconvenient and
dangerous to society, and would subject the laws to
continual infraction, and the government to
degradation, if such individuals or merchants did not
owe temporary and local allegiance, and were not
amenable to the jurisdiction of the country. . . .
In United States vs. Bull (15 Phil., 7), this court held:
. . . No court of the Philippine Islands had jurisdiction
over an offense or crime committed on the high seas
or within the territorial waters of any other country, but
when she came within three miles of a line drawn
from the headlands, which embrace the entrance to
Manila Bay, she was within territorial waters, and a
new set of principles became applicable. (Wheaton,
International Law [Dana ed.], p. 255, note 105;
Bonfils, Le Droit Int., secs. 490 et seq.; Latour, La Mer
Ter., ch. 1.) The ship and her crew were then subject
to the jurisdiction of the territorial sovereign subject to
such limitations as have been conceded by that
sovereignty through the proper political agency. . . .
It is true that in certain cases the comity of nations is
observed, as in Mali and Wildenhus vs. Keeper of the
Common Jail (120 U.., 1), wherein it was said that:
. . . The principle which governs the whole matter is
this: Disorder which disturb only the peace of the ship
or those on board are to be dealt with exclusively by
the sovereignty of the home of the ship, but those
which disturb the public peace may be suppressed,
and, if need be, the offenders punished by the proper
authorities of the local jurisdiction. It may not be easy
at all times to determine which of the two jurisdictions
a particular act of disorder belongs. Much will
undoubtedly depend on the attending circumstances
of the particular case, but all must concede that
felonious homicide is a subject for the local
jurisdiction, and that if the proper authorities are
proceeding with the case in the regular way the
consul has no right to interfere to prevent it.
Hence in United States vs. Look Chaw (18 Phil., 573),
this court held that:
Although the mere possession of an article of
prohibited use in the Philippine Islands, aboard a
foreign vessel in transit in any local port, does not, as
a general rule, constitute a crime triable by the courts
of the Islands, such vessels being considered as an
extension of its own nationality, the same rule does
not apply when the article, the use of which is
prohibited in the Islands, is landed from the vessels
upon Philippine soil; in such a case an open violation
of the laws of the land is committed with respect to
which, as it is a violation of the penal law in force at
the place of the commission of the crime, no court
other than that established in the said place has
jurisdiction of the offense, in the absence of an
agreement under an international treaty.
As to whether the United States has ever consented
by treaty or otherwise to renouncing such jurisdiction
or a part thereof, we find nothing to this effect so far
as England is concerned, to which nation the ship
where the crime in question was committed belongs.
Besides, in his work "Treaties, Conventions, etc.,"
volume 1, page 625, Malloy says the following:
There shall be between the territories of the United
States of America, and all the territories of His Britanic
Majesty in Europe, a reciprocal liberty of commerce.
The inhabitants of the two countries, respectively,
shall have liberty freely and securely to come with
their ships and cargoes to all such places, ports and
rivers, in the territories aforesaid, to which other
foreigners are permitted to come, to enter into the
same, and to remain and reside in any parts of the
said territories, respectively; also to hire and occupy
houses and warehouses for the purposes of their
commerce; and, generally, the merchants and traders
of each nation respectively shall enjoy the most
complete protection and security for their commerce,
but subject always to the laws and statutes of the two
countries, respectively. (Art. 1, Commerce and
Navigation Convention.)
We have seen that the mere possession of opium
aboard a foreign vessel in transit was held by this
court not triable by or courts, because it being the
primary object of our Opium Law to protect the
inhabitants of the Philippines against the disastrous
effects entailed by the use of this drug, its mere
possession in such a ship, without being used in our
territory, does not being about in the said territory
those effects that our statute contemplates avoiding.
Hence such a mere possession is not considered a
disturbance of the public order.
But to smoke opium within our territorial limits, even
though aboard a foreign merchant ship, is certainly a
breach of the public order here established, because
it causes such drug to produce its pernicious effects
within our territory. It seriously contravenes the
purpose that our Legislature has in mind in enacting
the aforesaid repressive statute. Moreover, as the
Attorney-General aptly observes:
. . . The idea of a person smoking opium securely on
board a foreign vessel at anchor in the port of Manila
in open defiance of the local authorities, who are
impotent to lay hands on him, is simply subversive of
public order. It requires no unusual stretch of the
imagination to conceive that a foreign ship may come
into the port of Manila and allow or solicit Chinese
residents to smoke opium on board.
The order appealed from is revoked and the cause
ordered remanded to the court of origin for further
proceedings in accordance with law, without special
findings as to costs. So ordered.
Araullo, C.J., Street, Malcolm, Avanceña, Villamor,
Ostrand and Johns, JJ., concur.