Property Possession

FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 182449 : March 6, 2013
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. MARTIN T. NG, Respondent.
DECISION
SERENO, C.J.:
Before this Court is a Rule 45 Petition, seeking a review of the 25 March 2008 Decision1 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 01143, which affirmed the 23 October 2002 Amended Decision2 of the
Municipal Trial Court (MTC), Consolacion, Cebu, in LR Case No. N-12, LRA Record No. N-67773. The MTC
ordered the registration and confirmation of title over five parcels of land claimed by respondent Martin T.
Ng.
The antecedent facts are as follows:3.
On 7 January 1997, respondent filed an application for the original registration of title over Lot Nos. 9663,
9666, 9668, 9690 and 9691, CAD 545-D (New) situated at Cansaga, Consolacion, Cebu. He claimed
ownership of these five parcels of land with a total area of 1,841 square meters. His claim was based on his
purchase thereof from the vendors, who had possessed the realties for more than thirty (30) years.
During the reception of evidence by the Clerk of Court, respondent furnished the following pieces of
documentary evidence to establish his purchase of the lots: (1) Deed of Absolute Sale between him and
Eustaquio Tibon;4 (2) Extra-judicial Settlement of Estate & Sale between him and Olivia Sicad vda. de
Ouano;5 (3) Deed of Definite Sale by Eduardo and Virginia Capao;6 (4) Deed of Absolute Sale between him
and Victoria Capadiso;7 and (5) Agreement of Partition between him and Victoria Capadiso.8 In addition, he
attached the numerous vintage Tax Declarations9 dating as far back as 1948.10 These Tax Declarations were
either under the names of the vendors, the previous transferors and the original owners of the lots. The
regularity and due execution of these contracts, Tax Declarations and realty payments were never assailed
by petitioner.
Respondent also submitted the following documents to prove his ownership: (1) the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) Certification showing that the subject lots were within the
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain;11 (2) the DENR Certification stating that the lots are not
covered by any other subsisting public land application;12 and (3) the original tracing cloth plan covering the
properties.13 Similarly, these pieces of evidence were never assailed by petitioner.
As for testimonial evidence, respondent narrated that these lots were purchased from the aforementioned
vendees and predecessors-in-interest, who had been in possession of the lots for more than thirty (30)
years. In support of his claims, he further presented the testimony of the 77-year-old Josefa N. Fat (Fat),
who lived near the subject lots.
According to Fat, she met respondent in 1993, when he brought with him workers assigned to plant trees
and to fence the property. Since then, she recounted that she saw him on the subject lots for several times.
Further, she stated that she knew the original owners and vendees of the lots, as they were her neighbors
and close friends. She also recounted that the properties were either inherited or transferred by the past
owners to the vendors, who in turn sold them to Martin T. Ng; and that there is no other person who laid
claim over the lots. She ended her testimony by asserting with certainty that the ownership and possession
by respondent and his predecessors-in-interest were public, peaceful, open, continuous, and in the concept
of an owner.
After the presentation of evidence, the MTC rendered its 23 October 2002 Decision confirming respondents
title to the subject lots and ordering the registration of the title in his name.
Petitioner, as represented by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), appealed to the CA. In a lone
assignment of error, it averred that the trial court erred in granting Ngs application, since respondent had
failed to comply with the requirements for the original registration of title.
Petitioner contended that respondent had failed to substantiate his alleged possession and occupation. It
attacked Fats testimony as full of motherhood statements, which could not be given weight by the courts. In
1
addition, it asserted that the Tax Declarations attached to the application merely provided an indicia of
possession, and not a conclusive proof of ownership.
The CA affirmed the factual findings of the MTC. It appreciated the statement of Josefa Fat, who lived near
the subject parcels of land, that she knew their previous owners as her neighbors and close acquaintances.
According to the appellate court, this testimony was even corroborated by
Tax Declarations and realty tax payments, which altogether sufficiently established the possession of the
realties by respondents predecessors-in-interest.14 Hence, the CA held:15 ?r?l 1
Considering that the possession of the subject parcels of land by the applicant-appellee tacked to that of his
predecessors-in-interest, covered a period of forty-nine (49) years to the time of the filing of the application
for registration in 1997, we hold that applicant-appellee has acquired an imperfect title thereto which may
be subject to confirmation and brought under the operation of the Torrens system.
WHEREFORE , the assailed Amended Decision dated October 23, 2002 of the MTC Consolacion, Cebu, is
AFFIRMED.
Aggrieved, petitioner reiterates its lone assignment of error before this Court:16 that the CA gravely erred in
affirming the trial courts appreciation of respondents claim of ownership as one that had been established by
virtue of an open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the subject lots.
RULING OF THE COURT
In a judicial confirmation of title under original registration proceedings, applicants may obtain the
registration of title to land upon a showing that they or their predecessors-in-interest have been in (1) open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of (2) agricultural lands of the public
domain, (3) under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, (4) for at least 30 years immediately
preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title, except when prevented by war or force
majeure.17 The burden of proof in land registration cases rests on applicants who must show clear, positive
and convincing evidence that their alleged possession and occupation were of the nature and duration
required by law.18?r?l 1
In this case, what is questioned is the sufficiency of the evidence submitted to prove that the possession by
respondents predecessors-in-interest was of the nature required by the Public Land Act and the Property
Registration Decree. Specifically, respondent must prove that his predecessors-in-interest openly,
continuously, exclusively, and notoriously possessed the realties.
Possession is acquired in any of the following ways: (1) by the material occupation of the thing; (2) by the
exercise of a right; (3) by the fact that the property is subject to the action of our will; and (4) by the
proper acts and legal formalities established for acquiring the right.19 In Director of Lands v. IAC,20 we
explained the nature of the possession required to confirm ones title as follows: c ralawli bra ry
Possession is open when it is patent, visible, apparent, notorious and not clandestine. It is continuous when
uninterrupted, unbroken and not intermittent or occasional; exclusive when the adverse possessor can show
exclusive dominion over the land and an appropriation of it to his own use and benefit; and notorious when
it is so conspicuous that it is generally known and talked of by the public or the people in the neighborhood.
(Emphasis supplied)
In perusing the evidence submitted by respondent, petitioner claims21 that the former merely presented (1)
a witness testimony full of motherhood statements, and (2) Tax Declarations and realty payments that do
not conclusively prove ownership. Thus, the Republic claims that the evidence of possession is insufficient.
However, as found by the courts a quo, it is clear from the records that respondent presented several pieces
of documentary evidence to prove that he openly possessed the properties. He submitted notarized Deeds of
Sale, Agreements of Partition and Extra-judicial Settlement of Estate and Sale to show the acquisition of the
lands from his predecessors-in-interest.22 ?r?l 1
Moreover, he presented Tax Declarations and realty payments showing that he and his predecessors-in-
interest had been paying real estate taxes since 1948 until the inception of this case in 1997; hence, for
more than 30 years. He also submitted the original tracing cloth plan in which the advance survey plan
shows that the subject lots had previously been under the names of the vendors, the previous transferors,
and the original owners of the lots.23
?r?l1
As we have ruled in Republic v. Sta. Ana-Burgos,24 while tax declarations and realty tax payments on
property are not conclusive evidence of ownership, they are nevertheless good indicia of possession in the
concept of owner, for no one in the right frame of mind would be paying taxes for a property that is not in
ones actual or at least constructive possession.
The voluntary declaration of a piece of property for taxation purposes is an announcement of ones claim
against the State and all other interested parties.25 In fact, these documents already constitute prima facie
2
evidence of possession.26 Moreover, if the holders of the land present a deed of conveyance in their favor
from its former owner to support their claim of ownership, the declaration of ownership and tax receipts
relative to the property may be used to prove their good faith in occupying and possessing it.27Additionally,
when considered with actual possession of the property, tax receipts constitute evidence of great value in
support of the claim of title of ownership by prescription.28
?r?l1
As for testimonial evidence, although it is unfortunate that respondents counsel failed to ask Fat specific
questions as to the fact of possession, it is evident that respondents predecessors-in-interest were the
witness longtime neighbors and close friends who lived near the subject lots. Logically, it can be inferred
that respondents predecessors-in-interest materially occupied and continuously possessed the adjoining
property. Her testimony reads thus:29 ?r?l1
Q: Do you know a certain Nemesio Tibon?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Why do you know him?
A: Because he was my close neighbor.
Q: In relation to Lot 9663 one of the subject lots, who is he?
A: He was the original owner of Lot No. 9663.
Q: Where is Nemesio Tibon now?
A: He is already dead.
Q: After Nemesio Tibon died, who owned and possessed Lot No. 9663?
A: It was his son, Eustaquio Tibon, who owned and possessed Lot No. 9663 after he inherited the same from
Nemesio Tibon.
Q: From his son, Eustaquio Tibon, where did the property go?
A: It was owned and possessed by the applicant, Martin T. Ng, after the latter bought it from Eustaquio
Tibon.
Q: Do you know a certain Diego Balaba?
A: Yes, sir.
A: We were very close neighbors before.
Q: In relation to Lot No. 9666, one of the subject lots, who is he?
Q: Where is Diego Balaba now?
Q: From Diego Balaba, who owned and possessed Lot No. 9666?
A: It was the spouses Rufino Quano and Oliva Sicad who owned and possessed the same after they bought
it from Diego Balaba.
Q: How did you know about this fact?
A: As I have said, Diego Balaba was my close neighbor and I was present when the sale was made.
Q: From the spouses Rufino Quano and Oliva Sicad, who owned and possessed Lot No. 9666?
A: It was the applicant, Martin T. Ng, who owned and possessed Lot No. 9666 after the latter bought it from
the spouses Rufino Quano and Oliva Sicad.
3
Q: Do you know a certain Liberato Alivio?
A: Yes, sir.
A: He was my neighbor and a very close friend of mine.
Q: Where is Liberato Alivio now?
Q: After Liberato Alivio died, who owned and possessed Lot No. 9668?
A: It was owned and possessed by his wife, Cipriana Herbieto.
Q: From Cipriana Herbieto, where did Lot No. 9668 go?
A: It was owned and possessed by his son, Ireneo Alivio, who, in turn, sold the same to the spouses
Eduardo Capao and Virginia Alivio.
Q: From the spouses Eduardo Capao and Virginia Alivio, who owned and possessed Lot No. 9668?
A: It was owned and possessed by the applicant, Martin T. Ng, after the latter purchased the same from the
spouses Eduardo Capao and Virginia Alivio.
Q: Why do you know all these facts?
A: Because I am living near the land and that the previous owners of the said land were my neighbor and
close friends.
Q: Do you know a certain Julian Capadiso?
A: Yes, sir.
A: He was my neighbor and a very close friend.
Q: Where is Julian Capadiso now?
Q: After Julian Capadiso died, who owned and possessed Lot No. 9690?
A: It was owned and possessed by the spouses Eustiquiano Naingue and Victoria Capadiso after the latter
bought it from Julian Capadiso.
Q: From the spouses Eustiquiano Naingue and Victoria Capadiso, where did the property go?
A: It was owned and possessed by the applicant, Martin T. Ng, after the latter bought it from the spouses
Eustiquiano Naingue and Victoria Capadiso.
Q: Why do you know all about these facts?
A: As I have said, I am living near the land and the original and previous owners of the said lot are my
neighbors and close friends.
4
Q: Do you know a certain Saturnino Capadiso?
A: Yes, sir.
A: He was my neighbor.
Q: Where is Saturnino Capadiso now?
Q: In relation to Lot No. 9691 one of the subject lots, who is he?
A: He was the original owner of Lot No.9691.
Q: From Saturnino Capadiso, who owned and possessed Lot No. 9691?
A: It was owned and possessed by his daughter, Victoria Capadiso after the latter inherited the same from
his father, Saturnino Capadiso.
Q: After Victoria Capadiso, who owned and possessed Lot No. 9691?
A: It was owned and possessed by the applicant, Martin T. Ng after the latter purchased the same from
Victoria Capadiso.
Q: What can you say then of the ownership and possession of the applicant over the subject lots?
A: I can say with certainty that the ownership and possession of the applicant and that of his predecessors-
in-interest over the subject lots is public, peaceful, open, continuous and in concept of owners.
Atty. Seno: cralawlib rary
That is all for the witness your Honor.
xxx ???ñ r?bl ?š ??r†??l l ?? l?b r?rÿ
The said witness further narrated that the lots were transferred either through a contract of sale or though
succession, from the original owners to the vendors who later became respondents predecessors-in-interest.
Taken together, these acts of transferring the property evinced the exercise of their ownership rights over
the lots.
Far from giving a motherhood statement, Fat also asserted with certainty that no other person laid claim to
the lots. This fact was corroborated by the DENR Certification that the lots were not covered by any other
subsisting public land application. Accordingly, respondent supplied proof of his exclusive possession of the
realties.
Therefore, given these pieces of documentary evidence consisting of muniments of title, tax declarations
and realty payments which were not disputed by petitioner; and the testimony as regards the actual
possession for more than 30 years by respondents predecessors-in-interest the OSG inaccurately portrayed
respondent as merely making general submissions in proving his claims. Rather, as found by the courts a
quo, he amply established that he and his predecessors-in-interest owned and possessed the subject lots
openly, continuously, exclusively, and notoriously, as required by our registration laws.
For these reasons, we see no reason to reverse the congruent factual findings of the MTC and the CA.
IN VIEW THEREOF, the assailed 25 March 2008 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 01143 is
hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Endnotes:
5
1
Rollo, pp. 34-44; CA Decision, penned by Associate Justice Francisco P. Acosta, with Associate Justices
Pampio A. Abarintos and Amy C. Lazaro-Javier concurring.
2
Id. at 75-88.
3
Id. at 34-35.
4
Records, p. 106.
5
Id. at 15-16.
6
Id. at 147.
7
Id. at 19.
8
Id. at 166.
9
Id. at 113-128; 131-140; 148-156; 158-165.
10
Id. at 113.
11
Id. at 105.
12
Id. at 30.
13
Id. at 83.
14
Rollo, p. 43.
15
Id.
16
Id. at 17.
17
Presidential Decree No. 1529 (1978), Sec. 14; Commonwealth Act No. 141 (1936), Sec 48.
18
Diaz-Enriquez v. Republic of the Philippines, 480 Phil. 787 (2004).
19
CIVIL CODE, Art. 531.
20
G.R. No. 68946, 209 Phil. 214, 224 (1992).
21
Rollo, pp. 14-27.
22
Director of Lands v. CA, G.R. No. 50260, 29 July 1992, 211 SCRA 868.
23
Records, p. 82.
24
G.R. No. 163254, 1 June 2007, 523 SCRA 309.
25
Id.
26
The Republic of the Philippines v. Santua, G.R. No. 155703, 8 September 2008, 564 SCRA 331.
27
Elumbaring v. Elumbaring, 12 Phil. 384 (1909).
28
Viernes v. Agpaoa, 41 Phil. 286 (1920).
29
Rollo, pp. 99-102; TSN dated 16 April 2002, pp. 5-33.
6
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-42859 March 17, 1938
GABRIEL LASAM, applicant-appellee, vs. THE DIRECTOR OF

LANDS and JOSE CHAN HONG HIN, ET AL., opponents-
appellant.
Acting Solicitor-General Melencio and B. Pobre for appellants.

Alfredo Catolico for appellee.
LAUREL, J.: chanrobles vi rtua l law lib ra ry
On January 24, 1930, Gabriel Lasam filed with the Court of First
Instance of Cagayan an application for the registration of 152
parcels of land containing a total area of 24,723,436 square meters,
situated in the municipality of Solana, Province of Cagayan,
described in the plan Exhibit K attached to the application. These
152 parcels include the parcel No. 9 here involved. chanroble svirtualawl ibra ry chanroble s virtual law lib rary
According to the lower court, the portions of said parcel No. 9 which
opposed during the time of survey were delimited and marked on its
plan Psu-67516 attached to the record as lots A to Z, AA to HH, MM
to ZZ, AAA to ZZZ, AAAA to ZZZZ, AAAAA, to FFFFF, NNNNN, 35 to
38, and 111 to 143, all inclusive. (Decision of the lower court, Bill of
Exception of the Government, p. 35.) chanrob les vi rtual law lib rary
The Director of Lands opposed the application on the ground that it

is not supported by any title fit for registration and that the land
sought to be registered is public land. The brothers Felipe, Jose and
Salvador, all surnamed Narag, who are first cousin to the applicant
Lasam, also filed opposition on the ground that they are the owners
of parcels No. 9. Opposition were also filed by Tomas Furigay and
35 other persons as homesteaders; by the provincial fiscal,
representing the Directors of Forestry, on the ground that portions
thereof are public forest; by Francisco Caronan and some 71 others
parties, claiming the parcels occupied by them as their exclusive
properties; by Jose Chan Hong Hin, on the ground that the applicant
includes his property of about 22 hectares and 50 ares; and by
Mauro Antonio, on the ground that the applicant includes the
portion occupied by him and belonging to him. Pablo Soriano
succeeded in having the order of general default set aside as to him
and was allowed to registered his opposition at a latter date.
7
Amendede applications and oppositions by the parties were
subsequently permitted to be filed. ch anroble svirtualawl ibra ry chan roble s vi rtual law lib rary
After a protracted hearing, the lower court rejected and the

oppositions filed, declaring the applicant, Gabriel Lasam, the owner
of parcel No. 9 as indicated in the plan Psu-67516 (Exhibit K), and
decreed the registration of said parcel in his favor. chanroblesvi rtu alawlib rary c hanrob les vi rtua l law lib rary
On September 10, 1934, counsel for various oppositors, after

excepting to the decision, filed a motion for new trial which was
denied, and the case was brought before this court by bill of
exceptions.chanroblesvi rtual awlib rary cha nrob les vi rtua l law lib rary
The Narag brothers and the Directors of Forestry appear to have

abandoned their opposition. They made no attempt to substantiate
their claims at the trial. chan roblesv irtualawli bra ry chan roble s virtual law l ibra ry
Counsel for the Director of Lands, et al. and for Jose Chan Hong Hin,
et al. make various assignments of error in their respective briefs. It
is not believe necessary however, to consider each and every
assignment made as the questions presented may, in our opinion,
be reduced to the following propositions: (a) Whether or not the
applicant, Gabriel Lasam, is entitled to the registered of parcel No. 9
on the basis of the document presented as Exhibit L, hereinafter to
be referred to, or in the alternative, whether or not he is entitled to
registered on the basis of public, continuous, and adverse
possession under a claim of ownership during the time prescribed
by law (par. 9, application); and the negative, (b) whether or not
the numerous oppositors - excluding the homesteader - are entitled
to the parcels which they allege are included in the controverted
parcel No. 9. The rights of the homesteader necessarily depend on
the resolution of these two propositions. chanroblesvi rt ualawlib ra ry chanrobles vi rt ual law li bra ry
Exhibit L purports to be an application dated June 27, 1873

addressed by Domingo Narag 1.� to the Alcalde Mayor, in which the
former stated that he had been in possession of the land above
described and asked that informacion testifical be admitted.
The informacion testifical was had before the Alcalde Mayor and
appears to have been approved by the Judge of the Court of First
Instance without objection on the part of the fiscal. It is the theory
of the applicant that Domingo Narag 1.� the original owner of
parcel No. 5, described in Exhibit L, owned P1,000 from the
applicant's which amount Narag needed for his
candidacy gobernadorcillo of Tuguegarao, Cagayan, in 1880; that
the original of Exhibit L was turned over by the applicant to his
lawyer, Vicente Marasigan, who lost it, and for this reason, only a
certificate copy of the document marked Exhibit L presented; and
that the fifth parcel mentioned in the document, Exhibit L, is the
parcel No. 9 described in the plan, Exhibit K. The Government
8
contends that Exhibit L is not a valid titled and does not confer
ownership that even if it were valid, it does not cover so extensive
an area as that appearing on the plan, Exhibit K. chanrob lesvi rtua lawlib rary cha nrob les vi rtua l law libra ry
The land designated as the fifth parcel is described in Exhibit L as

follows:
5.� Un terreno o pasto de ganados vacunos llamado Marguirig o

Cagguban que linda al poniente con el estero Pagul, oriente con el
pueblo de la Solana al norte con el sitio llamado y Calabbacao y al
sur con el sitio llamado Atayo el cual tiene un cabida de siete mil
brazaz y herede de mis Padres hace viente y dos a�os y en la
actualidad es donde mis granados de procreacion.
Parcel No. 9, the registration of which is applied for in these

proceedings, is described thus (brief of claimant-appellee p. 61):
Por el norte con barrios de Iraga, Bauan y Bangag; chanrobles vi rt ual law li bra ry
Por el este con el Centro y los barrios de Basi, Natapian y Lanna; chanrobles vi rtua l law lib rary
Por el sur con la carretera provincial; y chanrob les vi rtua l law lib rary
Por el oeste barrios de Maguirig, Cagguban y estero Pangul.
We are of the opinion that the court below committed no error in

receiving Exhibit L as evidence for the claimant, but its admission by
the court does not necessarily entitled the applicant Gabriel Lasam,
to the registration of the parcel claimed by him in these
proceedings. It is apparent that parcel No. 9, as indicated in the
plan, Exhibit K, is not the same parcel No. 5 described in document
Exhibit L. Whereas Exhibit L gives as boundaries on the north
the sitios of Maasin and Calabbacao, Exhibit K gives the barrios of
Iraga, Bauan, and Bangag; on the east Exhibit L gives the pueblo of
Solana, whereas Exhibit K gives "el Centro y los barrios de Basi,
Natappian y Lanna"; on the west Exhibit L gives estero Pangul,
whereas Exhibit K gives the barrios of Maguirig, Cagguban and
estero Pangul; on the south Exhibit L gives the sitio of Atayao,
whereas Exhibit K gives the carretera provincial. While there may be
partial indentity as to boundaries on the east and west, such
indentity is lacking as to the boundaries on the north and south.
This discrepancy is accentuated by the admmission of the applicant
that the parcel whose registered is sought is much smaller than that
described in paragraph 5 of Exhibit L. The explanation given by the
surveyors Jose Mallanao, presented as witness by the claimant, is a
follows:
Because on the north side when we went around the lot and I asked
for the barrios of Maasin and Calabacao the applicant pointed to me
9
a place very far from where he was at the time and where he
actually occupied the land, and on the south side he indicated to me
the provincial road. I asked why he should not take the actual land
indicated by this title and he told me that he was not occupying that
portion . That is the reason why I took up the boundary on the
south as provincial road. On the east side he indicated to me the
center of the municipality of Solana, barrios of Basi, Nangalisan and
Lanna, and on the west is a public land party bounded by the
barrios of Maguirig, and Cagguban and estero Pangul.
An applicant for registration of land, if he relies on a document

evidencing his title thereto, must prove not only the genuiness of
his title but the indentity of the land therein referred to. The
document in such a case is either a basis of his claim for registration
or not at all. If as in this case, he only claims a portion of what is
included in his title, he must clearly prove that the property sought
to be registered is included in that title. The surveyor, Jose
Mallannao, did not actually check up the boundaries of parcel No. 5,
as described in Exhibit L, and in testifying that parcel No. 9, in
Exhibit K, is smaller than that described as parcel No. 5 in Exhibit L,
he relied on hearsay. For instance, when asked whether north of
barrios Iraga, Bauan and Bangag of the land described in plan
Exhibit K, he would locate the sitios of Maasin and Calabacao, he
replied: " They saidthat Calabbacao is north of that barrio Iraga
yet." (Emphasis ours.) chanrobles vi rtua l law lib ra ry
Aside from what has been said with reference to discrepanies in the
boundaries, we cannot overlook the fact that the area in Exhibit L is
vaguely given as 7,000 brazas. The surveyor for the applicant, Jose
Mallannao, calculated the area of the property described in
paragraph 5 of Exhibit L on the basis of 7,000 square brazas or
49,000,00 square as 15,695,500 hectares more or less (s.n. pp.
820-822). The area claimed here according to the amended
application of February 26, 1930, and the plan Exhibit K is
24,723,437 square meters. According to the applicant before his
occupation of the land ceded by Domingo Narag 1.�, only about 2
hectares were cultivated. (s.n. p. 56, Gabriel Lasam.) And, with
reference to the payment of the land tax, the Solicitor-General in
his brief (p. 12) makes the following observation:
The property appears to have been declared for taxation purposes

as evidenced by revisions of tax declarations, Exhibit G-20 and G-21
(pp. 136, 137, record). There had been previous declarations with
an area of about 294 hectares ( id.) but, according to Exhibit G-22
(p. 138, record), the area which was not previously declared
contains 1,685 hectares. chanroblesv irt ualawli bra ry chan roble s virtual law l ibra ry
10
With the exception of a statement in which it appears that tax was
paid in 1902 (p. 140, id.) there appears in the record no tax
receipts evidencing the payment of taxes continuously from 1902 up
to this time.
It is not necessary to pass upon the contention of the Solicitor-

General that the informacion testifical (Exhibit L) is no legal effect
because of failure subsequently to solicit composition title pursuant
to the Royal Decree of June 25, 19880 (Fuster vs. Director of Lands,
G.R. No. 40129, Dec. 29, 1934), or to convert possession into a
registration of ownership in accordance with article 393 of the
Mortgage law (Fernandez Hermanos vs. Director of Lands, 57 Phil.,
929), for even if we were to accord all the legal force to this
document (Exhibit L), it would not serve as a basis for the
registration of 24,723,437 square meters. chanroble svirtualawl ibra ry chan roble s virtual law lib rary
Having arrived at this conclusion as to Exhibit L, is the applicant

entitled to registration because of the required possession during
the time prescribed by law? We have examined the evidence on this
point both testimonial and documentary, and while there is evidence
showing that the claimant might have possessed a portion of the
parcel claimed by him and the registration of which is sought, we
find the evidence lacking in certainly as to the particular portion
occupied and the extend thereof. Counsel for the applicant invokes
the doctrine laid down by us in Ramos vs. Director of Lands (39
Phil., 175, 180). (See also Roales vs. Director of Lands, 51 Phil.,
302, 304.) But it should be observed that the applicant of the
doctrine of constructive possession in that case is subject to certain
qualifications, and this court was careful to observe that among
these qualifications is "one particularly relating to the size of the
tract in controversy with reference to the portion actually in
possession of the claimant." While, therefore, "possession in the
eyes of the law does not mean that a man has to have his feet on
every square meter of ground before it can be said that he is in
possession", possession under paragraph 6 of section 54 of Act No.
926, as amended by paragraph (b) of section 45 of Act No. 2874, is
not gained by mere nominal claim. The mere planting of a sign or
symbol of possession cannot justify a Magellan like claim of
dominion over an immense tract of territory. Possession as a means
of acquiring ownership, while it may be constructive, is not a mere
fiction. In the present case, upon the description of 7,000 brazas as
the area of the land said have been originally possessed by
Domingo Narag 1.� and conveyed to the applicant, only two
hectares of which were according to the applicant cultivated at the
time of such transfer, the applicant would on the basis of the
computation hereinabove referred to and given at the trial by
surveyor Jose Mallannao, be entitled under Exhibit L to more than
13,000 hectares, although only 2,432 odd hectares are now being
11
sought for registration in these proceedings. The fact, however, that
he is claiming only a portion of the land claimed by him to be
included in his title, the further fact that according to his own
testimony he has given up more than 1,000 hectares to the Bureau
of Forestry, the discrepancies in the boundaries, his tax
declarations, and the existence of numerous homesteaders and
claimants are significant and tend to show that his possession over
the entire portion of the land sought to be registered is not "such as
to apprise the community and the world that the entire land was for
his enjoyment." (Ramos vs. Director of Lands, supra.) chanrob les vi rtual law lib rary
Our attention is next directed to the decision of this court

in Pamittan vs. Lasam and Mallonga (60 Phil., 908) which according
to counsel for the claimant Lasam, is determinative of the
ownership of the property now sought to be registered. Said case
refers to an action for partition between the heirs of Sofia Pamittan,
wife of Gabriel Lasam, originally brought in the Court of First
Instance and appealed to this court. The trial court in that case
found that parcel No. 7 - which is said to correspond to parcel No. 9
sought to be registered in these proceedings - "although during the
existence of the conjugal partnership, was proven to be the
exclusive property of the husband Gabriel Lasam". This court not
have passed upon the question whether parcel No. 7 was the same
parcel No. 9 in these proceedings; nor could it have passed upon
the conflicting claims with reference to parcel No. 9, now sought to
be registered. Whatever was said in that case could not bind the
oppositors in the present case, who were not parties thereto. chanroble svirtualawl ibra ry chan roble s virtual law lib rary
The grounds for opposition of the various oppositors are divergent

and are based on (a) possession from time immemorial: (b)
acquisition by inheritance, purchase and donations propters nuptias
and inter vivos; (c) payment of land taxes from 1906, 1915 and
1918 up to the filing of oppositions; and (d) acquisition "a titulo de
composicion" with the State. These oppositors denied tenants of the
applicant Lasam. After persual of the evidence presented by them,
we are constrained to accept the conclusion of the lower court that
none of the portions or lots claimed by them or any one of them has
been sufficiently identified, either by the oral or documentary
evidence which they presented. In view thereof, and because of the
insufficiency of the evidence presented, we are of the opinion that
the lower court committed no error in dismissing their
oppositions.chanroble svi rtualaw lib rary cha nrob les vi rtual law lib rary
In view of the foregoing, the judgement of the lower court is

reserved, without prejudice to the filing by the applicant. Gabriel
Lasam, of a new application and plan covering the portion of the
land actually occupied by him since July 25, 1894. Upon the
determination of that portion by the lower court, let judgement be
12
rendered accordingly. The remaining portion or portions of lot No. 9
as indicated on plan Psu-67516 (Exhibit K) are hereby declared
public lands, to be disposed of or otherwise death with in
accordance with law. Without pronouncement as to costs. So
ordered.
Avance�a, C.J., Villa-Real, Abad Santos, Imperial, Diaz and

Concepcion, JJ., concur.
13
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-13298 November 19, 1918
CORNELIO RAMOS, Petitioner-Appellant, vs. THE DIRECTOR OF

LANDS, objector-appellee.
Basilio Aromin for appellant.

Office of the Solicitor-General Paredes for appellee.
MALCOLM, J.:
This is an appeal by the applicant and appellant from a judgment of

the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, denying the registration
of the larger portion of parcel No. 1 (Exhibit A of the petitioner),
marked by the letters A, B, and C on the plan, Exhibit 1, of the
Government. chanroble svirtualawl ibra ry chan roble s virtual law l ib rary
One Restituto Romero y Ponce apparently gained possession of a

considerable tract of land located in the municipality of San Jose,
Province of Nueva Ecija, in the year 1882. He took advantage of the
Royal Decree of February 13, 1894, to obtain a possessory
information title to the land, registered as such on February 8,
1896. Parcel No. 1, included within the limits of the possessory
information title of Restituto Romero, was sold in February, 1907, to
Cornelio Ramos, the instant petitioner, and his wife Ambrosia
Salamanca. chanroble svirtualawl ibra ry chan roble s virtual law l ib rary
Ramos instituted appropriate proceedings to have his title

registered. Opposition was entered by the Director of Lands on the
ground that Ramos had not acquired a good title from the Spanish
government and by the Director of Forestry on the ground that the
first parcel was forest land. The trial court agreed with the objectors
and excluded parcel No. 1 from registration. So much for the
facts.
chanroblesvi rtua lawlib rary cha nrob les vi rtua l law lib rary
As to the law, the principal argument of the Solicitor-General is

based on the provisions of the Spanish Mortgage Law and of the
Royal Decree of February 13, 1894, commonly known as the Maura
Law. The Solicitor-General would emphasize that for land to come
under the protective ægis of the Maura Law, it must have been
shown that the land was cultivated for six years previously, and that
it was not land which pertained to the "zonas forestales." As proof
that the land was, even as long ago as the years 1894 to 1896,
14
forestal and not agricultural in nature is the fact that there are yet
found thereon trees from 50 to 80 years of age. chanroble svirtualawl ibra ry chan roble s virtual law lib rary
We do not stop to decide this contention, although it might be

possible, following the doctrine laid down by the United States
Supreme Court with reference to Mexican and Spanish grantes
within the United States, where some recital is claimed to be false,
to say that the possessory information, apparently having taken
cognizance of the requisites for title, should not now be disturbed.
(Hancock vs. McKinney [1851], 7 Tex., 192; Hornsby and
Roland vs. United States [1869], 10 Wall., 224.) It is sufficient, as
will later appear, merely to notice that the predecessor in interest to
the petitioner at least held this tract of land under color of title. chan roble svi rtualaw lib rary chan rob les vi rtual law lib rary
Subsection 6 of section 54, of Act No. 926, entitled The Public Land
Law, as amended by Act No. 1908, reads as follows:
6. All persons who by themselves or their predecessors and interest

have been in the open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation of agricultural public lands, as defined by
said Act of Congress of July first, nineteen hundred and two, under
a bona fide claim of ownership except as against the Government,
for a period of ten years next preceding the twenty-sixth day of
July, nineteen hundred and four, except when prevented by war
or force majeure, shall be conclusively presumed to have performed
all the conditions essential to a government grant and to have
received the same, and shall be entitled to a certificate of title to
such land under the provisions of this chapter.
There are two parts to the above quoted subsection which must be
discussed. The first relates to the open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation of what, for present purposes,
can be conceded to be agricultural public land, under a bona fide
claim of ownership. chanroblesv irt ualawli bra ry chan robles v irt ual law l ibra ry
Actual possession of land consists in the manifestation of acts of

dominion over it of such a nature as a party would naturally
exercise over his own property. Relative to actuality of possession,
it is admitted that the petitioner has cultivated only about one
fourth of the entire tract. This is graphically portrayed by Exhibit 1
of the Government, following:
chanrob les vi rtual law lib rary
The question at once arises: Is that actual occupancy of a part of

the land described in the instrument giving color of title sufficient to
give title to the entire tract of land? chanroble s virtual law l ib rary
15
The doctrine of constructive possession indicates the answer. The
general rule is that the possession and cultivation of a portion of a
tract under claim of ownership of all is a constructive possession of
all, if the remainder is not in the adverse possession of another.
(Barr vs. Gratz's Heirs [1819], 4 Wheat., 213; Ellicott vs. Pearl
[1836], 10 Pet., 412; Smith vs. Gale [1892], 144 U. S., 509.) Of
course, there are a number of qualifications to the rule, one
particularly relating to the size of the tract in controversy with
reference to the portion actually in possession of the claimant. It is
here only necessary to apply the general rule. chan roble svirtualawl ibra ry chan roble s virtual law l ib rary
The claimant has color of title; he acted in good faith; and he has
had open, peaceable, and notorious possession of a portion of the
property, sufficient to apprise the community and the world that the
land was for his enjoyment. (See arts. 446, 448, Civil Code.)
Possession in the eyes of the law does not mean that a man has to
have his feet on every square meter of ground before it can be said
that he is in possession. Ramos and his predecessor in interest
fulfilled the requirements of the law on the supposition that he
premises consisted of agricultural public land. chanro blesvi rt ualawlib ra ry chanrobles vi rt ual law li bra ry
The second division of the law requires consideration of the term

"agricultural public land." The law affirms that the phrase is denied
by the Act of Congress of July 1st, 1902, known as the Philippine
bill. Turning to the Philippine Bill, we find in sections 13 to 18
thereof that three classes of land are mentioned. The first is
variously denominated "public land" or "public domain," the second
"mineral land," and the third "timber land." Section 18 of the Act of
Congress comes nearest to a precise definition, when it makes the
determination of whether the land is more valuable for agricultural
or for forest uses the test of its character. chanroble svi rtualaw lib rary cha nrob les vi rtual law lib rary
Although these sections of the Philippine Bill have come before the
courts on numerous occasions, what was said in the case of
Jones vs. Insular Government ([1906], 6 Phil., 122), is still true,
namely: "The meaning of these sections is not clear and it is difficult
to give to them a construction that will be entirely free from
objection." In the case which gave most serious consideration to the
subject (Mapa vs. Insular Government [1908], 10 Phil., 175), it was
found that there does exist in the Act of Congress a definition of the
phrase "agricultural public lands." It was said that the phrase
"agricultural public lands" as used in Act No. 926 means "those
public lands acquired from Spain which are not timber or mineral
lands."chanrobles vi rtua l law li bra ry
The idea would appear to be to determine, by exclusion, if the land

is forestal or mineral in nature and, if not so found, to consider it to
be agricultural land. Here, again, Philippine law is not very helpful.
16
For instance, section 1820 of the Administrative Code of 1917
provides: "For the purposes of this chapter, 'public forest' includes,
except as otherwise specially indicated, all unreserved public land,
including nipa and mangrove swamps, and all forest reserves of
whatever character." This definition of "public forest," it will be
noted, is merely "for the purposes of this chapter." A little further
on, section 1827 provides: "Lands in public forests, not including
forest reserves, upon the certification of the Director of Forestry
that said lands are better adapted and more valuable for agricultural
than for forest purposes and not required by the public interests to
be kept under forest, shall be declared by the Department Head to
be agricultural lands." With reference to the last section, there is no
certification of the Director of Forestry in the record, as to whether
this land is better adapted and more valuable for agricultural than
for forest purposes. chanrob lesvi rtualaw lib rary cha nrob les vi rtua l law lib rary
The lexicographers define "forest" as "a large tract of land covered

with a natural growth of trees and underbrush; a large wood." The
authorities say that he word "forest" has a significant, not an
insignificant meaning, and that it does not embrace land only partly
woodland. It is a tract of land covered with trees, usually of
considerable extent. (Higgins vs. Long Island R. Co. [1908], 114 N.
Y. Supp., 262; People vs. Long Island R. Co. [1908], 110 N. Y.
Supp., 512.) chanroble s virtual law l ibra ry
The foresters say that no legal definition of "forest" is practicable or

useful. B. H. Baden-Powell, in his work on Forest Law of India,
states as follows:
Every definition of a forest that can be framed for legal purposes

will be found either to exclude some cases to which the law ought to
apply, or on the other hand, to include some with which the law
ought not to interfere. It may be necessary, for example, to take
under the law a tract of perfectly barren land which at present has
neither trees, brushwood, nor grass on it, but which in the course f
time it is hoped will be "reboise;" but any definition wide enough to
take in all such lands, would also take in much that was not wanted.
On the other hand, the definition, if framed with reference to tree-
growth, might (and indeed would be almost sure to) include a
garden, shrubbery, orchard, or vineyard, which it was not designed
to deal with.
B. E. Fernow, in his work on the Economics of Forestry, states as

follows:
A forest in the sense in which we use the term, as an economic

factor, is by no means a mere collection of trees, but an organic
whole in which all parts, although apparently heterogeneous,
jumbled together by accident as it were and apparently unrelated,
17
bear a close relation to each other and are as interdependent as any
other beings and conditions in nature.
The Director of Forestry of the Philippine Islands has said:
During the time of the passage of the Act of Congress of July 1,

1902, this question of forest and agricultural lands was beginning to
receive some attention and it is clearly shown in section 18 of the
above mentioned Act; it leaves to the Bureau of Forestry the
certification as to what lands are for agricultural or forest uses.
Although the Act states timber lands, the Bureau has in its
administration since the passage of this act construed this term to
mean forest lands in the sense of what was necessary to protect, for
the public good; waste lands without a tree have been declared
more suitable for forestry in many instances in the past. The term
'timber' as used in England and in the United States in the past has
been applied to wood suitable for construction purposes but with the
increase in civilization and the application of new methods every
plant producing wood has some useful purpose and the term timber
lands is generally though of as synonymous with forest lands or
lands producing wood, or able to produce wood, if agricultural crops
on the same land will not bring the financial return that timber will
or if the same land is needed for protection purposes.
chanrob les vi rtual law lib rary
The laws in the United States recognize the necessity of technical

advice of duly appointed boards and leave it in the hands of these
boards to decide what lands are more valuable for forestry purposes
or for agricultural purposes. chanroble svi rtualawl ibrary chan rob les vi rtual law lib rary
In the Philippine Islands this policy is follows to as great an extent

as allowable under the law. In many cases, in the opinion of the
Bureau of Forestry, lands without a single tree on them are
considered as true forest land. For instance, mountain sides which
are too steep for cultivation under ordinary practice and which, if
cultivated, under ordinary practice would destroy the big natural
resource of the soil, by washing, is considered by this bureau as
forest land and in time would be reforested. Of course, examples
exist in the Mountain Province where steep hillsides have been
terraced and intensive cultivation practiced but even then the
mountain people are very careful not to destroy forests or other
vegetative cover which they from experience have found protect
their water supply. Certain chiefs have lodged protests with the
Government against other tribes on the opposite side of the
mountain cultivated by them, in order to prevent other tribes from
cutting timber or destroy cover guarding their source of water for
irrigation.
chanroblesv irt ualawli bra ry chan robles v irt ual law l ibra ry
18
Dr. M. S. Shaler, formerly Dean of the Lawrence Scientific School,
remarked that if mankind could not devise and enforce ways dealing
with the earth, which will preserve this source of like "we must look
forward to the time, remote it may be, yet equally discernible, when
out kin having wasted its great inheritance will fade from the earth
because of the ruin it has accomplished." chanrobles vi rtua l law lib ra ry
The method employed by the bureau of Forestry in making

inspection of lands, in order to determine whether they are more
adapted for agricultural or forest purposes by a technical and duly
trained personnel on the different phases of the conservation of
natural resources, is based upon a previously prepared set of
questions in which the different characters of the land under
inspection are discussed, namely: chanroble s virtual law libra ry
Slope of land: Level; moderate; steep; very steep. chanrob lesvi rtualaw li brary cha nrob les vi rtua l law lib ra ry
Exposure: North; South; East; West. chanroble svirtualawl ibra ry chan roble s virtual law l ib rary
Soil: Clay; sandy loam; sand; rocky; very rocky. chanroblesv irt ualawli bra ry chan robles v irt ual law libra ry
Character of soil cover: Cultivated, grass land, brush land, brush

land and timber mixed, dense forest. chanroblesvi rt ualawlib ra ry chanrobles vi rt ual law li bra ry
If cultivated, state crops being grown and approximate number of

hectares under cultivation. (Indicate on sketch.) chanrobles vi rt ual law li bra ry
For growth of what agricultural products is this land suitable? chanrobles vi rt ual law li bra ry
State what portion of the tract is wooded, name of important timber

species and estimate of stand in cubic meters per hectare, diameter
and percentage of each species. chanro blesvi rtua lawlib rary c hanro bl es virt ual law li bra ry
If the land is covered with timber, state whether there is public land
suitable for agriculture in vicinity, which is not covered with
timber.chanrob lesvi rtua lawlib rary cha nro bles vi rtua l law lib ra ry
Is this land more valuable for agricultural than for forest purposes?
(State reasons in full.) chan rob les vi rtual law lib rary
Is this land included or adjoining any proposed or established forest

reserve or communal forest? Description and ownership of
improvements. chanroblesvi rtua lawlib rary c han robles v irt ual law l ibra ry
If the land is claimed under private ownership, give the name of the
claimant, his place of residence, and state briefly (if necessary on a
separate sheet) the grounds upon which he bases his claim. chanroble svi rtualawl ib rary chan rob les vi rtual law lib rary
When the inspection is made on a parcel of public land which has

been applied for, the corresponding certificate is forwarded to the
19
Director of Lands; if it is made on a privately claimed parcel for
which the issuance of a title is requested from the Court of Land
Registration, and the inspection shows the land to be more adapted
for forest purposes, then the Director of Forestry requests the
Attorney-General to file an opposition, sending him all data collected
during the inspection and offering him the forest officer as a
witness.chanroblesvi rtua lawlib rary cha nrob les vi rtua l law lib rary
It should be kept in mind that the lack of personnel of this Bureau,

the limited time intervening between the notice for the trial on
an expediente of land and the day of the trial, and the difficulties in
communications as well as the distance of the land in question
greatly hinder the handling of this work. chanroblesvi rt ualawlib ra ry chanrobles vi rt ual law li bra ry
In the case of lands claimed as private property, the Director of

Forestry, by means of his delegate the examining officer, submits
before the court all evidence referring to the present forest
condition of the land, so that the court may compare them with the
alleged right by the claimant. Undoubtedly, when the claimant
presents a title issued by the proper authority or evidence of his
right to the land showing that he complied with the requirements of
the law, the forest certificate does not affect him in the least as
such land should not be considered as a part of the public domain;
but when the alleged right is merely that of possession, then the
public or private character of the parcel is open to discussion and
this character should be established not simply on the alleged right
of the claimant but on the sylvical condition and soil characteristics
of the land, and by comparison between this area, or different
previously occupied areas, and those areas which still preserve their
primitive character.
Either way we look at this question we encounter difficulty.

Indubitably, there should be conservation of the natural resources
of the Philippines. The prodigality of the spendthrift who squanders
his substance for the pleasure of the fleeting moment must be
restrained for the less spectacular but surer policy which protects
Nature's wealth for future generations. Such is the wise stand of our
Government as represented by the Director of Forestry who, with
the Forester for the Government of the United States, believes in
"the control of nature's powers by man for his own good." On the
other hand, the presumption should be, in lieu of contrary proof,
that land is agricultural in nature. One very apparent reason is that
it is for the good of the Philippine Islands to have the large public
domain come under private ownership. Such is the natural attitude
of the sagacious citizen. chan roble svirtualawl ibra ry chan roble s virtual law lib rary
If in this instance, we give judicial sanction to a private claim, let it

be noted that the Government, in the long run of cases, has its
20
remedy. Forest reserves of public land can be established as
provided by law. When the claim of the citizen and the claim of the
Government as to a particular piece of property collide, if the
Government desires to demonstrate that the land is in reality a
forest, the Director of Forestry should submit to the court
convincing proof that the land is not more valuable for agricultural
than for forest purposes. Great consideration, it may be stated,
should, and undoubtedly will be, paid by the courts to the opinion of
the technical expert who speaks with authority on forestry matters.
But a mere formal opposition on the part of the Attorney-General
for the Director of Forestry, unsupported by satisfactory evidence
will not stop the courts from giving title to the claimant. chanroble svi rtualawl ib rary chan rob les vi rtual law lib rary
We hold that the petitioner and appellant has proved a title to the
entire tract of land for which he asked registration, under the
provisions of subsection 6, of section 54, of Act No. 926, as
amended by Act No. 1908, with reference to the Philippine Bill and
the Royal Decree of February 13, 1894, and his possessory
information.chanroblesvi rtualaw lib rary cha nrob les vi rtua l law lib rary
Judgment is reversed and the lower court shall register in the name
of the applicant the entire tract in parcel No. 1, as described in plan
Exhibit A, without special finding as to costs. So ordered. chan roblesv irt ualawli bra ry chan robles v irt ual law l ibra ry
Arellano, C.J., Torres, Johnson, Street and Fisher, JJ., concur.
21
FIRST DIVISION
G. R. No. 147549 - October 23, 2003
JESUS DELA ROSA and LUCILA DELA ROSA, Petitioners, vs. SANTIAGO CARLOS and TEOFILA
PACHECO, Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a petition for review on certiorari1 seeking to set aside the Decision2 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 54055 dated 20 July 2000 and the Resolution dated 23 February 2001 denying the
motion for reconsideration. The Court of Appeals reversed the Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 22, of Malolos, Bulacan ("RTC") and dismissed the complaint of Jesus Dela Rosa and Lucila
Dela Rosa for forcible entry against Santiago Carlos and Teofila Pacheco.
The Antecedents
This case stemmed from a complaint4 for forcible entry filed by Jesus Dela Rosa and Lucila Dela Rosa
("Spouses Dela Rosa") against Santiago Carlos ("Santiago") and Teofila Pacheco ("Teofila") with the
Municipal Trial Court5 of Paombong, Bulacan ("MTC").
In their complaint filed on 25 February 1998, the Spouses Dela Rosa alleged that they are the owners
of a house and lot ("Property") with an area of 352 square meters located at No. 25 San Roque,
Paombong, Bulacan. The Spouses Dela Rosa claimed that Leonardo Carlos ("Leonardo") transferred to
them the ownership of the Property under the Absolute Deed of Sale ("Deed of Sale") executed on 1
September 1966. The Spouses Dela Rosa registered on 6 October 1966 the Deed of Sale under Act
No. 3344 with the Register of Deeds of Bulacan. The Spouses Dela Rosa asserted that they renovated
the house, furnished and occupied the same from 1966 to the present. Since the Spouses Dela Rosa
work and their children study in Manila, they reside in the Property only during weekends and
holidays. However, they padlock the house on the Property while they are away and instruct relatives
who live nearby to watch over the Property.
The Spouses Dela Rosa further asserted that they have been paying the taxes for the land since 1966
to 1997, and for the house from 1966 to 1993. In addition, the Spouses Dela Rosa had a perimeter
fence built to separate the Property from the municipal road and to protect it from trespassers.
The Spouses Dela Rosa also asserted that in October 1997, they discovered that, through stealth and
without their knowledge and consent, Santiago had built a house of strong materials on a vacant lot of
the Property. Santiago did not secure the necessary building permit from the Municipal Engineers
Office. Teofila had also been transferring furniture to the house and sleeping there. On 20 November
1997, the Spouses Dela Rosa, through their counsel, demanded that Santiago and Teofila demolish
the house, remove their furniture and vacate the premises within ten days from receipt of the letter.
However, Santiago and Teofila did not heed the Spouses Dela Rosas demand.
In their answer, Santiago and Teofila alleged that they are the surviving heirs of the Spouses
Leonardo and Benita Carlos ("Spouses Carlos"). As heirs of the Spouses Carlos, they, along with Lucila
Dela Rosa, are co-owners of the Property. They contended that the Spouses Dela Rosa obtained the
Deed of Sale through fraud and undue influence and that their mother did not consent to the sale of
the Property which they claimed as conjugal. They maintained that the Spouses Dela Rosa were never
in possession of the Property because the latter only went there to visit their parents, and not as
owners. Insisting that they have been occupying the Property since birth, Santiago claimed that he
constructed the house on the Property in the concept of a co-owner.
After submission of the parties position papers, the MTC rendered a Decision dated 30 July 1998, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
22
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the Plaintiffs to be entitled to physical possession
of Lot 147-Part particularly described in Tax Declaration No. 97-0297-00342 (Exhibit F) situated at
San Roque, Paombong, Bulacan and this Court orders:
1. The Defendants, their heirs, assigns or any other persons claiming any right or interest over the
subject parcel of land under or in their names to vacate the same and surrender peaceful possession
thereof in favor of the Plaintiffs;
2. The Defendants to pay the Plaintiffs damages limited to the fair rental value for the use and
occupation of the premises in the amount of Two Thousand and Five Hundred Pesos (P2,500.00) a
month from the date of the discovery of the construction of the improvement (October 1997) until
they finally vacate and restore full possession thereof to the Plaintiffs;
3. The award of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) in favor of the Plaintiffs as and by way of
attorneys fees and costs;
4. The Defendants counter-claim is hereby dismissed for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.6 crä läwvirtuali brä ry
Aggrieved, Santiago and Teofila appealed7 to the RTC which rendered a Decision8 dated 31 May 1999
affirming in toto the decision of the MTC.
Dissatisfied with the decision of the RTC, Santiago and Teofila filed a petition for review9 with the
Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals rendered a Decision dated 20 July 2000, the dispositive portion
of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and another rendered DISMISSING
respondents complaint for forcible entry against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.10 crä läwvirt ualib rä ry
Hence, this petition for review.
The Ruling of the Trial Courts
The MTC, in ruling in favor of the Spouses Dela Rosa, held in part:
The evidence at hand disclose [sic] that the Plaintiffs took possession of the subject premises upon the
execution of the sale on September 1, 1966 and have been in occupancy thereof since then up to the
present. Under the law, possession is transferred to the vendee by virtue of the notarized deed of
conveyance. Under Article 1498 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, "when the sale is made through a
public instrument, the execution thereof shall be equivalent to the delivery of the object of the
contract, if from the deed the contrary does not appear or cannot clearly be inferred." (Ong Ching Po,
et al. vs. Court of Appeals, 239 SCRA 341)
In the same vein, Article 531 of the statute is explicit, thus: "Possession is acquired by the material
possession of a thing or the exercise of a right, or by the fact that it is subject to the action of our will
or by the proper acts or legal formalities established for acquiring such right." Aside from the legal
formalities as mentioned, Plaintiffs prior material occupation or possession is supported by
photographs depicting their residence (Exhibit Q) and their furnishings (Exhibits O and O-1) thereon.
Possession in the eyes of the law does not mean that a man has to have his feet on every square
meter of ground before it can be said that he is in possession. It is sufficient that petitioner (in this
case, the Plaintiffs) was able to subject the property to the action of his will (Somodio vs. Court of
Appeals, 235 SCRA 307).
x x x11 crä läwvirtuali brä ry
Finding that the MTCs factual findings are clear and supported by more than mere preponderance of
evidence,12 the RTC affirmed in toto the decision of the MTC. Consequently, Santiago and Teofila filed
a petition for review with the Court of Appeals.
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The Court of Appeals held that the execution of the deed of sale did not transfer physical possession of
the Property despite Article 1498 of the Civil Code, which contemplates of constructive, not physical
possession. The appellate court also found that there was an obstacle to the delivery of possession
23
because the Spouses Carlos, Santiago and Teofila were residing and continued to reside in the
Property.
Noting that the Spouses Dela Rosas position paper did not attach the affidavits of witnesses required
under Section 10 of Rule 70, the appellate court ruled that the Spouses Dela Rosa failed to prove prior
possession of the Property. The appellate court pointed out that instead of proving prior possession,
the Spouses Dela Rosa admitted the contrary. In their opposition to the motion to dismiss,13 the
Spouses Dela Rosa stated that they do not actually reside in the Property but in Manila and visit the
Property only during weekends and vacations. The Court of Appeals held that this admission confirms
Santiago and Teofilas claim that they have always been in physical possession of the Property since
birth.
The Court of Appeals also held that the Spouses Dela Rosa did not verify their complaint in violation of
Section 4 of Rule 70. Neither did they attach a certification against forum shopping in violation of
Section 5 of Rule 7. Moreover, the appellate court ruled that the sale, without the consent of Benita
Carlos, is void. Since the sale is void, no title passed to the Spouses Dela Rosa.
Lastly, the Court of Appeals ruled that assuming the sale is valid, the sale would apply only to
Leonardos share in the Property. Benita retained her one-half share in the Property that her children
Santiago, Teofila, Lucila and Francisco acquired by succession on her death. Thus, Lucila Dela Rosa
may not dispossess her co-owners Santiago and Teofila of the Property.
The Issues
The Spouses Dela Rosa assail the decision of the Court of Appeals on the following grounds:
1. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN CONSIDERING AS ONE OF THE GROUNDS FOR
REVERSING THE DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT AND OF THE MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT
THE ERRONEOUS ASSUMPTION THAT THE COMPLAINT APPENDED TO THE PETITION FOR REVIEW
FILED BY RESPONDENTS LACKED VERIFICATION AND CERTIFICATION OF NON-FORUM SHOPPING.
2. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN ALLOWING A COLLATERAL ATTACK ON THE VALIDITY
OF THE DEED OF ABSOLUTE SALE IN AN EJECTMENT PROCEEDING AND RULING THAT THE SAME IS
VOID FOR LACK OF MARITAL CONSENT OF BENITA CARLOS.
3. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN DECLARING THAT PETITIONERS FAILED TO PROVE
PRIOR PHYSICAL POSSESSION OVER THE PROPERTY DESPITE THE OVERWHELMING EVIDENCE TO
THE CONTRARY.
4. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN APPLYING THE RULES OF CO-OWNERSHIP OVER THE
PROPERTY.14
The Courts Ruling
We grant the petition.
Before resolving the main issue, we shall first dispose of the procedural issues in the instant case.
There is no longer any issue on the lack of verification and certification against forum shopping of the
complaint for forcible entry. The Court of Appeals itself stated in its assailed Resolution that it was a
mere "omission"15 by Santiago and Teofila in their petition for review. Santiago and Teofila failed to
append to their petition for review with the Court of Appeals the last page of the complaint containing
the verification and certification of non-forum shopping.16 For the failure of Santiago and Teofila to
attach to their petition the page of the complaint containing the verification and certification of non-
forum shopping, the appellate court should have faulted Santiago and Teofila and not the Spouses
Dela Rosa.
Another procedural question was the alleged non-submission of affidavits of witnesses that the
Spouses Dela Rosa should have attached to their position paper. Section 10 of Rule 70 provides:
SEC. 10. Submission of affidavits and position papers. Within ten (10) days from receipt of the order
mentioned in the next preceding section, the parties shall submit the affidavits of their witnesses and
other evidence on the factual issues defined in the order, together with their position papers setting
forth the law and the facts relied upon by them.
Section 10 should be read in relation to Section 14 of the same Rule, which states:
24
SEC. 14. Affidavits. The affidavits required to be submitted under this Rule shall state only facts of
direct personal knowledge of the affiants which are admissible in evidence, and shall show their
competence to testify to the matters stated therein.
xxx
The Spouses Dela Rosa jointly verified their position paper by stating that all the allegations in the
position paper are true and correct of their "own personal knowledge."17 The verification itself is an
affidavit.18 Section 4 of Rule 7 states that a "pleading is verified by an affidavit." Thus, the verified
position paper constitutes the affidavit of witnesses required under Rule 70. Certainly, the Spouses
Dela Rosa qualify as witnesses to their own complaint. While there are no affidavits of other witnesses
that support the complaint, the Spouses Dela Rosa attached to their position paper documentary
evidence that bolster their claim of prior possession.
Santiago and Teofila never raised as an issue the alleged non-attachment to the complaint of affidavits
of witnesses, either in the MTC or in the RTC. In their petition for review before the Court of Appeals,
Santiago and Teofila did not also raise this issue. The MTC and RTC apparently understood correctly
that the verified complaint of the Spouses Dela Rosa constitutes the affidavit of witnesses required
under Rule 70. We rule that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the Spouses Dela Rosa failed to
attach to their complaint the affidavits required in Sections 10 and 14 of Rule 70.
In a forcible entry case, the principal issue for resolution is mere physical or material possession
(possession de facto) and not juridical possession (possession de jure) nor ownership of the property
involved.19 In the present case, both parties claim prior possession of the Property. The Spouses Dela
Rosa claim that they have been in possession of the Property since 1966 upon the execution of the
deed of sale by Leonardo in their favor. On the other hand, Santiago and Teofila claim that they have
been continuously occupying the Property since birth and the Spouses Dela Rosa were never in
possession of the Property.
While admitting that Santiago and Teofila used to reside in the Property since birth, the Spouses Dela
Rosa contend that Santiago and Teofila moved out when they married in 1961 and 1959, respectively.
According to the Spouses Dela Rosa, Santiago and his family live in Manila (at 3500-F Magsaysay
Blvd., Sta. Mesa, Manila)20 while Teofila occupies the lot adjacent to the Property bearing, however,
the same address.21 Santiago and Teofila did not dispute these allegations by the Spouses Dela Rosa.
On the other hand, Santiago and Teofila admit that the Spouses Dela Rosa visit the Property. Visiting
the Property on weekends and holidays is evidence of actual or physical possession. Even if the
Spouses Dela Rosa were already residing in Manila, they could continue possessing the Property in
Bulacan. The fact of their residence in Manila, by itself, does not result in loss of possession of the
Property in Bulacan. The law does not require one in possession of a house to reside in the house to
maintain his possession.
In Somodio v. Court of Appeals,22 which the Spouses Dela Rosa cited, the petitioner there began
construction of a structure on his lot. His employment, however, took him to Kidapawan, North
Cotabato, and he left the unfinished structure to the care of his uncle. He would visit the property
every three months or on weekends when he had time. The Court ruled that possession in the eyes of
the law does not mean that a man has to have his feet on every square meter of the ground before he
is deemed in possession.23 There is no cogent reason to deviate from this doctrine.
Santiago and Teofila likewise do not deny that the Spouses Dela Rosa renovated the house, furnished
the same and constructed a perimeter fence around the Property. Santiago and Teofila contend that
these acts did not include the right to possess physically the Property.24 These acts of dominion are
clear indications that the Spouses Dela Rosa were in possession of the Property. Santiago and Teofila
failed to explain convincingly how the Spouses Dela Rosa were able to renovate, furnish the house and
construct a perimeter fence around the Property without physically possessing the Property. It is quite
improbable to perform these acts without the Spouses Dela Rosa physically possessing the Property.
Santiago and Teofila likewise challenged the validity of the sale between their father Leonardo and the
Spouses Dela Rosa. The sale transpired on 1 September 1966, before Leonardos death. The Spouses
Dela Rosa registered on 6 October 1966 the Deed of Sale under Act No. 3344 with the Registry of
Deeds of Paombong, Bulacan. If Santiago and Teofila truly believed that the Deed of Sale is void, they
should have filed an action to annul the same, but they did not. Santiago and Teofila questioned the
validity of the Deed of Sale only when the Spouses Dela Rosa filed the forcible entry case.
However, Santiago and Teofila cannot properly challenge the validity of the Deed of Sale in the
ejectment case because ejectment cases proceed independently of any claim of ownership. 25 Santiago
and Teofila claim that the Deed of Sale was executed without the consent of Benita, Leonardos
spouse. They also claim that the Deed of Sale was executed through fraud and undue influence.
However, these issues cannot properly be addressed in the present action. These issues can only be
25
resolved in a separate action specifically for the annulment of the Deed of Sale. Resolution of these
issues, in turn, will determine whether the surviving heirs of the Spouses Carlos are co-owners of the
Property who are likewise entitled to its possession. Co-ownership is only a necessary consequence of
the heirs successional rights to the Property, if any.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. The Decision dated 20 July 2000 and Resolution dated 23
February 2001 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 54055 are SET ASIDE. The Decision dated 31
May 1999 of the Regional of Trial Court, Branch 22, of Malolos, Bulacan in Civil Case No. 878-M-98,
affirming the Decision dated 30 July 1998 of the Municipal Trial Court of Paombong, Bulacan in Civil
Case No. 98-720, is REINSTATED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Vitug, and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
Ynares-Santiago, J., on official leave.
Endnotes:
1 Under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
2 Penned by Associate Justice Edgardo P. Cruz, with Associate Justices Ramon A. Barcelona and Marina Buzon concurring.
3 Penned by Judge Candido R. Belmonte.
4 Docketed as Civil Case No. 98-720.
5 Presided by Judge Efren B. Tienzo.
6
Rollo, pp. 149-153.
7 Docketed as Civil Case No. 878-M-98.
8 Rollo, pp. 154-158.
9 Under Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
10 Rollo, pp. 43-49.
11 CA Rollo, pp. 100-104.
12 Ibid., p. 108.
13
Ibid., pp. 63-68.
14 Rollo, pp. 21-22.
15 Ibid., p. 52.
16
Ibid., pp. 51-52.
17
Verification of Plaintiffs Position Paper, Rollo, p. 139.
18 In Nasser v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 32945, 3 December 1990, 191 SCRA 783, the Court held: "Finally, it is settled
that a verified statement incorporated in the complaint without a separate affidavit is sufficient and valid to obtain the
attachment (Tolentino v. Carla, et al., 66 Phil. 140-143). Thus, under the same ruling, the verified complaint in the case at
bar entitled "Application for a Writ of Preliminary Attachment" which specifically stated that to avoid redundancy and
repetition, the affidavit of the plaintiffs as required under Section 3, Rule 57 of the Revised Rules of Court is dispensed
with, as the matters to be treated and contained therein are already incorporated and made part of the complaint, duly
verified by them, has undoubtedly substantially complied with the requirements of the Rules and the court to which the
application for the attachment was filed has jurisdiction to issue the writ prayed for (Central Capiz v. Salas, 43 Phil., 30
[1922])." See also Mago v. Court of Appeals, 363 Phil. 225 (1999).
19 Cagayan de Oro City Landless Residents Asso., Inc. (COCLAI) v. Court of Appeals, 324 Phil. 466 (1996).
20
CA Rollo, p. 86.
26
21
Ibid., pp. 86-87.
22 G.R. No. 82680, 15 August 1994, 235 SCRA 307.
23 See also Roales v. Director of Lands, 51 Phil. 302 (1927).
24 Rollo, p. 192.
25 Spouses Diu v. Ibajan, 379 Phil. 482 (2000).
27
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. L-3088. February 6, 1907. ]
EL BANCO ESPAÑOL-FILIPINO, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. JAMES PETERSON, sheriff of the city of

Manila, ET AL., Defendants-Appellees.
Del-Pan, Ortigas & Fisher, for Appellant.
Hartigan, Marple, Rohde, & Gutierrez, for Appellees.
SYLLABUS
1. JUDGMENT; FINDINGS OF FACT; EVIDENCE. — When the findings of fact set forth in a judgment
appealed from are plainly and manifestly against the weight of evidence, taken at the trial, such judgment is
contrary to law and should be reversed.
2. CONTRACT OF PLEDGE. — A contract of pledge which unites the requisites required by articles 1857 and
1865 of the Civil Code is perfectly valid and efficacious, when in addition the creditor or a third person
appointed by common consent of the contracting parties has taken possession of the goods pledged. (Art.
1863, Civil Code.)
3. POSSESSION, SYMBOLICAL DELIVERY OF. — The symbolical transfer by means of the delivery of the keys
of the premises in which are stored the goods pledged is sufficient to consider the creditor, or the depositary
appointed by common consent of the parties, in legal possession of the same.
4. CONTRACT; FRAUD. — Where in a suit for the nullification of a contract it has not been alleged nor proved
that in the stipulations entered into there has been any fraud to the prejudice of third persons, a finding of
the court that such contract was entered into in fraud of third person is erroneous.
DECISION
TORRES, J. :
On the 24th of October, 1905, the Spanish-Filipino Bank, a corporation, through its attorneys, Del-Pan,
Ortigas and Fisher, filed a complaint against the sheriff of the city of Manila and the other defendant, Juan
Garcia, praying that judgment be rendered against the said sheriff, declaring that the execution levied upon
the property referred to in the complaint, to wit, wines, liquors, canned goods, and other similar
merchandise, was illegal, and directing the defendants to return the said goods to the plaintiff corporation,
and in case that he had disposed of the same, to pay the value thereof, amounting to P30,000, Philippine
currency, and further that it be declared that the said plaintiff corporation, under the contract of pledge
referred to in the complaint had the right to apply the proceeds of the sale of the said goods to the payment
of the debt of P40,000, Philippine currency, for the security of which the said merchandise was pledged, with
preference over the claim of the other defendant, Juan Garcia and that both defendants be held jointly liable
to the plaintiff for the sum of P500, Philippine currency, as damages, and the said defendants to pay the
costs of the proceedings, and for such other and further relief as the plaintiff might be entitled to under the
law. Plaintiff alleges in its complaint that under the contract entered into on the 4th of March, 1905, by and
between the Spanish-Filipino Bank and Francisco Reyes, the former, loaned to the latter the sum of
P141,702, Philippine currency; that on the same date Francisco Reyes was already indebted to the bank in
the sum of P84,415.38, Philippine currency, which, added to the amount of the loan, made a total of
P226,117.38, Philippine currency, received by the said Reyes as a loan from the plaintiff bank, the entire
sum at an annual interest of 8 per cent; that to secure the payment of these two sums and the interest
thereon, the debtor, Francisco Reyes, by a public instrument executed before a notary on the aforesaid date
mortgaged in favor of the plaintiff bank several pieces of property belonging to him, and pledged to the said
bank part of his personal property, specifying the proportion on which the said real and personal property
thus mortgaged and pledged in favor of the plaintiff corporation would be respectively liable for the payment
of the debt; that the property pledged by the debtor to the bank included a stock or merchandise, consisting
of wines, liquors, canned goods, and other similar articles valued at P90,591.75, Philippine currency, then
stored in the warehouses of the debtor, Reyes, No. 12 Plaza Moraga, in the city of Manila, which said goods
and merchandise were liable for the payment of the said sum of P90,591.75, Philippine currency; that in the
aforesaid deed of pledge it was agreed by and between the bank and the debtor, Reyes, that the goods
should be delivered to Ramon Garcia y Planas for safe-keeping, the debtor having actually turned over to
the said Garcia y Planas the goods in question by delivering to him the keys of the warehouse in which they
were kept; that in a subsequent contract entered into by and between the debtor, Reyes, and the plaintiff
bank on the 29th of September, 1905, the said contract executed on the 4th of March was modified so as to
28
provide that the goods then (September 29) in possession the depositary should only be liable for the sum
of P40,000, Philippine currency, the said contract of the 4th of March remaining in all other respects in full
force and effect, Luis M.a Sierra having been subsequently appointed by agreement between the bank and
the debtor as depositary of the goods thus pledged in substitution for the said Ramon Garcia y Planas.
On the 19th of October, 1905, in an action brought in the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila by
Juan Garcia y Planas against Francisco Reyes and Ramon Agtarat, judgment was rendered against the last-
mentioned two for the sum of P15,000, Philippine currency, to be paid by them severally or jointly, upon
which judgment execution was issued against the property of the defendants, Reyes and Agtarap. On the
aforesaid 19th day of October, for the purpose of levying upon the property of the defendants, the sheriff at
the request of Garcia, the plaintiff in that case, entered the warehouse where the goods pledged to the
plaintiff bank were stored under the custody of the depositary, Sierra, and levied upon them as per list
attached to the complaint marked "Exhibit A." The sheriff seized the goods which had been pledged to the
bank, depriving the latter of the possession of the same, to which said contract executed on the 4th of
March, 1905. Without the authority of the bank, Reyes could not dispose of the said goods. The value of the
goods seized by the sheriff was P30,000, Philippine currency, the said sheriff, having refused, and still
refusing, to return to the same to the bank, notwithstanding repeated demands made upon him to this
effect, and it being alleged in the complaint that unless prohibited by the court the sheriff would proceed to
sell the said goods at public auction and apply the proceeds to the satisfaction of the judgment rendered in
favor of the Juan Garcia y Planas, while the other debtor Reyes had not paid to the bank the P40,000,
Philippine currency, to secure the payment of which the goods mentioned in Exhibit A had been pledged to
the bank, that is, to secure the payment of a sum in excess of the actual value of the goods in the hands of
the sheriff.
The defendant sheriff, James J. Peterson, and Juan Garcia, his codefendant, through their attorneys,
Hartigan, Marple, Rohde and Gutierrez, answering the complaint, stated that they admitted the allegations
contained in paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 12, and 17 of the complaint, but denied the allegations contained in
paragraphs 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 14, 16, and 18. They further denied the allegations contained in paragraph
12, with the exception that the defendant sheriff levied upon the goods mentioned in Exhibit A attached to
the complaint for the purpose of satisfying the judgment referred to therein; and also the allegations
contained in paragraph 13 of the complaint, with the exception that the sheriff seized the property
mentioned in Exhibit A under the execution referred to therein; and finally defendants denied the allegation
contained in paragraph 15 of the complaint, with the exception of the allegation that the value of the
property seized is P30,000. They accordingly asked that the action be dismissed and that it be adjudged that
the plaintiff had no interest whatever in the property described in the complaint, and that the plaintiff be
taxed with the costs of these proceedings.
The testimony introduced by the parties having been received, and the exhibits having been attached to the
record, the court below entered judgment on the 4th of January, 1906, dismissing plaintiff’s action and
directing that the defendant recover from the Spanish-Filipino Bank the costs of this action, for which
execution was duly issued. To this judgment counsel for plaintiff excepted and announced his intention of
prosecuting a bill of exceptions, and further made a motion for a new trial on the ground that the judgment
of the court below was contrary to law and that the findings of fact were plainly and manifestly contrary to
the weight of the evidence.
The decision of this case depends mainly upon the question as to whether the contract of pledge entered
into by and between the Spanish-Filipino Bank and Francisco Reyes to secure a loan made by the former to
the latter was valid, all the requisites prescribed by the Civil Code having been complied with.
If so, the bank’s claim had preference over the claim of a third person not secured, as was the bank’s, by a
pledge, with reference to the property pledged to the extent of its value, and therefore such property could
not have been legally levied upon by the sheriff at the request of the defendant, Juan Garcia. (Arts. 1921,
1922, Civil Code.)
The contract in question complies with all the requisites provided in article 1857 of the Civil Code, such as
that the property was pledged to secure a debt, the date of the execution, the terms of the pledge, and the
property pledged, all of which appears in a public document, and the property pledged was placed in the
hands of a third person by common consent of the debtor and creditor, under the supervision of an agent of
the bank. (Arts. 1863, 1865, 1866, 1869, 1871, Civil Code.) The defect alleged to exist in the said contract
is that the debtor, Reyes, continued in possession of the property pledged; that he never parted with the
said property, and that neither the creditor nor the depositary appointed by common consent of the parties
were ever in possession of the property pledged, and for this reason, and upon the further ground that the
contract was fraudulent, the court below dismissed the complaint with the costs against the plaintiff.
In the motion for a new trial it was alleged by the plaintiff that the judgment of the court below was contrary
to law, and that the findings of fact contained therein were plainly and manifestly against the weight of the
evidence. If plaintiffs contention is correct, then the judgment of the court below should be reversed.
From the evidence introduced at the trial, both oral and documentary, it appears that a third person,
appointed by the common consent of the debtor and creditor, was in possession of the goods pledged in
favor of the bank under the direct supervision of an agent of the bank expressly appointed for this purpose,
and it has not been shown that the said Reyes continued in the possession of the goods after they had been
pledged to the plaintiff bank.
Exhibit C and the testimony of Francisco Reyes, Luis M.a Sierra, and Mariano Rodriguez corroborate the
existence and authenticity of the contract of pledge recorded in a public instrument and conclusively and
29
satisfactorily show that the debtor, after the pledge of the property, parted with the possession of the same,
and that it was delivered to a third person designated by common consent of the parties. For the purpose of
giving this possession greater effect, the pledgee appointed a person to examine daily the property in the
warehouse where the same was kept.
The witness Matias Garcia also testified as to the status of these goods, and informed Juan Garcia of such
status before the same were levied upon.
The sheriff’s testimony supports the allegation that the depositary, Sierra, was present at the place where
the goods were kept, as well as the representative of the bank, Rodriguez, when he, the sheriff, went there
for the purpose of levying upon the said property. He further testified that Rodriguez, the representative of
the bank, then protested and notified him that the property in question was pledged to the Spanish-Filipino
Bank.
The contract in question was, therefore, a perfect contract of pledge under articles 1857 and 1863 of the
Civil Code, it having been conclusively shown that the pledgee took charge and possession of the goods
pledged through a depository and a special agent appointed by it, each of whom had a duplicate key to the
warehouse wherein the said goods were stored, and that the pledgee, itself, received and collected the
proceeds of the goods as they were sold.
The fact that the said goods continued in the warehouse which was formerly rented by the pledgor, Reyes,
does not affect the validity and legality of the pledge, it having been demonstrated that after the pledge had
been agreed upon, and after the depository appointed with the common consent of the parties had taken
possession of the said property, the owner, the pledgor, could no longer dispose of the same, the pledgee
being the only one authorized to do so through the depositary and special agent who represented it, the
symbolical transfer of the goods by means of the delivery of the keys to the warehouse where the goods
were stored being sufficient to show that the depositary appointed by the common consent of the parties
was legally placed in possession of the goods. (Articles 438, 1463, Civil Code.)
The fact that the debtor, Reyes, procured purchasers and made arrangements for the sale of the goods
pledged and that the bills for the goods thus sold were signed by him does not affect the validity of the
contract, for the pledgor, Reyes, continued to be the owner of the goods, (art. 1869, Civil Code), he being
the one principally interested in the sale of the property on the best possible terms.
As to the reservation stipulated in paragraph 13 of the contract executed on the 4th of March, 1905, it could
not affect the contract in question for the reason that reservation referred to the rent from the property
mortgaged, to the bank and the dividends from the shares of stock also pledged to the bank, and not the
merchandise so pledged, and such reservation could not have rendered the contract of pledge null.
If the case is to be decided in accordance with the facts alleged and established, the defendant not having
introduced any evidence to show that the said contract of pledge was fraudulent as to other creditors, there
was no legal ground upon which the court below could have held that the contract evidenced by the
instrument in question was entered into to defraud other creditors of the pledgor.
For the reason hereinbefore set out, and the judgment of the court below being contrary to the evidence,
the said judgment is hereby reversed, and it is hereby adjudged that the plaintiff corporation, under and by
virtue of the contract of pledge in question, had a preferential right over that of the defendant, Juan Garcia,
to the goods pledged or the value thereof, the value to be applied to the payment of the debt of P40,000,
Philippine currency, for the security of which the said property was pledged, and the defendants are
accordingly hereby ordered to return to the plaintiff corporation the property improperly levied upon, or to
pay its value, amounting to P30,000, Philippine currency, without special provision as to costs. After the
expiration of twenty days let judgment be entered in accordance herewith, and ten days thereafter the case
be remanded to the court below for execution. So ordered.
Arellano, C.J., Mapa, Carson, and Willard, JJ., . concur.
30
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. L-2973. February 18, 1907. ]
JUAN MUYCO, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. PEDRO MONTILLA ET AL, plaintiffs-appellants.
D. Mapa, for Appellants.
M. Locsin, for Appellee.
SYLLABUS
1. JUDGMENT; EXECUTION; SHERIFF’S PROCEEDINGS. — The proceedings by virtue of a judicial order to

the sheriff for the execution of a judgment should be respected until the same are set aside by judicial
decree in accordance with law.
2. ID.; ID.; JUDICIAL SALE; POSSESSION. — The possession of property, conferred by the sheriff upon the
purchaser of the same at public auction, is one of the means or proper acts and legal formalities established
in order to acquire the right of possession referred to in article 438 of the Civil Code.
3. ID.; ID.; FORFEITURE. — After the possession of property has been conferred by the sheriff on a
purchaser at a judicial auction, the former possessor who allows a period of more than one year to elapse
without presenting any claim alleging his right, loses the possession, and he can maintain only an action to
recover title. (Article 460, par. 4, of the Civil Code and section 442 and 451 of the Code of Civil Procedure.)
DECISION
TORRES, J. :
On the 23rd of December, 1904, the plaintiff, Juan Muyco, through his attorney, Mariano Locsin Rama, filed
a complaint praying that judgment be rendered in his behalf, against the defendants in this case, requiring
the latter to return to the plaintiff the possession of land described in the complaint, to pay the sum of 2,500
pesos as damages or such amount as may be deemed just and equitable, and for any other and further
relief the court may deem proper, reserving to the plaintiff any criminal action which he might have arising
out of the acts of violence committed by the defendants, and accordingly alleging: jgc:c hanrobles. co m.ph
"That the plaintiff, Muyco, was in the quiet, peaceable, and adverse possession of five tracts of land in the
barrio of Ayungon, in the town of Valladolid, the superficial area of which is set out in the compliant, and
while in such possession he was wrongfully deprived of the same on the 8th, 10th, 12th, 14th, and 15th of
July and the 4th of August, 1904, by Pascual and Francisco Infante and Pedro Montilla, aided by the latter’s
share tenants, who proceeded to plough and sow the same, prohibiting the plaintiff from making any use of
the said land; and that on account of these acts of spoliation on the part of the defendants, the plaintiff had
suffered damages in the sum of 2,500 pesos, more or less, on account of having been deprived of the use
and occupation of the land, and costs of the suit."cralaw virtua 1aw lib rary
Dionisio Mapa appeared in behalf of the defendants, Pedro Montilla, Pascual Infante, Francisco Infante, and
three others, and answering the complaint stated: jgc:chanrob les.co m.ph
"That the defendants neither deny nor admit the facts alleged in the complaint: jg c:chan roble s.com. ph
"That the five parcels of land referred to in the complaint constitute an integral part of the hacienda of
Ayungon, in the town of Valladolid, which hacienda was mortgaged by Bernabela Jaducon and Jose Bellido to
one Teofilo Planta on the 1st of July, 1899, the title papers of said hacienda having been delivered to the
latter;
"That, action having been brought against the debtors Jaducon and Bellido, the Court of First Instance
rendered judgment on the 8th of May, 1903, directing that the debtors pay the debt, or in default thereof
that the land mortgaged be sold at public auction;
"That on the 16th of July, the debtors having failed to pay the debt, the land pertaining to the hacienda was
to be sold at public auction, notice thereof having been published in the town of Valladolid; on the 7th of
August following the sale was consummated and the land was sold to counsel representing the defendants
for the sum of 3,300 pesos; the plaintiff, Muyco, although he had knowledge of said sale, did not make use
of his right to intervene, and the purchaser transferred all his rights to the property thus bought by him at
public auction to one Pascual Infante for the sum of 3,300 pesos, and for this reason the sheriff on the 14th
31
of August aforesaid gave possession of the property to the assignee, Infante, to which the plaintiff made no
objection.
"That in the same month of August and about the same date the defendant Pedro Montilla acquired from
Bernabela Jaducon, one of the joint owners of the property in question, the right to redeem the part which
he had, and for this reason the sheriff went upon the land on the 17th of August and gave possession to the
assignee Pedro Montilla of that part of the land belonging to the judgment debtor Bernabela Jaducon,
without any objection or protest on the part of the plaintiff. On the 29th of August, one year later, when the
right to redeem the property had become barred by the statute of limitations, the plaintiff brought an action
for forcible entry and detainer in the court of the justice of the peace, alleging that the five parcels of land in
question belonged to him.
The defendants further denied all the allegations of the complaint relating to acts of spoilation committed by
them and alleged that all the contract made by the plaintiff relating to the ownership of the land were
executed subsequent to the year 1899 when all the undivided property was mortgaged to Teofilo Planta, the
direct grantor of the defendants, and accordingly prayed that the plaintiff’s action be dismissed with costs
against him, and for any other and further relief that the court might deem just and equitable.
The cause having proceeded to trial, the evidence introduced by both parties was duly taken and
documentary proof introduced by them was attached to the record.
The purpose of this action, as has seen, was to recover the possession of five parcels of land of which,
according to the complaint, the plaintiff, Muyco, was wrongfully deprived, and the action can therefore be
termed a plenary action for possession against the defendant Pedro Montilla, Francisco and Pascual Infante,
and others, the question of the title and ownership not having been raised at all.
It was duly established at the trial that Crispin Catalego, now deceased, was the former owner of the
hacienda of Ayungon, consisting of 94 hectares, 21 ares, and 57 centares, and that the five parcels of land
in question were included within the boundaries of said hacienda, as appears from the documents introduced
in evidence.
The said hacienda of Ayungon was mortgaged by its former owner, Crispin Catalego, to Teofilo Planta, now
deceased, to secure a debt, and the action having been brought by the guardians of the minor children of
the creditor against the widow and daughter of the debtor, the latter being represented by her husband, to
recover the amount of the indebtedness, a judgment was rendered on the 8th of May, 1903, condemning
the said defendants to pay the sum of 2,489.76 pesos, and the additional sum of 426.59 pesos, the interest
thereon, and in case the said defendants should fail to deposit the said amount in court for the benefit of the
plaintiff prior to the first day of the next regular term of the court, the land referred to in the deed issued by
the "Direccion General de Administracion Civil" on the 22d of January, 1886, in favor of the deceased
debtor, should be sold at public auction with the costs against the defendants, which said judgment became
final, no appeal having been taken therefrom.
On the 14th of July following, demand was made upon the defendant Bernabela Jaducon, the other
defendant Jose Bellido being absent, for the payment of the aforesaid sum, and she having failed to pay the
same the deputy sheriff went on the following day to the barrio of Ayungon with the creditor and a resident
of the town who was familiar with the boundaries of the hacienda, and proceeded to levy upon the land
therein included, and upon another fact of land in the same barrio, upon which was located a mill of six
cauas with its corresponding tiajores, two camarines in bad condition, one cart, one carabao, forty-four
bamboo cane plants, and one mango tree. The sheriff further proceeded to levy upon another tract of land
in Nabusuan, all of said property belonging to the debtors, Pedro Jaboneta having been appointed receiver
of the same.
That according to a notice published in the newspaper "La Igualdad," in the Island of Negros, on the 16th of
the said month, and by virtue of an order of the court, the deputy sheriff, Martin Aragon, gave notice of the
sale at public auction of the land in Ayungon belonging to Bernabela Jaducon and Jose Bellido, and the sale
took place between 4 and 5 o’clock p. m. on the 7th of August of the same year.
The said hacienda of Ayungon was sold at public auction for the sum of 3,300 pesos to the attorney, Dionisio
Mapa, the latter, however, immediately transferring the same to Pascual Infante for the same price, and the
assignee was accordingly given possession thereof on the 14th of August, 1903, although the latter, on
account of the assignment made by Bernabela Jaducon of her right to redeem six-tenths of the said
hacienda to Pedro Montilla, was placed in possession of the same by the sheriff on the 17th of the said
month, the said Pascual Infante remaining in possession of the other four-tenths, as per agreement between
them.
In the course of the proceedings relating to the execution of the aforesaid judgment to wit, from the 14th of
July until the 17th of August of the said year, when the hacienda of Ayungon was levied upon by the sheriff,
the sale thereof was announced on the 16th of July to take place on the 7th of August, and it was sold on
the latter date of the said Mapa, Pascual Infante and Pedro Montilla having been given possession of the
same on the 14th and 17th of August, respectively, It does not appear that Juan Muyco made any
opposition or objection thereto or that he intervened in any way in order to defraud his alleged interest in
the five parcels of land levied upon and subsequently sold, the possession of which was given to the
assignee of the original purchaser, notwithstanding the fact that he was duly notified of the proceedings by
his own tenants, and it was only a year later that made any claim thereto, alleging that he had been
wrongfully dispossessed by the said Infante and Montilla, who were given possession of the hacienda of
Ayungon by the deputy sheriff, Martin Aragon, under an order of the court.
32
The fact that the plaintiff Muyco took no action whatever, when he was duly notified of the levy made upon
the land of the hacienda of Ayungon, nor of the notice to the effect that the said land would be sold on a
fixed day and hour, published in a newspaper in the Islands of Negros, nor of the possession given by the
deputy sheriff on the 14th of August of the said land to Pascual Infante, the assignee of the original
purchaser, and on the 17th of August, 1903, to Pedro Montilla, the assignee of Bernabela Jaducon as to the
six-tenths of the hacienda, as appears from the record, shows conclusively that Jose Bellido’s testimony to
the effect that after he wrote a letter to the plaintiff notifying him of the levy made upon the hacienda, he
met the plaintiff in the principal street of the town of Valladolid and was told by him that he would not take
any action because the expenses would be greater than the value of the land in controversy.
It is very probable that the plaintiff had desisted from making any claim as to the land because when he was
notified by different persons of the levy and sale of the said hacienda, within the boundaries of which the
land in question was situated, the new owners having been placed in possession of the same, he did not
take any steps to defend his rights and avoid the consequences of the judicial proceedings relating to the
execution of a final judgment.
The aforesaid proceedings and the acts executed by the deputy sheriff, which must be presumed to have
been in accordance with procedural law, have not been duly challenged and it has not been proved that they
were abusive or illegal or that there was some defect that would render them null and void, and therefore
the acts of the sheriff, who was the officer in charge, enforcing all judicial processes, should be respected
until they are set aside by a judicial decision in accordance with law.
Article 438 of the Civil Code provides: jg c:chan roble s.com.p h
"Possession is acquired by the physical occupation of the thing or right possessed, or by the fact that the
latter remains subject to the action of our will, or by the proper legal steps and formalities established for
acquiring such rights."cralaw virtua1aw li bra ry
The possession given by the sheriff to the assignees of the original purchaser of the hacienda of Ayungon, in
compliance with the order made by the court in an action brought against the former owners of the said
hacienda, constituted the proper legal steps and formalities referred to in the above-quoted article as one of
the means of acquiring possession.
Article 460 of the same code provides: "The possessor may lose his possession
x x x
"(4) By the possession of another even against the will of the former possessor, if the new possession had
lasted more than one year." crala w virtua1aw l ibra ry
It is to be inferred from the express provision of the above-quoted article that Juan Muyco, after Infante and
Montilla had obtained judicial possession in due form of the land of the hacienda of Ayungon, more than a
year having elapsed, lost his right to the possession of the parcels of land which he claims belong to him and
which were alleged to be included within the boundaries of the said hacienda he having lost not only the
mere possession de facto but also the possession de jure, and the only action that he can now maintain is
an action to recover title.
If Pascual Infante and Pedro Montilla took possession of the property under an order of the court which was
enforced by an officer thereof on the 14th and 17th of August, 1903, there being no evidence that they have
either abandoned or lost the possession thus acquired by them, it is to be presumed that they were in
possession of the land during the months of July and August, 1904, when, as alleged in the complaint, the
wrongful occupation took place.
The acts alleged to have been performed by the owners of the property were acts performed by the owner
upon his property, and in objecting to the plaintiff Muyco cultivating a part of the land of the said hacienda
they merely exercised the right accorded them by the law.
No evidence has been introduced to show that the five parcels of land sought to be recovered were outside
the boundaries of the said hacienda; on the contrary, the documentary proof introduced by the plaintiff
himself shows that the land was included within the said boundaries.
Even though it should have been that the land was not within the boundaries of the hacienda, and whatever
the rights of the plaintiff might have been with regard to the five parcels of land which he seeks to recover,
with his silence and his negligence he could not defend his right of ownership or of possession, nor secure
the aid of the courts in protecting his rights. The fact that the plaintiff gathered part of the crop raised upon
the land of the hacienda does not affect the rights of the defendants, as the provisions of article 452 of the
Civil Code grant him this privilege.
Juan Muyco, who was a stranger to the action between the minors, Planta and the debtors Jaducon and
Bellido, had no right to bring an action against the sheriff who, in order to satisfy the judgment, proceeded
to levy upon and sell the land of the hacienda of Ayungon, of which the land in controversy was a part,
claiming that the acts performed by the said sheriff and the purchasers of the land were acts of spoilation.
His remedy was that provided for in section 442 of the Code of Civil Procedure, in connection with section
451 of the same code, relating to the execution or enforcement of the judgment and proceedings
33
thereunder.
The plaintiff Muyco, instead of applying to the sheriff in accordance with the referred-to section of Act No.
190, or instead of filing a petition in intervention, elected to bring an action to recover possession of the
property, alleging that he had been wrongfully and illegally deprived of the same. Moreover, it has not been
shown that the sheriff did not give possession of the said hacienda to the purchaser thereof in the manner
and form prescribed by law.
The foregoing facts show conclusively that the findings of the lower court were plainly and manifestly
against the weight of the evidence; that the court instead of rendering judgment for the plaintiff should have
dismissed the action, and we accordingly reverse the judgment rendered by that court on the 8th of March,
1905, and absolve the defendants Pedro Montilla, Pascual Infante, and others from the complaint filed by
Juan Muyco, without special provision as to costs, and the right is reserved to the plaintiff to bring a
separate action to recover title to the said property.
After the expiration of twenty days from the date hereof let judgment be entered in accordance herewith,
and ten days thereafter the case be remanded to the court below for execution. So ordered.
Arellano, C.J., and Johnson, J., concur.
Willard and Tracey, JJ., concur in the result.
Separate Opinions
CARSON, J., dissenting: chanrob 1es vi rtual 1aw lib rary
I dissent. The trial court found that it was not proven that the sheriff gave possession of the land in question
as alleged, and I do not think that this finding is plainly and manifestly against the weight of the evidence.
34
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 71283 November 12, 1987
MIGUEL ESCRITOR, JR., ANGEL ESCRITOR, RAMON

ESCRITOR, JUANA ESCRITOR, CONCORDIA ESCRITOR, IRENE
ESCRITOR, MATILDE ESCRITOR, MERCEDES ESCRITOR,
HEIRS OF LUIS ESCRITOR, represented by RUPERTO
ESCRITOR, HEIRS OF PEDO ESCRITOR, represented by
SUSANA VILLAMENA, LINA ESCRITOR, WENDELINA
ESCRITOR, ALFREDO ESCRITOR, SUSANA ESCRITOR and
CARMEN ESCRITOR, Petitioners, vs. INTERMEDIATE
APPELLATE COURT and SIMEON ACUNA, Respondents. chanrobles v irt ual law l ibra ry
GANCAYCO, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking the reversal of the

decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court in AC-G.R. No. CV-
01264-R entitled "Simeon Acuna vs. Miguel Escritor, Jr., et al," a
case which originated from the Court of First Instance of
Quezon. chanroble svirtualawl ibra ry chan roble s virtual law lib rary
The record of the case discloses the following facts: chanrobles vi rtual l aw libra ry
Lot No. 2749, located at Atimonan, Quezon, was the subject of

cadastral proceedings in the Court of First Instance of Quezon,
Gumaca Branch, Miguel Escritor, as claimant, filed an answer
thereto declaring his ownership over the lot alleging that he
acquired it by inheritance from his deceased father. 1 As required, a
notice of hearing was duly published, after which an order of
general default was entered. 2 The lot having become uncontested,
only Miguel Escritor appeared in order to adduce his evidence of
ownership. chan roble svirtualawl ibra ry chan roble s virtual law lib rary
On May 15, 1958, the Court rendered a decision in the

abovementioned case, Cadastral Case No. 72, adjudicating the lot
with its improvements in favor of claimant Escritor and confirming
his title thereto. 3 Immediately thereafter, Escritor took possession
of the property. On July 15, 1958, the Court, in an Order, directed
the Chief of the General Land Registration Office to issue the
corresponding decree of registration in favor of Escritor, the decision
in Cadastral Case No. 72 having become final. 4 chanrob les vi rtua l law lib rary
35
On August 2, 1958, Simeon S. Acuna, the herein respondent, filed a
petition for review of the above-mentioned decision contending that
it was obtained by claimant Escritor through fraud and
misrepresentation. 5The petition was granted on July 18, 1960 and
a new hearing was set for September 13, 1960. 6 While the
proceedings were going on, claimant Escritor died. His heirs, the
petitioners in this case, took possession of the property. chanroblesvi rtua lawlib rary c hanro bles vi rt ual law li bra ry
On February 16, 1971 or thirteen years after the disputed decision

was rendered, the Court adjudicated Lot No. 2749 in favor of
respondent Acuna, ordering petitioners to vacate the land. 7 A writ
of possession was later issued and petitioners voluntarily gave up
their possession. 8chan roble s virtual law l ibra ry
More than four years later, or on October 13, 1975 respondent

Acuna filed with the same Court in Civil Case No. 1138-G, a
complaint for recovery of damages against petitioners for the fruits
of lot No. 2749 which was allegedly possessed by the latter
unlawfully for thirteen years. According to respondent Acuña, the
registration of the said lot was effectuated by the deceased claimant
Escritor through fraud, malice, and misrepresentation. The lower
court, however, rendered a decision dismissing Acuña's complaint
for damages, finding that though petitioners enjoyed the fruits of
the property, they were in good faith possessing under a just title,
and the cause of action, if there was any, has already prescribed. 9
law libra ry
chanrob les vi rtual
On Appeal to the Intermediate Appellate Court, the judgment of the

lower court was reversed in a decision promulgated on October 31,
1984, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, the decision

appealed from is hereby REVERSED and set aside and another one
entered herein, ordering the defendants-appellees jointly and
severally (a) to pay the plaintiff- appellant the sum of P10,725.00
representing the value of the fruits appellees received for the 13
years they have been in unlawful possession of the land subject-
matter; (b) to pay plaintiff-appellant the sum of P3,000.00 for
attorney's fees and expenses of litigation, and (c) to pay the costs.
Hence this petition. chanroblesv irt ualawli bra ry chan roble s virtual law l ibra ry
The main issue that has to be resolved in this case is whether or not
petitioners should be held liable for damages. chanroblesvi rt ualawlib ra ry chanrobles vi rt ual law li bra ry
Contrary to the finding of the trial court, the Intermediate Appellate

Court made the pronouncement that petitioners were possessors in
bad faith from 1958 up to 1971 and should be held accountable for
damages. This conclusion was based on the statement of the
cadastral court in its August 21, 1971 decision, readjudicating Lot
36
No. 2749 to respondent Simeon Acuna, that "Miguel Escritor forcibly
took possession of the land in May, 1958, and benefited from the
coconut trees thereon. 10 The Intermediate Appellate Court
observed that on the basis of the unimpeached conclusion of the
cadastral court, it must be that the petitioners have wrongfully
entered possession of the land. 11 The Intermediate Appellate Court
further explains that as such possessors in bad faith, petitioners
must reimburse respondent Acuna for the fruits of the land they had
received during their possession. 12 chanro bles vi rtua l law lib ra ry
We cannot affirm the position of the Intermediate Appellate Court.

It should be remembered that in the first decision of the cadastral
court dated May 15, 1958, Lot No. 2749 was adjudicated in favor of
claimant Escritor, petitioners' predecessor-in-interest. In this
decision, the said court found to its satisfaction that claimant
Escritor acquired the land by inheritance from his father who in turn
acquired it by purchase, and that his open, public, continuous,
adverse, exclusive and notorious possession dated back to the
Filipino-Spanish Revolution. 13 It must also be recalled that in its
Order for the issuance of decrees dated July 15, 1958, the same
Court declared that the above-mentioned decision had become final.
Significantly, nowhere during the entire cadastral proceeding did
anything come up to suggest that the land belonged to any person
other than Escritor.chanro blesvi rt ualawlib ra ry chan robles v irt ual law li bra ry
On the basis of the aforementioned favorable judgment which was

rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction, Escritor honestly
believed that he is the legal owner of the land. With this well-
grounded belief of ownership, he continued in his possession of Lot
No. 2749. This cannot be categorized as possession in bad faith.
libra ry
chanroblesvi rtualaw lib rary cha nrob les vi rtual law
As defined in the law, a possessor in bad faith is one in possession

of property knowing that his title thereto is defective. 14 Here, there
is no showing that Escritor knew of any flaw in his title. Nor was it
proved that petitioners were aware that the title of their
predecessor had any defect. chanroble svi rtualaw lib rary chan rob les vi rtual law lib rary
Nevertheless, assuming that claimant Escritor was a possessor in

bad faith, this should not prejudice his successors-in-interest,
petitioners herein, as the rule is that only personal knowledge of the
flaw in one's title or mode of acquisition can make him a possessor
in bad faith, for bad faith is not transmissible from one person to
another, not even to an heir. 15 As Article 534 of the Civil Code
explicitly provides, "one who succeeds by hereditary title shall not
suffer the consequences of the wrongful possession of the decedent,
if it is not shown that he was aware of the flaws affecting it; ..." The
reason for this article is that bad faith is personal and
intransmissible. Its effects must, therefore, be suffered only by the
37
person who acted in bad faith; his heir should not be saddled with
such consequences. 16
Under Article 527 of the Civil Code, good faith is always presumed,
and upon him who alleges bad faith on the part of a possessor rests
the burden of proof. If no evidence is presented proving bad faith,
like in this case, the presumption of good faith remains. chanroblesvi rtua lawlib rary cha nro bles vi rtua l law lib ra ry
Respondent Acuna, on the other hand, bases his complaint for

damages on the alleged fraud on the part of the petitioners'
predecessor in having the land registered under his (the
predecessor's) name. A review of the record, however, does not
indicate the existence of any such fraud. It was not proven in the
cadastral court nor was it shown in the trial court. chanroblesvi rtua lawlib rary cha nro bles vi rtual law lib rary
Lot No. 2749 was not awarded to Escritor on the basis of his
machinations. What is clear is that in the hearing of January 22,
1958, the Court permitted Escritor to adduce his evidence of
ownership without opposing evidence as the lot had become
uncontested. 17 Respondent Acuna himself failed to appear in this
hearing because of a misunderstanding with a lawyer. 18 There is no
finding that such failure to appear was caused by petitioners in this
case. On the contrary, all the requirements of publication were
followed. Notice of hearing was duly published. Clearly then, the
allegation of fraud is without basis. chanro blesvi rt ualawlib ra ry chanrobles vi rt ual law li bra ry
Respondent having failed to prove fraud and bad faith on the part of
petitioners, We sustain the trial court's finding that petitioners were
possessors in good faith and should, therefore, not be held liable for
damages. chanroble svirtualawl ibra ry chan roble s virtual law lib rary
With the above pronouncement, the issue of prescription of cause of

action which was also presented need not be passed upon. chanroblesvi rtua lawlib rary cha nro bles vi rtua l law lib ra ry
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the decision appealed

from is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and another decision is
rendered dismissing the complaint. No pronouncement as to
costs. chanroble svirtualawl ibra ry chan rob les vi rtual law lib rary
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, C.J., Narvasa, Cruz and Paras, JJ., concur.
Endnotes:
1 Exhibit "A". Cadastral Answer. chanroble s virtual law l ib rary
2 Exhibit "B". decision in Cadastral Case. No. 72 dated May 15, 1958. chanrobles vi rtua l law lib rary
38
3 Ibid.
4 Exhibit "C", Order for the Issuance of Decrees in cadastral cases. chanrobles vi rtual law lib rary
5 Exhibit "D", Petition. chanrobles vi rtual law lib rary
6 Exhibit "E", Order in Cadastral Case No. 72. chanrobles vi rtual law lib rary
7 Exhibit "F", Decision in Cadastral Case No. 72. chanrobles vi rtua l law li bra ry
8 Exhibit "H", Writ of Possession. chanrob les vi rtua l law lib rary
9 Page 11, Record on Appeal. chanrobles vi rtua l la w libra ry
l0 Page 26, Rollo. chanrobles vi rtua l law lib ra ry
11 Pages 26-27, Rollo. chanrobles vi rtua l law lib ra ry
12 Page 27, Rollo. chanroble s virtual law lib rary
13 Exhibit "B", Decision in Cadastral Case No. 72 dated May 15, 1958. chanrobles vi rtua l law lib rary
14 Art. 526, New Civil Code. chanrobles vi rtua l law lib rary
15 Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines, Vol. II, 1983 Ed., p. 223; Sotto vs. Enage, (CA), 43 Off. Gaz. 5057. chanrobles v irt ual law li bra ry
16 Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines, Vol. 11, 1983 Ed., p. 234. chanrobles vi rt ual law li bra ry
17 Exhibit "B", Decision in Cadastral Case No. 72 dated May 15,1958. chanrobles vi rtua l law lib rary
18 Exhibit "E", Order dated July 18, 1960, Cadastral Case No. 72.
39
THIRD DIVISION
G. R. No. 146815 - April 9, 2003
HEIRS OF PEDRO LAURORA and LEONORA LAURORA, Petitioners, vs. STERLING TECHNOPARK
III and S.P. PROPERTIES, INC., Respondents.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The owners of a property have no authority to use force and violence to eject alleged usurpers who
were in prior physical possession of it. They must file the appropriate action in court and should not
take the law into their own hands.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to set aside the June
27, 2000 Decision2 and the January 22, 2001 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals4 (CA) in CA-GR SP
No. 54667. The dispositive part of the Decision reads:
"WHEREFORE, the [P]etition is GRANTED and the RTC [D]ecision dated 06 May 1999 and the RTC
[O]rder dated 03 August 1999 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and corollarily, the MCTC
[D]ecision is AFFIRMED." 5
The assailed Resolution denied petitoners Motion for Reconsideration.
The Facts
The factual antecedents are summarized by the CA as follows:
"In a [C]omplaint for Forcible Entry with Damages filed on 27 September 1997 before the Fifth
Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Carmona and Gen. Mariano Alvarez, plaintiffs therein, x x x Pedro
Laurora and Leonora Laurora [herein petitioners] alleged that they [were] the owners of Lot 1315-G,
SWD-40763 of the Yaptinchay Estate with an area of 39,771 sq. meters and located in Carmona,
Cavite. Pedro Laurora planted trees and has possessed the land up to the present. On 15 September
1997, [respondents] Sterling Technopark III and S.P. Properties, Inc. x x x through their Engr. Bernie
Gatchalian bulldozed and uprooted the trees and plants, and with the use of armed men and by means
of threats and intimidation, succeeded in forcibly ejecting [petitioners]. As a result of their
dispossession, [petitioners] suffered actual damages in the amount of P3,000,000.00 and P10,000.00
as attorneys fees.
"In their [A]nswer to the [C]omplaint, [respondents] averred that [petitioners were] not the owners of
the land because they disposed of it sometime in 1976 as shown by legal documents. On 02 April
1969, the Land Authority issued an order of award in favor of [petitioners], approving the application
of Pedro Laurora to buy the subject Lot 1315-G from the government. On 01 March 1974,
[petitioners] requested the Department of Agrarian Reform for the transfer of the lot to Juan Manaig.
Favorably acted upon, the DAR issued a permit to transfer dated 03 June 1975 through its Regional
Director Benjamin R. Estrellado. On 03 July 1975, Juan Manaig, as transferee and buyer, paid the
required amount of P10,643.65 under Official Receipt No. 8304707 to the government as full payment
for the transfer of said lot to him. On 26 March 1976, the [petitioners] as sellers and witnessed by
their sons, Efren Laurora and Dominador Laurora, executed a Kasulatan ng Paglilipatan ng Lupa
transferring the land to Juan Manaig as buyer. On 11 June 1976, the [petitioners] again witnessed by
their sons, Efren and Dominador, executed a Kasulatan ng Bilihang Tuluyan or Deed of Sale wherein
they sold Lot 1315-G including all improvements therein, in favor of Juan Manaig. The Deed of
Absolute Sale was approved by the Department of Agrarian Reform on 14 June 1976 in DAR Approval
of Transfer of Rights signed by DAR Regional Director, Benjamin R. Estrellado. After the approval of
the sale from the [petitioners] to Juan Manaig, the latter paid its real estate taxes. The tax
declarations of the land in the name of its previous owners, Yaptinchays, were cancelled and
transferred in the name of [petitioner] Pedro Laurora as owner-transferee. Thereupon, the heirs of the
late JUAN MANAIG sold the land to Golden Mile Resources Development Corporation which likewise
sold it to [respondent] S. P. Properties, Inc.
40
"After summary proceedings in the MCTC, x x x, a judgment was rendered dismissing the complaint.
The case was elevated to the Regional Trial Court. In due course, the said court rendered a decision
reversing the MCTC judgment. x x x"6
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The CA reversed the Regional Trial Court (RTC) and reinstated the Order of dismissal issued by the
Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC). It held that there was no evidence to support the claim of
petitioners to the prior physical possession of the property. The evidence allegedly showed that they
had already sold the land with the approval of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR). Accordingly,
their subsequent entry into and possession of the land constituted plain usurpation, which could not
be the source of any right to occupy it. Being planters in bad faith, they had no right to be reimbursed
for improvements on the land, in accordance with Article 449 of the New Civil Code.
Hence, this Petition.7
The Issue
In their Memorandum,8 petitioners raise this sole issue for our consideration:
"x x x [W]hether [p]rivate [r]espondent[s] ha[ve] a valid and legal right to forcibly eject petitioners
from the premises despite their resistance and objection, through the use of arm[ed] men and by
bulldozing, cutting, and destroying trees and plants planted by petitioners, without court order, to the
damage and prejudice of the latter."9
The Courts Ruling
The Petition is meritorious.
Main Issue:
Physical Possession of the Land
The only issue in forcible entry cases is the physical or material possession of real property --
possession de facto, not possession de jure.10 Only prior physical possession, not title, is the issue.11 If
ownership is raised in the pleadings, the court may pass upon such question, but only to determine
the question of possession.12
The ownership claim of respondents upon the land is based on the evidence they presented. Their
evidence, however, did not squarely address the issue of prior possession. Even if they succeed in
proving that they are the owners of the land,13 the fact remains that they have not alleged or proved
that they physically possess it by virtue of such ownership. On the other hand, petitioners prior
possession of the land was not disputed by the CA, which merely described it as usurpation.14
We stress that the issue of ownership in ejectment cases is to be resolved only when it is intimately
intertwined with the issue of possession,15 to such an extent that the question of who had prior
possession cannot be determined without ruling on the question of who the owner of the land is. 16 No
such intertwinement has been shown in the case before us. Since respondents claim of ownership is
not being made in order to prove prior possession, the ejectment court cannot intrude or dwell upon
the issue of ownership.17
Notwithstanding the actual condition of the title to the property, a person in possession cannot be
ejected by force, violence or terror -- not even by the owners.18 If such illegal manner of ejectment is
employed, as it was in the present case, the party who proves prior possession -- in this case,
petitioners -- can recover possession even from the owners themselves. 19
Granting arguendo that petitioners illegally entered into and occupied the property in question,
respondents had no right to take the law into their own hands and summarily or forcibly eject the
occupants therefrom.
Verily, even if petitioners were mere usurpers of the land owned by respondents, still they are entitled
to remain on it until they are lawfully ejected therefrom. Under appropriate circumstances,
respondents may file, other than an ejectment suit, an accion publiciana -- a plenary action intended
to recover the better right to possess;20 or an accion reivindicatoria -- an action to recover ownership
of real property.21
The availment of the aforementioned remedies is the legal alternative to prevent breaches of peace
and criminal disorder resulting from the use of force by claimants out to gain possession.22The rule of
41
law does not allow the mighty and the privileged to take the law into their own hands to enforce their
alleged rights. They should go to court and seek judicial vindication.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED and the assailed Decision REVERSED and SET ASIDE. No
costs.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona, and Carpio-Morales, JJ., concur.
Endnotes:
1 Rollo, pp. 10-22.
2 Id., pp. 24-29.
3
Rollo, p. 31.
4Special Seventh Division. Written by Justice Buenaventura J. Guerrero (Division chairman), concurred in by Justice Martin
S. Villarama Jr. and Justice Mercedes Gozo-Dadole.
5 Assailed CA Decision, p. 6; rollo, p. 29.
6 Id., pp. 2-3 & 25-26.
7This case was deemed submitted for decision on November 13, 2001, upon the Courts receipt of petitioners
Memorandum signed by Atty. Franco L. Loyola. Respondents Memorandum, filed on November 12, 2001, was signed by
Atty. Benjamin E. Mendoza.
8
Rollo, pp. 123-142.
9 Petitioners Memorandum, p. 5; rollo, p. 127.
10 Go Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 362 SCRA 755, August 14, 2001; Amagan v. Marayag, 326 SCRA 581, February 28,
2000; Diu v. Ibajan, 322 SCRA 452, January 19, 2000; Carreon v. Court of Appeals, 353 Phil. 271, June 22, 1998; Dizon
v. Court of Appeals, 332 Phil. 429, November 19, 1996; Hilario v. Court of Appeals, 329 Phil. 202, August 7, 1996.
11German Management and Services, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 177 SCRA 495, September 14, 1989; Ganadin v. Ramos,
99 SCRA 613, September 11, 1980; Baptista v. Carillo, 72 SCRA 214, July 30, 1976.
12 16 of Rule 70 of the 1997 Rules of Court; Diu v. Ibajan, supra; Dizon v. Court of Appeals, supra.
13 In their Memorandum, petitioners claim that the issue of ownership over the property "is still with the DARAB of Cavite."
14 Assailed CA Decision, p. 5; rollo, p. 28.
15
Paz v. Reyes, 327 SCRA 605, March 9, 2000; Vda. de Cruz v. Court of Appeals, 363 Phil. 539, March 4, 1999.
16
Refugia v. Court of Appeals, 327 Phil. 982, July 5, 1996.
17 Id., p. 1006.
18Muñoz v. Court of Appeals, 214 SCRA 216, September 23, 1992; Joven v. Court of Appeals, 212 SCRA 700, August 20,
1992; German Management and Services, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, supra.; Supia and Batioco v. Quintero and Ayala, 59
Phil. 312, December 23, 1933.
19Gener v. de Leon, 367 SCRA 631, October 19, 2001; Ceremonia v. Court of Appeals, 314 SCRA 731, September 21,
1999; Gachon v. Devera, 274 SCRA 540, June 20, 1997.
20Arcal v. Court of Appeals, 348 Phil. 813, January 26, 1998; Chico v. Court of Appeals, 348 Phil. 37, January 5,
1998; Ybañez v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 194 SCRA 743, March 6, 1991; Concepcion v. Presiding Judge et al., 204
Phil. 564, December 15, 1982.
21Evadel Realty and Development Corporation v. Soriano, 357 SCRA 395, April 20, 2001; Vda. de Villanueva v. Court of
Appeals, 351 SCRA 12, February 1, 2001; Bishop of Cebu v. Mangaron, 6 Phil. 286, June 1, 1906.
22
Villaflor v. Reyes, 22 SCRA 392, January 30, 1968; Pitargue v. Sorilla, 92 Phil. 5, September 17, 1952.
42
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 137944. April 6, 2000.]
FERNANDA MENDOZA CEQUENA and RUPERTA MENDOZA LIRIO, Petitioners, v. HONORATA

MENDOZA BOLANTE, Respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Tax receipts and declarations are prima facie proofs of ownership or possession of the property for which
such taxes have been paid. Coupled with proof of actual possession of the property, they may become the
basis of a claim for ownership. By acquisitive prescription, possession in the concept of owner — public,
adverse, peaceful and uninterrupted — may be converted to ownership. On the other hand, mere possession
and occupation of land cannot ripen into ownership.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari of the March 19, 1999 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals 2
(CA) in CA-GR CV No. 43423. The assailed Decision disposed as follows: 3
"WHEREFORE, for all the foregoing, the decision of the trial court appealed from is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. In lieu thereof, judgment is hereby rendered declaring . . . Honorata Mendoza Bolante the rightful
owner and possessor of the parcel of land which is the subject of this appeal." cralaw virt ua1aw lib ra ry
The Facts
The Petition herein refers to a parcel of land situated in Barangay Bangad, Binangonan, Province of Rizal,
having an area of 1,728 square meters and covered by Tax Declaration No. 26-0027. chanro bles.c om : chan roble s.com.p h
The undisputed antecedents of this case are narrated by the Court of Appeals as follows: 4
"The facts not disputed revealed that prior to 1954, the land was originally declared for taxation purposes in
the name of Sinforoso Mendoza, father of [respondent] and married to Eduarda Apiado. Sinforoso died in
1930. [Petitioners] were the daughters of Margarito Mendoza. On the basis of an affidavit, the tax
declaration in the name of Sinforoso Mendoza of the contested lot was cancelled and subsequently declared
in the name of Margarito Mendoza. Margarito and Sinforoso are brothers. [Respondent] is the present
occupant of the land. Earlier, on October 15, 1975, [respondent] and Miguel Mendoza, another brother of
[petitioners], during the cadastral survey had a dispute on [the] ownership of the land.
"During the pre-trial conference, parties stipulated the following facts: chan rob1e s vi rtual 1aw lib rary
‘1) The land subject of the case was formerly declared for taxation purposes in the name of Sinforoso
Mendoza prior to 1954 but is now declared in the name of Margarito Mendoza.
‘2) The parties agree[d] as to the identity of the land subject of instant case.
‘3) [Petitioners] are the daughters of Margarito Mendoza while the [respondent] is the only daughter of
Sinforoso Mendoza.
‘4) Margarito Mendoza and Sinforoso Mendoza [were] brothers, now deceased.
‘5) During the cadastral survey of the property on October 15, 1979 there was already a dispute between
Honorata M. Bolante and Miguel Mendoza, brother of [petitioners].
‘6) [Respondent was] occupying the property in question.
‘The only issue involved [was] who [was] the lawful owner and possessor of the land subject of the case.’
"After trial, the court a quo rendered its judgment in favor of [petitioners], the dispositive portion of which
reads as follows:chan rob1es v irt ual 1aw l ibra ry
‘Wherefore, in view of the foregoing considerations, judgment is hereby rendered for the [petitioners] and
43
against the [respondent]: chanro b1es vi rt ual 1aw l ibra ry
‘1. Declaring that the parcel of land situated in Bangad, Binangonan, Rizal covered by tax declaration no.
26-0027 in the name of Margarito Mendoza belong to his heirs, the [petitioners] herein;
‘2. Ordering [respondent] to vacate the property subject of the case and deliver possession thereof to the
heirs of Margarito Mendoza.
‘3. Ordering the [respondent] to indemnify the [petitioners] in the sum of P10,000.00, as actual damages.
‘4. Ordering the [respondent] to pay the costs.’"
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court because the genuineness and the due execution of the affidavit
allegedly signed by the respondent and her mother had not been sufficiently established. The notary public
or anyone else who had witnessed the execution of the affidavit was not presented. No expert testimony or
competent witness ever attested to the genuineness of the questioned signatures.
The CA further ruled that the affidavit was insufficient to overcome the denial of respondent and her mother.
The former testified that the latter, never having attended school, could neither read nor write. Respondent
also said that she had never been called "Leonor," which was how she was referred to in the affidavit.
Moreover, the appellate court held that the probative value of petitioners’ tax receipts and declarations
paled in comparison with respondent’s proof of ownership of the disputed parcel. Actual, physical, exclusive
and continuous possession by respondent since 1985 indeed gave her a better title under Article 538 of the
Civil Code.
Hence, this Petition. 5
Issues
Insisting that they are the rightful owners of the disputed land, the petitioners allege that the CA committed
these reversible errors: 6
"1. . . . [I]n not considering the affidavit as an exception to the general rule that an affidavit is classified as
hearsay evidence, unless the affiant is placed on the witness stand; and
"2. . . . [I]n holding that respondent has been in actual and physical possession, coupled with . . . exclusive
and continuous possession of the land since 1985, which are evidence of the best kind of circumstance
proving the claim of the title of ownership and enjoys the presumption of preferred possessor." cralaw virt ua1aw li bra ry
The Court’s Ruling
The Petition has no merit.
First Issue: Admissibility of the Affidavit
Petitioners dispute the CA’s ruling that the affidavit was not the best evidence of their father’s ownership of
the disputed land, because the "affiant was not placed on the witness stand." They contend that it was
unnecessary to present a witness to establish the authenticity of the affidavit because it was a declaration
against respondent’s interest and was an ancient document. As a declaration against interest, it was an
exception to the hearsay rule. As a necessary and trustworthy document, it was admissible in evidence. And
because it was executed on March 24, 1953, it was a self-authenticating ancient document. chanroble s.com : vi rtua l law lib rary
We quote below the pertinent portion of the appellate court’s ruling: 7
"While it is true that the affidavit was signed and subscribed before a notary public, the general rule is that
affidavits are classified as hearsay evidence, unless affiants are placed on the witness stand (People’s Bank
and Trust Company v. Leonidas, 207 SCRA 164). Affidavits are not considered the best evidence, if affiants
are available as witnesses (Vallarta v. Court of Appeals, 163 SCRA 587). The due execution of the affidavit
was not sufficiently established. The notary public or others who saw that the document was signed or at
least [could] confirm its recitals [were] not presented. There was no expert testimony or competent witness
who attested to the genuineness of the questioned signatures. Worse, [respondent] denied the genuineness
of her signature and that of her mother . . . [Respondent] testified that her mother was an illiterate and as
far as she knew her mother could not write because she had not attended school (p. 7, ibid). Her testimony
was corroborated by Ma. Sales Bolante Basa, who said the [respondent’s] mother was illiterate." cra law virt ua1aw li bra ry
The petitioners’ allegations are untenable. Before a private document offered as authentic can be received in
evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be proved first. 8 And before a document is admitted as
an exception to the hearsay rule under the Dead Man’s Statute, the offeror must show (a) that the declarant
is dead, insane or unable to testify; (b) that the declaration concerns a fact cognizable by the declarant; (c)
that at the time the declaration was made, he was aware that the same was contrary to his interest; and (d)
44
that circumstances render improbable the existence of any motive to falsify. 9
In this case, one of the affiants happens to be the respondent, who is still alive and who testified that the
signature in the affidavit was not hers. A declaration against interest is not admissible if the declarant is
available to testify as a witness. 10 Such declarant should be confronted with the statement against interest
as a prior inconsistent statement.
The affidavit cannot be considered an ancient document either. An ancient document is one that is (1) more
than 30 years old, (2) found in the proper custody, and (3) unblemished by any alteration or by any
circumstance of suspicion. 11 It must on its face appear to be genuine. The petitioners herein failed,
however, to explain how the purported signature of Eduarda Apiado could have been affixed to the subject
affidavit if, according to the witness, she was an illiterate woman who never had any formal schooling. This
circumstance casts suspicion on its authenticity.
Not all notarized documents are exempted from the rule on authentication. Thus, an affidavit does not
automatically become a public document just because it contains a notarial jurat. Furthermore, the affidavit
in question does not state how the ownership of the subject land was transferred from Sinforoso Mendoza to
Margarito Mendoza. By itself, an affidavit is not a mode of acquiring ownership.
Second Issue: Preference of Possession
The CA ruled that the respondent was the preferred possessor under Article 538 of the Civil Code because
she was in notorious, actual, exclusive and continuous possession of the land since 1985. Petitioners dispute
this ruling. They contend that she came into possession through force and violence, contrary to Article 536
of the Civil Code.
We concede that despite their dispossession in 1985, the petitioners did not lose legal possession because
possession cannot be acquired through force or violence. 12 To all intents and purposes, a possessor, even if
physically ousted, is still deemed the legal possessor. 13 Indeed, anyone who can prove prior possession,
regardless of its character, may recover such possession. 14
However, possession by the petitioners does not prevail over that of the Respondent. Possession by the
former before 1985 was not exclusive, as the latter also acquired it before 1985. The records show that the
petitioners’ father and brother, as well as the respondent and her mother were simultaneously in adverse
possession of the land.
Before 1985, the subject land was occupied and cultivated by the respondent’s father (Sinforoso), who was
the brother of petitioners’ father (Margarito), as evidenced by Tax Declaration No. 26425. 15 When
Sinforoso died in 1930, Margarito took possession of the land and cultivated it with his son Miguel. At the
same time, respondent and her mother continued residing on the lot.
When respondent came of age in 1948, she paid realty taxes for the years 1932-1948. 16 Margarito
declared the lot for taxation in his name in 1953 17 and paid its realty taxes beginning 1952. 18 When he
died, Miguel continued cultivating the land. As found by the CA, the respondent and her mother were living
on the land, which was being tilled by Miguel until 1985 when he was physically ousted by the Respondent.
19
Based on Article 538 of the Civil Code, the respondent is the preferred possessor because, benefiting from
her father’s tax declaration of the subject lot since 1926, she has been in possession thereof for a longer
period. On the other hand, petitioners’ father acquired joint possession only in 1952.
Third Issue: Possession of Better Right
Finally, the petitioners challenge the CA ruling that "actual and physical coupled with the exclusive and
continuous possession [by respondent] of the land since 1985" proved her ownership of the disputed land.
The respondent argues that she was legally presumed to possess the subject land with a just title since she
possessed it in the concept of owner. Under Article 541 of the Code, she could not be obliged to show or
prove such title.
The respondent’s contention is untenable. The presumption in Article 541 of the Civil Code is merely
disputable; it prevails until the contrary is proven. 20 That is, one who is disturbed in one’s possession shall,
under this provision, be restored thereto by the means established by law. 21 Article 538 settles only the
question of possession, and possession is different from ownership. Ownership in this case should be
established in one of the ways provided by law.
To settle the issue of ownership, we need to determine who between the claimants has proven acquisitive
prescription. 22
Ownership of immovable property is acquired by ordinary prescription through possession for ten years. 23
Being the sole heir of her father, respondent showed through his tax receipt that she had been in possession
of the land for more than ten years since 1932. When her father died in 1930, she continued to reside there
with her mother. When she got married, she and her husband engaged in kaingin inside the disputed lot for
their livelihood. 24
Respondent’s possession was not disturbed until 1953 when the petitioners’ father claimed the land. But by
then, her possession, which was in the concept of owner — public, peaceful, and uninterrupted 25 — had
45
already ripened into ownership. Furthermore she herself, after her father’s demise, declared and paid realty
taxes for the disputed land. Tax receipts and declarations of ownership for taxation, when coupled with proof
of actual possession of the property, can be the basis of a claim for ownership through prescription. 26
In contrast, the petitioners, despite thirty-two years of farming the subject land, did not acquire ownership.
It is settled that ownership cannot be acquired by mere occupation. 27 Unless coupled with the element of
hostility toward the true owner, 28 occupation and use, however long, will not confer title by prescription or
adverse possession. Moreover, the petitioners cannot claim that their possession was public, peaceful and
uninterrupted. Although their father and brother arguably acquired ownership through extraordinary
prescription because of their adverse possession for thirty-two years (1953-1985), 29 this supposed
ownership cannot extend to the entire disputed lot, but must be limited to the portion that they actually
farmed.
We cannot sustain the petitioners’ contention that their ownership of the disputed land was established
before the trial court through the series of tax declarations and receipts issued in the name of Margarito
Mendoza. Such documents prove that the holder has a claim of title over the property. Aside from
manifesting a sincere desire to obtain title thereto, they announce the holder’s adverse claim against the
state and other interested parties. 30
However, tax declarations and receipts are not conclusive evidence of ownership. 31 At most, they
constitute mere prima facie proof of ownership or possession of the property for which taxes have been
paid. 32 In the absence of actual public and adverse possession, the declaration of the land for tax purposes
does not prove ownership. 33 In sum, the petitioners’ claim of ownership of the whole parcel has no legal
basis.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision and Resolution AFFIRMED. Costs against
petitioners.
SO ORDERED. chanrobles. com : law lib rary
Melo, Vitug, Purisima and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.
Endnotes:
1. Rollo, pp. 30-39.
2. Seventh Division composed of JJ Mariano M. Umali (ponente); Fermin A. Martin Jr. (Division chairman)
and Romeo J. Callejo Sr. (member), both concurring.
3. CA Decision, p. 9; rollo, p. 38.
4. CA Decision, pp. 2-5; rollo, pp. 31-34.
5. This case was deemed submitted for decision on November 29, 1999, upon simultaneous receipt by this
Court of the parties’ Memoranda. Petitioners’ Memorandum was signed by Atty. Romeo M. Flores while that
of respondent was signed by Attys. Arceli A. Rubin and Rogel F. Quijano.
6. Petitioners’ Memorandum, pp. 5-6; rollo, pp. 85-86.
7. CA Decision, p. 5; rollo, p. 34.
8. Rule 132, Sec. 20, Rules of Court.
9. Rule 130, Sec. 38, Rules of Court; Fuentes Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 253 SCRA 430, 435, February 9, 1996;
People v. Bernal, 274 SCRA 197, 203, June 19, 1997.
10. Lichauco v. Atlantic, Gulf & Pacific Co., 84 Phil. 330, 342, August 23, 1949.
11. Rule 132, Sec. 21, Rules of Court; Heirs of Salud Dizon Salamat v. Tamayo, 298 SCRA 313, 318,
October 30, 1998; and Heirs of Demetria Lacsa v. Court of Appeals, 197 SCRA 234, 242, May 20, 1991.
12. Art. 536, Civil Code; Bishop of Lipa v. Municipality of San Jose, 27 Phil. 571, 575, August 29, 1914.
13. Ayala de Roxas v. Maglonso, 8 Phil. 745, 749, April 27, 1906.
14. Heirs of Placido Miranda v. Court of Appeals, 255 SCRA 368, 379, March 29, 1996.
15. Exhibit "1," RTC Records, p. 94.
16. Exhibit "2," RTC Records, p. 95.
17. Exh. "D," RTC Records, p. 77. Petitioners also submitted Tax Declaration Nos. 10410 for 1965, 13481 for
1974, and 26-0027 for 1985. RTC Records, pp. 78-79 & 57.
46
18. Exh. "B-17," RTC Records, p. 75. Real Property Tax receipts submitted by the petitioners covered the
years 1953-1979. RTC Records, pp. 58-75.
19. CA Decision, p. 8; rollo, p. 37. TSN, November 13, 1992, p. 11.
20. Arturo M. Tolentino, Commentaries & Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the Philippines, Vol. II, 1992
ed., p. 284; City of Manila v. Del Rosario, 5 Phil. 227, 231, November 10, 1905; Chan v. Court of Appeals,
33 SCRA 737, 745, June 30, 1970; and Perez v. Mendoza, 65 SCRA 480, 490, July 25, 1975.
21. Art. 539, Civil Code.
22. Article 540 of the Civil Code provides: "Only the possession acquired and enjoyed in the concept of
owner can serve as a title for acquiring dominion."
cra law virt ua1aw lib ra ry
24. Comment, p. 8; rollo, p. 53; TSN, January 4, 1993, p. 3.
26. Heirs of Miranda v. CA, supra, p. 375.
28. Corporation de PP. Dominicos v. Lazaro, 42 Phil. 119, 122 & 126-127, September 10, 1921.
29. Hiers of Miranda v. CA, supra, p. 368; and Heirs of Segunda Maningding v. Court of Appeals, 276 SCRA
601, 605, July 31, 1997.
30. Republic v. Court of Appeals, 258 SCRA 712, 720, July 12, 1996.
31. Director of Lands v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 195 SCRA 38, 44, March 11, 1991.
32. Heirs of Vencilao Sr. v. Court of Appeals, 288 SCRA 574, 581-582, April 1, 1998; Deiparine v. Court of
Appeals, 299 SCRA 668, 675, December 4, 1998; Titong v. Court of Appeals, 287 SCRA 102, 115, March 6,
1998.
33. De Luna v. Court of Appeals, 212 SCRA 276, 280, August 6, 1992.
47
EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-18536. March 31, 1965.]
JOSE B. AZNAR, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. RAFAEL YAPDIANGCO, Defendant-Appellee; TEODORO

SANTOS, Intervenor-Appellee.
Florentino M. Guanlao, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
Rafael Yapdiangco in his own behalf as Defendant-Appellee.
Lorenzo Sumulong, R.B. Hilao & B.S. Felipe for Intervenor-Appellee.
SYLLABUS
1. MOTOR VEHICLES; TRUE OWNER HAS BETTER RIGHT THAN BUYER IN GOOD FAITH TO POSSESSION OF
STOLEN CAR. — A person unlawfully deprived of the possession thereof has a better right as against a buyer
in good faith for value from a seller who had no title thereto.
2. ID.; ID.; ARTICLE 1506 OF THE CIVIL CODE NOT APPLICABLE WHERE SELLER HAD NO TITLE. — Under
Article 1506 of the Civil Code, it is essential that the seller should have a voidable title at least. It is clearly
inapplicable where the seller had no title at all.
3. PROPERTY; OWNERSHIP TRANSFERRED NOT MERELY BY CONTRACT BUT BY TRADITION AND DELIVERY.
— Ownership is not transferred by contract merely but by tradition or delivery. Contracts only constitute
titles or rights to the transfer or acquisition of ownership, while delivery or tradition is the mode of
accomplishing the same.
4. ID.; ID.; OWNERSHIP OF CAR SOLD NOT TRANSFERRED MERELY BY CONTRACT OF SALE WHERE THERE
WAS NO DELIVERY. — A contract of sale of personal property does not serve to transfer ownership where
the vendee took possession of the subject matter thereof by stealing the same while it was in the custody of
the vendor’s agent.
5. ID.; RULE UNDER ART. 559 CIVIL CODE; WHEN OWNER MAY RECOVER LOST PROPERTY FROM THIRD
PERSONS. — Under Article 559, Civil Code, the rule is to the effect that if the owner has lost the thing, or if
he has been unlawfully deprived of it, he has a right to recover it, not only from the finder, thief or robber,
but also from third persons who may have acquired it in good faith from such finder, thief or robber. The
said article establishes two exceptions to the general rule of irrevindicability, to wit: when the owner (1) has
lost the thing, or (2) has been unlawfully deprived thereof. In these cases, the possessor cannot retain the
thing as against the owner, who may recover it without paying any indemnity, except when the possessor
acquired it in a public sale.
6. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, STATUTORY PROVISION PREVAILS OVER COMMON LAW PRINCIPLE. — The
common law principle that where one of two innocent persons must suffer by a fraud perpetrated by
another, the law imposes the loss upon the party who, by his misplaced confidence, has enabled the fraud
to be committed, cannot be applied in a case which is covered by an express provision of the new Civil
Code, specifically Article 559. Between a common law principle and a statutory provision, the latter must
prevail in this jurisdiction.
DECISION
REGALA, J.:
This is an appeal, on purely legal questions, from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Quezon City,
Branch IV, declaring the intervenor-appellee, Teodoro Santos, entitled to the possession of the car in
dispute.
The records before this Court disclose that sometime in May, 1959, Teodoro Santos advertised in two
metropolitan papers the sale of his FORD FAIRLANE 500. In the afternoon of May 28, 1959, a certain L. De
Dios, claiming to be a nephew of Vicente Marella, went to the Santos residence to answer the ad. However,
Teodoro Santos was out during this call and only the latter’s son, Irineo Santos received and talked with De
Dios. The latter told the young Santos that he had come in behalf of his uncle, Vicente Marella, who was
interested to buy the advertised car.
48
On being informed of the above, Teodoro Santos instructed his son to see the said Vicente Marella the
following day at his given address: 1642 Crisostomo Street, Sampaloc, Manila. And so, in the morning of
May 29, 1959, Irineo Santos went to the above address. At this meeting, Marella agreed to buy the car for
P14,700.00 on the understanding that the price would be paid only after the car had been registered in his
name.
Irineo Santos then fetched his father who, together with L. De Dios, went to the office of a certain Atty. Jose
Padolina where the deed of sale for the car was executed in Marella’s favor. The parties to the contract
thereafter proceeded to the Motor Vehicles’ Office in Quezon City where the registration of the car in
Marella’s name was effected. Up to this stage of the transaction, the purchase price had not been paid.
From the Motor Vehicles Office, Teodoro Santos returned to his house. He gave the registration papers and a
copy of the deed of sale to his son, Irineo, and instructed him not to part with them until Marella shall have
given the full payment for the car. Irineo Santos and L. De Dios then proceeded to 1642 Crisostomo Street,
Sampaloc in Manila where the former demanded for the payment from Vicente Marella. Marella said that the
amount he had on hand then was short by some P2,000.00 and begged off to be allowed to secure the
shortage from a sister supposedly living somewhere in Azcarraga Street, also in Manila. Thereafter, he
ordered L. De Dios to go to the said sister and suggested that Irineo Santos to go with him. At the same
time, he requested for the registration papers and the deed of sale from Ireneo Santos on the pretext that
he would like to show them to his lawyers. Trusting the good faith of Marella, Ireneo handed over the same
to the latter and thereupon, in the company of L. De Dios and another unidentified person, proceeded to the
alleged house of Marella’s sister.
At a place in Azcarraga, Irineo Santos and L. De Dios alighted from the car and entered a house, while their
unidentified companion remained in the car. Once inside, L. De Dios asked Irineo Santos to wait at the sala
while he went inside a room. That was the last that Ireneo saw of him. For, after a considerable length of
time waiting in vain for De Dios to return, Ireneo went down to discover that neither the car nor their
unidentified companion was there anymore. Going back to the house, he inquired from a woman he saw for
L. De Dios and he was told that no such name lived or was even known therein. Whereupon, Ireneo Santos
rushed to 1642 Crisostomo to see Marella. He found the house closed and Marella gone. Finally, he reported
the matter to his father who promptly advised the police authorities.
That very same day, on the afternoon of May 9, 1959, Vicente Marella was able to sell the car in question to
the plaintiff- appellant herein, Jose B. Aznar, for P15,000.00. Insofar as the above incidents are concerned,
we are bound by the factual finding of the trial court that Jose B. Aznar acquired the said car from Vicente
Marella in good faith, for a valuable consideration and without notice of the defect appertaining to the
vendor’s title.
While the car in question was thus in the possession of Jose B. Aznar and while he was attending to its
registration in his name, agents of the Philippine Constabulary seized and confiscated the same in
consequence of the report to them by Teodoro Santos that the said car was unlawfully taken from him.
In due time, Jose B. Aznar filed a complaint for replevin against Captain Rafael Yapdiangco, the head of the
Philippine Constabulary unit which seized the car in question. Claiming ownership of the vehicle, he prayed
for its delivery to him. In the course of the litigation, however, Teodoro Santos moved and was allowed to
intervene by the lower court.
At the end of the trial, the lower court rendered a decision awarding the disputed motor vehicle to the
intervenor-appellee, Teodoro Santos. In brief, it ruled that Teodoro Santos had been unlawfully deprived of
his personal property by Vicente Marella, from whom the plaintiff-appellant traces his right. Consequently,
although the plaintiff-appellant acquired the car in good faith and for a valuable consideration from Vicente
Marella, the said decision concluded, still the intervenor-appellee was entitled to its recovery on the
mandate of Article 559 of the New Civil Code which provides: jgc:c hanrobles. com.ph
"Art. 559. The possession of movable property acquired in good faith is equivalent to title. Nevertheless, one
who has lost any movable or has been unlawfully deprived thereof, may recover it from the person in
possession of the same.
"If the possessor of a movable lost or of which the owner has been unlawfully deprived, has acquired it in
good faith at a public sale, the owner cannot obtain its return without reimbursing the price paid therefor."
libra ry
c ralaw virtua1aw
From this decision, Jose B. Aznar appeals.
The issue at bar is one and simple, to wit: Between Teodoro Santos and the plaintiff-appellant, Jose B.
Aznar, who has a better right to the possession of the disputed automobile?
We find for the intervenor-appellee, Teodoro Santos.
The plaintiff-appellant accepts that the car in question originally belonged to and was owned by the
intervenor-appellee, Teodoro Santos, and that the latter was unlawfully deprived of the same by Vicente
Marella. However, the appellant contends that upon the facts of this case, the applicable provision of the
Civil Code is Article 1506 and not Article 559 as was held by the decision under review. Article 1506
provides: jg c:chan roble s.com.p h
"Art. 1506. Where the seller of goods has a voidable title thereto, but his title has not been voided at the
49
time of the sale, the buyer acquires a good title to the goods, provided he buys them in good faith, for
value, and without notice of the seller’s defect of title."
cralaw vi rt ua1aw li brary
The contention is clearly unmeritorious. Under the aforequoted provision, it is essential that the seller should
have a voidable title at least. It is very clearly inapplicable where, as in this case, the seller had no title at
all.
Vicente Marella did not have any title to the property under litigation because the same was never delivered
to him. He sought ownership or acquisition of it by virtue of the contract, Vicente Marella could have
acquired ownership or title to the subject matter only by the delivery or tradition of the car to him.
Under Article 712 of the Civil Code, "ownership and other real rights over property are acquired and
transmitted by law, by donation, by testate and intestate succession, and in consequence of certain
contracts, by tradition." As interpreted by this Court in a host of cases, by this provision, ownership is not
transferred by contract merely but by tradition or delivery. Contracts only constitute titles or rights to the
transfer or acquisition of ownership, while delivery or tradition is the mode of accomplishing the same.
(Gonzales v. Rojas, 16 Phil. 51; Ocejo, Perez and Co. v. International Bank, 37 Phil. 631; Fidelity and
Deposit Co. v. Wilson, 8 Phil. 51; Kuenzle & Streiff v. Wacke & Chandler, 14 Phil. 610; Easton v. Diaz & Co.,
32 Phil. 180).
"For the legal acquisition and transfer of ownership and other property rights, the thing transferred must be
delivered, inasmuch as, according to settled jurisprudence the tradition of the thing is a necessary and
indispensable requisite in the acquisition of said ownership by virtue of a contract. (Walter Easton v. E. Diaz
& Co. & the Provincial Sheriff of Albay, supra.)
"So long as property is not delivered, the ownership over it is not transferred by contract merely but by
delivery. Contracts only constitute titles or rights to the transfer or acquisition of ownership, while delivery
or tradition is the method of accomplishing the same, the title and the method of acquiring it being different
in our law." (Gonzales v. Rojas, 16 Phil. 51)
In the case on hand, the car in question was never delivered to the vendee by the vendor as to complete or
consummate the transfer of ownership by virtue of the contract. It should be recalled that while there was
indeed a contract of sale between Vicente Marella and Teodoro Santos, the former, as vendee, took
possession of the subject matter thereof by stealing the same while it was in the custody of the latter’s son.
There is no adequate evidence on record as to whether Irineo Santos voluntarily delivered the key to the car
to the unidentified person who went with him and L. De Dios to the place in Azcarraga where a sister of
Marella allegedly lived. But even if Irineo Santos did, it was not the delivery contemplated by Article 712 of
the Civil Code. For then, it would be indisputable that he turned it over to the unidentified companion only
so that he may drive Irineo Santos and De Dios to the said place in Azcarraga and not vest the title to the
said vehicle to him as agent of Vicente Marella. Article 712 above contemplates that the act be coupled with
the intent of delivering the thing. (10 Manresa 132)
The lower court was correct in applying Article 559 of the Civil Code to the case at bar. For under it, the rule
is to the effect that if the owner has lost the thing, or if he has been unlawfully deprived of it, he has a right
to recover it, not only from the finder, thief or robber, but also from the third person who may have
acquired it in good faith from such finder, thief or robber. The said article establishes two exceptions to the
general rule of irrevindicability to wit: when the owner (1) has lost the thing, or (2) has been unlawfully
deprived thereof. In these cases, the possessor cannot retain the thing as against the owner, who may
recover it without paying any indemnity, except when the possessor acquired it in a public sale. (Del Rosario
v. Lucena, 8 Phil. 535; Varela v. Finnick, 9 Phil. 482; Varela v. Matute, 9 Phil. 479; Arenas v. Raymundo, 19
Phil. 46. Tolentino, id., Vol II, p. 261.)
In the case of Cruz v. Pahati, Et Al., 52 O.G. 3053, this Court has already ruled that —
"Under Article 559 of the new Civil Code, a Person illegally deprived of any movable may recover it from the
person in possession of the same and the only defense the latter may have is if he has acquired it in good
faith at a public sale, in which case, the owner cannot obtain its return without reimbursing the price paid
therefor. In the present case, plaintiff has been illegally deprived of his car through the ingenious scheme of
defendant B to enable the latter to dispose of it as if he were the owner thereof. Plaintiff, therefore, can still
recover possession of the car even if it is in the possession of a third party who had acquired it in good faith
from defendant B. The maxim that "no man can transfer to another a better title than he has himself’
obtains in the civil as well as in the common law." (U.S. v. Sootelo, 28 Phil. 147)
Finally, the plaintiff-appellant here contends that inasmuch as it was the intervenor-appellee who had
caused the fraud to be perpetrated by his misplaced confidence on Vicente Marella, he, the intervenor-
appellee, should be made to suffer the consequences arising therefrom, following the equitable principle to
that effect. Suffice it to say in this regard that the right of the owner to recover personal property acquired
in good faith by another, is based on his being dispossessed without his consent. The common law principle
that where one of two innocent persons must suffer by a fraud perpetrated by another, the law imposes the
loss upon the party who, by his misplaced confidence, has enabled the fraud to be committed, cannot be
applied in a case which is covered by an express provision of the new Civil Code, specifically Article 559.
Between a common law principle and a statutory provision, the latter must prevail in this jurisdiction. (Cruz
v. Pahati, supra).
UPON ALL THE FOREGOING, the instant appeal is hereby dismissed and the decision of the lower court
50
affirmed in full. Costs against the Appellant.
Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon,
J.P., and Zaldivar, JJ., concur.
51
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. L-8257. April 13, 1956.]
JOSE R. CRUZ, Plaintiff-Appellant, vs. REYNALDO PAHATI, ET AL., Defendants-Appellees.
DECISION
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
This is an action of replevin instituted by Plaintiff in the Court of First Instance of Manila to recover the
possession of an automobile and certain amount as damages and attorney’s fees resulting from his illegal
deprivation thereof.
The original Defendants were Reynaldo Pahati and Felixberto Bulahan but, upon amendment of the
complaint, Jesusito Belizo was included as party Defendant who was summoned by publication because
his whereabouts were not known. Belizo failed to appear or answer the complaint and so he was declared
default.
Pahati admitted having bought the automobile from Bulahan, for the sum of P4,900 which he paid in
check. When the Manila Police Department impounded the automobile, he cancelled the sale and
stopped the payment of the check and as a result he returned the automobile to Bulahan who in turn
surrendered the check for cancellation. He set up a counterclaim for the sum of P2,000 as attorney’s fees.
Bulahan on his part claims that he acquired the automobile from Jesusito Belizo for value and without
having any knowledge of any defect in the title of the latter; that Plaintiff had previously acquired title
chan roblesvirtualawlibrary
to said automobile by purchase from Belizo as evidenced by a deed of sale executed to that effect; that chan roblesvirtualawlibrary
later Plaintiff delivered the possession of the automobile to Belizo for resale and to facilitate it he gave
the latter a letter of authority to secure a new certificate of registration in his name (Plaintiff’s) and that
by having clothed Belizo with an apparent ownership or authority to sell the automobile, Plaintiff is now
estopped to deny such ownership or authority. Bulahan claims that between two innocent parties, he
who gave occasion, through his conduct, to the falsification committed by Belizo, should be the one to
suffer the loss and this one is the Plaintiff. Bulahan also set up a counterclaim for P17,000 as damages and
attorney’s fees.
After the presentation of the evidence, the court rendered judgment declaring Defendant Bulahan
entitled to the automobile in question and consequently ordered the Plaintiff to return it to
said Defendant and, upon his failure to do so, to pay him the sum of P4,900, with legal interest from the
date of the decision. The claim for damages and attorney’s fees of Bulahan was denied. Defendant Belizo
was however ordered to indemnify the Plaintiff in the amount of P4,900 and pay the sum of P5,000 as
moral damages. The counterclaim of Defendant Pahati was denied for lack of evidence. The case was
taken directly to this Court by the Plaintiff.
The lower court found that the automobile in question was originally owned by the Northern Motors, Inc.
which later sold it to Chinaman Lu Dag. This Chinaman sold it afterwards to Jesusito Belizo and the latter
in turn sold it to Plaintiff. Belizo was then a dealer in second hand cars. One year thereafter, Belizo offered
the Plaintiff to sell the automobile for him claiming to have a buyer for it. Plaintiff agreed. At that
time, Plaintiff’s certificate of registration was missing and, upon the suggestion of Belizo, Plaintiff wrote a
letter addressed to the Motor Section of the Bureau of Public Works for the issuance of a new registration
certificate alleging as reason the loss of the one previously issued to him and stating that he was intending
to sell his car. This letter was delivered to Belizo on March 3, 1952. He also turned over to Belizo the
automobile on the latter’s pretext that he was going to show it to a prospective buyer. On March 7, 1952,
the letter was falsified and converted into an authorized deed of sale in favor of Belizo by erasing a portion
thereof and adding in its place the words “sold the above car to Mr. Jesusito Belizo of 25 Valencia, San
Francisco del Monte, for Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000).” Armed with this deed of sale, Belizo succeeded
in obtaining a certificate of registration in his name on the same date, March 7, 1952, and also on the
same date, Belizo sold the car to Felixberto Bulahan who in turn sold it to Reynaldo Pahati, a second hand
car dealer. These facts show that the letter was falsified by Belizo to enable him to sell the car to Bulahan
for a valuable consideration.
This is a case which involves a conflict of rights of two persons who claim to be the owners of the same
property, Plaintiff and Defendant Bulahan. Both were found by the lower court to be innocent and to have
acted in good faith. They were found to be the victims of Belizo who falsified the letter given him
52
by Plaintiff to enable him to sell the car of Bulahan for profit. Who has, therefore, a better right of the two
over the car?
The law applicable to the case is Article 559 of the new Civil Code which provides: chanroble svirtuallawlibrary
“ART. 559. The possession of movable property acquired in good faith is equivalent to a title.
Nevertheless, one who has lost any movable or has been unlawfully deprived thereof, may recover it from
the person in possession of the same.
“If the possessor of a movable lost or of which the owner has been unlawfully deprived, has acquired it in
good faith at a public sale, the owner cannot obtain its return without reimbursing the price paid
therefor.”
It appears that “one who has lost any movable or has been unlawfully deprived thereof, may recover it
from the person in possession of the same” and the only defense the latter may have is if he “has acquired
it in good faith at a public sale” in which case “the owner cannot obtain its return without reimbursing the
price paid therefor.” And supplementing this provision, Article 1505 of the same Code provides that
“where goods are sold by a person who is not the owner thereof, and who does not sell them under
authority or with the consent of the owner, the buyer acquires no better title to the goods than the seller
had, unless the owner of the goods is by his conduct precluded from denying the seller’s authority to sell.”
Applying the above legal provisions to the facts of this case, one is inevitably led to the conclusion
that Plaintiff has a better right to the car in question than Defendant Bulahan for it cannot be disputed
that Plaintiff had been illegally deprived thereof because of the ingenious scheme utilized by Belizo to
enable him to dispose of it as if he were the owner thereof. Plaintiff therefore can still recover the
possession of the car even if Defendant Bulahan had acted in good faith in purchasing it from Belizo. Nor
can it be pretended that the conduct of Plaintiff in giving Belizo a letter to secure the issuance of a new
certificate of registration constitutes a sufficient defense that would preclude recovery because of the
undisputed fact that letter was falsified and this fact can be clearly seen by a cursory examination of the
document. If Bulahan had been more diligent he could have seen that the pertinent portion of the letter
had been erased which would have placed him on guard to make an inquiry as regards the authority of
Belizo to sell the car. This he failed to do.
The right of the Plaintiff to the car in question can also be justified under the doctrine laid down in U. S.
vs. Sotelo, 28 Phil., 147. This is a case of estafa wherein one Sotelo misappropriated a ring belonging to
Alejandra Dormir. In the course of the decision, the Court said that “Whoever may have been deprived of
his property in consequence of a crime is entitled to the recovery thereof, even if such property is in the
possession of a third party who acquired it by legal means other than those expressly stated in Article 464
of the Civil Code” (p. 147), which refers to property pledged in the “Monte de Piedad”, an establishment
organized under the authority of the Government. The Court further said: It is a fundamental principle
chanroble svirtuallawlibrary
of our law of personal property that no man can be divested of it without his own consent; chan
consequently, even an honest purchaser, under a defective title, cannot resist the claim of the true
roblesvirtualawlibrary
owner. The maxim that ‘No man can transfer to another a better title than he has himself “obtain in the
civil as well as in the common law.” (p. 158)
Counsel for Appellee places much reliance on the common law principle that “Where one of two innocent
parties must suffer by a fraud perpetrated by another, the law imposes the loss upon the party who, by
his misplaced confidence, has enabled the fraud to be committed” (Sager vs. W. T. Rawleight Co. 153 Va.
514, 150 S. E. 244, 66 A.L.R. 305), and contends that, as between Plaintiffand Bulahan, the former should
hear the loss because of the confidence he reposed in Belizo which enabled the latter to commit the
falsification. But this principle cannot be applied to this case which is covered by an express provision of
our new Civil Code. Between a common law principle and a statutory provision, the latter must
undoubtedly prevail in this jurisdiction. Moreover, we entertain serious doubt if, under the circumstances
obtaining, Bulahan may be considered more innocent than the Plaintiff in dealing with the car in question.
We prefer not to elaborate on this matter it being unnecessary considering the conclusion we have
reached.
Wherefore, the decision appealed from is reversed. The Court declares Plaintiff to be entitled to recover
the car in question, and orders Defendant Jesusito Belizo to pay him the sum of P5,000 as moral damages,
plus P2,000 as attorney’s fees. The Court absolves Defendants Bulahan and Pahati from the complaint as
regards the claim for damages, reserving to Bulahan whatever action he may deem proper to take against
Jesusito Belizo. No costs.
53
Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor; chan roblesvirt ualawli brary Jugo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J. B. L. and
Endencia, JJ., concur.
Reyes, A., J., concurs in the result.
54

Property Possession

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Property Possession

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 182449 : March 6, 2013

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. MARTIN T. NG, Respondent.

The antecedent facts are as follows:3.

RULING OF THE COURT

Q: Do you know a certain Nemesio Tibon?

Q: Why do you know him?

A: Because he was my close neighbor.

Q: In relation to Lot 9663 one of the subject lots, who is he?

A: He was the original owner of Lot No. 9663.

Q: Where is Nemesio Tibon now?

Q: Do you know a certain Diego Balaba?

Q: Why do you know him?

A: We were very close neighbors before.

A: He was the original owner of Lot No. 9666.

Q: Where is Diego Balaba now?

Q: How did you know about this fact?

Q: Why do you know him?

A: He was my neighbor and a very close friend of mine.

A: He was the original owner of Lot No. 9668.

Q: Where is Liberato Alivio now?

A: It was owned and possessed by his wife, Cipriana Herbieto.

Q: From Cipriana Herbieto, where did Lot No. 9668 go?

Q: Why do you know all these facts?

Q: Do you know a certain Julian Capadiso?

Q: Why do you know him?

A: He was my neighbor and a very close friend.

Q: Where is Julian Capadiso now?

A: He was the original owner of Lot No. 9690.

Q: Why do you know all about these facts?

Q: Why do you know him?

Q: Where is Saturnino Capadiso now?

A: He was the original owner of Lot No.9691.

Atty. Seno: cralawlib rary

That is all for the witness your Honor.

xxx ???ñ r?bl ?š ??r†??l l ?? l?b r?rÿ

G.R. No. L-42859 March 17, 1938

GABRIEL LASAM, applicant-appellee, vs. THE DIRECTOR OF

Acting Solicitor-General Melencio and B. Pobre for appellants.

LAUREL, J.: chanrobles vi rtua l law lib ra ry

The Director of Lands opposed the application on the ground that it

After a protracted hearing, the lower court rejected and the

On September 10, 1934, counsel for various oppositors, after

The Narag brothers and the Directors of Forestry appear to have

Exhibit L purports to be an application dated June 27, 1873

The land designated as the fifth parcel is described in Exhibit L as

5.� Un terreno o pasto de ganados vacunos llamado Marguirig o

Parcel No. 9, the registration of which is applied for in these

Por el oeste barrios de Maguirig, Cagguban y estero Pangul.

We are of the opinion that the court below committed no error in

An applicant for registration of land, if he relies on a document

The property appears to have been declared for taxation purposes

It is not necessary to pass upon the contention of the Solicitor-

Having arrived at this conclusion as to Exhibit L, is the applicant

Our attention is next directed to the decision of this court

The grounds for opposition of the various oppositors are divergent

In view of the foregoing, the judgement of the lower court is

Avance�a, C.J., Villa-Real, Abad Santos, Imperial, Diaz and

G.R. No. L-13298 November 19, 1918

CORNELIO RAMOS, Petitioner-Appellant, vs. THE DIRECTOR OF

Basilio Aromin for appellant.

This is an appeal by the applicant and appellant from a judgment of

One Restituto Romero y Ponce apparently gained possession of a