CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY

LAWYER’S DUTIES TO SOCIETY

CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
INTRODUCTION

BANOGAN V. ZERNA

Facts:
The original decision in this case was rendered by the cadastral court way back on February 9, 1926, sixty
one years ago. A motion to amend that decision was filed on March 6, 1957, thirty one years later. This was followed
by an amended petition for review of the judgment on March 18, 1957, and an opposition thereto on March 26, 1957.
On October 11, 1971, or after fourteen years, a motion to dismiss the petition was filed. The petition was dismissed
on December 8, 1971, and the motion for reconsideration was denied on February 14, 1972. The petitioners then
came to us on certiorari to question the orders of the respondent judge. The respondent court dismissed the petition
for review of the decision rendered in 1926 on the ground that it had been filed out of time, indeed thirty one years too
late. Laches, it was held, had operated against the petitioners.
The petitioners contend that the said judgment had not yet become final and executory because the land in
dispute had not yet been registered in favor of the private respondents. The said judgment would become so only
“after one year from the issuance of the decree of registration.” If anyone was guilty of laches, it was the private
respondents who had failed to enforce the judgment by having the land registered in their the pursuant thereto.
For their part, the private respondents argue that the decision of February 9, 1926, became final and
executory after 30 days, same not having been appealed by the petitioners during that period. They slept on their
rights for thirty one years before it occurred to them to question the judgment of the cadastral court.
It is shown that it is against their contentions and that under this doctrine they should not have delayed in
asserting their claim of fraud. Their delay was not only for thirty one days but for thirty one years. Laches bars their
petition now. Their position is clearly contrary to law and logic and to even ordinary common sense.

Issue:
W/N petitioners are already barred by laches.

Held:
YES. This Court has repeatedly reminded litigants and lawyers alike that litigation must end and terminate
sometime and somewhere, and it is assent essential to an effective and efficient administration of justice that, once a
judgment has become final, the winning party be not, through a mere subterfuge, deprived of the fruits of the verdict.
Courts must therefore guard against any scheme calculated to bring about that result. Constituted as they are to put
an end to controversies, courts should frown upon any attempt to prolong them. There should be a greater
awareness on the part of litigants that the time of the judiciary, much more so of this Court, is too valuable to be
wasted or frittered away by efforts, far from commendable, to evade the operation of a decision final and executory,
especially so, where, as shown in this case, the clear and manifest absence of any right calling for vindication, is
quite obvious and indisputable.
One reason why there is a degree of public distrust for lawyers is the way some of them misinterpret the law
to the point of distortion in a cunning effort to achieve their purposes. By doing so, they frustrate the ends of justice
and at the same time lessen popular faith in the legal profession as the sworn upholders of the law. While this is not
to say that every wrong interpretation of the law is to be condemned, as indeed most of them are only honest errors,
this Court must express its disapproval of the adroit and intentional misreading designed precisely to circumvent or
violate it. As officers of the court, lawyers have a responsibility to assist in the proper administration of justice. They
do not discharge this duty by filing pointless petitions that only add to the workload of the judiciary, especially this
Court, which is burdened enough as it is. A judicious study of the facts and the law should advise them when a case,
such as this, should not be permitted to be filed to merely clutter the already congested judicial dockets. They do not
advance the cause of law or their clients by commencing litigations that for sheer lack of merit do not deserve the
attention of the courts.

LEDESMA V. CLIMACO

Facts:
Atty. Ledesma was the counsel de parte for one of the cases pending before the sala of Judge Climaco. He
filed a motion to withdraw from the case but the judge denied the motion and instead appointed him counsel de oficio
for two more cases. Atty. Ledesma filed another motion to withdraw because he was appointed as election registrar,
which was still denied.

Issue:
Should his motion to withdraw as counsel prosper?

Held:
No. The respondent judge’s denial was proper. It was observed that there is no real conflict between his
duties as election registrar and counsel de oficio. The appointment of a lawyer as counsel de oficio is a privilege
which veteran lawyers in fact, readily welcome as an opportunity to render their services for free. In the same way, all
lawyers should treat it that way as an opportunity to prove to the community that the proper performance of his
profession is not contingent upon the payment of his fees.

CANON 1.UPHOLDING THE CONSTITUTION AND THE LAW

7 - Roberto Soriano v. Atty. Manuel Dizon (2006) (disbarment; frustrated homicide)
Doctrine:
 The purpose for a proceeding of disbarment is to protect the administration of justice by requiring
that those who exercise this important function to be competent, honorable and reliable —
lawyers in whom courts and clients may repose confidence.
Facts:
Complainant was a taxi driver who overtook the accused”s car on his way home after gassing up.
Accused was drunk at that time and tailed the taxi until it rounded by the Chugum and Carino streets. The
accused stopped his car and berated Soriano. There resulted an altercation, but Soriano merely tried to
stop Dizon from attacking him, because he was the older guy and he smelled of liquor. Dizon dropped his
eyeglasses, and Soriano picked them up. However, when Soriano attempted to return the eyeglasses,
Dizon had gotten a gun and wrapped its handle with a handkerchief and fired a shot at Soriano. The bullet
got Soriano”s carotid artery, but he survived due to prompt medical treatment. Dizon was convicted of
frustrated homicide and applied for probation, which was granted. However, he obstinately refused to
satisfy civil liabilities with Soriano. He also tried to settle with Soriano”s family with the vice mayor”s
help, but that got nowhere. He also fabricated stories that Soriano with two others beat him up. Also, he
was found to be in possession of an unlicensed firearm.
Issues:
W/N Manuel Dizon’s disbarment was proper.
Held/Ratio: YES. Accused displayed dishonestly and moral turpitude by his behavior. Among
others, the following facts prove that he lacks good moral character:
He was under the influence of liquor while driving his car;
He reacted violently and attempted to assault Complainant only because the latter, driving a taxi, had
overtaken him;
Complainant having been able to ward off his attempted assault, Respondent went back to his car, got
a gun, wrapped the same with a handkerchief and shot Complainant, who was unarmed;
When Complainant fell on him, Respondent simply pushed him out and fled;
Despite positive identification and overwhelming evidence, Respondent denied that he had shot
Complainant;
Apart from his denial, Respondent also lied when he claimed that he was the one mauled by
Complainant and two unidentified persons; and,
 Although he has been placed on probation, Respondent has, to date, not yet satisfied his civil
liabilities to Complainant.
Under Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, conviction for a crime involving moral
turpitude is a ground for disbarment or suspension. By such conviction, a lawyer is deemed to
have become unfit to uphold the administration of justice and to be no longer possessed of good
moral character.
STEMMERIK V. MAS

FACTS:
Stemmerik, a Danish citizen, wanted to buy Philippine property due to its beauty. He consulted Atty Mas
about his intention, to which the latter advised him that he could legally buy such properties. Atty Mas even
suggested a big piece of property that he can buy, assuring that it is alienable. Because of this, Stemmerik entrusted
all of the necessary requirements and made Atty Mas his attorney in fact as he went back to Denmark. After some
time, Atty Mas informed Stemmerik that he found the owner of the big piece of property and stated the price of the
property is P3.8M. Stemmerik agreed, giving Atty Mas the money, and the latter supposedly drawing up the
necessary paperwork.
When Stemmerik asked when he could have the property registered in his name, Atty Mas can’t be found.
He returned to the Philippines, employed another lawyer, and to his horror, was informed that aliens couldn’t own
Philippine Lands and that the property was also inalienable. Stemmerik the filed a DISBARMENT case against Atty
MAS in the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the IBP. The CBD ruled that Atty Mas abused the trust and
confidence of Stemmerik and recommended that he be disbarred. The IBP Board of Governors adopted such
recommendations.

ISSUE/S:
W/N Atty Mas can be disbarred.

HELD:
YES! Disbarred.

RATIO:
Disobeyed the Laws and the Constitutional Prohibition
Section 7, Article XII of the Constitution prohibits foreigners from buying Philippine Lands. Respondent, in
giving advice that directly contradicted a fundamental constitutional policy, showed disrespect for the Constitution and
gross ignorance of basic law. Worse, he prepared spurious documents that he knew were void and illegal.

Deceitful Conduct
By advising complainant that a foreigner could legally and validly acquire real estate in the Philippines and
by assuring complainant that the property was alienable, respondent deliberately deceived his client. He did not give
due regard to the trust and confidence reposed in him by complainant.

Illegal Conduct
By pocketing and misappropriating the P3.8 million given by complainant for the purchase of the property,
respondent committed a fraudulent act that was criminal in nature.

DE YSASI III V. NLRC

Facts:
Petitioner was employed by his father, herein private respondent, as farm administrator of Hacienda
Manucao in Hinigaran, Negros Occidental sometime in April, 1980. As farm administrator, petitioner was responsible
for the supervision of daily activities and operations of the sugarcane farm and attending to such other tasks as may
be assigned to him by private respondent. For this purpose, he lived on the farm, occupying the upper floor of the
house there.
Following his marriage on June 6, 1982, petitioner moved to Bacolod City with his wife and commuted to
work daily. He suffered various ailments and was hospitalized on two separate occasions in June and August, 1982.
In November, 1982, he underwent fistulectomy, or the surgical removal of the fistula, a deep sinuous ulcer. His
recuperation lasted over four months. In June, 1983, he was confined for acute gastroenteritis and, thereafter, for
infectious hepatitis from December, 1983 to January, 1984.
During the entire periods of petitioner's illnesses, private respondent took care of his medical expenses and
petitioner continued to receive compensation. However, in April, 1984, without due notice, private respondent ceased
to pay the latter's salary. Petitioner made oral and written demands for an explanation for the sudden withholding of
his salary. Both demands, however, were not acted upon.

Issues:
(1) whether or not the petitioner was illegally dismissed; (2) whether or not he is entitled to reinstatement,
payment of back wages, thirteenth month pay and other benefits; and (3) whether or not he is entitled to payment of
moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees because of illegal dismissal.

Held:

The decision of NLRC is set aside. Private respondent is ORDERED to pay petitioner back wages for a
period not exceeding three (3) years, without qualification or deduction, and, in lieu of reinstatement, separation pay
equivalent to one (1) month for every year of service, a fraction of six (6) months being considered as one (1) whole
year.
Rule 1.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility explicitly provides that "(a) lawyer shall encourage his
client to avoid, end or settle the controversy if it will admit of a fair settlement."
Counsels must be reminded that their ethical duty as lawyers to represent their clients with zeal goes beyond
merely presenting their clients' respective causes in court. It is just as much their responsibility, if not more
importantly, to exert all reasonable efforts to smooth over legal conflicts, preferably out of court and especially in
consideration of the direct and immediate consanguineous ties between their clients. The useful function of a lawyer
is not only to conduct litigation but to avoid it whenever possible by advising settlement or withholding suit. He should
be a mediator for concord and a conciliator for compromise, rather than a virtuoso of technicality in the conduct of
litigation.
Both counsels herein fell short of what was expected of them, despite their avowed duties as officers of the
court. The records do not show that they took pains to initiate steps geared toward effecting a rapprochement
between their clients. On the contrary, their acerbic and protracted exchanges could not but have exacerbated the
situation even as they may have found favor in the equally hostile eyes of their respective clients.
In the same manner, we find that the labor arbiter who handled this regrettable case has been less than
faithful to the letter and spirit of the Labor Code mandating that a labor arbiter "shall exert all efforts towards the
amicable settlement of a labor dispute within his jurisdiction." If he ever did so, or at least entertained the thought, the
copious records of the proceedings in this controversy are barren of any reflection of the same.

CORDON V. BALICANTA

FACTS:
Cordon, along with her daughter, inherited some properties from her husband with the help of Atty Balicanta.
Subsequently, Atty Balicanta enticed them to form a corporation to develop the real properties inherited. Such corp.
was formed, and the properties were registered in the corp.’s name. Atty Balicanta was the one who single-handedly
ran the corp.’s affairs, by being it’s Chairman, President, General Manager, and treasurer. By being such officers, he
made a number of acts: 1) made Cordon sign a voting trust agreement; 2) made Cordon sign a SPA to sell/mortgage
properties; 3) transferred title of some of the properties to other people. And by using spurious Board resolutions, Atty
Balicanta also made the following acts: 1) obtained a loan from Land Bank using the properties as collateral; 2) Sold
the Corp’s right to redeem the properties to another person; 3) demolished the ancestral home of the Cordon’s and
sold the lot to another person. In all of these, Atty Balicanta did not account for the proceeds coming the sales and
dispositions.
The Cordons made several demands for Atty Balicanta to give back the properties and to account the
proceeds of the loan. When such demands were unheeded, The Cordons terminated Balicanta’s services and filed a
complaint for disbarment against the latter in the IBP. The Commissioner, in its report, recommended for Balicanta’s
disbarment as well. The IBP Board of Governors resolved that Balicanta be suspended for 5 years for such conduct.

ISSUE/S:
W/N Balicanta be disbarred1.

HELD: YES! Disbarred.

RATIO:
Deceitful Conduct
The fraudulent acts he carried out against his client followed a well thought of plan to misappropriate the
corporate properties and funds entrusted to him. He started his devious scheme by making himself the President,

1
By virtue of Section 12(b), Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, this resolution is automatically elevated to the SC for
final action.
Chairman of the Board, Director and Treasurer of the corporation, although he knew he was prohibited from
assuming the position of President and Treasurer at the same time. He also entered into dishonest transactions
under the cloak of sham resolutions. His misdemeanors reveal a deceitful scheme to use the corporation as a means
to convert for his own personal benefit properties left to him in trust by complainant and her daughter.

Side Doctrine:
Good moral character is more than just the absence of bad character. Such character expresses itself in the
will to do the unpleasant thing if it is right and the resolve not to do the pleasant thing if it is wrong. This must be so
because “vast interests are committed to his care; he is the recipient of unbounded trust and confidence; he deals
with his client’s property, reputation, his life, his all.”

IN RE GALANG

Doctrine:
That the concealment of an attorney in his application to take the Bar examinations of the fact that he had
been with, or indicted for an alleged crime, as a ground for revocation of his license to practice law, is well settled.